estudos internacionais • Belo Horizonte, ISSN 2317-773X, v. 9, n. 1, (abr. 2021), p. 24-50

Party positions over international human

rights treaties in the United States in the

Post-Cold War

Posições partidárias sobre tratados internacionais de

direitos humanos nos Estados Unidos no pós-Guerra Fria

Posiciones partidistas sobre los tratados internacionales

de derechos humanos en los Estados Unidos después de la

Guerra Fría

Flávio Contrera

Matheus Lucas Hebling

DOI: 10.5752/P.2317-773X.2021v9.n1.p24

Received on April 04, 2019

Accepted on April 27, 2020

A

This article aimed to verify the occurrence of convergence and congruence in

the positions that the Democratic and Republican parties express about human

rights treaties in the Electoral, in the Executive, and the Legislative arenas, in

the Post-Cold War (1992-2016). The use of the comparative method guided the

study of six specic cases, analyzed using qualitative techniques. The results

point to two trends. The rst is that the possibility of convergence between the

Democratic and Republican parties tends to diminish when their positions on

human rights treaties are anchored by ideological perspectives, and the second is

that a party’s position on a treaty tends to be congruent among political arenas.

Moreover, the divergence of positions between the parties claries the liberal

internationalist character of the Democratic positions and the conservative

isolationist approach of the Republican positions.

Keywords: Human Rights. Political Parties. Post-Cold War. Treaties. The Uni-

ted States.

R

Este artigo teve como objetivo vericar a ocorrência de convergência e congru-

ência nas posições que os partidos Democrata e Republicano sustentaram sobre

tratados internacionais de direitos humanos nas arenas eleitoral, no Executivo e

no Legislativo, no pós-Guerra Fria (1992-2016). O emprego do método compa-

rativo orientou o estudo de seis casos especícos, analisados a partir de técnicas

qualitativas. Os resultados apontam duas tendências. A primeira delas é a de

que a possibilidade de convergência entre os partidos Democrata e Republicano

1. Esta pesquisa está vinculada ao

Processo FAPESP número 2019/20181-6.

2. Doutor em Ciência Política pela

UFSCar, Bolsista de Pós-Doutorado da

Fundação de Amparo à Pesquisa do

Estado de São Paulo (FAPESP) no Ins-

tituto de Políticas Públicas e Relações

Internacionais (IPPRI) da Universidade

Estadual Paulista (UNESP), São Paulo,

Brasil. ORCID: http://orcid.org/0000-

0002-6740-5489.

3. Mestre em Ciência Política pela UFS-

Car, Bolsista de Doutorado do Conselho

Nacional de Desenvolvimento Cientíﬁco

e Tecnológico (CNPq) na Universidade

Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP),

Campinas, Brasil. ORCID: https://orcid.

org/0000-0001-7810-0122.

Flávio Contrera, Matheus Lucas Hebling Party posions over internaonal human rights treaes in the United States in the Post-Cold War

tende a diminuir quando suas posições são ancoradas por perspectivas ideológi-

cas. A segunda é a de que a posição de um partido sobre um tratado tende a ser

congruente entre as diferentes arenas políticas. Além disso, a divergência de po-

sições entre os partidos evidencia o caráter liberal internacionalista das posições

democratas e a abordagem conservadora isolacionista das posições republicanas.

Palavras-Chave: Direitos Humanos. Partidos Políticos. Pós-Guerra Fria. Trata-

dos. Estados Unidos.

R

Este artículo tuvo como objetivo vericar la ocurrencia de convergencia y

congruencia en las posiciones que los partidos Demócrata y Republicano man-

tuvieron sobre los tratados internacionales de derechos humanos en el ámbito

electoral, ejecutivo y legislativo, en la posguerra fría (1992-2016). El uso del mé-

todo comparativo guió el estudio de seis casos especícos, analizados mediante

técnicas cualitativas. Los resultados apuntan a dos tendencias. La primera es que

la posibilidad de convergencia entre los partidos demócrata y republicano tiende

a disminuir cuando sus posiciones están ancladas en perspectivas ideológicas. La

segunda es que la posición de una parte en un tratado tiende a ser congruente

entre diferentes arenas políticas. Además, la divergencia de posiciones entre los

partidos resalta el carácter internacionalista liberal de las posiciones demócratas

y el enfoque conservador aislacionista de las posiciones republicanas.

Palabras-clave: Derechos humanos. Partidos politicos. Post-Guerra Fría. Trata-

dos. Estados Unidos.

Introduction

Prospects for cooperation initiatives among countries have long

been on the horizon of liberal theorists in international relations. Initially,

these perspectives envisioned the possibility of cooperation through in-

ternational organizations, which came to take eect only after World

War II. In subsequent years, these perspectives focused on regional in-

tegration (DEUTSCH, 1957; HAAS, 1964; MITRANY, 1966). Since the

1970s, liberals have envisioned cooperation through the construction of

international regimes (KEOHANE; NYE, 1977; KRASNER, 1982) and la-

ter, through global governance structures (ROSENAU, 1992). However,

this long period of theoretical development took place during the Cold

War, when the conict between the superpowers aected the prospects

for international cooperation.

The beginning of the 1990s, in contrast, is characterized as a mo-

ment of change and reorganization of the international system. The di-

sintegration of the Soviet Union and the end of the bipolar conict com-

bined with the intensication of the globalization process have ushered in

a new era in which cooperation initiatives among countries have become

more feasible. In this context, the prospects for international coopera-

tion have stimulated new enthusiasm for treaty-making as a way to solve

some of the world’s most pressing problems (ELSIG et al., 2011).

This is not to say that treaties are a particular post-Cold War phe-

nomenon. Quite the opposite. However, in this new context, they have

gained particular importance for States to jointly address challenges that

estudos internacionais • Belo Horizonte, ISSN 2317-773X, v. 9, n. 1, (abr. 2021), p. 24-50

transcend their borders, and that depend on a complex solution. In this

sense, it is clear in the literature that the end of the Cold War-era opened

up new opportunities for the further institutionalization and legalization

of international politics (ELSIG et al., 2011; GOLDSTEIN et al., 2000).

This more favorable context for cooperation did not, however, pre-

vent the United States (US), despite being the main actor in the interna-

tional system, from failing to ratify a series of important treaties, among

which the human rights treaties stand out. At the same time that the Uni-

ted States is recognized for its willingness to pressure other countries to

adhere to best human rights practices, that provision is not found when

it comes to the Americans themselves adhering to international human

rights treaties. For this reason, the relationship of Americans with this

issue has been described in the literature as paradoxical or even hypocri-

tical (BRADLEY, 2008).

On the other hand, it has to be considered that although the rate

of ratication of international treaties by the US is not among the highest

in the world (ELSIG et al., 2011), this does not mean Americans are un-

willing to build cooperative solutions to global problems. Eectively, the

construction of international treaties involves a series of steps, which

can be separated at the international and domestic levels. According to

Putnam (1988), this political struggle takes the form of a two-level game

involving bargaining between negotiators leading to a provisional agree-

ment (level I) and separate discussions between domestic support groups

on ratifying or not the agreement (level II).

It is precisely at the domestic level that the decision to ratify inter-

national treaties occurs. In contrast to the favorable context of coopera-

tion at the international level, the domestic context in the US has been

marked since the late 1980s by the intensication of party polarization

(BECKMANN, McGANN, 2008; BRUNELL et al., 2015; POOLE, ROSEN-

THAL, 1997; RAGUSA, 2016; THERIAULT, 2006).

Since political parties are the main actors responsible for approving

international treaties in the U.S. Senate, two important questions emerge

when we approach the positions they hold on these treaties. The rst

is the question of the convergence of positions, without which a treaty

cannot be ratied – given the qualied majority required for it. In this

scenario, how similar the Democratic and Republican parties’ positions

are when it comes to human rights? The second is the congruence of po-

sitions, essential for the party’s responsiveness to be veried by the voter

when a party manifests itself over a treaty in the dierent political arenas,

i.e., Electoral, Executive and Legislative. Are parties’ positions congruent

among dierent political arenas?

