27 • Conjuntura Internacional • Belo Horizonte, ISSN 1809-6182, v.17 n.1, p.27 - 38, mai. 2020

The Beijing Consensus and the New Silk

Road in Africa: Chinese investments in

new disputes of hegemony

O Consenso de Pequim e a Nova Rota da Seda na África: investimentos chineses em

novas disputas de hegemonia

El Consenso de Pekín y la Nueva Ruta de la Seda en África: inversiones chinas en

nuevas disputas de hegemonía

Lucas Gualberto do Nascimento*

DOI: 10.5752/P.1809-6182.2020v17n1p27

Received in: 10 de maio de 2019

Accepted in: 17 de novembro de 2019

Abstract

is paper will analyze, through several bibliographic sources, such as governmental

and academic reports, the development of Sino-African relations mainly in the sphere of

inﬂuence of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC); and of Belt and Road

Initiative (BRI), also known as the New Silk Road.

Keywords: Chinese foreign policy. Sino-African relations. Belt and Road Initiative.

Resumo

Este artigo analisará, a partir de diversas fontes bibliográﬁcas, relatórios governamentais e

acadêmicos, o desenvolvimento das relações sino-africanas principalmente na esfera de in-

ﬂuência do Fórum de Cooperação China-África (FOCAC); e no projeto de infraestrutura e

cooperação Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), também conhecido como a Nova Rota da Seda.

Palavras-chave: Política externa chinesa. Relações China-África. Belt and Road Initiative.

Resumen

Este artículo analizará, a través de varias fuentes bibliográﬁcas, como informes guberna-

mentales y académicos, el desarrollo de las relaciones sino-africanas, principalmente en el

ámbito del Foro de Cooperación China-África (FOCAC); y del proyecto Belt and Road

Initiavie (BRI), también conocido como la Nueva Ruta de la Seda.

Palabras clave: Política exterior chino. Relaciones China-África. Belt and Road Initiative.

Artigo

27 • Conjuntura Internacional • Belo Horizonte,

ISSN 1809-6182, v.17 n.1, p.27 - 38, mai. 2020

* Mestrando em Ciências Sociais - Relações Internacionais e Desenvolvimento, na Universidade Estadual Paulista (Unesp), Marília.

Bacharel em Relações Internacionais, pela Universidade Federal do Rio de Janeiro (UFRJ). É integrante do BRICS Educational

Internship Programme, promovido pela Far Eastern Federal University (FEFU), sob a presidência russa do BRICS em 2020. Atual-

mente é pesquisador do Analytical Centre da BRICS Youth Energy Agency (BRICS YEA), parceira do Instituto Estatal de Relações

Internacionais de Moscou (MGIMO); e membro do Núcleo de Pesquisa da UFRJ sobre Geopolítica, Integração Regional e Sis-

tema Mundial (GIS/UFRJ). É membro da Rede Brasileira de Estudos da China (RBChina). Obteve estância acadêmica semestral

na Universidade Autônoma de Madri (UAM), em 2016-2017; e na Universidade Goethe de Frankfurt am Main, em 2018-2019.

Atuou como membro do Grupo de Pesquisa da Política Internacional (GPPI), especializado no estudo do BRICS; e no grupo Res-

ponsabilidade do Estado, Uso da Força e o Bloco de Constitucionalidade do Direito Internacional, ambos da Universidade Federal

do Rio de Janeiro (UFRJ), de 2015 a 2018. Foi integrante do Programa Institucional de Bolsas de Iniciação Tecnológica (PIBIT),

em 2011-2012, pelo CEFET/RJ. Possui interesse nos seguintes temas: Política Externa Chinesa; BRICS; Economia Política Inter-

nacional; Estudos de População e Desenvolvimento; Direito Internacional Público. E-mail: lucasgdn2@gmail.com

28 • Conjuntura Internacional • Belo Horizonte, ISSN 1809-6182, v.17 n.1, p.27 - 38, mai. 2020

