European Union and world order:
an english school approach

União Europeia e a ordem mundial:
uma abordagem da Escola Inglesa

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Abstract

The concepts of ‘international system’, ‘international society’, and ‘world society’ are central to the English School’s approach to international relations. One of the major areas of inquiry within the English School has been the relationship between ‘international’ and ‘world society’. The paper discusses whether the creation of an ‘international society’ is a prerequisite for the establishment of a ‘world society’ or vice versa. It is argued that the European Union (EU) constitutes a ‘thick’ regional international society, which also includes significant elements of ‘world society’. EU’s enlargement, neighbourhood, and development policies help to extend the elements of ‘world society’ beyond the boundaries of the EU thereby contributing to the creation of a world order based on European values and norms.

Keywords: English School Approach; International Relations; EU

Resumo

Os conceitos de “sistema internacional”, “sociedade internacional”, e “sociedade mundial” são centrais para a abordagem da Escola de Inglesa para as relações internacionais. Uma das principais áreas de investigação dentro da Escola Inglesa tem sido a relação entre a sociedade “internacional” e “mundial”. O artigo discute se a criação de uma “sociedade internacional” é um pré-requisito para o estabelecimento de uma “sociedade mundial” ou vice-versa. Argumenta-se que a União Europeia (UE) constitui uma sociedade regional internacional ‘densa’, que também inclui elementos significativos da “sociedade mundial”. As políticas de alargamento, vizinhança, e de desenvolvimento da UE ajudam a extender os elementos da “sociedade mundial” para além das fronteiras da UE, contribuindo assim para a criação de uma ordem mundial baseada em valores e normas europeus.

Palavras-chave: Abordagem Escola de Inglesa; Relações Internacionais; EU
Introduction

The concepts of ‘international system’, ‘international society’, and ‘world society’ are central to the English School’s approach to international relations. One of the major areas of inquiry within the English School (ES) has been the relationship between ‘international society’ and ‘world society’ and ES scholars have sought to investigate whether the creation of an ‘international society’ is a prerequisite for the establishment of a ‘world society’ or vice versa. ES scholars have convincingly argued that the EU constitutes a regional international society, which is embedded within a much broader European international system that includes countries in Europe’s periphery (DIEZ; WHITMAN, 2002).

However, what has not been discussed extensively is to what extent EU’s policies help to extend the elements of ‘world society’ beyond the boundaries of the European Union. Therefore, the purpose of this paper is to investigate how the EU policies contribute to the creation of a ‘world society’ or world order that extends beyond the EU’s borders. In doing so, the paper is divided into six parts. The first section provides the theoretical framework of the paper and discusses the question of order from the perspective of the English School. The second section identifies the values and norms that constitute the basis of the EU world society and which the EU seeks to transmit globally. The third section focuses on the idea and policy of EU ‘conditionality’, while the remaining sections focus on the application of the conditionality policy to three different groups of states: states that are candidate for EU membership, states that are members of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), and states that are recipients of EU development assistance.

A note of caution: the paper does not seek to provide an evaluation of whether the transmission of world society elements is a ‘good’ or ‘bad’ thing. It only aims at investigating the relationship between an ‘international’ and a ‘world society’ and how regional and world orders are created and maintained in reference to the European Union.

The English School and the Question of Order

Central to the English School (ES) approach to the study of international relations is the inquiry into the nature of order in world politics (BULL, 1977, p. xv). According to Martin Wight (1991), there are three traditions of international thought about how order is maintained in international politics: the Hobbesian or realist, the Grotian or internationalist, and the Kantian or universalist tradition. The Hobbesian tradition views international politics as a state of affairs where each state is free to pursue its goals in relation to other states without any moral or legal restrictions. The only principles that may limit the behaviour of states are related to prudence and expediency. Consequently, agreements among states may be kept or breached depending on the interests of the states involved. The Grotian tradition views international politics as taking place within an international society. This implies that states are limited in their conflicts with one another by common rules, principles, and institutions. In other words,
states in international society are bound by imperatives of morality and law. The Kantian tradition sees in international politics a potential community of humankind. It takes the essential nature of international politics to lie in the transnational bonds that link the individual human beings.

The international/world order relationship

While the Hobbesian and Grotian traditions are associated with the idea of international order (order among states), the Kantian tradition is associated with the idea of world order which refers to ”[…] those patterns or dispositions of human activity that sustain the elementary or primary goals of social life among mankind as a whole” (BULL, 1977, p.19). According to Hedley Bull, world order entails something different from international order as order among humankind as a whole is something wider than order among states; ”something more fundamental and primordial than it; […] something morally prior to it” (BULL, 1977, p. 21). World order is more fundamental and primordial than international order because the ultimate units of the society of humankind are not states or nations, tribes or social classes but individual human beings, which are “permanent and indestructible in a sense in which groupings of them of this or that sort are not” (BULL, 1977, p. 21). In other words, the question of world order arises no matter what the political or social structure of the globe might be. World order is morally prior to international order in the sense that if any value is attached to order in world politics, it is order among all humankind, which one must treat as being the primary value. If international order has a value, this is because it is ”instrumental to the goal of order in human society as a whole” (BULL, 1977, p. 21). 

Discussion within the ES has shown first that ‘world order’ does not necessarily equal ‘global order’ as the former concept refers to patterns of human activity that may take place only within a particular world region. Second, world order may pre-exist but also assist the creation of international order (order among states). This implies that world order may take a form that is different than international order. Third, world order may also come into existence as a result of workings associated with international order that strengthen social and political elements associated with world order. This also means that international and world order may exist simultaneously. Last, but not least, as it will be shown later in this paper, because of the uneven development of international relations a global international order may exist but within which one may identify regional world orders, like in the case of the European Union.

