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estudos internacionais • Belo Horizonte, ISSN 2317-773X, v. 8, n. 4, (dez. 2020), p. 132-150
Brazil and Turkey in the 21st century:
strategic interests in comparative
perspective
1
Brasil y Turquía en el siglo XXI: intereses estratégicos en
perspectiva comparada
Brasil e Turquia no século XXI: interesses estratégicos em
perspectiva comparada
André Luiz Reis da Silva
2
Gabriela Dorneles Ferreira da Costa
3
DOI: 10.5752/P.2317-773X.2020v8.n4.p132
Received in: August 30, 2020
Accepted in: February 04, 2021
A
This research aims to compare the strategic interests and the positioning at the
foreign policy level of Brazil and Turkey in the 21st century, considering the
rise to power of, respectively, Workers’ Party (PT, in Portuguese) and Justice
and Development’s Party (AKP, in Turkish). Methodologically, it was used
bibliographical research and analysis of speeches in the General Debate of
the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) between 2010 and 2015. It was
veried convergence between Brazil and Turkey in themes as the acknowl-
edgment of the multipolarity of the World Order, the necessity of the United
Nations Security Council (UNSC) reform, the importance of the fortication of
the global economic governance by G-20 and the compromise with the Interna-
tional Law, with the terrorism combat and with the Humans Right protections.
As divergence point, it was veried the debates about the sort of reform to be
implemented at the UNSC and some questions involving the Arab Spring, such
as the military intervention at Libya in 2011. At last, some themes are more
recurrent at one country’s foreign policy than another’s; as topics regarding
Central Asia and Middle East, at Turkey’s case, and subjects regarding BRICS
and south-american regional integration, at Brazil’s case.
Keywords: Brazil. Turkey. Foreign Policy. Strategic Interests.
R
Esta investigación tiene como objetivo comparar los intereses estratégicos y el
posicionamiento a nivel de política exterior de Brasil y Turquía en el siglo XXI,
considerando el ascenso al poder, respectivamente, del Partido de los Trabajadores
(PT, en portugués) y el Partido de la Justicia y el Desarrollo (AKP, en turco). Met-
odológicamente, se utilizó la investigación bibliográca y análisis de los discursos
1. Esta pesquisa contou com apoio da
FAPERGS e do CNPQ.
2. Doutor em Ciência Política (UFRGS).
Pós-doutorado na School of Oriental and
African Studies/University of London.
Professor dos PPGs em Ciência Política
(PPGCP) e em Estudos Estratégicos
Internacionais (PPGEEI) da UFRGS. Porto
Alegre, RS, Brasil. Bolsista de Produtivi-
dade em Pesquisa do CNPq (PQ2). Esta
pesquisa contou com apoio da FAPERGS
e CNPQ. ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-
0003-2593-1189 Email: reisdasilva@
hotmail.com
3. Mestranda pelo Programa Interinsti-
tucional de Pós-Graduação em Relações
Internacionais “San Tiago Dantas”
(UNESP, UNICAMP, PUC-SP). Graduada
em Relações Internacionais pela UFRGS.
Foi bolsista de mestrado CAPES e
bolsista de iniciação científica CNPQ.
ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-
1967-1467 Email: gabrielaferreiradacos-
ta@gmail.com
133
André Luiz Reis da Silva, Gabriela Dorneles Ferreira da Costa Brazil and Turkey in the 21st century: strategic interests in comparave perspecve
en el Debate General de la Asamblea General de las Naciones Unidas (AGNU)
entre 2010 y 2015. Se vericó la ocurrencia de convergencia entre Brasil y Turquía
en temas como el reconocimiento de la multipolaridad del Orden Mundial, la
necesidad de la reforma del Consejo de Seguridad de las Naciones Unidas (CSNU),
la importancia del fortalecimiento de la gobernanza económica global por parte
del G-20 y el compromiso con el Derecho Internacional, con el combate al terror-
ismo y con las protecciones a los Derechos Humanos. Como punto de divergen-
cia, se vericaron los debates sobre el tipo de reforma a implementar en el CSNU
y algunas cuestiones relacionadas con la Primavera Árabe, como la intervención
militar en Libia en 2011. Por último, se detectaron algunos temas que son más
recurrentes en la política exterior de un país que en la de otro; como temas en
materia regional de Asia Central y Medio Oriente, en el caso de Turquía, y temas
de BRICS e integración regional sudamericana, en el caso de Brasil.
Palabras-clave: Brasil. Turquía. Política Exterior. Intereses Estratégicos.
R
Esta pesquisa tem como objetivo comparar os interesses estratégicos e o
posicionamento no plano da política externa do Brasil e da Turquia no sé-
culo 21, considerando a ascensão ao poder de, respectivamente, Partido dos
Trabalhadores (PT) e Partido da Justiça e Desenvolvimento (AKP, em turco).
