21
Impacts of Chinese economy and its global
geopolitics: after the slowdown
Impactos da economia chinesa e sua geopolítica global:
depois da desaceleração
Marcos Costa Lima
1
DOI: 10.5752/P.2317-773X.2019v7.n2.p21
Received in July 16, 2017
Accepted in August 23, 2018
A
This work present two main objectives: the rst one, in addition to show the
new centrality that Asia and East Asia regions represent today for the world
economy, discusses the impacts of China's slowdown after 2013 for Asean coun-
tries and how the Chinese economy has been restructuring with its back to nor-
mal. The second objective indicates the main challenges that China faces today
and analyzes whether China's expectations are maintained as a future systemic
center in global geopolitics.
Key-Words: China’s rising economy; China’s back to normal; Asean economy
vs. China; China’s challenges; China geopolitics
R
Este trabalho tem dois objetivos centrais: o primeiro, além de evidenciar a nova
centralidade que hoje representam a Ásia e a Ásia do Leste para a economia
mundial, discute os impactos da desaceleração da China após 2013 com relação
aos países da Ásia e como a economia chinesa se reestruturou com sua volta ao
normal. O segundo objetivo indica os principais desaos que a China enfrenta
hoje e analisa se as expectativas chinesas se mantêm como um futuro centro
sistêmico na geopolítica global.
Palavras-Chave: A ascensão da economia chinesa; a volta da China à normalidade;
Economia Asiática versus a China; Os desaos da China; a geopolítica chinesa
1. Prof. Dept. of Political Science, UFPE;
Ph.D. in Social Sciences, Universidade
Estadual de Campinas, UNICAMP,
Postdoctorate, University of Paris XIII
– Villetaneuse Coordinator of Institute
of Asia Studies-UFPE. Recife/ Brazil.
ORCID: 0000-0002-3831-7631.
estudos internacionais • Belo Horizonte, ISSN 2317-773X, v. 7, n. 2, (ago. 2019), p.21 - 41
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estudos internacionais • Belo Horizonte, ISSN 2317-773X, v. 7, n. 2, (ago. 2019), p.21 - 41
Introduction
I defend the point of view that there is a dierence between knowledge of other
peoples and ages resulting in understanding, compassion, study and careful anal-
ysis in the interests of themselves and, on the other hand, knowledge – if that
It comes to knowledge – integrated in a comprehensive campaign of self-ar-
mation, belligerency and declared war. There is, after all, a profound dierence
between the desire to understand for reasons of co-existence and enlargement
of horizons, and the desire for knowledge for reasons of control and foreign
domination. (SAID, 2007, p. 15)
This nal decade of the XXIst century is changing rapidly, but
keeping some standards in economy, politics and the environment. We
are still living the impact of the 2008 crisis, with strong repercussions
on a global scale, but whose core systemic insists on maintaining neo-
liberal policies in their central poles. Another major change comes from
the East, represented by "China Rise". And now questions whether the
return to normalcy in the country will change its expectations to re-
place the great hegemon that is the United States by 2030 (ARRIGHI,
2007). As Tsang ang Honghua (2016, p. 2) have said: “The decade under
Xis leadership, from 2012 to 2022, is going to be a pivotal one as he is
determined to lead China towards national rejuvenation at a time when
sustaining a fast rate of growth is becoming increasingly challenging.
Xi intends to turn the rhetoric of the China Dream into reality”. Which
means convert China into a moderately prosperous society, accompany-
ing the new global context of rapid change and preparing the country
to transform itself from a regional power into a superpower, or at least
into a global power.
According to the latest OECD report, (2018, p. 17), overall, growth
in 2017 in Emerging Asia (Southeast Asia, China and India) is expected to
remain strong. In 2017, growth in China and ASEAN is expected to pick
up on a strong trade rebound and resilient domestic consumption while
growth in India is anticipated to nudge down owing to taxation and mon-
etary reforms. Over the medium term (2018-22), the regions growth is
projected to remain robust, though slightly lower in comparison with the
average pace between 2011 and 2015.
These understandings, however, do not mean that the challenges
facing China and Asia today, whether geopolitical, economic, social, and
environmental, are not great.The environmental issue
2
, for example, a
sensitive area of global change, is widely spoken and discussed, but point-
ed mitigating eects are still very far from presenting consistent results
(TANG et al, 2015; ZHU et al, 2015; ZHANG, 2013; 2016). A signicant and
positive change was the development of developing countries into the
world economy. According to Nayyar (2014), there was a dramatic change
from 1970 to 2010, when the participation of these countries in global in-
dustrial production jumped from 1/12 to 1/3. Similarly, the share of world
exports of manufactured goods rose from 1/12 to 2/5.
For the table below, the excellent performance of developing coun-
tries, especially between 2001 and 2008 shows that the Asian continent
has been playing a decisive role, but also that global growth has been,
since 1971, as a result of higher growth in developing countries.
2. The UN-Climate Conference COP-21,
held in December 2015, concluded
with a historic agreement, which first
involves almost all countries of the
world, to make an effort to reduce
carbon emissions and contain the
effects of global warming, which should
remain under-2ºC. But the results, from
the 1st agreement was created in 1997
in Kyoto, the COP3, have been far short
to face the severity of the problem.
