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estudos internacionais

REVISTA DE RELAÇÕES INTERNACIONAIS

Poncia Universidade

Católica de Minas Gerais

Programa de Pós-Graduação

em Relações Internacionais

Belo Horizonte

ISSN: 2317-773X

v. 8 n. 2

junho 2020

estudos internacionais

REVISTA DE RELAÇÕES INTERNACIONAIS

Conselho Executivo

Prof. Javier Alberto Vadell

Prof. Leonardo César Ramos

Estagiários

Ana Rachel Simões Fortes

Fabiana Freitas Sander

Juliana de Faria Campos

Victor de Matos Nascimento

Conselho Editorial

Adam David Morton (University of Sidney)

Andrés Malamud (Instituto de Ciências Sociais– Universidade de Lisboa)

Antonio Carlos Lessa (Universidade de Brasília UNB)

Atílio Borón (Universidade de Buenos Aires - Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Cientícas y Técnicas)

Carlos Escudé (Centro de Estudios Macroeconómicos de Argentina - Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones

Cientícas y Técnicas)

Carlos Milani (Universidade do Estado do Rio de Janeiro)

Carlos S. Arturi (Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul)

Gladys Lechini (Universidade Nacional de Rosário - Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Cientícas y Técnicas)

Henrique Altemani (Universidade Estadual da Paraíba)

Ian Taylor (University of St Andrews)

Jens Bartelson (Lund University)

João Pontes Nogueira (Pontifícia Universidade Católica do Rio de Janeiro)

José Flávio Sombra Saraiva (Universidade de Brasília)

José Luis León-Manríquez (Universidade Autónoma Metropolitana Xochimilco)

Letícia Pinheiro (Universidade do Estado do Rio de Janeiro)

Luis Fernando Ayerbe (Universidade Estadual Paulista)

Marco Aurélio Chaves Cepik (Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul)

Marcos Costa Lima (Universidade Federal de Pernambuco)

Maria Regina Soares de Lima (Universidade do Estado do Rio de Janeiro)

Matt Ferchen (Tsinghua University)

Miriam Gomes Saraiva (Universidade do Estado do Rio de Janeiro)

Monica Hirst (Universidad Di Tella–Universidad de Quilmes)

Paulo Luiz Moreaux Lavigne Esteves (Pontifícia Universidade Católica do Rio de Janeiro)

Paulo Fagundes Vizentini (Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul)

Rafael Villa (Universidade de São Paulo)

R. Evan Ellis (Center for Strategic and International Studies)

Reginaldo Carmello Corrêa de Moraes (Universidade Estadual de Campinas)

Renato Boschi (Universidade do Estado do Rio de Janeiro)

Sean Burges (Australian National University)

Shiguenoli Myamoto (Universidade Estadual de Campinas – San Tiago Dantas)

Tullo Vigevani (Universidade Estadual Paulista)

Apoio

Departamento de Relações Internacionais da Pontifícia Universidade Católica de Minas Gerais (PUC-Minas)

Chefe do Departamento: Chyara Salles Pereira

Estudos Internacionais a partir de 2020 ........................................................ 7

Javier Vadell

Leonardo Ramos

International development cooperation as one of

the triggers for the process of public policy transfer ................................. 8

A cooperação internacional para o desenvolvimento enquanto

gatilho no processo de transferência de políticas públicas

La cooperación internacional como gatillante para la

transferencia de políticas públicas

Cecilia Osorio Gonnet

Maria Clara Oliveira

José Miguel Vergara

¿Aumenta la participación en operaciones de

paz la capacidad de las fuerzas armadas en

interactuar con actores civiles? Una evaluación

del aprendizaje en el caso de las Fuerzas Armadas chilenas ................. 27

Does the participation in peacekeeping increase the capacity

of the armed forces to interact with civilian actors? An

evaluation of learning in the case of the Chilean Armed Forces

A participação em operações de paz aumenta a capacidade

das Forças Armadas de interagir com atores civis? Avaliação

do aprendizado para o caso das Forças Armadas chilenas

Nicole Jenne

Italy: an aspiring mediterranean middle power

wavering between bilateralism and multilateralism .................................. 47

Itália: uma potente potência média mediterrânea oscilando

entre bilateralismo e multilateralismo

Italia: una aspirante a potencia media mediterránea oscilante

entre bilateralismo y multilateralismo

Anna Molnár

Lili Takács

Foreign investor´s rights, investment promotion

and facilitation agencies: a developmental and sustainable visión ....... 70

Direitos de investidores estrangeiros, agências de facilitação

de investimentos: uma visão desenvolvista e sustentável

Derechos de los inversores extranjeros, promoción de

inversiones y agencias de facilitación: una nueva visión

desarrollista y sostenible

Leonardo E. Stanley

El Pragmatismo en la CSS de China: integración

del genio histórico y elementos modernos .................................................. 86

China’s Pragmatism in the South-South Cooperation:

integration of the historical gene and modern elements

O pragmatismo da China na Cooperação Sul-Sul: integração

do gene histórico e dos elementos modernos

Fang Yuan

The Facilitating role of sport in foreign relations of the US and Iran ..... 103

O papel de facilitador do esporte nas relações externas dos

EUA e do Irã

El papel del facilitador deportivo en las relaciones exteriores

de EE. UU. E Irán

Amir Hosein Monazzami

Mahdi Shariati Feizabadi

Errata ...................................................................................................................120

Javier Vadell e Leonardo Ramos Estudos Internacionais a parr de 2020

Estudos Internacionais a partir de 2020

Javier Vadell

Leonardo Ramos

Conselho Executivo – Estudos Internacionais

No início de 2013 o Departamento de Relações Internacionais da

PUC Minas se propôs um novo desao: a criação de um novo periódico

de Relações Internacionais que zesse jus às características do próprio

Departamento: plural, multidisciplinar, inovador e atento às necessidades

da academia e da sociedade brasileira. Assim, em um contexto caracte-

rizado pelo crescimento consistente da área de Relações Internacionais

no Brasil, bem como pela necessidade de ampliação da produção de co-

nhecimento e de pesquisas nessa área (Sombra Saraiva, 2013), foi criada

Estudos Internacionais: Revista de Relações Internacionais da PUC Minas,

uma publicação destinada à investigação, o estudo e a promoção do deba-

te sobre as grandes questões internacionais nas suas várias manifestações

– política, econômica, cultural e societária (Vadell, 2013).

Desde então, as repercussões têm sido signicativamente animado-

ras: Estudos Internacionais tem se rmado na comunidade cientíca na-

cional e internacional de Relações Internacionais e da Economia Política

Internacional. A título de exemplo, nos últimos 2 anos foram submetidos

quase 200 artigos pelo sistema da revista, atestando um grande e cons-

tante uxo de submissões de artigos que trazem temas e reexões signi-

cativamente relevantes para a grande área dos Estudos Internacionais.

Isso nos leva, neste momento, a dar um novo passo em busca de melhor

atender aos nossos leitores e autores: a partir deste ano de 2020, Estudos

Internacionais será editada trimestralmente. Com isso, nosso objetivo é

aumentar o número de artigos publicados por ano bem como disponibi-

lizar de forma mais célere contribuições relevantes para o debate teórico

e empírico das Relações Internacionais.

Em tempos desaadores como os atuais, acreditamos que essas

mudanças serão bem recebidas pelos colegas, uma vez que pretendemos

com isso dar mais um passo na promoção e divulgação do conhecimento

cientíco de qualidade na área de Relações Internacionais. Agradecemos

neste sentido o apoio da PUC Minas, em geral, e ao Departamento de

Relações Internacionais, ao Programa de Pós-Graduação em Relações In-

ternacionais e à Biblioteca da PUC Minas, em particular. Isso inclui cole-

gas professores e professoras, funcionários e funcionárias e estagiários e

estagiárias que, de uma ou outra maneira, estiveram e estão envolvidos e

envolvidas neste ambicioso e estimulante projeto acadêmico.

SOMBRA SARAIVA, J. F. Estudos Internacionais.Estudos Internacionais: revista de relações

internacionais da PUC Minas, v. 1, n. 1, 29 abr. 2013.

VADELL, J. A. Porque uma nova revista de Relações Internacionais?.Estudos Internacionais:

revista de relações internacionais da PUC Minas, v. 1, n. 1, 29 abr. 2013.

estudos internacionais • Belo Horizonte, ISSN 2317-773X, v. 8, n. 2, (jun. 2020), p. 8 - 26

International development cooperation as

one of the triggers for the process of public

policy transfer

A cooperação internacional para o desenvolvimento

enquanto gatilho no processo de transferência de políticas

públicas

La cooperación internacional como gatillante para la

transferencia de políticas públicas

Cecilia Osorio Gonnet

Maria Clara Oliveira

José Miguel Vergara

DOI: 10.5752/P.2317-773X.2020v8.n2.p8

Recebido em: 02 de setembro de 2019

Aceito em: 17 de novembro de 2019

A

On the one hand, transfer is a process by which governments intentionally use

ideas about how policies in other countries work to design or redesign their own

public policies (Dussauge, 2012). On the other hand, cooperation is a process

that recognizes the existence of an interdependence between states and the

international arena. This article aims to discuss and clarify the relation between

international cooperation and policy transfer. Drawing on the analysis of devel-

opment cooperation in Brazil and Chile, we discuss how technical cooperation

agreements between these countries and third parties, encourage the transfer of

public policies, in particular of those considered as models in the area of social

policy, namely Bolsa Família and Chile Solidario. This article demonstrates that

international development cooperation facilitates the existence of processes that

allow for the transfer of specic components of social policies to other con-

texts. The analysis is based on a literature review and on information gathered

through interviews conducted with relevant actors.

Keywords: Transfer. Cooperation. Cash transfers. Brazil. Chile.

R

Por um lado, a transferência de políticas é um processo no qual os governos

utilizam intencionalmente informação sobre políticas de outros países para de-

senhar ou redesenhar as suas próprias iniciativas (Dussauge, 2012). Por outro, a

cooperação é um processo que reconhece a existência de interdependência entre

os estados e a arena internacional. Este artigo visa discutir e aclarar a relação

1. This article is a product of the

Research Project “Proyecto Fondecyt

Iniciación Nº 11160363 «¿Cómo viajan

las ideas? La tecnocracia chilena como

agente de transferencia de programas

sociales a Guatemala y Paraguay». Main

Researcher: First Author. This article is

also a partial result of the Research Pro-

ject “Governança multinível em políticas

sociais nacionalmente estruturadas: o

caso da assistência social”, coordinated

by Dr.Renata Bichir and developed

within Centro de Estudos da Metrópole

(Centro de Pesquisa, Inovação e Difusão

and Fundação de Amparo à Pesquisa

do Estado de São Paulo) (CEM/CEPID/

Fapesp). This project is funded by

Fapesp (process no. 2013/07616-7). A

preliminary version of this article was

presented at the International Conferen-

ce on Policy Diffusion and Development

Cooperation, May 16th-19th, 2018 Sao

Paulo-Brazil.

2. Cecilia Osorio Gonnet is Assistant

Professor in the Politics and Government

Department at the Universidad Alberto

Hurtado in Chile. She has a PhD in

Political and Social Sciences from the

Universitat Pompeu Fabra. Her areas

of research and teaching are public

policies, social policies, policy diffusion

and knowledge, ideas and actors. Her

main books are “Latin America and

Policy Diffusion” (Routledge, 2020),with

Porto de Oliveira, O. Montero and C.

Kerches and Osorio, Cecilia (2018) “Le-

arning or emulating: how social policies

are disseminated in Latin America”.

Editorial LOM, Santiago. https://orcid.

org/0000-0002-5515-2373

3. Maria Clara Oliveira holds a PhD in

Political Science (University of Sao Pau-

lo, Brazil). She holds a Researcher posi-

tion at Instituto de Direito Económico,

Financeiro e Fiscal (IDEFF, Portugal) and

was previously a Junior Researcher at

Centro de Estudos da Metrópole (CEM,

Brazil). Her interests include social

policy, cash transfers, public policy, and

policy diffusion and transfer. ORCID ID:

https://orcid.org/0000-0003-3045-6300

Cecilia Osorio Gonnet, Maria Clara Oliveira e José Miguel Vergara Internaonal development cooperaon as one of the triggers for the process of public policy transfer

entre cooperação internacional e transferência de políticas públicas. A partir de

uma análise da cooperação para o desenvolvimento promovida pelo Brazil e

pelo Chile, debatemos como os acordos de cooperação técnica assinados entre

estes dois países e terceiros contribuem para a transferência de políticas públicas,

em particular daquelas que são tidas como modelos na área de política social,

tais como o Bolsa Família e o Chile Solidario. Este artigo demonstra que a co-

operação internacional para o desenvolvimento facilita a existência de processos

que permitem a transferência de componentes especícos de políticas públicas

para outros contextos. A análise baseia-se na revisão de literatura e em infor-

mação recolhida por meio de entrevistas conduzidas com atores relevantes.

Palavras Chave: Transferência. Cooperação. Programas de Transferência Mon-

etárias Condicionada. Brasil. Chile.

R

Las transferencias de políticas son, por un lado, un proceso por el cual los

gobiernos utilizan intencionalmente información sobre políticas de otros países

para diseñar o rediseñar sus propias iniciativas (Dussauge, 2012). Por otro lado,

la cooperación es un proceso que reconoce la existencia de interdependencia

entre los Estados en la arena internacional. Este artículo tiene como objetivo

discutir y aclarar la relación entre la cooperación internacional y la transfer-

encia de políticas públicas. A partir de un análisis de la cooperación para el

desarrollo promovida por Brasil y por Chile, debatiremos como los acuerdos de

cooperación técnica rmados entre estos dos países y terceros contribuyen para

la transferencia de políticas públicas, en particular de aquellas que son tomadas

como modelos en el área de las políticas sociales, tales como “Bolsa Familia”

y el programa “Chile Solidario”. Este articulo demuestra que la cooperación

internacional para el desarrollo facilita la existencia de procesos que permiten la

transferencia de componentes especícos de políticas públicas para otros contex-

tos. El análisis está basado en la revisión de literatura e información recopilada

por medio de entrevistas a actores relevantes.

Palabras clave:

Transferencia. Cooperación Internacional. Programas de Transferencia Condi-

cionada. Brasil. Chile.

Introduction

This paper aims to discuss the relation between international coop-

eration and policy transfer in the context of a policy diusion process. On

the one hand, transfer is understood as a process by which governments

intentionally use ideas regarding the functioning of existing policies in oth-

er countries for the design or redesign of their own public policies (DUS-

SAUGE, 2012). On the other hand, cooperation is a process that recognizes

the existence of an interdependence between states and the international

arena, this means that there would be mutual and reciprocal dependence

between the various actors, where the actions of some would aect the

political-economic conditions of others (KEOHANE; NYE, 1977).

The links between cooperation and policy transfer have already

been discussed (CONSTANTINE; SHANKLAND, 2017; STONE, 1999)

and the literature on the circulation of ideas has debated this topic both

theoretically and empirically. However, and in spite of the recent advanc-

es, we believe that the relation between cooperation and policy transfer

4. José Miguel Vergara, Master in

Public Policy and Management, Univer-

sidad de Chile. Political Scientist with

specialization in Government and Public

Management, Universidad Alberto

Hurtado. His research areas are public

policy, social policy and knowledge

transfer.

estudos internacionais • Belo Horizonte, ISSN 2317-773X, v. 8, n. 2, (jun. 2020), p. 8 - 26

deserves more attention. To begin with, studies often mention coopera-

tion as a type of transfer, but oer no explanation on how to proceed with

the empirical application of the concepts, that is how to recognize the

specic characteristics of each one.

There is still something of a “missing middle” between the micro (in-country)

and macro (geopolitical) levels, since there is as yet little research that has used

a diusion or transfer lens to analyse the role played in less coercive forms of

transfer by the international-level institutional and policy architecture of devel-

opment cooperation itself (CONSTANTINE; SHANKLAND, 2017, p. 101).

Furthermore, we argue that the discussion concerning the actors

involved in a cooperation process can be enriched identifying the diverse

range of actors and instances where they interact. Lastly, we expect to

contribute to the debates by focusing on Latin-American countries, where

“the phenomenon of ‘voluntary’ policy transfer (…) under the rubric of

South-South Cooperation (SSC) has received far less attention, despite its

long history and growing importance” (CONSTANTINE; SHANKLA-

ND, 2017, p. 100). Finally, as Stone, Porto de Oliveira and Pal (2019) argue:

[b]y analysing development cooperation and policy transfer together, new mecha-

nisms operating within these processes can be seen. Policies need inevitably to be

translated to adapt to such contexts, informal cooperation is often displayed among

countries, and there can be dierent forms of resistance such as peasants ghting

against agricultural technology transfers.” (STONE; OLIVEIRA; PAL, 2019, p. 13).

Considering the former, our research question is: what is the con-

tribution of international cooperation to policy transfer? We argue that

cooperation is one of the channels through which policy transfer might

occur. In that sense, the existence of cooperation between states allows

the circulation of information, policy makers and models of public poli-

cies, creating an environment that enables transfer to occur. In addition,

cooperation agreements indicate specic actions and activities, thus con-

tributing directly to policy transfer.

In order to illustrate our views, we analyze Brazilian and Chilean

cooperation in the area of cash transfers between 2002 and 2015, a peri-

od that encompasses the creation and implementation of Chile Solidario

(CHS) and Bolsa Familia (BF) programs

. These cases were chosen be-

cause both countries have recently developed policies that are considered

to be best practices and, thus, have attracted international attention

. The

Chilean and Brazilian programs are relevant in terms of their compo-

nents and in what concerns the presence of cooperation and social devel-

opment agencies.

The information on the cases was gathered through the analysis of

the research produced on the topic and of ocial documents. Additional-

ly, a total of 34 semi-structured interviews were conducted between Oc-

tober 2015 and October 2018, with academics, bureaucrats, and interna-

tional organizations’ representatives. These individuals were selected be-

cause of their involvement with the Brazilian and the Chilean programs

and/or because of their participation in cooperation strategies developed

within the eld of social policies involving Chile and/or Brazil. The inter-

views were conducted in person in dierent sights – Chile (2016 to 2018),

Brazil (2015 to 2017), Paraguay (2018), Colombia (2018) and Guatemala

(2018). When the contact in person was not possible, the interviews were

5. In Brazil, cash transfer programs

have been implemented at the local

level since 1995 and the ﬁrst national

program dates from 2001. However, we

will focus only on BF program, which

is why we are considering this speciﬁc

period of time in our analysis.

6. Another relevant case of social

policy exported to other countries is the

Mexican program Progresa/Oportunida-

des/Prospera (BANEGAS-GONZÁLEZ;

MORA-SALAS, 2012; PECK; THEODORE,

2015; VALENCIA, 2008). However, for

this study we have decided to focus

on two cases since a reduced number

allows us to do a more detailed study

and also because these two programs

have different designs, whereas there is

a greater similarity between the Mexi-

can and the Brazilian programs.

Cecilia Osorio Gonnet, Maria Clara Oliveira e José Miguel Vergara Internaonal development cooperaon as one of the triggers for the process of public policy transfer

conducted via Skype. The goal was to clarify some of the information

that was already provided by other sources and to collect additional in-

formation.

The article is divided in three sections. In the rst part we critically

review the literature on policy transfer and cooperation. Secondly, we

analyze Brazilian and Chilean cooperation related to cash transfers. The

nal section is dedicated to the discussion of the relation between cooper-

ation and policy transfer, considering the evidence of the cases.

Transfer and cooperation

A rst step to discuss policy transfer and cooperation is to clari-

fy what we understand by the two concepts. Firstly, it is important to

mention that the study of policy transfer is part of a growing body of

literature on the circulation of ideas and policy models. An increasing

awareness of the interconnection between dierent units and of the im-

pact of external inuences in the development of policies has led to a

recent growing interest for these topics, producing important theoretical

and empirical studies (for example, DOLOWITZ; MARSH, 1996, 2000;

DUSSAUGE, 2012; EVANS; DAVIES, 1999; LEVI-FAUR, 2005; STONE,

1999; SUGIYAMA, 2011; PORTO DE OLIVEIRA; FARIA, 2017).

It is important to distinguish between the main streams in the lit-

erature. Porto de Oliveira and Faria (2017, p. 13) suggest to dierentiate

along these lines:

[p]olicy transfer deals with rather restricted processes involving a few politi-

cal units and their interactions, while policy diusion is seen as a process that

encompass several states, eventually from distinct continents. Policy circulation

is a term that has been employed to frame rather diuse and multidirectional

processes, as we will see ahead.

Diusion is a process “by which the adoption of innovation by

member(s) of a social system is communicated through certain channels

and over time, and activates mechanisms that increase the likelihood of

adoption by other members who have not yet adopted it” (LEVI-FAUR,

2005, p. 23). It is also relevant to highlight that the dissemination of an

idea or policy in a diusion process is an uncoordinated process, when

compared to transfer. Thus, countries would not act completely inde-

pendently or in a coordinated manner, but in an uncoordinated interde-

pendence (ELKINS; SIMMONS, 2005).

The term policy transfer was coined by Dolowitz and Marsh (2000)

who dene it as the “process by which knowledge about policies, admin-

istrative arrangements, institutions and ideas of a political system (past or

present) is used in the development of policies, administrative arrange-

ments, institutions and ideas in another political system” (DOLOWITZ;

MARSH, 2000, p. 5). Transfer is also, understood as a process by which

“governments intentionally use ideas / lessons about the functioning of

existing policies and institutions in other countries to inform the (re) de-

sign / implementation of their own public policies” (DUSSAUGE; 2012,

p. 52). The policy transfer approach distinguishes between voluntary, ne-

gotiated and coercive forms of transfer and tries to determine what is

estudos internacionais • Belo Horizonte, ISSN 2317-773X, v. 8, n. 2, (jun. 2020), p. 8 - 26

transferred, who is involved and under what conditions it is developed

(BENDER; KELLER; WILLING, 2014). In that sense, the literature identi-

es diverse mechanisms of transfer such as emulation, mixture, harmoni-

zation, hybridization, assemblage, between others (BENDER; KELLER;

WILLING, 2014; DOLOWITZ; MARSH, 2000; PRINCE, 2010).

According to Bennett (1997) and Stone (2001), the processes of

adopting a policy, or part of it, are attributable to transfer only if this pro-

cess is not the product of internal idiosyncratic factors; if during the adop-

tion the responsible politicians are aware of the adoption of the policy

or part of it in other places and if external experiences were used for the

domestic debate. Finally, Jules (2015) arms that another type of transfer

is the cooperative policy transfer. This concept highlights the interest of

one actor to transfer a policy among other units (MAVROT, 2017). In

addition, this author arms that the policy transfer processes should not

just be viewed as unilateral movements between two units “and can be

truly polycentric in nature” (MAVROT, 2017, p. 121).

The actors who take part in the processes are a key aspect that has not

been taken into account when studying policy transfer. As Dolowitz, Pluga-

ru and Saurugger (2019, p. 4) arm, “actors make transfer possible”. Actors

are those who carry out relevant actions and who intervene at some stage

of the public policy process (DENTE; SUBIRATS, 2014). According to Stone

(2001) in the transfer literature, the usual response to the question “who

transfers the policy” is “governments”, privileging the ocial actors as bu-

reaucrats, politicians and agencies. However, Dolowitz and Marsh (1996) list

a number of actors who might play a role in transfer that goes beyond the

former – i.e.: elected ocials, bureaucrats, political parties, pressure groups,

policy entrepreneurs/experts and supranational institutions. In addition, it

is important to consider the role of other actors, such as academics, epistem-

ic communities and think tanks. All of them are signicant for their role in

the production, dissemination and legitimization of knowledge and ideas

which can contribute to the design of policies or for their diusion.

As there are several types of actors, it is relevant to distinguish the

dierent roles that they play and the channels through which they act.

Evans and Davies (1999) arm that non-state actors participate in the soft

transfer of ideas that inuences the public agenda; while, stakeholders

are involved in hard transfer of practices that require formal decisions

(STONE, 2001). Dolowitz, Plugaru and Saurugger (2019) indicate that

power relations can be modied by national actors, reorienting the in-

tended goal of a transfer. That is to say that “(…) even when actors appear

to be subservient to the international, they can be in a position to change

power relations, even to the point of deviating the course of the transfer

process in order to frame it in accordance to their needs” (DOLOWITZ;

PLUGARU; SAURUGGER, 2019, p. 6). In addition, “policy transfer gener-

ally involves a range of tactics on the part of the policy makers to make ex-

tralocal policy programmes applicable in local circumstances” (PRINCE,

2010, p. 171). Therefore, the identication of the key actor in each process

of transfer is relevant to the understanding of its micro dynamics.

Furthermore, actors might use dierent channels to exert their in-

uence and to operate transfer processes. We argue that cooperation is

Cecilia Osorio Gonnet, Maria Clara Oliveira e José Miguel Vergara Internaonal development cooperaon as one of the triggers for the process of public policy transfer

one of the channels that they may use. Cooperation can be understood

as a process that recognizes the existence of an interdependence between

states and the international arena, meaning that there would be mutual

and reciprocal dependence between the various actors, where the action

of some would aect the political-economic conditions of others (KEO-

HANE; NYE, 1977). It can be seen as a relationship between partners try-

ing to combine a set of actions and criteria to achieve common objectives

at the international level. Such processes might involve actors such as

states, supranational organizations, international organizations, national

organizations, institutions, non-governmental organizations and individ-

uals (SABAT, 2008).

Cooperation can occur within dierent frames

(CONSTANTINE

AND SHANKLAND, 2017; ACGI, 2017; INSTITUTO CAMÕES, N/D).

Bilateral cooperation is carried out between two countries that follow

patterns and behavioral guidelines dened jointly and it is generally es-

tablished within a governmental sphere and through formal channels.

Triangular cooperation takes place when two or more countries or a mul-

tilateral organization join eorts to share experiences, knowledge and

resources, according to their comparative advantages, for the benet of

a third country or group of countries. Finally, multilateral cooperation

is carried out through schemes, programs and projects whose bases and

guidelines are accepted by a group of countries within the framework of

an international forum or agreement.

Historically, international cooperation is characterized by the pre-

ponderance of North/South relations, but new players from the South

are becoming more and more active. This has led to the rise of a brand-

new form of cooperation in which Southern countries are the main play-

ers. South-South cooperation is dened by the United Nations Oce for

South-South Cooperation (N/D) as

[a] broad framework for collaboration among countries of the South in the politi-

cal, economic and technical domains, it can take place on a bilateral, regional, sub

regional or interregional basis. Developing countries shared knowledge, skills, ex-

pertise and resources to meet their development goals through concerted eorts.

Brazil, Mexico, South Africa, India and China are some of the coun-

tries that have actively engaged in cooperation. The strategies employed

by these countries dier greatly, but there are some common ideas. First,

there is no coercion, since cooperation between Southern countries is

considered to be more horizontal. Secondly, cooperation projects are

generally based on experiences that have been implemented domesti-

cally (CONSTANTINE; SHANKLAND, 2017). Finally, Constantine and

Shankland (2017) draw attention to the fact that experience and learning

are becoming increasingly appreciated.

Complementing these ideas, Stone, Oliveira and Pal (2019) argue that

is relevant to focus on the particularities of transfer in developing countries:

government structures will be dierent, donors and international organisations

often have the whip hand; and ‘aid’ is itself a specic type of policy transfer with

its own agencies, networks, and professional knowledge. There are also unique

circumstances around the credibility of knowledge in a development context,

credibility that goes beyond mere technical expertise (STONE; OLIVEIRA; PAL

2019, p. 13).

7. There are other forms of cooper-

ation that we do not examine in this

article.

estudos internacionais • Belo Horizonte, ISSN 2317-773X, v. 8, n. 2, (jun. 2020), p. 8 - 26

The previous discussion claries the denitions involved in this

work and their limitations. Transfer and cooperation are dierent phe-

nomena, with some common components. As we present in Table 1,

transfer is process that implies the mobilization of knowledge (from a

model to an idea) whereas cooperation implies a relationship and interde-

pendence that could or not implicated that mobilization. Regarding the

degree of autonomy, a transfer process could be voluntary, coercive or

mixed. In the case of cooperation, willfulness is a key feature of the pro-

cess. In addition, the instruments are diverse. Transfer can occur by the

mechanism of emulation, mixture, learning, assemblage, between oth-

ers. Cooperation agreements (bilateral, triangular or multilateral) are an

example of the instruments that can be used to operate. Finally, in what

concerns the actors, there is an overlap between those involved in coop-

eration agreements and those who can be identied as agents of transfer.

We will consider the components presented here for analyzing the

Chilean and Brazilian cases in the next section.

Table 1 – Transfer and Cooperation: a comparison

Transfer Cooperation

Deﬁnition Process by which knowledge

about policies, administrative

arrangements, institutions

and ideas of a political system

(past or present) is used in

the development of policies,

administrative arrangements,

institutions and ideas in another

political system. (Dolowitz and

Marsh, 2000: 5)

Process that recognizes the

existence of an interdependence

between States and the

international arena, this means

that there would be mutual and

reciprocal dependence between

the various actors. (Keohane and

Nye, 1977).

Level of

autonomy

- Voluntary

- Mixture

- Coercive

Voluntary

Mechanisms - Mixture

- Emulation

- Learning

- Hybridization

- Harmonization

- Assemblage

Cooperation agreements:

- Bilateral

- Triangular

- Multilateral

Actors - States

- Political parties

- Academics

- International agencies

- International organizations

- National institutions

- Think tanks

- Elected ofﬁcials

- Bureaucrats

- Pressure groups

- Policy entrepreneurs/experts

- States

- Regional governments

- International agencies

- International organizations

- National institutions

- Elected ofﬁcials

- Bureaucrats

Source: Developed by the authors and based on Dolowitz and Marsh, 2000, Prince,

2010, Bender, Keller and Willing, 2014 and Keohane and Nye, 1977.

Cecilia Osorio Gonnet, Maria Clara Oliveira e José Miguel Vergara Internaonal development cooperaon as one of the triggers for the process of public policy transfer

Brazilian and Chilean international cooperation on social development

Brazilian and Chilean Conditional Cash Transfer Programs

Created in 2003

, Bolsa Família (BF) gained considerable attention,

especially after being classied as a best practice by international organi-

zations and nancial institutions, such as the Inter-American Develop-

ment Bank (IDB) and the World Bank (WB). In order to tackle poverty,

BF has two components: (1) an unconditional cash transfer directed at

families in extreme poverty that is attributed regardless of its compo-

sition; and (2) a conditional cash transfer (CCT) that is awarded to fam-

ilies with children that fall below the poverty line. This latter transfer

requires beneciaries to comply with conditionalities regarding immuni-

zation, health care and education of children (OLIVEIRA, 2018).

Chile has implemented a series of measures in the eld of social de-

velopment that have been considered best practices and, therefore, have

received international attention. Chile Solidario (CHS) and Puente are two

of those initiatives. CHS and Puente - its entry program - began in 2002

and aims to promote the integration of families living in extreme pover-

ty into the social networks of the State and their access to better living

conditions. One of the most innovative components of CHS, was the psy-

chosocial support given to the beneciary families, which consisted of a

personalized accompaniment by a professional or qualied technician, in

order to (1) promote the development of the necessary personal and fam-

ily skills to meet the 53 minimum thresholds required by the program;

and to (2) link beneciaries to local networks and benets. The accompa-

niment was carried out for 24 months and consists of a system of regular

work sessions with families or people at home (OSORIO, 2018).

Brazilian cooperation on social development

Brazil has been involved with South-South cooperation since the

60s but became an important player at the turn of the century. It has

moved from a position where it used to import policies to become an

actor known for exporting its domestic policies (FARIA, 2012). During

Lula’s government (2003-2010), Brazil has enacted several policies that

have led to an exceptional reduction of poverty and inequalities and have

attracted international attention. Over this period, social development

became a key aspect of Brazilian international cooperation, reecting a

growing importance of this policy sector also domestically. Lula’s direct

involvement in the ght against hunger and poverty was also quite im-

portant in garnering support for the program both domestically and in-

ternationally. Lula acted as an “international ambassador” (PORTO DE

OLIVEIRA, 2013) of BF, namely in the G8 meeting in 2003 and others

such as the meetings of the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO)

(PAPI; MEDEIROS, 2015).

The Ministry of Social Development (MDS) was created in 2004 and

was responsible for the management of BF, among other programs and

8. BF was not the ﬁrst conditional

cash transfer (CCT) implemented in

Brazil. Two important experiences were

created at the local level in 1995 in the

Federal District and in Campinas. These

CCTs were largely emulated at the

local level (COÊLHO, 2008; SUGIYAMA,

2008a, 2008b), reaching more than 100

municipalities. The federal government

created Bolsa Escola, a CCT with

education-related conditionalities in

2001, and several other CCT programs

were adopted between 2001 and 2003.

In 2003, these programs are replaced

by BF in an attempt to create a single

program targeting the poor (OLIVEIRA,

2018).

estudos internacionais • Belo Horizonte, ISSN 2317-773X, v. 8, n. 2, (jun. 2020), p. 8 - 26

strategies. Because of their expertise in dealing with specic issues, Brazil-

ian ministries are able to sign agreements with other countries. MDS is thus

responsible for providing international cooperation related to BF

. MDS

provides technical cooperation and exchanges knowledge and information

regarding its activities, mainly through the reception/sending of interna-

tional delegations, participation in seminars and workshops, and production

of information and materials on BF (LEITE, SUYAMA; POMEROY, 2013;

LORENZO, 2013). Bureaucrats directly involved with the program were re-

sponsible for providing related information to other countries (interviews).

Cooperation provided by the ministry is demand-driven (PAPI;

MEDEIROS, 2015), which means that countries that are interested in

the establishment of cooperation agreements should request MDS to do

so. More than 60 countries have shown interest in cooperating with the

ministry (LORENZO, 2013) and agreements have been signed with sev-

eral countries

. There seems to be a preference for the signature of co-

operation agreements involving a third party – a feature also present in

other Brazilian institutions (ANDRADE, 2008) – such as the WB, FAO,

the British Department for International Development (DFID), and the

United Nations Development Program (UNDP) (CAIXETA; SUYAMA,

2015; MDSA, N/D). Latin America is thus the prime destination of co-

operation, with more than 50% of the activities directed at it, followed

by Africa (PAPI; MEDEIROS, 2015). Among the specic demands for co-

operation, we can identify the following topics: targeting mechanisms,

payment systems, implementation and monitoring of conditionalities, in-

formation systems (Single Registry) and information related to BF and to

the Program for the Eradication of Child Labor (PETI) (LORENZO, 2013;

PAPI; MEDEIROS, 2015; interviews).

The Ministry has enacted several cooperation projects in the eld

of cash transfers. An agreement was signed with Peru to exchange on

monitoring and evaluation of conditionalities and to provide technical co-

operation aiming at strengthening the Peruvian program Juntos and help-

ing rethink the decentralized management of the program (ABC, 2007;

MDSA, N/D). An agreement of cooperation in the eld of cash transfers

and the ght against extreme poverty was signed between Brazil and

Chile (MDSA, N/D). Agreements that focus on cash transfers were also

established between Brazil and Ecuador, Bolivia, Cuba, El Salvador, and

Guatemala (MDSA, N/D).

African countries have showed particular interest in learning more

about BF. Both South Africa and Mozambique, for instance, have looked

at BF in order to rethink their own programs

(interviews; OLIVEIRA,

2012, 2018). The year 2006 saw the start of the Brazil-Africa Cooperation

Program on Social Development, involving Brazil’s MDS, the British De-

partment for International Development (DFID), and delegations from

Ghana, Mozambique, South Africa, Guinea Bissau, Nigeria and Zambia.

This initiative was funded by DFID and had the following goals: (1) facil-

itate the exchange of technical personnel; (2) foster technical assistance;

and (3) the creation of an information platform (ANDRADE, 2008).

In 2007, following a rst contact between the two countries

in the context of the Brazil-Africa Cooperation Program on Social

9. Within the ministry, the National

Secretary for Citizenship Income

(Secretaria Nacional de Renda de

Cidadania – SENARC) was responsible

for overseeing the program and thus se-

veral of its members have been involved

in cooperation projects. However, the

international projects were coordinated

by the Department for International

Projects.

10. Cooperation agreements were sig-

ned with countries such as Argentina,

Uruguay, Paraguay, Bolivia, Chile, Ecua-

dor, Peru, Cuba, El Salvador, Guatemala,

Haiti, Angola, Egypt, Senegal, Lebanon,

Vietnam and Pakistan (ABC, 2007,

MDSA, N/D; PAPI; MEDEROS, 2015).

