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China’s quest for oil: Brazil-China
relations in the oil sector (2000-2018)1
A busca da China por petróleo: as relações Brasil-China no setor petrolífero (2000-2018)
La búsqueda de petróleo: las relaciones Brasil-China en el sector petrolero (2000-2018)
Rafael Almeida Ferreira Abrão2
DOI: 10.5752/P.1809-6182.2021v18n1pX
Recebido em: 11 de agosto de 2020
Aceito em: 05 de abril de 2021
Resumo
Este artigo investiga de que forma a China se tornou uma força relevante no setor de
petróleo brasileiro. Os resultados mostram o Brasil como parte da estratégia da China de
diversicação de fontes do fornecimento de petróleo e o empenho das empresas chinesas
para participar de projetos no país latino-americano.
Palavras-chave: Brasil; China; Petróleo e Gás.
Abstract
is article reviews in what way China has developed into a sizable force in the Brazilian
oil sector. Findings show Brazil as part of China’s strategy of oil supply diversication and
the endeavor of Chinese companies to be part of projects in the Latin American country.
Keywords: Brazil; China; Oil and Gas.
Resumen
Este artículo revisa como China se ha convertido en una fuerza considerable en el sector
petrolero brasileño. Los resultados muestran que Brasil es parte de la estrategia de China
para diversicación de sus fuentes de petróleo y el esfuerzo de empresas chinas para
participar de proyectos en el país latinoamericano.
Palabras-clave: Brasil; China; Petróleo y Gas.
1 is study was sponsored by the Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior (CAPES) - Finance Code 001.
2 Ph.D. candidate at the Federal University of ABC (UFABC). Aliated Fellow at the International Institute for Asian Studies
(IIAS). Leiden, Netherlands. ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0001-9405-0719
Artigo
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Introdução
Energy is not just a regular commodity
traded on world markets. In political economy
analyses, energy is a strategic commodity and,
despite the increasing relevance of other energy
sources, oil continues to play a crucial role in
the world economy. Oil is a requirement for
all states, but at the same time, is not equally
distributed around the globe. It is a rare and
non-renewable resource and, above all, it is es-
sential for the survival, security, and well-being
of all states (FUSER, 2013). Energy is a fun-
damental element of the world economy and
it is a mandatory condition to mobilize other
resources (AMINEH; GUANG, 2017). Ener-
gy is a source of power.
Historically, oil and the fear of paralyzing
oil ows have mobilized countries economi-
cally and militarily to gain access to resour-
ces beyond their state borders. Japan entered
World War II to gain access to oil reserves in
Indonesia, while Nazi Germany’s army invaded
the Soviet Union with the ambition to conquer
the oil-rich Caucasus region. e United Sta-
tes’ (USA) oil predominance was central to the
outcome of World War II. Later, the dispute
between international companies and oil-rich
underdeveloped countries for control of said
countries’ main hydrocarbon reserves sparked
decolonization and nationalism movements. In
the 1970s, the two oil shocks created not only a
global economic crisis but also a group of weal-
thy and powerful oil-producing nations with a
high capacity to inuence international aairs.
ese are just a few examples of the oil indus-
try’s inuence among many wars, revolutions,
assassinations, coups d’état, and other relevant
episodes in contemporary history. According
to Yergin:
Over almost a century and a half, oil has
brought out both the best and worst of our civi-
lization. It has been both a boon and a burden.
Energy is the basis of industrial society. And of
all energy sources, oil has loomed the largest
and the most problematic because of its cen-
tral role, its strategic character, its geographic
distribution, the recurrent pattern of crisis in
its supply—and the inevitable and irresistible
temptation to grasp for its rewards (YERGIN,
1991, p. 780).