Thereby, this article aimed to verify the occurrence of convergen-

ce and congruence in the positions that the Democratic and Republican

parties express about human rights treaties in the Electoral, in the Execu-

tive, and the Legislative arenas, in the Post-Cold War. Although the small

number of cases analyzed does not allow us to produce generalizations,

the results point to two important trends that can be tested in future

studies that are not restricted to human rights issues. The rst is that the

possibility of convergence between the Democratic and Republican par-

Flávio Contrera, Matheus Lucas Hebling Party posions over internaonal human rights treaes in the United States in the Post-Cold War

ties tends to diminish when their positions are anchored by ideological

perspectives. The second is that a party’s position on a treaty tends to be

congruent among dierent political arenas.

Much has been done to understand party polarization, but mainly

in big-time series (LAYMAN, CARSEY, 2002; LEVENDUSKY, 2009).

Being the comprehension of polarization methodologically, quantitati-

vely (POOLE, ROSENTHAL, 1997), or qualitatively (HACKER, PIER-

SON, 2006), its relation with public opinion (FLYNN, HARBRIDGE,

2016), with the economy (MCCARTY, POOLE, ROSENTHAL, 1997) or

even party pressures themselves (SNYDER, GROSECLOSE, 2000). Ho-

wever, this literature has yet to explore topical issues and their relation

with party polarization, that being foreign policy or human rights. This

gap is the one we try to ll with this work.

This article is organized into ve sections. The introduction was

presented in this rst section. The second addresses the process of rati-

cation of international treaties in the United States. In the third section,

we presented the data and methods. In the fourth section, we discussed

the ndings, and, nally, in the fth section, we concluded.

The treaty process in the United States

The process of ratication of treaties in the United States is cha-

racterized by a series of steps. While negotiation and signing of treaties

take place internationally, treaties are sent to the Senate for advice and

consent at the domestic level. If a treaty is approved, it is submitted to the

President for ratication. This process is regulated by the Constitution,

which says: “He [the President] shall have Power, by and with the Advice

and Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties, provided two-thirds of the

Senators present concur.” (U.S. CONSTITUTION, art. II, § 2).

Unlike what the constitutional text might suggest with the word

“advice”, the President and Senate do not negotiate treaties together. Ac-

cording to Scott (2002), experience has shown that a shared role in the ne-

gotiation stage was impractical. Thus, the negotiation of treaties is limi-

ted to the actors in the Executive Branch and may be authorized by both

the President and the Secretary of State. After negotiations are conclu-

ded, the treaty is signed by the President. This signature, however, does

not end the process, nor does it create obligations related to the treaty for

the country. It is only a sign of the commitment of the United States to

the act of ratication, which needs to obtain the consent of the Senate.

Thus, once the treaty has been signed, the President can submit it

to the Senate through a message requesting its consent. The treaty, then,

is read and forwarded to the Foreign Relations Committee (FRC), which

allocates it to the calendar, where it remains until the FRC considers it.

The Committee may either report the treaty to the oor or recommend

its return to the President. Precisely, as Scott (2002) explains, only in three

situations treaties returns to the President. In the other six possible scena-

rios, treaties remain in the Senate and return to the FRC at the end of the

legislature. These scenarios, which are important for the understanding

of the treaty process in the United States, are provided in Chart 1.

estudos internacionais • Belo Horizonte, ISSN 2317-773X, v. 9, n. 1, (abr. 2021), p. 24-50

Chart 1 – Possible Scenarios of Senate Actions on Treaties

Senate Actions The result of Senate Actions

Vote on Advice and Consent to

Treaty

Vote on Resolution

of Return

Subsequent Location of

Treaty

Article 18

Obligation

Problem

1. Greater than or equal to 2/3 in

favor

Not applicable Returned to President No

2. Less than 2/3 in favor Greater than 1/2 in favor Returned to President No

3. No vote Greater than 1/2 in favor Returned to President No

4. Less than 2/3 in favor Less than 1/2 in favor Remains in Senate Yes

5. Less than 2/3 in favor

Less than 1/3 in favor

(more than 2/3 in favor of retaining)

Remains in Senate Yes

6. Less than 2/3 in favor No vote Remains in Senate Yes

7. No vote Less than ½ in favor Remains in Senate Yes

8. No vote

Less than 1/3 in favor

(more than 2/3 in favor of retaining)

Remains in Senate Yes

9. No vote No vote Remains in Senate Yes

Source: SCOTT, 2002, p. 1476.

If the Committee fails to decide on the treaty, it can remain on the

calendar indenitely. In this regard, the Foreign Relations Committee

has at this stage full decision-making power over the future of the treaty.

The negotiations conducted in the international arena around the treaty

are contrasted in the Senate with the conicts that characterize the Legis-

lative branch and the Domestic Politics.

Party Convergence

Bipartisan convergence on political issues relies on how much

are the parties compromised with their ideologies. Therefore, if there is

ideological polarization, the probability of parties converging on issues

fades away. The political positions of Democrats and Republicans are

ideologically based on liberalism and conservatism, respectively. But it

was not always so. When the Republican Party emerged in 1854 it was

fundamentally anti-slavery and liberal. In the 1860 presidential election,

the Democrats split into two wings, north and south, the rst being an-

ti-slave and liberal and the second being pro-slave and conservative. Ho-

wever, about a hundred years after the end of the Civil War the parties

were positioned on dierent ideological spectra. Throughout this period,

the Democratic Party became consistently liberal while the Republican

Party was pushed into conservatism. This was due to Democrat Woo-

drow Wilson adherence to labor guidelines in 1912 elections, previously

associated with the Republican Party; the rise in the 1930s of the New

Deal in Democrat Roosevelt’s government and his policies of welfare-s-

tate; and the Democrats’ adherence to the civil rights movement in the

1960s (ROSATI; SCOTT, 2011). At the end of the 1960s, the Vietnam War

divided the parties also on foreign policy (LINDSAY, 1994; MEERNIK,

1993; NELSON; TILLMAN, 1984). Opposition to the war became central

to the Democratic Party. Groups opposed to the war saw the moment as

4. Since Vietnam, presidents have

endorsed human rights as part of the

foreign policy agenda. At the same, they

have consistently attempted to bolster

American self-conﬁdence and revive the

perceived moral legitimacy of the U.S.

foreign policy by rhetorically mobilizing

American exceptionalism. Although the

rhetoric of American exceptionalism is

used by Democrats and Republicans,

it should not be confused with party

ideology.

Flávio Contrera, Matheus Lucas Hebling Party posions over internaonal human rights treaes in the United States in the Post-Cold War

a historic opportunity to help redene US foreign policy through a hu-

man rights policy (MAINWARING, 1986), that changed the fundamental

nature of US-Third World relations while still protecting essential Ameri-

can interests (SCHMITZ; WALKER, 2004).

In contrast to that progressive movement, Republicans received su-

pport in the mid-1970s from Christian fundamentalists, pro-life groups,

and others of special interest on the right. These groups played a major role

in articulating an image of the United States, embodying Christian virtues

and employing all available means to defeat communism, representing it as

the evil force that destroys Christian values. Moreover, Carter was accused

of being a weak president, especially after the disaster in Iran, the Sandi-

nista victory in Nicaragua, and the spread of atrocities committed by the

communist regimes of Cambodia and Vietnam. In this context, social mo-

vements organized by the new right demanded a more aggressive presence

of the United States in the Third World (MAINWARING, 1986). Reagan’s

victory in 1980 led American foreign policy in this direction, reinforcing

the Republican Party’s reputation as a proponent of conservative positions.