The international system/society relationship

In the ES literature, the Hobbesian and Grotian traditions are reflected in the concepts of ‘international system’ and ‘international society’ respectively, while the Kantian tradition is reflected in the concept of ‘world society.’ Bull (1977, p. 9–10) defined the international system as being formed ”when two or more states have sufficient contact between them, and have sufficient impact on one another’s decisions to cause
them to behave as parts of a whole.” An international society, on the other hand, exists

when a group of states, conscious of certain common interests and common values, form a society in the sense that they conceive themselves to be bound by a common set of rules in their relations with one another, and share in the working of common institutions (BULL, 1977, p. 13).

Later, Hedley Bull and Adam Watson (1984, p. 1) redefined international society as

a group of states [...] which not merely form a system, in the sense that the behavior of each is necessary factor in the calculations of the others, but also have established by dialogue and consent common rules and institutions for the conduct of their relations, and recognize their common interest in maintaining these arrangements.

At first sight, the two definitions of international society appear to be similar, but not only are they not similar, but they in fact correspond to two different historical forms of international society (STIVACHTIS, 1998, p. 15). Barry Buzan has used the terms gemeinschaft and gessellschaft to describe these two historical forms (BUZAN, 1993).

From the definitions stated above it becomes obvious that an international society presupposes an international system. This is because for an international society to exist two or more states need to be in contact with each other. It is this interaction that helps states to become conscious of certain common interests and values, work toward the creation of common rules, and share in the working of common institutions. Moreover, the concepts of ‘international system’ and ‘international society’ are associated with international order since they reflect and emphasize interaction among states.

As Bull’s distinction came under closer examination, it ran into criticism. The debate surrounding the validity of Bull’s distinction resulted in the acceptance that the international system is just a weak form of international society (STIVACHTIS, 1998). In other words, the idea and concept of the ‘international system’ equals that of a weak/thin ‘international society’ and the real distinction is between a weak/thin form of an international society (which can also be called international system) and a strong/thick one.

Applying the international system and international society definitions, it can be argued that the EU certainly constitutes a regional international system in the sense that EU Member States have sufficient contact between them, and have sufficient impact on one another’s decisions to cause them to behave as parts of a whole. But it can also be argued that the EU constitutes a regional international society too in the sense that the systemic interaction among EU Member States have made them conscious of certain common interests and common values and led them to establish by dialogue and consent common rules and institutions for the conduct of their relations, and recognize their common interest in maintaining these arrangements. However, as the system/society debate has demonstrated, even within an international system a minimum set of norms and rules exist to guide the behavior of member states and that’s why this system can also be viewed as a weak/thin form of inter-
national society. Consequently, one could argue that the EU has historically evolved out of the ‘thin’, *gesellschaft* type of European international society existing in the aftermath of the WWII, that was also a European international system, and which was gradually transformed to the ‘thick’, *gemeinschaft* type of regional international society of today.

The international/world society relationship

But what about the relationship between an ‘international society’ and a ‘world society’? Here there is a division within the English School. According to the Kantian view, there are moral imperatives limiting the actions of states but these imperatives are not associated with state co-existence and cooperation, as the Grotian tradition suggests, but rather with the “overthrow of the state-system and its replacement by a cosmopolitan society” (BULL, 1977, p. 25). While for Bull the creation of a Kantian type of world order presupposes the “overthrow of the state-system and its replacement by a cosmopolitan society” (BULL, 1977, p. 25), for other ES scholars ‘world society’ takes individuals, non-state organizations and ultimately the global population as a whole as the focus of global societal identities and arrangements, and puts transcendence of the states-system at the center of IR theory. Since the idea of ‘world society’ is associated with the concept of ‘world order’, the question is whether the establishment of world order undermines the function and existence of international order. Or to put it differently, does a world society undermine the existence of an international society?

More recently, Barry Buzan (2004) conceptualized ‘world society’ by introducing the idea of three domains or types of unit (interstate, interhuman, and transnational society). In Buzan’s work, the concept of ‘interstate society’ is synonym to the term ‘international society’. The concept of ‘transnational society’ refers to social structures composed of non-state collective actors, while the concept of ‘interhuman society’ refers to social structures based on interactions among individual human beings mainly manifested as large-scale patterns of shared identities. Buzan has used the term ‘world society’ to label situations in which no one of the three domains or types of unit (interstate, interhuman, and transnational society) is dominant over the other two, but all in play together. Therefore, ‘transcendence’ does not imply ‘overthrowing’. This is a fundamental difference between Bull’s understanding of the term ‘world society’ and Buzan’s conceptualization in the sense that the former presupposes the overthrowing of the of the states-system, while in the latter a world society not only may work in parallel with an international society but they may even strengthen each other.

As a result, a consensus has been reached within the ES according to which a Kantian type of world order may reflect a particular type of international society with a relatively high degree of shared norms, rules and institutions among states. This type of international society is associated with the concept of ‘solidarism’, which is used as a synonym for cosmopolitanism. According to Buzan, solidarism defines international societies with a relatively high degree of shared norms, rules and institutions among
states, "where the focus is not only on ordering existence and competition, but also on cooperation over a wider range of issues, whether in pursuit of joint gains (like in the case of trade) or realization of shared values (as in the case of human rights) (BUZAN, 2004, p. xviii). The concept of ‘solidarism’ stands in distinction to the concept of ‘pluralism’ that defines international societies with a low degree of shared norms, rules and institutions among states, "where the focus of society is creating a framework for orderly co-existence and competition, or possibly also the management of collective problems of common fate," such as arms control and environment (BUZAN, 2004, p. xvii). In other words, a very thick type of international society may, in fact, reflect a world society.