Metodologicamente, utilizou-se a pesquisa bibliográca e a análise de discursos
no Debate Geral da Assembleia Geral das Nações Unidas (AGNU) entre 2010
e 2015. Foi vericada a ocorrência de convergência entre o Brasil e a Turquia
em temas como o reconhecimento da multipolaridade da Ordem Mundial, a
necessidade da reforma do Conselho de Segurança das Nações Unidas (CSNU),
a importância do fortalecimento da governança econômica global pelo G-20 e o
compromisso com o Direito Internacional, com o combate ao terrorismo e com
as proteções dos Direitos Humanos. Como pontos de divergência, vericaram-se
os debates sobre o tipo de reforma a ser implementada no CSNU e algumas
questões envolvendo a Primavera Árabe, como a intervenção militar na Líbia
em 2011. Por m, foram detectados alguns temas que são mais recorrentes na
política externa de um país do que na de outro; como temas relativos a questões
regionais da Ásia Central e do Oriente Médio, no caso da Turquia, e assuntos
relativos aos BRICS e à integração regional sul-americana, no caso do Brasil.
Palavras-chave: Brasil. Turquia. Política Externa. Interesses Estratégicos.
Introduction
The international transformations occurred with the Cold War’s
end and with the acceleration of the globalization process accentuated
the multipolar tendencies of the international system, opening new pos-
sibilities for the international insertion of great peripheral States. Among
the diverse concepts and analyses that have been elaborated to compre-
hend the emergence of intermediate countries, the BRIC concept – cre-
ated in 2001 by Jim O’Neill, economist of the Goldman Sachs investment
bank (O’NEILL, 2001) – was the most popularized, both in the media and
in the academic eld. In 2003, the BRIC used to correspond to 9% of the
global GDP. Up to 2008, the economies of the four countries already cor-
responded jointly to 15% of the global economy, with their GDP adding
up to nine trillion of dollars. In 2009, BRIC constituted a political discus-
sion forum, and it embodied South Africa in 2011 (becoming “BRICS”).
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On the other hand, lots of works point other intermediate, medi-
um or emerging powers as holders of signicant capacities, mostly smaller
than those of BRICS’, but that can also inuence regionally and, especially,
aect the condition of regional power of BRICS countries (NOLTE, 2010).
The emerging countries represent, increasingly, an object of interest for
Brazilian foreign policy, as they constitute regional references of develop-
ment, are intermediate States in terms of power and inuence in the in-
ternational system, and can support the Brazilian aspirations for medium
power status. However, many have historical ties (economic and military)
with developed countries. In this context, there is Turkey, holder of strate-
gic importance in the Middle East and considered regional and intermedi-
ate power. This way, this research aims to identify the limits and the possi-
bilities of international action of intermediate powers as Brazil and Turkey.
The following study has been developed in a context of frequents
questionings about the similarities of the Brazilian and the Turkish behav-
iors at the international arena since the rise to power of the Worker’s Party
(PT, in Portuguese) and the Justice and Development Party (AKP, in Turk-
ish). In that sense, the main objective of this research is to identify points
of convergence and divergence in the international agenda of those coun-
tries, considering their respective political and social bases for the foreign
policy formulation and their central axes of international integration.
Therefore, the core question to be answered is whether the posi-
tion of these countries as emerging powers in the international system
gives them convergent positioning, identifying if Turkey has been build-
ing routes of convergence with Brazil’s foreign policy. To answer to this
matter, the comparative method – a systemic procedure of case analysis
– can be used, comparing the countries and establishing their similarities
and dierences, thus being “extremely useful to create and test proposi-
tions about the foreign policy behavior that apply to two or more cases”
(ROSENAU, 1968, p. 308).
Foreign policy comparative analysis, based on a limited number of
cases, has as methodology, basically, the identication and description of
the core variables involved at the problem (LIJPHART, 1971). Here, the
main independent variable is the fact that both countries are considered
emerging. The international themes selected, identied as Brazilian stra-
tegic interests, act as dependent variables, which allow the observation of
the similarities and dierences in the foreign policies of these countries.
The main intervenient variables are the relative capabilities (economic
and military), their relative positions in their regions, their development
models, their relations with the United States of America (USA), and their
position regarding the debate on multipolarity. However, this research
recognizes the diculty of clearly separating the variables’ orders, given
the complexity of this analysis, generating overdetermination of variables,
which can reinforce or exclude each other (HUDSON; VORE, 1995).
Thereby, seeking torender the comparison operational, the follow-
ing variables have been chosen: a) economic development model; b) rela-
tions with the USA; c) defense of multipolarity; d) United Nations Securi-
ty Council (UNSC)’s reform; e) climate change and development; f) ter-
rorism and Humans Rights; g) nuclear research development; h) World
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André Luiz Reis da Silva, Gabriela Dorneles Ferreira da Costa Brazil and Turkey in the 21st century: strategic interests in comparave perspecve
Trade Organization (WTO) – trade liberalization and the Doha Round;
i) global economic governance (G-20); j) South-South cooperation; k) re-
gional integration. The position of both countries regarding the events of
the Arab Spring was also compared. Concerning the research techniques,
the authors have used bibliographical research of both primary and sec-
ondary sources. So, the present work was built through the investigation
of books and articles and through speech’ analysis of the Brazilian and
Turkish representatives’ participation at the General Debate of the Unit-
ed Nations General Assembly (UNGA) between 2010 and 2015.
Changes to Brazilian foreign policy
The revision of Brazil’s matrix of international integration, which
was in force in the 1990s, implied a redenition of multilateral, regional
and bilateral priorities. Brazil seeks a broad multilateral and universalist
agenda, advocating mainly the multipolarity and the democratization of
international decision-making bodies, such as the United Nations Security
Council. The revaluation of multilateral forums for Brazil to present its
points of view, win supporters and articulate channels of collective interests
represents a new form of international integration, distinct from the previ-
ous matrix. A change in the scope of multilateral relations can be identied,
with the expansion of strategic partnerships and coalition groups, seeking
to advance diplomatically regarding the previous decade (AMORIM, 2004).
