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estudos internacionais • Belo Horizonte, ISSN 2317-773X, v. 8, n. 3, (set. 2020), p. 110-127
China’s economic presence
in Mozambique
Presença econômica da China em Moçambique
Presencia económica de China en Mozambique
Francisco Proença Garcia
1
DOI: 10.5752/P.2317-773X.2020v8.n3.p110
Received in: April 13, 2020
Accepted in: June 22, 2020
A
Our study aims to analyse the Chinese economic presence in Mozambique
during the second decade of the 21st century. This objective emerged from the
observation of the visible presence in Mozambique of several Chinese com-
panies that intervene in dierent sectors. The choice of this period of analysis
is mostly related with the lack of systematized studies about this topic, taking
also into consideration that, during this period, Mozambique faced an economic
and nancial crisis that resulted from a high debt and that led to the interven-
tion of the international community. In order to achieve this goal, a central
question arises: what are the characteristics of the Chinese economic presence
in Mozambique during the second decade of the 21
st
century? The rst part,
the framework, briey describes the Chinese presence in the African continent;
in the second part, we will address the relationship between Mozambique
and China and will describe spectrally the economic and nancial situation in
Mozambique; in the third we attempt to estimate the volume of trade between
both countries; in the fourth, we analyse China-Mozambique cooperation and
China’s Ocial Development Assistance to Mozambique, and; in the fth, we
analyse China’s current foreign direct investment in the country.
Keywords: China. Africa. Mozambique. Trade Relations. Cooperation. Foreign
Direct Investment.
R
O nosso estudo procura identicar uma caracterização para presença económi-
ca chinesa em Moçambique na segunda década do século. Assim, organizámos
a nossa análise em cinco pontos fundamentais. No primeiro, efetuamos uma
breve descrição da presença chinesa no continente africano; no segundo aborda-
mos as relações entre Moçambique e a China e descrevemos a situação econó-
mica e nanceira de Moçambique; em terceiro lugar procuramos quanticar
as relações comerciais entre os dois países e, num quarto ponto analisamos a
cooperação e a ajuda pública para o desenvolvimento efetuada pela China em
Moçambique, para, num quinto ponto analisarmos qual o atual investimento
direto efetuado pela China naquele país africano.
1. Professor Associado com Agregação,
Instituto de Estudos Políticos da
Universidade Católica Portuguesa e
Instituto Universitário Militar. https://
orcid.org/0000-0002-7605-1336
111
Francisco Proença Garcia China’s economic presence in Mozambique
Palavras-chave: China em África. Moçambique. Relações comerciais. Ajuda
Pública ao Desenvolvimento. Investimento Direto Estrangeiro.
R
Nuestro estudio busca identicar una caracterización de la presencia económica
china en Mozambique en la segunda década del siglo. Por lo tanto, organizamos
nuestro análisis en cinco puntos fundamentales. En el primero, proporciona-
mos una breve descripción de la presencia china en el continente africano; en el
segundo, abordamos las relaciones entre Mozambique y China y describimos
la situación económica y nanciera de Mozambique; en tercer lugar, buscamos
cuanticar las relaciones comerciales entre los dos países y, en el cuarto punto,
analizamos la cooperación y la ayuda pública para el desarrollo llevada a cabo
por China en Mozambique, de modo que, en un quinto punto, analicemos la
inversión directa actual realizada por China en ese país africano.
Palabras-clave: China en África. Mozambique, Relaciones comerciales. Asisten-
cia pública para el desarrollo. Inversión extranjera directa
Introduction
China is now the second largest economy in the world and it pro-
jects considerable power--including economic, military, diplomatic, te-
chnological, and sharp power--on a global scale. China’s riseis causing
substantial shifts in the international order, largely inilliberal and non-
-democraticdirections. Analysis of the nature and implications ofChina’s
increasingly assertiveactivities on the global stage is now one of the most
signicant contemporary topics for the study of International Relations.
The goal of this study is to identify and analyse China’s economic
and nancial presence in Mozambique, with special focus on the second
decade of the 21st century. We chose this topic due to the visible increase
in the number of rms operating in Mozambique in several sectors, and
to the unusual and interesting presence of Chinese personnel in cooper-
ation projects funded by the Chinese state. We chose this specic period
because of the scarcity of data and lack of systematic studies on the topic,
but also because during this period, Mozambique has had to deal once
again with political and security instability, a debt-driven economic ex-
pansion and a nancial crisis that required intervention from the interna-
tional community.
This paper oers a rigorous, empirically-grounded case study of
China’s involvement in Mozambique. But the relevance of the study is
not limited to Mozambique alone.By a careful analysis of the case of Mo-
zambique, the largeraimisto contribute toourunderstanding of China’s
growingpresenceand inuence on the continent of Africa, more broadly.
While there are many academic studies on Chinese-African rela-
tions
2
, and although generic data on the economies of African countries
is available from accessible and credible sources, studies on Mozambique
and specically on the Chinese involvement in the country are scarce. A
thorough review of the literature revealed little documentation in Por-
tuguese and English, and what little does exist is scattered across dier-
ent sources, such as the World Bank (2018), United Nations Conference
2. There is now a range of authors:
Alden (2006); Jiang (2009); Mohan
(2013); Besada and O´Bright (2017).
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estudos internacionais • Belo Horizonte, ISSN 2317-773X, v. 8, n. 3, (set. 2020), p. 110-127
on Trade and Development (UNCTAD, 2018), the Statistical Yearbook of
Mozambique (INE, 2018), the ForumonChina–Africa Cooperation website
(FOCAC, 2019) and the Macauhub website
3
.
The rst major systematic description of the relations between
China and Mozambique can be found in a book coordinated by Sérgio
Chichava and Chris Alden (2012), A Mamba e o Dragão – Relações Moçam-
bique-China em Perspectiva [The Mamba and the Dragon – An Outlook on
Mozambique-China Relations]. The book was published in 2012 by the
Institute of Social and Economic Studies (IESE) and the South African Insti-
tute of International Aairs.
Additionally, several sectoral studies have been conducted, address-
ing areas such as the Chinese presence in Mozambique’s agriculture
4
and
forests
5
, the diplomatic relations between China and Mozambique
6
, the
Chinese investment in the country
7
, Ocial Development Assistance
(ODA), the economy and trade
8
, the impact of FOCAC
9
, and labour rela-
tions between Chinese companies and Mozambican workers
10
.