Examining the establishment and development of the historical European international society, ES scholars have demonstrated that the Latin Christendom was a ‘world society’ that facilitated the establishment of the European international society of states (BULL, 1977; BULL; Watson, 1984; Watson, 1992; BUZAN; LITTLE, 2000). In other words, historically speaking, medieval Europe constituted a ‘world society’ that pre-existed and assisted the creation of a European international society (STIVACHTIS, 1998, p. 67-71). But what about the European Union? Is it possible the evolution and deepening of a regional international society to lead to the establishment of a regional world society?

According to ES literature, international societies and world societies may exist both at a regional/sub-global and global levels. Given the definitions of international system and international society, it has been demonstrated that the EU not only constitutes a homogeneous regional international society, which is embedded within a global heterogeneous international society (MORGAN, 1999; AYOOB, 1999; DIEZ; WHITMAN, 2002; STIVACHTIS; WEBBER, 2011). But does the EU also constitute a regional world society? Since the EU Member States adhere to the same international treaties and the norms and values associated with them and since the EU law determines the relations not only among the members states of the Union but also those of their citizens, it can safely be argued that the EU constitutes a ‘thick’, solidarist type of international society, which is equivalent to a regional world society. In the case of the EU, one may argue that an EU world society not only works in parallel with an EU international society but also that the evolution of the latter has brought the former into existence and that currently their simultaneous operation help to strengthen each others’ elements. In other words, due to the significant degree of its ‘thickness’, the EU currently constitutes both a regional international society and a regional world society.

If world order is morally prior to international order, then two fundamental questions arise: first, what are the primary values associated with this order in a multicultural world; and second, how does a regional international society, which is also a world society, like the EU, transmit its norms and values to the broader international society in which it is embedded thereby transforming it gradually into a world society? Studying the expansion of the historical European international society and its gradual transformation into the global international society of today, one can argue that in an anarchic international system the power dif-
differentiation among the units (states) allow the stronger ones to impose their norms and values upon those in need. In other words, the pressures of international anarchy and the need of certain states to maintain close relations with strong states or international organizations in order to achieve their national goals and objectives enables the latter to define certain expectations and impose certain standards of behaviour on the former. Thus the need of states to gain membership of the EU or maintain close contacts with it in order to receive development assistance allows the EU to demand and impose certain standards of behaviour upon them. But what are the norms and values associated with this behaviour? The answer to this question requires one to focus on the identification of the values and norms that constitute the basis of the EU international/world society.

Norms and Values of the EU International/World Society

The broad normative basis of the EU has been developed over the past fifty-five or so years through a series of declarations, treaties, policies, criteria and conditions. According to Ian Manners (2002), the five ‘core’ norms within the vast body of Union laws and policies, which comprise the *acquis communautaire* and *acquis politique*, include democracy, the rule of law, and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, all of which are expressed in the preamble and founding principles of the TEU, the development co-operation policy of the Community (TEC art. 177), the common foreign and security provisions of the Union (TEC art. 11), and the membership criteria adopted at the Copenhagen European Council in 1993. Among the four additional norms that Manners suggests, one can find ‘good governance’, which is implicit in the Copenhagen criteria but is also found in Romano Prodi’s inaugural speech to the European Parliament (PRODI, 2000), as well as Commission papers on ‘EU election assistance and observation’ and the ‘White Paper on European Governance’ (MANNERS, 2002, p. 242).

The principles of democracy, rule of law, social justice and respect for human rights were first made explicit in the 1973 Copenhagen Declaration on European Identity, although the centrality of many of these norms was only constitutionalized in the TEU. The EU has placed its norms and principles at the centre of its relations with the rest of the world (CLAPHAM, 1999; SMITH, 2001). For example, the EU has made its external relations informed by, and conditional on, a catalogue of norms, which come closer to those of the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR) and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR). As Manners points out, the EU is founded on and has as its foreign and development policy objectives the consolidation of democracy, rule of law, and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms (TEU, art. 6, art. 11, and TEC, art. 177). Furthermore it is committed to pursuing these norms in accordance with the ECHR (TEU, art. 6) and ‘the principles of the United Nations Charter’ (TEU, art. 11, preamble to TEC). Lisbon Treaty’s constitutional norms, such as democracy, rule of law, social justice and respect for human
rights, represent crucial constitutive factors determining the EU’s international identity.

In 2003, the European Security Strategy (ESS) identified bad governance - reflected in corruption, abuse of power, weak or collapsed institutions and lack of accountability - and civil conflict lead to state failure as a key threat to the EU’s security (ESS, 2003, p. 4). Therefore, spreading good governance, supporting social and political reform, dealing with corruption and abuse of power, establishing the rule of law and protecting human rights have been viewed by the EU as the best means for increasing European security. What is fundamental, however, is the identification and highlighting of the democracy-peace nexus in the European Security Strategy according to which,

> The quality of international society depends on the quality of the governments that are its foundation. The best protection for our security is a world of well-governed democratic states. Spreading good governance, supporting social and political reform, dealing with corruption and abuse of power, establishing the rule of law and protecting human rights are the best means of strengthening the international order... As the world’s largest provider of official assistance and its largest trading entity, the European Union and its Member States are well placed to pursue these goals (ESS, 2003, p. 10).

