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Falling-Behind: India’s space sector and
Brazil’s attempts to develop its own
Ficando para atrás? O setor espacial Indiano e as tentativas brasileiras
Quedando Atrás: El sector espacial de la India y los intentos de Brasil de desarrollar el
suyo propio
Gustavo Fornari Dall’Agnol1
DOI: 10.5752/P.1809-6182.2024v21n1pX-X
Resumen:
Este breve artículo cuestiona por qué la India ha logrado un desarrollo tan exitoso en el
sector espacial. A partir de esta pregunta, se indaga: ¿Por qué Brasil no lo ha conseguido?
Se observa que la India mantuvo una inversión sólida a largo plazo en su programa
espacial, mientras que Brasil solo invirtió de manera volátil y no sistemática. El artículo
utiliza el método comparativo, teniendo como principales parámetros de comparación el
desempeño de la industria espacial en ambos países, medido en términos de inversión,
etapas del desarrollo tecnológico y resultados. Con esto, se busca analizar cuáles son los
factores que llevaron a la India a destacarse en el sector, a pesar de que Brasil también
ha tenido grandes avances. Se observa que la India mantuvo una inversión sólida a
largo plazo en su programa espacial, mientras que Brasil solo invirtió de manera volátil
y no sistemática. Lograr el éxito de un proyecto a gran escala y a largo plazo requiere
la priorización de este en un escenario en el que varios gobiernos e incluso regímenes
cambiarán. La amenaza externa que siente la India sin duda es un impulsor del
desarrollo. Brasil, con un entorno más tranquilo, no tiene este incentivo. Sin embargo, si
aspira a proyectarse como un jugador clave y ser líder regional, no podrá dejar de seguir
invirtiendo.
Palabras chave: Espacio; Defensa; India; Brasil; Inversión.
Abstract:
is brief article questions why India has achieved such successful development in the space
sector. From this inquiry, the question arises: Why hasn’t Brazil managed to do the same?
e article employs a comparative method, using the performance of the space industry in
both countries as the main parameters of comparison, measured in terms of investment,
stages of technological development, and results. e aim is to analyze the factors that have
led India to excel in the sector, even though Brazil has made signicant progress. Achieving
success in a large-scale, long-term project requires prioritizing it in a scenario where
1 He holds a post-doctoral grant by CAPES / INCT at the Project: “INCT: Observatório de Capacidades Militares e Políticas de
Defesa. He holds a master’s degree in international political economy and a PhD in International Relations from PUC-MG were
he also worked as a post-doctoral researcher. He worked as an Assistant Professor at UFSC and PUC-MG. He is a senior fellow at
the South American Institute for Strategy and Development (ISAPE).
Artigo
30 • Conjuntura Internacional • Belo Horizonte,
ISSN 1809-6182, v.21 n.1, p.30 - 39, abr. 2024
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Introduction
is paper addresses the cases of India
and Brazil and their respective space sectors.
While India has a well-established and succes-
sful program with good prospects, Brazil has
lagged, despite its historical investments in the
eld. e aim of this paper is to address the
reasons for this dierence. India was the four-
th-largest military spender globally in 2023.
At $83.6 billion, its military expenditure was
4.2% higher than in 2022. I argue here that
sustained and long-term investment, priority
management, and external threat factors put
India’s program ahead of the Brazilians. As a
rule, military investment is closely tied to ae-
rospace development and its objectives. Figu-
res, particularly those related to investment,
demonstrate priorities assumed by a country
and have a clear impact on its Defense Indus-
trial Base. It is important to state that while
the main objective of the present paper is to
analyze and compare investment in the spa-
ce programs this does not mean that India is
ahead in all defense sectors. It is important to
highlight too that this paper focuses mainly on
comparisons among space programs with mi-
litary ends. at said, civil programs usually
also have military objectives. Middle-range
powers such as India, Turkey, and Brazil have
special importance in a multipolar world in
which alliances will become increasingly im-
portant. Nonetheless, this is mainly a defense
economics paper. It is based on parameters for
comparison put forward by Hartley (2011;
2019), such as those mentioned above. Trans-
various governments and even regimes will change. It is observed that India maintained
a solid long-term investment in its space program, while Brazil only invested in a volatile
and unsystematic manner e external threat that India faces is certainly a driving force
behind its development. Brazil, in a more peaceful region, does not have this motivator.