A cooperation project between the

Ministry and the city of New York was

also signed (ABC, 2007).

11. In the case of South Africa, study

tours took place in Brazil, Chile, and

in other Latin American countries in

order to assess the possibility of adding

conditionalities to their own program

(OLIVEIRA, 2018).

Cecilia Osorio Gonnet, Maria Clara Oliveira e José Miguel Vergara Internaonal development cooperaon as one of the triggers for the process of public policy transfer

Development, Ghana asked the Brazilian MDS to help in the elabo-

ration of a cash transfer program. A cooperation agreement between

these countries and DFID was signed later in that very year. Brazil has

understood this agreement as a good opportunity to disseminate BF, as

well as a possibility to learn about the implementation of cash transfers

in a dierent context (SOUZA, 2007). Ghana, in its turn, has seen it as

a way of getting access to technical knowledge on cash transfers and

at the same time legitimize its own program (SOUZA, 2007). Brazil-

ian delegations were sent to Ghana in three dierent moments in 2007

to present the Brazilian experience and discuss the following topics:

Single Registry, implementation of BF, monitoring and evaluation of

conditionalities, and the eradication of child labor (ANDRADE, 2008;

LEITE; SUYAMA; POMEROY, 2015; IPC, N/Db). The topics discussed

are a response to demands presented by the Ghanaian government to

MDS (IPC, N/Db). The implementation of this agreement has faced

some obstacles, namely the limited number of Brazilian representa-

tives available, the lack of knowledge regarding the Ghanaian context

and the non-denition of a well-designed strategy (LEITE; SUYAMA;

POMEROY, 2015). In spite of that, this can be seen as a fruitful coop-

eration, since Ghana has implemented a cash transfer program with

several features that mirror Brazil’s BF. The Ghanaian Livelihood Em-

powerment Against Poverty (LEAP) was rst implemented in 2008

and aimed at reducing poverty among children and other vulnerable

groups (GARCIA; MOORE, 2012). A monthly cash transfer is attributed

to families that are part of the Single Registry, an information system

similar to its Brazilian counterpart. The program has two branches: an

unconditional one that targets elderly people (ABEBRESE, 2011), and a

second one that involves conditionalities and that is directed at families

with children. In order to receive payment, families with children by

their composition are expected to comply with the following condition-

alities: (1) children must be enrolled in school and attend classes; (2)

all family members should be part of Ghana’s National Health Insur-

ance Scheme; (3) children up to 18 months must attend regular medical

checkups and follow the immunization calendar; (4) every form of child

labor is forbidden (ABEBRESE, 2011; GARCIA; MOORE, 2012; IPC, N/

Da). However, there is an incapacity for monitoring compliance with

conditionalities (GARCIA; MOORE, 2012).

Grebe (2015, p. 27) states that “while Brazilian consultants did par-

ticipate in the design of LEAP – and it shares certain characteristics such

as the conditionalities attached to the cash grants – the claim of it be-

ing an attempt to emulate Bolsa Família within the Ghanaian context is

belied by its relatively small scale and low benet levels”. Conditionali-

ties are not a typical feature of programs within the region (OLIVEIRA,

2013), thus one might argue that they are a result of the Brazilian inu-

ence. Also, the fact that the information system is called Single Registry

and shares similarities to the Brazilian system points to the existence of

a transfer process. Foli et al. (2018) and Oliveira (2015) also acknowledge

LEAP to be highly inuenced by Brazil’s BF.

estudos internacionais • Belo Horizonte, ISSN 2317-773X, v. 8, n. 2, (jun. 2020), p. 8 - 26

Chilean cooperation on social development

Chile pays particular attention to South-South cooperation. The

interaction with the countries in Latin America and the Caribbean and

with other developing countries is guided by four key components: (1) the

promotion, management and implementation of the capacity of Chilean

cooperation in other countries; (2) agreements focus on the demands of

third countries for Chilean experiences; (3) the goal is to strengthen the

capacity of professionals specialized in international cooperation man-

agement and, in addition, to contribute to the discussion on a South-

South intra-regional cooperation strategy and on a common framework

of cooperation; (4) the relations established should be horizontal and un-

conditional (VAN KLAVEREN, 2011).

The country often provides “triangular cooperation”. Chile has

approximately 14 triangular partners with priority areas of cooperation:

institutional strengthening and modernization; social development; eco-

nomic cooperation for development; environment, natural resources and

energy; agriculture and food security; territorial and local development;

disaster prevention and human resources training (AGCI, 2017; inter-

views).

The Agency of International Cooperation (AGCI), created in 1990,

is one of the main agencies responsible for coordinating international co-

operation resources and carry out cooperation actions with developing

countries. Since 2005, AGCI has been part of the Ministry of Foreign Af-

fairs and therefore their activities are more related to national foreign

policy priorities. During the period 2006-2009, the AGCI dened a group

of priority countries for South-South cooperation actions. Selected coun-

tries included Bolivia, Paraguay, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, the

Dominican Republic and Haiti (FUENTES, 2014; ROJAS, 2011; VAN

KLAVEREN, 2011).

CHS’s components, particularly the psychological support, were

replicated by other countries such as Paraguay, Colombia, Guatemala,

Panama and other Central American countries

(VALENCIA, 2008).

Based on the knowledge and experience accumulated with CHS and Pu-

ente, collaboration, cooperation and advocacy methods were established

facilitating the inuence of Chilean programs in the region.

In Paraguay, the Tekoporã

program is aimed at families living in

extreme poverty in rural areas of the country. The program began in

2005 and has conditionalities related to health and education and, similar

to what happens in CHS, the program incorporated “family guides” that

accompany the families and provide psychosocial support services (FON-

SECA, 2008). The program was supported by WB and IADB, as well as

technical support in the design and implementation by countries such as

Mexico, Brazil, Colombia (BATTILANA, 2015; VERA SOARES; BRIT-

TO, 2007) and Chile through AGCI (AGCI, 2013).

Between 2011 and 2014, a project called “Paraguay Among All.

Strengthening the Social Policy Strategy” was developed which consisted

of cooperation between Paraguay, Chile, Australia and Germany, seeking

to develop a national strategy to improve Paraguayan social policies and

12. Such as Barbados, Jamaica, Saint

Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint

Vincent and the Grenadines, Suriname

and Trinidad and Tobago.

13. Currently Tekoporã had undergone

improvements in management and

quality and increased coverage, from

80 thousand families in 2005 to 141

thousand families in 2013 and with

expectations of reaching 150 thousand

in 2017 (SECRETARÍA ACCIÓN SOCIAL,

2017). It also counts on other associated

programs, such as Tenonderã, for

indigenous families and Tekoha, which

hands over / returns property titles to

indigenous communities.

Cecilia Osorio Gonnet, Maria Clara Oliveira e José Miguel Vergara Internaonal development cooperaon as one of the triggers for the process of public policy transfer

programs. Some of the specic actions were carried out by the Chilean

Ministry of Social Development (MIDESO), with the support of AGCI,

and the Technical Unit (UTGS) of the Social Cabinet of the Presidency of

the Republic of Paraguay. During the period 2011-2014, seven technical

missions were carried out from Chile to Paraguay, involving the train-

ing of 35 Paraguayan professionals and technicians. At the same time, 12

professionals and technicians from the institutions that serve as the gate-

way to Paraguay SäsoPyahu (Abrazo and Tekoporã) and representatives of

UTGS carried out internships in Chile (AGUIRRE, 2013).

Triangular cooperation with Guatemala was established in partner-

ship with the German Deutsche Gesellschaftfür Technische Zusammenarbeit

(GTZ). This partnership started in 2003 and focused on Latin America

and the Caribbean, and it aims to replicate good experiences in countries

of those regions developed through cooperation between Chile and Ger-

many. The transmission of knowledge and experiences included Chilean

technicians as the experts in charge of the cooperation initiative. Para-

guay and Guatemala were among the countries which beneted from this

type of project (GIZ, N/D). For example, in 2007, Guatemala implement-

ed the National Action Plan for Children and Adolescents, which became

part of the CCTs Mi Familia Progresa in 2008. This initiative was created

to respond to high levels of poverty and malnutrition, and to low levels of

education and access to healthcare facilities among the rural population

(CECCHINI et al., 2009). Thus, the program seeks to improve, the living

conditions of families in extreme poverty through economic support, so

that they can invest in health, education and food

In Colombia, Familias en Acción (created in 2000) targets families

with members under 18 who experience situations of poverty and vulner-

ability. However, it was not until 2007 that the Social Protection Network

for Overcoming Poverty (JUNTOS) was created based on the Chilean

experience of Puente. JUNTOS is composed of two operating strategies

- the rst corresponds to family support, while the second regards the

coordination of State entities that intervene in the delivery of dierent

benets and monitor the compliance with 45 minimum thresholds. The

cooperation between Chile and Colombia has occurred through formal

and informal channels, since the presence of missions to learn about the

Chilean experience was not always linked to the Colombian Ministry of

Social Development.

Puente was also enacted in the Caribbean region. Created in 2007,

Puente was a horizontal cooperation initiative which sought to improve

social protection strategies in the Caribbean countries based on the Chil-

ean model (AGCI; FOUNDATION HENRY DUNANT, 2014). Caribbe-

an countries rst learnt about Puente through activities organized by the

Organization of American States (OAS) and then, countries requested to

learn more about the program’s principles and strategies. A pilot included

Jamaica, St. Lucia and Trinidad and Tobago, with Chile serving as the

technical expert providing knowledge on the Puente. By 2009, the initia-

tive was extended to include Barbados, St. Kitts and Nevis and St. Vin-

cent and the Grenadines and Suriname” (AGCI; FOUNDATION HENRY

DUNANT, 2014). The activities included (A) internships in Chile (1) to

14. In 2012 the program was replaced

by Mi Bono Seguro, which maintains

the formulation of the classic CCTs, with

conditionalities in the area of education

and health.

estudos internacionais • Belo Horizonte, ISSN 2317-773X, v. 8, n. 2, (jun. 2020), p. 8 - 26

share information regarding the theory that informs the programs and

practical information; and (2) to interact with those responsible for Puente

and with beneciary families; (B) training workshops; (C) mentoring by

Chilean tutors who have expertise with the program; and (D) the ad-

aptation of original Puente materials to enhance learning experiences of

Caribbean participants (AGCI and Foundation Henry Dunant, 2014).

As we mentioned, psychological accompaniment is a specic fea-

ture of the Chilean program and since the mentioned-above countries

have included it in their own programs after signing specic cooperation

agreements regarding this topic with Chile (and sometimes with a third

party), we can argue that this component was transferred from Chile to

new contexts and that cooperation agreements can be understood as an

instrument that facilitated the transfer process.

Final Remarks

Cooperation is one of the mechanisms through which the trans-

fer process can occur. In the last section we have analyzed Brazilian and

Chilean cooperation in the eld of cash transfers. These two case studies

have shown that policies – or at least specic elements of them – are ad-

opted by other countries and that this is facilitated by the establishment

of cooperation agreements. Indeed, we can clearly identify the replica-

tion of Brazil’s BF components and Single Registry

– the system used to

identify families in poverty – in Ghana. Transfer can also be observed in

the case of CHS, since its psychological component has been adopted by

other countries, such as Paraguay (see Table 2)

Cooperation and Transfer from Brazil and Chile, 2002-2015

Brazil Chile

Actors involved in cooperation processes MDS (Senarc)

MDS (Sec. Interacional)

ABC

AGCI

Fosis

MDS

Recipient countries - Latin American countries

- African countries

- Latin American countries

- Caribbean countries

Topics that are object of cooperation CCT – discussions based on the experience of

Bolsa Família

- Information and monitoring systems (Single

Registry)

- How to design and implement conditionalities

- How to monitor and evaluate compliance with

conditionalities

- PETI (Child Labour Erradication Program)

CCT – discussions based on the

experience of Chile Solidario

- How to design and implement

psychosocial support interventions

Evidences of transfer In the case of Ghana:

- Conditionalities in the ﬁelds of health and

education

- Single Registry – information system

In the case of Paraguay and

Guatemala:

- Implementation of the

psychosocial support component

Mechanisms Bilateral, triangular and multilateral cooperation Bilateral, triangular and multilateral

cooperation

Source: Developed by the authors.

15. Brazil’s Single Registry is also very

inﬂuential in the design and redesign

of information systems elsewhere

(interviews).

Table 2 – Cooperation and Transfer from Brazil and Chile, 2002-2015

Cecilia Osorio Gonnet, Maria Clara Oliveira e José Miguel Vergara Internaonal development cooperaon as one of the triggers for the process of public policy transfer

Both countries have shared knowledge that they have accumulated

through the implementation of their own programs. The ministries re-

sponsible for providing cooperation are the ones that host the programs

and the bureaucrats involved in cooperation agreements are the very

same that are involved with the programs back home (interviews). These

two countries give strong emphasis to technical cooperation, which con-

rms the argument of Constantine and Shankland (2017) that knowledge

and experience are growing in importance when it comes to develop-

ing cooperation projects. The preference for triangular cooperation also

illustrates this point, as Brazil and Chile are providing the experience

and technical information, whereas funding to enact the projects comes

from elsewhere. This is the case of the cooperation agreement signed

between Brazil, DFIF and Ghana - the funding to put the project in place

came from a traditional donor, but the expertise is provided by Brazilian

bureaucrats who are part of Brazil’s MDS and who have worked in BF

or in related topics and thus have considerable experience in the mat-

ter to advise Ghana on how to develop its own program. This is also

the case of the triangular cooperation established between Chile, Gua-

temala and GIZ. The German agency contributed to the dissemination

of the program by mobilizing Chilean experts who have knowledge and

experience due to their involvement with CHS. Finally, the presence of

Puente in the Caribbean is a good example of cooperative policy transfer

(JULES, 2015; MAVROT, 2017). Here, it is relevant to highlight the nu-

merous actors involved: transfers are not unilateral movements between

two units; they are polycentric. The role played by OAS, linking Chilean

experts to a group of countries, is relevant to understand how transfers

occur in the frame of cooperation initiatives.

Regarding the actors, when analyzing cooperation processes, it is

crucial to pay special attention to governments since they are able to gen-

erate the necessary commitments to carry out cooperation agreements,

be they bilateral or triangular. In addition, it is necessary to discuss fur-

ther the role of the experts, who can be “ocially” part of a cooperation

initiative, but later, can be also convened as an “independent” expert le-

gitimized by the experience obtained as a national policy maker.

As already mentioned, the process of transfer does not occur sep-

arately from diusion process. When we look at Latin American coun-

tries, we can identify the presence of an epistemic community that has

established a consensus on the importance of cash transfers as a means to

tackle poverty (OSORIO, 2018). The activities of this epistemic commu-

nity have led to the dissemination of programmatic ideas regarding cash

transfers and have created room for these initiatives to be implemented in

almost all countries in the region. Howlett et al. (2018) study the process

of CCT diusion and the process of implementation of a CCT in the Phil-

ippines and identify instrument constituencies – groups similar to epis-

temic communities that gather around a specic policy instrument – as

important actors in the dissemination of information and models. Foli et

al. (2018) also identify the existence of a transnational instrument constit-

uency concerned with CCTs and argue that the transfer of components

that are present in BF to Ghana was made possible due to its presence.

estudos internacionais • Belo Horizonte, ISSN 2317-773X, v. 8, n. 2, (jun. 2020), p. 8 - 26

When specic information on how to operate the program or

when information on policy instruments related to the program is need-

ed, a dierent type of relation between the adopting country and the

country of origin has to be established. In other words, transfer is need-

ed. This transfer process can take place through cooperation agreements.

The examination of cooperation agreements signed by Chile and Brazil

with third parties reveals that the recipient countries present very precise

demands on specic topics or instruments. In the case of Brazil, there is

an interest for conditionalities, monitoring of conditionalities and the Sin-

gle Registry. Ghana’s government was interested in getting information

on all of these topics and LEAP’s design reects the existence of a learn-

ing process that has resulted in the adoption of very similar features to

the ones of BF, namely the Single Registry and conditionalities (although

they are not eectively monitored). However, learning processes made

possible by cooperation might not always lead to the transfer of poli-

cies, since they can be judged somehow inadequate to the new context.

In other words, sometimes learning might result in “negative lessons”

(ROSE, 1993). South Africa was interested in learning more about the

Brazilian experience of CCTs – it was part of Brazil-Africa Cooperation

Program on Social Development and bilateral study tours took place-, but

has made a clear decision not to add conditionalities to the unconditional

cash transfer program already in place

(OLIVEIRA, 2018). Chile, in its

turn, is well-known for having innovated when developing the psycho-

logical component and this specic characteristic of the program is the

object of several cooperation agreements. This can be demonstrated by

studying the components present in CCTs in a comparative way. In the

case of Chile, the bilateral and triangular cooperation processes led to

a scenario that allowed the incorporation of CHS and Puente program

components. Particularly when studying the case of Colombia, there was

a predominantly formal cooperation process that allowed the exchange

of information and experiences, which are reected in the creation of

the Red Together - delivery of social support through managers and the

fulllment of 45 basic thresholds, very similar to Puente’s design. On

the contrary, in the case of Paraguay, despite the cooperation agreement

signed in 2009 with AGCI that installed the Social Protection System in

Paraguay, the process of implementing the system has not been complet-

ed until today and it is expected to be in operation by the year of 2023

(OSORIO; VERGARA, 2019).

If diusion results in the spread of ideas and models, transfer al-

lows for the particular elements of the public policy and to policy instru-

ments that are required to implement the programs to circulate. Diu-

sion, as an uncoordinated process, is related to the circulation of ideas

that are considered to be “macro”. In other words, it corresponds to the

circulation of more general and programmatic ideas and models. Inter-

national cooperation is often based on the discussion of specic policy

instruments. Thus, we argue that diusion allows for the circulation of

programmatic ideas, whereas transfer gives countries the mechanisms

to operationalize them. Puente in the Caribbean provides a good exam-

ple of that. Countries learnt about the Chilean program through a tradi-

16. School attendance rates are already

very high and therefore the government

has understood that adding conditio-

nalities would produce very little result

(OLIVEIRA, 2018).

Cecilia Osorio Gonnet, Maria Clara Oliveira e José Miguel Vergara Internaonal development cooperaon as one of the triggers for the process of public policy transfer

tional activity of exhortation developed by international organizations

and members of the epistemic community. Later, Caribbean countries

requested more information related to the programs and the cooperation

initiative driven by the OAS, with specic tools of transfer of knowledge,

was created.

The Brazilian and Chilean cases allow us to show that internation-

al cooperation can be used as a transfer mechanism. Further research

regarding this issue is needed, particularly, in what concerns the detailed

discussion of whether transfer implies learning, hybridization, emulation

or other denominations proposed by the literature. Additional research

could focus, for example, on the role of the diverse actors, the domestic

capabilities and the object of transfer, both from a theoretical and meth-

odological perspective. All of them are future questions that emerge

from this present work.

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Nicole Jenne ¿Aumenta la parcipación en operaciones de paz la capacidad de las fuerzas armadas en

interactuar con actores civiles? Una evaluación del aprendizaje en el caso de las Fuerzas Armadas chilenas

¿Aumenta la participación en operaciones

de paz la capacidad de las fuerzas

armadas en interactuar con actores

civiles? Una evaluación del aprendizaje en

el caso de las Fuerzas Armadas chilenas

Does the participation in peacekeeping increase the

capacity of the armed forces to interact with civilian

actors? An evaluation of learning in the case of the

Chilean Armed Forces

A participação em operações de paz aumenta a

capacidade das Forças Armadas de interagir com atores

civis? Avaliação do aprendizado para o caso das Forças

Armadas chilenas

Nicole Jenne

DOI: 10.5752/P.2317-773X.2020v8.n2.p27

Recebido el 13 de junio de 2019

Aprobado el 17 de octubre de 2019

R

Generalmente se supone que la participación en operaciones de paz aumenta la

capacidad de las fuerzas armadas para interactuar con distintos actores civi-

les. Este artículo presenta evidencia del caso de la participación de las Fuerzas

Armadas de Chile en el mantenimiento de la paz, principalmente la Misión

de Estabilización de las Naciones Unidas en Haití (MINUSTAH, 2004–2017).

En base de un estudio cualitativo, se evalúa si las operaciones de paz tuvieron

efectos a través de procesos de aprendizaje institucionalizados o individuales. La

evidencia demuestra que la participación en operaciones de paz condujo a dis-

tintos aprendizajes en las personas individualmente. No obstante, estas lecciones

tuvieron una trascendencia limitada en el conjunto de la institución militar. En

conclusión, las operaciones de paz no han conducido a cambios fundamentales

en la auto-percepción de las Fuerzas Armadas chilenas de su función frente a los

actores civiles.

Palabras Clave: Operaciones de paz. Cooperación civil-militar. Ayuda humani-

taria. Gestión del riesgo de desastres. MINUSTAH.

1. Profesora Asistente de la Pontiﬁcia

Universidad Católica de Chile, Instituto

de Ciencia Política, y Profesora Asociada

del Centro de Estudios Internacionales

(CEIUC) de la misma universidad. PhD en

Relaciones Internacionales del European

University Institute (EUI), Florencia.

ORCID: 0000-0001-7114-3146.

estudos internacionais • Belo Horizonte, ISSN 2317-773X, v. 8, n. 2, (jun. 2020), p. 27 - 46

A

It is generally assumed that participation in peacekeeping increases the ability of

the armed forces to interact with dierent civilian actors. This article presents

evidence from the case of the Chilean Armed Forces and their participation in

peacekeeping, specically in the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti

(MINUSTAH, 2004–2017). Based on a qualitative methodology, the study asses-

ses whether the participation in peacekeeping led to learning eects through

either institutionalized or individual learning processes. The evidence shows

that participation in peacekeeping eectively produced learning experiences in

individual members of the military. However, these lessons had limited trans-

cendence in the military institution as a whole. Consequently, peacekeeping has

not led to fundamental changes in the Chilean Armed Forces’ self-perception

with regards to their role vis-à-vis civilian actors.

Keywords: Peacekeeping. Civil-military cooperation. Humanitarian aid. Disas-

ter management. MINUSTAH.

R

Existe um pressuposto geral que frisa que a participação em operações de paz

aumenta a capacidade das forças armadas de interagir com diferentes atores

civis. Este artigo presenta evidencias sobre o caso da participação das Forças

Armadas do Chile na manutenção da paz, principalmente na Missão de Esta-

bilização das Nações Unidas no Haiti (MINUSTAH, 2004-2017). Partindo-se de

um estudo qualitativo, avaliou-se se as operações de paz chilenas conduziram a

efeitos nos processos de aprendizagem institucional ou individual. A evidência

mostra que a participação em operações de paz levou ao aprendizado entre

pessoas quando consideradas individualmente. Porém, essas lições tiveram um

signicado limitado sobre a instituição militar como um todo. Em conclusão,

as operações de paz não operaram mudanças profundas na autopercepção das

Forças Armadas chilenas em relação ao seu papel frente aos atores civis.

Palavras-chave: Operações de paz. Cooperação civil-militar. Ajuda humanitária.

Gestão de risco de desastres. MINUSTAH.

Financiamiento: Este artículo es parte del Proyecto No. 11170387, Programa

Fondecyt de Iniciación Etapa 2017, nanciado por la Comisión Nacional de

Investigación Cientíca y Tecnológica de Chile (CONICYT).

Agradecimiento: Este trabajo contó con el apoyo de numerosas personas que

han participado en la investigación, por lo que quiero agradecerles por su tiem-

po y su buena disposición. En especial quiero expresar mi gratitud a Alejandro

Atán, Andrés Fuentealba y a Mauricio Valdivieso, cuya ayuda y fe fueron funda-

mental para poder implementar el proyecto. Gracias también a Camila Bertra-

nou por su excelente trabajo como ayudante de investigación y a María Emilia

Manríquez Ponce por su aporte a la redacción del artículo en español.

Introducción

Generalmente se cree que las operaciones de paz internacionales

producen efectos transformadores en la institución militar (MOSKOS;

WILLIAMS; SEGAL, 2000). Tanto los responsables políticos como los

académicos comparten la opinión de que las operaciones de paz tienen

efectos, y que estos efectos son casi exclusivamente positivos (CHEYRE,

2011). Se supone que la participación en operaciones de paz aumenta

Nicole Jenne ¿Aumenta la parcipación en operaciones de paz la capacidad de las fuerzas armadas en

interactuar con actores civiles? Una evaluación del aprendizaje en el caso de las Fuerzas Armadas chilenas

en los militares el respecto a los derechos humanos, la democracia y

el mando civil bajo un estado de derecho. También se espera que las

operaciones de paz elevan el estatus internacional de un país y condu-

cen a mejores relaciones con otros estados. Otro supuesto efecto que

ha cobrado importancia es la capacitación de las fuerzas armadas en

trabajar con distintos actores civiles, dado que los cascos azules en las

operaciones de paz contemporáneas típicamente tienen a su cargo una

serie de tareas civiles y de policía y, además, trabajan junto a las orga-

nizaciones no gubernamentales (ONGs), agencias humanitarias y otros

actores civiles que forman parte de las operaciones de paz (MOSKOS;

WILLIAMS; SEGAL, 2000, p. 2).

Este artículo tiene como objetivo someter al escrutinio empírico el

supuesto que la participación en operaciones de paz mejora la interopera-

bilidad entre civiles y militares. Especícamente, se busca responder a la

pregunta cómo y si es que la participación en las operaciones de paz refor-

mó a las fuerzas armadas chilenas con respecto a su interacción con acto-

res civiles. Estos comprenden autoridades gubernamentales, burócratas,

organizaciones de la sociedad civil, ONGs, y no menos importantes las

poblaciones locales. Es preciso notar que el estudio no parte de la premisa

que una reforma sea o no sea necesaria. Se busca, más bien, evaluar si la

participación en operaciones de paz lleva a cambios en la institución mili-

tar, como académicos y políticos lo tienden a asumir (ARBUCKLE, 2006).

Esa presunción radica en que las relaciones entre civiles y militares suelen

ser más frecuentes en operaciones de paz que en otras misiones milita-

res. Por eso, la hipótesis generalmente asumida es que la participación en

ellas tuviera un efecto en las fuerzas armadas (CURRAN, 2017).

En términos metodológicos, el caso de Chile es un caso permisivo,

en el sentido de que las operaciones de paz se convirtieron en un tema po-

lítico relevante como consecuencia del proceso de democratización. En

el contexto de la reforma militar que se dio sucesivamente, esperaríamos

que las condiciones para el aprendizaje basado en las operaciones de paz

como una misión nueva fueran favorables, convirtiéndolo en un caso útil

para explorar el contexto especíco de posibles renovaciones, tal como en

el área de la interacción civil-militar.

Para evaluar los efectos de la participación en operaciones de paz,

se utiliza un marco de análisis de aprendizaje organizacional que pri-

vilegia el aprendizaje a través de la práctica. Según este, para que las

experiencias individuales se conviertan en lecciones para la institución

militar en su conjunto, deben constituir una masa crítica o deben difun-

dirse a través de canales formales y/o informales en toda la institución.

Para examinar si tales procesos han estado operando en las Fuerzas Ar-

madas chilenas, la metodología combina un análisis histórico-institu-

cionalista del marco en el que ocurren las experiencias en operaciones

de paz, junto con la evidencia de diversos métodos participativos. Estos

fueron casi exclusivamente dirigidos a miembros de las Fuerzas Arma-

das, dado que los diferentes mecanismos de aprendizaje son propios a la

institución militar. Los métodos participativos fueron implementados

en 2018 y comprendieron cinco grupos focales, más de 40 entrevistas y

una encuesta digital. La mayoría de los entrevistados fue personal acti-

estudos internacionais • Belo Horizonte, ISSN 2317-773X, v. 8, n. 2, (jun. 2020), p. 27 - 46

vo de las Fuerzas Armadas con experiencia en al menos una operación

de paz. Además, se entrevistó a un pequeño número de civiles y milita-

res en retiro que ocuparon posiciones en el aparato estatal que inuyen

sobre las posibilidades de aprendizaje con respecto a las relaciones entre

civiles y militares. El estudio recibió la aprobación de la Comisión de

Ética de la institución patrocinante.

Las conclusiones con respecto al aprendizaje son variadas. A nivel

individual, el personal desplegado en las operaciones de paz adquirió

nuevos conocimientos sobre cómo relacionarse y cooperar con actores

civiles, dependiendo de sus respectivas tareas. Sin embargo, debido al

hecho de que hay pocos mecanismos a través de los cuales se transmite

este conocimiento, las lecciones aprendidas han tenido un carácter tras-

cendental limitado. Por lo tanto, no se puede evidenciar que las operacio-

nes de paz hayan producido nuevos conocimientos institucionalizados

en el área de interacción civil-militar en las tres ramas de las Fuerzas Ar-

madas. Las instituciones militares mantienen una autopercepción como

garantes de la seguridad nacional donde los actores civiles denen su

mandato, pero no constituyen una parte integral del éxito de su misión.

Por lo tanto, la visión que sigue primando es una que separa el papel de

las fuerzas armadas en sus distintas funciones del papel de los actores

civiles, en lugar de apreciar a ambos como parte de la misma misión.

La pregunta sobre los potenciales aprendizajes en operaciones

de paz es relevante para el rol y desempeño de las fuerzas armadas

generalmente. La capacidad de lograr una buena interacción entre ci-

viles y militares ha sido destacada en el contexto de las operaciones de

paz ya que se considera necesaria para la efectividad operativa militar

(DE CONING, 2016, p. 14). Además de las operaciones de paz, la coo-

peración civil-militar también ha ganado importancia en el contexto

de otras misiones militares distintas a la guerra (MOOTW, por sus

siglas en inglés), como la contrainsurgencia y varias misiones internas,

incluidos los desastres naturales y el desarrollo comunitario. Algunas

de estas misiones subsidiarias internas tienen una larga tradición en

América Latina, donde los militares han intervenido para compensar

la falta de instituciones estatales. Asimismo, muchos países de la re-

gión han ampliado el papel interno de los militares en la última déca-

da, ya sea por el aumento de la inseguridad pública en los países an-

dinos y en México, por la ideología política como en Venezuela, o por

la percepción del riesgo cada vez menor de desobediencia militar que

llevó a los políticos a asignar tareas de seguridad interna a las fuerzas

armadas que, de lo contrario, no se cumplirían satisfactoriamente. Por

lo tanto, es relevante preguntar si los militares cambiaron su actitud y

mejoraron su capacidad para interactuar con actores civiles a través de

su participación en las operaciones de paz. Sin duda, el éxito de las rela-

ciones entre civiles y militares depende tanto de los militares, como de

los actores civiles. Este artículo se limita a solo un lado de la relación,

sin embargo, se ofrecen algunas reexiones sobre la parte civil en las

conclusiones. La siguiente sección describe los desafíos de las relacio-

nes civil-militares, antes de presentar el marco teórico de aprendizaje

organizacional y la metodología.

Nicole Jenne ¿Aumenta la parcipación en operaciones de paz la capacidad de las fuerzas armadas en

interactuar con actores civiles? Una evaluación del aprendizaje en el caso de las Fuerzas Armadas chilenas

Discusión teórica: los desafíos en el relacionamiento

entre civiles y militares

En general, se supone que las operaciones de paz introducen un ele-

mento civil en la cultura militar, ya sea debido a la naturaleza de las tareas

civiles y policiales asociadas con las operaciones contemporáneas de man-

tenimiento de la paz (MOSKOS; WILLIAMS; SEGAL, 2000, p. 2), o por-

que se requiere que las fuerzas armadas trabajen de la mano con actores

civiles. Estas experiencias representan una oportunidad para aumentar la

capacidad de los militares para trabajar en forma cooperativa, si no inte-

grada, con actores civiles basado en el conocimiento y el respeto mutuo.

Tales aprendizajes beneciarían una gama de tareas internas de las fuer-

zas armadas, especialmente en ayuda humanitaria y ayuda en desastres.

Las operaciones de paz institucionalizan la relación entre militares

y actores civiles. En este contexto, los actores civiles son: el liderazgo civil

de la misión, otras agencias civiles como UNICEF (United Nations Chil-

dren’s Fund), ONGs internacionales, organizaciones de la sociedad civil y

la población local. Las diferencias básicas entre las culturas organizativas

civiles y militares son ampliamente documentadas en la literatura rele-

vante (FRANKE, 2006; FRERKS et al., 2006, p. 35; WINSLOW, 2002). En

términos operacionales, las agencias civiles están organizadas horizontal-

mente y tienen mayor exibilidad que la institución militar, que se estruc-

tura verticalmente. Las relaciones jerárquicas en las fuerzas armadas no

solo estandarizan la velocidad y la ejecución de los procedimientos ope-

rativos, sino que también crean un entorno de comunicaciones diferente.

Los actores civiles y militares también tienden a tener objetivos dis-

tintos incluso bajo el mismo mandato de la misión. Generalmente, los

actores civiles permanecen en la misión para periodos más largos, lo que

les brinda la posibilidad de desarrollar estrategias a más largo plazo y

una mayor exibilidad para alcanzar sus objetivos. Los militares, por otro

lado, exhiben una actitud más ejecutiva para maximizar su impacto en

un período de despliegue de un solo año o incluso seis meses, como fue

el caso de los contingentes chilenos en Haití. Varios efectivos que habían

participado en operaciones de paz expresaron que los distintos enfoques

pueden generar irritación e incluso depreciación. Como explicó un piloto

de la fuerza aérea, “muchos empleados civiles de Naciones Unidas no es-

tán necesariamente interesados en mejorar la situación, sino que quieren

mantener su trabajo. Terminan su día de acuerdo con la hora de trabajo y

no cuando la tarea está terminada” (Ocial FACH, 2018, entrevista).

Por último, las interacciones entre civiles y militares se denen por

el hecho de que los militares confían en el poder coercitivo para llevar a

cabo su mandato tradicional de ganar guerras. En consecuencia, el en-

trenamiento militar ha puesto poco énfasis en las habilidades de “con-

tacto” que generalmente se valoran en las organizaciones civiles y que

son necesarias al tratar con civiles (DIEHL, 2008, p. 212). Estas incluyen

habilidades interpersonales e intergrupales, en particular comunicación y

negociación. Aunque generalmente son consideradas habilidades de sen-

tido común, incluso por muchos de los entrevistados para este estudio,

están lejos de ser evidentes y requieren concientización y capacitación.

estudos internacionais • Belo Horizonte, ISSN 2317-773X, v. 8, n. 2, (jun. 2020), p. 27 - 46

Un marco teórico para el aprendizaje organizacional

El marco aplicado para examinar el aprendizaje dentro de la orga-

nización militar combina dos enfoques de aprendizaje, el enfoque en el

comportamiento y el enfoque cognitivo. Mientras que el enfoque con-

ductual se centra en el cambio en los procedimientos, la doctrina y las

instituciones, la visión cognitiva ve el aprendizaje “como cambios siste-

máticos en los modelos mentales compartidos y las cogniciones de los

miembros de la organización” (HOLAN; PHILLIPS, 2004, p. 1604). Los

dos enfoques son combatibles dado que ambos asignan un papel cen-

tral a la transformación del conocimiento en el proceso de aprendizaje.

Sobre la base de Haas (1990, p. 23), para el propósito de este estudio,

el aprendizaje organizacional se puede denir como “un proceso me-

diante el cual el conocimiento consensual se utiliza para especicar las

relaciones causales de nuevas maneras, a modo que el resultado afecte”

a la percepción de los militares sobre sus propias funciones vis-a-vis los

actores civiles.

Las organizaciones están formadas por individuos, que se en-

cuentran al comienzo de un proceso de tres pasos de aprendizaje or-

ganizacional, los que son observables. En el primer paso, el individuo

externaliza nuevos conocimientos. Para que ocurra el aprendizaje or-

ganizativo, en un segundo paso este conocimiento es conrmado por

una coalición dominante dentro de la organización (RIETJENS, 2016),

que puede ser una masa crítica o una coalición de líderes. Finalmente,

el conocimiento se devuelve del nivel agregado al nivel individual, por

ejemplo, mediante la instrucción o la enseñanza. Producto de esta re-

troalimentación, el individuo internaliza el nuevo conocimiento como

parte de un conjunto más amplio de signicados sobre las funciones de

las fuerzas armadas.

