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As eleições no Reino Unido e seus impactos nas relações econômicas internacionais

The elections in the United Kingdom and their impact on the international economic relations

Carlos Gama¹

Sumário

Contrariando os institutos de pesquisa, o Partido Conservador obteve maioria simples das cadeiras no Parlamento britânico e venceu as eleições gerais de Maio de 2015. Pela primeira vez em mais de 30 anos um partido constituirá o governo sem necessidade de montar uma coalizão.

A vitória do partido do primeiro-ministro David Cameron foi obtida sobre os louros do plebiscito sobre a independência da Escócia. Realizado em setembro de 2014, 5 em cada 9 eleitores escoceses votaram pela permanência no Reino Unido com autonomia ampliada.

Palavras-chave: Reino Unido; Partido Conservador; David Cameron; Escócia; Economia

Abstract

Contrary to the research institutes, the Conservative Party got a simple majority of the seats in the British Parliament and won the general elections in May 2015. For the first time in over 30 years a party will constitute the government without assembling a coalition. The victory of Prime Minister David Cameron's party has been obtained on the referendum's laurels on the independence of Scotland. Held in September 2014, 5 out of 9 Scottish voters voted to remain in the United Kingdom with expanded autonomy.

Key words: United Kingdom; Conservative Party; David Cameron; Scotland; Economy

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O referendo escocês já prenunciara a trajetória de baixa do Partido Trabalhista, então liderado por Ed Milliband. O Partido Trabalhista ficou imprensado entre a campanha Better Together do Partido Conservador e a ascensão contudente de Alex Salmond do Partido Nacional Escocês. Esforços de última hora do ex-primeiro ministro Gordon Brown (escocês) foram insuficientes para reverter a derrota nas urnas de 2014. Em 2015 os trabalhistas obtiveram apenas 1 representante eleito na Escócia, tradicional reduto eleitoral, contra 56 representantes nacionalistas. No geral, os trabalhistas perderam 10% de suas cadeiras no Parlamento. O veredito das urnas levou Milliband à renúncia logo após o anúncio dos resultados.

O longo mandato trabalhista sob Tony Blair e Brown se iniciou com uma crise econômica internacional (com a quebra do Banco Barings em 1997) e chegou a seu termo no rescaldo de outra crise econômica internacional, ainda mais grave, iniciada em 2008. A economia britânica encolheu 4,3% em 2009, ano da eleição de Cameron. A desastrosa política externa de Blair também contribuiu para o declínio de seu partido – ao conduzir o Reino Unido a uma invasão ilegal do Iraque baseada em mentiras, que redundaria em fracasso (e criaria as condições para a emergência do ISIS), Blair diminuiu significativamente o capital político da tradicional potência ocidental.

Contrariando expectativas de uma longa recessão, o governo Cameron obteve êxitos econômicos. Num mercado de 30 milhões de trabalhadores, criou aproximadamente 1.8 milhões de empregos em 5 anos – quase cumprindo a meta de 1000 novos empregos diários. O Reino Unido é a economia que mais cresce no G-7 (3.2%), acima da média mundial. Pós-crise, o endividamento público foi reduzido à metade (do mais alto índice na União Europeia para um dos mais baixos, num bloco em crise). A inflação permanece em baixa.

As urnas não apenas legitimaram a gestão conservadora de Cameron dado o contraste com os últimos anos sob o trabalhismo. A vitória por maioria simples das cadeiras traz legitimidade adicional, capaz de dispensar alianças inconvenientes com diminuídos liberais democratas e ultranacionalistas de extrema direita do UKIP.

Além de recuperar o conteúdo unionista do partido, Cameron transformou seu discurso político. Ao invés de cortejar audiências tradicionais dos conservadores – a gentry e a aristocracia – a campanha de 2015 se focou no crescimento de uma classe média associada com os startups. Ao legar ao estado os papéis de indutor da produtividade e inovação e garantidor de regras competitivas em diversos espaços sociais, os conservadores responderam, com dilatado atraso, à transformação da plataforma política do Partido Trabalhista sob Blair – o novo trabalhismo da terceira via, que se propôs como novo centro político, ao redefinir a relação estado-sociedade a partir de fluxos de capital transnacionais (que não são propriamente novidade na City londrina).

Cameron logrou atualizar um discurso que remontava à época de Margareth Thatcher – o capitalismo popular – para a era digital via políticas públicas de austeridade vendidas como plataformas de produtividade e inovação, mecanismos de modernização intensa. Alavancados pelo crescimento econômico (via parcerias com o capital globalizado), Cameron e seu partido dispõem de uma plataforma política diante da qual os trabalhistas (e os demais) não lograram representar alternativas. Ao mesmo tempo, boa parte da criação de empregos no Reino Unido se deveu à flexibilização das relações trabalhistas – os chamados “zero-hour contracts”. O discurso de modernização da economia foi logrado contra o pano de fundo da precarização da força de trabalho (notadamente, de imigrantes oriundos de ex-colônias e outros países da União Europeia).

Além das estatísticas e da permanência da Escócia na união, Cameron foi poupado de reveses na política externa que poderiam abreviar seu mandato. Por um lado, gastos militares foram modestos em meio ao ajuste econômico. Os investimentos do outrora Império são hoje menores do que os do Japão – país sem cadeira permanente no Conselho de Segurança da ONU e constitucionalmente limitado no seu engajamento militar. Por outro lado a sombra dos malogros de Tony Blair permanece forte, recomenda prudência no plano externo.

Após modesta participação na desastrosa intervenção da OTAN na Líbia, o Parlamento negou autorização para Cameron empregar a força na crise na Síria – o que incentivou os Estados Unidos a aceitar a proposta negocial da Rússia. O Reino Unido manteve perfil baixo na invasão russa da Criméia, acatando com relutância as sanções impostas àquele país (em vista dos crescentes investimentos russos em terras britânicas). Face à ameaça crescente do ISIS, o Reino Unido participa de ações militares no Iraque e Síria de forma bastante mais modesta em comparação com as ambições globais de Blair uma década atrás. Recentemente, o Reino Unido endossou a proposta da União Europeia de criar uma força-tarefa para combater traficantes de seres humanos no norte da África. Até o momento, o prometido apoio britânico se limita à cooperação logística.

O governo conservador britânico representa um dos pontos de inflexão de uma Europa em crise, em contraste com o governo de esquerda grego. O Syriza encontra dificuldades em uma conjuntura dramática – reverter a pauperização da população grega sob pressões de uma dívida externa leonina gerida por colegas de União, como Alemanha e França, em desaceleração econômica. Na busca por alongar a dívida de uma super-endividada Grécia com credores europeus, o Syriza joga com os impactos da saída grega da Zona do Euro.

Em contraste com essa estratégia, uma das primeiras medidas do novo governo Cameron foi estipular um plebiscito em 2017 referente à permanência ou não do Reino Unido na União Europeia. Como no plebiscito escocês, Cameron jogou duas cartas na mesa: por um lado nacionalismo, por outro liberalismo econômico. A conjunção desses fatores constitui uma das mais interessantes mutações do capitalismo pós-crise de 2008. No repertório da redefinição da imagem do Reino Unido pós-crise figura como destaque a renovada popularidade da monarquia Windsor (impulsionada por casamentos e bebês reais), um trunfo de poder suave: a reprodução simbólica da ordem tradicional ganha um update midiático para uma aldeia global espetacularizada.

Nesse momento turbulento o Presidente da Comissão Europeia Jean-Claude Juncker afirmou que uma aliança anglo-saxã teria condições de destruir a Zona do Euro em caso de uma saída grega. A ansiedade da Europa continental a respeito de um longo governo conservador no Reino Unido é compreensível.

Além do crescimento econômico superior a toda a Zona do Euro, a ilha parece ter mais opções do que França e Alemanha (às voltas com uma crise de espionagem). Sob Cameron, o Reino Unido acena com a possibilidade de se tornar ponte na integração global entre as economias da Bacia do Pacífico (impulsionadas pela China) e do Atlântico (revitalizado pela recuperação econômica dos EUA). Nesse cenário minilateral, o Reino Unido contaria com vantagens competitivas: a Commonwealth (cujos membros incluem economias-chave do G-7 e G-20 como Canadá e Austrália), e laços com ex-colônias (como a Índia, membro dos BRICS, e economias emergentes na África). Em face das duras consequências do caso grego, a eventual defecção britânica da UE pode ser suavizada em termos globais.

Sem a ilha, o relógio da UE volta a 1972 – com o agravante de nova crise de baixo crescimento, inflação e controvérsias relacionadas com o status dos imigrantes (europeus e extracomunitários) vítimas de manifestações xenófobas, racistas e islamófobas (alimentadas pelo ISIS, atentados em Copenhague e Paris e pelos navios de imigrantes à deriva nas costas europeias). A xenofobia crescente adentra o debate político britânico: Cameron afaga o eleitorado de direita ao excluir imigrantes do futuro plebiscito sobre a permanência da ilha na União e ao apoiar a operação militar punitiva da UE no Mediterrâneo.

Para economias emergentes em processo de ajuste pós-crise – caso do Brasil – a experiência britânica traz interessantes insights. O Brasil foi uma das economias que mais rapidamente respondeu à crise de 2008 – via reforço do consumo doméstico, crédito farto e demanda crescente por commodities em outros emergentes como a China (especialmente petróleo e minérios). Após rápida recuperação (7.5% de crescimento do PIB em 2010), a economia brasileira rapidamente desacelerou. Após dois anos de crescimento quase zero e previsão de PIB negativo para 2015, o país vive o ciclo desgastante da recessão: desemprego em alta (7.9%), desindustrialização (queda de 5.9% no 1º trimestre de 2015), além de espasmos de inflação.

A centralidade do capital transnacional no seio da modernização da economia britânica pós-crise fez com que, dentre as economias do G-7, o Reino Unido fosse um dos primeiros a aderir ao novo Banco Asiático de Investimentos em Infraestrutura (BAII), capineado pela China. O Reino Unido se adiantou a seus companheiros de G-7 e União Europeia e fez seu medido de membrecia, inclusive antes de membros dos BRICS como o Brasil.

O interesse intenso pelo BAII e pelo capital emergente de países como a Índia, Rússia e o próprio Brasil também se deve a um paradoxo do Partido Conservador na atual conjuntura: conciliar

o crescimento econômico (associado com a precarização das relações de trabalho com intensa presença de mão-de-obra imigrante) com um discurso político nacionalista (alimentado pela espiral de xenofobia já tornada parte do mainstream eleitoral em diversos países europeus pós-2008). A receita liberal nacionalista tem sustentabilidade duvidosa nas águas revoltas de 2015. Perde fôlego frente ao capital transnacionalizado.

Pode o ajuste econômico que a reeleita Dilma Rousseff tenta aprovar junto a um Congresso hostil (controlado por sua própria base de governo) ser feito de forma condizente com objetivos de manutenção do emprego e retomada da produtividade em meio à crise econômica internacional? O exemplo britânico coloca em primeiro plano as contradições dessa reconfiguração do capitalismo contemporâneo.

Para o Brasil, a aliança com emergentes com a China ocorre uma conjuntura doméstica dramática². Efeitos colaterais da expansão do crédito e da redistribuição de renda dos últimos 12 anos coincidem com perda de espaço em tradicionais mercados para as exportações brasileiras. A crise política e de credibilidade que afeta o governo e empresas como a Petrobrás potencializa efeitos danosos e dificulta a reflexão sobre as contradições.

As turbulências na interface doméstica-internacional reverberam sobre uma política externa pragmática que mobiliza uma variedade de opções – a tônica do primeiro governo Rousseff. Torna-se urgente levar em conta não apenas os custos e possíveis ganhos, mas igualmente os efeitos não-pretendidos da aproximação com o capital transnacional de emergentes como a China – que superará 50 bilhões de dólares somente em 2015.

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2. GAMA, C.F.P.S. (2015). **A Aliança Brasil-China num Sistema Internacional em Transformação**. Disponível em: <http://www.sidneyrezende.com/noticia/249738> Acesso em: 30 de Maio de 2015.

An English School Approach to Public Diplomacy – social power and norm creation

*Uma abordagem da Escola Inglesa da Diplomacia Pública
– poder social e criação de normas*

Antônio Ferreira de Lima Júnior¹

Abstract

This article attempts to lift the veil on the connection between public diplomacy practices and some tenets of the English School. The general argument is that in the context of an anarchical society of states that govern themselves through shared institutions, norms and values, public diplomacy is an important instrument to influence the manufacturing of the norms and values that functions as the milieu of world politics. It is also maintained that states with effective public diplomacy policies are those with the greatest social power.

Key-words: Public Diplomacy; English School; Norms Creation

Sumário

Este artigo tenta levantar o véu sobre a conexão entre as práticas de diplomacia pública e alguns princípios da Escola Inglesa. O argumento geral é que, no contexto de uma sociedade anárquica de estados que governam a si mesmos através de instituições, normas e valores compartilhados, a diplomacia pública é um instrumento importante para influenciar a fabricação de normas e valores que funcionam como o ambiente da política mundial. Também se afirma que os estados com políticas eficazes de diplomacia pública são aqueles com o maior poder social.

Palavras-Chave: Diplomacia Pública; Escola Inglesa; Criação de Normas

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Introduction

The English School of International Relations Theory holds that we live in a world structured as an international society of sovereign states that are governed by international law and that communicate among themselves through the institution of diplomacy (BUZAN, 2010 e 2014; CASTRO, 2012; KAUPPI and VIOTTI, 1999; SUGANAMI, 2010). English school thinking shares beliefs with realism concerning the anarchical nature of the international system (BULL, 1977) but it also dialogues with the constructivist theory for it recognizes the societal dynamics of international relations, particularly in what regards the existence of order, justice, norms and values that are socially developed (SUGANAMI, 2010). According to such a theoretical construct, non-state actors play a significant role. Buzan and Little (2000), for instance, put forward that the contemporary world system is marked by the emergence of a plethora of non-state, non-territorial actors that challenge the stability in states' territorial boundaries and the idea of power as solely being military or economic (2000, p. 16).

It is widely believed that public diplomacy has become an important facet of this contemporary world system, especially due to the major events of September, 11, 2001 that took place in the United States. The terrorist attacks of astounding magnitude that brought the World Trade Center down and damaged the Pentagon in Washington encouraged the great superpower of the world to wonder how its image had been portrayed and interpreted in the Middle East and in the Islamic community as a whole. United Statesians posed questions such as "Why do people hate us so much?" (Nye, 2004).

The importance of public diplomacy has increased not only to the US and other countries that considered themselves under terrorist threat

(GILBOA, 2008; GREGORY, 2008; MELISSEN, 2005). Besides being a matter of national security to some countries, public diplomacy has also gained currency due to the changed architecture of contemporary international relations in what regards the ever increasing interdependence among nations as well as the importance of the international media, communication technologies and non-state actors. In this instance, much discussion has been made on the significance of issues such as public opinion, image, prestige and relationship building in the international arena. Yet, the purpose of public diplomacy and how it should be conducted is still not clear, particularly given its recurrent misuse as mere 'propaganda' (BERRIDGE, 2010) or 'international public relations' (CHARLES, 2001; DEAN, 2006; KENDRICK, 2004; MELLISEN, 2005). The way a country uses public diplomacy in order to obtain 'soft power' and to influence other countries' behavior is also subject to some uncertainty (HAM, 2010).