However, if it aims to project itself as a key player and become a regional leader, it cannot
aord to stop investing.
Key-words: Space; Defense; India; Brazil; Investment.
Resumo:
Este breve artigo questiona o porquê de a Índia lograr um desenvolvimento tão bem-
sucedido no setor espacial. A partir desse questionamento indaga-se: Por que o Brasil não
conseguiu fazer o mesmo? Vê-se que a Índia manteve um investimento sólido a longo prazo
em seu programa espacial e o Brasil só investiu de maneira volátil e não esquemática. O
artigo parte do método comparativo tendo como principais parâmetros de comparação o
desempenho da indústria espacial, nos dois países, medidas em termos de investimento,
etapas do desenvolvimento tecnológico e resultados. Objetiva-se, com isso, analisar quais
os fatores que levaram a Índia a se destacar no setor, muito embora o Brasil tenha tido
grandes avanços. Lograr o sucesso de um projeto de larga-escala e longo prazo requer a
priorização deste em um cenário em que diversos governos e até regimes mudarão. A
ameaça externa que a Índia sente com certeza é um propulsor do desenvolvimento. O
Brasil, com uma vizinhança mais tranquila, não tem esse indutor. No entanto, se almeja
se projetar como player e ser líder regional, não poderá car deixar de seguir investindo.
Palvras-Chave: Espaço; Defesa; India; Brazil; Investimento.
32 • Conjuntura Internacional • Belo Horizonte, ISSN 1809-6182, v.21 n.1, p.30 - 39, abr. 2024
forming resources into a well-established
program is the core issue. us, I address the
problem from a mobilizing resources and per-
sonnel point of view. Certainly, tactical and
strategic considerations will not be disregar-
ded when needed. e comparative recons-
truction of the history of both countries’ spa-
ce programs has the objective of determining
causality among the variables highlighted,
such as the country’s initiatives and external
threat impacts and the main object of this
study: the causes of success of space programs
in developing countries. e comparative me-
thod allows the researcher to infer causality
among phenomena (Bennet; Elman, 2010;
Elman 2008). However, a rigorous compari-
son is a challenge, due to fundamental histo-
rical dierences.
1.Space Capabilities and
Engagement
What are the main capabilities a state can
maintain in space and how much do they cost?
If considered just in terms of eciency, going
to the moon might not be a good choice. Ho-
wever, defense economics is also about power.
Eectiveness and deterrence are more impor-
tant than short-term expenditures. In order
to illustrate space capabilities and their role in
2024, I present some of the main features of
the U.S. Space Command:
“e space force’s record budget – including a
16% increase in RDT&E funding – and end
strength to 9,400 personnel (up from arou-
nd 8,600) reect the growing importance of
space to current and future DoD operations.
e service’s main procurement priority was
to increase the number of annual launches
to 15 from ten. e FY24 missions cover
ten for the National Security Space Launch
program, placing spacecraft in geostationary
and medium orbit, and ve launches for the
Space Development Agency’s Low Earth
Orbit constellation. Key RDT&E programs
include resilient missile warning and missile
tracking, space-technology development and
prototyping, and next-generation overhead
persistent infrared satellites (IISS, 2024).
It is clear that RDT&E is the major in-
vestment which correlates with an increasing
development of space forces. Missile warning
and tracking, alongside satellites, are sine qua
non conditions in the present scenario of great
power competitions. Certainly, India does not
yet compete with the United States. Howe-
ver, it´s development shows a fast pace, and
its space program has been promising since
the 1990s (Mistry, 1998). Innovation requires
risk taking; nonetheless, it is the most solid
way of turning the distribution of resources to
your favor. Alliances are unstable, and a state
must ultimately count on its own eorts (San-
tos, 2008)
2-The Case of India
e Indian space program was establi-
shed on November 21, 1963, with the launch
of Nike-Apache, an American sounding roc-
ket from the shores of emba near iruva-
nanthapuram on the west coast of India (Va-
sant, 2009; Mistry, 2009). Since then, India’s
launch vehicles advanced through the SLV-
3 and Augmented Satellite Launch Vehicle
(ASLV) towards numerous accomplishments.