(KLEIN, 2015).
23
Marcos Costa Lima Impacts of Chinese Economy and its Global Geopolics
Table 1: Growth rates of the world economy by region 1971-2008
Maddison data
1971-1980 1981-1990 1991-2000 2001-2008
Developing Countries 5.23 4.07 4.93 6.41
Asia 5.31 5.60 5.76 7.26
Africa 4.01 2.22 2.67 5.01
Latin America 5.57 1.34 3.19 3.52
Industrialised Countries 3.34 2.89 2.58 1.91
World 3.82 3.08 3.06 4.20
Source: MADDINSON (2007).
In Table 2 below, we compare the GDP indicators, Exports of goods
and services and population of the three main centers of advanced econ-
omies – US, Euro and Japan with each other and what they represent to
the world and then the same indicators for emerging economies – Russia,
the emerging and developing Asia (29 countries), including China, India
and Brazil also compared. But you can check what they represent to the
world. At rst, the GDP of Advanced represents 43.6% of global GDP,
while the GDP of the emerging and developing economies, 56.4%. The
contrast is due to the number of countries: while the forwards are only
36, the emerging 153. But what is striking is the position of the emerging
and developing Asia, which account for 28.7% of GDP, 16.9% of exports
Goods and Services and are 48% of the world population. China alone
represents 15.8% of world GDP, very close to the US and exports more
goods and services than the US, 10.2% against 9.9% respectively in 2014.
If we take into account the maintenance rates above 6% of GDP in
China and the low rates that remain at the heart of the system, we see
that China and Asia are approaching the economic hegemony of the US
and European Union. The IMF itself points out that in terms of purchas-
ing power parity (PPP) in US dollars, China has surpassed the US GDP,
respectively 19,392,357 against 17,947,000 trillion.
Table 2: Classification of Advanced and Emerging Countries and its participation in
the GDP; Export of Goods and Services and Population in 2013
GDP Goods and services Population Exports
Nº Countries Advanced
Economies
world Advanced
Economies
world Advanced
Economies
world
Advanced Economies 36 100.0 43.6 100.0 61.2 100.0 14,7
USA 1 37.7 16.4 16.1 9.9 30.5 4.5
Euro 18 28.2 12.3 40.4 24.6 32.0 4.7
Japan 1 10.5 4.6 5.9 3.6 12.3 1.8
Emerging Economies 153 100.0 56.4 100.0 38.8 100.0 85.3
Russia 1 6.1 3.4 6.0 2.6 2.4 2.0
Emerging Asia 29 50.9 28.7 43.5 16.9 57.3 48.8
China 1 28.1 15.8 26.4 10.2 22.7 19.4
India 1 11.8 6.6 5.3 2.0 20.8 17.7
Brazil 1 5.2 3.0 3.1 1.2 3.4 2.9
Source: IMF (2014, p. 163).
24
estudos internacionais • Belo Horizonte, ISSN 2317-773X, v. 7, n. 2, (ago. 2019), p.21 - 41
The displacement of the dynamic axis of the world economy to-
wards Asia Pacic had already been drawing for at least three decades
(VEIGA; RIOS, 2010), from the rapid Japanese growth, followed by so-
called Asian Tigers and soon after, the Flying geese and ending the unprec-
edented growth of China especially after 1978 and now in India. The re-
gion is thus decisively inuencing the whole world economy.
To Medeiros (1997), China's rise in international trade has gained
momentum since the 1980s, when a large expansion of regional trade
was directly associated with foreign investments from the Asian nancial
centers, particularly from Hong Kong.
The objectives of the present work are: the rst, in addition to pre-
senting the new centrality that Asia now represents for the world econo-
my, discusses the impacts of China's slowdown post 2013 for Asean and
other countries in Asia and how the Chinese economy has been restruc-
turing with its back to normal. The second objective analyzes whether
China's expectations are maintained as future systemic center in global
geopolitics, as its GDP has fallen from 9.3% in 2011 to 7.4% in 2014 and
6.8% in 2015. According to the IMF, this decreasing GDP trend will con-
tinue through 2018, when a recovery will occur.
Graphic 1 China Real GDP growth rate. (IMF)- 2011-2020
Source: IMF (2018a, s/p)
The real growth in emerging Asia
3
(Southeast Asia, China and In-
dia) lived a gentle moderation in 2015, 6.5%, and is projected to remain
so in the medium term to 2020 averaging 6.2% annually. China's growth
will continue cooling while India will have the highest growth rates of
GDP in the region. By 2015-2016, India GDP achieved – 7,93%, surpassing
China. But now is falling down.
3. The 10 countries of ASEAN: Thailand,
Philippines, Malaysia, Singapore, Indo-
nesia, Brunei, Vietnam, Myanmar, Laos
and Cambodia.
25
Marcos Costa Lima Impacts of Chinese Economy and its Global Geopolics
Graphic 2 GDP Growth of India -2012- 2017
Source: OGD PLATAFORM INDIA (2018, s/p).