Finally, energy is essential to both Brazil’s
and China’s development. While China needs
to fulll its energy demand with overseas re-
sources, Brazil can boost industrial develop-
ment and enhance social welfare using income
generated by its new oil and gas deep-sea pro-
jects. But more than that, energy is essential to
the world economy since it is a requirement
for the development and production of goods
and services. Energy is also at the core of sus-
tainability and global climate change debates.
e investigation about the prole of China’s
energy investments has been examined in inter-
national literature, with a more specic focus
given to Asia and Africa, but not as much in
Brazil. To ll this gap, this study means to brie-
y contribute to understanding the role of two
major global players in the political economy of
energy: Brazil, the Latin American largest eco-
nomy and resource-rich nation, and China, the
world’s fastest-growing economy in the last de-
cades and largest energy consumer in the world.
In this article, we aim to review in what
way China has developed into a sizable force
in the Brazilian oil sector. Our argument is
built upon a comprehensive analysis of data
and literature review. e structure of the pa-
per is divided into ve sections, including this
introduction. e following section presents
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the Chinese import-dependent path. e third
section explains how Brazil ts China’s strategy
of energy supply security. e fourth addresses
the growing Chinese inuence in the Brazilian
oil sector through trade, investment, and -
nance. Finally, the conclusion summarizes the
results, showing Brazil as part of China’s strate-
gy of oil supply diversication and the Chinese
companies targeting greeneld projects in the
Brazilian pre-salt elds since they have limited
opportunities in other parts of the world.
The Chinese Thirst for Oil
In the last two decades, China’s energy in-
vestments around the globe have increased ex-
ponentially. is move is part of a state-led eco-
nomic globalization strategy of State-Owned
Enterprises (SOE) and a part of China’s rise as
a global political and economic power (AMI-
NEH; GUANG, 2018). eir strategic focus
on becoming world market leaders prompted
Chinese National Oil Companies (NOCs)
to ensure supply security from resource-rich
countries, as well as to meet China’s high le-
vel of import-dependency. China’s dependence
on fossil energy imports exposes the country’s
energy security to plenty of geopolitical risks,
as many oil-producing regions and internatio-
nal transportation routes are historically unsta-
ble (PARRA, 2004). As argued by Hughes and
Lipscy (2013, p. 450), “the politics of energy is
reemerging as a major area of inquiry for poli-
tical science after two decades of relative quiet.
One reason is the growth in demand in China”
while Lee (2012, p. 75) highlights that “China’s
energy consumption has expanded and its rise
has become the dominant geopolitical issue of
our time, Beijing’s energy security policy has
become one of the major discussion topics”.
Energy security refers to the need to safe-
guard sucient resources to meet the national
demand (YERGIN, 2006) and, consequently,
it becomes a component of national security,
requiring the state to act by diplomatic, econo-
mic, and military means (KLARE, 2016). In
the Chinese case, Lee (2012) argue:
Governments in all major economies, demo-
cratic and authoritarian, view energy security
as an inherent component of their national
interest. [...] In China, the denition is much
stricter than in other energy-importing cou-
ntries (such as the United States and Japan)
since Beijing considers not just reliable and
uninterrupted but also a cheap supply of
energy as essential to its national and domes-
tic political interest (LEE, 2012, p. 77-78).
China’s integration into the global system
has been pushing the world to a multipolar or-
der and is rapidly spreading Chinese political
and economic inuence on dierent countries
and regions by trade ows, direct investments,
nance, and diplomatic relations. e growing
transnational activities from China’s largest
NOCs - China National Petroleum Corpora-
tion (CNPC), China Petroleum and Chemical
Corporation (Sinopec), and the China Natio-
nal Oshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC) - are
now crucial to the country’s energy supply se-
curity. Some analysts like Amineh and Guang
(2017, p. 40) argue that once the NOCs be-
come transnational actors, the state loses its
monopoly control over the actions of the com-
panies, although still maintaining relevant par-
ticipation in the companies’ decisions. Never-
theless, Hogenboom (2014) adds that although
the Chinese state no longer centrally controls
the NOC’s international strategy3, it continues
3 We take “strategy” as a NOC’s means of achieving long-
term objectives and “performance” as a NOC’s economic ef-
ciency in nding, developing, and delivering hydrocarbon
resources (VICTOR; HULTS; THURBER, 2012).