¿Cómo obtienen los individuos y las coaliciones dominantes nuevos

conocimientos? Entre las diferentes formas de aprendizaje, este artículo

se centra en la experiencia práctica. Eso se justica en base de los análi-

sis existentes. Los estudios de gestión muestran que la competencia en

el trabajo proviene principalmente de la experiencia (70%), y de partes

relativamente más pequeñas de las relaciones con compañeros, gerentes

y mentores (20%) y del aprendizaje formal (10%) (THYNNE; CHERNE,

2016, p. 69). La importancia del aprendizaje a través de la práctica se ha

demostrado también con respecto a las instituciones militares (MOSKOS,

1976, p. 96–97; O’TOOLE; TALBOT, 2011, p. 51–52). Para que las expe-

riencias individuales se plasmen a nivel institucional, es necesario con-

siderar tanto los canales formales como los informales. Si la experiencia

se transmite solo a través de canales informales, es posible que no llegan

a difundir nuevos conocimientos a toda la organización (CATIGNANI,

2014). No obstante, bajo ciertas condiciones, el uso de mecanismos de

aprendizaje formal implica costos de reputación que pueden desalentar

la noticación de problemas que desencadenaron nuevos conocimien-

tos (HARDT, 2017). Por lo tanto, se prestará atención tanto a los canales

formales como a los canales informales a través de los cuales se pueden

transmitir nuevos conocimientos adquiridos mediante la práctica.

Nicole Jenne ¿Aumenta la parcipación en operaciones de paz la capacidad de las fuerzas armadas en

interactuar con actores civiles? Una evaluación del aprendizaje en el caso de las Fuerzas Armadas chilenas

Metodología

El caso: las Fuerzas Armadas chilenas en operaciones de paz

El estudio se basa en un caso único, cuyas conclusiones no pueden

ser generalizadas sin comprobar si las condiciones relevantes son simila-

res en otros casos. Como se demostrará más adelante, el caso chileno es

un caso permisivo que representa condiciones generalmente favorables

para el aprendizaje. En este sentido, y considerando la escasa evidencia

empírica sobre la pregunta a responder, es un caso útil para explorar bajo

qué condiciones la participación en operaciones de paz aumenta la capaci-

dad militar de interactuar con civiles. Si los resultados de aprendizaje no

se dan en un caso permisivo, es más difícil aún que se produzcan en otros

casos con condiciones menos favorables.

La trayectoria de Chile en las operaciones de paz reeja en gran

medida el patrón global. Durante la Guerra Fría, las operaciones de paz

fueron limitadas en número y alcance (véase BELLAMY; WILLIAMS,

2010, p. 83–91). Estas operaciones de primera generación se restringían

generalmente a la vericación y supervisión de los acuerdos de paz entre

los estados, con contribuciones modestas de los países en desarrollo, in-

cluido Chile. Esto comenzó a cambiar después del año 1990, cuando las

operaciones de paz experimentaron cambios cualitativos y cuantitativos.

El sur global empezó a contribuir una proporción de personal unifor-

mado cada vez mayor a las operaciones de paz, que ahora eran típica-

mente de naturaleza multidimensional y comprendían actividades de re-

construcción post-conicto y de construcción del Estado. Además de los

pocos observadores que Chile había proporcionado de manera continua

desde 1949, en 1991-1992, el país envió su primera unidad de helicópteros

a la Misión de Observación de las Naciones Unidas en Irak-Kuwait (UNI-

KOM). Un año más tarde, la Armada participó con 53 infantes de marina,

observadores y una unidad de fuerzas especiales en la Autoridad de Tran-

sición de las Naciones Unidas en Camboya (UNTAC). En este momento,

las operaciones de paz eran más una política sectorial impulsada por las

Fuerzas Armadas que una política de estado integral. Sin embargo, las ba-

ses para la participación se empezaron a desarrollar gradualmente, tanto

en el marco legal como práctico, creando así las condiciones para recoger

las experiencias de operaciones de paz de forma sistemática para transfor-

marlas en aprendizajes. En 2002, el Centro Conjunto para Operaciones

de Paz de Chile (CECOPAC) comenzó a impartir sus primeros cursos

preparando a futuros cascos azules.

En los años 1990, las contribuciones chilenas a operaciones de paz

fueron aún limitadas, con no más de unas pocas docenas de efectivos des-

plegados. El patrón cambió en 2004, cuando el Consejo de Seguridad de

la Organización de Naciones Unidas (ONU) autorizó una Fuerza Interina

Multinacional en Haití (MIFH) y, tres meses después, la Misión de Estabili-

zación de la ONU (MINUSTAH). Chile, que integró la MIFH junto con los

Estados Unidos, Canadá y Francia, fue el único país cuyos cerca de 350 des-

plegados se quedaron para participar en MINUSTAH. En esta última Chile

estudos internacionais • Belo Horizonte, ISSN 2317-773X, v. 8, n. 2, (jun. 2020), p. 27 - 46

tenía un batallón mixto con infantería mecanizada del Ejército e infantería

naval, una compañía de ingenieros del Ejército, un grupo de helicópteros,

seis ociales de personal en la sede de la misión y unos 40 policías. En su

punto máximo, el contingente chileno ascendió a más de 500 personas.

Cuando la misión terminó en octubre de 2017, habían participado cerca

de 12,000 chilenos. Sin embargo, desde entonces la presencia del país en

las operaciones de paz se ha reducido a menos de 50 expertos en misión,

tropas individuales y policías en diferentes operaciones en todo el mundo.

Condiciones de fondo para el aprendizaje: intereses y motivaciones

El aprendizaje está inherentemente conectado al interés; cuanto

más fuertes son los incentivos externos y las motivaciones intrínsecas,

más probable es que el aprendizaje tenga lugar (CERASOLI; NICKLIN;

FORD, 2014). Aunque esta investigación no puede vincular de manera

concluyente el interés del individuo a sus experiencias de aprendizaje, se

ofrece una reexión general sobre los posibles factores motivadores del

personal chileno en operaciones de paz, especícamente en MINUSTAH.

La evaluación de las condiciones de fondo indica que no hubo ningún

obstáculo obvio para que se produjera la transformación del conocimien-

to nuevo obtenido en operaciones de paz. Generalmente, las condiciones

fueron favorables para que se dieran aprendizajes en base de la participa-

ción en el mantenimiento de la paz.

Los cascos azules chilenos fueron generalmente recibidos positiva-

mente por las poblaciones locales. En el caso de MINUSTAH, eso se debió

en gran parte a que operaban en áreas relativamente tranquilas, distinto a

los contingentes brasileños, por ejemplo, que fueron destinados a pacicar

la capital donde enfrentaron a bandas criminales. Solo en algunas, pocas

excepciones el contingente chileno en Haití fue atacado directa o indirec-

tamente (CHIBAT, 2017, p. 50–51). Los participantes informaron pocas de-

mostraciones de hostilidad y en su lugar sintieron que el uniforme con la

bandera chilena les trajo simpatías (Participante Grupo Focal 3). La actitud

acogedora e incluso agradecida del país receptor de la misión es importan-

te para que los cascos azules sientan que tienen un impacto. Es altamente

probable que eso mejore su valoración de la misión, creando así condicio-

nes más favorables al aprendizaje que si la misión es poco valorada.

Además, la situación de las fuerzas armadas en general hizo que el

aprendizaje fuera más probable. En parte dado su aislamiento durante la

dictadura, para la mayoría del personal el despliegue fue su primera ex-

periencia extendida en el extranjero y, como tal, muchos la describieron

como un momento decisivo. Un participante de un grupo focal se rerió a

la MINUSTAH como “la experiencia más linda de mi vida,” y nadie en el

grupo discrepó (Participante Grupo Focal 1, 2018). Un alto ocial en reti-

ro, después de una exitosa carrera en el Ejército, describió su designación

como observador militar en India-Pakistán como “la experiencia más im-

portante de mi vida” (Arancibia, 2018, entrevista). Profesionalmente, los

cascos azules valoraron la experiencia de servir en una misión real y, por

ende, puede suponerse que al menos estaban abiertos a la posibilidad de

aprender de las nuevas experiencias.

Nicole Jenne ¿Aumenta la parcipación en operaciones de paz la capacidad de las fuerzas armadas en

interactuar con actores civiles? Una evaluación del aprendizaje en el caso de las Fuerzas Armadas chilenas

Otro incentivo para el aprendizaje son los recursos: la remuneración y

el equipamiento. El estado chileno otorga un reconocimiento institucional

del desempeño de los cascos azules a través de pagos comparablemente altos.

Al ser desplegados, los miembros de las Fuerzas Armadas pueden obtener

hasta el triple de su sueldo habitual.

A modo de ejemplo, un teniente en la

misión en Chipre recibió casi US$ 5.500 mensuales en 2018,

cuando el ingre-

so promedio mensual de la población trabajadora en Chile es inferior a US$

1,000 (INE, 2019). Es probable que esta forma de reconocimiento refuerce la

moral de los efectivos, lo que debería aumentar su disposición a aprender.

Por otro lado, los recursos son importantes con respecto a las condi-

ciones en que se despliegan los cascos azules. Disponer de equipamiento

adecuado es relevante para mantener la moral de los militares (véase por

ejemplo GAUB, 2013), y Chile estaba bien preparado en este aspecto. Como

relató Mariano Fernández (2018, entrevista), quien se desempeñó como Jefe

de la MINUSTAH entre 2011 y 2013: “La contribución de Chile fue muy va-

lorada debido a su disposición en todo momento, a diferencia de otros con-

tingentes que por problemas materiales no podían hacer muchas cosas”.

Además del equipamiento, el personal chileno contaba con condi-

ciones de vida aceptables, si no cómodas. En MINUSTAH, el estado chi-

leno pagaba rotaciones de tropas cada seis meses, mientras que el periodo

habitual de la rotación que nancia la ONU es de un año. Aunque las con-

diciones para los primeros contingentes eran aún decientes, estas mejo-

raron rápidamente según lo dicho por un cabo que desplegó en 2014-2015:

“Sabia que estaba fuera de Chile solo porque no estaba con mi familia,

pero el resto lo tenía. Todas las regalías que uno tiene en Chile también

las tuve ahí” (Participante Grupo Focal 1).

En conjunto, el respaldo generalmente positivo que el personal de las

operaciones de paz chileno recibió por sus servicios tanto a nivel interno

como externo, muy probablemente reforzó la apertura hacia nuevas ex-

periencias y, por lo tanto, creó condiciones favorables para el aprendizaje.

Métodos

La metodología empleada combina un análisis histórico-instituciona-

lista del marco en el que ocurren las experiencias en operaciones de paz,

junto con la evidencia de distintos métodos participativos con miembros del

sector de seguridad y defensa de Chile. Estos comprendieron cinco grupos

focales con miembros de las fuerzas armadas que participaron en al me-

nos una operación de paz; una encuesta digital, a la cual respondieron 505

miembros de las fuerzas armadas con y sin experiencia en operaciones de

paz, y más de 40 entrevistas con militares, activos y en retiro, además de ci-

viles con experiencia en el ámbito de operaciones de paz, como por ejemplo

instructores de pre-despliegue y personal del Ministerio de Defensa. El enfo-

que en los actores militares se justica por el hecho de que los mecanismos

de aprendizaje son propios a la institución militar. El estudio fue autorizado

por la Subsecretaria de Defensa y el Estado Mayor Conjunto (EMCO).

Tabla 1 en el Anexo detalla el número de participantes en cada instru-

mento según institución y rango. Los datos demuestran la dominancia del

Ejército en la muestra, seguido por la Armada, especícamente la Infantería

2. Para el caso de MINUSTAH véase

KAUER TAPIA, 2006, p. 127 citando

DFL-1 (1999), Ley de presupuesto sector

Público No 19.915 (2003) y Ley No

18.948 Orgánica Constitucional de las

Fuerzas Armadas; SOTOMAYOR, 2004,

p. 296.

3. Información obtenida con el Comando

de la Armada, 31. 7. 2018.

estudos internacionais • Belo Horizonte, ISSN 2317-773X, v. 8, n. 2, (jun. 2020), p. 27 - 46

de Marina que participó en el batallón mixto de Chile en MINUSTAH. Con

un número de participantes muy reducido, para el caso de la Fuerza Aérea

(FACH) las conclusiones que se derivan del estudio deben de leerse con cui-

dado. No obstante, si ya en los casos del Ejército y de la Armada los aprendi-

zajes individuales no llegaron a traducirse en nuevos conocimientos institu-

cionales, es altamente probable que eso tampoco ocurrió en la FACH dado

que su participación en operaciones de paz ha sido relativamente menor.

Aprendiendo de operaciones de paz

En base de las entrevistas y grupos focales realizados para esta in-

vestigación, las experiencias de aprendizaje individuales en relación con

los actores civiles en operaciones de paz se pueden dividir en dos tipos

que serán analizados consecutivamente. El primero es un cambio en la

percepción a modo que los civiles dejen de ser una variable que inuye en

el teatro de operaciones, y se conviertan en el centro de atención en las mi-

siones militares. El segundo conjunto de experiencias de aprendizaje se re-

laciona con la interacción de los militares con los distintos actores civiles.

Civiles como parte integral de la misión militar

En 2017, el Ejército chileno adoptó la doctrina de Asuntos Civiles y

Administración Territorial (ACAT). Según un ocial que participó en el

proceso de cinco años para desarrollar el marco regulatorio, a través de

ACAT “los diferentes actores y la población civil en general adquieren un

papel central, por lo tanto, la relación con los civiles es esencial para que

la fuerza desplegada pueda cumplir la misión y alcanzar el objetivo nal

deseado” (Ocial Ejército I, 2018, entrevista). En línea con la nueva doc-

trina, poner a los civiles en un rol protagónico fue una de las experiencias

de aprendizaje que el personal desplegado en diferentes puestos en ope-

raciones de paz informo. La novedad no fue, como se podría pensar, que

los militares se preocuparan por los civiles; de hecho, un número signi-

cativo de los cascos azules que participaron en este estudio lamentó que

podrían haber hecho más en términos de ayuda humanitaria. En cambio,

las lecciones aprendidas fueron que a los civiles se les asignó un lugar cen-

tral dentro del marco de la misión militar, precisamente la base necesaria

para una relación integrada o al menos cooperativa, que es la relación

deseada en las operaciones de paz, gestión de riesgo en desastres, y otras.

Los militares chilenos sostuvieron ideas sobre su función en las

operaciones de paz y el papel de los civiles en ellas que cambiaron a través

de su experiencia en terreno. Un general del Ejército quien se desempeñó

como Comandante Adjunto y durante un periodo como Comandante de

la Fuerza multinacional de la MINUSTAH, tenía la percepción antes de la

asignación que “los procedimientos utilizados en las operaciones de paz,

podrían no ser útiles para el entrenamiento militar convencional” (Peña,

2018, entrevista). No fue la experiencia internacional en sí misma lo que

lo hizo cambiar de opinión –había estudiado años atrás en los Estados

Unidos–, sino su servicio en la misión que acercó las operaciones de paz a

lo que él sentía era la esencia de las fuerzas armadas:

Nicole Jenne ¿Aumenta la parcipación en operaciones de paz la capacidad de las fuerzas armadas en

interactuar con actores civiles? Una evaluación del aprendizaje en el caso de las Fuerzas Armadas chilenas

Me pude percatar de que uno, como militar, puede hacer mucho en operacio-

nes de paz empleando los medios y las capacidades de los militares como, por

ejemplo, el entrenamiento de nuestros ingenieros del Ejército en un país como

Haití donde la infraestructura vial es deciente. Los procedimientos de empleo,

también apuntaban a mejorar un entrenamiento convencional de las tropas por

el detalle de su instrucción y la mantención de un alto grado de alistamiento. En

denitiva, al emplear estas capacidades, se benecia el país y uno mismo, por la

experiencia de ayudar, sentirse útil y enfrentar situaciones complejas en condicio-

nes reales (Peña, 2018, entrevista).

Los integrantes de la Compañía Chileno-Ecuatoriana de Ingenieros

del Ejército para la Construcción Horizontal (CHIECUENGCOY) tam-

bién llegaron a tener nuevas percepciones sobre el papel de los militares

en las operaciones de paz y su relación con los civiles. Como informaron

participantes de un grupo focal, se habían marchado de Chile “pensando

que íbamos a ayudar a los haitianos, pero en realidad estábamos allí para

apoyar el componente militar de la misión” (Participante Grupo Focal 1).

La necesidad de MINUSTAH de conar en sus recursos centró la aten-

ción de CHIECUENGCOY en los civiles y su entorno, aunque de una

forma diferente a la que habían pensado. Los efectivos se desplegaron en

Haití, no como trabajadores humanitarios o de desarrollo, sino como una

ayuda directa para facilitar las tareas humanitarias a través de sus funcio-

nes militares, lo que les permitió traer a los civiles al centro de su atención

y ampliar su propia percepción de los roles militares.

Con los civiles en condiciones difíciles de ignorar, la actitud de que

los militares podrían “hacer algo” en el marco de su propia misión, es de-

cir, ir más allá de la mera coexistencia con actores civiles, no fue un hecho

dado sino se desarrolló a través de la experiencia en la misión (CARRAS-

CO GONZÁLEZ, 2005, p. 136). Esto se reeja también en que el concepto

de CIMIC

era básicamente desconocido en el Ejército chileno al menos

hasta en los primeros años de la MINUSTAH. CIMIC, que hace hincapié

en la integración de tareas civiles para alcanzar el objetivo de las fuerzas

de seguridad, es hoy en día un término comúnmente referido dentro de

las Fuerzas Armadas.

Para los nes de este estudio, la relevancia de CIMIC radica en el

enfoque del concepto en los civiles desde una perspectiva militar. Tradi-

cionalmente, CIMIC tiene funciones tanto humanitarias como de apoyo

a la guerra, aunque en términos prácticos está orientado a reducir la inter-

ferencia civil en los objetivos militares. Al menos en cierta medida, esta

visión se ha incorporado gradualmente a las percepciones de roles de los

participantes en las operaciones de paz.

Los primeros ociales del estado mayor designados para CIMIC

(U-9) tuvieron que “buscar en google qué era CIMIC” (Atán, 2018, entre-

vista; Serrano, 2018, entrevista). La compañía CHIECUENGCOY inicial-

mente ni siquiera implementó las actividades CIMIC a través del ocial

U-9, aludiendo a la falta de personal adecuadamente capacitado (DIVI-

SIÓN DOCTRINA, 2016, p. 109). La mayoría consideró que CIMIC era

una acción humanitaria de segundo orden más bien ajena a la misión

militar. Esta idea comenzó a cambiar a medida que los contingentes en

Haití implementaban actividades CIMIC y una cantidad considerable de

personal fue expuesto a los cursos de CIMIC durante la preparación de

4. En el marco de Naciones Unidas,

CIMIC es sinónimo de coordinación

civil-militar, mientras que CIMIC en las

doctrinas de la OTAN (Organización del

Tratado del Atlántico Norte), la Unión

Europea y Estados Unidos signiﬁca

cooperación civil-militar.

estudos internacionais • Belo Horizonte, ISSN 2317-773X, v. 8, n. 2, (jun. 2020), p. 27 - 46

pre-despliegue. “El batallón pensó que yo era una ONG uniformada”, re-

cordó uno de los primeros ociales CIMIC en MINUSTAH. Sin embargo,

hacia el nal de su turno, tuvo la impresión de que ya no pensaban que

él “estaba inventando actividades de ayuda humanitaria y divirtiéndose

mientras ellos patrullaban” (Serrano, 2018, entrevista).

Aquí, el efecto de aprendizaje radica precisamente en el énfasis en

los civiles dentro, más que afuera de la misión militar. La misma expe-

riencia de aprendizaje se reeja en el informe nal de CHIECUENGCOY,

que concluyó que las actividades CIMIC habían llevado al “desarrollo per-

sonal y profesional” de la unidad” (DIVISIÓN DOCTRINA, 2016, p. 123).

Las actividades CIMIC no fueron la única forma que provocó cam-

bios en las percepciones del rol militar frente a los civiles. Un infante de

marina que trabajó en una unidad de reconocimiento en Haití describió

cómo llegó a “ver a la población civil no al nal de una cadena de actuar,

sino como enfoque principal. Empiezas a preguntarte: ¿quién es este ac-

tor? Comienzas a tener interés por la gente y sus preocupaciones” (Atán,

2018, entrevista). De manera similar, un ocial del Ejército se rerió a las

relaciones entre civiles y militares como la experiencia de aprendizaje

más importante de lo que había experimentado en operaciones de paz en

Bosnia y República Centroafricana: “Lo que funcionaba bien en Bosnia

es un gran desafío aquí [en la República Centroafricana]; hay que generar

conanza para que la población local converse con la misión, hay que tra-

mitar el mensaje ‘ayúdenos para que te podemos ayudar, la misión depen-

de de ti’” (McCarthy, 2018, entrevista). Común a ambos casos es que los

civiles son reconocidos como centrales para la misión militar. Si bien de

esto no se desprende automáticamente un compromiso cualitativamente

mejor con las agencias civiles o la población en general, es la condición

previa necesaria para el éxito de las relaciones civil-militares.

La creciente participación de Chile en las operaciones de paz, sobre

todo su participación en Haití, ocurrió paralelamente a reformas en las Fuer-

zas Armadas que condujeron a mayor regulación y formalización. La mo-

dernización afectó a todas las áreas, incluida la relación de los militares con

civiles dentro del país, como por ejemplo a través de la adopción de doctrinas

sobre las Reglas para el Uso de la Fuerza (RUF). Si la experiencia de partici-

par en operaciones de paz afectó la incorporación de los nuevos marcos re-

gulatorios, es probable que fuera reforzada por el hábito de los cascos azules

de seguir las reglas escritas de Naciones Unidas, que la mayoría de los parti-

cipantes en este estudio percibían como “minuciosos” y “estrictos”. Si bien

podría debatirse si los nuevos conocimientos adquiridos se transeren de un

despliegue internacional al contexto nacional 1:1, al menos, la exposición a

las regulaciones de Naciones Unidas en las operaciones de paz aumentó la

conciencia de los militares respecto a los civiles en el contexto de su misión.

En conjunto, la evidencia presentada en esta sección muestra que

la participación en operaciones de paz ha llevado a aprendizajes indivi-

duales en lo que concierne a la importancia de integrar a los civiles como

parte de las misiones militares. A continuación, se examina cómo y si es

que las experiencias de las operaciones de paz afectaron la forma en que

los militares se relacionaban con las poblaciones civiles, agencias civiles y

ONGs, respectivamente.

Nicole Jenne ¿Aumenta la parcipación en operaciones de paz la capacidad de las fuerzas armadas en

interactuar con actores civiles? Una evaluación del aprendizaje en el caso de las Fuerzas Armadas chilenas

Modo de interacción con la población civil

En las operaciones de paz y especialmente en las llamadas misiones

multidimensionales, los militares cumplen tareas -involucrando a pobla-

ciones civiles- que habitualmente no realizan en su país de origen. En el

caso de Chile, estas fueron la realización de check points y la interacción con

detenidos, entre otros. Dado que no son rutinarias y considerando que las

operaciones de paz desempeñan solo un papel secundario para las Fuerzas

Armadas, estas tareas reciben poca o ninguna atención en los programas

de entrenamiento y educación militar. Sí existe hoy día una capacitación

previa al despliegue para el futuro personal de operaciones de paz, y hay

evidencia de que un proceso de aprendizaje mediante la práctica mejoró

la capacidad de los cascos azules para relacionarse con la población civil.

La falta de preparación y la reticencia que esto causó fue descrita

por un subocial que participó en la misión de la ONU en Camboya, una

de las primeras misiones donde Chile había desplegado tropas:

En Chile, nos dijeron que esa era una misión donde hay selva y guerrilla, y

dijimos ‘qué bueno, vamos’. Cuando llegamos y nos dijeron que teníamos que

trabajar con la población no nos gustaba, queríamos ir a patrullar la selva, para

eso estábamos entrenados (Subocial, 2018, entrevista).

Las expectativas no satisfechas causaron una actitud negativa hacia

la misión, pero los desafíos de la tarea eventualmente estimularon un

proceso de aprendizaje “a golpes”:

Al principio cuando nos tocó entrar en una villa entramos demasiado como mili-

tares, muy duro y gritando órdenes. Esto causó muchos problemas, así aprendi-

mos que lo teníamos que hacer de otra forma. Luego entramos con una bolsa de

dulces para los niños, conversando con la gente (Subocial, 2018, entrevista).

Común a las lecciones aprendidas en relación con los civiles es la

idea de que la proximidad con la población no afecta negativamente a

la autoridad del militar, sino que incluso puede beneciarla. Un ocial

explicó que su experiencia en MINUSTAH tuvo el efecto de que en un

segundo despliegue como observador militar:

Mi aproximación con la gente fue distinta. Sin mi experiencia previa en manteni-

miento de la paz, habría seguido las reglas más estrictamente. No es que haya actua-

do en contra de las reglas, sino que las reglas no dicen nada sobre las oportunidades

situacionales que pueden ser beneciosas, como entrar en contacto con las perso-

nas, bajarse del vehículo y tomarse un café con ellos (Serrano, 2018, entrevista).

Existe evidencia de que las experiencias obtenidas en misión viaja-

ron al contexto nacional. Un ocial a cargo de cuatro batallones desplega-

dos en la ciudad de Concepción para responder a la emergencia del severo

terremoto que azotó a Chile en 2010 encontró que:

Uno se dio cuenta claramente quién había estado en Haití y quién no. Los que

tenían experiencia de MINUSTAH eran más ecientes en su trabajo, tenían un

balance entre autoridad y respeto. Los que no tienen experiencia pueden o apli-

car demasiada fuerza, o carecer de autoridad (Atán, 2018, entrevista).

Es necesario tener en cuenta que el diseño de esta investigación no

capta las experiencias negativas en las relaciones civil-militar ni tampoco

las experiencias de aprendizaje perdidas. Lo que mostró esta sección es

que el mantenimiento de la paz efectivamente puede mejorar la capacidad

de los militares para relacionarse con las poblaciones civiles.

estudos internacionais • Belo Horizonte, ISSN 2317-773X, v. 8, n. 2, (jun. 2020), p. 27 - 46

Modo de interacción con ONGs y otras instituciones civiles

Las relaciones con los actores civiles en las operaciones de paz son

en su mayoría relevantes para los puestos de mayor rango y, en cierta

medida, para comandantes y ociales del estado mayor. Chile ha ocupado

pocos puestos de liderazgo en las misiones de la ONU, con la excepción

de MINUSTAH, donde cinco militares chilenos ocuparon el puesto de

Comandante Adjunto de la Fuerza. Para estos y para otros participantes

en la misión, la relación de trabajo menos conocida fue la interacción con

ONGs internacionales, algunas de las cuales son conocidas por una acti-

tud más bien distante hacia los militares (BYMAN, 2001, p. 103–104). Sin

embargo, en parte debido al cuidadoso proceso de selección de los Co-

mandantes Adjuntos, estos encontraron generalmente pocos problemas

e informaron que fueron “buscando formas de actuar que minimizaran

inconvenientes y asegurando que ambos lados pudiésemos cumplir con

los respectivos roles” (Toro, 2018, entrevista).

Ricardo Toro (2018, entrevista), quien se desempeñaba como Co-

mandante Adjunto cuando ocurrió el devastador terremoto de 2010, in-

formó que su experiencia en MINUSTAH le sirvió más tarde cuando fue

nombrado Director Nacional de la Ocina Nacional de Emergencia del

Ministerio del Interior y Seguridad Pública (ONEMI):

Reconocí la importancia de coordinar en la fase de prevención el cómo

buscar potenciar las capacidades entendiendo los objetivos de cada uno

[civiles y militares], con el objeto que cuando ocurra una emergencia

se tenga claro la forma de actuar y las restricciones por ambos lados

que ello conlleva. Ahora me adelanto a los probables escenarios que

pudiesen ocurrir.

Sin embargo, según el propio Toro, en su postura sobre las relacio-

nes entre civiles y militares si bien fue importante su experiencia en Hai-

tí, ello se complementó con el haber realizado un programa de maestría

en recursos humanos en una institución civil años antes:

En un momento de mi vida militar me di cuenta que era muy ‘milico’.

Además de prepararme para la guerra, necesitaba obtener otras capaci-

dades que me permitieran relacionarme más directamente con el mundo

civil (autoridades, voluntariado, etc.).

Esta y otras habilidades similares fueron resaltadas también por

un ocial que sirvió como comandante de contingente en MINUSTAH.

Después de su regreso, supo “cómo establecer una relación con las auto-

ridades civiles porque allí [en Haití], para cumplir la misión, tenía que

interactuar con el municipio, el alcalde, el hospital, etc.” (Urzúa, 2018,

entrevista). Si bien en este caso la necesidad parece haber desempeñado

un papel, hay otros ejemplos en los que el personal de las operaciones de

paz simplemente se dio cuenta de los benecios de cooperar con actores

civiles. Uno de los ociales CIMIC en MINUSTAH recordó reuniones se-

manales con representantes de distintas agencias humanitarias en el área

de responsabilidad del contingente. “En lugar de ir y reclamar un asiento

en frente de la mesa, nosotros [los militares] nos sentamos atrás como si

fuéramos simplemente otra parte invitada”, explicó (Serrano, 2018, entre-

vista). Según su juicio, poner a los militares a cargo de la reunión se ha-

Nicole Jenne ¿Aumenta la parcipación en operaciones de paz la capacidad de las fuerzas armadas en

interactuar con actores civiles? Una evaluación del aprendizaje en el caso de las Fuerzas Armadas chilenas

bría encontrado con resistencia, y habría impedido el intercambio abierto

de “información a menudo útil”.

Para que las distintas experiencias individuales de aprendizaje des-

critas se difundan, el vínculo con el nivel institucional como conjunto de

las Fuerzas Armadas es crucial. La siguiente sección discute los límites de

los mecanismos de aprendizaje formales e informales.

Del aprendizaje individual al organizacional: los límites de los mecanis-

mos de aprendizaje

Desde la publicación del llamado informe Brahimi en 2000 (UN,

2000), la ONU ha puesto énfasis en las relaciones entre los actores civiles y

el componente militar en las operaciones de paz. En el contexto chileno,

este aspecto se trata durante la preparación de pre-despliegue en CECO-

PAC, certicado por la ONU.

Como punto de contacto entre el personal de operaciones de paz

pasado y futuro, CECOPAC ha demostrado exibilidad para adaptarse

a los requerimientos especícos de las distintas misiones. Después de la

experiencia de los primeros contingentes en Haití, CECOPAC comen-

zó a introducir en sus cursos sesiones sobre negociación y mediación,

así como el tratar con los medios de comunicación (DIVISIÓN DOC-

TRINA, 2016, p. 52). Sin embargo, dado que estos cursos son de corta

duración, solo pueden proporcionar una introducción al tema. En una

encuesta digital implementada en el marco de este estudio, la mayoría

de los encuestados con experiencia en operaciones de paz (en total 251)

reportó que la interacción con distintos actores civiles generalmente

no implicó conictos y que sus unidades fueron preparadas para llevar

a cabo acciones CIMIC. Sin embargo, de un total de 449 militares (con

y sin experiencia en operaciones de paz), un 94 por ciento se mostró de

acuerdo con la armación que es necesario mejorar la interacción entre

las fuerzas armadas y actores civiles en las misiones que requieren la

participación de ambos.

El tema de las relaciones civil-militares ha sido lento en encontrar

el camino hacia el entrenamiento y la educación militar (Arancibia, 2018,

entrevista). La reciente adopción de la doctrina ACAT descrita anterior-

mente es un paso en esta dirección, al igual que los ejercicios de simula-

ción anuales VOLCANO practicados desde 2008 en el marco del Siste-

ma Nacional para la Protección de los Civiles. Los ejercicios consisten

en simulaciones de desastres nacionales y situaciones de emergencia que

requieren que las autoridades civiles y militares cooperen en la toma de

decisiones a nivel regional. No obstante, las relaciones entre civiles y mi-

litares no forman parte del plan de estudios en las escuelas militares de las

tres ramas, excepto para el nivel de ocial superior.

A parte de la capacitación y la educación, los mecanismos de apren-

dizaje formales incluyen canales para elaborar lecciones aprendidas.

Como autoridad coordinadora en el área del mantenimiento de la paz,

el EMCO recibe los informes semanales y los informes de nalización de

misión de todas las operaciones de paz. La Dirección de Operaciones y

Conducta Estratégica del EMCO identica los problemas planteados en

5. Las respuestas fueron: “muy de

acuerdo”: 204, “de acuerdo”: 218, “en

desacuerdo”: 21, “muy en desacuerdo”:

4, “no sé”: 2. La encuesta fue respondi-

da digitalmente entre agosto y octubre

del 2018.

estudos internacionais • Belo Horizonte, ISSN 2317-773X, v. 8, n. 2, (jun. 2020), p. 27 - 46

los informes y, en caso que se trate de asuntos de equipamiento, capacita-

ción o material, lo delega a la institución correspondiente. Sin embargo,

dado la falta de un enfoque especíco en la interacción civil-militar, no se

ha realizado ningún esfuerzo sistemático para identicar las fortalezas y

debilidades de los cascos azules chilenos en este ámbito.

Desde 2016, los informes proviniendo de las operaciones de paz se

comparten de forma automática con las tres instituciones. Cada una tiene

su propio centro de análisis, siendo el más importante en términos de

tamaño y recursos, el de la División de Doctrina del Ejército. Creada en

2006, la División tiene una unidad de lecciones aprendidas que actualmen-

te emplea a 16 personas quienes trabajan principalmente con los insumos

proporcionados por personal del Ejército. En 2016, se modicaron los pro-

cedimientos de información, para evitar los riesgos de reputación para la

futura carrera del informante. La unidad también envía sus propios ana-

listas a eventos seleccionados y puede interactuar de forma proactiva con

fuentes externas. A pesar de esto, es probable que no todos los problemas

relacionados con los diferentes aspectos de las relaciones entre civiles y

militares lleguen a la atención de la unidad de lecciones aprendidas. Los

criterios para un buen estándar de interacción entre civiles y militares no

están claramente denidos, y por eso son considerablemente más difíciles

de evaluar que procesos logísticos o la adaptación de equipamiento en

terreno, por ejemplo. Hasta el momento, no se ha propuesto ninguna mo-

dicación importante en el área de las relaciones civil-militares, aunque

se optimizaron procesos y procedimientos asociados mayoritariamente

al empleo de la fuerza en emergencias y catástrofes.

Sin un enfoque especíco en las relaciones civil-militares, los me-

canismos formales para procesar las experiencias vividas tienen un uso

limitado. Eso se reeja en el caso de varios ociales que participaron en la

misión de la Unión Europea en Bosnia, donde, según reportaron, fueron

particularmente bien recibidos por la población (Ocial Ejército II, 2018,

entrevista; Ocial Ejército III, 2018, entrevista). Los ociales atribuyeron

la facilidad de interactuar con la gente a una supuesta forma “latina” de

acercarse a las personas, cuando la verdadera razón probablemente es que

los chilenos hayan sido percibidos como neutrales en una misión donde la

mayoría de los estados europeos contribuyentes tienen una posición clara

en los conictos de los Balcanes vinculada a sus intereses nacionales. En

todo caso, sin un esfuerzo sistemático para evaluar tales experiencias, sus

posibles efectos de aprendizaje se pierden.

El hecho de disponer de un número relativamente pequeño de

canales formales para el aprendizaje no es necesariamente problemático

si las experiencias se comparten a través de canales informales. Muchos

de los entrevistados y entrevistadas informaron que tomaron contacto

con la persona que anteriormente había ocupado el puesto que iban

a asumir para recibir información en términos informales. Este con-

tacto es relativamente fácil de establecer en fuerzas comparativamente

pequeñas (las Fuerzas Armadas chilenas cuentan con menos de 65,000

efectivos), aunque, aparte de estos intercambios orientados a objetivos

especícos, las formas institucionalizadas de intercambios informales

parecen ser limitadas.

6. Información proporcionada por Guil-

lermo Cruz Valdés, Jefe de Lecciones

Aprendidas, División de Doctrina, 28.

2. 2019.