With the change of government in 2003, when Luiz Inácio Lula da
Silva took over the presidency, multilateral policy remained central, but
its content and strategies were reoriented. The new multilateral concep-
tion is based on a new reading of the international system, which identi-
es its power diusion and multipolar tendencies, but recognizes its in-
stitutional constraint that hinders the insertion of developing countries.
So, it defends the need for greater representation in discussion forums in
order to democratize and increase the eciency of organizations such as
the United Nations. Regarding action, it seeks to explore new spaces of
bargaining and negotiation, through intense use of articulation groups.
According to Maria Regina Soares de Lima (2005), the Lula government’s
emphasis on multilateralism would be interrelated with the perception of
Brazil’s position in the international scenario as a medium power, “which
sees in the mediation between the strong and weak its main contribution
to the international stability and the recognition of its international pro-
jection not by force, but by parliamentary diplomacy” (LIMA, 2005, p. 15).
On the other hand, the multilateral agenda has gained new per-
spective, associating substantial issues of economic development and
trade liberalization to the need for greater democratization of the deci-
sion-making process (mainly in the UN). It develops institutionalized co-
ordination with developing countries, in forums such as IBSA and G-20.
Thus, the Lula government accentuates the action on the horizontal-mul-
tilateral axis, conceiving an autonomous position for Brazil in the multi-
lateral forums, as a great State, which would seek – by bargaining means
rather than by good behavior – to gain greater visibility in the sphere of
international power (PECEQUILO, 2008).
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Thereby, in 2003, the country promoted the creation of two blocks,
IBSA or G-3 (India, Brazil and South Africa) and the G-20. IBSA represents
the institutionalization of the partnership between Brazil, India and South
Africa, aiming to promote cooperation on “a wide range of topics ranging
from trade to international security” (VIGEVANI; CEPALUNI, 2007, p.
296). The G-20 was established on 20 August 2003 during the preparato-
ry meetings for the 5
th
WTO Ministerial Conference. The group focus-
es on agriculture, the central theme of the Doha Development Agenda
(OLIVEIRA, 2005). The articulation with the countries known as BRIC
(Brazil, Russia, India, and China) was institutionalized in June 2009, in
the Russian city of Yekaterinburg, during the 1
st
BRIC Group Summit.
In that sense, Itamaraty
4
sought to increase the density of relations
in spaces that were previously barely occupied by Brazilian diplomacy in
the 1990s, with the approach to South American – especially the Ande-
an – countries, Southern Africa and the Middle East, and to China, India
and Russia. In addition, cooperation and deepening of partnerships with
these countries allowed the construction of alliances of “variable geom-
etry” such as the G-3, the G-20 and BRIC, in other words, these alliances
potentiated Brazil’s bilateral relations with countries classied as “strate-
gic partnerships” (CERVO; BUENO, 2011).
By reinforcing its alliances with developing countries, Brazil gradu-
ally frees itself from the inuence of traditional powers, acquiring greater
autonomy. Thus, it is considered that the Brazilian foreign policy in the
rst decade of the new millennium has constituted a new matrix of inter-
national integration, in which it seeks to strengthen regional integration
in South America and to recover Brazil’s multilateral tradition of critical
prole toward international asymmetries, as well as seeks to build stra-
tegic partnerships with similar countries in all continents (SILVA, 2015).
However, unlike the developmentalist matrix of the 1970s and
1980s, the new foreign policy matrix is more uid and multidimensional,
with exible political arrangements, alliances, and strategic partnerships,
combining actors, scenarios, and interests. The multidimensionality de-
rives from diplomatic action and articulation in various plans (bilateral,
multilateral and regional). It is observed that despite of the intensica-
tion of South-South cooperation, the traditional relations were not aban-
doned. Dilma Rousse government (2011-2016) embraced this same con-
ception, revealing a continuity regarding the foreign policy developed
during the two mandates of President Lula, although some adjustments
have been made in the program, mainly, due to the crisis situation that
hit global economy and to the domestic political crisis that culminated in
the impeachment process in 2016.
Changes to Turkish foreign policy
Turkey is included in a select group of countries that could surpass
economically the G-7 countries, except the United States, according to
Goldman Sachs forecasts for Next Eleven (N-11). This is due to the struc-
ture of the Turkish economy, whose level of maturity and development
stands out among the N-11. In fact, Turkey went through several periods
4. Brazil’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
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André Luiz Reis da Silva, Gabriela Dorneles Ferreira da Costa Brazil and Turkey in the 21st century: strategic interests in comparave perspecve
of economic boom during the twentieth century. At rst, the country
adopted an import substitution policy, during which it set up its indus-
trial base. Since the 1980s, however, Ankara has abdicated this project in
favor of a liberalization strategy to attract foreign investment and boost
the manufacturing industry, whose exports have become the engine of
production expansion. Thus, Turkey began to integrate the route of in-
ternational capital ows, boosting its trade balance.
