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ISSN 1809-6182, v.17 n.2, p.2 - 10, ago. 2020

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Artigo

Current foreign and security policy issues

regarding stationing nuclear tactical

weapons in Italy

Questões atuais em política externa e de segurança relacionadas ao estacionamento de

armas táticas nucleares na Itália

Temas de actualidad en política exterior y de seguridad relacionados con el estaciona-

miento de armas nucleares tácticas en Italia

Lili Takács¹

DOI: 10.5752/P.1809-6182.2020v17n2p2

st

Received in January 1 , 2020

Accepted in May 5, 2020

Abstract

During the Cold War Rome hosted nuclear weapons to strengthen the international ran-

king of the country, hoping that it provides opportunity to restore trust in Italy. Although

the original reasons of hosting U.S. nuclear weapons disappeared at the end of the Cold

War, Italy is not actively promoting nuclear disarmament.

Keywords: Italy. United States. Nuclear weapons. Nuclear disarmament. NATO.

Resumo

Durante a Guerra Fria, Roma hospedou armas nucleares para fortalecer a classiﬁcação

internacional do país, na esperança de que isso proporcione oportunidade para restaurar a

conﬁança na Itália. Embora as razões originais para hospedar as armas nucleares dos EUA

tenham desaparecido, a Itália não está promovendo ativamente o desarmamento nuclear.

Palavras chaves: Itália. Estados Unidos. Armas nucleares. Desarmamento nuclear. NATO.

Resumen

Durante la Guerra Fría, Roma albergó armas nucleares para fortalecer la clasiﬁcación

internacional del país, con la esperanza de que brinde la oportunidad de restaurar la

conﬁanza en Italia. Aunque las razones originales para albergar armas nucleares estadou-

nidenses desaparecieron, Italia no está promoviendo activamente el desarme nuclear.

Palabras clave: Italia. Estados Unidos. Armas nucleares. Desarme nuclear. OTAN.

1

Lili Takács is a PhD candidate at Doctoral School of Military Sciences at the National University of Public Service in Budapest,

Hungary. Her research focuses on Italian foreign and security policy within the Mediterranean region, and Italian-Libyan rela-

tions. ORCID: 0000- 0001-9085-6168

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Introduction

d-based missiles with a range of less than 500

km and air- and sea-launched weapons with a

range of less than 600 km, that were not suited

for strategic missions because they lacked the

range to reach targets inside the Soviet Union

According to the North Atlantic Treaty

Organization (NATO) Lisbon Summit De-

claration issued on 19 November 2010 the Al-

liance continues to support non-proliferation

eﬀorts in order to create a world without nu-

clear weapons (NATO, 1949; 2010). However,

as long as nuclear weapons do exist, NATO

remains a nuclear alliance. Apart from the

two European nuclear powers (Great Britain,

France), nuclear weapons are stationed in ﬁve

European NATO member states – Belgium,

the Netherlands, Turkey, Germany and Italy –

within the framework of forward-deployment.

In the last years several discussions have been

unfolded either in the United States (US) or

in Europe, whether nuclear weapons could be

used in the changed security environment of

our days. Since the end of the Cold War the

number of tactical nuclear weapons stored in

Europe has been signiﬁcantly reduced, howe-

ver their further reduction or complete with-

drawal from Europe have been subject of in-

tense debates.

(or, for Soviet weapons, targets inside the Uni-

ted States). ey were often small enough to be

deployed with troops in the ﬁeld or at forward

bases, the U.S. and the Union of Soviet Socia-

list Republics (USSR) could have used them to

attack targets in the theatre of the conﬂict, or

on the battleﬁeld itself, to support more limi-

ted military missions. (WOOLF, 2019)

In my paper I intend to analyse Italy’s po-

sition regarding hosting nuclear weapons based

on Robert Putnam’s logic of two-level games

that connects domestic politics and internatio-

nal relations, one inﬂuencing the other. I argue

that there are signiﬁcant diﬀerences of the role

domestic politics between the Cold War and

the post-Cold War period regarding Italian

nuclear policies. Putnam states that national

governments have to participate in two-level

games (domestic and international level) and

cannot concentrate only on one of the levels

while neglecting the other. International agree-

ments (in our case: hosting US NSNWs) need

to be adopted by national legislation (formal

ratiﬁcation) and by the public (informal ratiﬁ-

cation). (PUTNAM, 1988).