But how does the EU as a regional international/world society transmit its norms and values to the broader international society in which it is embedded thereby increasing not only its security but also transforming international order into world order?

EU trade and development policies have become powerful tools for promoting democratic reforms in third states. Contributing to better governance, conditionality and the assistance programs and targeted trade measures associated with it have become important features in EU’s external policy (ESS, 2003, p. 10). According to the ESS, for states that have placed themselves outside the bounds of international society, it is desirable that they rejoin the international community and that the EU should be ready to provide assistance. However, for those “who are unwilling to do so should understand that there is a price to be paid, including in their relationship with the European Union” (ESS, 2003, p. 10). Consequently, the next section will discuss the EU’s conditionality policy that constitutes the defining principle of the EU’s relations with the rest of the world.

EU Conditionality

The pressures of international anarchy and the need of certain states to maintain close relations with a regional international organization in order to achieve their national goals and objectives enable the EU to define certain expectations and impose certain standards of behavior on the former. Therefore, EU pressures aimed at altering attitudes and policies can be equally applicable to all states irrespective of whether or not they seek EU membership.

Among notions of international influences on democratization, ‘conditionality’ represents a deliberate effort to determine the process’s outcome through external pressure. This is achieved by specifying con-
ditions or even preconditions for support, involving either promise of material aid or political opportunities. A special version is ‘democratic conditionality’, which emphasizes respect for and the furtherance of democratic rules, procedures and values, which constitute the basis of the EU international/world society. While other international organizations make such conditionality demands, it is the EU, which, most of all, has elaborated an extensive policy of ‘democratic conditionality’. The latter has considerable leverage because the prize for compliance on the part of applicant states is full EU membership and on the part of countries that wish to establish close relations with the EU is often financial and development assistance.

Conditionality has been an essential feature of the EEC enlargement since the 1960s. The formulation of ‘political conditions’ has undergone considerable evolution over time expanded to include substantive democratic requirements. The real beginnings of ‘political conditionality’ thinking came in the early 1960s, when the issue of new membership was first under discussion although it did not actually take place until 1973. It was the European Parliament (EP) that took the initiative through its Political Committee to issue a report on the necessary political and institutional conditions for membership and association status of the EEC. The report stated clearly that “only states which guarantee on their territories truly democratic practices and respect for fundamental rights and freedoms can become members of the Community.” The report also warned that

states whose governments do not have democratic legitimization and whose people do not participate in government decisions, either directly or through fully elected representatives, cannot aspire to be admitted into the circle of nations which form the European Communities (PRIDHAM, 2005, p. 30).

Subsequent developments related to the relations between the EEC and the authoritarian states in Southern Europe (Greece, Spain, and Portugal) proved essential in assisting the definition of ‘political conditionality’. But it was the end of the Soviet Union, the collapse of communism in Eastern Europe, and the subsequent request of Eastern and Central European countries for EU membership that made ‘political conditionality’ a central feature of the EU enlargement (KLIEWER; STIVACHTIS, 2007, p. 146). The increasing role of the EU in world affairs also made ‘political conditionality’ a central feature of the EU’s external policy.

Specifically, the formulation of ‘political conditionality’ became a more central and proactive part of the overall enlargement process, influenced partly by concern over special problems relating to post-communist politics (PRIDHAM, 2002b, p. 205-6). Since the end of the Cold War in 1989, the EU (then EEC) has made assistance and institutional ties – first informally and later formally - conditional on the fulfillment of democratic and human rights standards. Generally, these conditions become more stringent as external countries seek to upgrade their institutional ties with and assistance by the European Union. In January 1989, the European Parliament demanded that “reference to human rights should figure” in the Trade and Cooperation Agreements the EEC was beginning to negotiate with the Central and Eastern European countries (CEECs)
and should be mentioned specifically in the negotiating mandates given to the Commission. In April 1989, the European Council made resumption of the negotiations with Romania conditional upon the country’s compliance with its human rights commitments in the CSCE framework. In November of the same year, the Paris European Summit established that “initiatives aimed at the countries of Eastern Europe as a whole are applicable only to those which re-establish freedom and democracy” (SCHIMMELFENNING; ENGERT; KNOBEL, 2006, p. 30). During his visit to Belgrade in May and June 1991, Jacques Santer, President of the Council, stated that Yugoslavia’s passage from the Cooperation agreement to association “hinges on political conditions such as […] progress in establishing democracy and respect for human rights and the rights of minorities” (SCHIMMELFENNING; ENGERT; KNOBEL, 2006, p. 30).

After the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the European Commission confirmed that “negotiating … new types of agreements has to be subject to political conditions.” In May 1992, the European Council underscored that “respect for democratic principles and human rights … as well as the principles of a market economy, constitute essential elements of cooperation and association agreements between the Community and its CSCE partners” (SCHIMMELFENNING; ENGERT; KNOBEL, 2006, p. 30). Henceforth, the EU added a clause to the agreements that stipulated a suspension of the agreements if partner countries failed to comply with these principles. In November of the same year, the European Council approved guidelines for PHARE, the EEC’s main program of assistance to the CEECs, which made aid conditional upon the “state of advance of the reforms in each of the beneficiary countries.” On this basis, Croatia and Serbia-Montenegro have long been denied PHARE aid. In July 1993, the new regulations of the aid program for the former Soviet republics (TACIS) strengthened conditionality too: “the level and intensity of the assistance will take into account the extent and progress of reform efforts in the beneficiary country” (SCHIMMELFENNING; ENGERT; KNOBEL, 2006, p. 30).