India launched its rst satellite from the Satish
Dhawan Space Center in 1980. Since then,
it has successfully developed launch vehicles,
imaging and communications capabilities and
other critical satellites. It has begun to deve-
lop counterspace capabilities. e country has
several bureaus dedicated to the space domain
33 • Conjuntura Internacional • Belo Horizonte, ISSN 1809-6182, v.21 n.1, p.30 - 39, abr. 2024
both in the military and civil sectors, each
with supporting policies. It does not have a
comprehensive space force yet. e India Spa-
ce Research Organization (ISRO) maintains
the country’s SLVs and spaceports. It is ne-
cessary to point out, however, that despite its
successful space program, India is import de-
pendent on most of its weapon systems (e.g.,
40% in 2018). So, it is not unreasonable to
state that India’s space program evolved con-
jointly with its nuclear program, primarily ta-
king into account the threats presented by its
neighbors: China and Pakistan.
By 2020 India had two operational orbi-
tal launch vehicles, the Polar Satellite Laun-
ch Vehicle (PSLV) and the Geosynchronous
Satellite Launch Vehicle (GSLV). Since 1980,
there have been 67 total Indian launches from
the Satish Dhawan Space Center. In 2017,
India broke records launching 104 satellites
with one PSLV.
e document entitled “Technolo-
gy Perspective and Capability Roadmap”
highlighted detailed investments for the se-
cond phase of the program and intended to
play an “anti-satellite” role from ground &
aerial problem”. Regarding Mission Shakti,
DRDO Chief Sthat Reddy stated that India
was in the process of developing dierent
ASAT (Anti-Satellite Weapons) technolo-
gies, including directed-energy weapons, la-
sers, and electromagnetic pulses. However,
beyond these general statements and reports,
the government of India has not publicized
any details of these activities. India could use
Nuclear Electromagnetic Pulse weapons for
nuclear detonation and to disable satellites,
although, as yet, there have been no public
statements of intent to pursue such a pro-
gram.
India’s 2018 Technology Perspective Ca-
pability Roadmap also declared an interest in
“detect, monitor, and jam enemy cellular re-
ceivers and satellite communication receivers,
or an integrated system to “carry out jamming
& spoong of satellite-based positioning sys-
tems”. In terms of cybercommunication, by
2019, the government of India had set up the
Defence Cyber Agency, the DCA, that is in-
tended to “control and coordinate joint cyber
operations”. Cyber deterrence against enemy
satellites both in space and on their land-based
systems is another option.
Indian lunar lander Chandrayaan-3 suc-
cessfully touched down on the lunar surface
on August 23, 2023, making India the fourth
nation to successfully land on the moon and
the rst to land in the south pole region. At
a time of heightened international competi-
tion, this accomplishment cannot be ignored.
According to the CSIS “ISRO’s space explo-
ration program is part of a broad government
strategy to realize the scientic, economic,
and security benets of space capabilities.
India’s space program is also seen as a path-
way for attracting young Indians into high-
-technology elds and for ushering in a more
technically advanced society” (CSIS, 2020).
Communication satellites orbiting the Earth
can improve connectivity among rural areas,
navigation systems, mariners, and imagery sa-
tellites. India can also monitor Chinese deve-
lopments in the area.
Since 2020, the Modi government has en-
couraged private-public partnerships in space
explorations and has as its main objectives the
rst human spaceight mission (Gaganyaan).
e south pole region of the moon is believed
to have frozen water that could be critical to
support human life on the satellite. Other mi-
34 • Conjuntura Internacional • Belo Horizonte, ISSN 1809-6182, v.21 n.1, p.30 - 39, abr. 2024
neral stores, used in electronics, and helium,
are capacities being explored. India’s accom-
plishment cannot be understated since Russia
failed to land on the South pole of the moon
just months earlier.
India developed kinetic physical weapons
after China’s successful 2007 ASAT develop-
ments, calling it the Mission Shakti (strength
in Hindi). “It suddenly reminded them that
their diverse space assets were now at risk”
(CSIS, 2020). While India still does not have
the capabilities to co-orbit ASAT capabilities,
it is developing the technical requirements
with France to build an RPO (Rendezvous and
Proximity Operations). Regarding Mission
Shakti: On March 27 2019, India successfully
launched a Prithvi Delivery Vehicle Mark-II
(PDV MK-II) missile defense interceptor at
one of its own satellites. Non-kinetic physical
weapons are in the plans of the Indian admi-
nistration, with a focus on electronic weapons,
specically miniaturization of EW elements as
payloads on satellites.