Starting in the 1970s, institutional and contextual changes have con-

tributed to a decrease in bipartisan consensus on foreign policy. In the insti-

tutional scope, the rule of representation of the parties within the Commit-

tees in the legislature changed. The percentage of representation of a party

within the Senate began to determine the percentage of seats that a party

is entitled to in each committee, including in the Committee on Foreign

Relations. At the same time, this change gave agenda power to the majority

party in each legislature and reinforced inter-party divisions as parties be-

gan to vote with greater discipline (ALDRICH, 2011; ROHDE, 1991);

Besides Vietnam, the end of the Cold War meant a substantial con-

textual change that aected the prospects for bipartisan convergence. Ex-

ternal threats – as the Soviet Union was during the Cold War – are funda-

mental for bipartisan consensus on foreign policy. As Simmel (1904) and

Coser (1956) showed, the existence of a threat can have positive conse-

quences for group cohesion, morale, and development. In such circums-

tances, i.e., the existence of an external threat, Huntington (1997) argued

that the United States promoted national security-related interests to deal

with it. On the other hand, some authors have shown a threat absence

opens an opportunity for the pursuit of parochial interests carried out by

the activism of interest groups (HUNTINGTON, 1997; NYE, 1999; RICE,

2000). This was the scene after the Soviet Union’s dissolution.

In the Post-Cold War era, foreign policy consensus was replaced by

party disagreement and polarization. The absence of a vital threat allowed

parties to reformulate their foreign policy positions (ORNSTEIN, 1992). The

strategy of containment had become inadequate to deal with the uid and

diuse threats that have gained centrality in the post-Cold War era, such as

environmental degradation, illegal immigration, ethnic and religious con-

icts, humanitarian emergencies, terrorism, and international crime.

Under these circumstances, we argue that there is a possibility for an

even smaller consensus on foreign policy in the post-Cold War context and

an increase in divergent positions between the major parties. International

human rights treaties are an important element of American foreign policy.

estudos internacionais • Belo Horizonte, ISSN 2317-773X, v. 9, n. 1, (abr. 2021), p. 24-50

In this sense, identifying the positions of the parties on these treaties allows

us to verify if there are cohesion and continuity in the defense of the Ame-

rican national interests or if these vary according to the party positions.

Scholars have acknowledged that the Democrats are seen as those

who best deal with social welfare and civil rights issues, while the Repu-

blicans are seen as the most capable of dealing with the rule of law and na-

tional defense (POPE, WOON, 2008). This ideological division that charac-

terizes parties includes foreign policy issues. Milner and Tingley (2015) ar-

gue that conservatives and liberals have dierent positions on trade policy,

international economic aid, and domestic military spending. The authors

also argue that conservatives are more hawkish on foreign policy than libe-

rals are. Liberals would engage in interventionism only in situations where

the human rights of the citizens of the countries involved are aected.

Thus, while Democrats are often classied as liberal, Republicans

are considered conservative in their positions. We expect this tendency to

be veried concerning the subjects analyzed here. This implies arguing

that in human rights treaties the Democrats would defend liberal while

the Republicans would defend conservative positions. This trend would

imply the possibility of ratifying a treaty since it would make it dicult

to build convergence between the parties. Considering the previous de-

bates on parties’ ideologies and positions over the time (HUNTINGTON,

1997; LINDSAY, 1994; MAINWARING, 1986; MEERNIK, 1993; MILNER;

TINGLEY, 2015; NELSON; TILLMAN, 1984; NYE, 1999; POPE; WOON,

2008; RICE, 2000; ROSATI; SCOTT, 2011), the institutional changes

and the prospects for polarization starting in the 1970 (ALDRICH, 2011;

ROHDE, 1991) and increasing in the post-Cold War (ORNSTEIN, 1992),

we have investigated the following hypothesis:

H1: The possibility of convergence between the Democratic and Republican par-

ties tends to diminish when their positions on human rights treaties are anchored

by ideological perspectives.

Party Congruence

Although the U.S. Senate is the arena in which parties’ positions on

treaties assume a more decisive character, parties also manifest themsel-

ves in previous or simultaneous moments in other arenas, such as in the

Electoral arena and the Executive arena. Thus, during presidential elec-

tions, parties can position themselves on international treaties in their

campaign manifestos. When they come to the United States Presidency,

the party in the Executive can also express positions on treaties in the

documents that organize the foreign policy guidelines of the Administra-

tion. In this regard, the National Security Strategy, edited by the National

Security Council and the Strategic Plan for International Aairs, edited

by the Department of State and the United States Agency for Internatio-

nal Development (USAID), stands out.

When parties took positions in the Electoral arena and the Execu-

tive branch, more than signaling their positions on the treaties to legis-

lators, they seek to shape the positions of the legislators themselves so

that there is party congruence around the subject of the treaty. This is

Flávio Contrera, Matheus Lucas Hebling Party posions over internaonal human rights treaes in the United States in the Post-Cold War

a key issue for contemporary democracies. It involves the perspective of

the responsiveness of elected political representatives to the demands of

citizens (DAHL, 1971). As policy-seekers, voters choose the party mani-

festo in the Electoral arena that most closely matches their preferences

(DOWNS, 1957).

In this regard, the voter’s vote is not only perspective but also re-

trospective. Considering that if the voter is satised with the government

performance of the previous period, he will keep his vote in the same

party. Otherwise, he will support another. Thus, motivation stemming

from the fact that parties are oce-seeking and that the fear of retaliation

by voters would act as incentives to motivate governments to be respon-

sive to voters (HOFFERBERT; BUDGE, 1992).

Responsiveness is measured by the positions that the parties mani-

fest in the Electoral, Executive and Legislative arenas. In other words, if

there is congruence in the positions held by the parties on human rights

treaties, there would be responsiveness. Thus, if the parties are responsi-

ve, we understand that there is a greater probability of congruence bet-

ween the positions defended by them in the Electoral arena and the Sena-

te; or otherwise, among the positions advocated by the winning party in

the Electoral arena, and later in the Executive and, in the Senate. Consi-

dering Downs (1957), Dahl (1971), and Hoerbert and Budge (1992) state-

ments, we have investigated the following hypothesis:

H2: A party’s positions on a treaty tend to be congruent among dierent political

arenas.

Data and Methods

We analyzed data extracted from documentary sources for the

analysis of the positions of political parties on international human rights

treaties in each of the arenas of party competition (Electoral, Executive,

and Legislative).

In the case of the Electoral arena, documentary sources are the pre-

sidential campaign manifestos of the Democratic and Republican parties

in the 1992, 1996, 2000, 2004, 2008, 2008, 2012, and 2016 elections. Cam-

paign manifestos are presented by the parties during their conventions to

select their respective candidates for the post of President of the United

States. Manifestos aim to present public policy objectives and proposals,

which are typically very broad and generic, although some sections may

be written narrowly to appeal to partisan interest groups.

For analyzing the positions of the parties in the Executive, the data

were collected in the two main public documents that guide US foreign

policy. These are the National Security Strategy (NSS), edited by the Na-

tional Security Council, and the Strategic Plan for International Aairs

edited by the Department of State and USAID.

The National Security Strategy obligation goes back to the 1986

passage of the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act.

As a key statement on the President’s global agenda, the national security

report represents the cornerstone of the strategic direction of encom-

estudos internacionais • Belo Horizonte, ISSN 2317-773X, v. 9, n. 1, (abr. 2021), p. 24-50

passing the allocation of national resources and the uses of elements of

national power to protect the national interest and to achieve national

and global goals and objectives of the United States. According to Reilly

(2004), as a unifying document for the Executive Branch, the security

strategy is designed to create an internal consensus on the foreign strate-

gy of defense, diplomacy, and economics. In the scope of this article, we

analyze the NSS’s published during the administrations of Bill Clinton

(1994, 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000), George W. Bush (2002, 2006),

and Barack Obama (2010, 2015). The NSS should be transmitted annually

since 1987, but frequently reports come in late or not at all for the decision

of the Administration.