Finally, at its Copenhagen Summit in June 1993, the European Council established the “stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of minorities” as the sin qua non for accession to the European Union. The Copenhagen political conditions have been elaborated on in the European Commission’s (EC) Opinion of 1997 and from 1998 in the regular annual reports on candidate countries. The political conditions have been tied in with EU’s programs of financial assistance, the accession partnerships, and the whole pre-accession strategy (PAPADIMITRIOU; PHINNEMORE, 2004; KNILL; LENSCHOW, 2005). It is worth mentioning that additions have been made to the original criteria, notably in the inclusion of the fight against corruption, prompted by growing evidence of widespread corruption in most post-communist states.

Since the end of the Cold War, the protection of human rights and the attainment of good governance have been gradually becoming fundamental conditions in determining EU relations with its neighbors as well as the recipients of its development assistance. Therefore, ‘world society’
elements present in the EU are exported beyond the EU boundaries, at least in three different ways. First through the EU’s Enlargement Policy candidate states are obliged to adopt norms, rules and practices compatible with those of the European Union. Second, through the implementation of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) states in the EU’s periphery which wish to establish advantageous and good relations with the EU are encouraged to adopt norms and practices compatible with those of the European Union. Finally, states that wish to be partners of the EU’s Development Policy and recipients of EU’s aid are encouraged to adopt policies, norms and practices compatible with those of the European Union.

EU Conditionality and Candidate States

The pressures of international anarchy following the end of the Cold War, the collapse of the Soviet Union, and the dissolution of Yugoslavia pushed a number of states, such as those of Eastern and Southern Europe as well as those of the Former Soviet Union to seek membership of the EU in order to achieve their national goals and objectives. These pressures and needs have enabled the EU to define certain expectations and impose certain standards of behavior on those states thereby transmitting elements of the EU international/world society beyond the EU borders. But how does this process work and what mechanisms does the EU use to achieve its objectives?

Applicant states seeking admission into the EU hope to gain social, political, and economic benefits that are associated with being a member state. However, before the EU acknowledges an applicant state as a member, the applicant state’s behavior must be modified to fit within liberal norms. Conditionality of acceptance uses a reward system to entice applicant states to adopt EU norms. The European Commission relies upon five ‘levers’ of conditionality:

• access to negotiations and further stages in the accession process;
• provision of legislative and institutional templates;
• aid and technical assistance;
• policy advice and twinning projects;
• monitoring, demarches and public criticism (Grabbe, 2006, 261).

If the EU conditions are not met, the EU has three reinforcement strategies available for use: reinforcement by reward, reinforcement by punishment, and reinforcement by support (SCHIMMELFENNIG; SEDELMEIR, 2005a, p.108; 2005b). Reinforcement strategies use social power to award desired behaviour while discouraging undesirable behaviour. According to Frank Schimmelfenning, reinforcement strategies differ from persuasion in two fundamental ways: first, reinforcement polices are exercised in an asymmetrical power structure where incentives and disincentives are used to entice applicants to adopt desired norms; and second, reinforcement polices look to modify state behavior over time (SCHIMMELFENNIG; ENGERT; KNOBEL, 2003, p. 498).

The substance of the reinforcement strategies involves two components: material incentives and social reinforcement (SCHIMMELFEN-
Material incentives involve tangible rewards. These rewards include but are not limited to the following: financial assistance, market access, technology experience and participation in decision. The second substantive component is social reinforcement. Schimmelfenning suggests that ‘sociopsychological’ rewards, such as international recognition and public praise influence applicant states to adopt desired norms (SCHIMMELFENNING, 2005a, p. 109).

The EU’s potential for impacting democratization in candidate states varies between three broad stages: first, pre-negotiations (when the Copenhagen criteria have to be satisfied before negotiations commence); second, actual negotiations (when political conditions as updated are monitored regularly); and third, once membership begins when the EU’s direct leverage over new entrants begins to weaken, but at the same time the indirect effects of European integration in helping to consolidate democracy increase through the very intensification of networking that goes with membership (PRIDHAM, 2002a, p. 957). Although the deeper effects of integration are most likely through the embedding of new democracies within the EU itself, the most decisive stages when direct effects are most effective remain the pre-negotiation and accession negotiation ones. During the first phase, negotiations may be blocked by a country’s failure to satisfy the political conditions, while during the second phase, negotiations may be interrupted or terminated if a negotiating country reverses its fulfillment of the political conditions, or chooses seriously to violate anyone of them.

The procedure for dealing with the failure of candidate states to meet the prescribed ‘political conditions’ is slow. At the beginning, there would be advance warnings in the annual regular report, and the European Commission would then set up an official visit to the country concern at the highest level. There would follow a period allowing for suitable action by the government. Failure to take any measures would be recorded in the next annual report. Eventually, if no measures are taken, then the matter would go to the European Council which would be responsible for halting negotiations for membership (PRIDHAM, 2002a, p. 958). Thus political monitoring of applicant countries is almost continuous. This procedure reflects the EU view of democratization as a ‘rolling process’ and not as a state that is reached at a certain point of time.