Resorting to Putnam’s theory my hypo-

thesis is that in this speciﬁc area of politics do-

mestic politics contributed to the governments’

choices without the need of formal ratiﬁcation

during the Cold War period, however, in the

New World either formal or informal ratiﬁ-

cation would be more needed. Using the me-

thodology of document analysis this research

is based on governmental and parliamentary

sources, news items, speeches, interviews and

Even though estimates indicate that

amongst the above-mentioned countries Italy

hosts the most nuclear devices and this is the

only country with two nuclear bases on its ter-

ritory, the Italian standpoint regarding nuclear

weapons is not well-known. is research aims

at displaying Italian standpoint and policies re-

garding hosting nonstrategic nuclear weapons

(NSNW) on Italian soil, with a special empha-

sis of its foreign and domestic policy implica-

tions and the changes that has occurred. In

my paper I use the term “nonstrategic nuclear

weapons” as nonstrategic (tactical) nuclear

weapons referring to short-range weapons. Wi-

thin the U.S.-Soviet context, this meant lan-

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reports. Due to length limit I display the major

milestones’ of Italian nuclear policy from the

weapons (e.g. Starﬁghter ﬁghter-bombers)

(FORADORI, 2012)

‘

arrival to nuclear weapons to Italy in the ﬁfties

until the 1 Conte-government.

At the end of the Cold War the United

States opted for the radical reduction of its sev-

eral thousand nuclear weapons stored in Eu-

rope. According to experts about 60-90 B-61

gravity bombs can be hosted by Italy (NOR-

RIS; KRISTENSEN, 2012).

st

Types of tactical nuclear

weapons stored in Italian

territory



e ﬁrst nuclear weapons were delivered

Hosting nuclear weapons, as a

tool of increasing international

ranking during the Cold War

to North-Eastern Italy in 1957: nuclear war-

heads for the Corporal and Honest John rock-

ets were assigned to the American Southern

European Task Force (SETAF). Negotiations

leading to the 1955 creation of SETAF consti-

tuted a precedent for future negotiations for

both countries. From the one hand Italy tried

to present the agreement as a result of a mul-

tilateral NATO initiative, not as a U.S.- Italy

bilateral one in order to minimize potential

hostile repercussions from the Soviet Union.

From the other hand Italy aspired to reduce

the costs of hosting American troops on its

territory, expecting to obtain certain com-

pensation to be used to develop Italian forces

After the Second World Ward Italy con-

centrated its eﬀorts on avoiding a punitive

peace treaty, which was an essential step for

reconstructing its destroyed economy and for

(re)creating political stability to (re)secure its

shattered international status. It must be high-

lighted that post-World War Italian foreign

policy was based on the pursuit of counterbal-

ancing the eﬀects of the peace treaty (HAL-

MOSY, 1982). As Italy integrated into the

Western block, the bipolar environment be-

came the decisive cleavage in domestic policy

as well, having a direct inﬂuence on Italian for-

eign policy behaviour.

After nuclear bombs were dropped on

Hiroshima and Nagasaki the civil and military

sphere agreed that Italy’s international ranking

would be adversely aﬀected by the nuclear era

thus resulting in the country’s further marginal-

ization within the international arena (NUTI,

2011). is opinion was embraced by the Ital-

ian political regime as well, thereby when for-

mulating foreign policy goals during the bipo-

lar era the will of compensating the damaged

international status always came in the lime-

light, this concept became the basis of Italy’s

military nuclear policy during the Cold War.

(

NUTI, 2011). From 1959 to 1960, 30 U.S.

Jupiter intermediate range ballistic missiles

IRBMs) with 1.45-megaton thermonuclear

(

warheads were deployed to Italy as part of the

Eisenhower-administration’s nuclear arsenal

modernisation programme. ese missiles

were dismantled in April 1963, six month

after the Cuban Missile Crisis was resolved.

From the beginning of the sixties Italy hosted

antiaircraft Nike-Hercules missiles with W-31

nuclear warheads with yields of 2, 20, and 40

kilotons positioned in the northern part of It-

aly; nuclear landmines – atomic demolition

munitions – positioned on the Yugoslavian

border; gravity bombs and several dual-use

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After the nuclear revolution of the ﬁfties,

the vicinity of the World War the creation of

an Italo-German axis would have evoked bad

memories, thus open and ﬁerce German-Ital-

ian cooperation did not materialize (MER-

LINI, 1988). Italy took the position that the

treaty would de facto consolidate existing dif-

ferences within Western European states by

using ‘nuclear state’, ‘non-nuclear state’ classiﬁ-

cation, (in Italian interpretation it would have

meant permanent Italian military inferiority

to France), hence it would hinder the deepen-

ing of European integration. As a consequence

Rome lobbied for a limited-term treaty which

would have given possibility to renegotiate the

terms of statuses.