Having said that, this article is an attempt to lift the veil on the connection between public diplomacy practices and some tenets of the English School. The overall argument is that in the context of an anarchical society of states that govern themselves through shared institutions, norms and values, public diplomacy is an important instrument to influence the manufacturing of the normative and moral framework that functions as the backdrop to world politics. It will be held that states with adroit, effective public diplomacy policies are those with the greatest social power.

The first section of the article will clarify the meaning of public diplomacy and analyze its importance in today's international politics. It will be held that public diplomacy goes beyond the notion of country image formation and branding, being more appropriate to understand it from a three-dimensional perspective: news management, strategic

communication and relationship building. The second section briefly explore the concept of “social power” and its relationship with the construction of norms and institutions, which are deemed as essential to provide order and justice for the international society of sovereign states, as far as the English School is concerned.

The concept of public diplomacy and its importance for today's international politics

It could be said that the public facet of diplomacy started to be consciously incorporated in international relations after the end of the I World War. The Woodrow Wilson speech on the Fourteen Points in 1918 perhaps delimits when secrecy and deceit started to be openly condemned in diplomatic practice (IYAMU, 2004; LAMBINO, 2005). Hamilton and Langhorne (1995) claim that it was the beginning of a ‘new diplomacy’ open to public inspection and control, although this initiative was more related to the public obtaining information about agreements than public involvement in international affairs. The important fact is that this new diplomacy activated a process of deliberation concerning world public opinion and its role in constraining the behavior of belligerent countries.

The term ‘public diplomacy’ was first used in 1965 by Edmund Gullion, Dean of Tufts University’s Fletcher School (US) in the creation of Fletcher of the Edward R. Murrow Center for Public Diplomacy (FISHER, 1972; IYAMU, 2004). According to Gullion:

Public diplomacy ... deals with the influence of public attitudes on the formation and execution of foreign policies. It encompasses dimensions of international relations beyond traditional diplomacy; the cultivation by governments of public opinion in other countries; the interaction of private groups and in-

terests in one country with those of another; the reporting of foreign affairs and its impact on policy; communication between those whose job is communication, as between diplomats and foreign correspondents; and the processes of inter-cultural communications (SNOW; TAYLOR, 2008, p. 19).

At the time when the concept ‘public diplomacy’ was first coined by Gullion, the term was used to refer to previous propaganda activities conducted by the United States government during the Cold War in order to influence public opinion abroad. Propaganda activities were fundamentally international broadcasting, such as *Radio Free Europe* and *Radio Liberty*, which intended to spread the capitalist ideology and ‘the American way of life’ throughout Communist-led Eastern Europe (STONE, 2003).

Currently, there has been much confusion about the concept of public diplomacy, which has been interchangeably used with “culture diplomacy”, “foreign propaganda”, “public relations” and “media diplomacy”, for example. Probably due to the revolution of communications technology and the role played by international media channels such as the CNN and BBC², some commentators have tended to still understand public diplomacy as mere “propaganda” or “international marketing” (BERRIDGE, 2010; CHARLES, 2001; DEAN, 2006; KENDRICK, 2004; MELLISEN, 2005). This notion is not *per se* incorrect, however it only accounts for a specific aspect of what public diplomacy largely entails. Additionally, it tends to adopt a rather ethnocentric view in the sense that it considers foreign audience as passive, in a way that it would promptly buy in the information that is being conveyed.

Ideally, public diplomacy should be regarded as a fundamental part of foreign policy and not something that comes afterwards to sell it (PETERSON,

2. The CNN effect is a concept that some authors use to refer to the influence of the international media in determining agendas and affecting international policy making. (GILBOA, 2008, p. 63).

2002). In this instance, not only is it necessary to construct a country's image, but also to bring stereotypes down, to influence international public opinion, to understand and be understood by other societies in addition to consider actors such as non-governmental individuals and organizations.

Possibly, Mark Leonard's concept of public diplomacy is the most comprehensive in the literature on this topic. He holds that the goal of diplomacy is three-fold: to transmit information, to sell a positive image of a country and to build long-term relationships that create an enabling environment for government policies (LEONARD, 2002). In other words, public diplomacy is considered to have three dimensions: (i) daily communications; (ii) strategic communications; and (iii) relationship building.

The first dimension of public diplomacy is the management of news, which must support both the traditional diplomacy of one government and the national interest put forward by its foreign policy. It operates in a rather short-term timescale with a preventive purpose, which aims to explain the context of domestic and foreign policy decisions, in conjunction with a reactive promptitude, which should give quick responses to deal with crises that have the potential to damage a country's image. Another important point is that news management should address both non-governmental and governmental audiences, be they mass or elite.

Image formation or 'nation branding' is the second dimension of public diplomacy. Its main goal is to communicate strategic messages, supported by cultural events, in order to promote one country in the international arena. This would account for the 'selling' or 'marketing' aspect of public diplomacy, especially as an attempt to influence the foreign audience, very much like a political or advertising campaign.

Finally, the third dimension regards the development of durable relationships with key individu-

als over a long period of time via training, seminars, conferences, language teaching, scholarships as well as scientific, educational and cultural exchanges. It is important that the host country attempts to give a positive experience to the individual, although this infield image building also incurs unpleasant moments to the visitor. Nonetheless, exchange programs will eventually deepen the foreigner understanding concerning the background against which foreign policy is formulated.

Public diplomacy has therefore emerged as a response to lasting transformations of the world in which diplomacy operates, such as the greater mobility (physical and intellectual) of individuals caused by the evolution of transport and communication technologies; more access to education, which helped to create a critical mass of individuals that no longer passively accept decisions taken by governments (at home and abroad) (FISHER, 1988; ROSS, 2002); and the multitude of media channels and their growing interest in reporting issues related to international affairs (COHEN, 1986; GILBOA, 2001). Gilboa (2008) has categorized those post-Cold War and post 9/11 challenges under three interconnected revolutions in mass communication, politics and international relations. The revolution in communication technologies, which brought about the Internet and global news networks (CNN International, BBC World and Al-Jazeera, for instance), enabled states, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), communities, companies and individuals to obtain and exchange ideas at a global level. The revolution in politics regards the democratization of many societies, leading to an increasing mass participation in political processes. The revolution in international relations refers to changes in the goals and means of foreign policy. Whereas in the past states were more concerned about territory, natural resources, population and other tangible capabilities, traditionally acquired through military and economic methods,

at present intangible assets such as a favorable image and reputation around the world are progressively moving center stage.

The next section will tackle the oft-cited relation between public diplomacy and soft power. It will also present the Peter van Ham's concept of "social power" (2010) and how it relates with the creation of norms and values in the international arena.

Social Power and Norms Creation

The practice of public diplomacy is oftentimes associated with the Joseph Nye's concept of soft power, which is "the ability to get what you want through attraction rather than coercion or payments" (NYE, 2004, p. x). The overall idea is that public diplomacy and the wielding of soft power help to advance and legitimize a country's foreign policy in the eyes others. Accordingly, whereas in the past military clout and how to operate armed conflicts would be crucial in determining the level of power of a state, modern world affairs demand additional sources of power as well as different ways to develop and apply them. As it became clear for the United States in the war of Iraq in 2003, military success and the toppling of Saddam Hussein's regime were not sufficient to legitimize the intervention and, what is more important, to win the hearts and minds of the Muslim world and lessen the anti-Americanism that abounded in Islamic societies (HAM, 2010).

Since Nye first introduced the idea of 'soft power' in the early 1990s,³ several other related concepts have been created to add different nuances such as "sharp power", "sweet power", "sticky power" and "smart power" (HAM, 2010) and some

authors have also tried to analyze the interplay between soft and hard power (HAM, 2005, 2008 e 2010; NYE, 2008). Recently, Peter van Ham (2010) has come up with a more embracing concept that he coined as "social power". Ham believes that whereas Nye's perception is overly agent-centered, besides being focused on attraction and persuasion, the concept of "social power" goes beyond that notion since it comprises discursive power, norm-advocacy, agenda-setting, the impact of media and communications and practices such as place branding and public diplomacy (HAM, 2010, p. 8). According to Ham (2010), social power is "the ability to set standards, and create norms and values that are deemed legitimate and desirable, without resorting to coercion or payment" (p. 8).

As it can be seen, the concept of social power intertwines with one of the most important tenets of the English School, that is, the acknowledgement of the relevance of norms and values as shapers of the behavior of international actors. But how does it happen? For the comprehension of social power, normal advocacy is clearly of paramount importance. Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink (1998) maintain that norm advocates are actors with "strong notions about appropriate or desirable behavior in their community" (p. 897), meaning that they will try to wield social power as a way to set agendas, build opinions, draft plans, propose policies and cognitively frame how the involved actors see the subject matters.

The state no longer monopolizes the process of rule-making, at least when it comes to "soft law", that is, "standards of good practices and codes of conduct endorsed at the international level but lacking legal standing, so that their implementation in the various countries is essentially left to the discretion of national authorities" (HAM, 2010, pp. 76 and 77). Consequently, a vast array of non-state actors now uses their expertise and authority to le-

3. The concept of soft power was originally developed by Joseph Nye in 'Bound to Lead: the Changing Nature of American Power', a book published in 1990, which discussed the then prevalent view that America was in decline. (NYE, 2004., p. xi)

gitimize their claims to set standards and rules as well as to convince their peers, colleagues and their national governments. Campaigns that were coordinated by NGOs such as Greenpeace and Amnesty International are emblematic examples of how non-state actors are able to mobilize and convince big audiences for a global cause. The 1997 Ottawa Convention to ban landmines is one of the most prominent examples in which an NGO acted as a catalyst to push diplomats and national governments to embrace a cause (HOKING, 2005).

These transgovernmental policy networks thus require states to use public diplomacy as a way to influence and understand foreign publics and transnational actors. Public diplomacy has been increasingly becoming woven into the fabric of mainstream diplomatic activity and contemporary international politics, especially because traditional diplomacy should go beyond government-to-government relations for diplomats now compete with a vast array of 'non-official reporters', actors and channels of international communication, which are considerably impacting on governmental decisions taken at the international arena (FISHER, 1988; MELISSEN, 2005).

Conclusion

Interest in the psychological or the human dimension of international relations as well as touching the hearts and minds of foreign publics is not a new idea. Even purported realists such as Hans J. Morgenthau argued in his book *Politics Among Nations* (1948) that a government should gain support of the public opinion of other nations for its foreign and domestic policies. This is an idea that underscores the relationship between public attitudes in other countries and both the elaboration and implementation of foreign policies. In today's world system, this notion is even more conspicu-

ous, given the revolutions in communication technologies, politics and international relations.

This article sustained that public diplomacy and the English School perspective have some common ground, especially in what regards the use of social power by state and non-state actors in constructing norms, values and institutions. Agents that are able to find skillful ways to cognitively frame the discussion of global issues will wield the greatest power. One way of accomplishing this goal is developing effective public diplomacy policies. Hence, it could be ventured that public diplomacy has been moving from the fringes of diplomatic work, although some diplomatic services may yet not grasped the magnitude of effectively communicating with foreign publics and transnational non-state actors.

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Contemporary Russia: A dialogue between English School and Constructivism

Rússia Contemporânea: Um diálogo entre a Escola Inglesa e o Construtivismo

Daniela Secches¹

It is important (...) to avoid taking states for granted by assuming that they are preformed entities that then interact in a society of states. Instead, we should acknowledge the fact that international society itself plays a crucial role in constituting and legitimating particular forms of political community. On the other hand, however, it is equally important to avoid societal structuralism and to resist the temptation to imply that states are simply constituted by international society. States and other forms of political community have a degree of agency and play an important role in constructing, sometimes deliberately, the societal structures that in turn constitutes and legitimates particular forms of agency.

Alex Bellamy, 2009, p.15.

Abstract

A dialogue between English School and constructivism is fruitful within contemporary world. As one of its important actors, Russia poses a challenge for International Relations when it comes to understand and forecast its behavior nowadays. The article, thus, seeks to analyze this issue by combining concepts from both theoretical contributions.

Keywords: *Russia; English School; Constructivism; Foreign Policy Analysis*

Sumário

Um diálogo entre Escola Inglesa e Construtivismo pode ser proveitoso no mundo atual. Como um de seus importantes atores, compreender o comportamento da Rússia é um desafio para as Relações Internacionais. O artigo, então, busca analisar essa questão combinando conceitos de ambas as contribuições teóricas.

Palavras-chave: *Rússia; Escola Inglesa; Construtivismo; análise de política externa*

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As the contemporary society life management milestone, the state can be the main character, or, at least, frames most of these cooperation and conflict processes at international arena. Nevertheless, they are not the only ones, neither there is a consensus on how to qualify them. The centrality of agency in Foreign Policy Analysis tries to overcome its dichotomy with structure.² The focus on decision-making process enables reflection on how a specific individual using his capacity to individually act or while acting collectively is capable of shaping international relations direction. Theoretical perspectives as constructivism and the English School collaborate for building such bridges more consistently since they are able to think under a sociological umbrella.

Here, the purpose is to briefly sketch a possible dialogue between English School and constructivism that would be applied to comprehend how contemporary Russian foreign policy mobilizes the country identitarian forces by defending an alternative political system against the dominant Western liberal model, that is, the defense of a Slavic democracy. The hypothesis is that such a homogenization strategy within the domestic debate is transferred to international speech as a tool for consolidating Russian role as a norm maker concerning the post-Cold War international society constitutive principle. At a first glance, it will be discussed the main theoretical concepts borrowed from a dialogue between the English School and constructivism – international society, identity, and interest. Last but not least, the empirical object – Russia today, will be discussed in order to demonstrate some brief final considerations on this combined theoretical framework potential.

2. This article aim is no to propose a full Foreign Policy Analysis model. Rather, it attempts to combine theoretical elements from English School and constructivism that would enable a better comprehension on Russia behavior in post-Cold War international society.

English School, constructivism and foreign policy analysis

The English School mainly works with three core concepts – international system, international society, and world society; and seeks to contribute for the debate based on theoretical and methodological pluralism (LITTLE, 2000). The debate on international society under rationalism is one of the central topics analyzed by English School. Manning (1975) considers international society articulated by state leaders for giving meaning to their behavior when it comes to relations with other countries. It would encompass, for the author, a peculiar social dynamics between peoples and organizations, as Linklater and Suganami (2006) point out. In a similar sense, Bull and Watson (1984, p.1) detailed the concept as

(...) a group of states (or, more generally, a group of independent political communities) which not merely form a system, in the sense that the behavior of each is a necessary factor in the calculations of the others, but also have established by dialogue and consent common rules and institutions for the conduct of their relations, and recognize their common interest in maintaining these arrangements.