In turn, the Strategic Plan of the Department of State and USAID

meets the provisions of the Government Performance and Results Act, passed

by Congress in 1993. Along with the National Security Strategy, the Stra-

tegic Plan of the Department of State conrms several important guide-

lines of US foreign policy. The dierence between the documents lies in

the fact that the former articulates the priorities of the Administration in

terms of policies and instruments dealing with security threats, while the

latter sets out a global and systematic view of national interests, as well

as covering the range of goals and activities of US government agencies

abroad (DEPARTMENT OF STATE, 1999). We analyzed the four Stra-

tegic Plans edited by the governments of Clinton (1999), Bush (2003 and

2007), and Obama (2014).

Finally, we analyzed the positions of the parties in the Legislative

Arena. In this case, there are three main sources of data: 1) Committee on

Foreign Relations Reports on the treaties; 2) The Congressional Record of

the oor actions; and 3) Treaties’ roll call votes when available

Case Selection

According to the Oce of the United Nations High Commissioner

for Human Rights (OHCHR), there are 9 core international human rights

conventions since the United Nations (UN) foundation. There are three

possible positions for a state regarding a treaty: state party, signatory, or

no action. Consent, via ratication, accession, or succession, followed by

its enforcement is required for a state to be a ‘state party’ to a treaty. A

preliminary endorsement and intent to domestic examination or rati-

cation are required for a state to be considered a ‘signatory’ to a treaty,

while ‘no action’ means that consent has not been expressed.

The United States has ratied until today only three of the nine UN

human rights treaties. Americans have also ratied two ILO (Internatio-

nal Labour Organization) and one HCCH (Hague Conference on Private

International Law) human rights treaties, all after the end of the Cold

War. Not all human rights treaties are included in our analysis though.

To verify the possibility of congruence in the positions of the parties re-

quires that a comparison is made between positions manifested in two

or more arenas. Thus, the criterion of case selection was to identify posi-

tions manifested by parties over a human rights treaty in more than one

arena

. We follow a sequential strategy. First, we identied the positions

5. Roll-call votes are not always

required. Roll call votes occur when a

representative or senator votes “yea”

or “nay,” so that the names of members

voting on each side are recorded. On

the other hand, senators can also vote

by voice. A voice vote is a vote in which

those in favor or against a measure say

“yea” or “nay,” respectively, without the

names or tallies of members voting on

each side being recorded.

6. Treaties approved in the Legislative

like the Abolition of Forced Labour

Convention (ILO), the International

Covenant on Civil and Political Rights

(UN), and the Convention against Torture

and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading

Treatment or Punishment (UN) did not

meet the two arenas criteria and were

not included in the analysis.

Flávio Contrera, Matheus Lucas Hebling Party posions over internaonal human rights treaes in the United States in the Post-Cold War

that the parties have expressed about human rights treaties in the Electo-

ral Arena. Then, in the Executive, and nally in the Legislative, between

1992 and 2016.

There are cases where positions have been manifested by the par-

ties: a) in the three arenas; b) only in the Electoral arena and in the Legis-

lative arena; c) only in the Executive arena and in the Legislative arena,

as shown below:

Image 1 – Case Selection Criteria

Source: Authors’ elaboration.

Once the positions expressed by the parties on treaties in more

than one arena have been identied, we excluded from the sample the

generic positions that did not refer to a particular treaty. In this sense, the

database was congured only by treaties specied in the party positions.

The following treaties met the criteria:

Chart 2 – Current Status of Human Rights Treaties

Treaty Organization Signed

Received in the

Senate

Senate’s last action Ratiﬁed

International Convention on the

Elimination of All Forms of Racial

Discrimination

United Nations

September 28,

1966

February 23,

1978

June 24, 1994

Resolution of advice and consent to

ratiﬁcation agreed to in Senate by

Division Vote.

Yes,

October 21,

1994

Convention on the Elimination

of all Forms of Discrimination

Against Women

United Nations July 17, 1980

November 12,

1980

November 20, 2002

Automatically referred to the CFR under

the provisions of Rule XXX, section 2, of

the Standing Rules of the Senate.

Hague Convention on Protection

of Children and Co-operation in

Respect of Intercountry Adoption

Hague Conference

on Private Interna-

tional Law

March 31, 1994 June 11, 1998

September 20, 2000

Resolution of advice and consent to

ratiﬁcation agreed to in Senate by

Division Vote.

Yes,

December 12,

2007

Convention on the Rights of the

Child

United Nations

February 16,

1995

Not sent Not Applied No

Convention concerning the

Prohibition and Immediate Action

for the Elimination of the Worst

Forms of Child Labour

International La-

bour Organization

June 17, 1999 May 8, 1999

May 11, 1999

Resolution of advice and consent to

ratiﬁcation agreed to in Senate by

Division vote.

Yes,

December 2,

1999

Convention on the Rights of

Persons with Disabilities

United Nations July 30, 2009 May 17, 2012

December 17, 2014

Automatically referred to the CFR under

the provisions of Rule XXX, section 2, of

the Standing Rules of the Senate.

Source: Elaborated by the authors with data from the U.S. Congress and the United

Nations Humans Right Indicators. Available at: http://www.congress.gov/ and https://

indicators.ohchr.org.

estudos internacionais • Belo Horizonte, ISSN 2317-773X, v. 9, n. 1, (abr. 2021), p. 24-50

Methodology

In addition to making an analysis between and among the selec-

ted cases of both parties in three dierent arenas, it is necessary to point

out that it will also be done among a few cases (small-N). This method,

called a case-oriented approach, allows the description of more details

and the understanding of complex relationships, considering historical,

institutional, and cultural particularities, focusing on specic processes

and relationships (DELLA PORTA, 2008).

The comparative method ts the search given your goals. For Mah-

oney (2007), the comparative analysis can be used for the development

and test of theories. Here, the second use is made, in which we use cross-

-case analysis as a means of causal inference, providing information about

its context or mechanism. In it, hypotheses are evaluated by elucidating

intervening processes and observable implications of arguments, requi-

ring the use of various facts and knowledge of general causal principles

to explain eects.

This method is used to locate intervening mechanisms by linking

a hypothetical explanatory variable to a result, avoiding spurious corre-

lations for a causal relationship. By identifying mechanisms that link a

supposed explanatory variable and an eect variable, trust in the causal

relationship is increased. More importantly, it must be understood that

the comparative method is always contextual, which means that die-

rent variables can have similar eects, whereas similar variables can have

dierent eects, depending on the context (RAGIN, 2000). In this way, it

is necessary to examine dierences and similarities in context to identify

dierent causal combinations.

According to Ragin (2000), such a method identies complex causal

combinations that explain the occurrence of a multicausal phenomenon

– which cannot be fully explained by quantitative measurements of the

variables. It adopts the same logic of the statistical method but adapts the

use of many variables with a small number of cases (small-N).

Findings

The willingness of the United States to ratify such treaties seems

less than the willingness of many of the countries that the Americans are

pressing to adhere to more humanitarian practices. On the other hand,

there is no guarantee that the accession of repressive states to human

rights treaties will lead them to comply with the agreed provisions.

Hafner-Burton et al.’s (2008) study show that nation-states with

very negative human rights records tend to sign and ratify human rights

treaties at similar rates to those states with positive records. In this res-

pect, the most autonomous states among the repressive states stand out.

This would occur because, being less constrained by domestic forces, the-

se governments would be more likely to ratify human rights treaties as a

symbolic commitment. Besides, the authors argue that the deepening of

international human rights regimes creates opportunities for repressive

states to exhibit low-cost legitimation commitments to world standards,

Flávio Contrera, Matheus Lucas Hebling Party posions over internaonal human rights treaes in the United States in the Post-Cold War

leading them to ratify treaties even without the capacity or willingness

to fulll commitments.

In turn, the decisions of states to commit themselves and their wil-

lingness to comply with human rights treaties would be related to the

level of democratization of the institutions of those states. Thus, Zhou’s

(2014) study suggests that political democratization is crucial to the crea-

tion of the international human rights regime because it creates “com-

promise” and “concession” mechanisms that motivate states to support

such treaties.