Nicole Jenne ¿Aumenta la parcipación en operaciones de paz la capacidad de las fuerzas armadas en

interactuar con actores civiles? Una evaluación del aprendizaje en el caso de las Fuerzas Armadas chilenas

Cabe señalar que, salvo por la excepción de MINUSTAH con su

participación masiva, los cascos azules chilenos generalmente han sido

ociales altamente capacitados con varios años de servicio, es decir, per-

sonas con un grado de autoridad para transmitir su experiencia dentro de

la institución. Está fuera del alcance de este estudio evaluar en qué me-

dida ellos han servido como multiplicadores de conocimiento en torno a

las relaciones civil-militares a través de conversaciones personales o expe-

riencias en el aula. Lo que sí es posible señalar en términos generales es

una cultura organizacional que muestra “poca apertura a la autocrítica”

(Fuentealba, 2018, entrevista). Eso se reeja por ejemplo en las relaciones

conservador-jerárquicas dentro de las Fuerzas Armadas y en el carácter

reservado de todo tipo de información, incluyendo a información que es

de acceso público en otros países con un alto nivel de profesionalismo mi-

litar. La falta de autoridad del EMCO en relación con las instituciones in-

dividualmente refuerza la tendencia a evadir el escrutinio crítico, ya que

cada una de las tres ramas busca evitar exponer deciencias. Por ende, se

llevó a cabo un único seminario conjunto sobre “Lecciones Aprendidas

en Haití” después de que la misión hubiera terminado. En este encuen-

tro cada fuerza resaltó cómo se resolvieron los problemas prácticos que

surgieron en el proceso de administrar, por primera vez en su historia,

un despliegue internacional de varias docenas hasta varios cientos de per-

sonas. Sin embargo, no se presentaron reexiones más amplias sobre la

preparación militar en relación con los requisitos de las operaciones de

paz contemporáneas, incluido las relaciones civil-militares.

En conjunto, los mecanismos disponibles para la difusión de nue-

vos conocimientos sobre las relaciones entre civiles y militares parecen

ser limitados. Esto sugiere que los efectos de aprendizaje individual des-

critos anteriormente mantenían su carácter de “conocimiento implícito”

de la práctica en terreno, ya que su transmisión al nivel institucional no

se produjo. Dado la falta de una retroalimentación positiva desde la ins-

titución, el tercer paso en el modelo de aprendizaje organizacional, es

cuestionable también cuán persistente el aprendizaje individual será en

el tiempo. A nivel doctrinal, las relaciones civil-militares han permaneci-

do subordinadas al papel tradicional de los militares como combatientes

donde los civiles son meramente una variable de entorno (véase también

Jenne 2020). Al mismo tiempo, la expansión del rol militar a través de la

participación en operaciones de paz no ha llevado a un cambio funda-

mental en la forma en que las fuerzas armadas como conjunto se perciben

a sí mismos frente a los actores civiles. Eso contrasta con la imagen públi-

ca que se ha buscado crear de las operaciones de paz como misiones hu-

manitarias. Para las fuerzas armadas, las nuevas tareas en operaciones de

paz, en la forma en que se presentaron, se asimilaron fácilmente al marco

conocido de la guerra donde los civiles no son centrales para la misión.

Conclusiones

La mayor capacidad para interactuar con actores civiles a menu-

do se incluye entre los benecios ostensivos que obtienen las fuerzas

armadas de la participación en operaciones de paz. Dentro de la misión

estudos internacionais • Belo Horizonte, ISSN 2317-773X, v. 8, n. 2, (jun. 2020), p. 27 - 46

tradicional de guerra, las autoridades civiles, las agencias humanitarias

y las poblaciones civiles han recibido poca o ninguna consideración. Sin

embargo, a medida que se introdujeron cambios con respecto a los roles

de las fuerzas armadas y los contextos en donde operan, la necesidad de

una relación cooperativa o incluso integrada entre los actores militares

y civiles ha tomado cada vez más importancia (véase las contribuciones

en RIETJENS; BOLLEN, 2008). Este estudio se propuso evaluar empíri-

camente si el mantenimiento de la paz introduce cambios en las fuerzas

armadas. Especícamente, se abordó la pregunta de cómo y si es que la

participación en las operaciones de paz reformó a las fuerzas armadas

chilenas con respecto a su interacción con actores civiles.

Las proposiciones que se deriven de un caso singular no son auto-

máticamente aplicables a otros. Sin embargo, dado la escasa evidencia

empírica sobre los aprendizajes a partir de la participación en opera-

ciones de paz, en caso chileno entrega algunas primeras conclusiones

generales y permite avanzar en una agenda de investigación sobre los

posibles efectos transformadores derivados de las operaciones de paz.

En primer lugar, se demostró que efectivamente las operaciones de paz

pueden llevar a aprendizajes individuales en los efectivos desplegados.

Sin embargo, en el caso chileno, los nuevos conocimientos no se tradu-

jeron del nivel individual al nivel institucional, como ha sido el supues-

to generalmente asumido. El proceso de aprendizaje organizacional

ha sido incompleto dado la falta de difusión generalizada del nuevo

conocimiento que haría posible la posterior retroalimentación desde

la institución hacia los individuos, consolidando así los nuevos cono-

cimientos. A nivel institucional, por ende, las operaciones de paz no

dieron lugar a cambios fundamentales en las percepciones dominantes

en las fuerzas armadas sobre las relaciones civil-militares. La consi-

deración de si tal cambio es deseable no es parte de este trabajo, sino

depende del rol que les adscribe el poder político a las fuerzas armadas.

En este sentido, es oportuno recordar que las relaciones civil-militares

dependen de partes iguales de la contraparte civil, que tiene la respon-

sabilidad de denir los términos bajo los cuales se lleva a cabo el qué

hacer de las fuerzas armadas.

Durante la última década, las operaciones de paz han ido per-

diendo su posición como misión subsidiaria más importante de las

Fuerzas Armadas chilenas, en términos de legitimar su función y re-

cursos. De hecho, el número de cascos azules chilenos ha disminui-

do dramáticamente desde que la MINUSTAH terminó a nes de 2017.

Además de la defensa nacional, la misión militar más visible y pro-

minente actualmente es la ayuda humanitaria y la asistencia en casos

de desastre. Existen interesantes sinergias entre ambas misiones con

respecto a la capacidad de los militares para interactuar con actores ci-

viles. Sin embargo, si la ayuda humanitaria y asistencia en desastres se

practica igual que las operaciones de paz, como otra forma de la misión

tradicional, sin el énfasis necesario en desarrollar la capacidad para la

cooperación civil-militar y las relaciones de trabajo integradas, los re-

sultados de esta investigación indican que los efectos de aprendizajes

en terreno podrían ser limitados.

Nicole Jenne ¿Aumenta la parcipación en operaciones de paz la capacidad de las fuerzas armadas en

interactuar con actores civiles? Una evaluación del aprendizaje en el caso de las Fuerzas Armadas chilenas

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Entrevistas citadas

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Grupo Focal 3, Santiago, 1. 6. 2018

Anexo 1

Tabla 1 - Composición de participantes por institución y rango.

Entrevistas Grupos focales (5 en total) Encuesta

Armada 6 14 147

Ejército 26 16 237

FACH 1 2 24

Civiles 13 1 -

No especiﬁcado - - 97

Total 46 32 505

Oﬁciales Generales 13 - 21

Oﬁciales Superiores 8 1 19

Oﬁciales Jefes 11 5 107

Oﬁciales Subalternos 1 5 32

Suboﬁciales Mayores - - 4

Suboﬁciales - 6 49

Clases - 15 161

Soldados de tropa profesional - - 14

No especiﬁcado - - 98

Anna Molnár e Lili Takács Italy: an aspiring mediterranean middle power wavering between bilateralism and mullateralism

Italy: an aspiring mediterranean middle

power wavering between bilateralism and

multilateralism

Itália: uma potente potência média mediterrânea

oscilando entre bilateralismo e multilateralismo

Italia: una aspirante a potencia media mediterránea

oscilante entre bilateralismo y multilateralismo

Anna Molnár

Lili Takács

DOI: 10.5752/P.2317-773X.2020v8.n2.p47

Received in September 01, 2019

Accepted in December 16, 2019

A

Italy managed to be an important actor in European aairs, its status as middle

power was several times called into question. Italy’s domestic political instability,

the frequent government crises, severe economic and nancial problems hinder

the country’s goal to become a recognized middle power, especially in the

Mediterranean region. Bilateral and multilateral tools are used alternately by

government coalitions to carry out foreign policy which has been dominated by

migration. Due to the afore-mentioned internal problems security and defence

policy is not capable of supporting foreign policy to the necessary extent.

Keywords: Italy. Mediterranean. Middle power. Armed forces. Foreign policy.

R

A Itália conseguiu ser um ator importante nos assuntos europeus, seu status de

potência média foi questionado várias vezes. A instabilidade política doméstica

da Itália, as frequentes crises governamentais, os graves problemas econômicos

e nanceiros dicultam o objetivo do país de se tornar uma potência média

reconhecida, especialmente na região do Mediterrâneo. Ferramentas bilaterais

e multilaterais são usadas alternadamente por coalizões governamentais para

levar a efeito a política externa que foi dominada pela migração. Devido aos

problemas internos acima mencionados, a política de segurança e defesa não é

capaz de apoiar a política externa na medida necessária.

Palavras chave: Itália. Região mediterrânea. Potência média. Forças armadas.

Política externa

1. Anna Molnár is an Associate

Professor at the National University of

Public Service (Budapest) and Head of

the Department of International Security

Studies. She is the Head of International

Public Management bachelor’s program.

She was the Head of Programme of

MA in international studies at the

University of Pannonia at the University

of Pannonia (Institute of Social Sciences

and International Studies, Veszprém) be-

tween 2010 and 2013. She received her

Ph.D. in international relations from the

Corvinus University of Budapest (2003).

Her published papers cover a wide

range of topics whose central theme is

focusing on security studies, EU CFSP/

CSDP, europeanization of Hungary, the

European Union’s Mediterranean policy

and on the Italian history and politics.

She gives courses at Hungarian and

foreign universities on European inte-

gration, international studies and Italian

politics. She had a Bolyai Research

Fellowship of the Hungarian Academy

of Science (2007–2010). ORCID: 0000-

0002-7958-6985

2. Lili Takács is a PhD candidate at

Doctoral School of Military Sciences at

the National University of Public Service

in Budapest. Her research focuses

on Italian foreign and security policy

within the Mediterranean region, and

Italian-Libyan relations. ORCID: 0000-

0001-9085-6168

estudos internacionais • Belo Horizonte, ISSN 2317-773X, v. 8, n. 2, (jun. 2020), p. 47 - 69

R

Italia logró ser un actor importante en los asuntos europeos, su condición

de poder medio fue cuestionada en varias ocasiones. La inestabilidad política

interna de Italia, las frecuentes crisis gubernamentales, los graves problemas

económicos y nancieros obstaculizan el objetivo del país de convertirse en una

potencia media reconocida, especialmente en la región mediterránea. Las herra-

mientas bilaterales y multilaterales son utilizadas alternativamente por coali-

ciones gubernamentales para llevar a cabo una política exterior que ha estado

dominada por la migración. Debido a los problemas internos antes menciona-

dos, la política de seguridad y defensa no es capaz de apoyar la política exterior

en la medida necesaria.

Palabras clave: Italia. Mediterráneo. Poder medio. Fuerzas Armadas.

Política exterior.

Introduction

Ever since the end of World War II – but more from the Risorgi-

mento – Italy always tried to be recognized as a real European power,

preferably equal to France and Great Britain, its goal has been entering the

restricted club of decision maker major powers. Italy has always dened

itself as a middle power, although its international ranking is constantly

changing, it can be considered as “the last one amongst the big ones, rst

one amongst the small ones.” (BONVICINI; COLOMBO, 2011, p. 12).

The aim of this paper is to analyse the main directions of Italian

foreign and security policies and the intrinsically linked development of

its armed forces during the crisis of the so called “second republic”. We

intend to analyse the military strength and also the foreign and security

strategies of this middle power. The rst chapter of the study provides a

conceptualisation of middle powers and displays the main characteristics

based on which we consider Italy a middle power. We provide a general

outlook on how middle powers have been discussed by scholars in aca-

demic literature. The second chapter examines the main directions of

Italian foreign policy, the third one analyses the most important strategic

documents, then the current programme of forces development (Docu-

mento Programmatico Pluriennale, DPP) is displayed. The main trends of

defence expenditures and Italy’s contribution to international missions

are analysed in the last part of the study. Using the methodology of docu-

ment analysis, this research is based on governmental and parliamentary

sources, news items, speeches, interviews and reports.

Italy as a middle power

The denition of middle powers, their structure, their role and

their behaviour has become subject of studies only after the end of the

bipolar era when researches started to focus on the relationship between

the US and its minor allies. However, the academic interest towards the

concept of middle powers is still scarce, even though the bipolar system

represented an exception in the history of international politics, as previ-

ous centuries were characterised by a multipolar power system, where

Anna Molnár e Lili Takács Italy: an aspiring mediterranean middle power wavering between bilateralism and mullateralism

the most stable political entities were middle sized. Historian Paul Ken-

nedy states that throughout the 19th century middle powers were the

decisive actors in the international arena (KENNEDY, 1987). As for a long

time middle powers were characterised as ‘good international citizens’

without further specics, no commonly accepted denition exists. In our

analysis we accept Adam Chapnick’s functional denition according to

him middle powers are basically small powers which temporarily evolve

to a middle status as a function of their contribution to a specic interna-

tional issue (CHAPNICK, 1999).

Several attempts were made to classify states based on aggregated

economic criteria. For example Holbraad made a classication of powers

using GDP and population as indicators in his article ‘Middle Powers in

International Politics’, however it resulted that both Japan and Nigeria

can be dened as middle power in spite of the economical and other huge

dierences within these countries. As a result of these kind of analytical

shortcomings, and of the fact that with qualitative tools it is hard to dis-

tinguish between regional powers and middle powers the quantitative

approach has been abandoned and a qualitative approach started to dom-

inate academic debates. Newer studies indicate that in the New World

Order behavioural and diplomatic indicators are more decisive at the ex-

pense of military and economic factors, thus middle powers are dened

by the dimension of their diplomatic networks and the issues promoted

within the international community (BISCOTTINI, 2016). Studies using

mixed methodology - combining statistical, normative and behavioural

method - are the most recent attempts to redene middle powers. J. Ping

in his work Middle Power Statecraft aims at identifying middle powers in

Asia and in the Pacic region rst by collecting all the countries of the re-

gion based on the composition of international organizations then by us-

ing the following analytical tools: population, geographic area, military

expenditure, GDP, GDP real growth, value of exports, GNI per capita,

trade as a percentage of GDP and life expectancy at birth. There seems to

be an accordance amongst scholars about the behaviour of middle pow-

ers, many authors have dened middle power behaviour as characterized

by such traits as mediation, coalition-building, multilateralism, and com-

promise brokerage (COOPER, 1997; COOPER; HIGGOTT; NOSSAL,

1997; HIGGOTT; COOPER, 1990; HOLBRAAD, 1971). Indeed, middle

powers are most often characterized by their tactics: compromising,

building coalitions, participating in international organizations, forging

consensus and maintaining international order (STEPHEN, 2013).

[f]rom military point of view – based on capabilities – Martin Wright dened

middle power as “a power with such military strength, resources and strategic

position that in peacetime the great powers bid for its support, and in wartime,

while it has no hope of winning a war against a great power, it can hope to inict

costs on a great power out of proportion to what the great power can hope to

gain by attacking it. (WRIGHT, 1978, p. 65)

Since all of the above mentioned denitions have shortcomings,

we use synthetic concept of middle power as it was stated by Matthew

Stephen: rstly, middle power should denote a state with middling ma-

terial capabilities. Secondly, only those states with middling material ca-

pabilities and the behavioural traits of middlepowermanship qualify as

estudos internacionais • Belo Horizonte, ISSN 2317-773X, v. 8, n. 2, (jun. 2020), p. 47 - 69

middle powers. In other words, both middle capabilities and middle pow-

er behaviour are necessary conditions for middle power status, but only

simultaneous fullment of both criteria is sucient to qualify as a middle

power (STEPHEN, 2013).

Based on our accepted denition, Italy can be considered a middle

power from behavioural and functional points of views. Italy is member

of the G7, it is one of the oldest supporter and one of the funding mem-

bers of the European integration process. Italy is an active participant

of international peace keeping missions and operations According to the

2018 statistics of the International Monetary Fund Italy has the eights

economy in the world (INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, 2018).

In military strength rankings Italy has been ranked somewhere between

the eights-eleventh place for the last few years, from Europe it has been

outranked only by France, the United Kingdom and Germany (GLOBAL

FIREPOWER, 2018). From the fties U.S. tactical nuclear weapons have

been stationed on Italian soil. At the same time it has to be highlighted

that France and the United Kingdom have always been more visible and

active within the NATO and the European Union, due to several reasons:

Italy’s domestic political instability, the frequent government crises, se-

vere economic and nancial problems as a consequence of slow increase

or stagnation of Italian economy since the middle of the nineties all hin-

dered Italy’s international activity and damaged its reputation. In spite of

its internal problems Italy is actively participating in international orga-

nizations, promoting multilateralism which usually prevails over bilater-

alism in its foreign policy.

Main directions of Italian foreign policy

Italian foreign policy’s strategic framework can be considered sta-

ble since it was formed after the Second World War. Its pillars are Europe-

an integration (EU); relations with the United States and the Atlanticism

of NATO; and Mediterranean relations characterised mainly by bilateral

relations with countries on the southern shores of the Mediterranean Sea

and by the EU framework, the so-called Union for the Mediterranean

(GILLI; UNGARO et al, 2015).

Although the strategic framework of Italian foreign policy re-

mained mostly intact as the Second Republic was born at the beginning

of the nineties, the centre of its gravity shifted often. In the centre of the

foreign policy carried out by centre-right governments from the middle

of the nineties we nd Atlantic values: strong ties to the U.S. and Israel,

and the intensication of bilateral relations driven by personal and eco-

nomic relations, as it can be seen in the cases of Libya and Russia. In the

same period the foreign policy of centre-left governments focused more

on deepening European integration, they had a more open attitude to-

wards Arab states, and preferred multilateralism over bilateralism. Alto-

gether, in spite of the shifts of focus, Italian foreign policy can be charac-

terised by a particular combination of bilateral and multilateral relations

and by the so-called ‘Levante approach’ (BONVICINI; COLOMBO, 2011)

which focuses on external trade policy considerations.

Anna Molnár e Lili Takács Italy: an aspiring mediterranean middle power wavering between bilateralism and mullateralism

In its traditional foreign policy and geopolitical target areas (Bal-

kans, Mediterranean, partly the Central European region) Italy has al-

ways been slightly confronting with other European powers (e.g. France,

Great-Britain, Germany) which also wanted to extend their sphere of in-

uence there. It has to be highlighted that Italy rarely played a decisive

role in the international arena and even when it did, it was only for a short

period, as it can be seen in the case of Libya. Italy was hit hard by the 2008

nancial crisis and due to the long-lasting economic crisis, the interna-

tional marginalisation of the country increased (BONVICINI; COLOM-

BO, 2010; COLOMBO, 2014).

Since the beginning of 2000s one of the main challenges of Italian

security and foreign policy was how to tackle illegal migration. Before

the Arab Spring (2011) Italian governments, lacking a genuine European

migration and asylum policy, used bilateral tools to tackle illegal migra-

tion. During the period of 2001-2006 and of 2008-2011, political parties (es-

pecially the Northern League) of the centre-right governments of Silvio

Berlusconi made illegal migration a national security issue.

The Second Republic of Italy plunged into a deepening internal and

external, political and nancial crisis in 2011. From this period on, Italian

foreign and security policy’s priorities focused explicitly on dual crisis

management: addressing the nancial-economic problems and challeng-

es posed by illegal migration. In 2011 the sovereign debt crisis reached

Italy, and the Italian sovereign debt market was on the brink of collapse

which could have meant that Italy would have to leave the Eurozone.

In the same year the deteriorating security situation resulting from the

Arab Spring and from the collapse of Ghedda’s system in Libya lead to

the increase of illegal migration through the Mediterranean Sea. Italy’s

situation was aggravated by the fact that the head of the centre-right

government, Silvio Berlusconi’s international reputation eroded gradu-

ally and the country sank into a foreign political isolation in the second

half of 2011. After Berlusconi resigned in November 2011, Mario Monti’s

technocratic government tried to improve Italy’s situation. Even though

Monti’s foreign policy did not dier signicantly from its predecessor’s

policies, the country’s international reputation improved considerably af-

ter he was appointed Prime Minister. Monti emphasised the importance

of multilateral relations, in contrast to Berlusconi’s preference of bilateral

and personal relations (MOLNÁR, 2012).

After the Arab Spring, the collapse of Libya posed new challenges

for Italian politics. The Italian governments of recent years have dealt

with illegal migration using both bilateral and European crisis manage-

ment tools. Although the major Italian political parties have been divided

over the governments’ responses to illegal migration since 2013, the Ital-

ian governments have managed to balance realist (pragmatic) and “Euro-

peanized” approaches.

Following the nancial and political crisis of 2011 several coalition

governments based on the cooperation of centre-left and centre-right par-

ties tried to strengthen Italy’s international role in order to avoid interna-

tional marginalisation. Since 2011 several Italian diplomats have achieved

key positions within European institutions: Mario Draghi in the Euro-

estudos internacionais • Belo Horizonte, ISSN 2317-773X, v. 8, n. 2, (jun. 2020), p. 47 - 69

pean Central Bank, Federico Mogherini as High Representative of the

Union for Foreign Aairs and Security Policy, Antonio Tajani as Presi-

dent of the European Parliament, General Claudio Graziano as head of

the EU’s Military Committee. These improved Italy’s negotiating power

and reputation, and the country’s foreign policy became more visible for

the European Union. However, this trend has been reversed by the Con-

te administration’s more Eurosceptic attitude, and Italian foreign policy

became once again more confrontational.

From 2011, in the period of dual crisis management Italian govern-

ments put focus on European integration – while maintaining strong At-

lantic relations – since they considered the European Union an adequate

tool for crisis management and thereby for the representation of national

interests. After the general elections of 2013, during the XVIII legislature

three coalition governments were in power: Enrico Letta’s government

(from April 2013 to February 2014) was followed by Matteo Renzi (Febru-

ary 2014 to December 2016) and then by Renzi’s former Minister of For-

eign Aairs, Paolo Gentiloni (from December 2016 to the end of the leg-

islature). The foreign policy of all three above-mentioned governments

concentrated on addressing the challenges of economic-nancial prob-

lems and migration-refugee crises. On the whole, Italian national inter-

ests were represented in a European disguise, a federalist EU policy with

the explicit goal of deepening European integration was in the centre of

Italian foreign policy.

After almost 400 migrants drowned near Lampedusa in October

2013, the Letta government approved ‘Mare Nostrum’ humanitarian-mil-

itary mission (DA MARE..., 2017). The primary goal was to manage the

crisis on European level, and Italy became the main advocate of EU’s joint

action. In 2014 during the Italian Presidency of the European Council,

migration became one of the key priorities (PREZIDENZA ITALIANA

DEL CONSIGLIO DELL’UNIONE EUROPEA, 2014). However, the real-

ization of the ambitious foreign policy goals was hindered by the insu-

ciency of human and material resources at disposal (MAGRI, 2013).

‘The European Union remained the principal eld of action of

Italian foreign policy during the Renzi government: the country ex-

pressed itself in favour of a joint European action in order to reduce

migratory pressure. By actively contributing to the EU’s public dis-

course about migration, Italy’s foreign policy goal was to avoid further

marginalization and to strengthen the country’s role in the integration.

However, the internal structural problems (e.g. high public debt, lack of

economic growth) set back Italy’s eorts to carry out decisive foreign

policy (GRECO, 2016).

The Italian Presidency of the Council in the second part of 2014

contributed signicantly to the improvement of the country’s reputation.

Federica Mogherini’s appointment as High Representative of the Union

for Foreign Aairs and Security Policy can be seen as the success of Italian

diplomacy’s activities. In November 2014 the unilateral Italian mission of

Mare Nostrum was replaced by Frontex’s Triton operation. This was an

important step for Italy and even though Triton’s scope and budget was

remarkably smaller, it was a joint European mission. In 2015 partly due to

Anna Molnár e Lili Takács Italy: an aspiring mediterranean middle power wavering between bilateralism and mullateralism

an Italian proposal and to the active role of High Representative Mogher-

ini, the EU decided to enlarge the scope and budget of Triton; to start EU-

NAVFOR MED joint military operation and to elaborate the main pillars

of common migration and asylum policy.

Italian governments actively contributed to the debate on the fu-

ture of European defence. In August 2016 the Gentiloni-government

elaborated the plan of the so-called ‘Schengen for Defence’, a plan for a

deeper integration in the eld of common security and defence. It pro-

posed two possible solutions: building on the potential of the Lisbon

Treaty (strengthening the cooperation of PESCO (Permanent Structured

Cooperation), the 44th article or the defence industry) or creating a so-

called ‘Schengen for Defence’. In the latter case a group of member states

– rst of all the founding members – would create a multinational Eu-

ropean force with its own budget and command under the ‘Schengen

for Defence’. According to the plan the cooperation would be open for

other member states to join. This new form of cooperation would then

be transposed gradually into the EU Treaties (GENTILONI; PINOTTI,

2016; MOLNÁR, 2018a).

After Matteo Renzi resigned, Paolo Gentiloni took his position as

Prime Minister. Gentiloni pursued the same foreign policy by focusing

on joint, EU-level solutions and bilateral negotiations in order to address

migration and refugee crisis to stop the ow of illegal migrants arriv-

ing via the central Mediterranean route. At the same time Italy support-

ed by all possible means the internationally recognized Government of

National Accord in Libya (e.g. the Hippocrates mission, deployment of

two military ships to Libya and the decision to send 100 Carabinieri to

Libya’s southern border) (MINISTERIO DELLA DIFESA, 2016). Italian

Special Forces have been deployed to Libya since 2016 (RAME, 2016). The

rst signs of reducing migration successfully emerged while the Genti-

loni-government was in power. The role of Minister of Interior Marco

Minniti cannot be denied in the process, since he was responsible for ne-

gotiating and concluding agreements with smaller Libyan power groups

(PARAVICINI, 2017).

The decades old economic problems, the lack of expected growth,

the protracted addressing of illegal migration from Libya had a negative

eect on the re-election chances of the ruling coalition led by Gentiloni.

Parallel to this process, the public condence in European institutions

declined signicantly (EUROBAROMETER, 2018).

After the general elections of 2018 Lega and Movimento 5 Stelle

gained power and made illegal migration a national security issue. The

strategic planning of the new Eurosceptic and populist coalition diers

considerably from the former governments’, it does not follow the ‘tradi-

tional’ directions of the last decades. The Eurosceptic government’s most

spectacular foreign policy shift is the alienation from the German-French

political trends.

The Conte-government’s rhetorical goals are in a clear contrast

with previous governments. Rome – opposed to the will of the previous

government – did not support the participation in the European Interven-

tion Initiative proposed by French President Emmanuel Macron (DIBEN-

estudos internacionais • Belo Horizonte, ISSN 2317-773X, v. 8, n. 2, (jun. 2020), p. 47 - 69

EDETTA, 2018). The new government’s position on addressing migrant

and refugee crisis became more radical, as it was conrmed when Italian

ports were shut down in front of the rescue ships of NGOs. Although the

number of conicts between Rome and the EU is growing, it needs to be

highlighted that Italy is still interested in a European solution.

As it was shown, Italian foreign policy became gradually dominat-

ed by the tackling of illegal migration since the beginning of the 2000s.

This trend was given a new impetus by the Arab Spring and the collapse

of Libya, as security aspects of the problems became more evident, ur-

gent steps needed to be taken by Italian decision-makers. The govern-

ments alternated bilateral and multilateral tools in search of an eective

solution, however in the absence of a functioning common refugee and

asylum policy, bilateral relations tend to be preferred in tackling migra-

tion, while multilateral relations – through the nancial mechanisms of

the EU – are used to handle economic and nancial problems. The bilat-

eral handling of illegal migration is strengthened by the fact that the new

government coalition explicitly made migration a national security issue.

Strategic documents of Italian foreign and security policy

In spite of pressing foreign policy challenges, no foreign and se-

curity policy strategy was prepared on a national level until 2015. Even

though a number of strategic documents existed, there was no real, com-

prehensive national security strategy, the White Book of Defence

, 2002

(MINISTERO DELLA DIFESA, 2002) can be considered the last one. This

White Book focused on new threats - mainly ethnical conicts - arriving

from the South and South-East; in sharp contrast with the White Book of

1985 which put the bipolar world’s traditional East-West confrontation in

the centre of its attention. The new White Book paid particular attention

to the threats emerging after 9/11 and on global war on international ter-

rorism. In connection with the afore-mentioned threat, armed forces had

new tasks: the focus of their activities shifted from direct area protection

to international missions, from military personnel to infrastructure and

equipment. In this period the new goal of increasing defence expendi-

tures emerged (MINISTERO DELLA DIFESA, 2002).

Another document setting out the directions of foreign and secu-

rity policy was the ‘Report 2020 – choices of foreign policy’ prepared in

2008 during the Prodi government. The Report emphasized three main

areas of crisis zones: Western Balkans, the so-called enlarged Mediter-

ranean (Mediterraneo Allargato) and Afghanistan, as a clear clarication

of the fact that from the Italian point of view crises zones had moved

from the East to the South. As a consequence of its geographic location,

Italy is particularly exposed to threats arriving from these areas, but at

the same time it has to be taken into account that these zones are eco-

nomically important for Italy. This document gave priority to the tack-

ling illegal migration coming from the Balkans and the Mediterranean

Region. According to this strategy it was not enough to rely on bilateral

treaties, but more international and European cooperation were needed

(DASSÚ; MASSARI, 2008).

3. Libro bianco della Difesa

Anna Molnár e Lili Takács Italy: an aspiring mediterranean middle power wavering between bilateralism and mullateralism

Even though no ocial medium- and long-term strategy was sub-

mitted, we can interpret the annual decree of the Minister of Defence

about next year’s security duties

as a short-term strategic framework for

Italian armed forces. The decree analyses international environment, se-

curity duties and nancial resources needed to their realization on an

annual basis.

The lack of a comprehensive foreign and security policy framework

had been apparent even before the necessary reforms were started. The

public and political debate in progress since the Berlusconi government

about the acquisition of 90 F35 Joint Strike Fighter revealed the necessity

for elaborating reform plans. After the political, public and stakeholder

debate in 2014 the new White Book on Italian foreign and security policy

was published in 2015 (MINISTERO DELLA DIFESA, 2015).

The White Book aimed at preparing the reorganization of armed

forces and at continuing to carry out the reforms started in 2012 by then

Minister of Defence Giampaolo Di Paola. Structural and budgetary reor-

ganisation was a primary goal of the reform process. Based on this docu-

ment, the rst pillar of Italy’s security is the European Union, the second

one is NATO, however, strong ties to the countries of the transatlantic

region and active participation in joint initiatives are equally important.

Regarding the EU, the White Book determined Italian support to deepen

Common Security and Defence Policy and emphasized the importance

of cooperation between NATO and the European dimension of defence.

International organizations, responsible involvement in their ini-

tiatives and in international missions have a fundamental role in safe-

guarding national interests. On the whole Italy’s security is based on

three pillars favouring multilateral relations: 1) European integration, 2)

strong transatlantic relations (NATO), and 3) Global relations (UN) (MIN-

ISTERO DELLA DIFESA, 2015). Compared to previous documents, this

White Book’s approach can be valued as more pragmatic, it emphasized

more the importance of national interests, so that development trends in

defence policy can be more easily determined. Parallel to the elaboration

and approval of the 2015 White Book, Italy expressed its renewed com-

mitment to acquire 90 F35 ghter planes until 2027.

Since 2013 the Ministry of Defence has issued annually the Pluren-

nial Programmatic Document (DPP) as a framework for defence expen-

diture, replacing the Minister’s above-mentioned annual decree. The

latest DPP regarding the period between 2018 and 2020 was submitted

by Elisabetta Trenta Minister of Defence with a signicant delay in No-

vember 2018. The document has been eagerly awaited since it provides

information about the new government’s vision regarding the defence

sector. Structural changes cannot be detected in this DPP since many

programmes, commitments, even 2018 defence budget had already

been approved by the previous DPP, submitted and approved by the

previous centre-left government. The system of submitting multiannu-

al documents regarding the defence sector (e.g. DPP) guarantees conti-

nuity in armament programmes and international commitments, since

the pillars of Italian defence can by modied only in part by the often

changing governments. Similarly to previous documents, this DPP also

4. Nota Aggiuntiva allo Stato di Previ-

sione della Difesa

estudos internacionais • Belo Horizonte, ISSN 2317-773X, v. 8, n. 2, (jun. 2020), p. 47 - 69

analyses international security environment as a short-, medium- and

long-term strategic framework, while related tasks and necessary nan-

cial resources are also displayed (MINISTERO DELLA DIFESA, 2018).

Even though the latest DPP is quite similar to the previous one, the new

concepts and interventions of the new Minister of Defence are slightly

perceptible, not only in the political priorities (Annex D), but in the

frequent use of the concepts “dual use” and “resilience”, which seem to

be the guiding principles of the new document, however the 2018-2020

DPP can probably be considered as a transitional document. Since the

current Italian defence strategy originates from previous DPPs as well,

apart from examining the 2018-2020 DPP, we also take into consider-

ation the contents of 2017-2019 DPP.

National commitment in the reference framework (Impegno nazionale

nel contesto di riferimento)

The rst part of the current DPP analyses Italy’s international en-

vironment and determines national commitments based on the main

strategic directions so that the specic armament programmes could be

tted into a coherent framework. By carrying out the armaments pro-

grammes according to the strategic development directions of the DPP,

Italian armed forces should possess adequate capacities to address new

threats, including guaranteeing economic and energy security and mi-

gration. It should be emphasized that in the latest DPP the following are

considered to be factors of instability: terrorism, migration ows, natural

disasters, calamities and organized crime, whereas military competition

amongst states or hybrid conicts would be secondary.

Italian geostrategic priorities remain the Euro-Atlantic, Euro-Med-

iterranean and Middle-Eastern regions. The rst two are considered as a

safety net and international engagement within the security triad of NA-

TO-UN-EU, the third and fourth are considered more of a challenge. As a

consequence, Italian armed forces need to possess the necessity capacities

within the state borders and in the territories of the crises zones in order

to address the afore-mentioned challenges.

The Euro-Mediterranean region is the rst strategic direction: it

should be interpreted as an open geopolitical region, where the eects

of trends and crises occurring in the Sahel, Horn of Africa and in the

Persian Gulf cumulate, aecting Italy directly through the Southern

shore of the Mediterranean Sea. The current DPP highlights Libya,

as the most important country in the region from Italian perspective:

alongside their historical ties, Libya is a strategic priority for Italy due

the security and energy security reasons (MINISTERO DELLA DIFE-

SA, 2018). Libya is important to manage the ow of migrants and ref-

ugees arriving via the central Mediterranean route to Italy. According

to FRONTEX, 170,664 people reached Italian shores mainly from Libya

in 2014, while 153,946 did so in 2015, and 181,376 in 2016 and 118,962

arrived in 2017. Due to eorts of the EU and Italy only 23,485 people

reached Italian shores in 2018 (FRONTEX, 2019). Italy imports oil and

gas from Libya which was its sixth supplier of oil (5%) and the third

Anna Molnár e Lili Takács Italy: an aspiring mediterranean middle power wavering between bilateralism and mullateralism

of natural gas (7%) in 2016 (ALDO, 2018; MINISTRY OF FORIGN AF-

FAIRS AND INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION, 2017).

Increasing the stability of the Mediterranean region is Italy’s na-

tional security interest, in this region Italian armed forces should have

the capacities to lead even multinational, coalition forces. In order to

successfully decrease social tensions related to illegal migration arriving

through the Mediterranean Sea, it will be a decisive factor for Italy how

it can conduct a decisive foreign policy in the region, in spite of its limited

defence expenditures and military capabilities, which are disproportion-

ate to the country’s economic potential and size (MOLNÁR, 2018b). Ni-

ger appears in the new DPP as a fundamental country for the security of

the Sahel region (MINISTERO DELLA DIFESA, 2018). The appearance

of Niger in the document is hardly surprising, considering that the bi-

lateral defence agreement signed in 2017 resulted in the launch of a new

Italian military mission in Niger which started in late 2018, when the new

government was already in power.

Syria and Iraq are the most important crisis zones in the Middle

East: besides jihadist threats, proxy wars of global and regional powers

raise the level of instability, the use of military power might be neces-

sary amongst political and diplomatic actions. The decrease of Iraqi and

Lebanese tensions are national priorities for Italian defence policy, the

reinforcement of their autonomous defence and security forces should be

supported not only on multilateral, but even on bilateral level (MINISTE-

RO DELLA DIFESA, 2018).