The Beijing Consensus:

disputes of hegemony

From a critical geopolitics perspective,

the current changes of hegemony in the in-

ternational system are not essentially a dispu-

te for supremacy between the United States

and China. Hegemony, in the perspective of

critical geopolitics, can be considered a deve-

lopment of new consensus. According to Ag-

new (2005, p. 57), in a Gramscian perspec-

tive of hegemony in geopolitics, the norms

and principles that regulate world politics

act as an element of convincing, in a relation

based on attraction and coercion. erefore,

the exercise of power is not only ascribed to

economic, political or military power, but is

part of a geopolitical idea of international

order. e Chinese ideals of harmonic pro-

gress and interdependence create incentives

towards an international order with a greater

presence of multilateralism, with multipolar

characteristics that are promoted as more

advantageous towards developing countries.

is strategy as a foreign policy tool aims to

be a convincing method as a “counter-he-

gemonic” geopolitical discourse, a form of

resistance against a so-called non-equitable

international system, in which developing

countries must seek more relevant roles

(BRITO, 2018, p. 80).

Although the Chinese state rejects this

term, some scholars are deﬁning its interna-

tional development approach as the Beijing

Consensus, as it is the Chinese model – that

is, the terms in which the Chinese inﬂuen-

ce in the international order is going to be

pursued - for economic growth with political

principles of non-interference and self-deter-

mination (QASEM; DONGEN; RIDDER,

2011, p. 2). According to Ramo (2004, p.

11-12), the Beijing Consensus is based on the

following terms: 1) Innovation-based develo-

pment; 2) Economic success not only measu-

red by GDP per capita, but by the extent of

its sustainability; and 3) Self-determination

for China and other countries, not ruled by

the United States’ understanding of develop-

ment. ese terms are deﬁned within a rejec-

tion of the Washington Consensus, a set of

liberal norms recommended by the United

States towards developing countries since the

1980’s. As a model for development and in-

ternational order, the Beijing Consensus has a

great presence in the discourse on Sino-Afri-

can relations, and its terms are going to be

further analyzed.

Innovation-based development

e terms of the Beijing Consensus are

being presented to the African continent as

the Chinese state oﬀers its own development

model as an example. Regarding innovation,

China is currently the second largest investor

in research and development (R&D) world-

wide, having surpassed the European Union

in recent years.

In addition, other important indicators

of an innovation-based development are:

applications for the registration of patents,

and the level of technological qualiﬁcation

of its population, especially the group known

as STEM (Science, Technology, Engineering,

and Mathematics). Figures 2 and 3 below de-

monstrate results similar to ﬁgure 1; that is,

the states that invest the most in R&D are the

ones with the highest number of patents, as

well as those with the highest level of techno-

logical qualiﬁcation.

29 • Conjuntura Internacional • Belo Horizonte, ISSN 1809-6182, v.17 n.1, p.27 - 38, mai. 2020

Figure 1 - Gross national R&D expenditures, in billions of dollars, from 1996 to 2013.

* e seven largest budgets for technological innovation highlight the astonishing Chinese growth in the ﬁrst decade of the twenty-

-ﬁrst century. Such a massive investment indicates China’s intention in participating in the international technological competition.

Source: American Institute of Physics, 2016.

Figure 2 - The ten most recurrent applications for patent registration by country in 2014

* e seven largest investors are among those who own more registration applications. e level of Chinese technological productivity is also

highlighted, being the ﬁrst country in requests for registrations, when it is becoming the second largest investor in technological innovation.

Source: World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO), 2016, p. 23.

30 • Conjuntura Internacional • Belo Horizonte, ISSN 1809-6182, v.17 n.1, p.27 - 38, mai. 2020

Measures of economic success

Regarding the economic success terms

promoted by the Beijing Consensus, there is a

rejection of the GDP measurement as the sole

indicator of development. e Chinese policies

are regarded as “people-focused”, due to their

development rates measured by quality of life

and human development, not minimizing de-

velopment concepts in only economic growth

(QASEM; DONGEN; RIDDER, 2011, p.