To achieve the research goal, it was necessary to answer the follo-
wing research question: What are the characteristics of the Chinese econo-
mic presence in Mozambique during the second decade of the 21st century?
China’s economic presence, which we will attempt to quantify, can
be felt in three broad overlapping areas: the rst is trade; the second co-
vers both cooperation and ODA and includes cooperation initiatives and
projects in various areas; the third area consists of FDI (Foreign Direct
Investment) by a considerable number of Chinese companies operating in
Mozambique. First, we tried to identify the economic and societal impact
of the Chinese presence in areas such as employment and socioecono-
mic development. However, we found that the lack of reliable data, the
dierent methodologies used to obtain these data, and the contrasting
conclusions of the sectoral studies made it impossible to establish a re-
liable metric to assess that impact. Therefore, we decided to focus only
on identifying the areas where the Chinese government has intervened,
providing specic gures when possible.
The research question immediately raised several subsidiary ques-
tions: What are the trade links between China and Mozambique? What
characterises China-Mozambique cooperation? How does China provide
Ocial Development Assistance to Mozambique? In what sectors? What
is China’s FDI in Mozambique and where is it used?
We used an essentially descriptive and exploratory methodological
approach
11
which consisted of analysing data from secondary sources (pu-
blished studies and documents issued by government sources and Inter-
national Organizations). The study is organized in ve parts, where we
attempt to answer the above questions. In the rst, which introduces and
contextualises the issue, we briey describe the Chinese presence in the
African continent; in the second, we discuss the relations between Mo-
zambique and China and describe Mozambique’s economic and nancial
situation; in the third, we attempt to assess the volume of trade between
the two countries; in the fourth, we analyse China-Mozambique coope-
ration and the ODA China has made available, and in the fth we analyse
China’s current foreign direct investment in this African country.
3. Macauhub available at: https://
macauhub.com.
4. Chichava (2010; 2014).
5. Muianga and Norfolk (2017);
Macqueen (2018).
6. Taylor (2009)
7. Liu (2009).
8. Ilhéu (2010); Roque (2009).
9. Hon, Jansson, Haifang, Burke and
Kiala (2010).
10. Feijó (2012); Wethal (2017).
11. We used a descriptive approach
in the sense defined by Gratton and
Jones (2010), in that we collected data
that describes facts about the links
between Mozambique and China, and
an exploratory approach in the sense
used by Chui (2007), in as much as we
explored the relations between China
and Mozambique to collect knowledge,
ideas and facts about the research
problems and to identify variables
associated with those problems.
Mlambo et al. (2016) used the same
methodologies in their article on China-
Africa relations.
113
Francisco Proença Garcia China’s economic presence in Mozambique
China in Africa
China’s current presence in Africa has been widely documented,
especially since the creation of the FOCAC in 2000. The FOCAC websi-
te describes this forum as a “platform established by China and friendly
African countries for collective consultation and dialogue and a coopera-
tion mechanism between the developing countries, which falls into the
category of South-South cooperation” (FOCAC, 2019). Fifty-three African
countries are members of this platform
12
.
The last FOCAC summit, the seventh since the forum was created,
was held in Beijing on 3
th
and 4
th
September 2018. The conference aimed
to develop the Forum’s work and deepen the strategic and cooperative
partnership between China and Africa. To achieve this goal, the forum
adopted by consensus the Beijing Declaration “Toward an Even Stron-
ger China-Africa Community with a Shared Future”. During the sum-
mit, the Chinese President stated that “Africa’s infrastructure is seeing
improvements thanks to these cooperation plans, which are expected to
bring the continent 30.000-km of highways, 85-million-tonnes per year
of harbour capacity, over 9-million-tonnes per day of water-cleaning ca-
pacity and about 20.000-megawatt power generating capacity, together
with creating some 900.000 jobs.” Also during the summit, an action plan
was dened for 2019-2021 (FOCAC, 2019). With the implementation of
the Belt One Road Initiative, China’s presence on the African continent is
expected to become increasingly visible
13
.
China’s importance to Africa has also been addressed in ocial
Chinese documents such as the African Policy Papers of 2006 and 2015.
In its second Policy Paper (2015), the Chinese government stated that it
wished to clarify its determination and goodwill to develop friendly and
cooperative relations with the African continent (CHINA.ORG, 2015)
14
.
China’s interest in the continent is also reected in the number of visits
by senior Chinese ocials to African countries. Between 2008 and 2018,
there were 79 visits to 43 dierent countries
15
.
China is in Africa to gain access to its markets, natural resources,
investment, and political and diplomatic support
16
, as well as to project
military power; in other words, it is defending its own interests.
China projects military power through the forces it deploys to Uni-
ted Nations peacekeeping missions, the most signicant being the mission
to South Sudan, to which it has committed over one thousand personnel.
This is a form of power projection and a way to gain access to local oil
17
.
China also has forces in Djibouti, where it has established its rst military
base outside the South China Sea. In addition to China, six other powers
(USA, France, United Kingdom, Japan, Italy and Saudi Arabia) have bases
in the country. From there, China can control the entire Bab el-Mandeb
strait and help protect the region’s shipping routes.
The relationship between Africa and China is one of mutual depen-
dence. Africa needs China’s assistance to spur its socioeconomic growth
and development, as well as to gain access to the Chinese markets, in-
vestments, loans, ODA programmes and technology
18
. Another equally
important factor is what we can call mutual political trust, since some
12. Available at https://www.focac.
org/eng
13. The statement of the FOCAC
Beijing Summit held in September
2018 reads: “Africa, being part of
the historical and natural extension
of the Belt and Road, has been an
important participant in this initiative.
The cooperation between China and
Africa under the Belt and Road Initiative
will generate more resources and
means, expand the market and space
for African development, and broaden
its development prospects. We agree
to form a strong synergy between the
Belt and Road Initiative and the 2030
Agenda for Sustainable Development
of the United Nations, Agenda 2063
of the African Union (AU), as well as
the development strategies of African
countries. The closer connectivity in
policy, infrastructure, trade, finance and
people-to-people ties, strengthened
industrial capacity cooperation under
the Belt and Road Initiative, and
greater cooperation in the planning of
African infrastructure and industrial
development will lend new impetus to
the win-win cooperation and common
development between China and
Africa”(FOCAC, 2019).