If inclusion in the international market is the main virtue of the
Turkish economy, government decit and technological gap of some of its
sectors are the main problems. Despite that, it should be noted that Tur-
key seems to have made considerable progress in terms of political stabili-
ty. Throughout the previous century, the country has faced several coups
d’état led by the army, which presented itself as the bastion of Turkish
secularism. Since 2002, however, a party with Islamic roots that has been
committed to institutionalizing democracy and preventing depositions of
elected governments has been established. This process crystallizes the
transformations of Turkish society, which seem to have already settled the
necessary foundations to ensure long-term economic growth. Given its
population and its strength in terms of military capabilities, it is presumed
that Turkey’s inuence on the international system will tend to increase
considerably in the next decades (WILSON; STUPNYTSKA, 2007, p. 5).
Turkey’s international relations are articulated along three main
axes, which shape the authorities’ responses to the demands of the inter-
national system. In the rst place, it is essential to connect the country to
its geopolitical context, in a position of connection between Europe, Asia
and the Middle East. Also important is the question of identity, as there is
an important debate regarding the cultural belonging of the Turks, con-
sidering the fact that they are embedded in the crossing of dierent con-
tinents. Finally, the problems stemming from Turkish history must be
emphasized, since the fact that the country was the seat of a great empire
sometimes gives rise to pretensions of greatness in the practice and in the
speeches of its leaders. These three factors intertwine and forge Turkish
diplomacy (ALTUNISIK; TÜR, 2005).
For example, there are several elements that demonstrate the rel-
evance of these aspects during the Cold War. Geopolitics became very
important during the 1980s, due to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.
The United States assigned much importance to Turkey, which was con-
templated with new weapons. In that same period, Turkish aspiration to
join the European Community generated many debates in civil society.
Members of the Welfare Party (Refah Partisi – RP, in Turkish) even said
that this interest was the result of a cruzade project. Subsequently, when
the RP came to power, it considered necessary to approach Muslim coun-
tries, because the Muslim roots of the country would push it to do so.
Other sectors, more linked to secularism, have criticized this position,
arguing that Ankara needs to orient itself toward Europe if it wants to
progress (ALTUNISIK; TÜR, 2005).
AKP’s presence at the heart of the decision-making policies gives a
more universal character to Turkish international relations. Although the
party carries an inheritance of radical Islam, it has not turned its back on Eu-
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rope; instead, retained the Turkish bid to join the European Union, which
is, in fact, a majority’s will of the local population. In addition, it has sought
to be more active in the rest of the world, as evidenced by the creation of
new embassies in Africa and Latin America. The government also encour-
ages new partnerships in the Middle East, considering the region a priority.
The rise of the AKP also increases the participation of the popular social
classes in issues related to diplomacy, a novelty, as politics in the times of the
secularists was, largely, applied from the top to the bottom (HIRO, 2009).
Relations between Turkey and the United States have undergone
several oscillations since the end of World War II. During Clinton’s admin-
istration, the proximity between the two governments remained, which
was crystallized in Turkish cooperation in the Balkans, for example. As
counterpart, Washington positioned itself in favor of Turkey’s accession
to the European Community and also favorably to the construction of the
Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline. At that time, the commercial partnership
also increased and, US entrepreneurs started to invest more in the Turkish
market, especially in communications, energy and infrastructure (GÜN,
2009).This placidity in relations, however, ended at the Iraq War of 2003, as
the Turkish Parliament did not authorize the installation of US troops in
Turkish territory, despite the government’s interest in doing so. After this
event, relations between the two countries entered a phase of uncertainty.
Another problem aroused from the Iraq War is the possibility of the emer-
gence of a Kurdish state in the region (ALTUNISIK; TÜR, 2005).
Since Obama’s government, few changes have occurred in relation
to previous paradigms. The United States continues to argue that the ght
against terrorism is one of the pillars of partnership with the Turks, also
because Turkey faces this problem domestically due to the PKK (GÜN,
2009). There is also discord over relations with Iran, as Ankara has tried
to avoid economic sanctions against Tehran. As a consequence of this
position, Obama announced that new arms sales will be subject to Turk-
ish behavior. Obama’s criticisms on the Armenian genocide of the early
twentieth century also sparked apprehension in the Turkish government,
which evidently did not appreciate these comments.
Turkish belonging – or not – to Europe is materialized in the Turk-
ish attempt to join the European Union (EU). Indeed, Ankara demanded
entry into the European Economic Community as early as 1959 and ob-
tained associate membership status four years later. In subsequent years,
nevertheless, a series of political problems caused the Turkish authorities
to avoid an ocial request to become a full member, being the invasion
of Cyprus the main one. European Community countries have severely
criticized this attitude, which has made the Turkish government aware
of the impossibility of succeeding on this issue. In 1987, then, there was
the ocial attempt, which was rejected two years later. It should also be
pointed out that the negative answer was peremptory, without any pros-
pect of reversal (ALTUNISIK; TÜR, 2005).
From the economic point of view, though, this situation changed in the
following decade. In 1995, a Customs Union was established between Turkey
and the European Union, which determines the free movement of goods
between these regions. This rule, however, does not apply to agriculture,
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André Luiz Reis da Silva, Gabriela Dorneles Ferreira da Costa Brazil and Turkey in the 21st century: strategic interests in comparave perspecve
as some European countries fear the competition from Turkish products
(YILMAZ, 2008). In the wake of these events, the government has sought to
implement measures aiming to the acceptance of its candidature to the Eu-
ropean Union, such as further promotion of Human Rights and suspension
of the death penalty. The biggest problem, nevertheless, derives from the fact
that the Turkish population exceeds 70 million, raising fears in the European
Union about its absorption. The atavistic dispute with the Greeks also does
not favor Turkey. It cannot be ignored, either, that the idea of admitting a
Muslim nation within Europe displeases many (ALTUNISIK; TÜR, 2005).