Accession countries respond formally by making necessary institutional changes and passing relevant legislation. However, as the cases of Bulgaria and Romania (STIVACHITIS, 2007) as well as those of Eastern and Central European states (GRABBE, 2006; SCHIMMELFENNING; SELDENMEIR 2005b; SCHIMMELFENNING; ENGERT; KNOBEL 2003) have illustrated, their full satisfaction, including their implementation in practice, is not always easy to achieve due to financial, political and social constraints facing the candidate countries. But since joining the EU has been identified as a policy priority, national governments are obliged to adhere to the EU conditions even if this means loss of popularity. On the other hand, the case of Turkey demonstrates that when the EU loses its importance in the eyes of the candidate country either because of its inability to deal with some issues, such a the financial crisis, and/or when
the interests of the candidate country could be served better through other ways, the EU political conditions are difficult to be accepted and implemented. Moreover, these cases also show that there is a difference between introducing institutional changes and enforcing them the reason being that societal and political conditions in candidate countries allow democratization and the norms and values associated with it to be internalized only in the medium and long run (PRIDHAM, 2005, 2002a).

EU Conditionality and the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP)

The pressures of international anarchy facing former Soviet Republics following the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union in conjunction with their need to address serious economic and developmental problems pushed these states to seek close relations with the EU in order to achieve their national goals and objectives with the hope that one day they may be able to join it. Facing political and social instability due to their economic problems the states of the southern and eastern shores of the Mediterranean also sought to establish closer relations with the European Union. The EU was quick to realize that its security was intimately connected to the stability of the countries geographically embedded in its neighborhood. The establishment of the ENP reflected the need of all parties concerned.

However, the presence of asymmetrical interdependence between the EU, on the one hand, and its neighboring states on the other, enabled the EU to request, if not impose, the implementation of certain standards of behavior from or on those states seeking thereby to transmit elements of the EU international/world society beyond the EU borders. But how does this process work and what mechanisms does the EU use to achieve its objectives?

While candidate states have to follow the EU acquis, there has been discussion regarding the specific role that the EU should take in the promotion of democratization in countries that are neither acceding countries nor candidates. As the European Commission states, the ENP is meant to allow its member to work “together with partner countries, to define a set of priorities, whose fulfilment will bring them closer to the European Union” (COMMISION COMMUNICATION, 2004). Even though candidacy may not be a short-term goal for some of these states, the EU nevertheless emphasizes the importance for building communication and shared values related to issues like security, democracy, human rights, political freedom, and trade liberalization. According to the EU, stability for not just the member states, but also the surrounding regions can be ensured much more effectively with attention paid to these areas, which are clearly interrelated and hard to untangle from one another.

According to the European Commission, there are many areas and situations that require attention in the aspect of assessing democratization and the protection of human rights (COMMISION COMMUNICATION, 2003). Among them is a noticeable deficit in governance, which restricts the cultivation of shared democratic values. The marginalization of women and insufficiency of judicial systems in many countries also
leads to a lack of political representation and development. Furthermore, democratization relies upon increased attention towards education programs, which often suffers funding inequality and inadequacy among external states. As a result, in 2001 the Commission (COMMISSION COMMUNICATION, 2001) laid out a set of policies that characterize the overall approach to democratization in external countries, and recommends: the promotion of consistent policies among states; a pro-active approach, focusing on political dialogue and assistance; and the adoption of a strategic approach, focusing on the implementation of specific projects.

Following the Communication from the European Commission to the Council and the European Parliament (EUROPEAN COMMISSION, 2003), the ENP was developed in 2004 with the objective of strengthening the prosperity, stability and security of the EU and its neighboring states. As such, it is based on the values of democracy, rule of law and respect of human rights (EUROPEAN COMMISSION, 2004). The ENP framework is proposed to the sixteen of EU’s closest neighbors. The ENP is mainly a bilateral policy between the EU and each partner country. However, it is complemented by regional and multilateral co-operation initiatives, such as the Eastern Partnership (launched in Prague in May 2009), the Union for the Mediterranean (the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, formerly known as the Barcelona Process, re-launched in Paris in July 2008), and the Black Sea Synergy (launched in Kiev in February 2008) (MOCANU, 2010).

In the ENP framework, the EU uses financial and diplomatic means to ensure that there is a move towards democratization in third states. In other words, the EU uses a strategy of positive reinforcement where the reward for desired behaviour is financial assistance. States, in order to reap the benefits of the ENP must show commitment to the respect of human rights, political freedoms, and democratization. Moreover, the Union’s neighbours, in order to take full advantage of the various benefits of the ENP, must pledge an adherence not only to human rights, but also to the values of democracy that the Union promotes.

In 2010-2011, the EU reviewed the ENP and put a strong focus on the promotion of deep and sustainable democracy, accompanied by inclusive economic development (EUROPEAN COMMISSION, 2011). Deep and sustainable democracy includes in particular free and fair elections, freedom of expression, of assembly and of association, judicial independence, fight against corruption and democratic control over the armed forces. The EU also stressed the role of civil society bringing about deep and sustainable democracy. The EU unveiled ‘more for more’ principle, under which the EU will develop stronger partnerships with those neighbouring states that make more progress towards democratic reform.

Within the ENP the EU offers its neighbors a privileged relationship, building upon a mutual commitment to common values (democracy and human rights, rule of law, good governance, market economy principles and sustainable development). The ENP builds upon the legal agreements in place between the EU and the partner in question: Partnership and Cooperation Agreements (PCA) or Association Agreements (AA). Implementation of the ENP is jointly promoted and monitored through the Committees and sub-Committees established in the frame
of these agreements. The European External Action Service and the European Commission publish each year the ENP Progress Reports. The assessments contained in the Progress Reports form the basis for EU policy towards each ENP partner under the ‘more for more’ principle. Thus the level of ambition of the relationship depends on the extent to which these values are shared.