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to encourage and support investments in natu-
ral resource sectors, ensuring China’s insertion
into the global economy and turning the coun-
try’s companies into increasingly transnational
players.
China was in the past an oil-exporting
country and after decades of economic growth
became a net oil importer in 1993. e coun-
try has become the largest energy consumer in
the world in 2011, surpassing the USA (EIA,
2015). To demonstrate China’s oil reliance, we
estimate the country’s structural dependency
rate. At rst, we measure Chinese apparent con-
sumption using the methodology as follows:
en, we calculate China’s structural
dependency on oil imports.
In other words,
Hence, we could measure China’s
structural dependency rate on oil imports.
After clarifying the methodology, we can de-
termine China’s rate of dependence on oil imports.
Firstly, since the oil production had no signicant
expansion, Chinese net oil imports increased stea-
dily to fulll the Chinese growing energy demand.
Chart 1. China’s oil production vs. net oil and oil products imports (kilotons, 2000-2018)
Source: Data from IEA, 2020. Author’s elaboration.
e expansion in consumption was accom-
panied by the increase in net oil imports bet-
ween 2000 and 2018, the most recent year with
available data, resulting in a scenario of structu-
ral dependency on oil imports. e Chinese oil’s
structural dependency boost from 86.202 to
484.900 kilotons between 2000 and 2018, al-
most six times higher than previously registered.
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By 2000, the structural dependency rate
in China was 35%, ten years later this rate rose
to 58% and has continued to grow to a high of
72% in 2018.
Chart 2. China’s apparent consumption vs. structural dependency (kilotons, 2000-2018)
Source: Data from IEA, 2020. Author’s elaboration.
Chart 3. China’s structural dependency rate (%, 2000-2018)
Source: IEA, 2020. Author’s elaboration.
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Consequently, the country has invested
in several energy projects overseas to meet the
needs of domestic consumption and diversi-
cation of supply to ensure supply security. It
is in this context of Chinese dependence on
oil overseas resources that Brazil is inserted on
China’s strategy of energy supply security.
Brazil Meets Chinese Oil Needs
Brazil is still emerging as a large oil-expor-
ting country and it is expected to become an
important actor in energy global geopolitics.
In 2007, the announcement of the discovery
of large oshore resources in the pre-salt layer
changed the historical landscape of scarcity of
the country’s oil and gas reserves. After proving
the potential of the pre-salt reservoirs, Brazil is
becoming a great oil exporter. e country is
already the largest producer in Latin America,
surpassing traditional producers such as Me-
xico, Venezuela, and Ecuador. e oil output
forecast made by the Brazilian energy planning
company can be seen in the chart below:
Chart 4. Brazilian Oil Production Forecast (Mb/d)
Source: EPE, 2020, p. 152.
Brazilian oil output is predicted to in-
crease 58% between 2020 and 2029. e oil
production is set to rise from 3.2 million bar-
rels a day (Mb/d) in 2020 to 5.5 million b/d
in 2029, most of it added by the increase in
pre-salt production. In 2019, the largest oil
producers (including crude oil, all other pe-
troleum liquids, and biofuels) were the USA
(19.5 Mb/d) followed by Saudi Arabia (11.8
Mb/d), Russia (11.4 Mb/d), and Canada (5.5
Mb/d) (EIA, 2020). is indicates that Brazil
can become one of the largest oil producers in
the world by the end of the decade.
e pre-salt is the main area with a capa-
city to steadily expand the world’s oil supply
and it is therefore in the crosshairs of the U.S.
and China. Schutte (2018) classied the an-
nouncement as a new reality to the oil indus-
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try since it changed the dynamics of national
hydrocarbon policies and transformed the
country’s historical path of import dependen-
ce into one of production and exportation.
Brazil’s ocial proven oil reserves accounted
for 13.4 billion barrels in 2018 (ANP, 2019).