Earlier, Hathaway’s study (2007) already showed that states with

less democratic institutions would be less likely to commit to human

rights treaties if they had poor human rights records because there would

be little prospect that treaties would be fullled. On the other hand, sta-

tes with more democratic institutions would be less likely to commit to

human rights treaties if they had precarious human rights records preci-

sely because treaties would likely lead to behavioral changes.

Although adherence to human rights treaties is not related to the

provision of compliance with these treaties, and that this provision varies

according to the level of democratization of the institutions of those cou-

ntries, the discussion about the United States’ diculty in ratifying such

treaties is not less relevant. The main human rights treaties only began to

be ratied by the United States in the late 1980s, and in those cases, they

were ratied under reservations (RUDs). Also, important treaties such

as the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination

Against Women, the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabili-

ties, and the Convention on the Rights of the Child have not been ratied

yet. We begin our analysis from these cases.

The Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination

Against Women

The Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimina-

tion Against Women (CEDAW) is awaiting approval since it was sent by

President Carter (Democratic Party) to the Senate for advice and consent

in 1980. The hearings were not made by the Senate’s Foreign Relations

Committee until 1988. According to the 2002 Committee Report, both

Reagan (1981-1989) and Bush (1989-1993), Republican administrations did

not indicate support for ratication of the treaty, this being the reason

for the FRC’s failure to act on CEDAW in the period. However, in 1994,

under Clinton’s presidency, with a Democratic majority in the Senate,

the treaty was nearing approval. By 13 votes to 5 (all 5 being from the

Republican minority), the Senate Foreign Relations Committee recom-

mended ratication of the treaty, subject to four reservations, four un-

derstandings, and two declarations. However, the midterm elections of

1994 led to the Republican takeover. Thus, the FRC came to be chaired by

Republican Senator Jesse Helms, who did not take CEDAW to the oor.

In 2002, Democrats retook the FRC, chaired by Senator Joseph Biden and

new hearings were held. A new report was approved by the Committee

by 12 votes (10 Democrats and 2 Republicans) to 7 (all 7 Republicans), but

estudos internacionais • Belo Horizonte, ISSN 2317-773X, v. 9, n. 1, (abr. 2021), p. 24-50

again CEDAW did not reach the oor. In the Report prepared by Senator

Biden the reasons for its approval are manifested:

Although women in the United States enjoy equal opportunity and equal protec-

tion of the law, these rights are not universally guaranteed elsewhere. The Con-

vention provides an important means to advance these rights. The Committee

believes that U.S. ratication of CEDAW will serve several important purposes

(US SENATE, 2002b, p.5)

On the other hand, the Republican minority at the FRC in 2002

argued that “the Convention raises several complex and important issues

which should have been explored further in one or more hearings with

the current Administration’s witnesses” (US SENATE, 2002b, p. 16). Mo-

reover, they reinforced the position manifested by the Republican mino-

rity of 1994, sustaining that “the United States has the strongest record on

opportunities and rights for women in the world, and that ratication of

the Convention, rather than improving that record, would raise divisive

social issues such as those noted above” (US SENATE, 2002b, p. 16).

The unwillingness of Republicans to CEDAW is also evident in the

Executive Arena. In the foreign policy documents analyzed, Republicans

failed to issue positions on the treaty. Democrats, in turn, positioned fa-

vorably to CEDAW in all seven National Security Strategy issued by the

National Security Council of the Clinton Administration, between 1994

and 2000. They argued that the United States “must continue to demons-

trate its willingness to adhere to international human rights standards”

(THE WHITE HOUSE, 1997, p. 24) and they called for the Senate consent

to ratify it (THE WHITE HOUSE, 1994; 1995; 1996; 1998; 1999; 2000).

Thus, while the Republican chairman in the FRC refused to take action

on CEDAW between 1995 and 2001, the Executive, under Democratic

control, pressed annually for its ratication.

Besides, the lack of convergence between Democrats and Republi-

cans on CEDAW was also manifested in the Electoral arena, from the 2000

election onwards. Democrats expressed favorably to the treaty in their ma-

nifestos, defending they were committed to ensuring full equality for wo-

men (DEMOCRATIC PARTY, 2008; 2012; 2016). Specically, in the 2000

election manifesto, they stood to “make a special eort to hear women

when they rise courageously to resist or end the war in their communi-

ties” (DEMOCRATIC PARTY, 2000, p. 49). In 2016, they related economic

growth, decreases in poverty, and prosperity of the families and commu-

nities to the opportunity of women and girls being “healthy, educated, and

able to participate economically” (DEMOCRATIC PARTY, 2016, p. 46).

On the other hand, Republicans stood in opposition to CEDAW

in the Electoral Arena. The position taken by Republicans in campaign

manifestos was that the United States should reject treaties, as CEDAW,

because its long-range implications on the American family are ominous

and unclear (REPUBLICAN PARTY, 2008; 2012; 2016). Devoting more

attention to the treaty in the 2008 election, Republicans argue that “UN

has no mandate to promote radical social engineering, any eort to ad-

dress global social problems must respect the fundamental institutions of

marriage and family” (REPUBLICAN PARTY, 2008, p. 7). Moreover, they

supported the Mexico City policy, “which prohibits federal monies from

Flávio Contrera, Matheus Lucas Hebling Party posions over internaonal human rights treaes in the United States in the Post-Cold War

being given to non-governmental organizations that provide abortions

or actively promote abortion as a method of family planning in other

countries” (REPUBLICAN PARTY, 2008, p. 7).

Indeed, the favorable position of the Democrats was congruent

among Legislative, Executive, and Electoral arenas. For its part, the an-

ti-treaty position expressed by the Republicans was congruent between

Electoral and Legislative arenas. The inaction of Republican presidents

on CEDAW may indicate that they were disinterested in the treaty’s

approval. In this sense, Republican positions would be also congruent

with the Executive.

Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities

The Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD)

was signed by President Obama (Democratic Party) in July 2009. Howe-

ver, it has not been ratied yet. Obama transmitted the CRPD to the Se-

nate for advice and consent to ratication in May 2012. On July 26, 20112,

FRC, chaired by the Democrat Senator John Kerry, passed a Report on

CRPD by a 13-6 vote, subject to certain conditions. All the ten Demo-

crats present voted favorably. Republicans split 6 to 3 against the treaty.

Democrats position on the treaty is expressed in the comments in the

Committee Report:

The committee is persuaded by the support of experts in disability law and

advocacy that ratication of the Convention will enable the United States to

more eectively advocate on behalf of the millions of disabled Americans. These

experts indicate that it will give the United States a more eective voice in advo-

cating for standards and practices abroad that comport with the high standards

for the protection of disabled persons found in U.S. domestic law and practice. In

addition to our bilateral eorts, ratication will allow the U.S. to nominate U.S.

disabilities experts to sit on the Disabilities Committee, giving the United States

a formal voice and vote in the Assembly of States Parties to the Convention (US

SENATE, 2012, p.7)

Since this Report was approved, CRPD proceeded to the oor whe-

re despite senators voted favorably by 61-38, it did not reach the required

majority of 2/3. Democrats voted unanimously favorably by 53-0, while

the majority among the (38-8) Republicans voted against it. Besides being

rejected, Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid pledged to try to ratify the

CRPD again. Senate FRC then held new hearings on the CRPD and

approved a resolution, by 12-6, of advice and consent to ratication of

the treaty. Again, 10 Democrats in FRC voted favorably. Republicans split

from 6-2, against the CRPD. However, the treaty was not brought to the

Senate oor for a vote and returned to the FRC at the end of the 113th

Congress. The Republican position on the treaty was manifested in the

minority views of the Committee Report:

It is one of our core values, and it is in our national interest to promote respect

for every human life (…) While this treaty is not an appropriate vehicle for achie-

ving these goals, principally because it has the potential to signicantly alter the

Constitution and because it is not an appropriate tool for establishing domestic

policy, substantial concrete action will be needed to bring about actual and tan-

gible progress internationally. And the United States should continue to bolster

those eorts (US SENATE, 2014, p. 36)

estudos internacionais • Belo Horizonte, ISSN 2317-773X, v. 9, n. 1, (abr. 2021), p. 24-50

Republicans also manifested concerns on the impact of CRPD on

Federalism and highlighted the implications of the provision of health

care in the treaty, specically regarding the phrase ‘‘sexual and repro-

ductive health’’, which could include abortion once “no language de-

ning sexual and reproductive health has been placed in the present reso-

lution”. As a highly controversial issue, abortion “should be determined

through domestic processes, not at an international level” (US SENATE,

2014, p. 33).