Signing the NPT led to the supervision

of Italian nuclear policy: in order to compen-

sate its exclusion from the inner circle Rome

became a ﬁerce supporter of the deployment

of new weapons (NJØLSTAD, 2005).e aim

of the support of the deployment of Euromis-

siles and the activity shown during rearmament

process of the so-called second Cold War was to

restore the image of a reliable partner which has

been damaged once again by Italian economic

diﬃculties of the 70s, consecutive far-left ter-

rorist attacks and domestic politics instability.

us in this period the aim of Italian nuclear

policy was even more to counterbalance and

exploit the negative image caused by domestic

policy problems, not to gain domestic political

support.

Italian nuclear policy was based on strength-

ening transatlantic relations which was seen as

the main source of accessing nuclear technol-

ogy and reaching any kind of nuclear power

status (NUTI, 2011). As far as nuclear shar-

ing remained in the centre of debates regarding

transatlantic security, Italy lobbied intensively

within NATO for the joint control of nuclear

weapons, since compared to Italy’s real interna-

tional ranking it would have guaranteed Rome

bigger inﬂuence on decision-making about the

eventual launch of nuclear weapons. is be-

haviour (lobbying for the joint control without

the joint burden-sharing) can be interpreted as

the externalization of the internal constraints

(

see later) (ISERNIA; LONGO, 2017), min-

imizing demands from the outside that could

change the domestic order, thus justifying free

riding behaviour in international institutions,

which in Putnam’s theory suggests the lack of

will to enlarge the domestic win-set, and using

tied-hand behaviour (PUTNAM, 1988)

e Kennedy administration’s decision

to gradually implement changes in its nucle-

ar policy impacted Italy directly. From the one

hand, as the U.S backed away from the concept

of nuclear sharing Italy was drifting away from

nuclear membership (according to its own in-

terpretation). From the other hand the fact that

the U.S. decided to give up nuclear sharing in

favour of a non-proliferation treaty with USSR

was a serious setback for Italian nuclear policy

based on transatlantic cooperation. As a conse-

quence Italy was a ﬁerce opponent of signing

the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nucle-

ar Weapons (NPT) (ALBERQUE, 2017). e

Italian government proposed a substantial revi-

sion and tried to coordinate its eﬀorts with the

government of West Germany, however, due to

Based on this strategic thinking it is hard-

ly surprising that Italy was the only Western

European country that tried to have a real dual

key arrangement for the control of the nuclear

weapons (NUTI, 2011).According to this con-

cept two ignition keys would have been neces-

sary to actually deploy nuclear weapons: one

must have been used by an Italian oﬃcial, the

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other by an American one, since the possibility

of passively accepting decisions made by other

power/powers was not satisfactory enough for

Rome. However, this mechanism functioned

only for one year in 1962, and only regarding

the Jupiter missiles, in every other cases the

nuclear weapons were under strict US control

Current issues of nuclear

weapons

With the end of the Cold War NATO

decreased its reliance on nuclear weapons in

its defence strategy (NATO, 1999). Since the

beginning of the New World Order Italy’s na-

tional security has not been threatened by such

an evident and easily deﬁnable challenge which

would necessitate the deployment of tactical

nuclear weapons. Furthermore, technological

development exceeded the practical advanta-

ges of using nuclear weapons, currently there

are many better solutions (e.g. new generation

precision weapons) to address any crises than

launching gravity bombs delivered by aircrafts

which are exposed to modern air defence sys-

tems, however, no nuclear power is willing to

disarm its nuclear weapons unilaterally.

(FORADORI, 2014).

During the whole Cold War objectives of

Italiannuclearpolicywereevident, eitherinterms

of foreign policy, or in terms of domestic policy.