The departure idea is that international society is a social construction. Therefore, states shape it when they interact within the foreign arena and are at once shaped by it paralleling what happens domestically with their society. Nevertheless, this should not mean a straightforward analogy between domestic and international societies. Linklater and Suganami (2006) recognize that international institutions where states shared norms and values exist have their own nature built upon their historical specificity.³ It is not possible to understand international society as something outside states practices.

3. It seems still pertinent here to endorse Tim Dunne (1998) discussion on John Rawls concept on society.

They are consubstantiated in these international society institutions. Buzan (2004) resumes Wight (1992) debates and remembers that the principles which organize international society can be changed from the Westphalia political equality model, to the suzerainty inequality model, and to the (neo)medieval functional difference between states. However, the 20th century international society is uncertain, what makes the reflection on its actors behavior more relevant and innovating. With this on mind, Ian Clark (2005) disagrees with the pluralist-solidarist dichotomy and asserts that international society is rather legitimist, and this was drift from the fundamental normative principle of a given international society.

Legitimacy original meaning comes from Latin, and refers literally to the quality of being in accordance with law, what was also related to custom during the medieval age. Nevertheless, legitimacy only becomes a common vocabulary after the French Revolution, and was not present within Illuminist reasoning (CLARK, 2005). International legitimacy is part of an intersubjective built bound to the normative set that composes it. Franck (1988, p. 16 e 19) conceptualizes legitimacy as “(...) a property of a rule or rule-making institution which itself exerts a pull towards compliance on those addressed normatively”. It is combined to “(...) the perception of those addressed by a rule or a rule-making institution that the rule or institution has come into being and operates in accordance with generally accepted principles of right process”.

For Clark (2005), the state actor qualification as an international society rightful member and its rightful behavior within it are two central principles of international society legitimacy bound. The first dimension is connected to the first order rules that detail the criteria for the own international society existence, as Wight (1992) points out. Therefore, the fundamental principles indicate which are

the entities able to be recognized as peers. This judgment is not only restrained to norms whose origin and verification are essentially external (COICAUD, 2002). To recognize what it is to be a state, a given political system entity is fundamental. It is relevant, then, not only formal criteria for state recognition as diplomatic tools, but also, and equally, informal membership requirements. The second normative dimension deals with how this settlement will function once it exists. Here, there are the second order rules that encompass coexistence and cooperation norms (BULL, 1977). Hence, there are two consensus productions. One is procedural, that is, it is focused on normative sources. The other is substantive, and concerns the behavior patterns enforcement that is considered adequate and responsive to primary rules (CLARK, 2005).

To think about the foreign realm legitimacy can be more easily systematized than domestic legitimacy, since there coercion is excluded (FRANCK, 1988). Therefore, legitimacy presupposes the existence and the recognition of a bound between the actors and the normative set to be observed by him. Clark (2005, p. 24) asserts that:

(...) [the] international society is constituted by its changing principles of legitimacy (first-order), which express its commitment to be bound: we can then trace its evolving (second-order) rules, revealed in its practices with regard to sovereignty, non-intervention, and non-use of force.

As a process under constant change, to comprehend international society legitimacy enables us to reflect upon periods of change that can even impact its stability. As put by Bukovansky (2002), these society constitutive principles are specific to a given cultural system and a given historical moment. Thus, legitimacy is something whose content is born, grows, ages, and dies, and can even demonstrate internal conflicts during its conformation (CLARK, 2005).

During times of systemic uncertainty, to think about international legitimacy enables to conjecture on international relations stability. Clark (2005) identified in its research periods when international order stability were shaken or even broken by changes within the international society constitutive principles, that is, shifts in what was understood intersubjectively as a legitimate international society, as it was the case of Westphalia (1648), Utrecht (1713-1714), the Congress of Vienna (1815), Versailles (1918), and the post-Second World War (1945). For Watson (1992), the state coexistence stability in a given moment is intrinsically connected to legitimacy and the consensus degree on its constitutive principles.

Following a more empirical reflection and understanding legitimacy as a belief on the existence of an organizing principle meant to be bounding (WEBER, 1978), it is possible to identify the European international society legitimizing constitutive basis until its full expansion to a global Western society after the Second World War. For Wight (1977), until the French Revolution it was possible to note that international legitimacy was built upon dynastic principle. It was replaced by the popular legitimization, that is, sovereignty was transferred from the monarch to the ruled ones, what made possible an increasing rational definition of the *Self* based on the national criteria, that shall be further discussed here soon (RAE, 2003).

International legitimacy boundaries are limited by legality, morality, and constitutionality, that define the political space (CLARK, 2005). It is not possible, then, to divorce the comprehension of distinct legitimacies creation and mutation without consider power distribution. This makes understanding what kind of society is possible and what are the criteria for its existence. It is necessary to differentiate between the qualitative legitimacy as a criterion for distinguishing a legitimate and a non-legitimate order;

as well to think about quantitative legitimacy, that is, the degree under which legitimacy is sustained in these society entities actions.

With this on mind, it is noted that the states behavior may be able to shape this legitimizing structure. Finnemore (1996, p. 2-3) remembers that:

(...) State interests are defined in the context of internationally held norms and understandings about what is good and appropriate... The normative context also changes over time, and as internationally held norms and values change, they create coordinated shifts in state interests and behavior across the system.

The states interests conformation process and its projection towards international society through its foreign policy are framed by international legitimacy both in qualitative and in quantitative terms. Nevertheless, distinct power distributions and intersubjective interactions between states and between state and international structure enable an active discrimination on actors whose rightful membership is not desired by this settlement in order to diminish its importance. This interaction is a powerful socialization force, and the legitimacy is better understood as a semi-permanent structure that encompasses values that will appear absolute in a given time for fulfilling state memberships (CLARK, 2005). A legitimate international society is born, then, “as an active, contested political process, rather than legitimacy as an abstract political resource. Since it is an activity, not a property, it involves creation, modification, innovation, and transformation” (BARKER, 2001, p. 28).

To comprehend this “process of consensual empowerment” (MINCHEV, 2000, p. 5) needs to consider a mediative epistemology in order to interpret the multiple crossing influences between the actor – the state and its foreign policy, and the structure – the international society. Nevertheless, it is important to stress that the state entity is also

a structure, as already mentioned here (BELLAMY, 2009), and the national interest construction can be only fully understood based on this premise. Hence, foreign policy analysis through the English School becomes richer within a dialogue with a more holistic constructivism.

The governance system diversity in the changing contemporary international order is related to an intense process of identity reconstruction and the reformulation of state and its *demos* relation. The thesis briefly presented here strives to consider Russia role in international society based on how this actor intersubjectively catches the foreign structure against which it acts and reacts. Therefore, it will be needed a historical inquiry on identity forces that compose Russian perception of the national. Identity is understood then as an intersubjective social construction process that is chronologically and locally altered, and is produced and reproduced by individuals connected to social categories (KLOTZ; LYNCH, 2007, p. 65).

State formation as a cultural component is central (RAE, 2003). In this sense, domestic society constitutes the state political body from its unification by means of a cohesive identity that is able to relate itself to a representative political administration. In this process, leaders and elites use identity discourse consciously or not to solidify and centralize their power on territorial boundaries of other state. In this discursive construction, the outsider is defined, that is, the *Other* against which the national identity body will make opposition. Nevertheless, it can pave the way for a pathological homogenization action, justifying institutionalized exclusion policies against certain individuals or certain collective entities. Therefore, national identity must be understood and reproduced as inherent and immutable by the identified ones.

The nation-state would, then, overcome its competitors due to its capacity to answer authori-

ty and centralization requirements, along with the demand for legitimate foreign recognition (SPRUYT, 1994). Ruggie (1993) stresses the intimate relation between state formation and culture, that is comprehended in Bourdian terms as a *habitus* created from a purposive design made by actors (BOURDIEU, 1990). For the author, this interaction changed the way a political community rearticulated during the medieval period around the Church, and transferred political authority for the individualized *Self* in modernity and for a clear demarcation between public and private, between domestic and international. This new perspective is, initially, still understood culturally under dynastic terms. The nobility premise, though, is surpassed with the growing post-First World War nationalism, and turned itself to the state territorial space, and, then, to popular sovereignty.

The political elite responsible for creating or keeping the state existence while the sovereign political entity is worried about personifying, symbolizing, and fomenting imagination on the identity it tries to sustain connected currently to nationalism (RAE, 2003). Gellner (1983) understand nationalism as a powerful force that elicits elites to define state identity and legitimize their own power. Within the international realm, hence, "is negotiated out of interaction within intersubjectively identifiable communities and it is this institution which legitimates the state as an agent in international social life" (RAE, 2003, p. 16). Therefore, a state interest projection towards its legitimation, coexistence, and cooperation relations with international society has a mutual influence with the state identity. Interests can be understood as aims that inform the actor behavior and are constructed from its identity structure informed by a narrative basis that gives meaning to the material purpose (RAE, 2003). Moreover, the macrostructure in which identity, as an intersubjective social process,

and the domestic elites agency towards mobilizing ideational resources can equally influence identities and interests.

The constructivist theory makes it possible to understand such a relation between identity and interests due to its historical and sociological effort for granting relevance to state own normative, ideational, and material structures related to their *demos* and the international society where they act. Price and Reus-Smit (1998) challenges the odds of comprehending material resources as power and richness outside a subjective reality that gives meaning to it, since it is this same reality that would permit understand how these instruments will be used in the political world. On one hand, the domestic political elites use internal and external symbolic resources to reinvent identitarian forces that could legitimate its power at home. On the other, international society is used as a structural framework that gives meaning and limits these elites action by defining the state formation and rightful membership conditions. As a consequence,

(...) the society of states evolves standards of legitimate corporate state behavior. International society thus plays an active role in state-building, as international principles of legitimate state action define, in part, how corporate state-building *should* occur. What is more, this is a two-way relationship (RAE, 2003, p. 23).

The analysis of an empirical problem based on the dialogue between constructivists and the English School dialogue can contribute for shedding some light on the contemporary multiple realities. Bearing that on mind, this article proposes to apply theoretical concepts from both streams that would overcome the agent-structure dichotomy and the materialist assumptions as a way to direct efforts for better understanding Russia and its role in the post-Cold War international society.

Russian foreign policy and the international society

The end of the Cold War and the bipolar order transformed the 1990 in an environment of high systemic uncertainty. It can be observed that the global international society under formation is highly heterogeneous. It finds challenging, therefore, to surpass its apparent inability to present international norms that can truly constrain international great powers behavior (BELLAMY, 2009). Within this context described by Vladimir Putin, current Russian president, as a polycentric and emergent world,⁴ Russia seeks to consolidate its role in the international arena. Its continental dimension that almost occupies one tenth of Earth, its hydrocarbons richness, its global economy share, its military arsenal, and its history in international politics makes its foreign policy aim almost naturally on finding a highlighted spot for the country, whose identitarian configuration and social practices were build as having for main *Other* Europe, and, today, the West (HOPF, 2008).

Haukkala (2008) discusses the role played by Russia during history concerning primary rules responsible for constructing international society legitimacy. The author identifies two possible roles. The norm maker is a state responsible for actively formulating the constitutive principle over which legitimacy and rightful membership are built, and, afterwards, construct the second order rules. The norm taker, on its turn, must obey the constitutive principle set out in order to be recognized as a peer. Table 1 summarizes Haukkala thought (2008, p. 53):

4. Statements made by Vladimir Putin during an interview to the Cuban agency Prensa Latina. See PRENSA LATINA. **Putín por una América Latina unida, sostenible e independiente.** Available in http://prensa-latina.cu/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=1&id=2871011&Itemid=1. Accessed on July 17th, 2014.

Table 1. Russia role for legitimacy constitution during history.

Period	International legitimacy constitutive principle	Russia role
17 th and 18 th centuries	Religion	Initially, Russia is not a full member. After Westphalia, it becomes a norm taker.
19 th century	Monarchy	Initially, a norm maker. Later, a norm taker.
20 th century during interwar	Nationalism	Not a full member between 1917 and 1930. Afterwards, a superficial norm taker.
Cold War	Territorial control	Key norm maker.
Post-Cold War	Liberal democracy, free-trade, and human rights	Norm taker.

Source: HAUKKALA, 2008, p. 53 (adapted).

Nevertheless, though Haukkala (2008) deals with the post-Cold War, his reflection is not deepened to consider 21st century Russian role, especially considering the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) enlargement, the post-September 11st, the 2008 global crisis, and, mainly, the current Ukrainian crisis. These events are central for comprehending how Russia behaves in front of such structural changes.

A relevant instrument for such discursive mobilization is the constitution of the difference through opposition against the *Other*. Hopf (2008), as previously pointed out, indicates Europe and the West as the main alterity reference for Russian national identity. Elite discursive mobilization of this distinction is strengthened during the 17th and the 18th centuries with the debate between Slavophil and westernizer forces (NEUMAN, 1996). The czarist Russia relations with Western Europe are further pushed by Peter the Great reforms, what made possible a sharper contrast with the alterity and a deeper social division within the political elite that whether defended the imitation of the West or supported an alternative path that could respect Russian uniqueness.⁵

5. These categories do not presented them monolithically. As time passed, they showed some internal divisions. For instance,

During its history, Russia presents distinct identitarian forces conformation, what can be understood partially as a consequence of structural changes happened in the period.⁶ As demonstrated by Haukkala (2008), Russian rightful membership and its role for the international society constitutive principle changed over time. Considering Russia participation and its interest for a differentiated international insertion from its historical legacy, it can be observed that identitarian forces were differently mobilized. One of the paths followed was the defense of certain domestic regimes as a way to correspond

Slavophiles, according to Neumann (2008), were divided into xenophobic and non-xenophobic groups, and the Westernizers turned into liberal, socialist, and Marxist streams.

6. Hopf (2008) writes about a Russia that swings between the desire of see its European nature recognized; a Russia that consciously transforms itself into European, and a Russia transcends Europe to search for a way to reaffirm its uniqueness. Tsygankov (2010) suggests three schools of thought on Russian identity over time – occidentalism, statism, and civilizationism. During the post-Cold War, Thorun (2009) recognizes the presence of identities that would translate the alterity into liberal ideas incorporation (1992-1994), into geopolitical realism (1993-2000), into geoeconomic realism (2000-2004), and into cultural geostrategic realism (2004-2007). Kuchins and Zevelev (2012) consider Russian identity in contemporary international society as composed of pro-Western liberals, great powers balancers, and nationalists. Finally, Clunan (2009) brings about seven classifications on recent Russian identity components. These distinct orientations led to a diverse interest formation that is translated into political mobilization, and, consequently, discursive mobilization of Russian leaders and political elite.

to the constitutive principle of a given time, and, hence, promoting Russian role within this structure.