The DPP mentions shortly the Western Balkans and Afghanistan

due to the ongoing military missions with signicant Italian partici-

pation: KFOR in Kosovo and NATO-RSM in Afghanistan. The active

participation in the security triad of the Euro-Atlantic region can be

evaluated as Italy’s contribution to international security and a safety

shield for the country. Italian proactivity within the NATO is in line

with the strategic priorities, since in the implementation of NATO’s

‘Framework for the South’ the Allied Joint Force Command in Naples

plays a substantial role. Through its successful command Italy intends

to strengthen its leading role in addressing crises emerging in the Med-

iterranean region. Regarding the European Union, Italy’s responsible

participation in the security of the Euro-Atlantic region equals to the

realization of an actual and functioning Common Security and Defence

Policy (CSDP), European Defence Agency and European Defence Ac-

tion Plan (MINISTERO DELLA DIFESA, 2018). We need to highlight

the fact that the renewed support for CSDP is slightly in contrast with

the governing parties’ Eurosceptic views.

The strategic directions of Italian security and defence policy are

clearly reected in multilateral (UN, NATO, EU) and bilateral military

missions, the majority of missions are present in the countries at the

shores of the Mediterranean Sea or in the African states alongside the

major migration routes through the sea.

In connection with the international environment and strategic

directions, it should be mentioned that the most important Italian doc-

ument which can be considered as defence strategy for the county does

estudos internacionais • Belo Horizonte, ISSN 2317-773X, v. 8, n. 2, (jun. 2020), p. 47 - 69

not mention Russia, in contrast with the so-called government contract.

According to the contract between M5S and Lega – which constitutes the

base of Giuseppe Conte’s government – there are three major regions to

be considered priorities from the points of view of security and defence

policy: NATO, Russia and the Mediterranean region (CONTRATTO…,

2018), however, the DPP does not reect this ambition.

Development of the forces based on the current DPP (Sviluppo dello

strumento militare)

The second chapter of the document synthetizes the strategic

guidelines, operational needs and the medium- and long-term devel-

opment directions of Italian armed forces, furthermore analyses and

evaluates the ongoing investment programmes. Even though this

study does not aim at analysing the current armament programmes

and projects, we should highlight the fact that the modernisation and

maintenance of the materials and systems used by the Special Forces

– which are more easily deployed in order to tackle new risks, such as

the ones emerging the ‘enlarged Mediterranean’ region – is in prog-

ress. New equipment, such as optoelectronic devices for night vision or

for the surveillance of special vehicles are to be acquired (MINISTERO

DELLA DIFESA, 2018). Several projects, such as the modernisation of

C-130J transport aircrafts, the maintenance of the operational capaci-

ties of the C27J eet, the acquisition of 16 CH47F Chinook helicopters,

or the development of the UAV platforms can be used either by Special

Forces or by multinational military missions (MINISTERO DELLA

DIFESA, 2017).

Defence expenditures

New challenges emerging after 1989 and 2001 led to changes in

NATO policies and military reforms in member states. In Italy one of

the first steps was the introduction of professional armed forces by

the abolition of conscription in 2004 (LEGGE, 2014). Decision-makers

in Italian defence sector realized that reforms are necessary in order

to tackle emerging external threats. The implementation of a more

definite foreign and security policy was hindered by the fact that

due to the effects of economic downturn, defence expenditures have

been declining since 2005 (GASPARINI; MARTA, 2008). The lack of

a sound strategic framework and of political will necessary to carry

out structural reforms set back the planning and the implementation

of military reform; however, the economic and financial crisis of 2008

had such a disastrous effect on Italian budget that military reforms

became indispensable.

After the crisis of 2011 the Monti administration started the reform

of defence budget and the preparation of military reform as part of a gen-

eral budget reform. In 2012 Giampaolo Di Paola Defence Minister – with

the support of the Prime Minister and the political parties supporting the

government – started to review armed forces, aiming not only at mili-

Anna Molnár e Lili Takács Italy: an aspiring mediterranean middle power wavering between bilateralism and mullateralism

tary budget cuts, but even at restructuration and downsizing

. Accord-

ing to the reform, savings should be recycled into the defence budget

(MARRONE, 2012).

When analysing defence budget allocations we must take into

consideration that allocations were calculated on the basis of the Finance

Act of 2017 which was approved in December 2016, so allocations and

actual expenditure items can sometimes diverge.

DPP is supposed to provide information about the approximate

defence allocations for the coming years. However, it is already known

that severe interventions and scal eorts are to be carried out regard-

ing the 2019 budget, meaning that previsions of next years’ defence

expenditures will change signicantly. We have to take into consider-

ation that defence funds come from multiple sources, as we can see in

the case of the integrated defence budget, which means that more vari-

ables can change the nal budget. As a consequence of the above-men-

tioned reasons it is hard to determine the exact defence budget of Italy.

Data provided by the Ministry of Defence is often not calculated ac-

cording to the approved NATO methodology.

Defence expenditures are decreasing: according to the current

DPP defence expenditures account for 1.19 percent of the GDP in 2017

(20269.1 million euros), 1.19 percent in 2018 (20968.9 million euros),

while short-term projections are the following: 1.15 percent in 2019

(21017. million euros) and 1.1 percent in 2020 (20646.1 million eu-

ros) (MINISTERO DELLA DIFESA, 2018). In the past decade, start-

ing from the outbreak of the economic crisis in 2008 defence budget

decreased by 4.1 percent at current value which can be considered a

severe backdrop.

Trends: Ordinary defence budget vs. defence budget comprising all funds 2008-2018

(black: ordinary defence budget; red: defence budget comprising all funds)

Source: Documento Programmatico Pluriennale 2018-2020, pp. 94.

5. The reform maximized the number of

armed forces in 150.000 person instead

of the 2012’s 183.000. The number of

civilians employed by Italian armed for-

ces will decrease from 30.000 to 20.000.

The 43.000 person redundancies need to

be carry out gradually by 2024.

estudos internacionais • Belo Horizonte, ISSN 2317-773X, v. 8, n. 2, (jun. 2020), p. 47 - 69

Defence expenditures/GDP 2008-2018 (green: defence budget comprising all funds; blue: or-

dinary defence budget; purple: ordinary defence budget excluding ‘territorial security costs’)

Source: Documento Programmatico Pluriennale 2018-2020, pp. 94.

From this study’s point of view, the most relevant items are the ones

allocated to tasks emerging in the traditional defence area. These are di-

vided into personnel expenses – comprising the allowance of professional

soldiers and civil employees of the army -; operating costs (‘esercizio’) guar-

anteeing the operability and eciency of armed forces; and investment

costs. This sector suered a 2.2 billion euros decrease since 2008. The level

of traditional defence expenditures stabilised around 13 billion euros, and

a further decrease is hard to carry out. The 2.2 billion euros decrease is

aggravated by the changes in the real purchasing power of euro: if we

calculate at 2008 rates, defence expenditures shrank by 3.9 billion euros.

This area is particularly important since these contradictory trends

can hardly guarantee the adequate development and maintenance of

armed forces. While classic defence expenditures are constantly shrink-

ing, the comparable ratio within cost groups is distorting: operating and

investment costs are decreasing, but personnel expenses are in a constant

increase. The classic proportion of the three cost groups (personnel – op-

erating costs – investment costs) should be 50–25–25 percent, however, in

spite of the redundancies of the last 20 years, personnel costs have risen,

as the graph shows below, in 2017 74 percent of classic defence expendi-

tures were allocated to personnel expenses. Personnel expenditures are

growing further: in 2018 more than 10 billion euros are allocated to cover

personnel costs (MINISTERO DELLA DIFESA, 2018).

Investment costs are still higher than operating costs, probably be-

cause defence industry is interested more in carrying out new projects

rather than maintenance projects. This means that equipment, materials

and infrastructure are getting older and outdated since maintenance ex-

penditures are lacking (DE PAOLIS, 2018).

Anna Molnár e Lili Takács Italy: an aspiring mediterranean middle power wavering between bilateralism and mullateralism

Cost groups within the classic defence expenditures from 2008 to 2017

Source: Martinelli, Giovanni (2007): Il bilancio della Difesa, analisidifesa.it, https://

www.analisidifesa.it/wp-content/uploads/2017/02/bildif17.pdf, downloaded:

06/10/2018

Cost groups within the classic defence expenditures from 2008 to 2017

Source: Martinelli, Giovanni (2007): Il bilancio della Difesa, analisidifesa.it, https://

www.analisidifesa.it/wp-content/uploads/2017/02/bildif17.pdf, downloaded: 06/10/18

Given that operating costs cover the expenses allocated to guaran-

tee the ecient and eective operation of armed forces (e.g. maintenance

costs) the 52 percent decrease between 2008 and 2017 is alarming. While

analysing operation costs, we must take into consideration the challenges

posed by the ageing military infrastructure.

estudos internacionais • Belo Horizonte, ISSN 2317-773X, v. 8, n. 2, (jun. 2020), p. 47 - 69

One of the primary goals of the restructuration and redundancies

of the 2012 reform was to increase the eciency of armed forces, which

implies the quantitative and qualitative review and examination of the

current infrastructure park. As a consequence of the lack of nancial

resources Italian armed forces are constrained to reduce the number of

strategic objects, where the majority of resources are concentrated. This

process can have counter-productive eects even in the short run on the

Italian running of JFC headquarters in Naples or on the desired leading

role in the Mediterranean region.

Although investments provided by Ministry of Defence

(MinDife)

show a decreasing trend, new renovation and modernization projects

started from 2017.

This allowed the launch of new programmes or the

completion of multiannual projects to full international commitments,

meanwhile the launch of high priority projects aimed at tackling critical

shortages became possible as well. It needs to be highlighted that these

programmes and projects are nanced by Ministry of Economic Devel-

opment

(MisE), not by MinDife.

The gravest problem of Italian defence expenditure is not its con-

stant reduction, but its structure: the decrease is often inconsiderate and

dicult to systematize, hindering the achievement of targets. Whilst per-

sonnel expenses have been growing constantly in spite of redundancies,

investment and operating costs have diminished. One of the most im-

portant goals of the defence budget reforms was to reorganize the struc-

ture of the expenditures. However, the reforms could not be completed

due to the unstable political situation of the country and the frequent

changes in government. It is evident that the current defence expendi-

tures can hardly guarantee the maintenance, the modernization and the

ecient development of the Armed Forces.

Referring to the otherwise well-functioning Italian defence indus-

try we have to consider the spill-over eects of the economic downturn,

since the crisis hit hard the top importer countries of Italian defence prod-

ucts. This led to the reduction of defence budget among others in France,

Poland or Greece, adversely aecting Italian defence industry and aggra-

vating the above-mentioned problems.

Security- and defence policy is supposed to support foreign poli-

cy goals, especially when security aspects of foreign policy – as it can

be seen in the Mediterranean region – are gaining priority status, but

current trends of Italian defence expenditures do not indicate this. With

inadequate defence expenditures Italian armed forces will not be able to

handle the new threats emerging in the Mediterranean regions, although

Italy aims at taking a leading role in the stabilization of Libya, acknowl-

edged by other powers, such as the U.S. or the old rival France. In the ab-

sence of a stable, consistent and adequately funded security and defence

policy, Italian foreign policy will not be able to take up the lead in the

region, in spite of the growing number of its military and civil missions in

Africa. In other words, the implementation of an eective foreign policy

in the Mediterranean region is hindered by the fact that Italian security

and defence policy is undernanced, since armed forces do not possess

every equipment and capabilities necessary to support foreign policy.

6. Ministero della Difesa

7. Insufﬁcient investment resources

in the ﬁnancial years of 2014, 2015,

2016 did not allow the launch of new

programmes.

8. Ministero dello Sviluppo Economico

Anna Molnár e Lili Takács Italy: an aspiring mediterranean middle power wavering between bilateralism and mullateralism

Italian participation in international missions

In the past decades Italy tried to balance its relatively low, decreas-

ing defence expenditures by actively participating in international mis-

sions in the most important conict zones.

After the Cold War Italian diplomacy realized that contributing to

collective security by actively participating in international missions has

become a precondition of Italy’s own security. Italian foreign policy used

the military instrument to increase the country’s international visibility

by becoming ‘security provider’ (COTICCHIA, 2017).

The number of Italian soldiers deployed in international missions de-

creased as the economic crisis hit the country: while in 2005 the number of

deployed soldiers reached 11000, after 2008 this number constantly declined

in spite of the high level of ambition (12000 pp). In 2008 Italian armed forces

participated in 25 dierent missions, but only with 8000 persons (RONZIT-

TI; RUFFA, 2014). The majority (85 percent) of these troops were deployed

in the three most important regions for Italian national interests and securi-

ty: Lebanon, Afghanistan and Western Balkan, so we can arm that it con-

centrated in the crisis zones aecting the country’s broadly dened security.

The high number of deployed Italian soldiers was meant to compen-

sate the country’s moderate foreign political activity and the scarce defence

funding. For Italy it will be a decisive question: how can this middle power

with its limited defence expenditures and military capacities – compared

to its economic potential – and with its often unstable internal policy carry

out a dominant foreign policy? As a consequence of its continuous econom-

ic problems and the nancial and political crises of 2011, its participation

in international missions declined signicantly. However, apart from the

2000 Italian soldiers deployed to Libya the number of Italian participants in

other international missions decreased to 6500 persons by 2012, while Ita-

ly’s goal is still to be present in the above-mentioned regions (MISSIONI…,

ano). For several years there have been more soldiers deployed to national

territory than to international missions: by the end of 2018 there are about

6000 Italian soldiers deployed in international missions, while more than

7000 serve in missions in Italian territory (MINISTERO DELLA DIFESA,

2019a). Regarding missions in Italian territory, we have to highlight the

fact that the biggest national mission – Operation Strade Sicure – can be di-

rectly connected to migration, since it is used as a crime prevention tool in

metropolitan and densely populated areas (MINISTERO DELLA DIFESA,

2019b), when crimes committed by migrants residing legally or illegally in

Italy are more and more often on the front pages of newspapers.

On the whole the strategic directions of Italian security and de-

fence policy are clearly reected by its participation in multilateral (UN,

NATO, EU) and bilateral military missions. Correspondingly to the coun-

try’s geographic position, beside the ‘traditional’ Euro-Atlantic orienta-

tion, the Mediterranean region, the Balkans and Africa can be considered

the centres of Italian foreign policy. As the map shows the majority of

the missions takes place in the countries at the shores of the Mediter-

ranean-Sea, and in African states important for migration through the

Mediterranean Sea. The relevance of the Mediterranean region and Afri-

estudos internacionais • Belo Horizonte, ISSN 2317-773X, v. 8, n. 2, (jun. 2020), p. 47 - 69

ca has been increased by the migration and refugee crises after the Arab

Spring, the fragile states of the region, religious terrorism and by the

consolidation of organized crime groups. If we compare Italian military

missions of the 2017-2019 DPP with the ones of the 2018-2020 DPP (see

below) the number of military missions in African countries is growing,

even though the largest missions with Italian participation continue to be

the ones in Lebanon and in Iraq (MINISTERO DELLA DIFESA, 2019a).

Military missions with Italian participation 2017-2019

Source: Documento Programmatico Pluriennale 2017-2019, pp. 12.

Military missions with Italian participation 2018-2019

Source: Documento Programmatico Pluriennale 2018-2020, pp. 22.

Anna Molnár e Lili Takács Italy: an aspiring mediterranean middle power wavering between bilateralism and mullateralism

The Gentiloni administration decided to strengthen Italian pres-

ence in Libya and Tunisia, and expressed its will to deploy a 400-person

troop to support the government of Niger. However, due to the local gov-

ernment and probably due to the reluctance of France – which plays a de-

cisive role in that region – the launch of the mission was delayed until late

2018. France is playing a more relevant role in Libya as well, but it disagrees

with the migration policy of the Conte government, and criticizes Italian

decision not to support European Intervention Initiative launched by French

President Emmanuel Macron. Finally, the mission received green light

in September 2018. Italian Defence Minister Elisabetta Trenta claimed it

as an important step to tackle migration ows (MIGRANTI..., 2018). It

shows that in spite of rhetorical dierences, the Conte government often

backs the previous governments’ foreign and security policy initiatives.

At the same time, multilateral solutions seem to be in a dicult

position: even though EUNAVFOR MED is still functioning, but its man-

date -which would have expired at 31st December 2018 was extended only

for a three-month period, until 31 March 2019 (COUNCIL DECISION,

2018). The harder approach of the Conte government does not ease the

EU’s eorts: Vice-Minister Matteo Salvini threatened that Italy would not

participate in the mission, if participating ships take migrants mostly to

Italian ports (UE..., 2018)

, demanding the distribution of migrants within

member states. These three months are considered to be an extra time to

nd compromise within member states, since the mission’s mandate can

only be modied by unanimous vote. However as European Parliament

elections are getting closer, it will be more dicult to nd an acceptable

solution for every national government, since a general anti-migration

attitude can be observed within member states.

While multilateral relations seem to be neglected by the Conte

administration, Italo-Libyan bilateral relations started to intensify: af-

ter the Palermo Summit about Libya, in December 2018 Khalifa Hafter

was received in Rome, then Prime Minister Conte had bilateral meetings

with the most important leaders of Libya (Prime Minister Serraj, Khalifa

Haftar, Khaled Al Meshri President of the Higher Council of the State

of Libya, Agila Saleh, President of the Libyan House of Representatives)

during his trip to Libya (CONTE..., 2018).

Conclusion

Even though Italy managed to be an important actor in Europe-

an aairs, its status as major power was several times called into ques-

tion. Italy has the eights biggest economy on the world, the third GDP in

the Eurozone, but it can be dened only as a weakening middle power.

Due to its geographic position it tries to exert its inuence on the close

and important regions: Western Balkans, North-Africa and Middle East.

From 2018 the Eurosceptic Conte administration tries to carry out a more

confrontational foreign and security policy in order to represent national

interests more radically, while multilateral relations tend to be neglected,

bilateralism has become once again more central, as we can see in the case

of Libya. In the current moment, the decline of multilateralism seems to

9. According to the mandate of EUNA-

VFOR MED rescued migrants should be

taken to the nearest port abailably, whi-

ch is mainly Italy due to its geographical

vicinity to Libya.

estudos internacionais • Belo Horizonte, ISSN 2317-773X, v. 8, n. 2, (jun. 2020), p. 47 - 69

weaken the European dimension of the Conte administration, bilateral

negotiations are considered to be a safer and faster way of safeguarding

national interests, Italy has entered into more open and sharp conicts

with European institutions, as was seen in the case of EUNAVFOR MED.

However, due to some geopolitical realities several changes in foreign

policy can be observed only in the rhetoric. The Conte administration is

composed by populist, extremist movements, some measures taken by

the government are dierent from the previous governments’ steps but

Euro-Atlantic and Euro-Mediterranean regions will probably continue to

be in the centre of Italian foreign and security policy.

As a consequence of Italian armed forces’ low level of ambition and

budget problems it is logical that the country concentrates its power and

capacities to the region of “Mare Nostrum”, but it necessitates safe and ra-

tional management of the limited budget. We nd that Italy participates

in too many international missions compared to its real capacities, even

though the number of missions has declined in the last few years. With

this active participation Italy would like to increase its international vis-

ibility, compensating the fact that it is not a member of the nuclear club.

Not a quantitative, but a qualitative shift is necessary to achieve this goal.

The implementation and completion of the restructuration of

armed forces – started by previous administrations – has to be carried out

by a new political actor that generally criticizes the decisions of its pre-

decessor. It remains to be seen whether the M5S-Lega coalition evaluates

the reform of armed forces as a result of a multi-party agreement and con-

tinues to implement the measures of the 2015 White Book or withdraws

from it. The latter would further delay the imperative modernization of

Italian armed forces. Regardless of whether the new coalition carries out

the reforms of the White Book or outlines new directions for the armed

forces, it is clear that the current trends of defence spending do not sup-

port the implementation of an eective foreign policy, quantitative and

qualitative changes would be necessary so that the aspired Mediterra-

nean middle power role could be lled either from the foreign policy or

from security and defence policy point of views.

As we demonstrated in our study even though the strategic di-

rections have been stable since the beginning of the nineties, however,

we must take into consideration regarding either foreign or security

and defence policy, that not only the international political situation

changes often, but Italian internal policy is unstable as well, having an

eect on its defence sector and on the desired Italian leading role in

the Mediterranean region. Parliamentary elections in 2018 resulted in a

complex internal political situation, the new M5S-Lega coalition has to

redene Italy’s role in the international community, but the operational

dynamic of the coalition could slow down this process. Both parties

have a strong anti-EU rhetoric which could change common security

and defence policy as well, in case one of the main supporters of deep-

ening defence integration backs out from this part of the European in-

tegration. Even though the 2018-2020 DPP recognizes the importance

of CSDP based on the allocation of funds, it seems to be only a mostly

theoretical support.

Anna Molnár e Lili Takács Italy: an aspiring mediterranean middle power wavering between bilateralism and mullateralism

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estudos internacionais • Belo Horizonte, ISSN 2317-773X, v. 8, n. 2, (jun. 2020), p. 70 - 85

Foreign investor´s rights, investment

promotion and facilitation agencies: a

developmental and sustainable visión

Direitos de investidores estrangeiros, agências de facilitação

de investimentos: uma visão desenvolvista e sustentável

Derechos de los inversores extranjeros, promoción de

inversiones y agencias de facilitación: una nueva visión

desarrollista y sostenible

Leonardo E. Stanley

DOI: 10.5752/P.2317-773X.2020v8.n2.p70

Received in: September 29, 2019

Accepted in: February 05, 2020

A

Fifty years ago, the role of foreign investors was at the center of the political de-

bate, with host state - investors disputes showing a geographical North-Southth

pattern. The end of the ISI model would signal a new era, including a new rela-

tionship with foreign investors. As part of their eorts, developing and emerg-

ing countries (DECs) liberalize foreign direct investment (FDI) national policies

and to provide scal and other incentives to foreign investors. FDI ows were

seen as always benecial: a quantitative approach. Sooner than later, however,

policy-makers became aware of the scheme’s pro-investment bias. FDI quality,

not quantity, became the new ideal. Latin American countries’ position in the

issue, however, remains quantitative objectives still dominate the investment

debate. Indeed, a movement towards sustainability would come to question

the natural-resource led growth model followed by the region. So, the debate

around the treatment of foreign investors remains open.

Keywords: Foreign Direct Investment. Investment Protection, Promotion and

Facilitation. Development and Sustainability.

R

Cinquenta anos atrás o papel dos investidores estrangeiros encontrava-se no

centro do debate político, onde as disputas (Inversora - Estado Soberano)

mostravam um claro padrão geográco Norte - Sul. A nalização do mod-

elo sustitutivo marcará o início de uma nova era, a qual implicou uma nova

aproximação ao investimento estrangeiro. Como parte do esforço, os países em

desenvolvimento e emergentes decidem liberar suas políticas de investimento

estrangeiro direta (IED). Os uxos de IED eram vistos como beneciosos, sem-

pre: enfoque quantitativo. Quanto antes, no entanto, os fazedores de política

1. Associated Researcher at the Center

for the Study of the State and Society

(CEDES) – Argentina. ORCID iD: 0000-

0001-6590-2636

Leonardo E. Stanley Foreign investor´s rights, investment promoon and facilitaon agencies: a developmental and sustainable visión

começaram a reconhecer o forte caráter pró-investidor do esquema. E a qual-

idade, não a quantidade, devém o novo ideal. No entanto, os países da região

seguem mantendo uma visão cuantitiva. O movimento pró-sustentabilidade do

desenvolvimento vem a questionar o modelo de desenvolvimento que segue a

região, e baseado na exploração dos recursos naturais. Neste sentido, o debate

com respeito ao tratamento dos investidores estrangeiros não só não se tem

saldado: ainda não tem começado.

Palavras chave: Investimento estrangeiro direto. Proteção, Promoção e Facili-

tação de Investimentos. Desenvolvimento e Sustentabilidade.

R

Cincuenta años atrás el rol de los inversores extranjeros se encontraba en el

centro del debate político, donde las disputas (Inversionista - Estado Soberano)

mostraban un claro patrón geográco Norte - Sur. La nalización del mod-

elo sustitutivo marcará el inicio de una nueva era, la cual conllevó una nueva

aproximación a la inversión extranjera. Como parte del esfuerzo, los países en

desarrollo y emergentes deciden liberalizar sus políticas de inversión extran-

jera directa (IED). Los ujos de IED eran vistos como beneciosos, siempre:

enfoque cuantitativo. Más temprano que pronto, sin embargo, los hacedores de

política comenzaron a reconocer el fuerte carácter pro-inversor del esquema. Y

la calidad, no la cantidad, deviene el nuevo ideal. Sin embargo, los países de la

región siguen manteniendo una visión cuantitiva. El movimiento pro-sostenib-

ilidad del desarrollo viene a cuestionar el modelo de desarrollo que sigue la

región, y basado en la explotación de los recursos naturales. En este sentido,

el debate respecto al tratamiento de los inversores extranjeros no solo no se ha

saldado: aún no ha comenzado.

Palabras clave: Inversión Extranjera Directa. Protección, promoción y facil-

itación de inversiones. Desarrollo y sostenibilidad

Introduction

Developing and emerging countries (DECs) - foreign investors’ re-

lationship experienced important and controversial twists. A multilater-

al agreement on foreign investment has become a long-standing eort,

whose rst attempt was made in the period immediately after World War

II (WWII). Initially, an International Trade Organization responsible for

employment, foreign investment, international commodity agreements,

restrictive business practices, and services, as well as international trade,

was to have emerged from the negotiations undertaken in Havana, Cuba,

in 1948 at the invitation of the United States (US) Government. That aim

was dashed when President Truman did not even present the negotiated

draft to the US Congress aware that it would not be approved because

of the international commitments that it entailed. Since then, the artic-

ulation of the new international trade and foreign investment architec-

ture became an exercise in provisional initiatives and second-bests, which

reected more the evolving relative negotiating strengths of the major

players (the US and Europe) rather than any well-conceived master plan.

However, on the other hand, the early post-WWII was, also an era of

rising nationalizations, rst by communist takeovers in China, Eastern

Europe, and Cuba, then during the 1960s and 1970s by numerous devel-

oping countries which expropriated foreign investments in their terri-

estudos internacionais • Belo Horizonte, ISSN 2317-773X, v. 8, n. 2, (jun. 2020), p. 70 - 85

tories, especially in the natural resource sector (mostly petroleum and

mining). Resource nationalism momentum would come with the Dec-

laration for the Establishment of a New International Economic Order,

adopted by the United Nations General Assembly in 1974, and referred to

a wide range of trade, nancial, commodity, and debt-related issues.

Whereas geopolitical alliances reected a West-East political divide,

economic disputes were instead following a geographical North-South pat-

tern, and the chances for a multilateral scheme agreement were practically

nill. A dierent route was undertaken at the bilateral level, particularly af-

ter the signature of the bilateral investment treaty between Germany and

Pakistan on November 25, 1959. Bilateralism proliferated in the nineties,

following DECs´ governments decided to liberalize their foreign direct

investments (FDI) regimes. Institutionally the new era encompassed the

signature of international investment agreements (IIAs) and the adherence

to the World Bank´s International Court for the Settlement of Investment

Disputes (ICSID). Tough the promotion, protection, and liberalization of

foreign investment has mostly occurred under this bilateral framework,

multilateral initiatives also ourished. DECs´ policy space for development

was further reduced at the Uruguay Round, whose trade-related aspects

of intellectual property rights agreement (TRIPS) came to prevent sover-

eigns from introducing technology transfer clauses. Developmental poli-

cies were also aected other two World Trade Organization (WTO) agree-

ments: the Trade-Related Investment Measures (TRIMs) and the General

Agreement on trade in services (GATS). Finally, in May 1995 the Orga-

nization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) member

governments launched the Multilateral Agreement on Investment (MAI)

at the Annual Meeting of the OECD Council at Ministerial level

The resulting emerging global legal framework rests on the twin

foundations of customary international law and national laws and regu-

lations. It relies on its substance on a multitude of IIAs and other legal in-

struments. Towards the same goal, some DECs governments decided to

create individual oces: Investment Promotion and Facilitation Agencies

(IPFAs), basically directed to administrate incentives. Leaving aside institu-

tional dierences, if any, the new legal and administrative entities started

to ourish

. IIAs growth was astonishing, rising from 396 agreements in

1990 (MORTIMORE; STANLEY, 2009), to more than 3,300 as of 2017 (MO-

HAMADLEH, 2019). IPFAs have also prospered and actually counting with

more than 200 IPFAs at the national level (HARDING; JARVONIC, 2012).

Meanwhile, a signicant tectonic, geopolitical shift emerges recong-

uring global FDI ows. Lead by China, an increasing number of Emerging

joined the (formerly, a Northern exclusive) league of capital exporter coun-

tries. Meanwhile, Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) environ-

mental began to plead international organizations for changing towards

a more holistic perspective on growth: development should be socially

inclusive and environmentally sustainable. As development moves from a

narrow economic towards a more holistic vision, a new vision is required

for installing a sustainable nance - development model (SCHOENMAK-

ER, 2017). By analogy, foreign investors should now be ask [by host coun-

tries] to excel the sustainable test. Henceforth, controversies around the

2. . The MAI was a ﬁrst attempt to

combine in one multilateral agreement

the disciplines in three critical areas of

foreign direct investment rule-making

– speciﬁcally, foreign investment protec-

tion, foreign investment liberalization,

and dispute settlement.

3. IIAs encompass bilateral investment

treaties (BITs) as well as investment

chapters within regional and bilateral

free trade agreements (FTA). The term

might also include other special sche-

mes dealing with investment issues, as

the double - taxation treaties.

Leonardo E. Stanley Foreign investor´s rights, investment promoon and facilitaon agencies: a developmental and sustainable visión

role of foreign investors in long-term development is not longer a South-

ern countries´ issue (as observed in the sixties and seventies) but a concern

being shared by auent societies too. New claims for re-regulate foreign

investments are listen, almost everywhere - even among US policy mak-

ers. Likewise, as the sustainable development debate deepens, the concern

over the sovereign right to regulate is turning global.

Theoretical foundations of foreign investors’ special protection in-

volve several arguments, going back and for but always returning to the

old rules versus discretion discussion. Whereas in the 1990s, those favoring

rules were in the majority, nowadays, the pro-investor bias became under

scrutiny. The presence of information asymmetries, on the other hand,

explained IPFAs irruption and dissemination. Whereas the IA problem

persists, however, IPFAs goals have changed: originally designed to attract

investors (a quantitative mandate), nowadays investments are expected to

match SDGs (a qualitative mandate). What explains developed countries´

transformation, from being ercely opposed to regulating capital inows

(including FDI ows) to suddenly start advocating for more screening and

control over foreign investors? Which forces explain IFPAs new qualitative

appraisal? How can this ideological shift be explained? Why the change

seems not to be aecting Latin America (FDI related) institutions?

The paper discusses rst the economic foundations behind the

[FDI] legal protection scheme, as well as those supporting the introduc-

tion of promotion and facilitation agencies. The second section turns at-

tention to the multilateral fora, asking why an international agreement

on investment facilitation could now be approved and whether it remains

favorable for the DECs long-term sustainable development. The third

section list a series of characteristics host countries policy toolkit could

list if the government’s intention is to made FDI inows compatible with

sustainable development. Thereafther, some conclusions follows.

Foreign investors treatment: what protection, promotion,

and facilitation means

Foreign direct investments might present positive contributions to

development, but benets should be not taken for granted. Neither costs

underestimated. Spill-overs on the local economy might relate, among

others issues, to technology transfer, managerial best practices, skill de-

velopments, and research and development activities. The arrival of long-

term ows might not be rewarding, and they may even be not desirable

for sustainable development (CLAESSENS et al., 2003; GODA; TORRES,

2013; IBARRA, 2011; RAY, 2016; RAY et al., 2017; RODRIK; SUBRAMA-

NIAN, 2009; SABOROWSKI, 2009; TIENHAARA, 2009).

Short of funds, however, host countries embraced neoliberalism in

the nineties, including new (pro-investor) legal rules and the establish-

ment of new oces (agencies) directed to seduce foreign investors to (and

helping them after) arrival. From a policy perspective, the government du-

ties were straight and simple: to eliminate discretion and reduce informa-

tional asymmetries, and to follow robust and straightforward rules. The

rules versus discretion debate help us to understand the legal discussion;

the informational bias would be introduced to delineate the agency issue.

estudos internacionais • Belo Horizonte, ISSN 2317-773X, v. 8, n. 2, (jun. 2020), p. 70 - 85

Rules versus discretion

Discretion in the hands of DECs policy-makers was then blame as

preventing the arrival of foreigners. After years of mutual mistrust, de-

veloping countries decided to take the rst step and expand their legal

guarantees: to x the rules of the game. The signature of bilateral invest-

ment treaties (BITs) was an essential step in this direction, as it expanded

investors´ legal guarantees and, henceforth, helped to reduce their polit-

ical risks (STANLEY, 2004). In the search for investments, however, the

host government started to leave away policies that, in the past, permit-

ted them to link FDI to development.

An overwhelming majority of investment agreements concluded

since 1990 were traditional. In the sense that they admitted foreign invest-

ments of the other contracting party only if such investments conformed

to the host country’s legislation (MORTIMORE; STANLEY, 2006, 2009).

This represents the so-called “admission model”, which was common in

European BITs with developing countries, and emphasized investment

protection. A relatively small group of investor countries, led by the USA,

took advantage of the unique historical events in the 1980s and 1990s to

implement a strong push towards foreign investment liberalization, par-

ticularly in developing countries and economies in transition. BITs fur-

ther enlarged foreign investors’ rights, whose legal challenge remained

unknown by the time of the signature. Sooner than later, US BITs inu-

ence disseminate among Western allies, with the European Union (EU)

introducing a new agreement template in the 2000s (STANLEY, 2018).

Unexpectedly, BITs benets proved minimal, whereas damages for

alleged breaches started to boost (CCSD, 2018; JOHNSON et al., 2018)

The push against this type of agreement starts to go further, admitting

that if “there were a link between investment treaties and FDI ows, in-

vestment agreement and their protection can potentially undermine in-

vestment and its intended benets” (JOHNSON et al., 2018, p. 7).

After observing how lean benets were, policy-makers started to in-

terrogate on the substantial costs the scheme bring with it. The loss of exi-

bility would suddenly transform into a leading issue, as treaties pushed sov-

ereigns to cede control over their policy space

. The government loss of ex-

ibility arises on several clauses, for example, on those restricting the use of

“performance requirement” objectives (JOHNSON et al., 2018)

. The exten-

sive denition of investment, for instance, permitted Argentina´s bondhold-

ers to challenge the debt renegotiation process (MORTIMORE; STANLEY,

2006). The inclusion of the “indirect expropriation” concept was behind in-

vestor´s spurious claims, preventing governments to fulll their regulatory

duties. The standard of government treaty of foreign investors (e.g., “fair

and equitable treatment,” “national treatment”) was also under question,

as its wording remains vague and open to interpretation by arbitral pan-

els (GORDON; POHL, 2015; JOHNSON et al., 2018; SINGH; ILGE, 2016).

Finally, all the controversies around the investor-state dispute settlement

(ISDS) mechanism. Initially designed to ensure a neutral, a - political forum,

the mechanism would sooner than later be under criticism as it favored in-

vestors the most (CCSD, 2018; GORDON; POHL, 2015; JOHNSON et al.,

4. As of July 31, 2017, 817 known ISDS

claims had been ﬁled, and at least 114

states had faced formal complaints

(JOHNSON et al., 2018)

5. As claims against sovereigns began

to ﬂourish, the original group of Latin

America challengers (Bolivia, Ecuador,

and Venezuela) enlarged. New voices

were now coming from the global South

(South Africa, Indonesia, India), but

also high-income countries (Norway,

Australia, the Netherlands). Critical

voices towards the ISDS scheme were

also coming from Germany, France, and

Italy (VIDIGAL; STEVENS, 2018).

6. Whereas provisions like this were

affecting many LDCs around the world,

some EMEs have strategically avoided

to include them in their IIAs (e.g., China)

Leonardo E. Stanley Foreign investor´s rights, investment promoon and facilitaon agencies: a developmental and sustainable visión

2018; MORTIMORE; STANLEY, 2009; VAN HARTEN, 2016)

. There is a

predominant, shared concern that the ISDS system has been use to prevent

the realization of a “global” public interest (VIDIGAL; STEVENS, 2018).

Not only the IIAs pro-investor bias generated a hot political issue,

but policy-makers were also called to include sustainability issues in the

agenda. This reects the emergence of a new consensus, which introduc-

es a qualitative (not quantitative) perspective on FDI and asking devel-

opment to be sustainable. This new vision certainly challenges the old,

Washington Consensus approach over IIAs design as to the role played

by the ICSID scheme (SAUVANT, 2019a, b). How to integrate sustainable

development objectives in the IIAs, however, remains the single most rel-

evant challenge for the IIAs system as a whole (GORDON et al., 2014;

ZHAN, 2018)

, as the status quo prevents countries from advancing with

the necessary rebalancing of rights and obligations between partners.