Central to the ENP are the bilateral ‘Action Plans’ between the EU and each ENP partner. These set out an agenda of political and economic reforms with short and medium-term priorities of three to five years. ENP Action Plans reflect each partner’s needs and capacities, as well as their and the EU’s interests. Under the ENP Action Plans the EU works together with its partners to develop democratic, socially equitable and inclusive societies. Because the civil society plays an important role in contributing to democracy and good governance building in partner countries, the EU supports organizations via the Civil Society Facility. Moreover, the EU offers its neighbors economic integration, improved circulation of people across borders, financial assistance and technical cooperation toward approximation with EU standards. The European Commission provides financial support in grant form to partners; the European Investment Bank and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development complement this support through loans.

The ‘more for more’ principle applies to all incentives proposed by the EU: policy developments as well as to financial assistance. Countries determinedly embarking on political reforms are offered, in addition to the incentives available to other partners, elements of market access: economic integration and development (DCFTAs), mobility of people (mobility partnerships), and a greater share of the EU financial support. In this context, the Commission has decided to set up specific programs both for the Eastern (EAPIC) and Southern (SPRING) neighbors that will allocate extra financial support only to those neighbors taking clear and concrete steps on political reforms.

The question then arises as to how to enforce these stipulations that may seem broad and ambiguous. Indeed, there is much debate as to how democracy should be defined, and in which contexts and how democratic principles should be insisted upon. Besides negotiation and diplomacy, financial incentives seem to be the most widely considered way of increasing democratization. While the EU includes the language of democratization in agreements made with third states, unlike candidate states following the Copenhagen criteria, there are no clear, concrete political ramifications for third states that do not further pursue democratization. Economic incentives and positive conditionality, like the financial aid given to particular programs or organizations in third parties is a popular way for the EU to influence democratization measures. However, their effectiveness should also be taken with a grain of salt, as there may be concerns that the involvement with the EU in the Mediterranean can inadvertently support authoritarian regimes (GILLESPIE; WHITEHEAD, 2002, p.198).

Despite the criticism it has received (SASSE, 2008), the ENP has served as a valuable tool for increasing democratization and security in
the states surrounding the borders of the European Union. At the same time, it has been acknowledged that the degree of acceptance and implementation of the EU political conditions is subject to three constraints: first, the financial, political and social constraints facing the ENP countries; second, the lack of significant economic and financial benefits that these states can extract from the EU even if they introduce the changes requested; and third, the lack of any prospect of becoming members of the Union (SCHIMMELFENNING, 2005b). In other words, the governments of the ENP states are confronted by a dilemma: why should they introduce any social, political and economic changes that would result in social upheaval and loss of popularity and legitimacy if the costs of doing so are higher than the benefits they could gain? In addition, like in the case of candidate states, there is a difference between the formal introduction of institutional changes and their enforcement. At the same time, despite its integrative potential, the analysis of case studies in various policy sectors has revealed that the network governance provided by the ENP is not void of hegemonic traits (LAVENEX, 2008).

EU Conditionality and Development Assistance Recipient Counties

Facing pressures stemming from international anarchy as well as political and social instability due to their economic problems, the states of the developing and less developed world have sought to establish closer relations with the European Union. As in the case of the ENP states, the presence of asymmetrical interdependence between the EU, on the one hand, and the developing and less developed states on the other, has enabled the EU to demand the implementation of certain standards of behavior from those states if development assistance is to be provided. Consequently, the introduction and implementation of requested changes would assist the EU to transmit elements of its international/world society beyond the EU borders. But how does this process work and what mechanisms does the EU use to achieve its objectives?

The origins of the EU’s development policy can be found back in 1957 when the European Economic Community (EEC) was created and its relations with the sub-Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific states (ACP) were established. Following the decolonization process a new approach was needed to regulate the relations between the European states and the new independent states. The Yaoundé Conventions grounded the relations on a legal basis and provided the fertile ground for the enhancement of the partnership between the EEC and these states. Later the Lomé Conventions sought to provide a broader and enhanced relation between the partners. Lomé IV (1990-2000) became the first development agreement to incorporate a human rights clause as a “fundamental part of cooperation.” An updated clause confirmed human rights as an “essential element of cooperation”, signifying that any violation could lead to partial or total suspension of development aid by the EU after prior consultation of other ACP nations and the abusing party (HOLLAND, 2002).

When the Cotonou Agreement was established in 2000, it introduced a new approach to EU-ACP relations while preserving the fun-
damental instruments of the partnership from the Lomé Conventions including conditionality clauses on human rights (EUROPEAN COM-
MISSION, 2010a). With the Cotonou Agreement, the EU changed its role 
from a sole aid provider to an international actor that would monitor on a 
regular basis the application of the political conditionality principles by its 
ACP partners (MARSH; MACKENSTEIN, 2005; BRETHERTON; VOL-
GER, 2006). This clearly demonstrates the effort of the EU to exercise a 
greater influence on ACP countries to improve their poor conditions on 
human rights and promote ‘good governance’. Thus EU development as-
stance became a motive for these developing countries to reform their 
policies and practices associated with democracy, the rule of law, social 
justice and respect for human rights.