Brazilian strategic interests revealed at the United Nations General Assembly
In analyzing statements by President Dilma at the UN General As-
sembly (UNGA), we can perceive concepts that guide the foreign policy
of her government. Among the most frequent and emphatic ones are the
following: multilateralism and democratization of multilateral institu-
tions (perspective of the rise of multipolarity and of greater participation
of developing countries); UN reform (global governance crisis and the
need for reforms, especially in the UNSC); sustainable development(eco-
nomic development associated to the eradication of poverty, with the
zealous use of natural resources and with environmentally sustainable
patterns of production and consumption); economic-nancial equilibri-
um (criticism toward the nancial market and the monetary, exchange
and commercial policies of developed countries); protection of Human
Rights (creation of the principle of Responsibility while Protecting and
criticism of Human Rights violation through cybernetic espionage).
The issues regarding multilateralism and democratization of multi-
lateral institutions are linked to the premise of a recent transformation in
the international order. Dilma and her foreign policy makers seek Brazil’s
international integration in a world that has recently become multipolar
but has retained obsolete mechanisms of debate and cooperation between
nations. In this sense, the government defends multilateralism as the most
reasonable way of maintaining world peace and stability in this new mul-
tipolar system (ROUSSEFF, 2011; 2014). Furthermore, it advocates greater
democracy in multilateral forums, since, in this new context, the absence
of developing (and especially emerging) countries in multilateral discus-
sions compromises the global governance process’ eciency and restricts
the legitimacy of these institutions (ROUSSEFF, 2011; 2012; 2013; 2015).
UN reform is linked to the previous concepts, also associated to the
view of loss of eciency and legitimacy of the bodies that maintain their
structure and operations based on the outdated system. According to that
perception, Dilma maintains that the world suers not only from an eco-
nomic crisis, but also from a political trust and governance crisis (ROUS-
SEFF, 2011). The countries who have the power to take action in internation-
al institutions no longer have the power to make their decisions legitimate
and to compel other States to put their resolutions into practice. Thus, in
the midst of the demands for reform of the UN Security Council, the pres-
ident reiterates Brazil’s interest and commitment to take part in the group
of permanent members as a Latin American representative. Defending that
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Brazil is the greatest power in the region, Dilma’s administration arms
that the country is likewise a reference in promoting peace, respect for Hu-
man Rights and promotion of multilateralism (ROUSSEFF, 2012; 2014).
The development matter during Lula’s administration focused on
the so-called South-South cooperation, so that the developing countries
would gain more space in the international system. Moreover, even though
the concept of development allied to peace was present in his foreign pol-
icy agenda, the main emphasis was on the economic issue. To claim that
the economic aspect was abandoned in the Dilma’s government would be
a misunderstanding. What occurred, in fact, was a greater attention to the
promotion of elements that should accompany economic development,
such as peace and security. From this conception, Brazil, under Dilma’s
foreign policy, proposed to aid developing countries in issues that go far
beyond the nancial aspect; reaching themes such as cooperation in food
security, agricultural technology, clean and renewable energy generation
and combat of poverty and hunger. In this sense, Brazil achieved a great
victory with its performance of Rio+20 conference (ROUSSEFF, 2012).
At the conference, which was a mark of multilateralism, the coun-
try was able to approve the inclusion of points such as the ght against
hunger and poverty as a Sustainable Development Goal. Thus, the search
for domestic achievement and promotion of international eorts for a
sustainable development model that combines economic growth, eradi-
cation of poverty, conscious use of natural resources and sustainable pat-
terns of consumption and production was a milestone in the foreign pol-
icy of the Dilma government regarding development, cooperation and
environmental care (ROUSSEFF, 2012; 2014; 2015).
The search for economic-nancial equilibrium is based on criticisms
of deregulation of the nancial market, Currency War, protectionism of de-
veloped countries, and exclusion of emerging countries from the debate on
solutions to the 2008 global economic crisis (ROUSSEFF, 2011; 2012). Presi-
dent Dilma’s questioning, in general, concerns the use of orthodox policies
by developed countries, which have negative eects on developing countries,
forcing emerging countries to adopt criticized defense measures (ROUSSEFF,
2012). The president calls for a greater regulation of nancial markets, in view
of the need to control the indiscriminate entry of speculative capital that leaves
the economy volatile. In addition, she recriminates the so-called – by the then
Finance Minister, Guido Mantega –Currency War, a maneuver by developed
countries that leaves Brazil at disadvantage in international trade. Neverthe-
less, she repudiates protectionism, vehemently denying accusations that Brazil
uses such mechanism. Besides, in all her speeches the president was emphatic
in her call for a decentralization of the world economic debate (ROUSSEFF,
2011; 2012; 2013).The demand for greater participation of developing coun-
tries in economic policy decisions was constant; as well as the demand for the
deepening of interactions between the International Monetary Fund (IMF),
the World Bank (WB), the WTO, the UN, and multilateral forums that are
more representative, such as the G-20 –Dilma’s main instrument regarding
economic debates at the international level – (ROUSSEFF, 2012).