Information

Asymmetric information has often been blamed as another clear

(contractual) disadvantage, preventing deals to be made among un-

known partners. Informational asymmetries were mainly observed as

“to constitute a signicant obstacle to capital ows across international

borders” (HARDING; JAVORICK, 2012, p. 2). By providing information,

governments alleviate the burden of bureaucratic procedures as well as

reduce investors´ transaction costs. IPFAs incentive the arrival and per-

manence of foreign investors.

IPFA design, however, remains controversial: some insisting in sep-

arate agencies, others preferring to bring promotion and facilitation activi-

ties under the same roof. Others might conceive it as a dual process: starting

with the design of the target sectors (promotional stage), then continuing

with those activities directed to facilitate investors´ radication (facilitation

stage) (HESS et al., 2018). Promotion associates with incentives, including

“any measurable advantages accorded to specic enterprises or categories

of enterprises by (or at the direction of) a government, to encourage them

to behave in a certain manner” and include “measures…designed to in-

crease the rate of return of a particular FDI undertaking either to reduce

(or redistribute) its costs or risks” (CASS, 2007, p. 30). The facilitation stage,

in turn, is mainly directed to assist investors in dealing with local rules

and bureaucracy. It is usually considered to conform a continuous task and

bringing assistance (at both, at the pre-establishment and after establish-

ment), and incentivizing foreigners to expand their local operations.

Agencies´ goals have also experienced a structural transformation:

from quantitative to qualitative goals (VCC - WAIPA, 2010). Highly popu-

lar in Latin America, rst-generation agencies associated with liberalization

and deregulation measures (SAUVANT, 2019b). A second generation contin-

ued to promote the entry, but it also started to include some other activities

directed to help investors in their installation phase. Beyond the institution-

al scope, however, rst and second-generation structures both shared a gen-

eral, quantitative objective: to attract foreign direct investment. Agencies,

third-generation design, start to focus actions towards some specic sectors.

7. The ISDS system involves two main

forms: the United Nations Commission

on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL)

and the World Bank International Court

for the Settlement of Investment Dispu-

tes (ICSID). Both the UN and the World

Bank, have recently decided to examine

the hottest issues (BERGER et al., 2018).

8. The liberalization push has produced

a massive legal transformation. As

observed in the WTO - Trade-Related

Investment Measures (TRIMs), affecting

host countries’ policies on FDI as it

prevents them from introducing local

content requirements. Notice that which

prohibited trade-related investment

measures, such as obligatory require-

ments of locally-acquired inputs (“local

content”) that were inconsistent with

necessary provisions of GATT 1994

(MORTIMORE; STANLEY, 2009)

estudos internacionais • Belo Horizonte, ISSN 2317-773X, v. 8, n. 2, (jun. 2020), p. 70 - 85

Targeting was explained by the fact that FDI contribution to development

diers dramatically depending upon the industry (MORAN, 2010). A fourth,

and latest IFPAs generation is starting to ourish, basically aiming to match

investments with the host country long-term, sustainable development

objectives. Modern agencies consider four, dierent dimensions: econom-

ic (linkages, technology transfer, training), social (labor and employment

standards, community health, education, training), environmental (mini-

mizing the adverse impacts of investments, mobilizing environmental tech-

nologies for conservation) and institutional or governance (fair and ecient

negotiations, contracts). Overall, agencies should be backed by a long-term

strategic vision, which is not indierent to FDI inows: whereas in some

sectors investors´ should be wellcome, in some others the arrival might be

better to deter. Investment targeting, henceforth, remains alive but condi-

tional to the matching of long - term and sustainable development goals.

The structure of incentives, however, remains directed towards the

accomplishment of a narrow economic vision disregarding social, environ-

mental, and institutional dimensions (VCC - WAIPA, 2010). To be (strate-

gically) useful, however, agencies should take the country specicities into

account - including its economic, social, and environmental constraints. If

the sovereign aims to prot from FDI for the national economy structural

transformation, henceforth, a dierent design would be in mind. In the

end, quality (not quantity) is what it counts for sustainable development:

better and more professional agencies bring dierent levels of FDI into

host countries (HARDING; JAVORICK, 2012; SAUVANT, 2019b; VCC -

WAIPA, 2010). In particular, sovereigns should work in IFPA´ design and

carefully target sectors of FDI attraction (HARDING; JAVORICK, 2012;

MIŠKINIS; BYRKA, 2014), to induce the arrival (and permanence)

of those

investments that they consider particularly desirable for the (long-term and

sustainable) development (SAUVANT, 2019b). Agencies could also stimu-

late cooperation among foreign and local rms (as in the building of a local

supply network or the transfer of technology), or interaction with local

communities (as for the attainment of the project´s sustainability goals). In

sum, agencies could be designed in order to perform both transformative

and sustainability goals. The quantity towards quality goal movement,

however, is far from granted. Highly ambitious objectives which, in Latin

American case, few agencies might be able to undertake. Unfortunately, in

the region, agencies are taught as solving some specic (i.e.: informational)

market failures but specically directed to eliminate bureaucratic norms

and rules (VOLPE MARTINCUS; SZTAJEROWSKA, 2019)

. For multilat-

eral organizations as the IDB or the OECD, “interested parties” basically

refer to private partners and multinational rms consultation.

Promotion and facilitation activities, additionally, might compromise

signicant amounts of resources from the host government. Fiscal and -

nancial incentives, both directed to seduce investors´ enter and to remain,

are fund-burdensome for DECs restricted budget (CASS, 2007). This should

lead host countries to carefully confront FDI costs and benets when de-

signing the incentive package, and certainly including the project´s expect-

ed social and environmental costs (RAY et al., 2017; ZARSKY; STANLEY,

2013). Moreover, negative externalities could be signicant and long for

9. Facilitation activities might include,

among others: a) follow-up and

monitoring of development of already

accomplished investment project; b) the

building, maintenance, and enhance-

ment of local supply network; and, c)

Investment retention and expansion

(MIŠKINIS; BYRKA, 2014).

10. The pro-market vision backed by the

Inter-American Development Bank (IDB)

and the Organization for the Economic

Cooperation and Development (OECD),

which follows an acritical analysis of

how investors are being treated around

the world - missing how developed

OCDE countries have traditionally

treated foreign investors (and are, as

looking after the last announcements)

Leonardo E. Stanley Foreign investor´s rights, investment promoon and facilitaon agencies: a developmental and sustainable visión

longer, particularly for those projects associated with natural resource ex-

ploitation. It implies the adoption of a new and more sophisticated approach

towards FDI; a perspective aimed to induce the arrive of funds somehow

alienated with the country’s long-term, transformative, and sustainable de-

velopment objectives (COLEMAN et al., 2018, SAUVANT, 2019b). By in-

cluding sustainability issues, new IPFAs agencies intents to alienate with

the UN´s sustainable development goals (SDGs). By screening foreign rms

compromises on technology transfer or the construction of local linkages,

agencies could also alienate with the developmental-transformative role.

Old constraints, new actors, and the (re) emergence of multilateralismo

In spite of accepting bilateralism, DECs´ opposition to multilateral-

ism remained erce and widely extended [remember their stance against

the so-call Singapore issues introduced in the rst WTO Ministerial Con-

ference (1996); and the Cancun Conference collapse (2003)]. The former

opposition have recently permuted to consensus, with DECs now pushing

for installing investment issues at the WTO 11th Ministerial Conference

at Buenos Aires (2017) (DIE, 2019; ICSID, 2018; JOSEPH, 2018). A group of

countries has called for closer global cooperation “to create an ecient,

transparent, and predictable environment for facilitating FDI and aim at ar-

riving at a plurilateral ‘investment facilitation agreement’ (IFA)” (METHA;

MANGLA, 2019, p. 7). The Joint Statement on Investment Facilitation for

Development (JSIFD) was backed by 70 Member States who called for clos-

er global cooperation to create an ecient, transparent, and predictable

environment for facilitating FDI. The collective aim, to arrive at a plurilat-

eral “Investment Facilitation Agreement” (WTO - IFAs). Investment facil-

itation measures deal with the application of investment policy, not about

the right to regulate or about investment protection (HAMDANI, 2018).

The WTO - IFA proposal considers international trade and in-

vestment as closely interconnected and facilitating DECs development

(JOSEPH, 2018). This interconnection, therefore, permits to place the

IFA issue within the WTO scope. On the positive side, the WTO - IFA

adopts now a balanced, pro-development perspective rather than the

pro-investor bias associated with old BITs (DIE, 2019; ICSID, 2018; SAU-

VANT, 2019). Additionally, the initiative does not include the typical legal

clauses included in IIAs (fair and equitable treatment, no discriminatory

treatment, indirect expropriation) neither recognize market access, in-

vestment protection, and dispute settlement issues. The proposal might

undoubtedly bring some more room for developments, but still presents

some disadvantages (CUTS, 2017; GHIOTTO; GAUMÁN, 2019; HAN-

DAMI, 2018; ICSID, 2018; JOSEPH, 2018; MANN; DIETRICH BRAUCH,

2019; SINGH, 2017; TWN, 2018). One fundamental, widely expanded dis-

sent, relates to the fact that the proposed framework goes beyond the

WTO’s current mandate. Of particular interest, however, relates to the

absence of obligations on home countries and investors on sustainable de-

velopment issues. Host country capacity building is undoubtedly needed,

particularly to guarantee long-term and sustainable investment inows

(ICSID, 2018; SAUVANT, 2019). As such, the initiative remains envisioned

to complement the traditional IIAs scheme.

estudos internacionais • Belo Horizonte, ISSN 2317-773X, v. 8, n. 2, (jun. 2020), p. 70 - 85

By being active in the proposing, a group of DECs hopes to realign

themselves with the liberal order now under challenge, but also to make

it work. Multilateralism is also backed by authorities in Beijing, as they re-

alize that time has come to leave away the (defensive) bilateral stance of

the past (PATHIRANA, 2018; SAUVANT, 2018; STANLEY; FERNANDEZ

ALONSO, 2016; WADE, 2011). Gone are the days when China started nego-

tiations to become a WTO member, an special arrangement which bring

authorities with policy space to climb the technological ladder. Ranked as

the world second-largest economy, China´s global presence goes beyond

international trade to expand into investment and nancial ows. Going

global, in particular, means new business opportunities for Chinese SOEs

rms whose long-term, strategic vision bring western governments ner-

vous (BUCKLEY, 2018; HANEMANN; ROSEN, 2018; LE CORRE, 2019;

MEUNER; MONIN, 2017). The accommodate western mood was den-

itively particularly aected following Xi Jinping launched two strategic,

long-term plans: Made in China 2025 and the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).

Both are raising important questions for those involved in the design of an

international FDI policy regime (BUCKLEY, 2018). As hosting the 2016 G20,

authorities in Beijing realized the opportunity to advance with the discus-

sion of investment issues (SAUVANT, 2018). At Shanghai, the G20 collective

proposed a new template (The Guiding Principles for Global Investment

Policymaking), subsequently endorsed by Head of States at the September

Hangzhou meetings. Surprisingly, the G20 Guidelines include sustainable

development and inclusive growth among the core principles (ZHAN,

2016). The proposed framework, however, remains envisioned on advising

DECs in how to enter in global value chains (GVCs) (AKMAN et al., 2017)

Other proposals include the one launched by the United Nations

Conference on Trade and Development - UNCTAD Global Action Menu

for Investment Facilitation (the Menu). OECD Policy Framework for In-

vestment (PFI) is the oldest one, instrumented, and on use since 2006

(NOVIK; CROMBUGGHE, 2018) being recently updated by the OECD

Secretariat (OECD, 2018b). This highly ambitious proposal prioritize

quality FDI ows, identifying ve clusters of quality indicators: produc-

tivity-innovation, skills, job quality, gender, and carbon footprint (SAU-

VANT, 2019). At the regional level, the Investment Facilitation Action Plan

(IFAP) introduced in 2008 by members of the Asian - Pacic Economic

Cooperation (APEC). IFAP investment facilitation scope involves ‘actions

taken by governments designed to attract foreign investment and max-

imize the eectiveness and eciency of its administration through all

stages of the investment cycle,’ and ‘eective investment facilitation can

make a signicant contribution to the sort of broader investment climate

reform eorts widely practiced by APEC member economies.’ A series

of bilateral, regional, and continental investment - facilitation initiatives

started in Africa, including the Pan-African Investment Code (2015) and

the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfFTA) (MBENGUE, 2018).

Opinions over schemes being revised keep increasing, but a funda-

mental divide among policy-makers is whether proposals should alienate lo-

cal rules with SDGs (re-regulate) or instead host country eorts should be di-

rected towards the elimination of bureaucratic rules (de-regulate). Although

Leonardo E. Stanley Foreign investor´s rights, investment promoon and facilitaon agencies: a developmental and sustainable visión

some might seem this as recreating the old markets versus state discussion,

the solution to this old dilemma might lies somehow in the middle center.

How to conciliate rights and obligations, policy space, and compromise?

Underdevelopment is by no means just a problem of governance, to

put institutions right or to reduce barriers in order to seduce investors. As

prestigious institutions might be, as critical foreign funds are needed, of

utmost importantce for DECs is to have a plan for the long-run. Hence-

forth, the focus should turn on cooperation and facilitation issues employ-

ing a broader, developmental perspective that might help in the design of

the answer. Besides investors and states, this expanded perspective is ask-

ing for the involvement of civil society in shaping a new investment tem-

plate (BUCKLEY, 2018; RAJAN, 2019). The increasing political relevance

of new issues (civil society, social and environmental claims) [cooperative,

stakeholder vision] is forcing leaders around the world towards the recog-

nition of broader social and environmental rights until recently neglected.

From this perspective, the Brazilian Cooperation and Investment

Facilitation Agreement (CIFA) template might be taught as a helpful

starting guide (BERNASCONI-OSTERWALDER; DIETRICH BRAUCH,

2015; HEES et al., 2018; HEES; ROCHA PARANHOS, 2018; PERRONE;

ROJAS DE CERQUEIRA CÉSAR, 2015; VIDIGAL; STEVENS, 2018). The

CIFA framework does not include the ISCD mechanism but introduc-

es a hybrid system of dispute prevention and state-to-state arbitration.

It explicitly includes substantive obligations to investors, but it brings

them help in dealing with local authorities (through the establishment

of national focal points or ombudsman gures). The CIFA framework,

besides, recognizes local regulation preeminence over foreign investors.

But the Brazilian initiative remains silent on voice: how civil society en-

ters in the investment template discussion?

Institutional change in perspective: what lies behind

the recent transformation?

As noted, once the commodity price cycle reversed, the postwar

development model start to vanish and DECs´ negotiation power scale

down. Whereas in the past to much weight was attach to bring incentives

to investors, nowadays, an increasing number of sovereigns are demand-

ing foreigners to share benets and to recept investments only if they

contribute to sustainable development goals.

What explains DECs transformation, from being ercely opposed

to regulating capital inows (including FDI ows) to suddenly start ad-

vocating for more screening and control over foreign investors? Which

forces explain the movement from a regime biased in investor´s favor to

another aimed to share investment benets over an equal basis? How can

this ideological shift be explained?

On the one hand, civil society pressure on governments towards

the implementation of social and environmental development goals.

[FDI] quality (not quantity) is becoming mainstream among academic

circles and, as pressured by their constituencies, mandatory for several

governments around the world. On the other hand, the rise of South FDI

estudos internacionais • Belo Horizonte, ISSN 2317-773X, v. 8, n. 2, (jun. 2020), p. 70 - 85

ows - but China, as their companies come to dispute their Western com-

petitors’ supremacy in global markets. The movement towards a qualita-

tive approach, in this case, might be masking fears over Chinese rms´

technological leapfrogging and technological catch - up but also growing

protectionism amidst Western governments.

Nevertheless, the movement from quantitative to qualitative ap-

proaches should be appreciated on its own. A sizeable institutional shift,

indeed. To made this happen, however, a broad coalition is undoubtedly

needed - particularly among DECs, whose formal institutions are often

weak and capture by entrepreneurial coalitions. To ensure a broader “sus-

tainable” vision the voice of social actors becomes critical and, increasing-

ly listen by global rms as the Peter Buckley (2018) comment:

[t]he increase in shareholder activism, stakeholder pressure, the importance of

conrming to (global) standards, the increase in ethical consumerism and public

and social pressure, in general, requires MNEs, in particular, to pay increasing

attention to moral standards in business behavior, not just in “Corporate Social

Responsibility” or “Shared Value” but as a means of long term sustainability and

survival (BUCKLEY, 2018, p. 10).

In a recent paper, Karl Sauvant and Howard Mann (2017) list a series

of characteristics for each of four dierent dimensions of sustainability

in order foreign direct investment in qualifying as sustainable (see table

below). To be clear, the listing shows which FDI ows might qualify as

sustainable according to the SDGs as to meet the challenges imposed by

the climate change commitments. Whereas the indicative list might be a

useful transition, however, is far from simple. It requires host countries to

adopt a long - term, sustainable vision on development.

Table 1 - The four dimensions of sustainability FDI and their sustainable characteristics

Dimension Characteristic Dimension Characteristic

Economic • Employment

• Local linkages

• Technology transfer

• Infrastructure

• Community development

• Equitable distribution of wealth

• Tax accountability

• Promote research & development (R&D)

Environmental • Resource management

• Pollution controls

• Low carbon/greenhouse gases footprint

• Waste reduction

• Biodiversity protection

• Climate change

• Water

• Renewable energy

Social • Labor rights

• Skills enhancements

• Public health

• Workplace safety

• Non-discrimination

• Fair wages

• Beneﬁts

• Human rights

• Indigenous rights

• Gender

• Resettlement

• Cultural heritage protection/diversity

Governance • Transparency

• Local management

• Supply chain standards

• Consumer protection

• Stakeholder engagement

• Anti-corruption

• Legal compliance

• Risk management systems

• Environmental management systems

• Environmental impact assessment/

social impact assessment

• Human rights due diligence

• Corporate governance

Source: Sauvant and Mann (2017; page v)

Leonardo E. Stanley Foreign investor´s rights, investment promoon and facilitaon agencies: a developmental and sustainable visión

DECs should undoubtedly be pleasant by the recognition of all

these dimensions and attributions, as they collectively ensure a more

balanced and sustainable development path. Sovereigns should accom-

plish to insert them in new, rened, and more sustainable legislation (FDI

rules). Remarkably, the topics listed by Sauvant and Mann (2017) goes

beyond the Millenium Developmental Goals (MDGs), including a signif-

icant number of issues [and, accompanying policies] which might allow

the host country to perform a developmental, and transformative model.

Consider the introduction of technology transfer clauses or specic re-

wards for those establishing research and development activities. Both

are policies aimed to transform the local productive base, going beyond

institutions and incentives to seduce investors. Development involves a

sustainable, structural transformation of the national economy. Pursu-

ing one but lifting the other side is like to envision Hamlet without the

Prince of Denmark (CHANG, 2010).

Host (DECs) countries could undertake this perspective (globally

either partially) when drawing their legal framework as when negotiating

IIAs. What matters for BITs, and FTAs is not the presence of guarantees

per se but about how investors and host states might end with sharing

costs and benets (STANLEY; 2018). In other words, the objective should

go beyond the idea of attracting as much FDI as possible but to induce the

arrival of investors, which could raise the standards and welfare of the

country (MIŠKINIS; BYRKA, 2014; SAUVANT, 2019b). Towards this end,

policy coherence is undoubtedly needed. As for matching investment leg-

islation (protection) with agencies dealing with promotion and facilita-

tion goals (ZHAN, 2016). Better coordination would permit, above all,

to achieve the country’s long-term sustainable development objectives.

Conclusions

Once antagonists, developing and developed countries, both start-

ed to move towards the center: recognizing the relevance of foreign

funds for development but also claiming sovereign rights for exibility

and policy space. Whether the change in position responds to the rise of

China or follows social actors’ legitimate claims is beyond the scope of

this paper. Independently of the source, however, the change reects a

new, more holistic vision linking development and sustainability.

As sustainability becomes a global issue, it forces sovereigns to

modify old investment treaties and to advance with the necessary rebal-

ancing of rights and obligations between partners. Legal updating, how-

ever, remains a necessary but not sucient condition to began to transit

a new era. Policy coherence is also needed between investment policies

and other public areas, including those dealing with the design of promo-

tion and facilitation agencies. IPFAs design, however, should be in line

with the host country’s developmental goals. In this sense, what mat-

ters for sustainability ideas to become politically accepted is how local

elites and societies perceive them. Both issues start to be taken into con-

sideration by policy-makers, and included in all revised multilateral pro-

posals. The “one-size-ts-all” presciption is not longer valid, DECs have

estudos internacionais • Belo Horizonte, ISSN 2317-773X, v. 8, n. 2, (jun. 2020), p. 70 - 85

now more room at choosing their developmental path. Even DCs have

recently decide to leave old “institutional constraints” away, notably the

anglo-saxons ones. At the end, what matter when chosing a particular

(developmental) path are how it ts with local ellites ambitions and civil

society expectations.

For countries in the region, the problem lies in matching the cur-

rent export-led model with sustainability issues. The matching, however,

remains hard to accomplish. Overall, the regional view on the FDI issue

remains, to some extent, old-fashioned, with a quantitative perspective

dominating the investment debate. The current debate is well-known

among political and economic elites, but they still refuse to move away

from the status quo. Take, for example, the energy transition debate. De-

spite leaders’ environmental compromise on the Paris Agreement on cli-

mate change, governments continue to provide sweetheart loans, guar-

antees, and other forms of preferential nancing to fossil fuel projects.

Foreign funds are also, by and large beneting the non - renewable sector.

In other words, if economic growth continue to rely upon the appropia-

tion of rents then elites would keep sustaining the model. This explains

why the above mentioned quantitative paradigm remains alive at Latin

America, and why elites prefer to embrace Milton Friedman motto (“the

Business of Business is Business”) and refuse to openly discuss environ-

mental and social costs. Civil society, however, is starting to challenge

the natural-resource growth model. To discuss externalities, and how to

cope with them. The spread of social unrest movements all around the

Americas is showing that the debate started. In orser to achieve this, is

neccesary to bulid up new alliances and to expand the consensus for the

attainment of the long-term development.

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El Pragmatismo en la CSS de China:

integración del genio histórico y

elementos modernos

China’s Pragmatism in the South-South Cooperation:

integration of the historical gene and modern elements

O pragmatismo da China na Cooperação Sul-Sul:

integração do gene histórico e dos elementos modernos

Fang Yuan

DOI: 10.5752/P.2317-773X.2020v8.n2.p86

Recebido el 15 de septiembre de 2019

Aprobado el 01 de marzo de 2020

R

Durante los últimos setenta años, China ha sido una estrella fulgurante en el

campo de la cooperación internacional. El factor principal que contribuyó al as-

censo exitoso del gigante asiático es el pragmatismo reejado en sus estrategias

de Cooperación Sur- Sur (CSS). El desarrollo de las estrategias tiene tres fases- el

período de Mao Zedong (1949-1976), la época y la post-época de Deng Xiaoping

(1978-2012) y la nueva etapa de Xi Jinping (desde 2013)- y en cada una observan

reformas dirigidas, en vez de por las ideologías, por los intereses del Estado en

diferentes contextos internacionales. Consecuentemente, el progreso de la CSS

de China cambió la estructura política internacional, y ofreció experiencias y

lecciones útiles para otros países en desarrollo. El presente trabajo va a analizar

desde el vínculo de continuidad del pragmatismo las estrategias de la CSS de

China a lo largo de las tres fases, y durante un período de tiempo que va desde

la década de 1950 hasta la actualidad.

Palabras clave: China. Cooperación Sur-Sur. Pragmatismo. Iniciativa de “una

Franja y una Ruta”.

A

During the last seventy years, China has been a shining star in the eld of the

international cooperation. The mean reason that contributed to the asian

giant’s successful rise is the pragmatism reected in its South-South Coopera-

tion (SSC) strategies. The development of the strategies has three stages- the

Mao Zedong period (1949-1976), the Deng Xiaoping era and the post Deng

Xiaoping era (1978-2012) and the new Xi Jinping age (from 2013)- and in each

stage can we observe reforms guided, instead of by the ideologies, by the

interests of the State in dierent international contexts. As a result, China’s

progress in the SSC changed the international political structure, and oered

1. Fang Yuan, doctoranda del Instituto

Iberoamericano de la Universidad de

Salamanca (España), residencia en Sa-

lamanca de España, con ORCID https://

orcid.org/0000-0001-5264-7525.

Fang Yuan El Pragmasmo en la CSS de China: integración del genio histórico y elementos modernos

useful experiences and lessons for other developing countries. The present

article will analyze from the link of continuity of the pragmatism China’s SSC

strategies in the long term of the three stages, and during a period of time that

goes from the 1950 decade to the present.

Keywords: China. South-South Cooperation. Pragmatism. “One Belt One

Road” proposal.

R

Nos últimos setenta anos, a China tem sido uma estrela relevante no campo da

cooperação internacional. O principal fator que contribuiu de êxito do crescimen-

to do gigante asiático é o pragmatismo reetido nas estratégias da Cooperação

Sul-Sul (CSS). O desenvolvimento das estratégias tem três fases – o período de

Mao Zedong (1949 – 1976), a época e pós-época de Deng Xiaoping (1978 – 2012) e

a nova etapa de Xi Jinping (desde 2013)- em cada uma das fases se observam refor-

mas dirigidas, em vez de ideologias, pelos interesses do Estado em diferentes con-

textos internacionais. Consequentemente, o progresso da CSS de China mudou a

estrutura política internacional, e ofereceu experiências e lições úteis para outros

países em desenvolvimento. O presente trabalho analisa desde o vínculo de conti-

nuidade do pragmatismo as estratégias da CSS de China ao longo das três fases, e

durante um período de tempo que vai desde a década de 1950 até a atualidade.

Palavras chave: China. Cooperação Sul-Sul. Pragmatismo. A iniciativa ‘Um

Cinturão, Uma Rota’.

Introducción

El pragmatismo no es una nueva idea para los chinos, más bien ha

formado parte de su cultura milenaria. A lo largo de sus setenta años de

historia, la República Popular de China (RPC) lo ha implementado con

determinación, aunque no se haya generado una escuela de pensamiento

reconocida como tal. Históricamente, la idea de pragmatismo se remon-

ta a la Dinastía Han, cuando el historiador más prestigioso, Sima Qian

(a.C.145-?)

, escribió en su obra maestra Registros Históricos (2013, p.3256)

lo siguiente “Todos los seres humanos bajo el cielo nos movemos activa-

mente por intereses”

. En cierto sentido, este argumento coincide con

la perspectiva básica del Realismo (MORGENTHAU, 2006), respecto al

motivo profundo de las actividades de los Estados nacionales modernos

ante los asuntos de las relaciones internacionales.

Después de largos años de introducir las ideas del pragmatismo en

la cultura china y más las lecciones aprendidas de las luchas contra los ja-

poneses y el Partido Nacionalista, el Partido Comunista de China (PCC)

obtuvo un mejor entendimiento sobre lo qué era el pragmatismo. Sin

embargo, la aplicación inicial en las políticas internas no trajo los resulta-

dos esperados como para ser el principio rector metodológico de un país

inmenso y heterogéneo en casi todas sus dimensiones. A pesar de que

en el presidente Mao Zedong y en su gobierno predominó la perspec-

tiva del pragmatismo, dentro de su administración política aparecieron

ciertos movimientos desviacionistas de extrema izquierda (el Gran Salto

Adelante y la Revolución Cultural) que menospreciaron el pragmatismo.

Los resultados negativos de dichos movimientos advirtieron al PCC de la

peligrosidad de estar desvinculado de la realidad, y por eso, después de

2. Sima Qian, historiador y prosista

de la Dinastía Han, se encargó del

estudio de la astronomía, el diseño

del calendario lunar y el registro de la

historia en la corte. Se estima como “el

padre de la historia”, cuya obra maestra

Registros Históricos fue el primer libro

biográﬁco de la historia china completa

de más de tres milenarios. La gran obra

se considera la primera de “Las 24 His-

torias” porque fue tan inﬂuyente que las

historias sucesivas tomaron el género

biográﬁco como el estilo formal. Ocupó

una posición importante también en la

historia de la literatura china.

3. Tian Xia Xi Xi Jie Wei Li Lai, Tian Xia

Rang Rang Jie Wei Li Wang

estudos internacionais • Belo Horizonte, ISSN 2317-773X, v. 8, n. 2, (jun. 2020), p. 86 - 102

la muerte del presidente Mao, Deng Xiaoping decidió abandonar las ilu-

siones impracticables para ir en busca de un “socialismo con característi-

cas chinas” y siempre recordar que se debe “cruzar el río sintiendo las

piedras” (QIN, 2008). En este sentido, la locución “buscar la verdad en los

hechos”

se convirtió en un lema esencial dentro del discurso del presi-

dente Deng Xiaoping, quien también mencionó: “sea negro o blanco, si

puede atrapar ratones, es un gato bueno”. Este es un ejemplo típico del

espíritu pragmático que cubrió a toda China (DOMÍNGUEZ, 2017).

Respecto a la cooperación internacional, tras la III Sesión Plena-

ria del XI Congreso Nacional del PCC, donde se sintetizaron las expe-

riencias y lecciones de la Revolución Cultural, se reconrmó la línea

ideológica marxista y pragmática. Es así que, el PCC llevó a cabo una

serie de profundas reformas políticas a nivel interior y exterior (QIN,

2008). A pesar de ello, en el campo de la cooperación internacional se

mantuvo una coherencia básica en los principios de la ayuda al exterior

(ZHOU et al., 2013).

En este sentido, es pertinente denir el concepto de Cooperación

Sur- Sur. La Asamblea General de las Naciones Unidas dene la Coop-

eración Sur- Sur (CSS) en su documento nal de la conferencia en Nairobi

(21 de diciembre de 2009) como:

La cooperación Sur-Sur es una empresa común de los pueblos y los países del

Sur, surgida de experiencias compartidas y anidades, sobre la base de unos

objetivos y una solidaridad comunes, y guiada, entre otras cosas, por los princi-

pios del respeto de la soberanía y la implicación nacionales, libres de cualquier

condicionalidad. La cooperación Sur-Sur no debería considerarse asistencia

ocial para el desarrollo. Se trata de una asociación de colaboración entre iguales

basada en la solidaridad … La cooperación Sur-Sur comprende la participación

de múltiples partes interesadas, incluidas las organizaciones no gubernamentales,

el sector privado, la sociedad civil, las instituciones académicas y otros agentes

que contribuyen a hacer frente a los problemas y alcanzar los objetivos en ma-

teria de desarrollo de conformidad con las estrategias y los planes nacionales de

desarrollo (NNUU, 2010).

Respecto a la Unidad Especial de Cooperación Sur-Sur del Programa

de Naciones Unidas para el Desarrollo (2009), adscrita al Programa de las

Naciones Unidas para el Desarrollo (PNUD) (UNOSSC en inglés), dene:

la Cooperación Sur-Sur es un marco amplio de colaboración entre países del sur

en el ámbito político, económico, social, cultural, ambiental y tecnológico que

involucra a dos o más países en desarrollo y que puede tomar la forma de coope-

ración bilateral, regional, subregional o interregional (UNOSSC, 2009)

La CSS del país asiático inició desde cero en 1950 (THE STATE

COUNCIL INFORMATION OFFICE OF THE PEOPLE´S REPUBLIC

OF CHINA, 2011), justo un año después de la fundación del país, en oc-

tubre de 1949. Por ende, la CSS de China, que se basa principalmente en el

comercio internacional, la inversión directa y la cooperación nanciera,

casi ostenta setenta años de vida, en los cuales ha ganado peso en el cam-

po de la cooperación internacional. Esta CSS ha pasado por tres fases: el

período de Mao Zedong (1949-1976), la época y la post-época de Deng

Xiaoping (1978-2012) y la nueva etapa de Xi Jinping (desde 2013). Cada

fase tiene diferentes contextos internos y externos, motivos, objetivos,

instrumentos y mecanismos administrativos (HU; LIU, 2012; HUANG;

HUANG; REN, 2012; TANG, 2013a; ZHANG, 2010; ZHOU et al., 2013).

4. Shi Shi Qiu Shi

Fang Yuan El Pragmasmo en la CSS de China: integración del genio histórico y elementos modernos

El presente trabajo va a analizar desde el vínculo de continuidad del

pragmatismo las estrategias de la CSS de China a lo largo de las tres fases,

y durante un período de tiempo que va desde la década de 1950 hasta la

actualidad. Todo esto con el n de adquirir lecciones empíricas y ofrecer

varias sugerencias para las reformas futuras de la estrategia de la CSS en

las nuevas circunstancias mundiales. Para ello, las preguntas de inves-

tigación que se pretende contestar son dos: ¿por qué la CSS de China se

desarrolló tan rápido? y ¿cuáles son los factores principales que afectaron

el diseño de las estrategias de CSS?

Este trabajo se divide en cuatro capítulos. El primero cuenta el con-

texto en que nació la CSS de la RPC y los principios primordiales que

guían al país asiático e impactan en el Tercer Mundo. El segundo capítulo

habla de las características de la CSS en el período de la presidencia de

Deng Xiaoping (1978-1989), al ser una época donde la CSS sufrió cam-

bios signicativos. La tercera parte corresponde a las transformaciones

de la CSS de China bajo las nuevas circunstancias mundiales posteriores

al despegue de la economía de China. El cuarto apartado sintetiza la

tradición milenaria del pragmatismo que ha impregnado la CSS China.

El artículo cierra con las conclusiones.

Primera fase: en busca del reconocimiento internacional y

establecimiento de los principios de la CSS

La RPC anunció al mundo el establecimiento de su gobierno cen-

tral en 1949 (MAO, 1949). Este hecho marcó la llegada de una cierta paz

interna al país, una paz que había estado esperado el pueblo chino por 17

años, catorce años de la resistencia contra la invasión de Japón y luego tres

años de guerra civil que terminó con la retirada, de una parte, del Par-

tido Nacional Kuomintang (KMT) a Taiwán, sin embargo, la otra parte

del KMT que permaneció en China continuó el conicto a menor esca-

la, pero el PCC pudo imponerse nalmente. Asimismo, en los primeros

años de vida del país, sucedieron algunos conictos en las fronteras, por

ejemplo, la guerra entre China e India (JIANG, 2016). Y al mismo tiempo,

China estuvo amenazada por el conicto de la Guerra Fría. En este con-

texto, la alianza inestable con la Unión de Repúblicas Socialistas Soviéti-

cas (URSS) y la lucha ideológica del comunismo contra el capitalismo hi-

cieron que el poder asiático recién nacido tuviera que caminar por el lo

de la espada. Por esa razón, en esos momentos lo más importante para el

PCC fue la consolidación de su poder y conseguir el reconocimiento de

la sociedad internacional mediante el fomento de la CSS, la cual se basó

en dos aspectos esenciales: primero, el apoyo político y militar a las lu-

chas de independencia y una ferviente oposición al imperialismo en Asia,

África y América Latina. Y segundo, la ayuda nanciera a los países del

Tercer Mundo, esta ayuda era unidireccionalidad y su n primordial era

aliviar la presión externa de las dos potencias (Estados Unidos y URSS)

y comenzar a crear un ambiente favorable para el desarrollo económico

entre China y los países del Tercer Mundo (DOMÍNGUEZ MARTÍN et

al., 2019; HU; LIU, 2011; HUANG; REN, 2012; YAN, 2016; ZHANG, 2010;

ZHOU et al., 2013).

estudos internacionais • Belo Horizonte, ISSN 2317-773X, v. 8, n. 2, (jun. 2020), p. 86 - 102

Después de 14 años de combates, el país que había sido el más rico

y avanzado durante un período bastante largo, se encontraba en ruinas

(ZHANG, 2019). El PCC, cuya fundación se había inspirado en el PCUS

y la Revolución de Octubre, fue naturalmente miembro del bloque de la

Unión Soviética y se posicionó en contra de la Organización del Tratado

del Atlántico Norte (OTAN), liderada por los Estados Unidos (EEUU). Sin

embargo, a nales de la década de 1950, China rompió relaciones con la

URSS y a partir de ese entonces la ideología pasó a un segundo plano y

fueron los intereses del Estado Chino los que determinaron las políticas

estatales (SHEN, 2007; SONG, 1995). En este sentido, para China, en vez

de depender de una amistad frágil de los soviéticos, la opción fue ampliar

el campo de relaciones internacionales. En 1954 el primer ministro de

China, Zhou Enlai, propuso por primera vez los denominados “Cinco

Principios de Coexistencia Pacíca” con el n de salir del aislamiento im-

puesto por la URSS y los EEUU. El objetivo esencial de estos principios

era crear más lazos con los países en desarrollo. Posteriormente, a partir

de los principios mencionados, se establecieron en 1955 los “Diez Princip-

ios de Bandung” y más tarde en 1964 se crearon los “Ocho Principios de

la Ayuda Económica y la Asistencia Técnica al Exterior” (AYLLÓN, 2013;

DOMÍNGUEZ, 2019; HUANG; TANG, 2013a; ZHOU et al., 2013). Vale

mencionar que a partir de la creación de los principios de Coexistencia Pa-

cica, el espíritu de mutuo benecio y la igualdad pasaron a formar parte

fundamental de la CSS de China (DOMÍNGUEZ, 2017; HU; LIU, 2011).