Bipolar environment had a heavy inﬂuence on

the fragmented, unstable Italian domestic polit-

ical system (MOLNÁR, 2011), since the most

important cleavage between political parties was

product of the East-West opposition: the Italian

Communist Party (Partito Communista Italiano,

PCI) with its 30% support in average was unable

to ﬁnd any possible coalition partners. When us-

ing Putnam’s theory this composition of Italian

domestic politics resulted in the fact that the

Parallel to the changes of the international

environment Italian security policy underwent

major changes: from the static security policy

of the Cold War, concentrating on unidirectio-

nal security threat and conventional Article V.-

‘formal ratiﬁcation’ of Rome’s decision wasn’t

restrained by domestic political issues. PCI as-

sumed the role of supporting anti-nuclear pro-

tests and movements which had several eﬀects on

Italian nuclear policy. Firstly, due to the fact that

it was the Communist party – forced into op-

position –supporting protests probably thwart-

ed the evolution of Northern European-like

anti-nuclear mass movements (MORO, 2017).

Secondly, the objection of nuclear issues by the

Communist party strengthened the pro-nuclear

position of the often-changing, pro-Western Ital-

ian governments, even when the ruling elite was

not entirely convinced of the expediency of host-

ing nuclear weapons. e anti-nuclear stance

of PCI made pro-Western orientation more

accentuated in Italian politics, thus simplifying

the whole issue of hosting nuclear weapons to a

choice between “East” and “West”.

-related territorial defence tasks Italian security

policy shifted towards a more ﬂexible and active

approach (FORADORI, 2014). is resulted

that Rome is capable of projecting increased for-

ce and Italian armed forces can intervene in dis-

tant theatres as well, from security consumer it

has become security provider. However, NSNWs

cannot be deployed during crisis management

and peacekeeping tasks. Italian politics accepted

st

that in the 21 century international ranking is

not determined by a country’s will to host nu-

clear weapons on its territory, but by its active

participation in handling international crises.

As far as domestic policy is concerned the

need to keep the Italian Communist Party in

opposition became outdated, PCI transformed

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into an accepted, politically acceptable, coa-

lition-capable social democratic party which

doesn’t want to change anymore Italy’s foreign

policy orientation. As a consequence the do-

mestic political win-set ceased to be being li-

mited, Italian governments have to satisfy their

domestic voters with the nuclear policy, as well.

its territory, otherwise it would go against Ger-

many, whose status it has been trying to achie-

ve for a long time. Disarmament hasn’t been on

the Italian political agenda since the German-

-Belgian-Dutch initiatives were announced.

e IV Berlusconi-government (2008-2011)

preferred bilateral relations based on good per-

sonal relations of the Prime Minister, it empha-

sized the importance of the United States. is

atlanticist orientation impeded the adoption of

a joint statement with pro-disarmament coun-

tries against the US. After the fall of the Ber-

lusconi administration, Mario Monti’s techno-

crat government came into power (2011-2013)

which didn’t have neither adequate mandate,

nor adequate leader to address such complex

issues. It must be taken into consideration that

the Monti government had to deal primarily

with the consequences of the economic and

the migration crises thus its dual crises mana-

gement eﬀorts couldn’t focus on NSNWs. e

same applies for Enrico Letta’s then Matteo

Renzi’s grand coalition governments. After the

2018 parliamentary elections a slightly unor-

thodox coalition came into power with Lega

and MoVimento 5Stelle (M5S). e coalition

parties had diﬀering views regarding nuclear

weapons: while M5S wanted to rend the Me-

diterranean region a nuclear-free zone, Lega

emphasized the importance of the privileged

relations with the US which excludes nuclear

disarmament (TREZZA, 2018). Since the go-

verning parties had converging opinions about

more urgent issues as well, nuclear questions

Political attitude towards

disarmament

Even though the original reasons for hos-

ting nuclear weapons disappeared, Italy is not

particularly active in the ﬁeld of disarmament.

Oﬃcially Rome supports nuclear disarmament,

however, until a joint position isn’t reached

amongst NATO member states, it is highly im-

possible that Italy would take ‘unilateral’ steps.

As a consequence until any NATO member

state – e.g. Baltic or Central and Eastern Eu-

ropean countries – attributes security values to

deploying nuclear weapons to Europe, Italy is

willing to slow down or delay any decision regar-

ding their complete withdrawal, since multila-

teral decisions have traditionally enjoyed advan-

tages to unilateral ones in Italian foreign policy.