14. Among other aspects, the document
explains that this cooperation will
entail: “1. Enhancing political mutual
trust; 2. Deepening cooperation in
international affairs; 3. Deepening
economic and trade cooperation; 4.
Strengthening development cooperation
between China and Africa; 5. Deepening
and expanding cultural and people-to-
people exchanges; 6. Promoting peace
and security in Africa; 7. Strengthening
exchanges and cooperation in consular,
immigration, judicial and police areas”
(CHINA.ORG, 2015)
15. The Global Sentinel website has
detailed information on these visits,
including locations, and dates and the
names of visiting officials (GLOBAL
SENTINEL, 2018).
16. A study by Mlambo et al. (2016)
identifies four key elements of China’s
goals in Africa: access to resources;
political support; access to markets;
investment opportunities. Another study
by Haroz (2011) identifies three priorities
in China’s investment in Africa: strategic
diplomacy, ideological values and
commercial benefit.
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estudos internacionais • Belo Horizonte, ISSN 2317-773X, v. 8, n. 3, (set. 2020), p. 110-127
African political elites nd China’s government model more appealing
than that of Western liberal democracies, as well as less intrusive regar-
ding domestic issues when granting loans and making investments (BE-
SADA; O´BRIGHT, 2017).
The Chinese presence in Africa has elicited dierent reactions and
arguments from the general public, political elites, and even academi-
cians. According to Afrobarometer (2016), a survey conducted in 36 Afri-
can countries revealed that, when asked how they evaluated the Chinese
inuence in their countries, 63% of respondents rated China’s economic
and political inuence as positive. However, some view China as a new
neo-colonial power (CLINTON, 2011) that drains countries of their re-
sources and contributes to underdevelopment and deindustrialisation
(DE GRAUWE; HOUSSA; PICILLO, 2012), while preventing the world’s
most vulnerable countries from having control over strategic sectors of
their economies (ABODOHOUI; SU; DA SILVA, 2018). Other arguments
are that investing in authoritarian countries only benets corrupt politi-
cal elites and that there have been reports of Chinese rms not complying
with local labour laws (ABODOHOUI; SU; DA SILVA, 2018).
Despite this, some researchers describe the Sino-African rela-
tionship as multifaceted and mutually benecial (FANTU; CYRIL, 2010)
and view China as a partner for African development in areas such as en-
trepreneurship, education and culture, pointing to numerous benets in
terms of infrastructures, job creation, increased productivity and higher
living standards (ABODOHOUI; SU; DA SILVA, 2018), while others argue
that if these investments are only benetting the political elites and not
the general population, the blame should not fall solely on the Chinese
side but also on the shoulders of African leaders. (MLAMBO et al., 2016).
Quantifying China’s ODA to Africa is not a straightforward task.
First, as we mentioned earlier, the information on the topic is scarce and
dicult to access. Second, it is not easy to distinguish ODA from FDI in
the territory because a large part of this investment is conducted through
Chinese state-owned enterprises that “should ideally help the States to
fully play its national sovereign functions” (ABODOHOUI; SU; DA SIL-
VA, 2018, p. 131). After analysing several sources, Besada and O’Bright
(2017) suggest a value of US$75.4 billion between 2000 and 2011; on the
other hand, Mlambo et al. (2016) propose rather dierent gures (over a
very dierent period), identifying a total of US$37.7 billion in aid between
1950 and 2009. What these dierent analyses have in common is that the
amounts are always signicant, which points to a strong relationship bet-
ween China and Africa.
China also aims to promote integration in the African continent
by supporting cross-border projects and agreements with African sub-re-
gional organizations and continental nancial organizations such as the
African Development Bank. In a symbolically charged investment, China
nanced the construction of the new headquarters of the African Union.
The beginning of the 21st century saw a tremendous increase in
trade between China and the African continent. The statistics show that
the volume of trade increased by 1000% between 2001 and 2008 (MLAM-
BO et al., 2016). By 2010, it had reached US$114.18 billion, making China
17. By May 2019, China had committed
2443 personnel to United Nations
missions, 1041 of whom were deployed
to the South Sudan mission. For more
information on the Chinese blue helmets
in South Sudan, see (UNITED NATIONS
PEACEKEEPING, 2019).
In the first 10 months of 2013 alone,
Chinese companies invested more than
US$20 billion in Sudan’s oil sector and
imported 1.9 million tons of oil from
South Sudan (BESADA; O´BRIGHT,
2017).
18. For Haroz (2011), Africa has six
interests that drive its partnership with
China: infrastructural development;
direct investment; favourable loan
terms; debt relief; expanding trade
and sustaining growth rates; access
to technology and professionalised
training.
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Francisco Proença Garcia China’s economic presence in Mozambique
Africa’s largest trading partner. In 2014, this value increased to US$221.5
billion, corresponding to US$105.8 billion in imports from China and
US$115.7 billion in exports, or an increase of 75% in trade volume in only
four years (BESADA; O’BRIGHT, 2017)
Africa mainly exports natural resources, especially oil (China im-
ports about 23% of its crude oil from Africa), and imports machinery,
transport equipment and manufactured goods. However, that trade is
quite concentrated, with 60% of Chinese exports going to six countries
(South Africa, Egypt, Nigeria, Algeria, Morocco and Benin) and 70% of
Chinese imports coming from only four countries (Angola, South Africa,
Sudan, and Democratic Republic of the Congo) (RENARD, 2011). These
data conrm what we already knew: that any studies on Africa should be
mindful of the fact that Africa is not a homogeneous entity, but one that
comprises 54 countries with distinct economic, nancial, sociocultural
and religious realities and very dierent regimes and systems of govern-
ment. This means that global approaches do not reect countries’ indivi-
dual realities, often leading to unfounded generalisations.
China’s FDI in Africa seems to relate to trade and ODA, but its
value is minimal when compared to China´s total FDI. This form of in-
tervention in Africa was greatly encouraged by the Chinese government
during the last decades of the 20th century as part of an internationalisa-
tion strategy to support growth and economic reform in China.