3). erefore, despite the fact that the Chine-

se state indeed pursues a higher gross domestic

product in promotion of its development mo-

del, it also promotes other results that are not

as evident, such as the fast rise of its Human

Development Index (HDI) throughout the last

three decades, as ﬁgure 4 illustrates.

However, even though there is indeed a

strong growth when it comes to Chinese life

quality indexes, there are rising levels of ine-

quality as well, which must be controlled by the

People’s Republic of China (PRC) government

if there is an interest to promote the Chinese

development model internationally. According

to Ning Jizhe, head of the National Bureau of

Statistics (NBS), the Gini coeﬃcient of China

remained above 0.4 in 2017, which is classiﬁed

by the United Nations as an inequality alert

line (PEOPLE’S DAILY ONLINE, 2018).

Figure 3 - Projection of the percentage of graduates in the STEM group among the OECD and

G20 countries in 2030

* ere is a Chinese and Indian dominance of the graduates in technological areas, responsible for R&D research, intellectual

property development, and the establishment of new technological standards.

Source: Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), 2015

31 • Conjuntura Internacional • Belo Horizonte, ISSN 1809-6182, v.17 n.1, p.27 - 38, mai. 2020

Self-determination

e third and last element that composes

the Beijing Consensus is the idea of self-deter-

mination, which is often accompanied by the

principle of non-interference when conduc-

ting foreign policy. According to this principle,

“China emphasizes the need for developing

countries to actively seek independence from

outside pressure” (QASEM; DONGEN; RI-

DDER, 2011, p. 3), especially regarding the

previous principles known as the Washington

Consensus. According to Williamson (1990),

the Washington Consensus is based on ten

principles: 1) Fiscal discipline; 2) Reordering

public subsidies; 3) Tax reforms; 4) Liberaliza-

tion of interest rates; 5) Competitive exchange

rates; 6) Trade liberalization; 7) Liberalization

of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI); 8) Gene-

ralized privatization; 9) Deregulation; 10) Pro-

tection of property rights.

In fact, the Chinese development mo-

del does not reject the previous principles en-

tirely, but adapts them for its own interests. In

general, only the principles of privatization and

deregulation are not respected by the Beijing

Consensus developmental approach, since the

“state-directed capitalism” (HALPER, 2012,

p. 103), in direct contrast with privatization

principles, is seen as an advantage both by the

Chinese authorities and its African allies, as

there are less or no conditionality imposed by

the Chinese when conducting business develo-

pment overseas. As Halper aﬃrms,

China’s political system provides a further

commercial advantage over rivals in the Uni-

ted States, Europe, and Japan. Liberal demo-

cracies must deal with powerful domestic in-

terest groups in business and the legislature.

e absence of domestic political obstacles

enables Chinese companies and government

Figure 4 - The evolution of Chinese Human Development Index (HDI) from 1990 to 2016

* Rising from 0.514 in 1990 to 0.752 in 2016, the index is an example of the image that China is promoting, as an emergent

power willing to cooperate with developing countries in new forms of consensus.

Source: United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), 2018.

32 • Conjuntura Internacional • Belo Horizonte, ISSN 1809-6182, v.17 n.1, p.27 - 38, mai. 2020

actors to forge agreements much more rapi-

dly than their Western counterparts. (HAL-

PER, 2012, p. 104)

After the exposition of the three elements

that compose the Beijing Consensus as a new de-

velopment model, section 2 further analyzes how

these ideas are shaping Sino-African cooperation,

especially the Forum on China-Africa Coopera-

tion (FOCAC) and the Belt and Road Initiative

(BRI) infrastructure initiative in the continent.

ese initiatives are based on the same principles

of the Beijing Consensus: technological develo-

pment; economic measurements beyond GDP;

and the respect for the principles of non-interfe-

rence in domestic politics of other states.