Nonetheless, Sauer and Estrella (2019) esti-
mate that, with the certication of pre-salt
oil and gas resources, this amount can achieve
more than 100 billion barrels shortly, which
can conrm that “pre-salt changes any future
scenario on the insertion of Brazil, putting the
country on another level in world geopolitics”
(SCHUTTE, 2014, p. 86).
is brings challenges and opportunities
to the country’s economy and raises an intense
debate about the regulatory framework, foreign
currency appreciation, infrastructural projects,
sovereign and social funds, technological ad-
vances, and how to improve the national in-
dustry’s chains with upstream and downstream
opportunities. e regulatory framework has
changed several times due to the political pres-
sure of dierent actors. Transnational oil com-
panies, such as ExxonMobil, withdrew their
ventures in Brazil returning after a few years
when a new government took over and set a
more favorable regulation to oil transnational
companies. Meanwhile, China’s investments
remained despite any government or regula-
tory change.
Finally, it is worth noticing the comple-
mentary character of both Brazil and China’s
energy needs. On one hand, the discoveries in
Brazil oer plenty of resources to satisfy Chi-
nese aims of energy security and diversication
of supply, strategic assets in ultra-deep-sea wa-
ters, economic opportunities, and technolo-
gy to China’s engineering, machinery and oil
companies. On the other hand, China oers
opportunities to help Brazil develop its expen-
sive deep-sea projects in a moment that the
country and Petrobras have scarce capital avai-
lable to carry out such ventures, which can im-
prove the country’s development opportunities
for the next decades.
Brazil-China in Linkages in the
Oil Sector
As discussed in the previous sections, Bra-
zil has become a major producer and expor-
ter of oil at a time of increasing demand from
China for this commodity. is resulted in a
growing Chinese presence in the Brazilian oil
sector, which occurred through i) the increase
of Brazilian exports to China; ii) the expansion
of Chinese investments in Brazil, and iii) the
presence of Chinese nancial institutions su-
pporting Brazilian oil projects and companies.
erefore, we analyze the three vectors of Chi-
nese expansion in the Brazilian oil sector: tra-
de, investments, and nance.
Trade
Another aspect of the relations between
the two countries is the growth of trade. Chi-
na’s economic and political rise is changing the
global energy scenario since the country’s in-
creasing demand for raw materials cannot be
met by available domestic natural resources
alone. is poses a challenge to the country’s
energy security, as it relies on imports for 78%
of the crude oil it consumes (NBSC, 2018).
e country has become the largest commer-
cial partner for some of the Latin American
and Caribbean (LAC) countries. In the case
of Brazil, the rst decade of the 21st century
marked an exponential expansion of more than
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2000% in bilateral trade, reaching US$ 71.27
billion (YANRAN, 2017).
e Chinese industrialization and urbani-
zation process increased the demand for natural
resources and resulted in asymmetric commer-
cial ows between LAC countries and China.
e Chinese share of the exports in LAC rose
from 1.2% in 2000 to 9.6% in 2016, while
the imports rose from 2.5% in 2000 to 18.7%
in 2016 (HIRATUKA, 2018). e ows of
exports from LAC countries to China are not
very diversied, with most of them exporting
one or just a few goods consisting largely of
raw materials, while imports are mainly of ma-
nufactured products. South America trade rela-
tions with China consists mainly of basic pro-
ducts, especially food and energy, while China
has become a competitor to Mexico, Central
America, and the Caribbean in their national
markets and the USA, oering similar manu-
factured products to those produced in China
(CASAS; FREITAS; BASCUÑÁN, 2020).