By 1991, China’s FDI in Africa was US$1.5 million, representing
0.2% of the country’s total FDI; in 2007, it had increased to US$4.46 bil-
lion, or 5.9% of the total FDI) (RENARD, 2011). China increased its FDI
again in 2016, when it reached US$7 billion, which was still only 4.4%
of the China´s total FDI. However, in 2017 there was a drastic reversal,
mainly due to policies to contain capital outows, and the Chinese FDI
in Africa fell to US$1 billion or 0.6% of China’s total FDI (HUANG, 2018).
A signicant part of Chinese investments is made through large
state-owned enterprises that receive state subsidies or loans, whose ac-
tivities focus on natural resource exploitation and services such as the
building of infrastructures. These large companies, as well as all their
capital goods and labour, are imposed on African governments in return
for loans and grants (ILHÉU, 2010). It should be stressed that these invest-
ments are welcomed by African governments due to their positive impact
on the local economy and development but also to China’s use of “soft
power” (NYE, 1990) or even “sharp power” (NED, 2017)
19
. Moreover, Chi-
na does not impose the strict rules required by organizations such as the
European Union or the World Bank.
Currently, about 2200 Chinese companies continue to invest in the
African continent despite numerous risks and challenges (ABODOHOUI;
SU; DA SILVA, 2018).
Mozambique and China
The two countries have a longstanding relationship. The rst re-
cords of Chinese presence in Mozambique date back to the late 19th
century, when Chinese emigrants settled in the then city of Lourenço
19. The National Endowment for
Democracy’s / International Forum for
Democratic Studies coined the term in
a December 2017 report “Soft Power’to
‘Sharp Power’: Rising Authoritarian
Influence in the Democratic World”.
In the report “what we have to date
understood as authoritarian “soft
power” is better categorized as “sharp
power” that pierces, penetrates, or
perforates the political and information
environments in the targeted countries.
In the new competition that is under
way between autocratic and democratic
states, the repressive regimes’ “sharp
power” techniques should be seen as
the tip of their dagger - or indeed as
their syringe”.
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estudos internacionais • Belo Horizonte, ISSN 2317-773X, v. 8, n. 3, (set. 2020), p. 110-127
Marques. They were well received because they provided a cheap skilled
workforce (an alternative to the more expensive European workers), whi-
ch the country needed to build infrastructure such as public buildings,
railways and seaports (MEDEIROS, 2007).
This community was mainly based in Beira and Lourenço Mar-
ques. From the 1950s onwards it began to settle there with small indus-
trial manufacturing units, and the younger generations, who had atten-
ded the ocial schools, began to take on public roles and jobs in private
institutions (MEDEIROS, 2007).
The relations between the new Government installed after the 1975
Wars of Independence (particularly FRELIMO) and the People’s Republic
of China date back to the early 1960s, when China provided training to
FRELIMO guerrillas (GARCIA, 2003). After Mozambique became inde-
pendent, these relations were maintained and strengthened, with both
countries formalising their diplomatic relations and establishing techni-
cal and even nancial support and cooperation agreements. The relations
between the two countries naturally changed as the international con-
text evolved. While the bond between them was essentially ideological in
the past, today, more than forty years after Mozambique’s independence,
it is mainly economic. Chris Alden and Sérgio Chichava (eds.) provide a
detailed account of this evolution in the book China and Mozambique:
From comrades to capitalists (CHICHAVA; ALDEN, 2014).
Paula Roque and Chris Alden (2014) describe the relations between
the two countries as prudent and committed but also collaborative. The-
se characteristics also describe the relationship between China and other
African countries. The authors argue that Mozambique is still under
strong inuence by the Bretton Woods Institutions, international donors,
western NGOs and local civil society. Furthermore, the activities of the
Mozambique Liberation Front (FRELIMO) greatly inuence and limit
the economic policies of the Mozambican government, and the authors
add that more than 50% of the Mozambican state budget comes from
foreign nancial aid (ROQUE; ALDEN, 2014).
Mozambique is one of the poorest countries in the world. Accord-
ing to data from the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP),
it was ranked 180th in the Human Development Index in 2018, which
means it has very low scores in socioeconomic indicators. More than
62.9% of the population lives on less than US$2 a day (UNITED NA-
TIONS DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME, 2018).
In the rst decade of the 21st century, Mozambique had an aver-
age growth of 8% per year, mainly due to the funding of megaprojects
and international assistance. From 2006 onwards the country’s econom-
ic growth was sustained by signicant investments in coal mining, the
agricultural industry, construction sector services and in other indus-
tries(ROQUE 2009).
The World Bank has stated that the country is currently recovering
from the recent episode of macroeconomic volatility and is having trou-
ble achieving economic growth. After the remarkable growth of the last
decade, the growth rate fell to 3.8% (less than half) in 2016. In 2017 there
was another slight decrease to 3.7%, and in 2018 the growth rate was a
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Francisco Proença Garcia China’s economic presence in Mozambique
mere 3.3%, with the economy still struggling to cope with the downturn
that followed the debt crisis of 2016 (WORLD BANK, 2018).
The economy has slowed down due to a series of shocks, which in-
cluded political and internal security instability, the decrease in the price
of raw materials and adverse weather conditions. Another noteworthy
factor was the “suspension of external support to the State Budget and
the Balance of Payments by cooperation partners and the suspension of
the International Monetary Fund programme for Mozambique follo-
wing the discovery of undisclosed government debt” (BANK OF MO-
ZAMBIQUE, 2016).
In addition to this weak growth, Mozambique is burdened by pu-
blic debt, which rose from 40% to 115% of the GDP between 2006 and
2015 (BRANCO, 2017), reaching 128.3% in 2016 (INTERNATIONAL
MONETARY FUND, 2008) and 111.9 % in 2017, corresponding to a public
debt of US$10.3 billion (MACAUHUB, 2018a).
In 2012, China increased its nancing by 160% compared to pre-
vious years, becoming the largest lender to Mozambique. In 2014, Mo-
zambique’s total debt to China was US$886 million (MACQUEEN, 2018).
Following the FOCAC summit of 2000, China announced the cancella-
tion of US$22 million of Mozambique’s external public debt, and cancelled
another US$52 million between 2001 and 2007, which corresponds to all
accumulated debt between 1980 and 2005 (MUIANGA; NORFOLK, 2017).