3-The Case of Brazil
e main dierence in success between
Brazil and other nations in space exploration
may lie in the historical context and political
will that shaped Brazil’s approach to long-term
projects like a space program. Brazil has expe-
rienced periods characterized by volatile elite
leadership, where investments in ambitious,
long-term projects have uctuated based on
prevailing political ideologies.
Building a robust space program requires
sustained investment and consensus within the
government to sponsor such endeavors. Histo-
rically, mercantilist views, which prioritize the
accumulation of power and wealth even at the
expense of short-term economic gains—have
correlated with the high points of Brazil’s spa-
ce program. During liberal periods, however,
Brazil’s capabilities as a middle power aiming
for industrialization and self-suciency have
deteriorated.
After the 1930s revolution, Brazil’s geo-
political position and policy direction leaned
towards a mercantilist approach. Investments
in defense were viewed as key to industriali-
zation, growth, and the pursuit of national
wealth and power (Mattos, 2021). is pers-
pective was inuenced by gures like Góes
Monteiro, considered the “father of geopoliti-
cal thought in Brazil.”
By the 1950s, Brazil had established the
Instituto Tecnológico Aerospacial (ITA) in con-
junction with the Centro Tecnológico Espacial
(CTA) and the Instituto Militar de Engenharia
(IME), recognizing the critical importance of
research and development for an autonomous
space program. During military governments,
institutions for the Defense Industrial Base
were created, aiming to reduce dependency
through strategic industrial policies such as the
PND I and PND II.
In the 1960s, Brazil continued to advance
in the space sector with the construction of the
Centro de Lançamento de Barreira do Inferno
in Natal-RN. Brazil successfully launched four
sounding rockets at sub-orbital levels, leading
to the creation of the Missão Espacial Comple-
ta Brasileira (MECB), which aimed to develop
national satellites and launch vehicles for laun-
ch from Brazilian soil.
35 • Conjuntura Internacional • Belo Horizonte, ISSN 1809-6182, v.21 n.1, p.30 - 39, abr. 2024
Figure 1- The Brazilian Space Program
Source: Antunes, Erich Vieira. 2016, p. 72.
2 It was decided to leave the gure in Portuguese as it is a very specic government structure.
Brazil achieved success in constructing
functioning satellites such as SCD-1, SCD-2,
and SCD-3, launched from Cape Canaveral
in collaboration with China’s Taiyuan base.
However, one of the notable setbacks to Bra-
zil’s space program was the failure to develop
a functional space rocket capable of indepen-
dently launching satellites. e VLS-1 project,
initiated in 1984, aimed to achieve this auto-
nomy but faced signicant challenges, inclu-
ding mission failures in 1997 and 1999, and
a tragic incident in 2003 resulting in the loss
of lives.
After the 1990s, Brazil’s space program
faced signicant changes. e country’s demo-
cratization process led to a lack of consistency
in addressing national defense issues, with civil
society calling for limits to military power and
political protagonism. Brazil renounced key ca-
pabilities under Fernando Henrique Cardoso’s
government, embracing a cosmopolitan, glo-
balized, liberal worldview reected in treaties
banning missiles and nuclear weapons (NPT),
for example. Budget cuts further impacted the
ability of the space program to procure neces-
sary components for launching systems (Viei-
ra, 2016).
In recent years, Brazil has faced resource
constraints for investments in science and te-
chnology, opting for a secondary role in global
space economy chains. is insertion model
reects a shift towards renouncing strategic au-
tonomy, exemplied by the signing of the Te-
chnological Safeguards Agreement (AST) with
the United States (BRASIL, 2024). ese shifts
highlight the challenges and transformations
faced by Brazil’s space program amidst evolving
political and economic landscapes.