Neither W. Bush (Republican Party), during CRPD negotiations,

nor Obama, after signing it, manifested positions on the treaty in the

Executive foreign policy documents. On the other hand, in the Elec-

toral arena, Democrats and Republicans took positions on the treaty.

Democrats manifested favorably to the CRPD, standing that is the role

of the United States, as the world leader, to protect the rights of people

with disabilities. They promised “ensure there is sucient funding to

empower Americans with disabilities to succeed in school and beyond”

(DEMOCRATIC PARTY, 2008, p. 49); to “protect and expand the right

of Americans with disabilities to get the accommodations and support

they need to live in integrated community settings” (DEMOCRATIC

PARTY, 2016, p. 19); to “improve access to meaningful and gainful em-

ployment for people with disabilities” (DEMOCRATIC PARTY, 2016,

p. 19) and to “provide tax relief to help the millions of families caring

for aging relatives or family members with chronic illnesses or disa-

bilities” (DEMOCRATIC PARTY, 2016, p. 19). Republicans, in turn,

opposed CRPD ratication, sustaining the same argument they used

to criticize CEDAW, namely, by considering its long-range impact on

the American family as ominous and unclear (REPUBLICAN PARTY,

2012; 2016).

Once again, the positions of both the Democratic and Republican

Party were congruent, but not convergent, between the Legislative and

Electoral Arenas. Democratic Party positions were also congruent with

President Obama’s signing of the treaty in the Executive. While Demo-

crats stood for the ratication of the CRPD, Republicans opposed it.

Convention on the Rights of the Child

The Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) was signed by

President Clinton in February 1995, but he did not submit it to the Senate,

primarily because of strong opposition from the Legislative members.

Bush Administration (2001-2009) opposed the treaty and expressed se-

rious political and legal concerns to the CRC. Therefore, instead of pres-

sing the Senate for its advice and consent on the Convention, the Bush

Administration focused to get the Senate’s approval on two Optional

Protocols related to the CRC. The rst is the Optional Protocol on the In-

volvement of Children in Armed Conict; and the second is the Optional

Protocol on the Sale of Children, Child Prostitution, and Child Pornogra-

phy as shown in the chart below.

Flávio Contrera, Matheus Lucas Hebling Party posions over internaonal human rights treaes in the United States in the Post-Cold War

Chart 3 – Current Status of the Optional Protocols to the CRC

Treaty Signed Received in the Senate Senate’s last action Ratiﬁed

Optional Protocols to the

Convention on the Rights of

the Child

July 5, 2000 July 25, 2000

June 18, 2002

(on Involvement of Children in Armed Conﬂict)

Resolution of advice and consent to ratiﬁcation agreed to

in the Senate by Division Vote.

Yes,

December 23,

2002

June 18, 2002

(on the Sale of Children, Child Prostitution and Child

Pornography)

Resolution of advice and consent to ratiﬁcation agreed to

in the Senate by Division Vote.

Source: Elaborated by the authors with data from the U.S. Congress. Available at:

http://www.congress.gov/

These Protocols were considered less controversial than the Con-

vention itself and they were sent to the Senate by President Clinton on

July 25, 2000. After holding a public hearing on the Protocols on March 7,

2002, the FRC considered them favorably on May 23, 2002, by voice vote,

recommending Senate’s advice and consent to them. Considered on the

oor, both Protocols got Senate’s approval on a Division vote. Once the

roll call was not requested, it was not possible to identify the minority

who opposed the Protocols. Moreover, only senators who supported the

Protocols were addressed on the oor. According to Democratic Senator

Barbara Boxer, the formal adoption of the protocol’s standards for U.S.

military operations would “enable the U.S. to be able to eectively pres-

sure other governments and forces to end the use of children within their

military ranks” CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, 2002, p. S5717). About the

second Protocol, she stated that ratication was important to protect vul-

nerable children, who “cannot often get help on their own — not only

because of their young age— but also because they have no birth certi-

cates or ocial documents. They are, in eect, ‘’invisible.’’” (CONGRES-

SIONAL RECORD, 2002, p. S5718).

Parties in the Executive and the Electoral arena, on the other hand,

manifested positions about the Convention itself and not about its Pro-

tocols voted in the Legislative. Precisely, the Democratic Party showed

support to the CRC and the Republican Party opposed it. However, while

Democrats took positions only in the Executive arena, Republicans ma-

nifested on CRC only in the Electoral Arena. Democrats highlighted that

President Clinton after signing CRC was seeking consent from the Se-

nate on it. The reason for support was to demonstrate the United States’

“willingness to adhere to international human rights standards” (THE

WHITE HOUSE, 1996, p. 33; 1997, p. 24). On the other hand, Republi-

cans used the Electoral arena to manifest their opposition to the CRC.

By arguing that under the US Constitution, “treaties become the law of

the land”, they justied their opposition on the same grounds they did

on CEDAW and CRPD. Precisely, because of the unclear implications of

treaties, like the CRC, on the American family (REPUBLICAN PARTY,

2008; 2012; 2016).

Therefore, convergence was possible only on the Optional Pro-

tocols to CRC in the Legislative Arena. Positions of Democrats in the

estudos internacionais • Belo Horizonte, ISSN 2317-773X, v. 9, n. 1, (abr. 2021), p. 24-50

Executive and of the Republicans in the Electoral arena show divergence

on CRC itself. This divergence prevented Clinton from submitting the

Convention to the Senate. While the Democratic position is congruent

between the CRC (in the Executive) and its optional protocols (in the Le-

gislative), the Republican position diverges between the CRC (in the Elec-

toral) and its protocols (in the Legislative).

International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial

Discrimination

The International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of

Racial Discrimination (CERD) received its advice and consent from Sena-

te on June 24, 1994, and it was ratied under reservations

by President

Clinton on October 21, 1994. Despite ratication, building convergence

around the treaty was a time-consuming process. Signed by Democrat

President Lyndon Johnson in 1966, CERD would only be referred to the

Senate in 1978 by President Carter. From then on, it was 16 years before

the treaty was approved by the Senate, although under RUDs. According

to the Committee Report, domestic and international events at the end

of 1979 prevented FRC from moving to a vote on the Convention. After

that, neither the Reagan nor the Bush Administration supported ratica-

tion (US SENATE, 1994). President Clinton’s support for CERD unlocked

the treaty procedure in the FRC. Hearings were held in May 1994 which

followed the unanimous approval of an amendment by Republican Sena-

tor Jesse Helms to the motion for a resolution but not to the instrument of

ratication

. Subsequently, the resolution of ratication was unanimou-

sly approved, by voice vote, by the members of the FRC. Proceeded to the

oor, CERD passed with the majority required. A minority of senators

voted against it. Even though it is not possible to identify them since there

was no request for a nominal vote. On the oor, the Democratic Senator

and Chairman of the FRC, Claiborne Pell stated on the Treaty:

The convention is an important instrument in the international community’s

struggle to eliminate racial and ethnic discrimination. As a nation that has gone

through its struggle to overcome segregation and discrimination, we are in a

unique position to lead the international eort. Our position and the credibility

of our leadership will be strengthened immeasurably by the ratication of this

convention--ratication, I might add, that is long overdue. Moreover, ratication

will also enable the United States to participate in the work of the Committee

on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination established by the convention to

monitor compliance (CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, 1994, p. S7635).