OBS: After following gross domestic product (GDP) for many years, policy makers have
now also started looking at gross value added (GVA) to analyse growth.
The Growth in the ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Na-
tions) will be slightly lower, averaging 4.6% in 2015 and 5.2% by 2020,
led by the Philippines and Vietnam. Private consumption is the largest
contributor to overall growth, while exports contribute less than in the
previous decade (OECD, 2018).
Because of the Asian Financial Crisis of the late 1990, the region
felt the necessity of reassessing the inequality and poverty by considering
that rapid economic growth was quite insucient to face these challeng-
es. In Indonesia, half of the population was vulnerable to poverty and
hunger, caused by high food prices and unemployment, a problem that
crossed all Asian countries but with great dierences among them. In
2005, the Asean established The Asian Development Banks Social Pro-
tection, reecting that poverty needs to be faced via nationals programs
for social protection. Many policies have been implemented since, but
still appear timid to deal with the scale of the problem: in terms of poverty
head count ratio at US$2 per day in Purchasing Power Parity in 2010,Malasyia
counts 2%; Thailand 4%; Indonesia 50%; Lao PDR 65%; Philipines 41%;
Vietnan 41% and Cambodja 50%. among these countries, Indonesia, Lao
PDR and Vietna were the ones that most drastically reduced poverty
since 1992 (COOK; PINCUS, 2014).
The reduction in the pace of China will continue to aect the
growth prospects of the rest of the region due to the decrease of Chinese
imports and the decline of investment ows. Countries have dierent
variations in their levels of exposure to the risks outlined.
The impact of the reduction of Chinese rhythm can be seen in vari-
ous aspects, such as exports and Foreign Direct Investment (FDI). Exports
26
estudos internacionais • Belo Horizonte, ISSN 2317-773X, v. 7, n. 2, (ago. 2019), p.21 - 41
are the rst impact on the countries of ASEAN. Goods exported to China
as part of the GDP of these countries are variable and range from 12%
to Malaysia and 6-8% for Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam; dropping to
3% for Indonesia and the Philippines. Exports of many of the ASEAN-5
4
countries are tightly integrated with China through regional production
chains. Products exported to China for many ASEAN-5, countries-inten-
sive Japan imported parts, South Korea and other Asian countries. But
also, many of the exports from ASEAN-5 and other Asian countries to
China are used to produce exports that go to other regions, not for nal
household. However, the most aected countries so far have been Malay-
sia, Singapore and Thailand (OECD, 2016). (SHIE, & MEER, 2010)
The figure 1 Trade relations China and South Asian Economies – 2018 shows the trade
relations of China with the South Asian Economies, and mainly five countries, in order,
Vietnan, Singapore,Thailand, Malasia and Indonesia, perform 89% of the total trade.
Source: OH (2017, p. 2).
FDI is another complicating factor for the ASEAN as a result of
reduced Chinese pace. China's FDI inows into several ASEAN coun-
tries have been reduced and, since 2009, these investments had been an
important source of foreign investment, particularly in Malaysia and
Thailand, they end up compromising the growth of the same. The re-
percussions of this shrinkage can also impact domestic nancial markets
and may complicate macroeconomic management in these countries.
Yet due to the Chinese cooling, can also aggravate capital ows of Ase-
an as the US monetary policy has been more strict. The nancial links
between the countries of ASEAN and China can increase the risk of con-
tagion from market uctuations in China for nancial markets of Asean
(BAJPAI, 2016).
4. The countries of ASEAN 5 are: Indo-
nesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Thailand
and Vietnan.
27
Marcos Costa Lima Impacts of Chinese Economy and its Global Geopolics
Asean MAP
Source: ASEAN MARKET RESEARCH (2018, s/p).
The countries of ASEAN 5 are among the fastest growing in the
world, but still have serious infrastructure problems, which are larger
in Indonesia, the Philippines and Vietnam than in Thailand and Singa-
pore, which have a higher per capita income. A likely contributing fac-
tor to the fall in the investment rate was the Asian crisis of 1997. But
after the recovery, there was robust growth, and the ASEAN-5 countries
have made great progress in poverty reduction, which signicantly fell
from the start 1990s, however, challenges remain. Taking a comparative
perspective, Indonesia, Philippines and Vietnam still have considerable
population living below the poverty line, while extreme poverty has be-
come almost non-existent in Malaysia. In terms of income distribution,
Malaysia and Thailand have Gini indices slightly higher than the others.
Moreover, the inequality of average income has increased modestly in
ASEAN-5. (OECD 2018; 2017; ASEAN 5, 2019).
According to Seneviratne and Sun (2013), investments in infrastruc-
ture, both in quality and quantity, improved the result of the income dis-
tribution. However, investment by itself does not promote equality of in-
come, which can be clearly observable in the region, by internal regional
disparities with respect to energy and transportation. The capital -inten-
sive investment, do not increase employment, and even the negligence
towards environment.
ASEAN will celebrate 50 years of existence and since last year they
are trying to promote inclusive and innovation-led economic growth to
enhance the performance of the ASEAN Economic Community (AEC).