The current Russian position and international society character resembles the 19th century. In this opportunity, Russia was raised as a norm maker during the Congress of Vienna through a conservative stance concerning international society primary rules, mobilizing initially Slavophil forces and the defense of a despotic political regime based on an alternative Christianity. In the 19th second half, the foreign minister Gorchakov adopts a more Westernizer discourse and a hesitant norm taker role. From 1998 on and a clearer NATO persistence and enlargement, Russian elite effectively downplays Westernizers forces into a more *sui generis* identitarian combination searching for a balance within intersubjectivities and the diverse approaches on the West. This strategy has made Russia mobilize a reformist contesting foreign policy against international order based on the defense of an alternative political regime.

This reformist, though not revolutionary, regime is known as Slavic democracy (DUGIN, 2012), and it is a consequence of the bureaucratic centralization resumed from 2000 on when Vladimir Putin arrived at the government. Nevertheless, the power concentration on the leader reproduces an idolatry relation between the leader and the *de-mos*. In this sense, a strong state is not mistaken by something totalitarian or bad even for popular participation by identitarian forces in Russia. This domestic governance reproduces previous models as Ivan IV and Joseph Stalin rules. At the same time, elements of the Western liberal model are also incorporated into this particular conception of state, by means of free trade and a human rights protection different sense. However, it still does not correspond directly to US or European models that are basis for contemporary global international society legitimacy, and poses a challenge

for understanding Russian foreign policy and internal politics bridges in the post-Cold War era.

Final remarks

The defense of a Slavic democracy is projected by Russian foreign policy today as a way to legitimize its interest on keeping its rightful membership to international society and become a stronger norm maker for its constitutive principle. Such strategy reflects an internal homogenization discourse that is read internationally as a challenging proposal for post-Cold War international order, even if it is not necessarily revolutionary. The consequent impact of this dynamics for international stability credits relevance for such a research within International Relations field, considering that there are few following this line of reasoning nowadays on Russia. A dialogue between constructivism and English School can enable scholars to update such empiric inquiry at the same time it contributes for development theoretical encounters within the discipline.

The hybrid theoretical model briefly presented here can shed some light into such a mysterious actor and its tension between a norm maker and a norm taker role. From an agrarian state to great world power, an analysis based sole on rational interest would not be able to fully understand Russian foreign behavior in the post-Cold War era. The internal government change from Yeltsin rule to Putin-Medvedev in an specific political model historically built, along side with a different international context, represents a structural and normative framework with which Russia perception of itself interact. To better comprehend this dynamic by applying English School theory combined with constructivism to this study case proves itself as a promising research agenda to be further detailed following a mediative epistemology.

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Climate Change as Environmental International Security Issue: The Threat of Global Warming in Small Island States

*Mudança Climática como Questão de Segurança Ambiental Internacional:
A ameaça do Aquecimento Global nos Pequenos Estados Ilha*

Letícia Britto dos Santos¹

Abstract

This paper discusses the process of securitization of climate change. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) is seen as a securitizer agent and the Small Island States as an audience. The possibility of those countries disappearing is a threat to the national and the human security.

Keywords: *Securitization, Climate Change and Small Islands States*

Sumário

Este artigo discute o processo de securitização da mudança climática. O Painel Intergovernamental sobre Mudanças Climáticas (IPCC) é visto como um agente securitizador e os Pequenos Estados Ilha como seu público. A possibilidade destes países desaparecerem é uma ameaça à segurança nacional e humana.

Palavras-chave: *Securitização, Mudança Climática; Pequenos Estados Ilha*

1. Doutoranda no Departamento de Relações Internacionais.

Introduction

This study aims to present new security concepts that expand the traditional concept of security and allow us to consider “new” threats. The second section will present the new theme of security in International Relations, the concepts of human security and environmental security as they were originally formulated and currently understood; then will present the Securitization Theory of the Copenhagen School, which takes into consideration how the idea of security is built in the speech act and how the audience is persuaded to see climate change as a risk to human security. The third section will contextualize climate change, presenting an overview of its historic international regime and the related organizations, analyzing the role of the IPCC in the securitization process of climate change. The fourth section will analyze the Small Island States as an audience of the securitization process of climate change. In the fifth, and final, section, the conclusion is presented.

The new theme of security in International Relations

The field of security studies has become one of the most dynamic and contested ones in International Relations in recent decades (Williams, 2003 *apud* Barbosa, 2008). Among the formulators of the new theme of securitization is the Copenhagen School, of which the work of Barry Buzan and Ole Waever is associated, and it has developed the Theory of Securitization. This theory highlights the political nature of the security as a speech act, challenging the traditional approach to security and introducing a social constructivist perspective. This theory considers how problems are transformed into security issues (Barbosa, 2008).

Human Security

The concept of security, according to the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) (1994), was primarily viewed as security of a territory from external aggression, the protection of national interests in foreign policy, or as international security meaning when all countries perceive the same threat, e.g., a nuclear risk. This concept relates more to nation-states than to people.

The concept of human security, presented in the UNDP Report of 1994, states that the international system should protect both national sovereignty and individual rights and, therefore, the concept of security should be reformed. Thus, human security is a universal concern and is relevant to people all over the world, whether they live in rich or poor countries, and many threats are common to all, such as drugs, crime, pollution, and violations of human rights. According to the UNDP, the intensity may differ from one part of the world to another, but the threats to human security are real and growing.

The concept of human security, according to the UNDP (1994), is people-centered and is concerned with how human beings live in society and whether they live in conflict or in peace. The report also states that it is less costly to protect human security by early preventative measures than by later intervention. According to the UNDP Human Development Report (1994, p. 24):

The list of threats to human security is long, but most can be considered under seven main categories: economic security, food security, health security, environmental security, personal security, community security, and political security

Human security is focused on protecting the basis/center of society vital core in order to protect and improve upon human freedom in threatening situations. There must be willingness and the ability to maintain security and

stability in the integration of political, social, environmental, economic, military, and cultural systems (Liotta and Taylor, 2006). Human security is a perspective on the study when it comes to addressing threats to the survival of societies, groups, and individuals.

Environmental Security

Thus, national security primarily involves military issues related to the defense of territoriality, sovereignty, and threats that a country has already received. Other human security issues involve the protection of individuals at risk due to certain threats, among which are the ones related to environmental issues that pose threats to human life itself.

It is understood that the notion of environmental security is even broader than the human security, because threats such as natural disasters and global warming are endangering the lives of other species and threatening the Earth's ecosystems, which are indispensable to the maintenance of any life form.

Discussions as to whether or not to consider the environment as an issue of security for international relations purposes, according to McDonald (2005), do not consider one central question to evaluate the socially constructed character of international security as an academic discipline. Therefore, the question of whether or not the problem is a security issue, presupposes the existence of a universal concept of security, and, according to this author, security is a term that has different meanings for different groups of people at different times and for different situations.

These questions would be more consistent, according to McDonald (2005), if we understood what type of security we are approaching or conceptualizing when we consider the issues of environmental changes. Thus, you might think of global climate change as a matter of socially constructed international security due to the nature of

the threat to human life, the ecosystem, and the international system.

Because the issue of security should be focused on the survival of humanity, when environmental issues began threatening the survival of humanity, these issues were included in the security agenda. Given the catastrophic impact that environmental changes could have on the international society, these issues have started to become a threat to the international system.

Several post-positivist theorists and scholars of the subject of security, have pointed to the open nature of the concept of security in this context, although this argument was addressed more thoroughly by the Copenhagen School.

Securitization Theory – The Copenhagen School

According to Buzan, Wæver & Wild (1998) the end of bipolarity after the Cold War provided more space for the globalization and integration of countries and the advent of a new international setting expanding the concept of international security in international relations. No longer left to rely only on classical realism, there was now room for new perspectives in security studies. In addition to the military issue, new phenomena were considered threats to states and individuals, such as terrorist networks, economic crises, global epidemics, and environmental variations, which are considered global risks. This leads us to the Copenhagen School's study of security threats as constructed through social interaction (Buzan, 1997).

The concept of securitization proposed by the Copenhagen School is based on the constructivist perspective of the social world, as well as the identities and interests of actors and structures and is built by intersubjective and collective processes. While traditionalists link the study of the existence of objective security threats, the Copenhagen

School authors consider that securitization and the criterion of securitization are intersubjective practices through which one securitizer agent demands to socially establish the existence of a threat to a group survival (Buzan et al, 1998, pp. 29-31).

This criterion is based on an analysis of specific contexts on which security is built, offering insight into the meaning of security policy. In certain communities, a special situation can arise where a particular matter is transformed into a security issue of paramount importance that needs to be addressed immediately.. (McDonald, 2005).

Security is understood as protecting fundamental values from potential threats to nations, reinforcing the responsibility of addressing vulnerable populations. If a legitimate political issue exists, especially if you accept the argument that the definition of a problem is a matter of security, this will allow exceptional measures to be taken through various policy responses (Buzan et al., 1998).

The Copenhagen School initiated discourse to analyze the process by which a particular issue is considered a security issue. For Buzan et al. (1998), securitization is a “speech act.” Security does not refer to a physical object, security is an idea that involves interactions between individuals through discourse that an act is to be considered. By saying the word security, a state representative refers to an event in a specific area that demands a special right to use any means that may be necessary to avoid the event (Buzan et al., 1998).

Thus, we seek to understand the securitization of new issues on the international agenda such as environmental issues, specifically the issue of climate change. Scientists, especially those involved with the IPCC, have built a causal connection between climate change and the related consequences by focusing on the changes to natural phenomena such as: rising oceans, melting glaciers, changes in rain patterns, and floods in various regions of the planet.

The consequences that relate to the lives of individuals are perceived as threats to current economic conditions. Because this is a new phenomenon that, according to scholars, creates risks and uncertainties in the relations between actors in the international system and because it may pose threats to individuals, issues such as ensuring access to water, the need for protection against extreme weather events such as floods and droughts, and also uncertainties about the future existence of Small Islands States have been seen as security issues and are being urgently addressed in international conferences for the protection of life and to guarantee the conditions of human survival.

Contextualizing climate change: IPCC as securitizer agent

Scientists from the IPCC believe that global warming² can change the Earth's climate, contributing to the intensification of some natural phenomena, such as droughts, rising sea levels, melting glaciers, changes in rainfall patterns resulting in major flooding in several regions of the planet, and increased occurrences of hurricanes, cyclones, and typhoons. (IPCC, 1990)

The trajectory and the role of the IPCC in the International Regime on Climate Change is to provide information on which states will base decisions. Thus, in 1990, the IPCC concluded from the analysis of a data set that emissions of greenhouse gases (GHGs) in the atmosphere increased as a result of uncontrolled human activities. (IPCC, 1990) The Human activity was identified as the driving force of climate change. One can anticipate that the securitizer content of the IPCC speech act

2. Global warming is defined by the IPCC as a global temperature increase that has been observed in the last 150 years due to the increase of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere (IPCC, 1990)

was accepted by various actors in the international system who understood the necessity to establish multilateral measures and conditions for international cooperation in order to reach an agreement on how to solve the common problem.

Faced with this information, developing countries have heeded the warnings put forth by the IPCC and have begun to address the issue of climate change from the perspective that Small Island States are the biggest “victims” of global warming. As a result, small island states have blamed developed countries for the threats posed by climate change.

One of the indications that the issue has been securitized is that fact that there have been discussions on the topic at meetings of the Security Council³ of the United Nations (UN). The issue of climate change was first brought to the Security Council on April 17, 2007⁴ to discuss its implications for international peace and security. According to the Foreign Secretary of the United Kingdom, Margaret Beckett, “*climate change referred not to the issue of national security,*” but the “*collective security in a fragile and increasingly interdependent world,*” thus transforming “*the way the international community thinks about security*” (Barbosa, 2008).

At this time, it was predicted that the rise in sea level by the end of the century would be between 20 and 60 cm. However, according to new studies by the IPCC, the most likely rise could exceed one meter, due to the acceleration of melting glaciers. According to the speech acts of IPCC scientists, this increase would be significant enough to threaten the existence of most of the coastal towns

and small developing countries, such as the islands of the Maldives and Tuvalu (IPCC, 2007).

On June 21, 2011, the Second Meeting on Climate Change of the Security Council of the United Nations was held, and they discussed the risks of climate change on food security and global peace. There were divergent opinions on whether or not to treat the issue as a matter of international security (Lipinski 2011).

The most vulnerable countries, like Nauru, the smallest island nation in the world, questioned whether the opinions at the meeting would be different if more nations were being affected by climate change. Nauru President Marcus Stephen asked, “What if the pollution coming from our island nations was threatening the existence of the major emitters? What would be the nature of today’s debate under those circumstances?” (Lipinski 2011).

After discussing this issue, the members of the Security Council reached an agreement that would incorporate the projections of climate change in its global report on local issues and suggested that member countries develop a text on the possible implications of climate change on security. They also considered that, apart from the consequences of climate change in the short-term such as rising seas and drought, there could also be long-term impacts such as changes in food production, the migration of inhabitants, and territorial conflicts in the Pacific Islands and countries in Africa. Following the reports issued by the IPCC, many still believed that the effects of climate change would continue (Lipinski 2011).

Small Islands States: The audience of the securitization process of climate change

The Small Islands States are organized in a coalition called the Alliance of Small Island States

3. More information can be found at: <http://www.unep.org/newscentre/Default.aspx?DocumentID=2646&ArticleID=8817&cl=en>.

4. The Security Council recognized other UN agencies (in particular the Framework UN Convention on Climate Change) that will pursue other aspects of climate change (including negotiations on the stabilization of concentrations of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere) that are not under the mandate of the Security Council (DE SOUSA, 2009).

(AOSIS). In 1990, during the Second World Conference on the Environment, held in Geneva the AOSIS presented itself as a unique diplomatic corps and since then has been characterized as a diplomatic entity at the UN. It is accepted that the recognition by the international society of small island states as an alliance was something gained over time (Abreu, 2011).

These countries are allies because they share challenges and concerns about environmental development and because of their shared susceptibility to environmental disasters, especially in terms of climate change as warned by the IPCC. These countries also have geographic and demographic similarities such as small populations, a lack of transportation resources, remoteness, and a dependence on international trade, among others.

Being countries with few capabilities, including financial and political resources and little influence in the international system, it is likely they would have difficulty being heard in this scenario. (ALLIANCE OF SMALL ISLAND STATES, 2013). This alliance works as a bargaining tool and represents these nations so that their needs are brought to the international community. The individual actions of members of AOSIS do not have a strong chance of success and the formation of the coalition is the best alternative for this group of coastal countries. (Abreu, 2011).

These goals reflect on how the audience receives Small Islands States, and based on the securitizer speech act and the IPCC reports, the very creation of the alliance was based on the belief that these are the countries that have contributed least to the increase of global warming and, admittedly, would be the first to suffer the dramatic consequences of this phenomenon.