Continuing Brazilian diplomatic tradition of defending the protec-
tion of Human Rights, President Dilma condemned violence against civil-
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André Luiz Reis da Silva, Gabriela Dorneles Ferreira da Costa Brazil and Turkey in the 21st century: strategic interests in comparave perspecve
ians in insurgencies in the Middle East – in the context of the Arab upris-
ings. This led to debate on the principle of Responsibility while Protecting
(RwP), a complement to the principle of Responsibility to Protect (R2P),
which was questioned when humanitarian intervention in Libya became a
military intervention for regime change (ROUSSEFF, 2011; 2012). The intro-
duction of the Responsibility while Protecting principle was a daring move
of the Dilma government’s foreign policy, considered a concrete measure
of demonstrating Brazil’s ability to take diplomatic initiatives, underpin-
ning Brazil’s pursue for a permanent seat on the UNSC. Furthermore, the
formulation of the principle marked a change of Brazilian position, which
now admits the need for foreign intervention in certain circumstances. An-
other evidence of Brazil’s tougher stance on Human Rights abuses under
Dilma’s government. Finally, another issue that was treated as a Human
Rights violation by the president was the virtual espionage that assaulted
the privacy of civilians, decision-makers and Brazilian strategic companies.
It triggered eorts, especially in cooperation with Germany, to condemn
such acts as a Human Rights violation (ROUSSEFF, 2013).
Turkish strategic interest revealed at the United Nations General Assembly
When analyzing statements by Turkish representatives in the Gen-
eral Debates of the United Nations General Assembly between 2010 and
2015, one can identify concepts that have been guiding Turkish foreign
policy in this period. Among the most frequent and emphatic ones, are the
following: multilateralism and democratization of multilateral institutions
(perspective of the rise of multipolarity, UN reform, strengthening of the
G-20, commitment to international law, defense of nuclear non-prolifera-
tion); protection of Human Rights (combat of terrorism and Islamophobia,
concern for refugees); responsible development (commitment to human-
itarian aid and cooperation with Least Developed Countries– LDCs –,
notion of collective environmental responsibilities); and regional security
and stability (promotion of democracy in the Middle East, encouragement
of cooperation and economic interdependence with neighbors).
Turkey recognizes that the international system is in the process
of multipolarization and, therefore, believes that it is necessary to adapt
multilateral institutions to this new order. In this way, Turkey advocates
for a reform in the UN system, especially in the Security Council – but
not in the format intended by Brazil – (DAVUTOĞLU, 2012; 2015; ER-
DOĞAN, 2011; 2014; GÜL, 2010; 2013).Turkey also criticizes the tradition-
al international nancial institutions (IMF, WB etc) and emphasizes the
role of the G-20 in overcoming the 2008 international economic crisis,
advocating a strengthening of more democratic arrangements for such
economic debates (DAVUTOĞLU, 2015; GÜL, 2010). In addition to these
traditional demands from emerging countries, Turkey also demands
greater respect for international law, especially regarding equal treat-
ment between States (GÜL, 2010). In this sense, it questions the double
standards for issues such as nuclear non-proliferation. Double standards
cases, according to the country, damage the credit of international insti-
tutions. Therefore, Turkey calls for a new approach to the issue of nuclear
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non-proliferation; in order to be fair, it must have a more democratic and
universal approach (GÜL, 2010).
In the point of Human Rights, Turkey criticizes the selectivity in
statements proclaiming the protection of these rights. Thus, its repre-
sentatives condemn what is considered as negotiability of these rights
(DAVUTOĞLU, 2012; ERDOĞAN, 2011). Turkey advocates that Human
Rights need to be respected unconditionally and emphasizes two types
of violations that aect the country: Islamophobia and terrorism (DAVU-
TOĞLU, 2012; GÜL, 2013). For Turkey, the lack of condence and lack of a
sense of justice in the UN is a strengthening factor of terrorism and, so, the
country rearms the necessity for reforms in this institution. It defends
the combat of terrorism to be indiscriminate, regardless of political, ideo-
logical or religious orientation, and believes that combating terrorism is
the greatest challenge of these days. In relation to Islamophobia, Turkish
representatives arm that prejudice and hate speech cannot be confused
with freedom of expression (DAVUTOĞLU, 2012; 2015).The issue of refu-
gees is of utmost concern to Turkey, especially since the beginning of the
Syrian Civil War. According to the Turkish government, the country sees
the issue of refugees and migrants in a more comprehensive perspective
than a mere State security issue. The Turks deal with the matter through
the binomial development-humanitarian aid in order to seek long-term
solutions to the problem (DAVUTOĞLU, 2015; ERDOĞAN, 2014).
Turkey desires to be a model for the States of its region and also
wants to project itself as a regional power concerned with others States
globally. For that reason, the Turkish foreign policy applies the concept of
responsible development. In this sense, the country, taking advantage of
its good economic moment, emphasizes its willingness to assist in the de-
velopment of other countries, especially those known as Least Developed
Countries and African countries (GÜL, 2010; 2013). Turkey emphasizes its
collaboration with humanitarian aid and its proposal for cooperation based
on the principle of mutual benets. In this regard, the cooperation agency
of Turkey (TIKA, in Turkish) stands out (ERDOĞAN, 2011; GÜL, 2010).