Debido al aislamiento que sufría China por parte de las dos superpo-

tencias de la época y gracias al éxito de las luchas independentistas de los

países coloniales de Asia y África en los años 50 y 60 Mao formuló gradual-

mente una de sus más famosas teorías. En concreto, en 1948 Mao planteó

por primera vez la teoría de “la zona intermedia” que hace referencia a la

existencia de un extenso espacio entre los dos bloques de la Guerra Fría

en el que se situaban diversos países con características distintas (países

de Asia, África y América Latina) (1962). Posteriormente, Mao replanteó

su teoría y estipuló que existían “dos zonas intermedias: una incluía Asia,

África y América Latina mientras la otra, estaba conformada por Europa,

Canadá, Oceanía, y Japón” (1963). La primera zona intermedia mencionada

se convirtió en la génesis del término posterior “Tercer Mundo”. En el año

1974, Mao habló por primera vez de la clasicación de “tres mundos” en su

conversación con el presidente de Zambia: el Primer Mundo compuesto

por EEUU. y la URSS (“tigres de papel” del imperialismo capitalista y del

socialimperialismo), el Segundo Mundo integrado por los poderes inter-

medios –Europa, Canadá, Oceanía y Japón– y el Tercer Mundo formado

por Asia, África y América Latina. El criterio de clasicación que usó Mao

fue el “poder” y no la “ideología” o “clase social” de los países. Por ende,

tanto la clasicación de los tres mundos y la ubicación de China en el Tercer

Mundo indicaron un cambio realista de la estrategia internacional de Mao

(COOK, 2010; DOMÍNGUEZ, 2019; HE, 2005; HE, 2010; MORGENTHAU,

2006; SHEN, 2007; SONG, 1995; SUN, 2005; YAN, 2016; ZHANG, 2010).

Sin embargo, cabe recordar que durante los diez años de la Revo-

lución Cultural (1966-1976) el principio de la “lucha de clases” dominó en

casi todos los campos del país, excepto en el campo de la diplomacia pues

Fang Yuan El Pragmasmo en la CSS de China: integración del genio histórico y elementos modernos

aquí solo dominó tres años. Además, este principio al estar dirigido por

las ideologías del anti-imperialismo y anti-revisionismo provocó conic-

tos en las fronteras con la URSS en 1969, llegando al límite del estallido de

la guerra. Más tarde, la distención de las relaciones con EEUU. dejó más

incómoda la política exterior antigua. Pues en este sentido, la República

salió de la lucha ideológica poniendo por encima los intereses de la na-

ción china. La estrategia pragmática resultó correcta cuando China logró

los votos decisivos de 26 países africanos a favor de la legitimidad de la

RPC como la única representante ante las Naciones Unidas excluyendo a

Taiwán en 1971 (NNUU, 1971) y más tarde, en 1979, estableció relaciones

diplomáticas con los EEUU (DOMÍNGUEZ, 2019; HU; LIU, 2011; YAN,

2016; YAN; HE, 2017).

El núcleo del pragmatismo de China es la eciencia al realizar refor-

mas cuando cambian las situaciones. Las reformas –que se reeren a los

ajustes correctos de la política– a tiempo y realmente llevadas a la práctica

por las entidades de base son muestra del liderazgo político del PCC, lo que

ha permitido la reemergencia de China (YAN; ZHANG, 2018; ZHANG,

2014, 2019). En concreto, si bien en la primera fase de desarrollo, el objeti-

vo de la CSS era obtener el reconocimiento internacional del país, dejando

de lado a Taiwán, los instrumentos que se usaron fueron distintos en cada

etapa y la política de la CSS cada vez se volvió más pragmática. Después

de obtener un asiento en las Naciones Unidas, hubo un giro de la política

exterior del apoyo a las luchas independentistas en los países coloniales

al soporte del NOEI (siglas de Nuevo Orden Económico Internacional)

propuesto por el G77 en 1974 (DOMÍNGUEZ, 2016, 2019; DUBEY, 2014;

SAUVANT, 2014), cuya causa, aparte de “descolocar profundamente a la

URSS” (DOMÍNGUEZ, 2019), se trató de un cambio de la meta en el sigui-

ente paso tras la consolidación de su poder: desarrollar la economía china.

La terminología de self-reliance fue una de las orientaciones esencia-

les en el pensamiento de Mao que nació en el período de la lucha contra

la invasión japonesa. Frente a una doble presión de las tropas de Japón

y KMT, Mao promovió un movimiento de producción del ejército y el

Pueblo para “tener sucientes ropa y alimentos con las propias manos”

(MAO, 1991, p.1270) en las bases de apoyo (LU, 1965; MAO, 1991; ZHU,

1994). El movimiento no solo proporcionó la base material del triunfo de

la resistencia, sino también consiguió experiencias económicas preciadas

y fue una formación práctica para un grupo de personas calicadas para

la construcción de la economía de la República futura (LI, 2001). Luego,

en la época de la Guerra Fría, la self-reliance, integrada con la independen-

cia, se consideraba el espíritu dirigente de todos los asuntos estatales e

individuales para los chinos. Cabe señalar que el término de self-reliance

tenía que ver con el pensamiento materialista dialéctico de Mao: “La cau-

sa externa es la condición de cambio mientras la causa interna es la base.

La externa funciona por medio de la interna” “la causa determinante de

la evolución de una cosa no reside en el exterior sino en el interior, en la

contradicción de la misma” y “Pueblo, solo el Pueblo puede ser la fuerza

motriz de crear la historia”. (LI, 2001; LU, 1965; MAO, 1991; ZHU, 1994).

En este sentido, el desarrollo de un país se supone determinado por el

afán y los esfuerzos de construirlo por su propio pueblo. Pero deben de-

estudos internacionais • Belo Horizonte, ISSN 2317-773X, v. 8, n. 2, (jun. 2020), p. 86 - 102

stacar que la self-reliance no signica rechazar la ayuda exterior. Por el

contrario, tanto Mao como Deng subrayaron que la ayuda exterior fue

un factor imprescindible para el desarrollo, pero lo más importante fue

cómo recibirla. Es decir, “la revolución del Pueblo no se puede ganar sin

la ayuda exterior” (DENG, 1994), sin embargo, “esperamos la ayuda ex-

terior pero no podemos depender de la ayuda. Dependemos de nuestros

esfuerzos, de la creatividad del ejército y el Pueblo” (Mao, 1991).

Además, la orientación también presentaba la característica prag-

mática. Por un lado, superó al marco ideológico señalando que “tenemos

que aprender todas las ventajas de todos los Estados y de las naciones,

siempre que sea buena” “sin tener en cuenta de que el país sea capitalista

o socialista” y “estudiar los fracasos extranjeros para escarmentar” (LI,

2001; LU, 1965; MAO, 1991; ZHU, 1994). Por otro lado, esta orientación,

como experiencia exitosa compartida por China con el Tercer Mundo,

luego en 1970 se convirtió en la collective self-reliance bajo los Cinco Prin-

cipios de Coexistencia Pacíca que principalmente ponían el énfasis en la

cooperación económica y técnica a favor del NOEI, buscando “el desar-

rollo endógeno con cambio estructural” (DOMÍNGUEZ, 2019) y negan-

do la nueva colonización de los países del Norte en nombre de la “ayuda

económica” atada por condiciones políticas (DOMÍNGUEZ, 2016a, 2016b,

2017, 2019; LIN; WANG, 2016; ZHOU et al., 2013).

La primera etapa de la CSS fue clave porque en este período China

construyó los principios básicos de la cooperación internacional que actual-

mente aún dirigen las actividades del país en este campo, lo cual muestra

que la ambición del primer grupo líder del país no se limitó a lograr éxitos

en su mandato; en cambio, ellos tuvieron programas aplicables en el próxi-

mo siglo, o incluso siglos, con la meta de realizar el gran resurgimiento de la

nación china. Como señaló Confucio (a.C.,551- a.C., 4792013, p.)

“si uno no

tiene plan a largo plazo, tendrá preocupaciones a la vista”, así que hacer plan

a largo plazo ha sido la costumbre para los sucesores del gobierno chino.

Segunda fase: desarrollo económico y la estrategia de bajo perﬁl

Bajo la orientación de self-reliance, la economía y los índices sociales

iban mejorando notablemente. En ese momento, el sistema de planica-

ción contribuyó a resolver ecazmente los problemas surgidos en la reali-

zación de la ayuda y arreglar la producción doméstica, lo que en cierto sen-

tido promovió la producción interna (DOMÍNGUEZ, 2019; ZHOU et al.,

2013). No obstante, en el primer quinquenio de los años 70, el crecimiento

de la ayuda al exterior fue demasiado rápido que la ayuda sumó el 5,88%

de los gastos nancieros generales en aquel período llegando en 1973 a al-

canzar el 6,92% (ZHOU et al., 2013). Teniendo en cuenta el impacto nega-

tivo en la economía de las políticas de extrema izquierdista (el Gran Salto

Adelante y la Revolución Cultural), la ayuda al exterior se convirtió en

una carga pesada para un país todavía pobre, así que se efectuaron ajustes

de los medios, la administración, las políticas y el enfoque de la CSS de

China al dar por cerrado el período de la Revolución Cultural. Por ello,

el presidente Deng Xiaoping propuso una orientación general de reforma

y apertura al exterior en la III Sesión Plenaria del XI Congreso Nacional

4. Confucio (a.C.,551-a.C.,479), gran

pensador y educador de la China

antigua. Su obra “Las Analectas de

Confucio” es uno de los libros más

clásicos y conocidos chinos. La obra

está disponible en: https://ctext.org/

analects/zhs.

Fang Yuan El Pragmasmo en la CSS de China: integración del genio histórico y elementos modernos

del PCC (1978) con el objetivo de transformar la economía planicada de

China en una economía de mercado y realizar el objetivo estratégico de

las “Cuatro Modernizaciones”, las cuales implicaban la modernización de

la agricultura, la industria, la defensa nacional y la tecnología cientíca del

país. (CAI, 2010; HU; LIU, 2011; HUANG; REN, 2012; HUANG; TANG,

2013a, 2013b; LIU, 2013; ZHANG, 2010; ZHOU et al., 2013).

La política exterior en la época de Deng se hizo más pragmática

con el n de crear un ambiente internacional cómodo para el crecimiento

de la economía china, ya que existía una posibilidad muy reducida de

que ocurriera una Tercera Guerra Mundial entre los dos bloques (DENG,

1994; YAN, 2016). En 1982, durante el XII Congreso Nacional del PCC se

planteó ocialmente, por primera vez, que los intereses de la nación chi-

na serían la base del trabajo diplomático y se conrmó la política de no-

-alineamiento para evitar conictos internacionales. Posteriormente, en

los años 90, con el n de la Guerra Fría, se aplicó una estrategia de “bajo

perl” para hacer frente al imperialismo de EEUU. Se debe mencionar

que el cambio de la política exterior china coincidió con las demandas

internas del Pueblo, el cual exigía “una sociedad modestamente acomo-

dada” y la distensión de la situación internacional. En este sentido, como

señaló Deng, los dos temas más relevantes de la época fueron la paz y el

desarrollo (DENG, 1994; HE, 2010; YAN, 2013, 2016, 2018).

Mediante la transformación del sistema económico, las reformas de

la CSS de China se fueron profundizando en muchas dimensiones. Prim-

ero, se incorporó a las relaciones internacionales el principio de “buscar la

verdad en el hecho”, subrayando que “todo debe partir de la realidad” y se

observó una coherencia en la “igualdad y el mutuo benecio”. Segundo,

se redujo la cantidad de proyectos para evitar gastos fuera de la capacidad

económica de China. Tercero, se ajustaron las formas de ayuda, por ejem-

plo, se dejó atrás las inversiones de proyectos productivos y se comenzó a

invertir en proyectos simbólicos como estadios, hospitales, centros de con-

gresos, etc., proyectos que eran más fáciles de manejar y permitieron alivi-

ar la carga económica de China. Estos proyectos eran de tamaño pequeño

y medio y todavía muy heterogéneos. Cuarto, el mercado se convirtió en

un factor signicativo en las reformas del régimen administrativo tratan-

do de transformar la función del gobierno. Desde el año 1982, se efectuó

el sistema de responsabilidad contractual y en los años 90 se estableció el

sistema de subasta y licitación. El rol de los órganos de la ayuda al exteri-

or china experimentó un cambio, ya que pasó de una autoridad ejecutiva

competente a un coordinador y administrador de las actividades en el mer-

cado, todo esto con el n de descentralizar los órganos pertinentes a las

entidades contratantes, cuyos intereses económicos se consideraban prior-

itarios sobre los políticos (HU; LIU, 2011; HUANG; REN, 2012; HUANG;

TANG, 2013a, 2013b; ZHANG, 2010; ZHOU et al., 2013).

En síntesis, la estrategia de “bajo perl” coincidió con las condiciones

del país –uno de los cinco países miembros permanentes del Consejo de Se-

guridad pero con un escaso poder duro correspondiente– y la situación in-

ternacional de aquel momento –un mundo unipolar relativamente estable

y pacíco– promoviendo en la CSS de China las reformas que incorporaron

el factor mercado como el sujeto de actividades y cambiaron la función del

estudos internacionais • Belo Horizonte, ISSN 2317-773X, v. 8, n. 2, (jun. 2020), p. 86 - 102

gobierno, es decir, dejaron los campos rentables a las empresas mientras el

gobierno prestó más atención a los aspectos relacionados con el bienestar y

la sociedad (HU; LIU, 2011; HUANG; REN, 2012; HUANG; TANG, 2013a,

2013b; ZHANG, 2010; ZHOU et al., 2013). Por esto, China escogió una es-

trategia determinada para los países pequeños frente a las superpotencias.

La humildad se convirtió en una de los aspectos esenciales del poder del

país con n de reducir conictos diplomáticos con otros, sobre todo con los

EEUU, creando un ambiente relajado para el progreso económico. En las

siguientes décadas, el denominado ciclo de súper-crecimiento fue resulta-

do de dos factores: primero, de la política de reforma que activó la creativ-

idad de la sociedad y, segundo, de la apertura al exterior que proporcionó

un referente de desarrollo (CAI, 2010; YAN, 2013, 2016).

Con el crecimiento de la economía, la CSS de China se fue am-

pliando. “A partir de 1995, China reformó su cooperación económica,

empaquetando las donaciones a fondo perdido y los préstamos sin in-

terés, junto con créditos concesionales, inversión extranjera directa (de

sus empresas estatales) y acuerdos comerciales” (DOMÍNGUEZ, 2018).

El proceso se aceleró después de ingresar en la Organización Mundial de

Comercio (OMC) en 2001 y al año siguiente se llevó a cabo la estrategia Go

Globally, fortaleciendo conexiones aún más estrechas con el mundo medi-

ante las inversiones de las empresas chinas (ELLIS, 2018; DOMÍNGUEZ,

2018; LIN; WANG, 2013; YAN, 2018; ZHANG; SMITH, 2017; ZHOU et al.,

2013). El enfoque en la economía contribuyó al crecimiento imparable de

China, lo que aumentó obviamente el poder y la inuencia del país en los

asuntos internacionales, y como consecuencia empezó a tener impacto

en la construcción del orden internacional (DOMÍNGUEZ, 2018; YAN,

2016; ZHANG, 2019).

Hacia la tercera fase: el Gran Renacimiento de la Nación China como

país responsable

Actualmente, estamos en la transición de la segunda fase del de-

sarrollo de la CSS de China a la tercera. China ya es la segunda economía

más importante del mundo, y próximamente será la primera. Gracias al

despegue económico, el dragón asiático ya es “un elefante en la habitación”,

que no puede esconder su volumen e inuencia como lo que hizo antes.

La sociedad internacional le pide ser más que un compañero de comercio

e inversión (DOMÍNGUEZ, 2018; YAN, 2013; 2015; 2016; 2018). Además,

con la llegada al poder de Donald Trump en EEUU, se vislumbra una

reivindicación del nacionalismo en este país. Un giro a la derecha, consid-

erado como una resistencia a la globalización, que también afecta a varios

países europeos y latinoamericanos (YAN, 2016; YAN; HE, 2017).

En este contexto, la RPC, siempre etiquetada por el “proteccionis-

mo” y la “no economía de mercado”, ya es y será, irónicamente, el país

que más apoya el libre comercio y la globalización (DOMÍNGUEZ, 2016a,

2017; YAN, 2018). Un ejemplo claro de esta tendencia China es su esfuerzo

por integrar a la económica mundial con la creación de una nueva ruta de

la seda, posteriormente, denominada “una Franja y una Ruta”. No obstan-

te, su ambición va más allá del poder económico, pues no pretende repetir

Fang Yuan El Pragmasmo en la CSS de China: integración del genio histórico y elementos modernos

la experiencia de la Guerra Fría, cuando China y otros países miembros

del Movimiento de Países No Alineados (MNOAL, 1961) propusieron el

establecimiento del NOEI (DUBEY, 2014; SAUVANT, 2014). Ahora, el ob-

jetivo primordial es crear un nuevo orden mundial que no solo se reduce

a la dimensión económica, más bien se expande a todos los campos de

competición con los países desarrollados. Pero el reto más difícil es que

China quiere realizar su ambición por medios pacícos construyendo un

nuevo tipo de relación internacional con los EEUU (LIN; WANG, 2016;

YAN, 2015, 2018; ZHANG, 2011, 2017).

El objetivo de la política diplomática de China cambia según los in-

tereses del Estado en distintos períodos: en la época de Mao fue conse-

guir reconocimientos de la sociedad internacional; en la época de Deng

fue satisfacer las demandas básicas de vida del Pueblo; y hoy en la época

de Xi Jinping es lograr la dignidad nacional con la realización de los “dos

objetivos centenarios” –construir una sociedad modestamente acomodada

para el año 2021, centenario de la fundación del PCC, y convertir a China

en un gran país socialista y moderno para el año 2049, cuando se cumple

un centenario del establecimiento de la RPC (DOMÍNGUEZ, 2017; HE,

2016)– y el Gran Renacimiento de la Nación China (XINHUA, 2017; YAN,

2016, 2018; ZHANG, 2017). Considerando el poderío nacional integral de

hoy y la tendencia de crecimiento, China es el único candidato posible para

alcanzar o superar el poder de EEUU, así que la política de bajo perl ya no

es adecuada para un país reemergente. De acuerdo con el realismo moral

de Yan Xuetong (2015, 2016, 2018), para cumplir el Sueño Chino, la meta

del presente período se basa en crear una autoridad internacional mientras

sigue siendo un gran país responsable- esto hace referencia a que China

asume más responsabilidades, contribuye a proporcionar más bienes públi-

cos globales, está logrando un amplio apoyo internacional al conseguir más

países aliados y transforma la diplomacia orientada por intereses políticos.

La CSS como parte de la política exterior responde a estos cambi-

os en diversos aspectos. Por un lado, el planteamiento en 2013 del me-

ga-programa “One Belt One Road (OBOR)”, diseñado inicialmente para

el impulso de la integración económica y el incremento regional con la

creación de la Franja Económica de la Ruta de la Seda hacia Asia y Euro-

pa y la Ruta Marítima de la Seda del siglo XXI hacia Asia y África, se ha

convertido en una iniciativa global en la que otros países de fuera de la

región han mostrado interés y voluntad de participación. El presidente

Xi ha expresado en varias ocasiones que la OBOR es una propuesta abi-

erta para todos los países del mundo bajo el principio de igualdad, mutuo

benecio y negociación política. Esta iniciativa que pone su énfasis en el

fortalecimiento de las intercomunicaciones entre países, la resolución del

décit de infraestructuras y la transformación estructural de la economía

reejan el valor chino- “quien desea desarrollarse procura ayudar a que

se desarrollen otros”- en la construcción de un nuevo orden mundial

(DOMÍNGUEZ, 2016a, 2017; GU et al., 2016; LIN; WANG, 2016; QIN;

WEI, 2018; YAN, 2018).

Por otro lado, China está estableciendo su sistema nanciero a fa-

vor de la CSS dejando a lado los recursos nancieros multilaterales tradi-

cionales, en concreto, el Banco Mundial y el Fondo Monetario Internacio-

estudos internacionais • Belo Horizonte, ISSN 2317-773X, v. 8, n. 2, (jun. 2020), p. 86 - 102

nal (FMI) liderados por EEUU. Cabe destacar que la fundación del Banco

Asiático de Inversión en Infraestructura (AIIB) en 2015, como el soporte

nanciero principal de la iniciativa OBOR, aparte del Fondo de la Ruta de

la Seda, ya ha causado impacto en el orden nanciero internacional, pues

esta entidad ya cuenta con la participación de 70 países incluyendo cinco

países del G7, que produce una redistribución del poder en el campo in-

ternacional nanciero. La ebre del marco multilateral de la nanciación

de China es el resultado del descontento con el sistema nanciero tradi-

cional caracterizado por su baja eciencia y condicionalidades extremas.

(CHEN, 2015; DOMÍNGUEZ, 2016b, 2017; GU et al., 2016; LIN; WANG,

2016; LIU, 2016; YAN, 2018; WANG, 2015). En resumen, en la nueva era de

la política exterior de Xi Jinping, caracterizada por la “lucha por el éxito”

y “ser un gran país responsable”, China intenta crear un nuevo régimen

internacional de la CSS con valores diferentes de los tradicionales, todo

esto en un panorama internacional de transición hegemónica de EEUU a

China (DOMÍNGUEZ, 2018; YAN, 2016, 2018).

El pensamiento ﬁlosóﬁco y la tradición milenaria del pragmatismo de China

China es un país único en todos los sentidos, no solo por la gran

supercie y la población, sino también porque es un Estado continental

precisamente solapado por una civilización ininterrumpida durante tres

milenios. Se puede integrar el genio histórico y los elementos modernos en

los campos donde China consigue éxitos. Por lo tanto, si se quiere entend-

er China, hay que conocer su historia y su cultura (ZHANG, 2011, 2019).

La sustancia de la nación china se generó naturalmente mediante la

integración gradual de las 56 etnias que vivían en esa tierra (FEI, 1989). A

pesar de muchas guerras civiles y períodos de desunión, durante un gran

periodo de tiempo China fue un país unitario y “unipartidista”, gobernado

por un único grupo, la mayoría confucianista. Sin embargo, la autoconcien-

cia de la identidad de la nación china para el Pueblo no se empezó a desper-

tar hasta que después de la Guerra del Opio la frontera del país se volvió a

abrir violentamente durante la Primera Guerra Chino-Japonesa en 1894 y

luego de la Alianza de Ocho Naciones (compuesta por el Reino Unido, los

EEUU, Francia, Alemania, Rusia, Japón, Italia e Imperio Austrohúngaro)

en 1900 (FEI, 1989; ZHANG, 2008, 2011). Después del saqueo, el proceso

de modernización que acababa de surgir se vio suspendido. No obstante,

la ambición de los expoliadores nunca quedó satisfecha, así que Japón se

convirtió en miembro de los Países de Eje y provocó en 1931 la segunda

guerra invasora con la ilusión de colonizar China. Pues en este contexto, el

Pueblo Chino no tenía nada de conanza en los países desarrollados, por

ello, cuando terminó la guerra y estos describieron “una vía fantástica” ha-

cia la utopía occidental y quisieron imponer ciertas reformas políticas “por

su bien” al pueblo, China no aceptó ya que “los hechos están por encima de

la elocuencia” (CAI, 2010; JIANG, 2016; ZHANG, 2017, 2019).

Aparte de los acontecimientos mencionados, la causa profunda por

la que China eligió un camino propio de desarrollo tiene que ver con

su concepción losóca de la historia. Ya que la nación china ha experi-

mentado unicaciones y divisiones, ascensos y decadencias incontables,

Fang Yuan El Pragmasmo en la CSS de China: integración del genio histórico y elementos modernos

además, de épocas en las que compitieron cien escuelas ideológicas, a

partir de ello se formó una concepción losóca dinámica y multilineal

de la historia, totalmente contraria a la occidental, la cual considera el

desarrollo del régimen político de modo unidireccional (YAN, 2015, 2016;

ZHANG, 2011, 2017). En otras palabras, el mundo occidental piensa que

la democracia liberal es el n de la Historia (FUKUYAMA, 2006), mien-

tras que China cree que cada país, basado en sus propias condiciones y cir-

cunstancias, puede encontrar una vía precisamente adecuada para el de-

sarrollo, así que las experiencias exitosas pueden ser aprendidas, pero no

copiadas al pie de la letra (CAI, 2010; DENG, 1994; MAO, 1991; ZHANG,

2017). Por lo tanto, como dijo en su discurso de Zhang Weiwei sobre el

modelo chino (2019): a China no importan los modelos occidentales ni

pretende exportar el Modelo Chino, porque considera que “nunca se debe

imponer a otros lo que no deseas para ti mismo” (CONFUCIO, 2013).

Para aprender de cualquier modelo de desarrollo, lo más importan-

te es el pensamiento losóco detrás de las políticas concretas (ZHANG,

2019). El pragmatismo de la CSS de China se reeja en tres dimensiones.

En primer lugar, la CSS siempre sirve a los intereses del Estado sin tener

en cuenta de las discrepancias ideológicas. En ocasiones especícas, Chi-

na proporciona ayuda incluso a países que tienen relaciones diplomáticas

con Taiwán, dejando a un lado, cuando sea necesario, el principio esencial

de “una Sola China” (DOMÍNGUEZ, 2017; LIN; WANG, 2016; ZHANG;

SMITH, 2017). Respecto a los intereses del Estado, aunque varían según

la época, su objetivo es mejorar la vida del Pueblo. Esta doctrina del Pue-

blo, que hace referencia al pensamiento milenario de que el pueblo chino

es la base del Estado y que la paz del Estado depende de la consolidación

y la solidaridad del pueblo, ha sido ampliamente aceptada por cada dinas-

tía hasta hoy en día. Por eso, se ha convertido en una costumbre prestar

gran atención al bienestar del pueblo. Esto es, sin embargo, precisamente

lo que falta en el mundo occidental, que profundiza la quiebra entre el

pueblo y las élites. Aparte, en muchos casos se comete el error de prestar

más atención a la forma que a la esencia. Por ejemplo, la esencia de la

democracia son los pesos y contrapesos entre los poderes del Estado y la

capacidad del Pueblo de criticar y corregir al gobierno con el n de evitar

el abuso del poder, empero, en varios países la democracia se ha vaciado

ya que el demos solamente cumple una función electoral (MAIR, 2015).

Por consecuencia, en los últimos años han aparecido outsiders políticos

que carecen de experiencia política y ostentan un discurso populista. En

este sentido, las palabras del presidente Xi pueden ser una advertencia:

“las palabras huecas impiden el desarrollo del país mientras el trabajo y la

práctica lo propician”. Este valor, por supuesto, se extenderá por la CSS de

China cada vez más amplia y profunda (FEI, 1989; LI, 1999; LIN; WANG,

2013, 2016; YAN, 2015, 2016; ZHANG, 2011, 2017, 2019).

En segundo lugar, China efectúa reformas políticas a un ritmo

acelerado y al mismo tiempo mantiene unas metas rmes a largo plazo,

por ejemplo, la meta de realizar el Gran Renacimiento de la Nación Chi-

na se estableció al mismo tiempo que la fundación de la RPC y se llevó

a cabo mediante diversos planes quinquenales, los cuales ajustaban las

políticas tradicionales al contexto de cada época. Ahora bien, debido a

estudos internacionais • Belo Horizonte, ISSN 2317-773X, v. 8, n. 2, (jun. 2020), p. 86 - 102

la concepción dinámica de la historia, el dragón asiático considera que

no existe una receta o estrategia general que perdure por siempre, más

bien cree que se debe progresar continuamente con el paso del tiempo.

De acuerdo con el realismo moral, la razón principal de que China sea

la segunda potencia mundial y esté tan cerca de alcanzar a los EEUU es

debido a las profundas y constantes reformas que lleva a cabo gracias al

gran liderazgo político del PCC (YAN, 2015, 2016, 2018; ZHANG, 2011,

2017, 2019). Lo evidente en el caso estadounidense es que a pesar de que

los intelectuales norteamericanos están convencidos de la capacidad de

supervivencia y autocorrección del régimen democrático liberal, es obvio

que la llegada de Trump al poder tendrá grandes repercusiones en todos

los ámbitos (YAN, 2018).

La última dimensión y también la más importante es la insistencia

en el espíritu rector de “buscar la verdad en el hecho”. En este sentido, la

cultura china señala la necesidad de combinar la teoría y la realidad: “a

leer miles de libros y hacer miles de viajes”, “la práctica es el único criterio

para comprobar la verdad” (DENG, 1994), y que “todo debe partir de la

realidad”. Asimismo, el PCC cree en las particularidades de cada país, por

eso no copia sin antes considerar o probar las experiencias “avanzadas” y

advierte a otros países en desarrollo que no cometan este error. Después

de tantos años de aplicar uno de sus más importantes refranes –“cruzar

el rio sintiendo las piedras” (DENG, 1994)– y aprender de él, China com-

parte su experiencia en la resolución de problemas a través de la CSS. En

concreto, el país primero realiza una prueba limitada en una determina-

da zona antes de aplicar una política general, es decir, construye Zonas

Económicas Especiales o Parques Industriales en los que se lleva a cabo

una serie de políticas preferenciales con n de comprobar la viabilidad de

las políticas, además, concentra los reducidos recursos en el desarrollo de

los sectores prioritarios que suelen ser los sectores con más ventajas com-

parativas (LIN; WANG, 2013, 2016).

Conclusión

La CSS de China dispone de objetivos claros en cada etapa de su evo-

lución, los cuales se equilibran con los intereses del Estado. En la primera

fase, la ayuda al exterior tuvo como objetivo el reconocimiento interna-

cional de la RPC, además, en esta etapa se plantearon los principios y el es-

píritu rectores de la CSS: los “Cinco Principios de la Coexistencia Pacíca”,

los “Ocho Principios de la Ayuda Económica y la Asistencia Técnica al Ex-

terior”, y el espíritu de independencia y collective self-reliance. Igualmente,

en esta etapa, la ayuda exterior de China se caracterizó por su internacio-

nalismo y anti-imperialismo, lo cual contribuye a que el país rompiera

las relaciones con las dos superpotencias de la época (EEUU y la URSS) y

fomentase sus vínculos con los países del Tercer Mundo. Tras el n de la

Guerra Fría, la CSS de China se centró en alcanzar un progreso económi-

co vertiginoso ya que la situación económica de la época así lo permitía y

el pueblo chino demandaba más desarrollo. Igualmente, la política exte-

rior china se volvió más pragmática debido a su estrategia de bajo perl.

No obstante, actualmente, China, la segunda economía más importante

Fang Yuan El Pragmasmo en la CSS de China: integración del genio histórico y elementos modernos

del mundo y país líder de la CSS, transforma su estrategia de bajo perl

por una estrategia basada en la responsabilidad y sin miedo para enfrentar

a los EEUU, todo esto da lugar a que China aumente su inuencia en el

orden internacional y construya un nuevo régimen internacional de co-

operación. En este sentido, la iniciativa OBOR y el AIIB ostentan un peso

notable en la escena internacional, e incluso son relevantes para aquellos

países aliados de los EEUU. En el futuro China deberá acelerar su nueva

estrategia de responsabilidad si desea lograr alcanzar todos sus objetivos

(YAN, 2015, 2018) y construir un sistema de monitoreo y evaluación que

logre satisfacer la demanda de transparencia que solicita el pueblo y la so-

ciedad internacional (DOMÍNGUEZ, 2018; LIN; WANG, 2016).

La aplicación del pragmatismo de China es el resultado de la inte-

gración del genio histórico y los elementos modernos. La historia empíri-

ca forma una base cultural para aceptar la idea pragmática y se la com-

bina con términos modernos como la igualdad, los derechos humanos y

el Estado Nacional. Además, vale mencionar que las peculiaridades de la

nación China (ZHANG, 2017, 2019) –la supercie inmensa, la población

enorme, la historia milenaria y la acumulación cultural innita– también

inuyen y forjan su camino socialista. No obstante, otros países, con car-

acterísticas diferentes, también pueden encontrar sus modelos ideales de

desarrollo, siempre y cuando no copien los paradigmas de países desar-

rollados y no abandonen sus ventajas comparativas.

China se ha beneciado mucho de la globalización y la ayuda ex-

terior, por ello, comparte sus experiencias y lecciones adquiridas. La CSS

de China se basa en la losofía de una cultura abierta e incluyente que

pretende buscar “la unidad en la diversidad” y desea que “aquellos que

quieran desarrollarse procuren ayudar a que otros se desarrollen”. Es así

que el país asiático no promueve ni el racismo ni el sistema de tributo

(LIN; WANG, 2016; YAN, 2015; ZHANG, 2019).

En los últimos tiempos, los diversos conictos frecuentes entre

EEUU y China evidencian que EEUU se siente amenazado por el ascenso

económico del dragón asiático. En este juego de poder de suma-cero la

contradicción entre los dos países es inevitable. Por ende, ¿la guerra Chi-

no- Estadounidense es evitable? China ha prometido que no provocará ni-

nguna guerra, pero ha destacado también que no tiene miedo a la misma.

En este caso, teniendo en cuenta que China no se someterá a la presión

estadounidense, existe una posible línea de investigación respecto a la

cooperación preventiva de seguridad con el n de convertirse en el otro

polo del mundo, pero sin caer en la trampa de Tucídides.

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103

Amir Hosein Monazzami e Mahdi Sharia Feizabadi The Facilitang role of sport in foreign relaons of the US and Iran

The Facilitating role of sport in foreign

relations of the US and Iran

O papel de facilitador do esporte nas relações externas

dos EUA e do Irã

El papel del facilitador deportivo en las relaciones

exteriores de EE. UU. E Irán

Amir Hosein Monazzami

Mahdi Shariati Feizabadi

DOI: 10.5752/P.2317-773X.2020v8.n2.p103

Received in: December 16, 2019

Accepted in: April 06, 2020

A

Attractiveness and eectiveness are the two main global features of sport; The

Islamic Republic of Iran’s “soft power”, after fourteen years of its revolution,

has been inuenced by various macro and micro concepts that have been

repeatedly challenged by Western countries, especially the United States. So,

the Islamic Republic of Iran, in light of recent years’ successes in the interna-

tional eld of sports, including seventeenth among the 206 countries in the

Olympic 2012 can use this capacity to expand its interactions in the international

arena. The purpose of the present study was initially to explore the concepts

of strengthening Iran’s soft power through sport and to design a favorable

paradigm for the development of diplomatic relations with Western countries,

especially the United States. Then, SPSS and PLS software were used to inves-

tigate the correlation between variables based on Spearman’s test, exploratory

factor analysis and nally structural and interpretive modeling of independent

and dependent variables. The ndings showed that seven factors of nancial

development, devout, conversion, civilization, cohesion, governmental issues

and friendship were in four levels inuenced by Iran’s international sporting

environment.

Keywords: United States. Iran. West. Sports Diplomacy. Olympic.

R

O soft power da República Islâmica do Irã, após catorze anos de sua revolução,

foi inuenciado por vários conceitos macro e micro que foram repetidamente

desaados pelos países ocidentais, especialmente pelos Estados Unidos. Assim,

a República Islâmica do Irã, à luz dos sucessos dos últimos anos no campo

internacional do esporte, incluindo o décimo sétimo entre os 206 países nas

Olimpíadas de 2012, pode usar essa capacidade para expandir suas interações

na arena internacional. O objetivo do presente estudo foi inicialmente explorar

1. Assistance Prof. Department of

Sport Sciences, Shahid Rajaee Teacher

Training University, Tehran, Iran

He was born in 11 March 1978 in

Alashtar from Iran.