In 2017, ASEAN members adopted the AEC 2025 Consolidated Strategic
Action Plan to implement the 2025 AEC Blueprint. Endorsed by ASE-
AN economic ministers and the AEC Council, the Strategic Action Plan
aims to foster regional integration by increasing trade and investment;
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estudos internacionais • Belo Horizonte, ISSN 2317-773X, v. 7, n. 2, (ago. 2019), p.21 - 41
integrating micro, small and medium-sized enterprises into the digital
economy; and developing an innovation-driven economy. These mea-
sures reect the main theme of the 30th ASEAN Summit in April 2017,
“Partnering for Change, Engaging the World” (OECD, 2018).
However, as the OECD Report points out, the region suer of un-
derdeveloped infrastructure wich constrains the development of digital
economy, and less than 30% of the population is on line in India, Indone-
sia and Cambodia, Lao PDR and Myanmar, wich have the fewer number
of secure Internet servers for the population, less high speed broadband
internet (except Indonesia), and relatively high Internet prices, a problem
also in Philipines.The number of secure internet is higher in Singapore,
but in the rest of the region is very dierent (OECD, 2018).
Graphic 1. Percentage of adults who are financially literate in Asia, 2014
Source: Adapted from KLAPPER; LUSARDI; OUDHEUSDEN, (2014).
We can see that unless Singapore, the majority of the countries in
the region present a very low literacy rate.
If the Chinese turbulence was, rst, a demand shock to the ASEAN
countries, it can be partially mitigated by domestic macro-economic pol-
icies. These countries may have room for scal and monetary stimulus
able to sustain growth in the short term. But in the long term, China's
back to normal may aect the production structure of these countries.
One possibility is that rising wages in China has created incentives to
shift production to intensive companies in labor, such as the textile sec-
tor, for these countries of ASEAN (OECD, 2018). Looking at table 3, we
can see that with all the problems that aect the region, the average of
GDP growth is still high, except for Brunei Darusslam and Singapore.
Another point is that all the countries in the region should improve in
secondary and tertiary education.
29
Marcos Costa Lima Impacts of Chinese Economy and its Global Geopolics
Table 3: Real GDP Growth of Asean, China and India
Annual percentage change
Source: OECD (2018, p.17).
Chinese economic growth already reduced a few years ago on the
one hand, and on the other the recent turmoil in the stock market, raises
suspicion that the economy is fragile. China accounts for 15% of global
output and the eects of this reduction will be felt not only in Asean, as
we have seen before, but in Japan, South Korea and Taiwan. Moreover,
the impacts have been felt in Brazil and throughout Latin America.
In August 2015, the People's Bank of China (PBOC) surprised mar-
kets with three yuan consecutive devaluations, dropping 3% in its value.
Since 2005, the Chinese currency was appreciating (33%) against the US
dollar and this rst devaluation marked the biggest drop in 20 years. The
unexpected move was considered by many as an attempt by China to
boost its exports, with China People's Bank stating that the devaluation
is part of its reforms to direct savings to the market. (JOHNSTON, 2015).
Much of what has fueled the Chinese economy over the past three
decades was based on a growth model driven by exports and invest-
ment in infrastructure, fueled by credit. But the weak external demand
from rich countries and the level of total debt to 250% of GDP, which
has nearly doubled since 2008, is revealing the unsustainability of this
model. To reverse the trend, Xi Jinping, China's president since 2013 has
been preaching the return to "normal" for a more sustainable economy.
This transition to an economy directed to technological advances, more
oriented to the domestic market-oriented to the services sector, is caus-
ing immediate eect, although varied, on neighboring China (TSANG;
HONGHAUA, 2016).
The countries of East Asia such as Japan, South Korea and Tai-
wan have pointed out the impact. The latter country, whose exports are
directed by 40% to China, saw its growth rate of 3% in 2015 fell to 1.65%
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estudos internacionais • Belo Horizonte, ISSN 2317-773X, v. 7, n. 2, (ago. 2019), p.21 - 41
in 2016. Japan, which is a major supplier of industrial machinery, automo-
biles and other industrial products to China saw in the second half of 2015,
a decrease of 4.4% in exports, while GDP growth contracted by 0.4%. In
South Korea exports fell 6.4% in 2015 over the previous year. (OECD, 2018)
Australia also felt the crisis, especially because of its dependence on
commodities exports to China. Many mining companies see their annual
prots drop by low demand from China. Indonesia, a country with over
261 million, has been resentful of the decline in investment, low job cre-
ation and tax revenues. Malaysia, meanwhile, was impacted by the drop
in prices of its export of natural resources. (MATSUMOTO, 2019)
The countries of South Asia have fewer ties to the Chinese econ-
omy and the impact will be lower. Indian rms are less integrated with
those of China and the country is not as dependent on external demand.
Nevertheless, India's growth has been accelerated and the expectations
are that grow up in China in the coming years. (CUI, 2007).
But, what are the impacts on the US economy?
China is the largest export economy in the world. In 2016, China
exported $ 5.29 trillion and imported $ 3.41 trillion, resulting in a positive
trade balance of $ 1.88 trillion. By 2016 China's GDP was $ 11.2 trillion
and its GDP per capita was $ 15.5 Thousand. The main export destina-
tions of China are the United States ($ 385 billion), Hong Kong ($ 287
billion), Japan ($ 129 billion), South Korea ($ 93.7 billion) and Germany ($
65.2 billion). The top import origins are Hong Kong ($ 285 billion), South
Korea ($ 124 billion), the United States ($ 115 billion). (OEC, 2017).