AOSIS has a membership of 44 states and observers from all oceans and regions of the world including Africa, the Caribbean, the Indian Ocean,

the Mediterranean, the Pacific Ocean, and the South China Sea. The states are Antigua and Barbuda, Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Cape Verde, Comoros, Cook Islands, Cuba, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Fiji, Federated States of Micronesia, Grenada, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Jamaica, Kiribati, Maldives, Marshall Islands, Mauritius, Nauru, Niue, Palau, Papua New Guinea, Puerto Rico, Samoa, Singapore, Seychelles, Sao Tome and Principe, Solomon Islands, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, Suriname, Timor Leste, Tonga, Trinidad and Tobago, Tuvalu, and Vanuatu. The observers are American Samoa, Netherlands Antilles, Guam, and the Virgin Islands of the United States. Of these, 37 are members of the United Nations, corresponding 28% of the UN developing countries, and the AOSIS makes up 20% of all UN members. Together, they constitute five percent of the world population (ALLIANCE OF SMALL ISLAND STATES, 2014).

Members of AOSIS are geographically divided into three regions: the Caribbean; the Atlantic, Indian, and Mediterranean; and the Pacific, as shown in Table 3. Each region has specific needs and interests, but AOSIS seeks to find common ground between participants so that everyone can be represented equitably (Abreu, 2011).

Conclusion

Given that security issues in general have, at least implicitly, a position of value and ideology, in this case, the issue of security was focused on the survival of humanity and contained ideologies or value positioning imposed by the IPCC: the belief in global warming. This issue is addressed as a problem relating to human and environmental safety, as environmental issues have come to be interpreted as a risk to human life itself. Then, it proceeds to be included in the security agenda, as was seen in the

section dedicated to the expansion of the themes of the international security agenda.

The theory of the Copenhagen School, securitization, warned of the political nature of the security action, which was often observed in this study through the IPCC reports. Thus, it is a challenge to the traditional approach of security because from the social constructivist perspective, the problem of climate change and the impacts on the global hydrological cycle, were established through the social interactions of these security speech acts and conferences and were then transformed into a security issue.

Beginning with the idea that speech is a practice, an action by a person in the world founded on an interpretation can construct a truth. Thus, though the IPCC claims that its reports are neutral, it discusses certain subjects that interact with other subjects in international society (as in the case of the Small Islands States), and this can influence values and beliefs.

The security speech act by the IPCC denotes a threatening tone, which ultimately makes the Small Islands States reveals its beliefs that the subject should be treated as a security issue. Vulnerable states are in a condition that applies both to the effects of climate change as well as to the political discussions and deliberations on the environment.

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A difusão da Escola Inglesa na América Latina: a EI e o discurso diplomático brasileiro

The diffusion of English School in Latin America: ES and the Brazilian diplomatic discourse

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Resumo

O presente artigo pretende analisar a influência da Escola Inglesa no discurso diplomático brasileiro e, assim, sua política externa. Nesse sentido, almeja-se examinar a utilização desta abordagem teórica e de sua agenda de pesquisa na produção de conhecimento sobre relações internacionais e na prática diplomática do Brasil. Este artigo faz parte de um projeto de pesquisa que almeja analisar a difusão da Escola Inglesa entre as academias e a prática diplomática latino-americanas. Todavia, nesta fase preliminar da pesquisa, focaremos no tema específico supracitado: política externa e discurso diplomático brasileiro.

Palavras-chave: Teoria das Relações Internacionais; Escola Inglesa; Brasil; América Latina

Abstract:

This paper intends to analyse the influence of the English School in Brazilian diplomatic discourse and, hence, its foreign policy. In this sense, it aims to analyse the use of this approach and its research agenda on the knowledge production about international relations and on the diplomatic practices of Brazil. This paper is part of a research project that aims to analyse English School's diffusion on Latin American scholarship and diplomatic practice. However, on this preliminary stage of the research we will focus on the aforementioned specific issue: Brazilian foreign policy and diplomatic discourse.

Key-words: International Relations Theory; English School; Brazil; Latin America.

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Introdução

O presente artigo faz parte de um projeto de pesquisa que pretende analisar a difusão da Escola Inglesa entre a produção intelectual e os debates diplomáticos latino-americanos sobre as relações internacionais. Assim, esta pesquisa almeja examinar a utilização desta abordagem teórica e de sua agenda de pesquisa na produção de conhecimento sobre relações internacionais da América Latina. Este artigo, contudo, recorta este tema mais amplo para abordar, de forma mais detalhada, a presença da Escola Inglesa no discurso diplomático brasileiro.

Apesar de a política internacional ter sido foco de interesse de tomadores de decisão e intelectuais latino-americanos desde época anterior à formação dos Estados na região, o estudo das relações internacionais (assim como da Ciência Política) tem uma história mais recente na América Latina. Estes estudos deram-se através do diálogo com entendimentos das relações internacionais ao redor do globo (através da formação intelectual e do trabalho profissional de diplomatas e acadêmicos), o que permitiu a construção de um híbrido latino-americano, que *picks and chooses* e traduz conceitos teóricos de diferentes tipos de abordagens e compreensões de mundo; assim mesclando contribuições e criando novas compreensões latino-americanas do que constitui o internacional (Tickner, 2002, 2009).

Dentro deste contexto, este artigo procura examinar a presença da Escola Inglesa neste híbrido latino-americano. O trabalho está dividido em três seções, além desta introdução e da conclusão: a primeira é uma introdução aos principais conceitos da Escola Inglesa, destacando-se a sua ênfase na tradição grociana das RI; a segunda faz um breve histórico dos estudos das relações internacionais na América Latina e no Brasil; e a terceira analisa o papel da Escola Inglesa dentro do discurso diplomático brasileiro. A metodologia deste trabalho consiste, então,

em uma pesquisa analítica, que busca identificar o espaço ocupado pela Escola Inglesa dentro do discurso diplomático brasileiro por meio de entrevistas com embaixadores e acadêmicos brasileiros e de estudo crítico bibliográfico de obras referentes à Escola Inglesa e ao discurso diplomático brasileiro. Posteriormente, os objetivos mais amplos do projeto de pesquisa serão incluídos neste trabalho, que discutirá como os conceitos da Escola Inglesa foram incorporados pela academia e diplomacia latino-americanas.

A Escola Inglesa e a Tradição Grociana

Desde o final dos anos 1950, a Escola Inglesa é formada por um grande grupo de acadêmicos, baseados geograficamente, em sua maioria, no Reino Unido; que concordam em tratar a perspectiva da sociedade internacional como uma importante forma de interpretar a política mundial. Entre os autores de sua primeira geração, estão Charles Manning, Martin Wight, Hedley Bull, Adam Watson, Alan James e John Vincent. Entre os autores recentes, podemos citar Andrew Hurrell, James Mayall, Robert Jackson, Tim Dunne e Nicholas Wheeler (Suganami, 2003: 256-7)³. A Escola Inglesa é identificada por sua ênfase no conceito de sociedade internacional e nas chamadas três tradições. Conforme desenvolvido por Hedley Bull (1977: 13), tal conceito pressupõe a existência de um grupo de Estados que se consideram ligados por certos valores e interesses comuns. Seu relacionamento acontece por um conjunto comum de regras e instituições. Essa ênfase demonstra as preocupações normativas dos membros da Escola Inglesa com as regras, normas, leis e princípios de legitimidade que sustentam a ordem mundial.

3. Sobre a história da Escola Inglesa e seu desenvolvimento, ver Dunne (1998), Souza (2003), Linklater e Suganami (2006) e Buzan (2014).

Nesse sentido, ao se analisar um determinado contexto internacional a Escola procura focar na prática, ou seja, os significados e as justificações que os agentes dão para suas ações. E, ao mesmo tempo em que procura enxergar a historicidade de tais práticas, busca apoio na teoria política internacional para informar sobre as bases dos julgamentos morais destas ações e sobre o estado em que estamos (Dunne, 2005: 170). A sociedade internacional reflete um ordenamento precário e difícil de ser mantido, mesmo quando suas instituições funcionam adequadamente. Ela varia não somente de acordo com as mudanças na distribuição de poder, como nos dizem os realistas, mas, principalmente, com as mudanças dos princípios de legitimidade que estão em sua base.

Há uma tensão subjacente à ordem internacional. Isso porque as três tradições da política mundial – revolucionista, racionalista e realista – convivem simultaneamente. A tradição revolucionista, representada, entre outros, no pensamento internacional por Kant, o qual acredita que a unidade moral essencial não é o Estado, mas os indivíduos. Os revolucionistas ou universalistas, dependendo da sua vertente (marxista-leninista, jacobina, fascista, liberal) pregam a solidariedade ou o conflito transnacional, que atravessam fronteiras. A tradição realista, representada por Maquiavel e Hobbes, destaca o elemento do conflito e da guerra nas relações internacionais. Para a Escola Inglesa, toda política é política de poder. A tradição racionalista, cujo representante máximo é Hugo Grócio, é descrita por Martin Wight (1966: 91) como uma *via media* entre as duas tradições. Os racionalistas são os maiores defensores da ideia de uma sociedade internacional. Enfatizam os elementos da cooperação, da diplomacia e do comércio. Para Wight (1991) as três tradições de pensamento refletiam a interpenetração entre a teoria e a prática da política: a teoria, através da análise e classificação de escri-

tos dos teóricos das respectivas tradições; a prática, através da análise dos discursos e das ações de diversos estadistas.

O Estudo das Relações Internacionais na América Latina e no Brasil

Como já introduzido, o estudo das relações internacionais na América Latina é de formação recente, sendo que sua institucionalização data da década de 1960. Os antecedentes à formalização destes estudos datam da década de 1930, quando da criação do primeiro centro de estudos latino-americano de assuntos internacionais, fundado por um grupo de acadêmicos chilenos inspirados pelo aumento do grau de participação da região nas relações internacionais através da Liga das Nações e da Organização Mundial do Trabalho (Lagos, 1980).

A experiência internacional da América Latina instigou a elite intelectual latino-americana das décadas seguintes a formular maneiras de entender seu processo de inserção e interação com o internacional. Assim surge, no seio da CEPAL (Comissão Econômica para América Latina), intelectuais que se dedicam a entender e a criar bases de ação para política externa e o desenvolvimento da América Latina. Este pensamento logo se ampliou através de trabalhos conduzidos em outras instituições e organizações, como a UNCTAD, o BID e a CECLA. O interesse por temáticas das relações internacionais tem crescido entre intelectuais e diplomatas latino-americanos desde então (Lagos, 1980).

Nesse contexto, a partir da década de 1960, as relações internacionais passam a se constituir como uma área de estudos dentro das academias de vários países latino-americanos. O esforço conjunto da região na criação de saber desta área pode ser visto na instituição da rede de centros acadêmicos RIAL (Programa de Estudos Conjuntos sobre as Relações

Internacionais da América Latina), em 1977⁴, para a promoção do ensino e da pesquisa de relações internacionais na América Latina, objetivando a formação de profissionais capacitados a trabalhar na diplomacia e na academia da região. Novos centros de pesquisa, cursos universitários e de pós-graduação nacionais e regionais foram criados nas décadas seguintes (Tomassini, 1980; Tickner, 2002, 2009).

No caso do Brasil, a formação do quadro de diplomatas nacionais é instituída de forma separada da institucionalização do estudo das relações internacionais na academia. Isto se dá com a criação de um instituto de formação para os selecionados no concurso público⁵ à carreira diplomática brasileira, o Instituto Rio Branco, de 1944, dentro do Ministério das Relações Exteriores – o Itamaraty. Todavia, estes diplomatas não se isolavam dos debates intelectuais que ocorriam no Brasil, na América Latina e no mundo, havendo grande troca de experiências entre a academia e a diplomacia brasileira⁶. Não por acaso, como veremos na próxima seção, os trabalhos acadêmicos de diplomatas serão importantes na divulgação dos estudos da Escola Inglesa no Brasil, a partir dos anos 1980.

Sob os auspícios do regime militar, o estudo das relações internacionais na academia brasileira surge em meados dos anos 1970, quando a academia passa a buscar a compreensão do contexto internacional no qual o Brasil se inseria (caracterizado pela guerra fria, crise da hegemonia estadunidense, crescimento da tendência à multipolaridade nos campos econômico e político) (Hirst, 1992; Herz, 2002) e o entendimento de sua própria posição no mundo (que passava, naquele momento, pelo gran-

de crescimento do país devido ao “milagre econômico”) (Miyamoto, 1999).

Esta busca inicia a institucionalização da esparsa literatura já existente no país sobre temas de relações internacionais e política exterior⁷ na medida em que culmina na criação, em 1973, de cadeiras de Relações Internacionais e Política Internacional em alguns cursos de Ciências Sociais em São Paulo; e, em 1974, na criação do primeiro curso universitário de RI e, em 1976, a pós-graduação em História das Relações Exteriores do Brasil pela Universidade de Brasília – UnB (Miyamoto, 1999).

O primeiro curso universitário de Relações Internacionais no Brasil foi criado na UnB, em 1974, a partir de contribuições substantivas de acadêmicos de diversos campos de conhecimento (historiadores, cientistas políticos, especialistas em direito internacional e economistas) (Herz, 2002) e de diplomatas do Itamaraty. Num contexto em se que ensaiava a abertura do regime militar brasileiro (Miyamoto, 1999), mesmo que o sistema universitário ainda fosse reprimido pelo regime de exceção que restringia os assuntos passíveis de serem abordados pela academia, houve apoio decisivo por parte do governo militar⁸ – através do Itamaraty – na consolidação deste curso (Jatobá, 2013). Assim, contou-se com a presença de vários diplomatas no corpo de professores do curso de RI na UnB durante suas duas primeiras décadas de existência (Jatobá, 2013).

Em meio a este contexto de apoio à institucionalização da área, foram promovidos vários congressos e painéis de temática internacional, levados a cabo por instituições governamentais, universidades e centros de pesquisas nacionais e agências

4. Que manteve suas atividades até a década de 1990 (Tickner, 2002, 2009).

5. O concurso público para a seleção dos diplomatas brasileiros foi instaurado em 1931.

6. Ver o trabalho de Pinheiro & Vedoveli (2012) que debate o status dos diplomatas brasileiros também como intelectuais e seus interlacs com a academia brasileira.

7. Principalmente no que tange a história diplomática brasileira (Almeida, 1993), estudos geoestratégicos e militares (Miyamoto, 1999; Jatobá, 2013), questões relacionadas à Bacia do Prata (Miyamoto, 1999) e trabalhos inspirados pelo pensamento cepalino (Herz, 2002).

8. O apoio dos militares se deu em função da busca pelo fortalecimento do Estado e de suas capacidades na qual as universidades desempenhavam papel estratégico (JULIÃO, 2009)

de fomento nacionais e internacionais (como a Fundação Ford). Estes seminários contavam com a presença de acadêmicos brasileiros e estrangeiros (os *brazilianistas*) e produziam anais e revistas da temática. Um destes seminários, em 1978, foi o fundador do Conselho Brasileiro de Relações Internacionais (Miyamoto, 1999). Em meados dos anos 1980, o crescimento do campo se deu em outras áreas do país; foram criadas novas cadeiras e programas de graduação e pós-graduação em RI no centro-oeste, sudeste e no sul do país; e também o Grupo de Trabalho sobre Relações Internacionais e Política Externa no interior da Associação Nacional de Pós-Graduação e Pesquisa em Ciências Sociais (Miyamoto, 1999).