The FOCAC and the OBOR in

Africa: new forms of consensus

e generation of consensus in Africa,

such as the Forum on China-Africa Coopera-

tion (FOCAC), brings elements of Chinese fo-

reign policy in ways of convincing. is forum

had its 18

anniversary in 2018, as well as its

third summit. Taking place in Beijing, it has

been considered as a landmark in Sino-African

relations, as all African United Nations’ mem-

ber-states have recognized the People’s Repu-

blic of China (PRC) as the legitimate Chinese

state, except for the state of Eswatini, former

Swaziland (BLANCHARD, 2018).

e Beijing Declaration, document of the

FOCAC summit held in 2018, is another ele-

ment of the Chinese consensus principles for

the region. In a position opposed to what is

considered as a post-colonial imposition, the

members of the forum signed not to impose

policy conditionalities on their cooperation

agreements, in a dual commitment both to

respect the one-China principle, and the so-

called “national conditions” of African coun-

tries (FOCAC, 2018).

e principles of mutual beneﬁt, also ex-

pressed as “win-win”, and cooperation driven by

non-conditionality ﬁt the African needs to ex-

pand economic growth - without the restraints

required by Western countries - are elements

that favor the intensiﬁcation of Sino-African

development cooperation. e African con-

tinent is receiving important investments in

the coming decades, as China pledged US$60

billion for the next three years. is is a sig-

niﬁcant sum, as it is estimated by the African

Development Bank that the African continent

needs US$130 to US$170 billion worth of in-

frastructure annually (RYDER, 2018).

Figure 5 - Types of ﬁnancing as consequences of the 2018 FOCAC Summit

* As a result of the last FOCAC Summit, in 2018, the Chinese government announced US$60 billion as ﬁnancing to African

countries, especially for projects supported by the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).

Source: DAHIR, 2018

33 • Conjuntura Internacional • Belo Horizonte, ISSN 1809-6182, v.17 n.1, p.27 - 38, mai. 2020

e FOCAC initiatives are synergistically

connected to BRI projects in Africa, promo-

ting the ideals of technology development, new

measures of economic success – the so-called

“people-to-people” economic development -,

and non-interference, along with the “win-win”

cooperation proposals. erefore, both initiati-

ves contain the main principles of the Beijing

Consensus as strategic guidelines, and a com-

plement between the Chinese development

discourse and its initiatives being promoted.

Nevertheless, such an extensive infrastruc-

ture project among emerging countries raises

consequences on international politics, espe-

cially questions regarding negative impacts –

and skepticism about “win-win” terms - along

with challenges that may come throughout its

development. e Chinese ﬁnancing policies to

Africa are being accused of “debt trap” (SHA-

BAN, 2018), even though external debt-G-

DP rates of African states are lower than their

European counterparts (RYDER, 2018), and

even neocolonialism (TIEZZI, 2018). Gascón

(2018) emphasizes that high levels of bilateral

debt may cause economic dependency in the

future, and that Chinese ﬁnancing in Africa still

suﬀers from lack of transparency, as follows:

e beneﬁciary African countries – which accu-

mulate a debt higher than 100 billion dollars to

China – could be compromised for generations

and even be obligated to cede to the Asian giant

part of the infrastructures and projects built

with Yuans. […] is secrecy, which is common

on Chinese commercial operations in countries

generally lacking of democracy as Africans, rai-

ses suspicions about the loan conditions, and

brings fear that some leaders may have mort-

gaged their countries in exchange of acceding

fast money that is needed to survive and to be

presented with popularity in elections.

However, Eom (2016) aﬃrms that there

are scarce evidences that Chinese loans aim at

natural resources, defending that Chinese inte-

rests are focused on establishing the One China

policy – it is, the non-recognition of Taiwan as

a sovereign state – and on connective infras-

tructure, communications and power.

In addition, African leaders are defending

mostly two aspects of ﬁnancing China-Africa

development cooperation: lower interest rates

compared to Western counterparts; and shor-

ter average waits. According to Nigerian pre-

sident Muhammadu Buhari, during the 2018

FOCAC,

Let me use this opportunity to address and

dispel insinuations about a so-called Chinese

‘debt trap’. ese vital infrastructure projects

being funded are perfectly in line with Ni-

geria’s Economic Recovery & Growth Plan.