Once dierent positions on CERD were not recorded on the oor,

convergence between Democrats and Republicans seems to have prevai-

led in the Legislative Arena. In the Executive arena, in turn, only the

Democratic Party manifested on CERD. In the National Security Stra-

tegy, the Clinton Administration argued that the ratication of CERD

demonstrated “our own willingness to adhere to international human

rights standards” (THE WHITE HOUSE, 1994, p. 20; 1995, p. 24; 1996,

p. 33). However, in the Electoral Arena were not manifested positions of

both parties on the treaty. Thus, the Democratic position on CERD is

congruent between the Executive and Legislative arenas. The lack of ac-

7. The United States did not ratify CERD

as a self-executing treaty, asserting that

CERD did not create an independent

cause of action in U.S. courts. They

claimed that because its laws provided

extensive protections and remedies

against racial discrimination, it did not

need to enact additional legislation to

comply with CERD.

8. The proviso of Senator Helms

clariﬁes the relationship between the

convention and the U.S. Constitution.

Since this relationship is a matter of

U.S. domestic law, the proviso was not

included in the instrument of ratiﬁcation

deposited by the President.

Flávio Contrera, Matheus Lucas Hebling Party posions over internaonal human rights treaes in the United States in the Post-Cold War

tion of Republican Administrations in the Executive on CERD contrasts

with the Republican acceptance of the treaty in the Legislative. Ultima-

tely, this could indicate an incongruity by the Republican Party. Howe-

ver, this was not the case. Republicans’ convergence with Democrats in

Congress came only after decades of gridlock and negotiations that assu-

red, through RUDs, that CEDAW would not be self-executing.

Convention concerning the Prohibition and Immediate Action for the

Elimination of the Worst Forms of Child Labour

The Convention for the Elimination of the Worst Forms of Child

Labour (ILO) received Senate’s advice and consent on May 11, 1999, and it

was ratied by President Clinton on December 2, 1999. This rapid process

is due, according to the FRC Chairman, Republican Senator Jesse Hel-

ms, to treaty negotiators who “consulted regularly with members of this

committee and the committee sta during negotiations and were able

to ensure that the treaty tracked consistently with the United States Fair

Labor Standards Act” (US SENATE, 1999, p. 9).

After holding a public hearing, the FRC voted favorably on ILO, by

voice vote, on November 3, 1999. The Committee Report stated the “pro-

posed Convention is in the interest of the United States” (US SENATE,

1999, p. 5). However, the recommendation for consent included RUDs

Moved to the oor, the treaty got Senate’s approval by Division vote

(CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, 1999, p. S14226).

In the Executive, only the Democratic Party took positions on the

ILO treaty. They promised to work “to ensure that international human

rights principles protect the most vulnerable or traditionally oppressed

groups in the world – women, children, indigenous people, workers, re-

fugees, and other persecuted persons” (THE WHITE HOUSE, 1999, p.

47; 2000, p. 47). To fulll this end they expressed support for the wide rati-

cation of the ILO Convention on the Worst Forms of Child Labor (THE

WHITE HOUSE, 1999; 2000). No positions about the Convention were

taken in the Electoral arena. Thus, while parties were convergent in the

Legislative on the ILO treaty, the Democratic Party was also congruent

about its positions in the Executive and the Legislative.

Hague Convention on Protection of Children and Co-operation in Respect

of Intercountry Adoption

Signed by President Clinton on March 31, 1994, the Hague Adop-

tion Convention was ratied by President Bush on December 12, 2007.

The Republican takeover of 1994 in the Senate and the election of George

W. Bush in 2000 contributed to the 13-year delay between the signing and

the ratication of the Hague Convention. Clinton transmitted the Con-

vention to the Senate only on June 11, 1998. CFR held a public hearing on

the treaty in 1999; and, on April 13, 2000, the Committee nally approved

the proposed convention, by voice vote. Republican Senator Sam Brown-

back was the only one to oppose the treaty. The Convention, then, pro-

ceeded to the oor. Together with the Convention, Senator Enzi asked

9. The United States declared the

Senate’s advice and consent should be

binding on the President’s interpreta-

tion of the Treaty; on a proviso of the

supremacy of its Constitution; on two

understandings about basic education

and children working on farms.

estudos internacionais • Belo Horizonte, ISSN 2317-773X, v. 9, n. 1, (abr. 2021), p. 24-50

unanimous consent to the Implementation Act of the Hague Adoption

Convention (H.R. 2909), already agreed in the House. Senators then, gave

their advice and consent to the Convention on September 20, 2000, with

declarations. A Division vote was requested and senators were counted.

A majority of two-thirds of senators voted favorably. Democratic Senator

John Biden stated on the occasion:

This treaty is important for a very simple reason — it will help facilitate inter-

national adoptions and provide important safeguards for children and adoptive

parents. It is a good thing when the government can make things easier for its

citizens — in this case, adoptive parents. Adoption is a joyous occasion, but the

current system can be confusing and present uncertainties (CONGRESSIONAL

REPORT, 2000, p. S8866).

To express the convergence regarding the Adoption Convention

and its implementation, Senator Biden highlighted it was the product of

compromise between Republicans and Democrats in both Senate and

House

: “None of us got all that we wanted. But I believe we have a good

product here. I want to express my appreciation to them and their sta

for the hard work that went into the drafting of this bill” (CONGRESSIO-

NAL REPORT, 2000, p. S8866).

In the Executive arena, only the Republican Party took positions

on the Hague Convention. In the Strategic Plan of 2003, it was stated

that the Administration would “push for implementation of The Hague

Intercountry Adoption Convention” (DEPARTMENT OF STATE, 2003,

p. 17). In the same document, in 2007, they added the Department of Sta-

te would “work tirelessly to prevent and resolve cases of international

parental child abduction”. (DEPARTMENT OF STATE, 2007, p. 39). Mo-

reover, none of the parties manifested on the Hague Convention in the

Electoral Arena. Therefore, party positions on the treaty were conver-

gent in the Legislative and the Republican position is congruent between

the Executive and the Legislative.

Discussion

An examination of the ratication process of international human

rights treaties reveals a trend that may be linked to party positions. In all

the six cases analyzed, the treaties were signed by a Democrat President.

Except for the CRC, which did not reach the Legislature, all treaties were

also sent to the Senate by a Democrat President. Bill Clinton ratied two

treaties and George W. Bush, in turn, ratied one treaty and the two

Optional Protocols to the CRC. Indeed, the Clinton Administration has

acted to follow up the treaties awaiting Senate approval, such as CERD

and CEDAW, and has also negotiated and signed the Hague Adoption

Convention, the ILO Convention on Worst Forms of Child Labor, and

the CRC.

Given the strong performance of the Democrat Presidents and

Clinton, in particular, for a greater commitment of the United States to

human rights issues, in the late 1990s, authors have remarked that the

United States would have raised priorities, which do not satisfy the Ame-

rican national interest. An example of this is the conduction of foreign

10. Biden speciﬁcally mentioned the

efforts of the Democratic Senator

Landrieu, himself, and the Democratic

Representatives Sam Gejdenson and

Bill Delahunt; and also the efforts of

Republican senators Helms (Chairman

of FRC) and Brownback, and of the

Republican representatives Ben Gilman

and Dave Camp.

Flávio Contrera, Matheus Lucas Hebling Party posions over internaonal human rights treaes in the United States in the Post-Cold War

policy by the president during the conict with Yugoslavia, which made

evident to the world the limit of American power, after having built a

coalition to tackle the problem (GOW, 1997; JAKOBSEN, 1994; KRAH-

MANN, 2003). Understanding that national interest should focus prima-

rily on security, Huntington (1997) argued that commercial and ethnic

interests would prevail over other potentially more vital interests in the

face of the United States’ diculty in dening its priorities after the end

of the Cold War.