Rhetorically Rome fully supports nuclear

disarmament, but in spite of the rhetorical su-

pport Italian governments haven’t submitted

any concrete initiative, and it’s highly probable

that the realization of US preferences will con-

tinue to come ﬁrst in the future. e Italian

government didn’t even join the other three

NATO member states (Germany, Belgium, the

Netherlands) that expressed their will to disarm

nuclear weapons since 2009-2010 (SPAG-

NUOLO, 2011). However, in case these cou-

ntries reach an agreement about the details of

disarmament, Italy probably will follow their

lead and won’t insist on keeping NSNWs in

st

were oﬀ the agenda, under the 1 Conte-go-

vernment Lega and M5S simply avoided the

issue in order to maintain the fragile coalition

as long as possible.

Nuclear disarmament is neither on the

public, nor on the political agenda. In the centre

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of Italian foreign and security policy we ﬁnd a

dual crisis management mechanism addressing

the eﬀects of ﬁnancial-economic crisis on the

one hand, the migration-refugee crisis on the

other hand. ese issues are more important for

the public’s subjective perception of security than

nuclear weapons deployed to Italian territory

which aren’t even known by the population.

Conclusion

At the end of World War II for decades

Rome tried to balance its loss of inﬂuence by

strengthening transatlantic relations and by

hosting American non-strategic nuclear weap-

ons. is commitment had well deﬁned goals

during the Cold War: from foreign political

point of view it was seen as a tool to get back

in the decision-making circle, from internal

political point of view it was considered a

tool to keep the Italian Communist Party in

opposition, thus strengthening the pro-West-

ern orientation of the country. Putnam’s two

level-game logic can be only partially veriﬁed

for the Cold War period Italian nuclear pol-

icy: neither formal, nor informal ratiﬁcation

of government agreements were needed: the

structure of Italy’ domestic political arena was

shaped by bipolar logic, thus the Communist

Party was forced into opposition, the formal

ratiﬁcation of agreements was guaranteed.

In this period there was basically no need for

informal ratiﬁcation of government agree-

ments about NSNWs, since these decisions

were made by a small, ruling elite, without

informing the public. In the case of Italy in-

ternational and domestic ‘tables’ were clear-

ly separated during the Cold War, but in the

same time bound together by the fact that any

change on the one table would imply radical

changes on the other one. Two strategies have

been dubbed: the internalization of the exter-

nal constraints (overlapping domestic political

cleavage with the international one, domestic

left-right constraint becomes a manifestation

of East-West confrontation) and the external-

ization of the internal constraints (minimizing

demands from the outside that could change

the domestic order), thus justifying free riding

e population wasn’t surveyed until the

mid-2000’s, even from then only some surveys

were conducted having the conclusion that Ital-

ians are more pro-disarmament than pro-NSN-

Ws. Resorting to Putnam’s theory, we ﬁnd that

there was no need for ‘informal ratiﬁcation” by

the public of government agreements to host

NSNWs. e result of these surveys corroborates

with the assumption that the public was left out

of decisions regarding nuclear issues: according

to the results of the 2006 surveys –conducted 50

years after the ﬁrst American NSNWs had been

deployed to Italy – 32.6% of the respondents

were not aware that nuclear weapons are stored

in their country, and only 10.9% of them knew it

for fact. After the respondents were informed that

independent experts claim that nuclear weapons

are stored in Italian territory, more than half of the

respondents expressed concerns about this phe-

nomenon. In lack of information for decades Ital-

ian governments avoided informal ratiﬁcation of

their decisions regarding nuclear policy. Amongst

the ﬁve European countries hosting American

nuclear weapons Italy has the biggest number of

supporters of the nuclear-free Europe concept

(71.5% of the respondents in 2006) (STRAT-

COM, 2006). In a 2007 survey 93% of the re-

spondents claimed that Italy should aim at re-

ducing/disarming nuclear weapons and for 70%

of them the use of nuclear weapons by NATO

wouldn’t be acceptable under any circumstances

(THE SIMONS FOUNDATION, 2007)

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behaviour in international institutions. Using

Putnam’s metaphor by not willing to enlarge

the domestic win-set, the preferred behaviour

was “tied hands” (ISERNIA; LONGO 2017).

political sphere was not informed about it. After

the Cold War the values attributed to NSNWs

declined, thus the topic slipped down from the

agenda, but more information became known

for the public and the political spheres, as well.



e diﬀerence between the security

systems of the bipolar and the post-bipo-

lar worlds can be described as structural, as

Waltz argued in his structural realism theory

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