Chinese investments are highly concen-
trated in those Latin American countries with
substantial oil reserves and petroleum is crucial
for their exports, economic growth, and public
revenues (HOGENBOOM, 2014). In Brazil, a
far more diversied economy in comparison to
other LAC countries, the Observatory of Econo-
mic Complexity (OEC) indicates that the share
of crude oil exports in 2017 was 7.9% (US$ 17.4
billion) and 43% of this amount was exported to
China. is shows that while China has multi-
ple oil suppliers, with Brazilian crude oil accou-
nting for just 5.1% of their supply, Brazil on the
other hand is increasingly dependent on expor-
ting oil to China. In 2020, during the Covid-19
outbreak, Brazil has become China’s 4th largest
oil supplier, only behind Saudi Arabia, Russia,
and Iraq, which consolidated Brazil as a major
source and an essential part of China’s strategy
of oil supply diversication. On the other hand,
it is important to notice that 70% of Brazil’s oil
exports were destined for China in July 2020, an
increase of 30% in a year, indicating that the re-
lations between the two countries are increasing
steadily (VALLE; PARRAGA, 2020).
Investments
Brazil has become the largest recipient of
China’s energy investments in the world. As
stated by the Chinese Global Investment Trac-
ker (CGIT), US$ 727.5 billion were invested
in dierent energy projects throughout the
world between 2005 and 2019, of which US$
50.31 billion were directed to Brazil’s energy
sectors, topping Canada (US$ 41.84 billion),
Australia (US$ 38.37 billion), Pakistan (US$
38.87 billion) and Russia (US$ 30.85 billion).
e Chinese investments in the Brazilian oil
and gas sector are listed in the table below:
Table 1. Chinese Oil and Gas Investments in Brazil
Year Company Operation Amount
2010 Sinochem 40% Peregrino block US$ 3 billion
2010 Sinopec 40% Repsol Brasil US$ 7.1 billion
2012 Sinopec 30% Galp Energia US$ 5.2 billion
2013 CNOOC 10% Libra block US$ 700 million
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We can observe that Chinese investments
are increasing steadily, especially after the eco-
nomic and political crisis that took place in
Brazil after 2014, withstanding even the drop
in international oil prices of that same year.
ese investments are concentrated in pre-salt
assets and are mainly made by SOEs such as
CNOOC and China Southern Petroleum
Exploration and Development Corporation
(CNODC), a CNPC subsidiary. Between
2003 and 2017, SOEs accounted for 83% of
the total amount of China’s investments in
Brazil (HIRATUKA; DEOS, 2019).
Finance
e internalization of NOCs has been
supported by the expansion of Chinese nan-
cing through large public banks (HIRATUKA;
DEOS, 2019). is movement can also be ob-
served in the Brazilian case, where China’s oil
investments have been encouraged by nancial
institutions such as the China Development
Bank (CDB), e Export-Import Bank of Chi-
na (Exim Bank), and in a smaller amount, by
the Bank of China (BOC) and the Industrial
and Commercial Bank of China (ICBC). Since
2005, CDB and Exim Bank have provided more
than $137 billion in loan commitments to La-
tin American countries. According to the Chi-
na-Latin America Finance Database, the largest
nance amounts are destined to South Ameri-
ca’s resource-rich nations: Venezuela (US$ 62.2
billion), Brazil (US$ 28.9 billion), Ecuador
(US$ 18.4 billion), and Argentina (US$ 17.1
billion). e larger part of these transactions is
directed to the energy sector and are backed-
-loan arrangements in exchange for oil supply.
e Chinese energy-related loans directed to
Brazil can be seen at the following table.
Year Company Operation Amount
2013 CNPC 10% Libra block US$ 700 million
2015 TEK 1 block in the Recôncavo basin R$ 201 thousand
2016 China Investment Corporation US$ 1 billion
2016 China Investment Corporation 90% Nova Transportadora do Sudeste US$ 410 million
2017 CNPC US$ 120 million
2017 CNOOC 20% Alto do Cabo Frio Oeste block R$ 70 million
2017 CNODC 20% Peroba block R$ 400 million
2017 CNOOC 1 block in the Espírito Santo basin R$ 23.5 million
2017 TEK 2 blocks in the Recôncavo basin R$ 1.5 million
2018 Shandong Kerui Petroleum Construction of Comperj US$ 600 million
2018 CNPC 30% TT Work
2018 CNOOC 30% Pau Brasil block R$ 150 million
2019 CNOOC 5% Búzios eld R$ 3.4 billion
2019 CNODC 5% Búzios eld R$ 3.4 billion
2019 CNODC 20% Aram block R$ 1 billion
Source: AEI, 2020; SCHUTTE, 2020.