At the 2015 FOCAC summit, China announced another cancella-
tion of non-overdue interest until that year and a downward revision of
interest rates on credits to be allocated in the coming years. Despite these
relief and debt cancellation policies as a form of aid to Mozambique, in
2017 China remained Mozambique’s second largest individual creditor
20
.
According to the Report and Opinion of the Administrative Court on
the 2017 State General Account, Chinese loans totalled US$1.8 billion,
corresponding to 38.3% of Mozambique’s total debt to third States. The
document also states that, between December 2016 and December 2017,
the country’s debt to China increased by US$200 million, which did not
include the debt incurred with the construction of Xai-Xai airport. The
cost of facilities such as the Zimpeto National Stadium, the new Mavala-
ne airport, the new Presidency building, the Circular Road, the Maputo-
-Katembe bridge, and the migration of the television and radio networks
from analogue to digital were the main causes of the spike in public debt
from only US$342 million in 2012/2013 (MACAUHUB, 2018a).
Trade relations between China and Mozambique
The ties between the two countries were renewed at the beginning
of the 21st century. In 2001, an Economic and Trade Joint Committee was
established, followed by several important bilateral agreements
21
. Also
important was the founding, in 2003, of a Forum for Economic and Tra-
de Cooperation between China and Portuguese-speaking countries. The
Forum, with headquarters in Macau, was created on China’s initiative to
promote trade relations between its member countries, as well as to deve-
lop and implement common projects in various domains (ILHÉU, 2010).
20. Mozambique’s largest lender is the
International Development Association
(IDA), a World Bank organization that
has loaned the country a total of US$2.5
billion (MACAUHUB, 2018a).
21. The following agreements were
signed: 2001 – agreement on trade;
agreement on the promotion and
reciprocal protection of investments;
2002 - agreement on human
resources development, agriculture
and environmental protection; 2004 -
economic and technical cooperation
agreement for agriculture, health,
education and mining; 2007 - agreement
to strengthen bilateral trade and
economic relations for the period 2008-
2009; 2007 - protocol of cooperation on
military assistance; 2014 - cooperation
agreement between the Bank of
Mozambique and the People’s Bank
of China. For more on this topic see:
Macqueen (2018).
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estudos internacionais • Belo Horizonte, ISSN 2317-773X, v. 8, n. 3, (set. 2020), p. 110-127
The economic involvement between the two countries is reected
in increased trade ties. According to data from the Statistical Yearbook
(INE, 2018), China is the fth largest market for Mozambican exports. In
2017, exports from Mozambique to China reached US$252,608 million,
corresponding to 5.35% of all exports, and the economic growth rate
was 3.7% per year. In the fourth quarter of 2018 alone, these exports to-
talled US$164,544 million, corresponding to 12.29% of total exports, and
the main exports were timber, natural sands, titanium ores, and seeds
(INE, 2018). In 2011, the export volume reached US$167,692 million, or
4.7% of all exports.
Meanwhile, in 2017, imports totalled US$493,355 million, or
8.59% of the total. In the fourth quarter of 2018, the import volume was
US$187,837 million, or 10.22% of the total, and the main imports were pe-
troleum oil, tyres and vehicles (INE, 2019). As we mentioned earlier, this
value amounted to US$374,659 million in 2011, or 5.9% of total imports
(INE, 2012).
The specic case of timber exports is worth examining more close-
ly. Mozambique is one of the largest exporters of timber to China and
China “is the destination for approximately 93 per cent of all Mozam-
bique’s timber exports” (MACQUEEN, 2018, p. 8). About 50% of this
wood is illegally exported
22
. Illegal logging has been widely discussed and
studied due to concerns over its impact on the environment and on the
sustainable development of the forest and its populations (MACQUEEN,
2018; MUIANGA; NORFOLK, 2017; ROQUE; ALDEN, 2012).
Cooperation and Ocial Development Assistance in Mozambique
Estimating the Chinese ODA to Mozambique is not an easy task
due to the reasons already mentioned in this study – it is dicult to dis-
tinguish ODA from what is in fact FDI. For example, in 1997-1998, the Ex-
port-Import Bank of China (ExIm Bank)
23
created a fund of US$20 million
to encourage Chinese companies to do business in Mozambique “(…) and
to build a new embassy and a commerce centre administered by the Eco-
nomic and Commercial Counsellor’s Oce in downtown Maputo (…)”
(ROQUE; ALDEN, 2012, p 14).
With the end of the Civil War in Mozambique, China’s aid in-
creased. This nancing helped build the new Parliament, the Ministry
of Foreign Aairs, the Joaquim Chissano Conference Centre, as well as
to build military housing for soldiers. The aid also came in the form of
donated military equipment and training (ROQUE; ALDEN, 2012).
China and Mozambique have bilateral cooperation agreements in
areas such as health, education, agriculture, infrastructure, and securi-
ty and defence. This support consists of grants, technical assistance, and
interest-free or low-interest loans (CHICHAVA, 2012). The list provided
here is not comprehensive and includes only those which we considered
to be the most signicant.
The Umbeluzi Agricultural Institute, the rst pilot project for agri-
cultural technology cooperation, was established in the wake of FOCAC
2006. That same year, a soft loan of US$50 million was granted to build
22. A 2012 report by the Environmental
Investigation Agency states that
“Chinese customs statistics show the
import of 230.000 cubic meters of logs
from Mozambique in 2011; conversely,
Mozambique’s data shows just 36.000
cubic meters of logs being shipped
to China that year. This indicates
widespread mis-declaration at the
point of export, with containers of
logs banned from export being falsely
described as sawn timber” (EIA, 2012)
23. The ExIm Bank requires that the
buildings for which the loans are
intended be built by Chinese companies.
119
Francisco Proença Garcia China’s economic presence in Mozambique
three processing plants and to import agricultural machinery and tech-
nology (EKMAN, 2012).
This bilateral cooperation was further strengthened with President
Hu Jintao’s visit to Mozambique in 2007. President Hu Jintao pledged an
additional US$170 million in loans and cooperation in the areas of agricul-
ture, technology, education, health, the economy, and natural resource
exploration. During the visit, China granted Mozambique a concessional
loan of about US$40 million for the construction of three buildings for
the Attorney General’s Oce and a concessional loan of US$15.4 million
to build a national stadium in Maputo with the capacity to hold 42 thou-
sand people (CORREIA, 2010).