Table 4 US Trade Goods with China – 2014-2017 (billions US)
Exports Imports Balance
TOTAL 2017 130,369.5 505,597.1 -375,227.5
TOTAL 2016 115,602.1 462,618.1 -347,016.0
TOTAL 2015 115,932.0 483,188.7 -367,256.7
TOTAL 2014 123,657.2 468,474.9 344,817.7
Source: US CENSUS (2018).
The value of goods and services purchased by the Chinese in the US
in 2014, as we see in table 4, reached 123.65 billion dollars, which corre-
sponds to 5.3% of US exports. However, China is the rst global exporter
to the US with a value reached 468.474 billion dollars. Also in 2014, repre-
senting 16.4% of US imports. Thus the US trade balance with China is in
decit and this decit is nanced in part by China's capital ows. Only in
four years trade, the value of balance trade pro- China exceeds 1.434.416
trillion USD. I mean, China is the largest US lender, keeping most of US
Treasury bonds, and the Foreign Exchange Reserves represent in may 2018
US$ 3.134 Trillion
5
.
The decrease in Chinese consumer spending level will aect US
exports negatively, it will have to seek other markets to allocate its ex-
ports, which may result in a fall in GDP of this country, at least in the
short term. With the reduction of imports by Chinese and maintaining
5. China has, since 2014, about $ 4
trillion of US reserves.
31
Marcos Costa Lima Impacts of Chinese Economy and its Global Geopolics
the export level to the US, there will be increase in the decit in the
trade balance at least in the short term. According to the OECD, 2% of
Chinese domestic demand drop will cause a drop of 0.3% in US GDP in
2015 and 2016.
Another form of injury to the US relationship with China will be
the Chinese go to sell US treasury bonds. The Chinese government may
sell the bonds, for example, heat its economy and make new investments.
A massive sale of these securities will be a major threat to the US, it would
take prices to a sharp drop (FLOYD, 2015).
US companies that generate a signicant portion of its revenues
from China are likely to be adversely aected due to lower domestic de-
mand in China. The result would ultimately aect not only the holders
of securities of these companies but layos and increased unemployment.
But the drop in the pace of China's economic growth would cause
not only negative eects in the US, such as the fall in oil prices. Since
China is the world's largest importer of the product, 7.4 million barrels
per day in 2015, the tendency is to fall and the US being the world's sec-
ond largest importer, or 7.2 million barrels in 2015, lower prices have a
positive eect on its trade decit, when the cost to import oil would be
reduced, but with harmful eects for countries that depend on oil export.
(BARRON, 2018).
The major challenges of China
If not expected major negative impacts on the whole of the rich
regions – the United States especially and the European Union who lives
already one since 2008 crisis, the biggest concern for 2016 is mainly with
China, since its rapid growth, so important from the early, now it is re-
duced dramatically. Its economy has cooled the impetus and after an av-
erage growth of almost 10 percent between 2006 and 2014, growth was
6.8 percent in 2015 and is expected to fall to 6.3 / 6.5 percent in 2016. But
the real concern is that the slowdown in China could easily generate a
new recession. That's why China is the most obvious source of uncertain-
ty for the world economy in 2016
Optimists believe that China will manage this transition smoothly.
Unfortunately, this will be dicult. Investments expenditure are more
volatile than consumers spending: they are subject to fall faster than con-
sumer spending. Moreover, the growth model based on investment in
China has been nanced by huge amounts of debt. Again, there is an
unsustainable feedback loop in operations of state banks that collected
large masses of savings of Chinese families, paying articially low inter-
est rates on them. They have funneled this cheap capital for companies
with political connections, which have duly feasted with the volume of
investments.While these loans and investments continued at high speed,
they were sucient to sustain the growth rate, which in turn kept the de-
fault rate at a reasonable level. But once the music stops, the debt will no
longer be reimbursed.Default rates will jump;banks will suer losses.If
banks react lending less, growth will slow further and the default rate
will increase. (WOLF, 2018).
32
estudos internacionais • Belo Horizonte, ISSN 2317-773X, v. 7, n. 2, (ago. 2019), p.21 - 41
Anyway, the robust economic growth in China over the past two
and half decades made it a global economic growth engine.Statistics show
that China is the largest exporter of goods, and their purchases represent
about 10% of global trade.Not only that, China was responsible for more
than one third of oil demand growth until recent times and even most
of the copper demand.The country is one of the world's largest manu-
facturing center, and therefore received the title of "the world factory".
Overall, China has multiplied its trade and nancial links with the world
over the years. And this time when it is experiencing a slowdown, the
international impact is very large. Its economy recorded fast growth in
twenty-ve years untill 2009, and the prospects are to decrease to 6,5%
untill 2020. Its exports recently dropped by 25%, then a year earlier,
while imports fell by almost 14%.The economic growth of other coun-
tries, particularly those that rely on orders from China ends up being
harmed (BAJPAI, 2016).