Some of the debts, it must be noted, are self-

-liquidating. Nigeria is fully able to repay all

the loans as and when due, in keeping with

our policy of ﬁscal prudence and sound hou-

sekeeping. (SHABAN, 2018)

Firstly, as the more African countries are

being classiﬁed as “middle-income”, the har-

der it is for them to receive low-interest ﬁ-

nancing from institutions, such as the World

Bank. erefore, countries as Nigeria, Côte

d’Ivoire and Kenya tend to perceive Chinese

ﬁnancing as positive, due to lower repayment

rates (RYDER, 2018). In the case of ﬁnancing

in Ghana and Democratic Republic of Con-

go (DRC), repayments were made in exports,

called as “resource-secured”: the Bui Dam,

paid with 6% of Ghanaian cocoa exports

throughout 20 years; and extensive infrastruc-

ture projects in DRC, mainly transportation

and power grids, ﬁnanced by the proﬁts from a

Sino-Congolese mining joint-venture (BRAU-

TIGAM, 2013, p. 212-213).

Second, still according to Ryder (2018),

one of the greatest advantages that African lea-

34 • Conjuntura Internacional • Belo Horizonte, ISSN 1809-6182, v.17 n.1, p.27 - 38, mai. 2020

ders seek among Chinese development coo-

peration is the dynamism that Chinese loans

provide towards ﬁnancing projects in this

continent. Non-Chinese loans to Africa have

an average wait of nine years, even when the-

re is an environmental commitment, such as

in Rwanda and Ethiopia. erefore, Chinese

loans are seen as preferable as the viability and

return of the projects are prioritized, occasio-

nally being approved in two years.

Within the African demands expressed

by its leaders and the African participation

throughout FOCAC summits, the BRI stands

out as an agglutinating element of infrastruc-

ture needs between China and Africa. China’s

proposals on infrastructure investment in Africa

are based on the expectation of an exponential

growth rate of Sino-African trade, which were

expanding at rates of ﬁfteen to twenty percent

a year until the end of this decade (FOXMAN,

2013). us, to support the growth of such

a steady trade, the Chinese trade partnership

project with Africa is based on the establish-

ment of twelve ports, designated as Strategic

Maritime Distribution Centers (SMDC), ac-

cording to the map below.

Figure 6 - The Strategic Maritime Distribution Centers (SMDC) of the BRI

* Map describing the Chinese strategy for the insertion of the African continent into the BRI, from strategic distribution centers

established in the Indian and Atlantic Oceans. Part of the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road, it can be observed how they also

articulate with ports in South and Central America, forming a network of intensifying trade between emerging countries.

Source: EYLER, 2014.

35 • Conjuntura Internacional • Belo Horizonte, ISSN 1809-6182, v.17 n.1, p.27 - 38, mai. 2020

ese seven ports located along the In-

dian, the Atlantic, and the Mediterranean Sea

were strategically selected to promote the Chi-

nese development model in Africa through

trade. is section of the so-called 21

Centu-

ry Maritime Silk Road is located close to large

population centers, which provide a reasonable

distribution network of goods being imported

and exported. us, such investment in infra-

structure is sustaining the growth of Sino-Af-

rican trade, which reached US$ 385 billion in

2015, representing three quarters of the Chi-

nese trade with the European Union (FOX-

MAN, 2013; SUN; RETTIG, 2014).

Next, ﬁgure 7 illustrates key factors of

the SMDCs of the Maritime Silk Road, such

as population and GDP per capita, crucial

elements to analyze the strategic importance

of these locations to the expansion of Sino-

-African trade.

Figure 7 - The strategic African ports of the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road

* It emphasizes the size of the population centers combined, with more than 120 million people, as well as their largely-populated

neighbors. As middle-income countries with economic potential, they are crucial to further growth of the Sino-African trade.