O fim da ditadura e o início do processo de abertura e internacionalização da economia brasileira, no final dos anos 1980 em diante, foi o ambiente de expansão dos programas de graduação e pós-graduação em Relações Internacionais no Brasil, sendo os anos 2000 representantes de um *boom* nos cursos de graduação em Relações Internacionais (Herz, 2002; Julião, 2012), em conformidade com o crescimento do ensino superior em geral no Brasil (Barasuol, 2012). Atualmente, espalhados por todas as regiões do Brasil, há 126 programas de graduação em RI e a pós-graduação em RI conta com 12 mestrados e 6 doutorados. A Associação Brasileira de Relações Internacionais (ABRI), criada no ano de 2005, tem buscado consolidar e formalizar a área no Brasil através de diversas maneiras: formalização curricular, promoção de fóruns e eventos, criação de redes regionais etc. (Jatobá, 2013).

Esta primeira seção se encerra com anseios futuros de analisar o espaço da Escola Inglesa dentro das academias e da diplomacia no Brasil e na América Latina. Apesar de obtermos dados de alguns estudos sobre a utilização da Escola Inglesa no ensino e na produção latino-americana sobre as relações interna-

cionais (Tickner, Cepeda & Bernal, 2012; Barasuol, 2012), obtivemos poucas respostas das entrevistas enviadas a acadêmicos e diplomatas. A próxima seção se deterá ao tema no qual a pesquisa mais avançou até o presente momento: a presença da Escola Inglesa no discurso diplomático brasileiro.

A Escola Inglesa e o Discurso Diplomático Brasileiro

Desde o lançamento do livro de Hedley Bull, *The Anarchical Society*, em 1977, alguns diplomatas e acadêmicos brasileiros passaram a utilizá-lo como fonte para suas análises. De forma esparsa e isolada, pois nossos levantamentos indicam a princípio que não houve maiores debates ou repercussões da publicação sobre o livro no Brasil. Como vimos na seção anterior, o estudo das Relações Internacionais nos anos 70 e 80 ainda era incipiente no país. O diplomata José Guilherme Merquior, que a época servia na embaixada brasileira em Londres, estava escrevendo sua tese do Centro de Altos Estudos (CAE) do Instituto Rio Branco, intitulada *O Problema da Legitimidade na Política Internacional*, de 1979 (ver Merquior, 1993) e já incorpora o livro de Bull à sua análise da questão da legitimidade internacional. Talvez mais significativamente, Merquior é um dos responsáveis por apresentar os trabalhos de Bull a dois dos principais autores que serão importantes na difusão da Escola Inglesa no Brasil: Celso Lafer e Gelson Fonseca Jr. (entrevista com Lafer, 2013; e entrevista com Fonseca Jr., 2013). É para o trabalho destes dois autores que nos voltaremos a seguir.

Celso Lafer, advogado e cientista político, é professor emérito e aposentado pela Universidade de São Paulo - USP. Desde o início dos anos 1970, Lafer publica trabalhos sobre Relações Internacionais, sendo um dos pioneiros da área no Brasil, e desde meados desta década volta-se especificamente

para a análise do problema da ordem internacional e suas implicações para a política externa brasileira. Por isso, Lafer conta que, no contexto de diálogos sobre teoria das relações internacionais, Merquior lhe enviou o *The Anarchical Society*, quando foi publicado, por considerar que o livro de Bull seria útil para o aprofundamento do tema da ordem mundial que ele havia analisado anteriormente num ensaio intitulado “Ordem, poder e consenso, caminhos da constitucionalização do Direito Internacional” (Lafer, 1977: cap. 3). Nas palavras de Lafer:

Foi muito pertinente a sugestão de José Guilherme [Merquior], pois um dos méritos da proposta analítica de Bull é a da existência de uma sociedade internacional que vá além do sistema interestatal, pois este sistema interestatal vai criando, por mútuo acordo, normas e instituições para a conduta de suas relações e reconhecem um interesse comum na manutenção destes arranjos para a vida internacional. É a existência destas normas e instituições, destes arranjos, que configuram uma sociedade internacional. Esta enriquece o conceito do sistema, permitindo que a análise das relações internacionais não se veja limitada apenas à discussão das relações de poder entre os estados, incorporando ao mesmo tempo a historicidade e o seu impacto na configuração do sistema internacional. Foi este horizonte reflexivo que me ajudou no aprofundamento do tema da ordem mundial no ensaio que integra *Paradoxos e Possibilidades* (Entrevista com Lafer, 2013).

Este livro de Lafer, *Paradoxos e Possibilidades: Estudos sobre a ordem mundial e sobre a política exterior do Brasil num sistema internacional em transformação*, de 1982, é possivelmente a primeira publicação no Brasil e talvez na América Latina a incorporar de maneira sistemática e consistente os trabalhos de Bull e também de Martin Wight. Assim, no capítulo III deste livro (A política externa, a paz e o legado da Grécia clássica), Lafer baseia-se no livro de Wight, *Systems of States*, de 1977, para analisar algumas modalidades históricas de estrutu-

ração da ordem internacional. É principalmente no capítulo VI (Reflexões sobre o tema da nova ordem internacional num sistema internacional em transformação), ensaio este definido pelo autor como “o núcleo básico deste livro” (Lafer, 1982: 12), que Bull e Wight são utilizados de forma extensiva. Lafer usa o arcabouço destes autores, em meio a referências de direito internacional, para formar a base teórica em que analisará a conjuntura em transformação da época e assim traçar “um quadro de possibilidades de ação”, na expressão de Fonseca Jr. (1998: 260) quando se refere a este ensaio de Lafer, para potências intermediárias como o Brasil. Assim, Lafer está entre os estudiosos que Fonseca Jr. caracteriza, dentro do quadro do desenvolvimento dos estudos das Relações Internacionais no Brasil, como o “autor que simboliza, no mundo acadêmico, a passagem definitiva do prescritivo para o analítico” (ibid.).

Neste ensaio, Lafer usa de Wight sua caracterização do sistema internacional moderno, a crítica à vertente kantiana e sua concepção de balança de poder. Com relação a Bull, é utilizada além da crítica à vertente kantiana, sua análise do gerenciamento da ordem pelas grandes potências, e sua análise do papel do direito internacional. Na conjuntura do início dos anos 1980, Lafer (1982) busca analisar o conteúdo do debate sobre a nova ordem então em discussão, o alcance das reivindicações trazidas pelas demandas dos países subdesenvolvidos e o significado do processo de negociação em curso. Na sua visão, que também refletia uma visão amplamente compartilhada à época, aquele período da política internacional passava por uma disjunção entre ordem e poder. Tal disjunção advinha da perda gradual de legitimidade que cada superpotência enfrentava em seus respectivos blocos de poder, sistemas intrainperiais, na terminologia de Helio Jaguaribe, que era outra referência importante para Lafer. Isto se refletia na crescente dificuldade no

exercício da hegemonia por parte das grandes potências (ibid.: 100).

A esta questão intrainperial somava-se outra, que na época acreditava-se ser uma difusão de poder: a relativa diminuição do poderio norte-americano e o relativo acréscimo de poder soviético. Em função de todas estas dificuldades das grandes potências e em função da consequente disfunção entre ordem e poder, as grandes potências apresentavam dificuldades de “simplificar a pauta da vida internacional” (que, segundo Hedley Bull, citado por Lafer, seria uma das modalidades de gestão da ordem mundial pelas grandes potências – fazendo prevalecer temas e assuntos de seus interesses em detrimento dos interesses de outros Estados). Assim, Lafer pergunta: o que significa esta complexidade da pauta da vida internacional? “Significa que, dadas as redistribuições de poder que se verificaram no sistema internacional, novas demandas e novos interesses têm que ser efetivamente levados em conta” (ibid.: 106). Isso abria possibilidades para os países subdesenvolvidos e especialmente as potências intermediárias, como o Brasil, terem uma participação efetiva na elaboração de uma nova ordem mundial.

O tema da nova ordem era um debate sobre “a estrutura desejável das relações econômicas no mundo”, segundo citação de Robert Cox feita por Lafer. Este via que todos esses *paradoxos* apontados representavam também *possibilidades*, ou seja, recursos de poder para os países subdesenvolvidos na dinâmica do processo de negociação da nova ordem mundial (ibid.: 133). Assim a tese central de sua análise, afinada com o discurso oficial do Itamaraty na época, era de que havia necessidade de uma ação conjunta do Brasil com outros países intermediários para que juntos pudessem ser protagonistas da necessária “dimensão reformuladora” da ordem em transformação. Estes países possuiriam as características necessárias para exercerem “o papel de pon-

te entre tendências contrapostas – a oligopolização e a anarquia, que hoje ameaçam fraturar o sistema internacional”. As potências intermediárias teriam a capacidade de “catalisar uma outra compatibilização de interesses, distinta da que vem caracterizando a gestão do sistema interestatal pelas grandes potências (...). Esta compatibilização de interesses precisará dar nova forma e novo conteúdo à ordem mundial através das possibilidades de variação da desordem, trazidas pela complexidades das reivindicações igualitárias e democráticas dos países subdesenvolvidos” (ibid.: 143-4).

Como hoje sabemos, as potências intermediárias não puderam ou não souberam dar nova forma e conteúdo às suas reivindicações igualitárias e democráticas. Entretanto, para nossos objetivos cabe destacar o ganho analítico, reconhecido pelo próprio autor em citação acima, sobre o tema da ordem internacional que proporcionou a incorporação dos conceitos trabalhados por Bull. Assim, tanto Lafer (ver também Lafer, 1984; 1989) quanto Fonseca Jr. (1987) buscavam se aprofundar no tema da ordem internacional para nela achar os espaços de autonomia⁹ possíveis para potências intermediárias como o Brasil. Acreditava-se que, como vimos, estas podiam servir de pontes entre tendências opostas no sistema internacional e assim ajudar a formar “consensos”, importantes para se levar adiante uma cooperação multilateral em crise nos anos 1980. Posteriormente, Lafer buscará enfatizar esse potencial de formar consensos da política externa brasileira em sua gestão como ministro das Relações Exteriores em 1992, como por exemplo, durante a Conferência das Nações Unidas sobre o Meio Ambiente e Desenvolvimento (ECO-92).

9. O conceito de “autonomia” é fundamental para se compreender o pensamento latino-americano em Relações Internacionais e, conseqüentemente, crucial para se entender os debates em torno da política externa brasileira, principalmente a partir dos anos 1950/60. Para referências importantes sobre o tema ver Moura (1982); Hurrell (1986); Tickner (2003 e 2008); Vigevari e Cepaluni (2009).

As visões brasileiras sobre a sociedade internacional do pós-guerra fria

Conforme destacado por José María Arbilla (2000), no pós-guerra fria, os quadros conceituais da política externa brasileira, assim como a da Argentina, foram atualizados visando incorporar os chamados “novos temas da agenda global” – meio ambiente, terrorismo, narcotráfico, direitos humanos e reformas de mercado – gerados principalmente a partir do primeiro mundo. Nessa seção examinaremos como os conceitos da Escola Inglesa foram incorporados nesses debates sobre os marcos conceituais da política externa brasileira e como isso tem colaborado para a sua difusão no Brasil.

Conforme demonstramos acima, o aprofundamento da análise sobre a ordem internacional, nos anos 1970 e 1980, foi fundamental para que Lafer e Fonseca Jr. tornassem-se dois dos principais analistas sobre a Nova Ordem Internacional do pós-Guerra Fria no Brasil – tanto que Ribeiro (2011: 89), ao analisar o discurso brasileiro sobre as Relações Internacionais nos anos 1990, destacou o que ela chama de o “modelo de Lafer e Fonseca”. Para estes autores o período do pós-guerra fria é marcado por incertezas e se, num primeiro momento foi otimista, com a perspectiva de funcionamento do sistema de segurança coletiva durante a Guerra do Golfo e com a leitura de Francis Fukuyama sobre o chamado “fim da história”; num segundo momento se mostrou pessimista com vários conflitos étnicos, como na Bósnia, e agora marcado pela leitura de Samuel Huntington sobre o “choque de civilizações”. Destacam que é preciso saber responder de maneira rápida e eficiente a esta nova configuração das polaridades indefinidas, como se tivessem buscando um novo projeto de modernização do Estado, agora também através da política externa “só com uma visão própria, portanto autônoma, do processo in-

ternacional, teremos condições de influenciar e de nos valer dessas *indefinições*” (1994:71; ênfases no original). Assim, como nos anos 1980, buscam o lugar das potências intermediárias para influenciar os processos decisórios internacionais.

Ambos os autores veem que a globalização apresenta tanto perigos quanto oportunidades. Criticam a globalização e a nova ordem liberal por tirarem da pauta internacional temas importantes para os subdesenvolvidos como o desenvolvimento, mas, por outro lado, “a autonomia só será exercida com sucesso se levarmos em conta a necessidade de aceitar a inevitabilidade da globalização e soubermos aproveitar a sua dinâmica” (1994:71). Acreditam que “a especificidade do Brasil é compatível com as *forças profundas dos processos de globalização*” e que, portanto, “participar e ativamente dos processos de globalização é algo que se pode fazer sem que se perca o sentido de escolha política (1994:77; ênfases no original).

Possivelmente, o livro que mais divulgou a Escola Inglesa no Brasil é o do embaixador Gelson Fonseca Jr. *A Legitimidade e Outras Questões Internacionais*, de 1998. Além de ter um capítulo em que discute o conceito de ordem internacional a partir das ideias de Hedley Bull, suas análises da legitimidade internacional são baseadas nos autores da Escola Inglesa, principalmente em Martin Wight em seu capítulo “International Legitimacy” do livro *Systems of States*. O livro foi influente, pois além de textos introdutórios que foram adotados para os alunos da graduação, ele trazia uma discussão conceitual sobre a política externa brasileira que se tornou referência por cunhar termos e expressões que passaram a serem referidos tanto nos debates acadêmicos quanto nos círculos diplomáticos.