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e previous data indicates a sizable and
growing Chinese nancial presence in Brazil.
It is possible to observe that most loans were
concentrated in the energy sector (US$ 26 bil-
lion) and a large part of this amount was taken
by Petrobras (US$ 25 billion), the country’s oil
state-owned company and largest Brazilian en-
terprise. e active role of China’s investment
and commercial banks increased signicantly
after the global crisis. According to Hiratuka
and Deos (2019), the data suggests that Chine-
se banks operate in Brazil with the strategy to
ensure the supply of natural resources to Chi-
na’s growing demand. At the same time, those
banks expand markets for Chinese suppliers of
goods and services.
Even though their operations in Brazil
are still incipient (compared to the stock of
foreign direct investments), Chinese nance
to Latin America topped nancial transactions
from either the World Bank and the Inter-A-
merican Development Bank in the 2005-2019
period (GALLAGHER; MYERS, 2020). Ano-
ther sample of the Chinese banks’ relevance is
shown by their increasing international per-
formance. In 2018, four Chinese commercial
banks were the largest in the world by volu-
me of assets: ICBC, China Construction Bank
(CCB), Agricultural Bank of China (ABC),
and BOC (HIRATUKA; DEOS, 2019).
Conclusion
In this article, we seek to highlight Chi-
na’s increasing dependence on oil imports.
is dependence forced the country to adopt
a strategy of diversication of oil supply, see-
king to guarantee its energy security. e gro-
wth in China’s demand for overseas oil sources
occurred at a time when Brazil is becoming an
oil-exporting nation, which made the country,
and the new assets in the pre-salt layer, become
part of China’s energy security strategy.
One of the main aspects of NOCs acti-
vities in Brazil is the possibility to compete in
bidding rounds of new and highly productive
areas, something unusual in other parts of the
world where the access to oil reserves is limited
Table 2 Finance: Chinese energy-related loans to Brazil
Year Purpose Lender Borrower US$ billion
2007 GASENE pipeline CDB BNDES 0.75
2008 Coal plant CDB Government 0.35
2009 Pre-salt oil eld development CDB Petrobras 7
2014 Bilateral cooperation agreement CDB Petrobras 3
2015 Bilateral cooperation agreement CDB Petrobras 1.5
2015 Bilateral cooperation agreement CDB Petrobras 3.5
2015 Leasing of platforms P-52 and P-57 ICBC Petrobras 2
2016 Supply of equipment and services EximBank Petrobras 1
2016 Debt nancing CDB Petrobras 5
2017 Oil production CDB Petrobras 5
2018 Upgrade in renery infrastructure NDB Petrobras 0.2
Source: GALLAGHER; MYERS, 2020; PETROBRAS, 2020.
26 • Conjuntura Internacional • Belo Horizonte, ISSN 1809-6182, v.18 n.1, p.16 - 27, mai. 2021
to the State-owned companies of the host cou-
ntry. e new exploratory areas of the Brazilian
pre-salt have been enabling the participation of
Chinese NOCs in greeneld projects, not only
in what is left behind by the IOCs like in other
parts of the world. In other countries, the Chi-
nese NOCs are engaging with the international
oil companies (IOCs), but in Brazil, they choo-
se to operate alongside state-owned Petrobras
rather than engage with IOCs because of the
geological expertise and the recognized techno-
logical leadership in the oshore environment
of the Brazilian company.
In short, while China ensures its energy
security and Brazil transforms into a major oil
exporter, their relations through trade, invest-
ments, and nance are developing and beco-
ming increasingly relevant.
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