Source: EYLER, 2014

36 • Conjuntura Internacional • Belo Horizonte, ISSN 1809-6182, v.17 n.1, p.27 - 38, mai. 2020

As a complement to the SMDCs, a land

distribution network is being developed, impro-

ving physical integration among African coun-

tries, facilitating trade intra-Africa and exports,

and bringing new levels of cooperation into the

BRI. e infrastructure agreements reached as a

result of FOCAC and BRI are representative of

a technologic-based development alongside the

exercise of the concept of “win-win” coopera-

tion, due to the African needs for infrastructure

and the Chinese needs of emerging markets.

Figure 8 illustrates the land infrastructure pro-

jects tied to the SMDCs, the land sector com-

plementary to the Maritime Silk Road.

Figure 8 - Map of the African continent highlighting the SMDC

ports with their land railway ramiﬁcations

ere are projects aiming at connecting both African coasts through railways, as it is visible from the Dar Es Salaam-Lobito railroad.

e colored countries are members of the Asian Infrastructure & Investment Bank (AIIB), an important alternative for further

infrastructure ﬁnancing. Source: BREUER, 2017, p. 3

37 • Conjuntura Internacional • Belo Horizonte, ISSN 1809-6182, v.17 n.1, p.27 - 38, mai. 2020

rough the construction and expansion

of ports and infrastructure along the African

coastline as a part of the BRI, as well as the pro-

motion of new levels of trade with the countries

that are active in the activities of FOCAC, the

terms of the Beijing Consensus take part as a

guideline oﬀered to African countries as a deve-

lopment pathway. e three main aspects of the

Chinese development model– technologic deve-

lopment, economic measurement beyond gro-

wth, and non-interference in domestic politics

– take part in the contemporary Sino-African re-

lations, as the Chinese state promotes its idea of

development as a model for emergent countries.

Conclusions

is paper intended to analyze the concept

of the Beijing Consensus as a development frame-

work of the Chinese foreign policy, especially to-

wards Sino-African relations. Based on the princi-

ple of hegemony as the capability of shaping new

kinds of norms and consensus of an international

order, the Chinese development model is being

sought by African countries with relative success.

rough the economic cooperation measu-

res implemented by the Forum on China-Africa

Cooperation (FOCAC) and the infrastructure

projects that are part of the BRI, new kinds of

consensus are being structured in Africa, and

they are applying the three aspects that deﬁne

the Beijing Consensus: a) technological deve-

lopment, through infrastructure construction;

b) economic growth measured by other means

rather than only GDP, improving development

sustainability with external debt rates below the

size of national economies; and c) preserving

the principles of non-intervention and self-de-

termination of the African partners, not looking

after regime changes in their domestic politics.

However, there are challenges that still

have to be solved for the complete establish-

ment of this consensus. Ryder (2018) highlights

that, even though most of the critics towards

BRI projects in Africa are coming from non-

-Africans, especially neocolonialist accusations

coming from European countries, the Chine-

se loans conditions need to be improved, as

they still require the strategy known as “tying”,

which is the necessity of the participation of a

Chinese company for the approval of the loan

contracts. In addition, more sources of ﬁnan-

cing are needed, as the African continent an-

nual demands on infrastructure are more than

the double of the value coming from Chine-

se investment. Moreover, there are concerns

about higher levels of transparency regarding

the content and terms of such loans, especially

in South Africa (GASCÓN, 2018).

e contemporary Sino-African rela-

tions are the best example of the application

methods of the Beijing Consensus, and these

measures have been very attractive to develo-

ping countries so far. It is a success of a Chinese

foreign policy, which seeks to promote China

as one of the leaders of an international order

marked by multipolarity and the intent of es-

tablishing new norms that shape international

relations. As long as Western powers do not

seem eager to fulﬁll the large demands of emer-

gent countries, it is diﬃcult to predict compe-

tition against the Chinese model in terms of

development cooperation.

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