Based on Perry and Carter’s (1999) categorization of US security

risks where three priority lists are ranked, Joseph Nye Jr. (1999) discusses

the prevalence of humanitarian priorities at the expense of vital priorities

for the United States in the post-Cold War era. According to Nye, “List C”

would have risen to the forefront of US foreign policy priorities because

of the disappearance of vital threats after the end of the Cold War and

because its capacity for attention in the mass media, which has an impact

on public opinion and the formulation of foreign policy.

In a similar vein to Huntington (1997) and Nye (1999), then-foreign

policy advisor George W. Bush, during the 2000 presidential campaign,

Rice (2000) states that the national interest would have been replaced

by humanitarian interests and interests of the international community

under the Clinton administration, whose eagerness to nd multilateral

solutions to global problems would have resulted in the ratication of

agreements that were not in US interests.

One common element among these analyzes is the suggestion that

the American national interest would have been replaced by the defense

of humanitarian interests in the United States in the Clinton Administra-

tion, to the detriment of more important issues such as national security.

Critically, these analyses link human rights issues to the Democrat Presi-

dent. Indeed, human rights advocacy has been on the Democratic Party’s

agenda since before the end of the Cold War. Precisely, the defense of

human rights by the Democrats goes back to the erosion of the liberal-

-conservative consensus that prevailed until the Vietnam War. In that

sense, Jimmy Carter, during his presidency, sought a new direction for

American foreign policy. This would be shaped by principles of human

rights and non-intervention. According to Schmitz and Walker (2004, p.

114), “in making human rights a key element of all discussions and con-

siderations of American foreign policy, Carter succeeded in shifting the

discourse on American foreign policy away from the dominant concerns

of the Cold War and containment”.

In contrast to the Democratic movement for the defense of hu-

man rights, in the mid-1970s Republicans received the support of Chris-

tian fundamentalists, pro-life groups, and others of special interest on

the right. In the early 1980s, “news stories about abortion indicated that

pro-life interest groups were associated with the Republican Party while

pro-choice groups were aligned with the Democratic Party, underscoring

the clearer and more dierentiated positions being adopted by the par-

ties” (CARMINES et al, 2010, p. 1152). Since then, the “Republican Party

and conservative religious activists have presented themselves as protec-

tors of moral and religious values” (WILLIAMS, 2007, p. 1), addressing

estudos internacionais • Belo Horizonte, ISSN 2317-773X, v. 9, n. 1, (abr. 2021), p. 24-50

“policies relating to sexual behavior, marriage, and the family, including

opposition to abortion and same-sex marriage” (WILLIAMS, 2007, p. 1).

Indeed, the Republican opposition to CEDAW, CRPD, and CRC

was founded, as we have seen, in the defense of principles related to tra-

ditional morality, which are ideologically associated with conservative

thinking and positioning right. It is important to note, however, that Re-

publicans are not opposed only to human rights treaties, but to all treaties

that may challenge American sovereignty. Such perception appears in the

Republican campaign manifestos of 1996, 2012, and 2016: “Just as George

Washington wisely warned America to avoid foreign entanglements and

enter into only temporary alliances, we oppose the adoption or ratica-

tion of international treaties that weaken or encroach upon American

sovereignty” (REPUBLICAN PARTY, 2012, p. 14).

In this sense, besides the ideological dimension, there would also

be an isolationist perspective in the Republican opposition. In this regard,

although the election of the Republican Dwight Eisenhower has driven

a conservative internationalist orientation of the Republican Party in fo-

reign policy since the 1950s (ROSATI; SCOTT, 2011), especially concer-

ning the struggle against communism, the isolationist perspective never

would have been abandoned, being invoked in matters involving sove-

reignty, as is the case of international treaties. In contrast, the Democrats

have been historically characterized by the defense of a liberal internatio-

nalist orientation in foreign policy.

Indeed, these dierences in the perspective of foreign policy that

characterize the parties and the congruence they manifest in their po-

sitions on human rights treaties in the dierent arenas challenge the

continuity in American national interests and thus aect the country’s

commitment to human rights demands. Because of the lack of consensus,

American exceptionalism fed into rights rhetoric. Rights for Americans

was one thing. US action on behalf of the human rights of foreigners was

another (FORSYTHE, 1995).

Given the above, the analysis of the positions of Democrats and

Republicans on human rights treaties in the Electoral, the Executive, and

the Legislative arena supports the hypothesis that bipartisan convergence

is aected by the ideological arguments that underpin the positions of the

parties and also the hypothesis that a party’s position on a treaty tends to

be congruent among dierent arenas.

Conclusions

In verifying the positions of Democrats and Republicans regarding

human rights treaties in the Electoral, Executive and Legislative arenas in

the post-Cold War era, we concluded that the possibility of interpartisan

convergence is aected by the ideological arguments that underpin the

positions of the parties and, that there is congruence in the positions that

the parties manifest in the dierent arenas.

Specically, to convergence, we saw that it was not reached in three

of the six cases analyzed. They are the Convention on the Elimination of

All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), the Convention

Flávio Contrera, Matheus Lucas Hebling Party posions over internaonal human rights treaes in the United States in the Post-Cold War

on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD), and the Convention on

the Rights of the Child (CRC). In the specic case of the CRC, although

there was no convergence with the main Convention, the parties con-

verged and made possible the approval in the Senate of the two Optional

Protocols related to the CRC, considered less controversial.

We identied, in the positions of Democrats and Republicans,

ideological arguments that grounded the party divergence in those

three treaties. Precisely, the Republican opposition to CEDAW, CRPD,

and CRC was based on the defense of principles linked to traditional

morality, which are ideologically associated with conservative thinking

and right-wing positioning. In turn, Democratic Party support for the

treaties was based on the defense of individual rights of minorities, ideo-

logically linked to liberal thinking and the realignment in American fo-

reign policy initiated by Carter.

On the other hand, convergence was possible in the other three ca-

ses analyzed. They are the International Convention on the Elimination

of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (CERD), the Hague Convention

on Protection of Children and Co-operation in Respect of Intercountry

Adoption, and the Convention Concerning Prohibition and Immediate

Action for the Elimination of the Worst Forms of Child Labor (ILO). Ho-

wever, even in these cases, convergence between parties has not been

easily achieved. In addition to being ratied with reservations, these trea-

ties have taken some time to receive the consent of the Senate.

To the congruence of party positions among the Electoral, Executive

and Legislative arenas, we have seen that it occurred in all cases analyzed,

although in the Legislative there has not always been complete party unity

around a treaty. Still, party majorities followed the same positions their

parties expressed in the Executive and/or Electoral arena. This nding

suggests that there is responsiveness in the positions advocated by Demo-

crats and Republicans on human rights treaties and that this responsive-

ness is placed above a possible continuity of American national interests.

Thus, alternation in the Executive’s command and majority control

in the Senate has changed the commitment of the United States to human

rights treaties. While the Democratic Party has positioned and acted to

ratify human rights treaties, the Republican Party has been opposing or

working to delay ratication of these treaties, which have taken place

after much negotiation and with reservations.

Although the small number of cases analyzed does not allow us to

make generalizations, the ndings of this article oer clues to identify

the reasons why important human rights treaties have not been ratied

by the United States. The analysis of an expanded number of cases and

other issues in future work may reinforce the understanding that conti-

nuity in American foreign policy is aected by party alternation in the

Executive and by changes in the control of the Senate majority, and that

these alternations suggest dierent approaches in foreign policy. That is,

concerning international treaties, while the Democrats would be posi-

tioning themselves from a liberal internationalist approach, the Republi-

cans, on the other hand, would be positioning themselves from a conser-

vative isolationist perspective.

estudos internacionais • Belo Horizonte, ISSN 2317-773X, v. 9, n. 1, (abr. 2021), p. 24-50

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