BA: Islamic Azad University, Iran

MA: University of Tehran, Iran

PhD: University of Tehran, Iran

Research Interest: Sport Events

National Volleyball Player of I.R. Iran

Corresponding Author: Email: amirho-

sein.monazami@gmail.com

https://orcid.org/ 0000-0002-8020-7698

2. Assistance Prof. Department of

Physical Education, Technical and Voca-

tional University, Tehran, Iran

He was born in 21 April 1987 in

Mashhad from Iran.

BA: University of Tehran, Iran

MA: University of Tehran, Iran

PhD: University of Tehran, Iran

Research Interest: Sport Diplomacy

Email: mshariati@tvu.ac.ir

https://orcid.org/0000-0003-1260-5253

104

estudos internacionais • Belo Horizonte, ISSN 2317-773X, v. 8, n. 2, (jun. 2020), p. 103 - 119

os conceitos de fortalecer o poder brando do Irã por meio do esporte e projetar

um paradigma favorável ao desenvolvimento de relações diplomáticas com os

países ocidentais, especialmente os Estados Unidos. Em seguida, os softwares

SPSS e PLS foram utilizados para investigar a correlação entre variáveis baseadas

no teste de Spearman, análise fatorial exploratória e, nalmente, modelagem es-

trutural e interpretativa de variáveis independentes e dependentes. As descober-

tas mostraram que sete fatores de desenvolvimento econômico, uxo religioso,

transformação e comunicação, intercâmbio cultural, unidade nacional, cor-

rentes políticas e construção da paz estavam em quatro níveis inuenciados pelo

ambiente esportivo internacional do Irã.

Palavras-chave: Estados Unidos. Irã. Ocidente. Diplomacia Esportiva. Olímpica.

R

El poder blando de la República Islámica de Irán, después de catorce años de su

revolución, ha sido inuenciado por varios conceptos macro y micro que han

sido desaados repetidamente por los países occidentales, especialmente los

Estados Unidos. Por lo tanto, la República Islámica de Irán, a la luz de los éxitos

de los últimos años en el campo internacional del deporte, incluido el deci-

moséptimo entre los 206 países en los Juegos Olímpicos de 2012, puede utilizar

esta capacidad para expandir sus interacciones en el ámbito internacional. El ob-

jetivo del presente estudio fue inicialmente explorar los conceptos de fortalecer

el poder blando de Irán a través del deporte y diseñar un paradigma favorable

para el desarrollo de las relaciones diplomáticas con los países occidentales,

especialmente los Estados Unidos. Luego, el software SPSS y PLS se utilizaron

para investigar la correlación entre variables basadas en la prueba de Spearman,

el análisis factorial exploratorio y, nalmente, el modelado estructural e inter-

pretativo de variables independientes y dependientes. Los resultados mostraron

que siete factores de desarrollo económico, ujo religioso, transformación y

comunicación, intercambio cultural, unidad nacional, corrientes políticas y

construcción de la paz estaban en cuatro niveles inuenciados por el entorno

deportivo internacional de Irán.

Palabras clave: Estados Unidos. Irán, oeste. Diplomacia Deportiva. Olímpico.

Introduction

In the light of globalization, information technology has been rap-

idly developed and advanced, and using the aforementioned facilities

and easy access to the technology has evolved the international circum-

stances. This structural and inherent evolution in international system

converted the public diplomacy to a tool, to which the governments re-

sort, to be able to better attain their national goals regarding other states

(RAHMANI, 2015). That is, goals which essentially include political, eco-

nomic, cultural, and social aspects (KESHAVARZ SHOKRI, 2013). Be-

sides these goals, the nature of public diplomacy has also been changed.

Unlike the past, where the nature of international system and its associ-

ated relationships were based on hard power and when the governments

used military forces, army, conferrals, and international unities and liai-

sons to gain their international goals, today the countries worldwide are

looking for alternative solutions and seeking a “softer” term to progress

their diplomatic goals (SABBAGHIAN, 2016). Moreover, the governments

try not to only focus their diplomatic system on the governing board of

105

Amir Hosein Monazzami e Mahdi Sharia Feizabadi The Facilitang role of sport in foreign relaons of the US and Iran

the counterpart country and are trying to aect the social and mental

structures of people. Thus, one of the most important characteristics of

diplomacy arises. In modern diplomacy, people satisfaction and require-

ments have the topmost position, and the people’s foreign decisions are

dependent on people’s opinions. Also, other alternative tools (other than

hard power) are applied to realize foreign goals. Therefore, practitioners

and politicians talk about sport diplomacy, because of its peacemaking

and training functions, and due to the fact that sports are considered as a

“soft power” (GRIX; HOULIHAN, 2014).

Indeed, sports diplomacy is the eorts of countries sport ambassa-

dors in various elds to boost a country’s picture and its soft power; for

example, the presence of Dennis Rodman, the American basketball play-

er in North Korea, and watching basketball with North Korea’s president

indicates the power of this part of public diplomacy. Or embracing the

picture of Iranian’s leader by Melvyn Douglas, the American wrestler in

the crowd of 7

Iranian presidential election is another representation

of sport’s soft power in developing the relationships between disputative

countries; this kind of diplomacy is based on cultural and social values of

dierent countries and targets the public opinions, politicians, as well as

governments. Sports diplomacy act as an elixir which, as an ingenious

and intact diplomatic tool is able to remove the discrepancies and can

promote development, conversation and consistency. Firms which works

in the eld of sports and diplomacy can enhance positive values of sports,

such as mutual respects, discipline, patience and tolerance, and compas-

sion in the rough and sharp political relations, and thus soften such an

atmosphere (LI, 2013).

Sport diplomacy is intentionally and consistently employed by gov-

ernmental and non-governmental actors to advance politics, businesses,

development, training, image, reputation, brand name, and people to

people communications and it uses sport events in this regard (MUR-

RAY, 2013). Indeed, as the diplomats sit around a desk, the athletes are

also running around a runway to realize the national goals; sport diplo-

macy is mostly emphasizing on the peace which is created among gov-

ernments and nations, and this is the factor that increases the tendency

to hold sport events. For example, 2008 Olympic games in Beijing is an

indication of understanding and friendship sense boosting, as well as re-

moving the created borders due to the end of the Cold War (JANKOVIC,

2017). Therefore, the bond between diplomacy and sports is an eective

solution which in companion can enhance a brighter and more eective

horizon to attain international diplomatic successes (SABBAGHIAN,

2016).

Besides the cultural areas, sports as an important and eective

dimension, has played a considerable role in countries’ political and

economic development (NAURIGHT; SCHIMMEL, 2005). Due to the

political and cultural aspects, sport has been widely recognized among

countries, and today the international sport is considered as an insep-

arable component of nations’ interrelationships and campaigns (MUR-

RAY, 2013). In this regard, can one claim that the share of each country

from the sport or the sport industries is dierent, depending on the cul-

106

estudos internacionais • Belo Horizonte, ISSN 2317-773X, v. 8, n. 2, (jun. 2020), p. 103 - 119

tural type and their policy makers’ point of view? It can be seen that the

nancial turnover due to the sports is dierent in countries which con-

siders sports as a means of entertainment, compared to the countries

which addresses sports as a part of their macroeconomics (SHARIATI

FEIZABADI, 2016). For example, in United Kingdom (UK) sports in-

dustries are placed among the rst 15 biggest industries, while in some

other undeveloped countries, sports are not even considered as a small

productive industry.

However, what is evident is that a high share of revenues in de-

veloped countries is related to the sports’ industries. In other word, pro-

fessional sports are no longer considered as an entertainment, but also

it is in fact, a highly protable industry which has a high capability to

absorb capitals. For example, by designing a sports’ decade (between 2010

to 2020), Brazil, as one of the 5 powers of evolving economies of BRICS

tried to host various disciplines of sports, such as FIFA world cup of 2014

or the summer Olympics of 2016 in Rio. Besides using this heritage in

economic development, Brazil, as such, tried to introduce itself as a stan-

dard country in international arena (SAJJADI, 2000). Thereby, paying at-

tention to sports and sports’ events can aect other employment areas

as an umbrella, and can inuence other people employments indirectly.

Development and economic collaborations, accompanying with sports

communications, cause the governments to promote the political and

foreign cultures and learn lessons from each other (ŠTULAJER; ŠTULA-

JER, 2016). Besides this national protability, sports diplomacy has now

succeeded in making borders pale, and opening more ways to conversa-

tions, through which various people can gather altogether (KHABIRI,

2014). According to the aforementioned advantages, this kind of diploma-

cy causes the relationships between governments and nations to boost

as time passes. As well, in the twentieth and twenty-st centuries, that

diplomacy was considered a theory, policy and culture in which interna-

tional relations are based on (DEOS, 2016).

Investigating the literature, we concluded that there has been a

large attention and focus on sports diplomacy as an eective solution to

remove between-countries’ stresses. Bakhshi Chenari et al. (2019) in their

study, “providing solutions to enable and enhance the sports diplomacy

in foreign policy of Islamic Republic of Iran (IRI)”, taking a qualitative

and quantitative approach, have concluded that the most important solu-

tions to enable and boost sports diplomacy in foreign policy of IRI are, as

follows, according to the experts’ perspective:

• Reviewing the administrative directives in sports agencies

(i.e. ministry of sports, the national committee of sports, etc.);

• Holding coordination meetings between ministry of sports

and ministry of foreign aairs, as the two main adminis-

trates of sports diplomacy;

• Training the political-sports managers of the country, con-

sidering the primary principles of international interactions

in a worldwide level; and

• The development and execution of a comprehensive and sci-

entic program to enhance the sports diplomacy.

3. . BRICs: Brazil, Russia, India, China,

and South Africa

107

Amir Hosein Monazzami e Mahdi Sharia Feizabadi The Facilitang role of sport in foreign relaons of the US and Iran

Shariati Feizabadi and Nazemi (2017), in their study, titled “De-

signing the concepts of sports’ peacemaker culture in the development of

international relationships” concluded that among various phenomena,

sports is considered as one of the most prominent indications of peace in

the 3

millennia, and could play a considerable role amongst the peace-

making programs of BRICs (Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa).

These countries have employed sports as a lever and a mean to appeal

their requirements from the global society. Islamic Republic of Iran re-

ferred to the View Plan in 2013 at United Nations General Assembly, and

now it is able to employ its national sports capacity in order to realize its

goals and objectives in international arena. Also, the ndings indicated

that the 34 frequent concepts in the eld of sports can play an explanatory

role in creating a peacemaker culture concept. Among these locutions,

“replacing the war and military diplomacy with sports, and creating in-

ternational friendship” was the most frequent locution (SHARIATI FEIZ-

ABADI; NAZEMI, 2017); In another research, titled “The place of sport in

domestic and international politics for peace and friendship” which has

been carried out by Mohammadi Aziz Abadi (2018), he concluded that

sports plays the following considerable and strategic roles in the nations

and governments’ relationships (AZIZ ABADI, 2018):

• Improvement and modication of a nations’ image;

• Boosting friendship;

• Increasing the peace and developing between-countries

friendship;

• Developing the business and tourism;

• Encouraging the international development;

• Unifying minorities; and

• The most important, the improvement of international rela-

tionships in order to boost the between-nations’ friendship.

Bagheri, Shariati Feizabadi and Nazarian (2016), in their study ti-

tled “Soft modeling (ISM) of sports diplomacy components” analyzed

data indicated that the components were categorized in three areas of;

bonding (cultural development and amicability), independence (media

interactions, national unity and identication, political development and

ghting isolation), and dependency (dark dimension, economic develop-

ment, branding and international prestige and the development of smart

prestige). Shahrezaei and Shirzadi (2016), in their study titled “The role of

sports in expanding the international terms of IRI”, indicated a more em-

phasis and focus on the sports’ role in developing friendly relationships

and collaborations with other countries and international organizations,

due to the role of cultural factors, soft power and interactions in foreign

policies, as well as an attention to sports as a mean to enhance the coun-

try international prestige by attaining successes and honors in interna-

tional arenas of sports and power presentation.

Jankovic (2017) in his study, titled “Boosting the solutions for inter-

national debates: the role of sports diplomacy”, indicates that not only the

traditional Olympic games but also the football rules show that sports can

work as a supplementary mean to resolve international debates. Schnei-

der (2018), in his research, titled “Sports as a facilitator for international

108

estudos internacionais • Belo Horizonte, ISSN 2317-773X, v. 8, n. 2, (jun. 2020), p. 103 - 119

positive relationships” indicated that sports can facilitate the resolution of

global issues positively by improving the international relations. Among

all people and governments, the sport is considered as a proper facilitator

for positive relationships, regardless of the current situation. Sport is con-

sidered as an international joint activity, which can enhance international

interactions, good faith between nations, friendship, and loyalty among

dierent nations. Boyacioglu and Oguz (2016) suggested that sport was

translated into a positive approach and a big mean of sanction in interna-

tional relationships and yet it continues. Thereby, increasing its impacts

on the most important items from the last century up to now, will have

impact on sport games and approximately all over the world and before

Olympic games, and then on other organizations (especially on football).

In fact, sport has played an important role in the test of power and races

between two poles in a warless environment, at that time; because sport

games are considered as wars which do not end in death and indicate the

economic eects of globalization in sports’ industry (BOYACIOĞLU &

OĞUZ, 2016).

Fozooni (2014) in his paper titled “Religion, politics, and social

class: conicts and competition in Iranian football”, investigated the re-

ligion, class, sex and race developments via football in Iran. He knows

football as the representation of IRI government national construct and

considered it as a result of religion power in social classes. Munt (2015) in

his study titled “Game, Set, Match: Sports and the Future of Diplomacy”,

indicated that sports diplomacy is considered as a legitimate base to study

international relations. In his study, he argues that countries sports diplo-

macy provide “soft” relatively opposing relationships. However, in this

research, he tries to remove the objections against this concept and high-

lights it by providing some samples which sports diplomacy can have.

Chehabi (2011), in his research titled “The sports diplomacy between USA

and IRI”, knows the victory of Seyed Mohammad Khatami in Islamic Re-

public of Iran presidential election in 1997 as a starting point for friendly

approach against dierent world countries.

Either in yesterday’s overwhelming atmosphere of pre- The Joint

Comprehensive Plan of Action period, or in the context of eorts of west-

ern countries of 5+1 today, in post-JCPOA era, Iran sports could keep alive

some twinkles of hope in boosting diplomatic interactions among these

countries, which can one name the presence of Iranian volleyball players

in the nal stage of volleyball world cup in 2019 in United States (USA),

as the last sample; Since in the last decade, IRI has been attacked dramat-

ically by media and advertisements in international public opinions (ad-

vertisements via projects such as Islamophobia, Shia-phobia, and Irano-

phobia), because of its ideologies to foster revolutionary goals, ideological

conicts against the East and the West, as well as due to its behavioral dif-

ferences in foreign policy eld, developing an appropriate roadmap seems

so necessary to frustrate these attacks and to modify the international im-

age of IRI in the world population minds, especially in Western countries,

more than ever (BAKHSHI CHENARI, GOODARZI, SAJJADI; JALALI

FARAHANI, 2019). The position of USA in international system as well

as the strategic role and position of IRI in the region arose mutual neces-

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Amir Hosein Monazzami e Mahdi Sharia Feizabadi The Facilitang role of sport in foreign relaons of the US and Iran

sities to create an appropriate relationship. IRI sports, as an Asian power

could always gain a prominent position in international arena, especially

in volleyball, wrestling, taekwondo, weight lifting and football, up to the

point that in summer Olympic games of London in 2012, IRI stood at the

rank, which was upper than Brazil, Spain, Argentina, Turkey, etc.

Therefore, in this study we aim to identify the diplomatic dimensions

and capacities of IRI sports, and make use of this bed as a tool to start and

boost the political relations with Western countries, especially USA.

Methodology

This research is considered a survey research in terms of data col-

lecting method, while it is an applied research from its goal perspective.

First, we tried to review the sports diplomacy literature and explore the

most important locutions inuencing the sports diplomacy by the Fuzzy

Delphi Method (FDM) and employing 10 experts. To this end, we devel-

oped a questionnaire and it was given to the experts, so that they could

screen the components and identify their importance. Finally, 33 locu-

tions were approved as indicated in Table 2. The statistical sample in the

second section was based on Cochran formula to calculate the unknown

population volume. The number of people was 170 according to the 5

question Likert scale. Considering the omissions, nally, 318 question-

naires were usable among the total 320 distributed questionnaires. In the

next sections, we employ Kolmogorov–Smirnovtest, Spearman correla-

tion coecient, exploratory factor analysis, as well interpretative struc-

tural models (ISMs) to nd and determine the relations between compo-

nents (which are converted to variables).

Findings

In order to carry out tests in our software, the questionnaires were

distributed among 318 people, whose demographics are depicted in table 1.

Table 1 - Descriptive statistics of quantitative part

No. Demographical parameters Choices Frequency Percentage

1 Sex

Male 176 55.3

Female 142 44.6

2 Marriage status

Single 124 38.9

Married 194 61

3 Education

BS 135 42.4

MS 116 36.4

PhD 67 21

4 Age

Under 30 81 25.4

31 to 40 103 32.3

41 to 50 75 23.5

51 and above 59 18.5

Source: own elaboration

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Before designing the conceptual model of research based on in-

terpretative-structural modeling, rst it is necessary to identify the in-

terested components based on previous studies and experts’ comments.

To do so, in the rst step (i.e. the identication of problem parameters),

the decision-makers’ comments were collected using the 5 Likert scale,

and then a triangular fuzzy number was attributed to factors. Then, the

suggested threshold in literatures was employed to determine each fac-

tor status (accept/reject). 33 locutions in sports were selected to design a

questionnaire. Also, a free question was designed at the end of question-

naire in which the respondents were asked to mention all inuencing

factors that they think of them, as important factors for the research pur-

pose. Second, the questionnaire was used to collect experts’ comments

in decision making groups in order to obtain the relative importance of

inuencing factors and their ranks. Therefore, data collection was car-

ried out in 2 steps. In the rst step, the questionnaire was given to the

members of experts group, and they were asked to mention their ideas

about each measure as oral parameters in the questionnaire. The fuzzy

mean and the explicit fuzzy number were explored according to the

mean calculation formula. Finally, the identied factors were named. In

this step, we tried to answer the question “What are the inuencing fac-

tors in sports diplomacy?” To name the factors, 2 general measures were

used, that is “controllable/incontrollable”, and “general/specic”. First

factor: It includes locutions 2, 3, 15, 17, 23, and 30 which constitute 13.357

percent of the total variance. These factors have the most variance. This

factor includes 6 locutions, as follows:

Step 1: Identifying the problem parameters

The decision-making group comments were collected according

to a 5-points Likert scale, and then the triangular fuzzy number were

attributed to factors. Then, considering the threshold suggested in lit-

eratures, each item status (accept/reject) were determined. 33 locutions

in sports diplomacy were selected to design a questionnaire. Also, a

free question was designed at the end of questionnaire in which the re-

spondents were asked to mention all inuencing factors that they think

of them, as an important factor for the research purpose. Second, the

questionnaire was used to collect experts’ comments in decision mak-

ing groups in order to obtain the relative importance of inuencing

factors and their ranks. Therefore, data collection was carried out in 2

steps. In the rst step, the questionnaire was given to the members of

experts group, and they were asked to mention their ideas about each

measure as oral parameters in the questionnaire. The fuzzy mean and

the explicit fuzzy number were explored according to the mean cal-

culation formula. Finally, 7 factors were identied and named. In this

step, we tried to answer the question “What are the main factors in fa-

cilitating the relations of Iran and USA sports diplomacy?” To name the

factors, 2 general measures were used, that is “controllable/incontrolla-

ble”, and “general/specic”. Finally, 7 factors were identied which are

summarized in table 2.

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Amir Hosein Monazzami e Mahdi Sharia Feizabadi The Facilitang role of sport in foreign relaons of the US and Iran

Table 2 - Categorized factors using explorative analysis

LocutionExplored Factor

Sports diplomacy is a tool to indicate a real picture of Iranians to the world.

Civilization

Sports can lead to boost world population interactions.

Indigenous, local and traditional sports create an appropriate platform to develop revolution discourse.

Sport is a tool with which one country people can stand against the other.

Sport can develop the cultural relations between countries’ population.

Sport events play the main role to improve public diplomacy between IRI and USA.

International sport events in USA are much less covered compared to IRI.

Comprehensive and general understanding and interactions with western countries, is considered as a prere-

quisite for sports diplomacy development.

The governmental and state laws prohibit the realization of sports diplomacy goals in Iran.

Governmental

Issues

Sport is a tool to develop diplomatic relations.

A country attendance in sport events can take a country out of political and geopolitical isolation.

Sport can help to reconstruct internal agencies.

Sport is a tool to promote power and dominance.

Countries try to gain their broad goals via sports.

Sport can create a platform in which the political geography can approximate natural geography.

Sport helps to improve foreign relations and enhance between governments’ understanding.Friendship

Sports can be considered as an alternative for war and military diplomacy.

Sports are a reason for psychological wars among governments.

Sport is a tool against doping, race, tribal, regional and class diversity.

Sports can soften and normalize the relationship between two countries which have cold opposing political atmosphere.

Sport is an appropriate atmosphere to inﬂuence public opinions.Cohesion

Sport is source for conﬂicts and discrepancies between countries.

Sport diplomacy between countries requires a change in between-societies hostilities and mutual bonds.

Sport teaches leadership, team working, respecting to rules, and mutual respects.

Sport can lead to countries’ consistent development.Financial

Sport increases the economic outcomes.

Sport can create mutual consistent relationships and leads to development.

Sport is a reason for a revolution in communications and information.Conversion

Sport plays an important role in political, social, and economic life of different countries’ population.

Sport’s role is beyond a body activity and includes various social, educational, cultural, political, and economic functions.

Sports diplomacy is affected by religion and political ideology. Devout

Sport decreases the religion varieties.

Source: own elaboration

In the second step, we constructed the structural self-interactive

matrix. It is constructed of sports diplomacy dimensions and components

and their comparison, using four states of conceptual relationships.

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Table 3 - Structural self-interactive matrix for factors inﬂuencing sports diplomacy

i j 1 2 3 4 5 6 7

1 Governmental Issues X V X X V V V

2 Devout A X X X V V A

3 Conversion X X X V V V V

4 Civilization X X A X V V V

5 Cohesion A A A X X X V

6 Friendship A V A X X X X

7 Financial A A A A A A X

Source: own elaboration

In the 3

and 4

steps, the primal and nal matrixes were built:

Table 4 - The primal and ﬁnal matrixes

i j 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Inﬂuence power

1 Governmental Issues 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 6

2 Devout 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 6

3 Conversion 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 5

4 Civilization 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 5

5 Cohesion 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 4

6 Friendship 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 3

7 Financial 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1

The degree of correlation 3 4 3 6 5 6 6 30

Source: own elaboration

In the 5

step, following the determination of attainment set as well as

the prerequisite of each parameter, the common elements in the attainment

set and prerequisite for each parameter were identied. After determining

the prerequisite and attainment sets as well as common elements, it was the

time for determining parameters’ (elements) levels. In the rst table, those

parameters have the highest level, whose attainment set is equal to the com-

mon elements. After determining this (these) parameter(s), we will elimi-

nate them from the table and will form the next table by other remained

parameters. Like the rst table, we determine the 2

level parameter in the

table, and will continue until all parameters’ levels are determined.

Table 5 - Determining the parameters’ levels

Dimension(s) Attainment set Prerequisite set Common elements Leveling

1 7-6-5-4-3-2-1 4-2-1 4-3-2-1 3th level

2 7-6-5-4-3-2-1 4-3-2-1 4-3-2-1 4th level

3 7-6-5-4-3-2-1 4-3-2-1 4-3-2-1 4th level

4 6-5-4-2-1 3-2-1 4-3-2-1 3rd level

5 7-6-5-4 6-5-4-3-2-1 6-5-4 2nd level

6 7-6-5-4 6-5-4-3-2-1 6-5-4 2nd level

7 7 6-5-4-3-2-1-7 7 1st level

Source: own elaboration

113

Amir Hosein Monazzami e Mahdi Sharia Feizabadi The Facilitang role of sport in foreign relaons of the US and Iran

In the next step, following the determination of relationships and

parameters’ level, the primary model was developed. To do this, rst we

sort the parameters according to their level, from the lowest to the highest.

In the current model, the parameters have been classied in 4 levels. At the

topmost level, the economic development model can be seen, which is af-

fected most (correlation factor). At the lowest level, are located political cir-

cles, and reforms and communications, which act as the model base. The

model starts with these parameters and then leads to other ones. At the

next levels, are located other components, which can be seen in gure 1.

Figure 1 - Extracted model from interpretative-structural modeling

Source: own elaboration

In the 7

step, the analysis of inuencing power and the correlation

degree has been carried out, using MICMAC diagram. We can dene a

coordinate system based on the correlation degree and parameters inu-

encing power and divide it to 4 equal parts. In this study, some parame-

ters are located under the driving subgroup, which has a high inuencing

power a low correlation power. Located in the next group are dependent

parameters which are somehow the results of the product development

process, and are less able to lead to other parameters. All the results are

depicted in the following gure and table.

Table 6 - The level of inﬂuencing power and correlation of parameters

Parameters 1 2 3 4 5 6 7

Inﬂuencing power 7 7 7 6 4 4 1

Correlation power 4 4 4 3 6 6 7

Source: own elaboration

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Figure 2 - Inﬂuencing power and correlation of parameters

Source: own elaboration

Path analysis and Hypothesis tests

In order to investigate the relationship between research param-

eters, we rst assess the relationship between these parameters using

Spearman’s correlation coecient, in order to primarily investigate the

relationships. Spearman’s correlation coecient can provide an overview

of the relationship between the two main research parameters. The re-

sults of correlation test showed that all relationships are signicant at

99% condence level (0.01% error) and the change direction is the same.

So, the Null hypothesis is rejected and the alternative hypothesis (i.e. a

signicant relationship) is conrmed, and each two research parameters

are correlated positively and signicantly.

Table 7 - Correlation matrix for research parameters

Parameters 1 2 3 4 5 6 7

Governmental Issues

correlation

----- ----- ----- ----- ----- -----

Signiﬁcance ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- -----

Conversion

correlation 0.318

----- ----- ----- ----- -----

Signiﬁcance 0.000 ----- ----- ----- ----- -----

Devout

correlation 0.403 0.247

----- ----- ----- -----

Signiﬁcance 0.000 0.000 ----- ----- ----- -----

Civilization

correlation 0.458 0.539 0.330

----- ----- -----

Signiﬁcance 0.000 0.000 0.000 ----- ----- -----

Cohesion

correlation 0.617 0.416 0.362 0.479

----- -----

Signiﬁcance 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 ----- -----

Friendship

correlation 0.34 0.566 0.375 0.571 0.405

-----

Signiﬁcance 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -----

Financial

correlation 0.404 0.273 0.365 0.310 0.33 0.357

Signiﬁcance 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000

Source: own elaboration

115

Amir Hosein Monazzami e Mahdi Sharia Feizabadi The Facilitang role of sport in foreign relaons of the US and Iran

After the identication of dependent and independent parameters,

now we investigate the relationship between parameters, using structur-

al equations model in PLS software. Codes can be seen in the software

output, each of them indicates a parameter. The parameters are shown

as follows: Governmental Issues as GI, Civilization as CI, Conversion as

CO, Devout as DE, Cohesion as CO, Friendship as FR, and Financial as

FI. The essential criterion for assessing the latent endogenous parameters

is R

deterministic coecient. The value of R

(0.67, 0.33, and 0.19) in path

models of PLS is considerable, medium, and weak, respectively. As can

be seen, this value is equal to 0.463 for friendship parameter, 0.445 for co-

hesion parameter, which are considerable. It is equal to 0.162 for nancial

which is categorized as weak. Figure 3 indicates the research conceptual

model following the determination of between-parameters relationship.

Figure 3 - Research conceptual model plotted by the software

Source: own elaboration

In order to assess the validity of measurement tool, we have used

the converging validation by Fournel and Larker measure (i.e. the vari-

ance mean has been explored). The least AVE of 0.5 indicated sucient

convergence. That is, a latent parameter can explain more than a half of

its dening dispersion. The mean values of explored variance are reported

as civilization (0.732), nancial (0.809), cohesion (0.735), friendship (0.685),

governmental issues (0.647), conversion (0.710), and devout (0.849). As can

be seen, the explored mean value for the latent parameter in reective

model is higher than 0.4, which indicates the desired converging validity

of the measurement model.

Finally, we used the PLS software ® to assess the research model.

We have also used non-parametric test of bootstrap (TENENHAUS et

al., 2005) with 500 repetitions to estimate the standard errors and testing

hypothesis. The essential criterion for assessing the latent endogenous

parameters is R

deterministic coecient. The value of R

(0.67, 0.33, and

0.19) in path models of PLS is considerable, medium, and weak, respec-

tively (AZAR et al., 2012). As can be seen, this value is 0.919 for civiliza-

tion, which is considered considerable, and is 0.326 and 0.2 for friendship,

and cohesion parameters, respectively which are considered as medium.

As well, it is equal to 0.16 for nancial which is considered as weak. Each

path coecient in PLS structural model can be considered equal to a

standardized beta coecient in usual least squares regressions.

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Figure 4 - Model in structural path coefﬁcients state

Source: own elaboration

*CI: Civilization, DE: Devout, GI: Governmental Issues, CO: Conversion, FE: Friendship,

CH: Cohesion, FI: Financial

Figure 5 - Model in signiﬁcant numbers state

Source: own elaboration

*CI: Civilization, DE: Devout, GI: Governmental Issues, CO: Conversion, FE: Friendship,

CH: Cohesion, FI: Financial

As can be seen from the research structural model, there exists a

positive and signicant relationship between governmental issues, de-

vout, conversion parameters, and the cohesion parameter, according to

the signicance numbers and between-parameters’ relationships struc-

tural coecient. In addition, there also exists a positive and signicant

relationship between civilization and friendship parameters and cohesion

parameter. Finally, there is a signicant and positive relationship between

the two parameters of cohesion and friendship, with nancial.

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Amir Hosein Monazzami e Mahdi Sharia Feizabadi The Facilitang role of sport in foreign relaons of the US and Iran

Discussion and conclusion

According to the research ndings, we explored 7 factors related to

Iran sports diplomacy. Among these 7 factors, the governmental issues

and civilization are inseparable components of sports diplomacy, that if

are accompanied, could be considered as “soft power” generating factor

against USA. Although some believe that sports act as a tool for politi-

cians (NAURIGHT; SCHIMMEL, 2005), sports diplomacy can move in

a separate way, so that avoid political challenges. Sports diplomacy can

mitigate the political stress between IRI and USA through its valuable

and popular nature, as sports promote a sense of respect and mutual hap-

piness, per se. Sports diplomacy can also play a role in the evolution of mi-

cro-cultures and civilization values between the two countries. Not only

by gathering dierent countries people altogether, and the evolution of

such micro-cultures, the constructive and eective interaction between

IRI and USA governments are formed, but also it provides conditions

for “civilization” between the two countries’ people, and as Sabbaghian

(2016) suggested, after a short while, political and cultural successes will

arise between the two countries. In this regard, it seems that IRI must try

to use various civilization methods and tools to take appropriate actions

to distress, remove its negative images, make positive images of itself,

and recognize itself for American people. With regard to sports diplo-

macy critical role in making peace and friendship among countries, IRI

must reduce its tendency to use military and threatening tools, and open

direct conversation doors in the light of sports diplomacy. On the other

hand, having friendly relationships with other countries can smooth the

way for the other important tool for implementing the sports diplomacy,

that is hosting sports events.

Another important point of this research is that dierent sports di-

plomacy components are interrelated, and as the results of Spearman’s

correlation test veried the signicant and positive relationships between

components, in the case of a change in one, the other will also be changed.

For example, the passion of Iranians to wrestling was a key element for

US policy makers to send the rst Americans in a shape of wrestling team

after Islamic revolution in 1997 that was concluded to “Sport Diplomacy”.

Therefore, sports diplomacy may lead to gain a wide range of social, po-

litical, and economic goal in IRI.

Next, the result showed that nancial factor is known as one of the

most important components of sports diplomacy. Sports can be a part

of Iran macro-economy and have a large share of the country revenue.

Today, sport is not only considered as a body activity and entertainment,

but also can boom a protable industry. Theoretical literature indicat-

ed that many countries that holds sport events, make a lot of money for

themselves besides introducing their countries to others (SAJJADI, 2000).

Therefore, in the light of sports, IRI can provide opportunities to extend

her collaborations with USA and so, she could exploit her right to host

sport events. In this way she could partly create employment to resolve

some of her economic issues, and create a positive commercial balance.

Brazil, Germany, South Africa, and Russia are sample who hosted cred-

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ible world games, not long time ago and as such they tried to introduce

themselves as standard countries. One of the research’s interested com-

ponents was national unication. This parameter can both aect other

parameters and can be also aected by them. Sport games are an indica-

tive of the cohesion and empathy of dierent countries’ people. Playing

national anthems during games, especially in the case of victories, is an

indicative of athletics and participants’ empathy which induce the sense

of national pride and patriotism. Sports diplomacy indicated that govern-

ments decide their foreign policies according to their people opinions,

and only if people are satised, they could reach unication and integrity.

Thus, one can say that not only sports diplomacy creates empathy and

unication between people, but it also changes the relationship between

the governments and their population.

Evidences indicate that sports have advanced the relationship be-

tween IRI and USA. For example, the USA wrestling team attendance

in Takhti wrestling cup in 1998 for the rst time after the interruption

of the two countries’ relationships, the football match between IRI and

USA in the same year -which was since referred to as football diplo-

macy, and with the USA president message led to the nations close-

ness- and/or American wrestler attendance in Khalij Fars cup in 1385

-in which Iranian students welcome them- are all samples which show

some opportunities to improve the relationships between these two

countries. Therefore, one can say that sports diplomacy in Iran must

act as a diplomatic and cultural mean to build trust, convince, and at-

tract American athletics and people, instead of being as an advertising

weapon to create credits to reach the country political objectives and

goals (KHABIRI, 2014). Moreover, considering the huge negative ad-

vertisements forced by USA against IRI, leveraging sports diplomacy

promotion tools, such as sports messengers, holding exhibition games

as well as sports tourism can somehow reduce this huge amount of neg-

ative advertisements, and links both people and governments of these

two countries. By creating a sense of peace and friendship between USA

and IRI, sports diplomacy can provide opportunities to reduce stresses

and negative advertisements against Iran. It can even convince world

public media to induce a positive perspective to the world, in the light

of sports and their valuableness and popularity.

At the end, the present study suggests to address the assessment

of these two countries activities during the past 40 years, so that it could

be clear that how much were these activities and actions succeed in

meeting IRI goals, national interests and Islamic expedience, to realize

Iran diplomatic goals. At the next step, is located the development of

a roadmap for IRI sports diplomacy with regard to USA, in order to

evaluate capacities, challenges, goals and Iran’s foreign policy prefer-

ences as well as the current situation of sports diplomacy. At the 3

step, it is necessary to establish an organization to organize Iran’s sports

activities regarding the USA and, nally, resuming formal diplomatic

relationships between the two countries and employing professional

and capable sports diplomats in the form of embassies, dependents, or

sports consultants in these countries.

119

Amir Hosein Monazzami e Mahdi Sharia Feizabadi The Facilitang role of sport in foreign relaons of the US and Iran

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estudos internacionais • Belo Horizonte, ISSN 2317-773X, v. 8, n. 2, (jun. 2020), p. 120

Errata

O Conselho Editorial de Estudos Internacionais, Revista de Relações Inter-

nacionais do Programa de Relações Internacionais da Pontifícia Universi-

dade Católica de Minas Gerais, ISSN: 2317-773X torna públicos, para ns de

citações futuras, os seguintes ajustes no artigo “R(r)elações I(i)nternacionais,

Realismo e Análise da Política Externa (APE): contextualizando a invenção da

APE”, do autor Pedro Emanuel Mendes, DOI: 10.5752/P.2317-773X.2020v8.

n1.p64, publicado no volume 08, número 01 em abril de 2020:

• Na página 64 elimina-se o espaço entre “análise historiográ-

ca da invenção” e “da APE”;

• Na página 68 onde está “norte-ameri cana” leia-se “norte-a-

mericana”;

• Na página 71 onde está “deveria continuar ser estudada” leia-

-se “deveria continuar a ser estudada”;

• Na página 72 elimina-se o espaço entre “teoria da política in-

ternacional,” e “não era uma teoria”;

• Na página 74 onde está “associaisdo” leia-se “associais do”.

Belo Horizonte, julho de 2020.

Prof. Javier Alberto Vadell

Editor Chefe de Estudos Internacionais

Departamento de Relações Internacionais

Programa de Pós-Graduação em Relações Internacionais da PUC Minas