Regarding the environment, the country states that it should be considered
as a global indivisible public good. Hence, the international community
must assume collective responsibilities toward its protection (GÜL, 2010).
The core regional matter of Turkey is the promotion of regional se-
curity and stability, so that the country can develop itself and assume the
role of regional power. Turkey – dierently from Brazil – does not men-
tion a process of regional integration, but stresses the importance of its
eorts for greater cooperation in the dierent regions to which it belongs
(Middle East, Caucasus, Balkans, and Central Asia) (DAVUTOĞLU, 2015;
GÜL, 2010). Turkey sought to disseminate its model of democracy in the
Middle East, in order to create a favorable environment to the expansion
of relations, especially economic, between the countries of the region.
The Arab Spring was a timely event in that direction, allowing Turkey to
project itself as a regional leader in rebuilding a democratic Middle East.
Nevertheless, it is known that in the course of this process the instability
of the region only worsened, damaging the Turkish doctrine of “Zero
Problems with the Neighbors”. Besides, throughout the speeches in the
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André Luiz Reis da Silva, Gabriela Dorneles Ferreira da Costa Brazil and Turkey in the 21st century: strategic interests in comparave perspecve
UN General Debate, in the regional perspective Turkey also claims for
the recognition of the Palestinian State and for the resolution of the Cy-
prus issue (ERDOĞAN, 2011; GÜL, 2010, 2013). In both cases, the country
demands respect for international law and uses this theme as an example
of UN’s fragility regarding conict resolution, again pointing the lack of
democracy and representativeness in the organization. The conjuncture
situation in its region made the issues of the Syrian Civil War, the DAESH
(Islamic State) and the Failed State of Libya being constants in the speech-
es (DAVUTOĞLU, 2012; ERDOĞAN, 2011; GÜL, 2013).
Brazil and Turkey Bilateral Relations
Relations between Brazil and Turkey have grown rapidly and be-
come increasingly relevant to these countries in the last decade. Although
there have been bilateral agreements for more than 150 years, only in re-
cent years a strategic partnership has been achieved (LAZAROU, 2016).
In this context, there were ocial visits, signing of agreements and estab-
lishment of covenants –which involved both government and private sec-
tor – signaling a change in the way these countries relate (BRAZIL, 2011c).
In 2003, an important agreement was signed on cooperation in de-
fense-related matters in order to promote the exchange of personnel for
practical training, participation in courses, seminars, and conferences (BRA-
ZIL, 2003). The year of 2004 was a mark for bilateral relations due to the
visit of Celso Amorim, the rst Brazilian Foreign Minister to visit Turkey in
an ocial mission (BRAZIL, 2006b, p. 227-228). In the same year, Brazilian
Minister of Development, Industry and Foreign Trade, Luís Fernando Fur-
lan, and Defense Minister, José Viegas, also visited Turkey. Brazil received
Turkish National Economy Minister, Kemal Unakitan, in Brasilia for the
1
st
Meeting of Economic, Commercial and Industrial Cooperation between
Brazil and Turkey (BRAZIL, 2010c). The result of the missions was noticed
in the immediate trade increase in the following year (BRAZIL, 2011f).
Between 18 and 21 January 2006, Brazil received Deputy Prime Min-
ister and Foreign Minister of Turkey, Abdullah Gül, accompanied by a del-
egation of approximately 50 people. He participated in the creation of the
Brazil-Turkey Business Council and also visited Embraer and Turkish Hon-
orary Consulate. The arrival of Deputy Prime Minister served to show the
soaring interest of the two countries in strengthening their political and
trade relations (BRAZIL, 2006b). For this reason, a Joint High-Level Com-
mittee was set up to foster cooperation in the following areas: “political di-
alogue, economy and trade, science, technology, defense industry, nance,
investment, tourism, culture, cooperation between diplomatic academies,
and other areas of mutual interest” (BRAZIL, 2006a). This commission
became responsible for the signicant approximation in later years.
Due to the convergence in several matters, these countries have
achieved a higher degree of cooperation in areas such as political consul-
tations – through the High-Level Cooperation Commission – and ener-
gy cooperation – with the installation of Petrobras in Turkey. Petrobras
and the Turkish Petroleum Corporation (TPAO) have identied poten-
tial cooperation themes in several sectors. So, they have started work-
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ing together on oil and gas exploration on the Black Sea coast (BRAZIL,
2011c). In May 2009, President Lula made the rst ocial visit of a Bra-
zilian Head of State to Turkey. In his speech, President Lula emphasized
the rapprochement between the two countries, with the creation of the
High-Level Cooperation Commission, the installation of Petrobras in the
country and the growth of bilateral trade.
By becoming conict mediators, countries without great military
or economic capabilities have found a way to exert inuence on import-
ant issues in the international arena. Only so Brazil would be able to
participate in peace and security issues in the Middle East, as suggested
by President Lula (GHITIS, 2009). In this context, the former president
was the mediator of an agreement signed in Tehran between Iranian
President, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, and Turkish Prime Minister, Tayy-
ip Erdogan, in May 2010. The agreement concerned the Iranian nuclear
program, criticized and seen as a threat to regional security and the nu-
clear non-proliferation system by the United States (FONTEIJN; ASSL;
INGRAM, 2010). This achievement was only made possible due to the
participation of Brazil and Turkey in the negotiations, in view of the un-
successful negotiations conducted by the International Atomic Energy
Agency (IAEA) in the previous year (SILVA, 2010).