Table 5 China: Composition of GDP (gross domestic product) across economic sectors
from 2006 to 2016
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
Agri
11.11% 10.77% 10.73% 10.33% 10.1% 9.25% 9.4% 9.3% 9.1% 8.8% 8.6%
Ind
47.95% 47.34% 47.45% 46.24% 46.72% 44.37% 45.3% 44% 43.1% 40.9% 39.8%
Serv
40.94% 41.89% 41.82% 43.43% 43.19% 46.38% 45.3% 46.7% 47.8% 50.2% 51.6%
Source: STATISTA (2019).
Construction and industry (including mining, manufacturing,
electricity, water the largest and gas) accounted for 44% of China's GDP in
2013. The industry was the main contributor until 2010, when the service
sector by pass in 2011 and in 2016 achieved 51.6%. The OECD report (2018)
that we are using for this information, points out three major challenges
for China, the environment, human capital and rural development.
On the environment, high levels of pollution are known in large
Chinese cities, which are not few (LIMA, SILVA; ALVES, 2014). In De-
cember 2015 air pollution again reached record levels in China. Ten cities
decreed red alert, the most serious, with levels of toxic particles up to 30
times higher than the maximum tolerated, according to the World Health
Organization (HAN et al, 2018). One hundred million Chinese were told
to stay home. And for the rst time, an entire province, Shandong, went
on red alert. Another 50 cities have issued orange alerts, with worrying
levels of pollution. China has suered for decades with severe pollution
6
.
With an economy based on coal made the country the world's largest
CO2 emitter. In recent years the particle levels in the air and smog have
become alarming and forced the Chinese government to recognize the
problem and announce emission reduction measures. Earlier this year,
90% of Chinese cities could not t in quality levels of air determined by
the Chinese government itself.
With all the implications of the problem for human health, China
continues to massively use coal, whose burning releases carbon monox-
ide, carbon dioxide and other harmful gases. Chinese President Xi Jinping
said recently that the country's CO2 emissions, which coal is the largest
6.See also POLUIÇÃO DO AR..., 2015
and OSTERATH, 2018.
33
Marcos Costa Lima Impacts of Chinese Economy and its Global Geopolics
source, will reach its peak in 2030. Greenpeace reports that the country
has to approve the construction of 155 new coal plants in 2015. (GALE-
NOVICH, 2018)
The recognition by the government of the serious eects of pollu-
tion, human and economic costs, has led to reforms. Measures taken to
improve air quality has had some results in reducing urban pollution, but
still very insucient.
China is the world leader in industrial production, including min-
ing and mineral processing, processed metals, petroleum, cement, coal,
chemicals and fertilizers. It is also a leader in manufacturing machinery,
armaments, textiles and clothing. The country is the largest manufactur-
er of consumer products, a leader in food processing, and a major manu-
facturer of telecommunications equipment. It is a growing manufacturer
of automobiles, railway equipment, ships, aircraft and even spacecraft,
including satellites (BAJPAI, 2014).
Graphic 2: China Industry Value Added (% GDP) 2006-2016
Source: OECD (2015).
The industry value added dropped down substantively from 47%
in 2006 to 40% in 2016, a fall that reects the slightest presence of GDP
among the sectors. The Chinese Human Capital will have a tendency to
be improved, as the country seeks to intensify innovation and knowledge
intensive industries. The OECD (2015) considers that even people with
higher qualications in the country are not suciently prepared for the
demands of a market that is gaining complexity and sophistication.
The skills considered "soft", linked to management positions, com-
munication and negotiation, among others, today regarded as the most
urgent, are not generally obtained in universities. Recognizing these de-
ciencies, it is understood that vocational education oers ways to im-
prove the practices, the government has invested in the intensication
of training in the workplace. Also sustain greater interaction between
universities and the industrial sector. The National Centers of Technol-
ogy Transfer (NTTC) have acted as intermediaries between universities
and industry to spread innovations. And with much more autonomy,
they are able to patented technology market, thus increasing the rate of
patents produced by universities. New training programs and attracting
world-class researchers and other highly skilled workers, has helped to
34
estudos internacionais • Belo Horizonte, ISSN 2317-773X, v. 7, n. 2, (ago. 2019), p.21 - 41
support the need and search for new innovations. A so called Nation-
al Medium Shot Talent Development and Long-Term (2010-2020), has
operated to attract and retain individuals with high qualication in six
priority areas: political leaders and cadres of government, business entre-
preneurs technical, industry managers, skilled agricultural workers and
social service agents (OECD, 2018)
Chinese R&D investment has grown remarkably over the past two
decades. It is now the second-largest performer in terms of R&D spend-
ing, on a country basis, and accounts for 20 percent of total world R&D
expenditure, with the rate of R&D investment growth greatly exceeding
that of the U.S. and the EU (OECD, 2018).
Figure 1 R&D spending in billions of dollars (current, in purchasing power parity
terms) 1981-2013
Source: OECD (2018).