Suas principais contribuições para o debate são as suas caracterizações do comportamento diplomático brasileiro como sendo de “autonomia pela distância” (durante a Guerra Fria) e “autono-

mia pela participação” (no pós-Guerra Fria). A autonomia pela distância se expressava, em primeiro lugar, por uma distância em relação às ações do Bloco Ocidental quando dizia respeito à engajamentos militares; em segundo, significava manter uma atitude crítica em relação às superpotências. Para Fonseca Jr. (1998: 362), “porque a força não estava no repertório das formas de presença brasileira no mundo, ganhávamos o poder da legitimidade (apoiávamos as maiorias multilaterais em temas como a autonomia palestina, a condenação do *apartheid* ...). A soma dessas atitudes definia o perfil internacional do país”. Essas eram atitudes defensivas, a manutenção de uma distância “qualificada” (ibid.: 360). Se participávamos dos regimes internacionais era mais pela condição de “carona” do que por ter arcado com os custos da ação coletiva (Lima, 1990). No pós-Guerra Fria, contudo, a política externa brasileira engajou-se propositivamente na ordem multilateral de então, passando a buscar o que ficou conhecido por “autonomia pela participação”. Nesse diapasão, o país busca participar da formulação das regras internacionais e não apenas se defender se distanciar de regras que eram feitas por outros e que poderiam interferir com a autonomia. Para Fonseca Jr., são exemplos dessas “atitudes positivas” a forma como o Brasil lidou com os chamados “novos temas”, principalmente na Rio-92 e na II Conferência Mundial de Direitos Humanos, em Viena 1993, onde sua diplomacia teria agido de modo a garantir consensos, para que impasses fossem superados. Para o autor, estas

são questões que só existem porque refletem a necessidade de regras que expressem a dimensão social do internacional. Houve, em determinados momentos, sobretudo os iniciais da composição da agenda, em que algumas dessas regras eram vistas com apreensão pela diplomacia brasileira, como tivessem a marca de uma imposição exterior que levasse a constrangimentos e limitações à autonomia. Creio que isto foi se dissolvendo e, gradual-

mente, a política externa brasileira retoma a sua vocação de participar do esforço de construir regras, de tornar a sociedade mais sociedade... (Entrevista com Fonseca Jr., 2013).

As mudanças ocorridas na política externa geraram um debate sobre, afinal, qual seria o paradigma conceitual que passou a guiá-la no pós-Guerra Fria. Seria o tradicional realismo que orientou a política externa brasileira ao longo do século XX (Lima, 1994; Silva, 1995) ou outras abordagens e paradigmas estariam influenciando a atuação brasileira? Como qualificar a atuação brasileira na década de 1990? Dentre estas contribuições, alguns analistas e diplomatas passaram a identificar a presença de “um componente grotiano significativo na política externa brasileira” (Goffredo Junior, 2005: 98). Celso Lafer destacou, por exemplo, “as constantes grocianas” da atuação brasileira no plano multilateral e, por diversas vezes, se refere à ação do Barão do Rio Branco como inaugurando um estilo grociano que, a seu ver, inspira a política externa brasileira no século XX (2000, p. 47 e 70). Nessa mesma linha, Gelson Fonseca Jr. conceitua o papel internacional brasileiro no século XX como reflexo de uma identidade complexa, mas próxima do ocidente, no que conceituou como um “liberalismo qualificado”, ou seja, “num âmbito de um capitalismo que favorecia modelos de planejamento e a intervenção política, fundado na perspectiva do Welfare State” (1998: 275).

Letícia Pinheiro (2000) sugere, em um sofisticado esforço tipológico, que estando os velhos paradigmas do universalismo ou globalismo (e sua vertente grotiana: 1961/64) e do americano (e suas vertentes pragmática: 1902/45, 1951/61 e 1967/74; e ideológica: 1946/51 e 1964/67) superados e esgotados, seja pelo fim da Guerra Fria ou pelo fim do modelo econômico de Industrialização por Substituição de Importações, a atuação internacional brasileira seria melhor caracterizada como “institucionalismo pragmático”. Para ela, a atuação brasileira

mantém, no seio do projeto neoliberal, o realismo do “desejo de autonomia”, por mais que nesse novo contexto seja colocado a frente um discurso mais principista e mesmo moral ao se enfatizar a adesão às normas internacionais. Sua hipótese é que “essas visões se completam” (ibid.: 322) e serão usadas de acordo com os interesses em jogo. Assim, no plano internacional quando atua globalmente o país teria mais ganhos em defender uma lógica multilateral; já no plano regional o país atuaria de forma a não favorecer uma maior institucionalização da região de forma a manter sua liberdade de ação.

Considerações Finais

Este artigo procurou destacar, de forma preliminar, como os conceitos da Escola Inglesa foram incorporados no debate sobre a política externa brasileira dentre os diplomatas brasileiros. Alguns dos principais conceitos da Escola Inglesa (como: As três tradições de Martin Wight, o conceito de Sociedade Internacional, o conceito e a noção histórica de legitimidade internacional, o papel das grandes potências, o papel do terceiro mundo, entre outros) foram incorporados na discussão sobre política externa no Brasil,¹⁰ o que colaborou e tem colaborado para sua difusão e para reforçar a importância de estudá-la e adotá-la nos cursos obrigatórios de Teoria das Relações Internacionais dos cursos de graduação e pós-graduação no Brasil. Como demonstra Monica Herz,

a incorporação da bibliografia e dos conceitos da Escola Inglesa é congruente com o movimento da política externa oficial que, a partir do governo Collor de Mello, ajusta a política externa brasileira às normas do sistema in-

ternacional. A introdução de uma visão mais sociológica desse sistema, proporcionada por autores como Hedley Bull e John Vincent, se inscreve no processo de construção de um discurso sobre a inserção brasileira na sociedade internacional, o que implicaria a aceitação de um conjunto de normas e instituições. Assim, enquanto o governo brasileiro ratificava os pactos da ONU sobre direitos humanos, tomava a decisão de tornar-se um membro pleno do Tratado de Tlatelolco, aderiria aos regimes de controle de tecnologia de mísseis e ao grupo de fornecedores nuclear, os conceitos da Escola Inglesa eram incorporados aos debates acadêmico e diplomático (p. ex., Fonseca Júnior, 1998) (Herz, 2002, p. 28).

Próximos passos para análise da recepção da Escola Inglesa na América Latina incluem a discussão da produção teórica que se produziu nos países da região sobre esta escola em temas como: guerra e paz; intervenção humanitária; regionalismo, etc. Bem como analisar e relacionar estas discussões teóricas com a consolidação das academias de Relações Internacionais da América Latina e as principais características da produção acadêmica da região.

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10. Nossas entrevistas preliminares com pesquisadores de Relações Internacionais do Chile e da Argentina demonstram que essa é uma característica da academia e do discurso diplomático brasileiro. Eles colocam que os conceitos da Escola Inglesa (e da área acadêmica de RI, em geral) não fizeram ou fazem parte da discussão sobre política externa dos diplomatas desses países.

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Multilateralization of Promotion of Democracy in Latin America: an Analysis Through the English School Tradition¹

A Multilateralização da Promoção da Democracia na América Latina: uma Análise a partir da Tradição da Escola Inglesa

Mariana Andrade e Barros²

Abstract

The article aims to discuss the adequacy of using the English School tradition as a theoretical approach to analyze the promotion of democracy in Latin America. We conclude that it is suitable because of the emphasis on internationally shared values and norms, the acceptance of change and of methodological pluralism.

Keywords: *Democracy promotion, Latin America, English School*

Resumo

O artigo objetiva discutir a adequação da utilização da tradição da Escola Inglesa como quadro teórico para analisar a promoção da democracia na América Latina. Conclui-se que se trata de uma perspectiva teórica apropriada devido à ênfase no compartilhamento de valores e normas, aceitação da mudança e do pluralismo metodológico.

Palavras-chave: *Promoção da democracia, América Latina, Escola Inglesa*

1. The subject of this paper is an ongoing research for a doctoral thesis that is focused on the “Multilateralization of Promotion of Democracy in Latin America” and that has as theoretical framework the English School. The thesis is developed in a joint program between PUC-Minas – International Relations – and Université Sorbonne – International Law –, what establishes the doctorate at an interdisciplinary framework.

2. Doutoranda em Relações Internacionais na Pontifícia Universidade Católica de Minas Gerais, doutorado sanduíche em Direito Internacional na Université Paris 1- Sorbonne. Mestre em Direito Internacional na Pontifícia Universidade Católica de Minas Gerais (2009), especialista em Direito Internacional pela Faculdade Milton Campos (2008). Graduação em Direito pela Universidade Federal de Minas Gerais (2006) e em Relações Internacionais pela Pontifícia Universidade Católica de Minas Gerais (2004). Professora do Centro Universitário UNA e do UNI-BH.

Presentation of the subject

The emergency of democracy as a subject in the international agenda is the result of a long historical journey, which implies in the review of traditional paradigms that inform centuries of international relations. A change of such magnitude does not happen without questions and contradictions. A term with such a controversial content as “democracy” in multilateral forum discussions is accompanied by much communication noise. After all, what does the democratic political regime – so much vaunted in the last few decades – mean? What is its configuration? Systemically, what are the consequences of the democratic rupture in a State? The development of democracy as a value in the international sphere had specificities determined by regional rationales, even though recently it is possible to notice its promotion on a global scale. With these questions in mind, the aim of this study is the process of multilateralization of Latin-American democracy, its configurations and unfolding.

There are many factors that make Latin America an intriguing object of study in this sphere of global governance. Latin-American countries were among those that suffered military interventions from the United States under the pretext of a need for democratization (PECENY, 1999). In the American continent occurred the first multilateral manifestations, in treaties which considered democracy as a value to be preserved and defended after the Second World War³. In the same region, some important doctrines on non-intervention were developed – as doctrines Drago and Estrada.

In the last decades, geopolitics have contributed to increase the subject complexity. On

the one hand, ideological power exerted by the United States in favor of democracy in its liberal outlook, on the other the ascension in several countries of regimes that are ideologically removed from Washington and challenge this liberal outlook. As a scenario, there are political crises rated as ruptures in the democratic regime in several States. Regional international organizations – especially Organization of American States (OAS)⁴, Union of South American Nations (UNASUR)⁵ and Common Market of South America (MERCOSUR)⁶ – have proved themselves vital players in this context, both in building the multilateral normative on democracy and in reacting in times of crises⁷. These facts pose the question that guides our study. How are norms, rules and values for promoting democracy in Latin America multilaterally formed? This phenomenon will be understood from three dimensions. The first of them is the context in which this apparatus is created, that is, which social and political events and debates evolved in the process of forming the multilateral promotion of democracy. The second dimension involves gauging the content, that is, the meaning of democracy according to regional inclinations. Finally, the way normative dispositions on democracy have been interpreted and applied in practice will be analyzed.

4. OAS is formed by all 35 independent states of the Americas.

5. UNASUR is formed by Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Guyana, Paraguay, Peru, Suriname, Uruguay and Venezuela.

6. MERCOSUR is formed by Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, Uruguay and Venezuela.

7. These organisations reacted to the most relevant of crises regarding democracy in the region in the last years. OEA took measures in the following cases: Nicaragua (1990-1997, 2004-2005), Haiti (1991, 1993-2000, 2002-2006), Suriname (1992-2000), Peru (1992), Guatemala (1993), Paraguay (1996, 2012), Venezuela (2002-2004), Ecuador (2005, 2010), Bolivia (2008), Guatemala (2009), Honduras (2009). UNASUR reacted to the following crises: Bolivia (2008, 2012), Venezuela (2014). And MERCOSUL reacted to Paraguay (2008, 2012) and Venezuela (2013).

3. Promotion of democracy started in Latin America with the emergency of the Organization of the American States in 1948. In Europe, it began one year later, in 1949, with the European Council.

The object of the study requires tracing the limits of the research scope from a temporal and geographic view and regarding the level of analysis. Temporally it is possible to place the end of World War II as a milestone marking the start of multilateralization as the thematic of democracy in the American continent. However, the configuration given to the theme in regional forums is directly related to the way this issue was treated up to that point – even though far from a multilateral view. Therefore, it is necessary to return to the end of the 19th century to examine the appearance of an international outlook for promoting democracy that was then being carried out both militarily and unilaterally by the United States. Strengthening and rising of democracy to a priority matter in the regional agenda happened in fact from 1990 on, a period of redemocratization of Latin America and the end of bipolarity in the international system. Therefore, three periods should be analyzed. Between 1898 and 1947 unilateral actions carried out under the argument of democratization will be analyzed. Between 1947 and 1990 there is a kind of tenuous multilateralization of democracy promotion. And finally, from 1990 on the dense multilateralization that happens with a greater profusion of normative provisions and pro-democratic actions in Latin America.

Geographically the thesis deals with Latin America. The emergence of norms on democracy happens in the American continent as a whole, or the Inter-American System, within the scope of the Organization of American States (OAS). More recently it is possible to notice efforts in the subregional sphere, especially in times of rupture of democracy in Latin-American countries. This is the case of UNASUR and MERCOSUR. Political and social specifics, the recent past of dictatorships and the relation with North-American interventions justify treating Latin America separately from the

rest of the continent.

Having as object the process of multilateralization of a subject, the level of analysis that best matches the purpose of the research is the regional one. Thus we analyze norms, rules and values shared within the scope of regional international organizations dealing directly with promoting democracy, namely OAS, Unasul and Mercosul. A point that must be clarified now: how far unilateral actions of States and normative actions of global international organizations – such as the United Nations Organization – should be taken into account in our research. Latin America is inserted in a larger context for discussion of the subject. That is why it is possible that, in certain cases, there is an influence and the relation among other international players and those that are the focus of this study in the sphere of democracy promotion will be analyzed.

Theoretical framework of the thesis

Democracy promotion is, initially, a phenomenon that may produce positive results leading to more inclusive political societies. However, it is rife with antinomies that undermine its legitimacy. In the same way realization of democracy within States is marked by dichotomies, its emergence as an issue in the international agenda is characterized by incongruities that must be pointed out and criticized.

Promotion of the democratic regime cannot fit in only one perspective. It is not only one side of Human Rights or the search for democratic peace. Likewise, it cannot be reduced to a simple and pure form of imperialism or of spreading an ideology; after all, there is a certain level of sharing that the idea of democracy is a value unto itself. There is no label capable of accounting for this phenomenon, because it does not have a single cause. Attempting

to explain its existence or motivations based on a single variable means missing its complexity.

By examining values spread, normative provisions and operationalization of normative content for the specific case of Latin America, we intend to show the reach, limits and incoherences in this thematic by dealing with both its theoretical and empirical configuration. So, the theoretical framework of this research must, necessarily, provide an instrument for analyzing the following problems: the important role of history for normative construction; the relevance of changes for the understanding of the international system; the existence and causes of values, norms and rules shared on an international level. These features are important as the study includes two fields of investigation, International Relations and Law. As consequence, it aims to explain multilateralization of democracy promotion from a sociological and a historical and legal perspective. This means that the analysis will be based on diverse methodologies and methods and, therefore, the theory to be employed to think the research must include the possibility of methodological pluralism as capable of producing knowledge.