That same year, an agreement was signed with the Eduardo
Mondlane University to conduct research on rural development and ag-
riculture (ROQUE; ALDEN, 2012). China also contributes to the tour-
ism sector by listing Mozambique as a tourist destination for Chinese
citizens. Mozambique is one of the African countries classied as a “rec-
ommended” destination for Chinese tourists. The Chinese Government
also increased the number of Mozambican duty-free products from 190
to 442 (CORREIA, 2010). In terms of military cooperation, a military
assistance protocol was signed between the Armed Forces General Stas
of both countries and the Chinese Government also granted US$1.5 mil-
lion to refurbish several departments of the Mozambican armed forces
(ROQUE; ALDEN, 2012).
In 2008, both countries signed a Cooperation Agreement on Scien-
tic and Technological Innovation. The agreement had three main goals:
to increase agricultural research activities by nancing the Centre for
Agricultural Research and Technology Transfer in the district of Boane
and the Moamba Technological Park; to create a health science centre
for research in infectious diseases; and to train Mozambican sta in Mas-
ters and PhD programmes in China (CORREIA, 2010). That same year,
a group of about 100 Chinese experts, which included a team from the
Hunan Hybrid Rice Institute, arrived in Mozambique to support the irri-
gation channel network project (MACAUHUB, 2008).
Sérgio Chichava (2010) lists several grants to Mozambique between
2007 and 2012. China provided assistance to ood victims (US$400 thou-
sand) and funded the construction of four schools in Maputo, Gaza, Nam-
pula and Niassa (about US$3 million) and a Centre for the Prevention and
Treatment of Malaria in Maputo. This centre, and the centre in Boane
mentioned above, were part of a list of Chinese promises to African coun-
tries at FOCAC 2006. Earlier 2019, China announced that it had granted
36 scholarships for rst degree students and 5 scholarships for Master’s
students in the 2019/2020 school year (MACAUHUB, 2019).
China’s FDI in Mozambique
In 1999, the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Co-
operation invested US$12 million to establish the CentreforInvestment Pro-
motion Development and TradeofChina (CPIDCC) in Maputo, one of eleven in-
vestment promotion centres set up in Africa by the Chinese government.
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estudos internacionais • Belo Horizonte, ISSN 2317-773X, v. 8, n. 3, (set. 2020), p. 110-127
The centre works with the CPI to facilitate Chinese investment in Mo-
zambique (HON et al., 2010).
According to a report by the Centre for Chinese Studies of the
Stellenbosch University, data from the CPI shows that between 1990 (the
year China started investing in Mozambique) and 2007, China’s FDI in
Mozambique was US$148 million, of which US$69 million were invested
after 2003 (HON et al., 2010). The following year (2008), China invested
US$76.8 million in the territory, becoming the second largest investor af-
ter South Africa (HON et al., 2010).
During the rst decade of the 21st century, 80% of China’s FDI in
Mozambique went to four investment projects, three in the industrial
sector and one in the aquaculture and sheries sector
24
However, despite
these signicant gures, during the rst decade of the century the Chi-
nese investment in Mozambique represented only 2% of the total FDI,
which amounted to US$10.6 billion (CHICHAVA, 2010).
Until 2012, much of China’s investment was concentrated in the
manufacturing sector (77%), followed by aquaculture and sheries (12%)
and agriculture, agroindustry and construction (4%) (CHICHAVA, 2010).
The projects funded by these investments were mainly based in Maputo.
Today, the Chinese FDI in Mozambique focuses on building infrastruc-
ture and on the forestry, agriculture and mining sectors.
This investment in infrastructure has helped to build several
government buildings and renew the road network. There are several
Chinese construction companies which regularly outbid other foreign
companies in the international tenders issued by the Government or
the World Bank (ROQUE; ALDEN, 2012). Thanks to their competi-
tive prices, Chinese companies are responsible for carrying out more
than one third of the country’s road construction and are involved in
the rehabilitation of urban water supply systems in Maputo, Beira and
Quelimane. This state of aairs has been widely protested by compa-
nies with Mozambican capital, who complain of unfair competition
(NIELSEN, 2012). Moreover, there have been numerous reports of la-
bour disputes in Chinese companies (BUNKENBORG, 2012; FEIJÓ,
2012; WETHAL, 2017).
In 2006, the Mozambican government loaned US$2.3 billion from
the ExIm Bank to build the Mphanda Nkuwa Dam on the Zambezi Riv-
er, US$300 million to build the Moamba-Major Dam, US$100 million
to build three sports stadiums (CORREIA, 2010), and took out another
smaller loan to refurbish the capital’s airport (ALVES, 2005).
During Prime Minister Aires de Aly’s visit to China in 2010, the
Chinese government declared its intention to fund several projects in
Mozambique, for a total of about US$172 million in the form of grants,
interest-free loans and low-interest loans (CHICHAVA, 2010). Later, in
August 2011, during Mozambican President Armando Guebuza’s visit to
China, an agreement on nancial cooperation was signed with the Chi-
na Development Bank (CBD). The agreement aimed to introduce trade
credits for the private sector in Mozambique, as well as to fund public
investment, which implied greater involvement of the CBD in the Mo-
zambican nancial sector (ROQUE; ALDEN, 2012).
24. The four investment projects are: an
Africa Great Wall Cement Manufacturer
plant in Marracuene; a CIF MOZ cement
factory in Matutuine; the Hong &
Binga Development Fishery Company,
which operates in industrial fishing
and shipbuilding, among other areas;
and the Henan Haode Mozambique
Industrial Park, which aims to develop
a textile and clothing industry in
Marracuene district.
121
Francisco Proença Garcia China’s economic presence in Mozambique
In 2011, the Mozambican government compiled a list of projects
to be developed in cooperation with the People’s Republic of China. Of
these, twenty were deemed priorities in alleviating the infrastructure
decit (valued at US$1.398.2 million). The list was submitted to the Chi-
nese government for consideration, and the approved projects were fund-
ed through concessional loans from the ExIm Bank. More than 60% of
these projects are in the infrastructure sector (refurbishment and mod-
ernisation of the Maputo International Airport; construction of 900Km of
power lines; construction of the new building of the Council of Ministers;
construction of housing for ocers of the State’s Intelligence and Security
Services; construction of sports infrastructures, etc.) (CHICHAVA, 2010).