Table 4: The Rise of China in Science
Share of world scientic
papers 2003
Share of world scientic
papers 2013
Average annual growth rate
in scientic papers 2003-13
US 26.8% 18.8% 7.0%
EU 31.0% 25.4% 4.9%
Japan 7.8% 4.7% 1.7%
SKorea 2.0% 2.7% 10.4%
China 6.4% 18.2% 18.9%
Source: VEUGELERS (2017, p. 2)
The table 4 gave evidence of the rising position of China in ten years
in terms of share of scientic paper, getting very close to the US and EU.
Maintaning the annual growth, in few years China will overcome them.
China is the world's largest agricultural economy, with agriculture,
forestry, animal husbandry and sheries accounting for about 8.6 % of its
GDP, in 2016. This percentage is much higher than developed countries
7.The 10 largest agricultural producers
in the world are: China, USA, Brazil,
India, Russia, Mexico, Japan, Germany
and Turkey. But the biggest exporters
are: USA, Canada, France, Brazil, Italy,
Netherlands, China, Belgium, Germany,
United Kingdom.
35
Marcos Costa Lima Impacts of Chinese Economy and its Global Geopolics
like the US, UK and Japan, where agriculture accounts for about 1% of
GDP. The chart below shows the evolution of the share of agriculture in
GDP (1983-2013). Although the percentage has gradually decreased over
the years, it still accounts for about 34% of the total employed population.
Over the past seven years, the share of agriculture as a share of GDP re-
mained more or less stable. (DEPTAMENT OF AGRICULTURE, FOOD
AND THE MARINE, 2018).
The economic reforms of 1978 changed the face of agriculture in
China. Before these reforms, four out of ve Chinese were working in
agriculture. But that changed with the property rights in the eld, which
led to growth small businesses do not farm in rural areas. The de-collec-
tivization, along with better prices for agricultural products, led to higher
productivity and a more ecient use of labor. The other major change
occurred in 2004 when the agricultural sector began to receive greater
support in a major shift in economic policy in which the government has
to support the sector policies rather than overwhelming it, as I used to.
(HUANG; YANG; ROSSELLE, 2010).
Rural development is considered as the third challenge, since the
rural areas did not suer the same modernization that the urban areas,
although the gap has been reduced. The productivity in rural areas is
seen as critical and to narrow this gap, you need more support to rural
areas. Agricultural productivity will have to be extended through mech-
anization and investments. The credit assistance and facilitation of land
reallocation are laying the foundation for improved productivity. But
the attempt to prevent the depletion of these lands and the excessive use
of pesticides are major challenges. The government should increase the
training of farmers and reduce subsidies for fertilizers that contaminate
not only groundwater but also rivers and drinking water.
The Chinese Geopolitics and Concluding remarks
One issue that has gained the world specialized media is where will
move the economy, global geopolitics, ambitions and inuence of Chi-
na – the aim of the Communist Party to maintain a standard of "medi-
um-high growth" (6.5%) until 2020 will become attainable?
From the military point of view, even with the braking, China has
motivation and resources to keep growing this sector even more rapidly
than its neighbors and even the US. The legitimacy of the Communist
Party is, in good measure, pressed by the "great rejuvenation of the na-
tion" – a concept that includes the claim on the islands that are in dis-
pute, the airspace and the expansion of the South and East China seas.
President Xi Jinping, has amply demonstrated its interest in pursuing his
goal, in part by accelerating the transformation of the People's Liberation
(BLACKWILL; CAMPBELL, 2016) into a world-class ghting force with
operations well beyond Asia.
A less aggressive economy should increase the importance to Bei-
jing to maintain a peaceful regional environment so that it can expand
trade and investment with its neighbors. The paradox is that the top
leaders of China have deliberately encouraged its population in a nation-
36
estudos internacionais • Belo Horizonte, ISSN 2317-773X, v. 7, n. 2, (ago. 2019), p.21 - 41
alist propaganda, which has resulted in a growing expectation of public
opinion of the country to sovereignty claims in the East Sea and the
South China.
From the point of view of international institutions under US lead-
ership since World War II, it is evident the great eorts made by the Chi-
nese in seeking to consolidate multilateralism, where signicant exam-
ples are the BRICS and the Bank of the BRICs and the creation of the
Bank Asian Investment in Infrastructure (Baii). On the other hand, the
gigantic project One Belt One Road, with estimates of more than $ 1 tril-
lion investment in infrastructure projects, which will require many years
for its implementation. If successful, it will create a powerful economic
belt across Eurasia, which also articulates with the maritime Silk Road
8
.This is one of the key projects of China's foreign policy today, which will
connect China to Europe and Africa by land and sea routes passing con-
sequently a number of countries of Central Asia and the Middle East. The
Chinese dream to regain the lead when it comes to international trade
is what prompted the Beijing government to the creation of this project,
and the way in which China intends to deal with the other actors in the
implementation and realization of the same is at least dierent from the
way that the current hegemon – the Unite d States of America – deal with
this issue (BARBOSA et al, 2016).