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Graph 2- Industry Contribution to GDP%
Source: IRBD. e Author
Investment is the fundamental variable,
especially through a long-time span, or in the
long term, to make a project successful. Space
programs require investment, especially in the
form of R&D. Governments can change, but
a program such as the space program has to
be funded and administered, or it will fade as
was the case with Brazil. I added Turkey to the
graph to make a point: economists claim that
industry downsizing in proportion to GDP is
only natural because of productivity. But as il-
lustrated in Graph 2, middle powers may not
follow this rule. ey are not developed cou-
ntries with highly specialized and aggregated
value services. Industry is still a path for deve-
lopment3.
3 For a critical and normative analysis of the Bra-
zilian space program, see: Ceballos, Durão, 2010.
Graph 1- Investment as a share of the GDP %
Source: e Author. IRBD.
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I include this graph not only to show the
abrupt fall of Brazil’s industry but also to rein-
force that what economists propose as natural/
prevailing development – services representing
more than industry in GDP – must be analy-
zed carefully. Medium powers, which are not
leaders in cutting-edge technology service pro-
vision, can benet signicantly from industrial
investment.
Graph 3- Military spending as a % of the GDP
Periods of high growth and investment
when Brazil was the fastest growing country in
the world led to rising military expenditures.
But investment in large-scale projects must be
solid, without interference from budget and
administrative uctuations. ese projects have
to be a state priority, regardless of who wins
the election. Space programs are long-term in-
vestments, and the downsizing of resources will
certainly aect them.
Graph 4- Defense Spending (U$ 2021 dollars)
Source: e Author. SIPRI
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While Brazil clearly has a volatile defense
budget, which may represent periods of doubt
in terms of the discussion about the impor-
tance of the defense industry, especially since
the levels of external threat are low, India has a
steady a growing project to expand its inuence
and be a regional power. Space, space defense,
shipbuilding and cybertechnology are India’s
strengths. However, Table 1 demonstrates that
it needs R&D and development in a number
of other technologies. e country already has
the fourth highest military expenditure gure
in the world and, facing Pakistan and Chi-
na as possible enemies is the main motivator
behind India’s space program. However, some
problems in the country’s industrial base still
remain for India.
Table 1- Procurement (National and International) in India
Source: Behera, 2019
India is highly dependent on arms imports
which, from the point of view adopted here,
is problematic considering its potential threat
scenarios. To produce major components of all
forces domestically, and innovate or emulate,
however, would be a massive endeavor, one it
seems that India’s DRDO is already under-
taking. It is interesting that in table 2, space
industry requirements are considered, whereas
that is not always the case with Brazilian invest-
ment in technologies.
Table 2- DRDO’s Developed Systems (2017)
Source: Behera, 2019, p. 519
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Table 2 shows that the top technologies
for Indian investment are space-linked: Missi-
les, Radar Systems, and so on. India has chosen
to specialize in some strategic areas. at seems
to be their plan. Brazil has a relative success in
the aerospace sector with Embraer and the São
José dos Campos Cluster, although it is more
civilian oriented.
Although the data collected is more ge-
neral, highlighting investments and defense
expenditures, for example, I argue here that
they have a direct eect on the country’s space
programs, which are conducted by the Air For-
ce with most of the investments by the public
sector. Furthermore, there is a problem with
data availability, especially when regarding past
programs. is poses a limitation to this study,
regarding both countries.
Concluding Remarks
Even if Brazil has an ambition of beco-
ming a regional power per se, or a global player,
uctuations in budgets and priorities cannot
happen in this way. Brazil’s area of possible po-
tential inuence is large and has to count on
building capabilities, because even if you are
at peace, you prepare for war, and even if you
don’t want to develop new capabilities, it is a
good reminder that they are relative and not
absolute.
In this paper I have conducted a compa-
rative analysis between the space programs of
India and Brazil. Brazil has made some advan-
ces, although India is far ahead. Some of the
explanations reside in steady investment and
budget, alongside maintaining a strategy. Ad-
ditional factors are the external threat to India
by China and Pakistan and the immense vola-
tility of Brazil’s space program, both budgetary
and administrative. Brazil’s pursuit of a develo-
pment program, emulating some aspects of In-
dia, would not be a bad idea. Nowadays there
are startups and private companies operating in
space, although the State remains the main ac-
tor. Partnerships should be sought cautiously,
but not disregarded.
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