As part of this investment, in 2012 the ExIm Bank began nancing the cir-
cular road project in Maputo (US$400 million) and the Maputo-Katembe
Bridge (US$1.1 billion), which was inaugurated in June 2018.
With millions of hectares of arable land (36 million), 19 million hec-
tares of productive forest land and a vast river network, Mozambique has
a remarkable agricultural potential. This potential has attracted Chinese
FDI, which focused on logging projects in the rst decade of the 21st cen-
tury. During this period, four of the eight projects approved by the CPI
were in logging and timber trade and two were in the food production
sector. This investment represented only 4% of the total Chinese invest-
ment for the same period (CHICHAVA, 2010).
Of over 700 forestry companies operating in Mozambique, more than
200 have Chinese capital, and of the 289 forest concessions we identied,
60 have been awarded to Chinese investors (CHICHAVA, 2010). To address
the lack of standardised practices among these companies and concessions
and encourage sustainable investment, the Chinese government issued a
document titled “Guidelines for Sustainable Trade and Investment for For-
est Products for Chinese Overseas Enterprises” (MACQUEEN, 2018).
In 2009, as part of its eort to support agricultural investment in
the Zambezia Province, the ExIm Bank granted a loan of US$50 million
to the Cabinet Planning for the Development of Zambezi Valley for agri-
cultural projects in the valley. The funds were used to purchase agricul-
tural machinery (US$20 million) and in industrial units in Tete, Zambeze
and Manica (US$30 million) (ILHÉU, 2010).
FDI in Mozambique has focused on these mega projects. In the mi-
ning sector, Brazil and India have made signicant investments in the
Moatize Coal mines, while the heavy sands mines in Moma (Angoche)
are largely funded by Korean money. However, China did not invest hea-
vily in mining during the rst decade of the century, with only a few
private mining companies operating in the gold mining and trading sec-
tor. It was only in 2012 that Chinese companies began to show interest
in the coal industry in Tete, with the China Kingho group and WISCO
committing to initial investments of US$5 billion and US$800 million,
respectively (CHINA DAILY, 2010). The China Kingho Group has also
shown interest in research and exploration of oil, natural gas and other
mineral resources (ILHÉU, 2010).
The latest statistics issued by the Industrial and Commercial Bank
of China show that 70% of Chinese FDI in Mozambique is allocated to
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estudos internacionais • Belo Horizonte, ISSN 2317-773X, v. 8, n. 3, (set. 2020), p. 110-127
natural resources, including gas and oil (AFRICAN DAILY VOICE, 2019).
In 2010, the Daqing Oileld Drilling Engineering Company won an in-
ternational tender to drill for natural gas in Mozambique (MACAUHUB,
2010). Finally, the Africa Great Wall Cement Manufacturer was granted
a license to mine for limestone and heavy mineral sands in the Angoche
district (CHICHAVA, 2010).
These recent investments in the mining, oil and gas sectors constitu-
te a signicant change in the patterns of Chinese FDI in Mozambique, whi-
ch has not only increased but also become more geographically disperse.
In 2014, Chinese FDI had a signicant impact on the industrial sec-
tor with the inauguration of a car assembly plant in Maluana by Matched-
je car, a company valued at US$50 million. The company eventually went
bankrupt in 2018.
The Chinese FDI in Mozambique has grown noticeably, and there
are over 100 Chinese companies operating in a variety of areas, such as
energy, agriculture, sheries, real estate, construction materials, tourism,
transport, telecommunications, infrastructure and trade. According to
data from the Chinese Embassy in Maputo, the accumulated Chinese
FDI in the territory was already approaching US$6 billion by March 2017
(MACAUHUB, 2017a) and would reach US$173 million in the rst half of
2017 (APIEX, 2017).
In 2018, the total FDI in Mozambique was US$2.3 billion, which
marked a sharp decrease (26%) when compared to 2017. This indicator
has been declining since 2013, when FDI in the country reached US$6.175
billion. However, projects in the oil, natural gas and coal exploration sec-
tors are beginning to attract Chinese investors and this indicator is expec-
ted to recover in the medium to long term (UNCTAD, 2018).
Despite this sharp downturn in foreign investment, China conti-
nues to invest in the territory. Holding 20% of the South Coral explora-
tion project, the China National Petroleum Company is the second largest
shareholder in the natural gas sector. This project has received US$4.8
billion in funding from several organizations, including the ExIm Bank
(MACAUHUB, 2017b). The Chinese ambassador in Maputo, JSu Jian, rei-
terated China’s intentions to continue investing and recalled that there
are several other projects in a list compiled by the Mozambican gover-
nment in a memorandum of understanding signed in 2017. This memo-
randum covers several priority areas (industrial parks, roads, agriculture,
exploration of natural and energy resources and ports) (MACAUHUB,
2018b).
The China Railways International Group is also expected to nish
building a cabotage port in Chongoene and railway links to the Limpopo
Corridor in Macarretane, as well as extensions to important projects such
as the Chibuto heavy sands exploration project in Gaza and the Janga-
mo project in Inhambane, which are valued at about US$3 billion (MA-
CAUHUB, 2018c). The company will also build the new Save River Bridge
in Inhambane province, which represents an investment of about US$100
million (MACAUHUB, 2018d). Mozambique is currently negotiating -
nancing to build a vocational and technical training institute in Gorongo-
sa (MACAUHUB, 2018e). In 2016, at the Beijing Business Forum, the Mo-
123
Francisco Proença Garcia China’s economic presence in Mozambique
zambican president challenged Chinese entrepreneurs to invest in four pi-
votal areas: agriculture, energy, tourism and infrastructure (NYUSI, 2016).
On 2nd September 2018, on the eve of the seventh FOCAC Sum-
mit, the President of the Republic of Mozambique, Filipe Nyusi opened a
business forum in Beijing, during which Mozambique and China signed
eight memorandums of understanding on infrastructure, industry, tele-
communications, agriculture and nancial services
25
.