The so call Silk Maritime Route begin in Quanzhou in the province
of Fujan, and also reach Guang, Guandong province, Beihai (Guanxi) and
Haikou (Haina), before heading to the Strait of Malacca, Kuala Lumpur;
it will address Calcutta, India, and then cut the rest of the Indian Ocean to
Nairobi, Kenya and following to Sri Lanka. From Nairobi, the sea route
will go north around the "Horn" of Africa and from there to the Red Sea
and the Mediterranean, with a stop in Athens before reaching the Earth's
Silk Route in Venice.
According to Hilpert and Wacker (2015, p. 2), which feature the
wide arc of projects, trade and investment agreements established in
recent years by China, China's new leadership builds a proactive for-
eign policy, much stronger, to shape their own environment, far be-
yond what remain just reacting to events. "Economic diplomacy plays a
central role. Geographically, the priorities are based on what is dened
as a "great neighborhood" where Xi Jinping speaks of a "community
of shared interests, destination and responsibility", or a “Target Com-
munity ". For the authors, with this immense project platform, China
demonstrates to be inclined to take a much larger global and regional
responsibility.
This pro activism is justied as an attempt to counteract the cre-
ation of two large free trade agreements between the European Union
and the United States, (TTIP) Transatlantic Trade and Investment Part-
nership, and the second among the 12 APEC countries including the US
and Japan, Transpacif Partnership (TPP). The latter, especially, is for the
Chinese a US attempt to harm it economically through trade diversion
and isolate it in Asia, its own region. (Carneiro, F.Lirio, 2018)
8. Beijing has established 40 billion
USD for the Silk Road Fund to the land
initiatives / sea megaproject.
37
Marcos Costa Lima Impacts of Chinese Economy and its Global Geopolics
Route Map of Silk Road One Belt One Road
Sources: ITALY PLANS TO... (2019).
9
This true eervescence by which China is passing, despite its "back
to normal" economy, is also reected in the culture and production of
knowledge. The magnitude and importance that the country gained af-
ter the victory of the revolution led by Mao Zedong, has caused Chinese
social scientists to reect on the making of their academic subjects, hith-
erto very subordinate to the Western codex.
Is emerging in the eld of International Relations, one called "Chi-
nese School" of thought that seeks to merge political realism aspects and
economic liberalism adopted in RI's, with the works of philosophy and
great thinkers of pre-Qin dynasty
10
, as the Confucius and Sun Tzu, which
are the basis and inuence for the way of life adopted by China nowadays.
Moreover, the fact that China is a communist country also inuences the
creation of this Theory of International Relations (BARBOSA et al, 2016).
Barry Buzan wrote in 2010 an exciting and dense article about the
possibilities and challenges that China has to maintain its rise peacefully.
The author, unlike Measheimer (2010) and Fred Halliday, (2000), believes
that the project is feasible, however, that will be much harder than it has
been in the last three decades; China will have to strongly think about it
even on its internal issues and the international society in which today
is one of the largest players. These processes, in a crisis even without a
clear and denite insight, will create strong tensions – for example, with
the United States and Japan, without being able to repeat its successful
experience since 1978. The country is better positioned than most of the
great powers to do well and cannot keep a comfortable distance of the
problems now faced by the West U.S. (US VS CHINA…, 2013). Wheth-
er or not, it will be demanded for an international action that can be at
the height of their current conditions of a great power. In this sense, the
dimension of peace and the categorical statement this premise
11
may rep-
resents, is an invaluable overcoming to the capitalist crisis (BUZAN, 2010,
p. 34; LIMA, 2016a).
9.See also HONG, 2015.
10. The year 221 BC is often referred
to as the time when China was unified
in the form of a large kingdom or
empire, although there are already
several states and dynasties before
that. Successive dynasties developed
bureaucratic control systems that would
allow the Chinese emperor administer
the vast territory that was to become
known as China.
11. Inside China is emerging an effort to
promote some of the principles inspired
by Confucio toward building a more
collectivist order, a harmonious alter-
native to the conflictual individualism
that took account of Western thought of
international relations (YAQING, 2012;
XIAO, 2009).
38
estudos internacionais • Belo Horizonte, ISSN 2317-773X, v. 7, n. 2, (ago. 2019), p.21 - 41
So, it is encouraging that the Chinese Academy works towards
rescue, in international relations, of a immense country's tradition, in
building a "Chinese School". The Chinese tradition is consistent in this
direction. As has been said by Qin Yaqing (2012), the theory feeds on a
certain culture, developing and subsequently gaining universality by in-
teraction with other cultures. Thus, taking the perspective of the concept
of tian xia
12
(world order) and the practice of a system of taxes, backed
a deep structure of over 3,500 years, allowing the country to study the
size of wide civilization. The ideas of harmony, peace, cooperation are
important values in Chinese culture, which are in addition to Confucian
thought, according to which human nature is correctable or potentially
ready for good. The Confucian Humanism Hsiung (2010) says that what
determines the eect of human nature is that the condition of the human
environment (society), can be perfected by moral education.
This tradition is welcome, when the array of Western political the-
ory, structured in capitalism, says the opposite, in the famous phrase of
Hobbes on the "Wolf of the Man". The last paper of the prestigious Prof.
Yan Xuetong (2018), considering that liberalism is losing its strength, is
moving in a direction that gives reason to a chinese pacic ascent
13
.
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