From these points, we present the English School tradition as a framework to help to elucidate our object. The basis of this theoretical current is related to questions on practices, norms and institutions considered as fundamental factors for understanding the international system. The English School deals particularly “with the intersubjective meanings (...) embedded in historical practice and historically constructed normative structures” (ALDERSON; HURRELL, 2000, p. 27), which matches both the object of the study and the perspective we intend to study it from. The fact that the English School tradition acknowledges the State as central to analyses of the international society without, however, losing sight of the existence of multiple international players, is

also relevant. This fact matters when what is examined is the multilateralization of a subject from regional international organizations. The State’s will and interest are relevant, but will be treated from a multilateral outlook according to provisions and actions of interstate institutions. Regarding the methodological question, pluralism, as explained by Richard Little, is inherent to this theoretical tradition outlook and arises both from the commitment to a multidimensional theoretical framework and to its multifaceted approach to history (2009, p. 79). This methodological flexibility is an imperative to holistically understand the emergence of the promotion of democracy in the Inter-American System and how it developed.

This research is structured from the idea of the existence of an international society as proposed by Hedley Bull (2002). Bull’s famous definition proposes that the international society is formed by a group of States related by the sharing of rules and institutions that result from common interests and values (2002, p. 13). According to Bellamy, two very diverse trends can be noticed currently in the international society. On the one hand, there is the use of force among the States and violation of International Law. On the other, there are several governance systems that, among other things, deal on how the State must organize itself internally (BELLAMY, 2004, p. 01). International promotion of democracy is a side of this new agenda of international relations that is part of the second position of deepening governance in international society. The normative construction of the international society support to democratic regime happens from the insertion of this issue in the scope of international institutions.

Institutions are understood in this paper as relatively durable and fundamental practices that can be modified in time and are constitutive of States and the international society, since they define their

characteristics and purposes (BUZAN, 2004, pp. 166 - 167)⁸. Among authors of the English School there is a consensus of treating International Law as a constant and fundamental institution of the system of States (BUZAN, 2004, p. 174). Even though, lacking a central power, the utility of International Law as an instrument for social change is limited when compared to domestic law (WILSON, 2009, p. 169), understanding its configuration and changes means learning about significant characteristics of international society itself, of the values shared by it and of the will and interest of the most relevant players in the system.

By proposing a normative analysis of the path toward multilateralization of democracy, we analyze International Law and its material and formal sources. By material sources, we understand “the sociological bases of international norms, their political, moral or economic basis” (PELLET *et al.* 2009, p. 124). The material sources are a reflex of the structure of the system and ruling ideologies (PELLET *et al.* 2009, p. 124). It is only possible to understand the emergence of positive law, its content and its application by taking into account the social and political context that gave rise to them. In other words, understanding of International Law requires understanding the international society itself (WILSON, 2009, p. 168).

On the other hand, formal sources of International Law are the procedures that lead to the creation of positive law. There is almost a consensus in legal doctrine for the adoption of Article 38 of the International Court of Justice Statute as the most relevant legal text to ascertain the formal sources, without, however, considering it as covering all possibilities. According to the provision, the following are considered as sources of International

Law: treaties, international customs, general principles of Law, judicial decisions and the writings of publicists. Besides these, unilateral acts of the State and decisions of international organizations must also be considered as formal sources (PELLET *et al.* 2009, p. 126).

The multilateral way of promoting democracy in Latin America is, therefore, studied from two dimensions. The first is the analysis of the social, political and economic environment that served as a context for the emergence of the subject and for its development. The second dimension is that of normative positivation. This means studying the content of standards and rules making up promotion of democracy in Latin America and also its operationalization. As already mentioned, multilateralization of this subject happened within the scope of regional international organizations. Therefore, it is in the decisions of these organizations, in treaties executed in their sphere, in customs, in principles and in case law of regional courts that we will try to understand both the meaning of the political regime promoted and the way as it has been interpreted and applied⁹.

Assessment of material and formal sources of International Law allow the access to its normative components, namely, norms, rules and values (LASMAR, 2011, p. 09). It is relevant to understand how these normative components have been created and altered in the American continent since World War II in order to promote and defend the democratic political regime. According to Robert Keohane’s traditional definition norms are here conceived as behavior patterns involving considerations on rights and obligations (KEOHANE, 1984, p. 57). Now the rules specify actions and values that

8. This means that the term institution, such as understood here, is related to the wider sense of the word, which Buzan calls primary institutions (2004, p. 166). Thus, “institutions” or “primary institutions” will be terms used interchangeably.

9. According to the methodological choice explained before, unilateral acts of States will only be considered for the purposes of this research when they affect multilateral actions done within the scope of regional international organizations, so as to not lose track of the objective of this study.

make up the attitudes of players (KRATOCHWIL, 1995, p. 64). Therefore, rules are specific kinds of standards that were subject to institutionalization. The values both guide the behavior of players in their rational choices and influence perception regarding circumstances as to reality they are inserted in (LASMAR, 2011, p. 14).

The establishment of a set of norms, rules and shared values in relation to the political regime of States begun in the Americas from World War II onwards, and deepened with the end of the Cold War. These two periods marked, respectively, the end of a phase of tenuous multilateralization and dense multilateralization of the subject. During the tenuous stage norms and rules were created within OAS, but have rarely been implemented. In the dense stage, on the other hand, besides the establishment of a more robust body of norms and rules, there is a constant performance, not only by OAS, but, sometimes, also by UNASUR and MERCOSUR in times of crises of democracy in Latin-American States. Both World War II and the Cold War were events that engineered what Holsti calls “discontinuity with the past” (1998, p. 03). To them one can assign characterization of large events (HOLSTI, 1998, p. 05), since they changed standards of practices, ideas and institutions in international politics. After World War II it is possible to realize a growth in the sharing of norms, rules and values among international players, which were institutionalized by means of international organizations. On the regional sphere, among themes that came up in the agenda, the defense of democracy came up (e. g. within OAS and the Council of Europe). The end of the ideological clash after the Cold War coincided with a wave of democratization and elevated this matter to a status of priority in the international society.

Sharing of a minimum of rules and values required for pacific coexistence and order in the international system shows a pluralist interstate socie-

ty (BUZAN, 2004, p. 46). Insofar as the set of rules shared by international players goes beyond mere coexistence in a search for other objectives related to cooperation on an economic, social, communication and environmental level, this society comes close a solidarist structure (BULL, 2002, p. 67). The fact of provisions on democracy having being incorporated to International Law on democracy during recent history of the American continent evinces a manifestation of solidarism and, therefore, moves away from pluralism in the region¹⁰.

However, this manifestation of solidarism should not be seen as though it were a process of convergence without any caveat. The analysis on promotion of democracy in Latin America shows something beyond the “sharing of significant moral standards” (BELLAMY, 2004, p. 11). There is an ideological way that becomes clear with priority assigned to a specific kind of law and that would not originate without questions in a continent in which domestic politics is historically marked by external mismanagements and by attempts to assert the principle of non-intervention. Sacralization of liberal democracy is part of the trend of separating civil and political rights from others, assigning them a greater importance than to economic, social, cultural and collective rights. According to Vincent this formula discloses a liberal trend of perceiving rights, since part of the idea of negative rights – that demand non-interference by the State – and positive rights – that require constant action by the State (2005, p. 10). Even those who defend the existence and the need for application of an international norm in favor of democracy agree that the principle that rules this norm is based on a specific view tied to liberal logic. Dissemination of democracy is part of a wider picture of dissemination of liberalism as an economic regime.

10. The position adopted in the research is inspired by the teachings of Buzan, who understands pluralism and solidarism as non-mutually excluding, that is, as parts of a spectrum that allows for gradations (2004, p. 49).

These statements are followed by two propositions. The first is that, like many other traits of the international society, this one also has in relations of power a fundamental point for its actualization. The second is that promotion of democracy in Latin America is characterized by a search for homogenizing state structures. Buzan talks on the possibility of a conscious convergence for a greater “homogeneity of internal structures and values shared by States” (2004, p. 147). This convergence can happen due to calculation, coercion and/or belief (BUZAN, 2004, p. 151), each of which contributing on different levels for strengthening solidarism and, therefore, for the level of compliance of players to norms and values contained therein. The three motivations are part of the process of promoting democracy in Latin America.

It is possible to notice along history a trend toward a search for homogeneity of political structures. It happened so with the principle of sovereignty in the Modern State, with the separation of powers, with “juridification” of the State. The effort exerted by some States and international organizations for the spreading of the democratic political regime comes close to this trend, even though it has not reached such a high level of propagation as in the other examples mentioned. In Latin America this movement of searching for “homogenization” of the political regime among States has two consequences. One is the selective application of defense of democracy. This is noticed in practice when similar cases result in diverse reactions from regional international organizations. The second consequence relates to the first. It is increasingly possible to notice behaviors displaying non-agreement with the form and the ideology making up the idea of democracy advertised by the most traditional regional international organization, the OAS. There is a trend in the last few years to take to other organizations, such as UNASUR and MERCOSUR, de-

cisions related to disruption of democratic regimes in the region. This shows a disagreement of some countries in the region – especially those that form an opposition to the United States, like Venezuela and Bolivia – with the normative body of defense of democracy and, particularly, with implementation of these norms in case of disruption of the democratic order.

Conclusion

The way multilateralization has been developed in Latin America shows the complexity of democracy promotion. The major challenge to study this issue is try to start from a multifaceted view, which will allow it to be apprehended in its legal, sociological and historical aspects. The purpose in adopting an approach including theoretical and empirical questions is contributing for a kind of approach that has been little analyzed in this field. In this context the tradition of the English School can amount to an important innovation in the studies on democracy and the international society, such as required for the preparation of a doctorate thesis and help elucidating even cloudier issues on this subject. Furthermore, the English School is one of the International Relations’ theories that make the greater efforts to comprehend the role and the importance of International Law in the international society. This is necessary link in order to respect the interdisciplinary character of this research.

The mobilization the English School tradition with the aim of understanding the promotion of democracy in Latin America may also contribute to deepen the comprehension on some elements of the theory in two ways. First, it may help to apprehend the existence or not of a regional international society in Latin America. The focus of English School works is on the European international society with little work done on other regions.

Using the theory to explain a Latin-American phenomenon may contribute to understand its possibilities to the studies of the subglobal level. Besides, the development of this research may also support the pluralist-solidarist debate as it seeks to further the comprehension of the features and nuances that characterize solidarism in general and liberal solidarism in particular. So, while putting together some themes that are not usually treated together – democracy promotion, Latin America and English School – this paper and the ongoing research aim to enrich the possibilities of investigation regarding both the subject and the theoretical framework.

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RODRIK, Dani.
A Globalização foi longe demais?
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Aline Carolina da Rocha Mota¹
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Dani Rodrik é economista e, atualmente, professor da Harvard University³. Rodrik tem se destacado como um economista influente nas análises da economia política global, produtor de uma literatura de acurada metodologia, exemplificação e aderência aos problemas conjunturais. Em “A Globalização foi longe demais?”, publicado no Brasil no ano de 2011, Rodrik apresenta e discute os efeitos da integração econômica nos arranjos sociais domésticos, destacando o desafio contemporâneo de harmonizar a globalização com as políticas internas. Tal preocupação já havia sido levantada em estudos anteriores, sempre relacionando a capacidade de ser realizar políticas públicas internas em um ambiente de maior integração e, consequentemente, maior interdependência entre os atores internacionais. Na obra supracitada, é possível notar o rigor metodológico, bem como as análises e argumentos fundamentados em exemplos precisos.

O autor utiliza o livro para apresentar o argumento – e conduzir o leitor a uma reflexão instigante – de que o livre mercado pode tornar-se uma ameaça à estabilidade social, na medida em que afeta as normas internas de cada país, além de oferecer riscos às suas instituições e políticas domésticas. Desta maneira, ele avalia como a integração internacional dos mercados de bens, serviços e capital está alterando as práticas tradicionais de cada sociedade, consequentemente suas economias locais, e promovendo a desintegração da estrutura produtiva e social interna dos países, especialmente, dos países em desenvolvimento, emergentes, ou potências médias.

Para sustentar o argumento de que o âmbito interno dos países tem sofrido interferências negativas em decorrência do processo de integração econômica, Rodrik inicia sua análise pelo setor produtivo, evidenciando os contrastes entre trabalhadores qualificados e não qualificados,

1. Graduada em Relações Internacionais na Universidade Estadual da Paraíba

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além das disparidades salariais entre os dois tipos de mão de obra citados, o autor levanta a problemática da mão de obra imigrante – oriunda de países desenvolvidos para países em desenvolvimento, ou em sentido contrário – que altera as disponibilidades de empregos nos países afetados.

De tal colocação, depreende-se um dos motivadores das disparidades salariais, problema que afeta de forma dura as nações.

Outro argumento defendido por Rodrik refere-se às mudanças nas políticas e instituições nacionais que terminam por posicionar-se favoravelmente a uma adequação tendo como referência os parâmetros das economias integradas. O autor evidencia, por meio de exemplos, que o processo de integração econômica exige dos países alterações em suas políticas econômicas, mas, sobretudo, sociais, a fim de promover o livre mercado e aumentar os fluxos de comércio e investimentos. Em virtude disso, é possível constatar que a capacidade dos governos de implementar programas sociais e aplicar taxações que favoreçam o estado tem sido sistematicamente reduzida na medida em que avança o processo de integração econômica, levando risco a soberania nacional. Cabe notar que o argumento apresentado por Rodrik sustenta-se na perda de autonomia e de margem de manobra por parte dos governos nacionais em colocar em prática programas e políticas sociais, devido ao ônus gerado aos orçamentos internos. Não é a integração que minimiza a capacidade de intervenção, mas a restrição orçamentária e a destinação dos gastos diante do cenário descrito pelo autor.

Rodrik questiona se a globalização foi longe demais a ponto de promover a desintegração social em favor de uma integração econômica, chamando atenção para o risco de que as pressões sociais interfiram na economia dos países e em seus governos. Como possível solução para o desafio de manter uma sociedade nacional coesa em meio à globaliza-

ção e a liberalização dos mercados, Rodrik aponta o caminho das mudanças nas políticas dos Estados, de modo a não permitir o protecionismo, mas equilibrar as demandas sociais com a necessidade de manter a economia do país aberta ao investimento externo e à integração econômica. Ou seja, o equilíbrio proposto por Rodrik é no estabelecimento dos objetivos, a integração e as relações econômicas internacionais não devem competir com objetivos de ordem interna que privilegiam uma ordem social bem atendida pelos governos nacionais.

É irrefutável que a discussão levantada no livro de Dani Rodrik sobre a relação entre a integração econômica e seus impactos sobre os arranjos sociais se transferem de modo pertinente para os dias atuais, num momento de tentativa de superação de uma crise econômica ampla, que tem levado ao aumento das taxas de desemprego e insatisfação social tanto em países desenvolvidos quanto em países não desenvolvidos ou emergentes. Em “A globalização foi longe demais?” é possível identificar, nos argumentos do autor e em seus exemplos, elementos que reforçam a necessidade de repensar as políticas que promovem a integração econômica, de modo que as mesmas mantenham a coesão social. É uma boa contribuição reflexiva para interessados no estudo da Economia Política Internacional.

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