In a clear demonstration of mutual interest in cementing the rela-
tions between the two countries, Filipe Nyusi, attended the One Belt One
Road Conference hosted by Beijing on 25
th
and 26
th
April 2019. On this oc-
casion, Nyusi assured the Chinese President that he was personally inves-
ted in the success of the initiative and highlighted the need to exchange
experiences on governance (DIÁRIO DE NOTÍCIAS, 2019).
Conclusion
China has made use of dierent instruments of power, such as mili-
tary power projection and the FOCAC, to defend its interests in Africa. In
order to achieve its goals, China has strengthened its diplomatic ties, expo-
nentially increased its trade volume, provided ODA and facilitated coope-
ration, and focused its investments in the exploration of natural resources.
However, the Chinese presence is not evenly distributed across the
continent. Africa is an entity that represents multiple countries, therefo-
re, global approaches do not reect countries’ individual realities, which
often leads to unfounded generalisations. For example, China maintains
trade relations with only half a dozen countries, and the Chinese FDI for
the entire continent, albeit very signicant (US$7 billion), represents only
4.4% of the total Chinese FDI in 2016.
Much of China’s ODA and FDI is channelled through large state-ow-
ned enterprises, which are imposed on African governments with all their
capital goods and labour in return for loans and grants. It should be stres-
sed that China’s use of “soft power”, or even “sharp power”, is welcomed
by African governments, mainly due to its impact on the economy and
local development, but also because China does not impose the strict rules
required by organizations such as the European Union or the World Bank.
Based on this analysis, we can conclude that, today, the relations
between China and Africa are multifaceted and mutually benecial. On
the one hand, in terms of socioeconomic development, African countries
greatly benet from a strong and growing Chinese presence. On the
other, China needs Africa’s markets, resources and political and diploma-
tic support.
Mozambique, one of the countries with the lowest socioeconomic
indicators in Africa, is currently coping with a strong debt burden and an
economic downturn. By 2017, China had invested an accumulated value
of over US$6 billion in the territory, becoming one of the country’s main
economic partners and its second largest individual lender.
Mozambique currently views the longstanding relations between
the two territories as cautious but both countries have committed to
strengthening their bilateral economic cooperation ties.
25. On 2
nd
September 2018, the
portuguese newspaper Expresso
reported that “In the infrastructure
sector, memoranda were signed for
the construction of a road between
Niassa province, in the far northwest
of the country, and Tanzania, and
for the repair of National Road
Number Six, linking the city of Beira,
in Sofala, to the border village of
Machipanda in Manica province.
Another memorandum between the
National Road Administration of
Mozambique and the China Road
and Bridge Corporation includes the
construction of a road section between
Pambara, in Vilanculos district, and
Mangungumete, in Inhassoro district,
in the southern province of Inhambane.
Another document outlines the
construction of an integrated transport
system between the Limpopo Valley
and the Chongoene port in southern
Gaza province. Industrial parks in
Boane and Marracuene, in the Maputo
province, are part of the memorandum
signed between the Mozambican
Ministry of Industry and Trade and the
China Civil Engineering Construction
group. The Ministry of Agriculture
and Food Security of Mozambique
signed a memorandum with the China
Railway 20 Bureau Group Corporation
and the Northwest University. In the
telecommunication’s technology sector,
Chinese company Huawei signed
a memorandum of understanding
with Mozambique Mobile, while in
the financial area Mozambican bank
Millennium Bim signed a memorandum
with UnionPay, a leading Chinese
electronic payment systems company.”
(EXPRESSO, 2018).
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estudos internacionais • Belo Horizonte, ISSN 2317-773X, v. 8, n. 3, (set. 2020), p. 110-127
These economic and trade links have gained new momentum in
the current century. China is now the fth largest market for Mozam-
bican exports, and in 2017 it was the largest (legal and illegal) export
market for Mozambican timber. That same year, China was also the
country’s third largest importer, with a share of about 9% of all Mozam-
bican imports.
With the end of the Mozambican Civil War, China increased its
ODA to Mozambique and signed cooperation agreements in areas such
as health, agriculture, infrastructure, and security and defence. This
assistance consists of grants, technical training (civilian and military),
interest-free or low-interest loans and signicant funding for public in-
frastructures. China also provides funding for science and technology
through scholarships and research and technology transfer centres, parti-
cularly in the agriculture and health sectors.
Chinese investment in the country dates back to the 1990s and has
been growing exponentially since. A large part of this investment is chan-
nelled through large state-owned enterprises, which mainly focus on
manufacturing, natural resource exploration (minerals, agriculture and
forest resources) and services such as facilities construction. The Mozam-
bique government has made several investment requests to the Chinese
state, which are compiled in a list of projects that have been submitted for
consideration (totalling over €1 billion).
Despite the sharp decline in FDI since 2017, China continues to in-
vest in Mozambique. However, the investment trend shows a transition
from the industrial and agricultural sectors to the mineral resources and
natural gas sector, signicantly changing the geographical distribution of
Chinese investments, which are moving from the south of the country to
the centre and north of the territory, with all the socioeconomic and even
security implications this entails.
The preceding study of China’s economic involvement in Mo-
zambique provides a set of data and framework of analysis that may as-
sist in understandinghow China gains and projectspower in other re-
source-richAfrican countries with similar political regimes, as in the case
of Angola. That said, this study is essentially focused on economic rela-
tions. And, of course, not all power is merely economic. What is now
required is a more comprehensive analysis of the nature and dynamic
ofpolitico-diplomatic relations, and the role of economic ties therein, be-
tween African states and China.
In conclusion, today, the Chinese presence in Mozambique is the
result of a multifaceted and mutually benecial economic relationship.
Mozambique benets from Chinese trade, investment and ODA, which
have an important impact not only on its socioeconomic growth and
development but also on making the country less dependent on tradi-
tional donors, whereas China draws important diplomatic and economic
benets from its relationship with a country rich in natural resources.
Furthermore, Mozambique holds an important geostrategic position and
exerts a powerful inuence throughout the entire east Africa region, con-
trolling not only the Mozambique Channel but also all points of entry
into the countries of the Southern Hinterland.
125
Francisco Proença Garcia China’s economic presence in Mozambique
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