The European Commission contends that stability and security are 
some of the most important factors for long-term engagement with third 
states. Thus, by focusing on ‘good governance’ in some of the most politi-
cally unstable regions, the EU seeks to address “the root causes of conflict 
and insecurity” (EUROPEAN COMMISSION, 2010b, p. 2). Established by 
the European Parliament in 1994, the European Initiative for Democracy 
and Human Rights (EIDHR) focuses precisely on the issue of democra-
tization and the promotion on human rights in third countries (COM-
MISSION COMMUNICATION, 2003). This primarily takes place through 
funding activities of non-governmental and international organizations.
In 2003, the annual sum for the worldwide projects amounted to € 100 
million. Thus, the EIDHR was established as a mechanism for coopera-
tion and as a “financing instrument for the promotion of democracy and 
human rights worldwide” (EUROPEAN COMMISSION, 2010b, p. 5).

The EU notes that the fact that the organization is the world’s larg-
est aid donor demonstrates a commitment to poverty alleviation and 
economic development across the globe (COMMISSION COMMUNI-
CATION, 2012, p.1). The need to deliver aid, according to the 2012 An-
nual Report by EUROPEAID, cannot be removed from democratization 
efforts, or the further pursuit of human rights regimes (COMMISSION 
COMMUNICATION, 2012, p. 1). For example, the report places particu-
lar emphasis on the EU’s relationship with Central Asian states, where 
it is “seen as a close political ally and trusted partner on whom they can 
rely on (sic) in the challenging transition process on which they have em-
barked” (COMMISSION COMMUNICATION, 2012, p. 5). Similarly, the 
EU-Latin America/Caribbean (LAC) Madrid summit in May 2010 out-
lined greater political relations with Central and South American coun-
tries. Even in Southeast Asia, the EU works towards strengthening bilat-
eral partnerships with countries to increase the promotion of demo-
cratization in the region, in the hopes of securing other regions in order to 
secure EU’s interests (COMMISSION COMMUNICATION, 2012, p. 6).

Although it has received considerable criticism (HOLLAND, 2002), 
EU development policy has served as a valuable tool for increasing de-

cratization in the developing and less developed world. On the other 
hand, it has been acknowledged that the degree of acceptance and imple-
mentation of the EU political conditions is subject to two constraints: 
first, the financial, political and social constraints facing the countries in
question; and second, the lack of significant economic and financial benefits that these states could extract from the EU even if they introduce the changes requested (MARSH; MACKENSTEIN, 2005). In other words, like in the case of the ENP states, the governments of the developing and less developed states are confronted by a basic question: why should they introduce any social, political and economic changes that would probably meet popular resistance if the costs of doing so are higher than the benefits they could gain? In addition, like in the case of candidate and ENP states, there is a difference between the formal introduction of institutional changes, on the one hand, and their implementation and enforcement on the other, as historical, societal, economic and political conditions in the countries at hand would only allow the democratization process to produce concrete results in the medium and long run.

Conclusion

The purpose of this paper was to discuss how the policies of the EU contribute towards the strengthening of an international and world order that reflects EU’s interests and values. In so doing, the paper utilized the English School approach to international relations and its concepts of ‘international society’ and ‘world society’. The paper claims that the EU constitutes a ‘thick’, solidarist type of regional international/world society, which is embedded in a ‘thinner’, pluralist international society. In addition, it is argued that in the case of the EU, not only an ‘international society’ pre-exists and assists the development of a ‘world society’ within its boundaries but also the two societies co-exist and strengthen each other.

The paper suggests that the pressures of international anarchy in conjunction with the need of non-EU states to maintain close relations with a regional international organization in order to achieve their national goals and objectives but also the presence of asymmetrical interdependence in favour of the EU have enabled the latter to define certain expectations and impose certain standards of behaviour on the former. Therefore, EU pressures aimed at altering attitudes and policies can be equally applicable to all states irrespective of whether or not they seek EU membership.

The paper demonstrates that the ‘world society’ elements present in the EU are transmitted globally in, at least, three ways. First through the EU’s Enlargement Policy candidate states are obliged to adopt norms, rules and practices compatible with those of the European Union if they wish to gain admission. Second, through the implementation of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) states in the EU’s periphery, which wish to establish advantageous and good neighbouring relations with the EU, are encouraged to adopt norms and practices compatible with those Union. Third, states that wish to be partners of the EU’s Development Policy and recipients of EU’s aid are also requested to adopt policies, norms and practices compatible with those of the European Union. In doing so, the EU contributes towards the creation of a world order compatible with the EU’s vision and interests.
Finally, the paper argues that the degree of EU’s success in creating an international/world order according to its interests and values is determined by certain factors. For example, in the case of the accession countries, the acceptance and implementation of the EU political conditions becomes difficult due to financial, political and social constraints facing the candidate countries. But since joining the EU has been identified as a policy priority, national governments are obliged to adhere to the EU conditions even if this means loss of popularity. As far as the ENP partners are concerned, the implementation of the EU political conditionality is subject to three constraints: first, the financial, political and social constraints facing the ENP countries; second, the lack of significant economic and financial benefits that these states could extract from the EU even if they introduce the changes requested; and third, the lack of any prospect of becoming members of the Union. The first two of these constraints are also applicable to the case of the countries that are partners in the EU’s Development Policy. Moreover, the paper claims that one should differentiate between the formal introduction of institutional changes, on the one hand, and their implementation and enforcement on the other, as historical, societal, economic and political conditions in non-EU countries would only allow the democratization process to produce concrete results in the medium and long run. Last, but not least, the paper argues that when the EU loses its importance in the eyes of a third country either because of its inability to deal with some issues, such as the financial crisis, and/or when the interests of the third country could be served better through other ways, the EU political conditions are difficult to be accepted and implemented.

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