Like Brazil, Turkey defends the right to develop nuclear ener-
gy research for peaceful purposes, in accordance with Article IV of the
Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) (BRAZIL, 2010b; SILVA, LEÃES, 2014).
The involvement in the Iranian issue has allowed Brazil and Turkey to
bring positive inuences in a region where the inuence of the United
States and Europe is viewed with apprehension by many (FONTEIJN;
ASSL; INGRAM, 2010). Despite this eort, the UN Security Council ap-
proved a fourth round of sanctions on Iran. Turkey and Brazil were the
only countries that voted against it, while Lebanon abstained (JORNAL
DE BRASÍLIA, 2010). According to President Lula, the Tehran Declara-
tion was not intended to solve all problems, but aimed at re-establishing
dialogue, building trust between countries and overcoming controver-
sies (BRAZIL, 2010d).
After joint eorts on the Iranian issue, the Prime Minister of
Turkey came to Brazil in May 2010. Recep Tayyip Erdogan was at the
inauguration of the General Consulate of Turkey in São Paulo, visited
Embraer, met with President Lula and participated in the Brazil-Turkey
Business Forum. This was the rst visit of a Turkish Prime Minister to
Brazil (ANATOLIA NEWS AGENCY, 2010). During this visit an action
plan for the strategic partnership was established between the two coun-
tries (BRAZIL, 2010a).
Through this action plan, the strategic partnership can be built based
on nine points. The rst one is political dialogue and cooperation in multi-
lateral forums, where both commit themselves to establishing interactions,
exchanging information on their respective regions, especially on issues of
peace and security. Brazil and Turkey have agreed to focus eorts on de-
fending the goals of disarmament and non-proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction. They have also pledged to articulate positions in multilateral
forums. Furthermore, on the one hand, Brazil was in favor of bringing Tur-
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André Luiz Reis da Silva, Gabriela Dorneles Ferreira da Costa Brazil and Turkey in the 21st century: strategic interests in comparave perspecve
key closer to MERCOSUR; on the other hand, Turkey manifested its inter-
est in approaching BRICS and IBSA, in order to facilitate dialogue between
these countries, as well as expressed its support to Brazil’s rapprochement
with the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) (BRAZIL, 2010a).
Second, the countries have dened the cooperation in the area of
trade and investment. By that, these countries started to encourage the
formation of public and private joint ventures in Brazil and Turkey as
well as in third countries. They have highlighted cooperation with Af-
rica, cooperation in research and development, and cooperation in the
aeronautical sector. Third, it was pointed the energy cooperation, related
to the presence of Petrobras in Turkey. Then, cooperation in the areas
of biodiversity, as well as in the issues of environment and sustainable
development. The sixth point is cooperation in the defense area, where
countries rearmed their commitment to the 2003 agreement on this
subject. The exchange for visits and training became the most important
aspect, as well as the eorts for identifying business opportunities in the
defense industry. For this purpose, it was proposed the creation of a joint
working group on defense. The last three points deal with prevention
of organized crime and terrorism, joint work in the area of science and
technology, and cultural and educational cooperation (BRAZIL, 2010a).
As the same time of the establishment of the strategic partnership,
trade relations increased signicantly due to closer ties between the two
countries. Trade increased by approximately 330% between 2002 and
2008, reaching US$ 2,195,456,920 until November 2011 (BRAZIL, 2011f).
Brazilian exports are heavily concentrated in iron and iron ore, which
accounted for approximately 30% of total volume of Brazil’s exports to
Turkey in 2011. But Brazil also exports soy, wheat, cotton, coee, and
tobacco to Turkey (BRAZIL, 2011d). Yet, Brazil imports a much more di-
versied list of intermediate goods such as iron and steel bars and wires,
automobile bodywork accessories, articial ber yarns, and some types
of motor vehicles (BRAZIL, 2011e).
The expansion of business is favored by the complementarity be-
tween the two economies. However, despite geographical distance, the
greatest obstacle to trade relations is the so called cultural distance be-
tween the two countries: “insucient institutional dialogue, limited in-
tegration of professional and business networks, restrictions to the tran-
sit and residence of professionals, and dierent patterns of consumption”
(BRAZIL, 2009, p. 63). As these two economies expand and reach more
elds globally, it becomes more urgent to overcome these dierences.
The visit of President Dilma Rousse in October 2011 served to
rearm the interest of the two countries in narrowing ties, nding new
anities, and strengthening the strategic partnership. The countries
signed acts in higher education, agreements on the transfer of convict-
ed persons and juridical assistance in criminal matters (BRAZIL, 2011a).
Proofs of the continuation of the close relations between the two coun-
tries in Dilma’s government were Brazilian support for Turkey’s candida-
cy for a non-permanent seat in the UN Security Council for the 2015-2016
mandate and, at the same time, Turkish appeal to Brazil’s entry as an
observer at the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (BRAZIL, 2011c).
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However, the rst major divergence faced by the countries was
the situation in countries aected by the wave of riots during the Arab
Spring. In general, Brazil and Turkey dealt dierently with these events
(BRAZIL, 2011b). Notwithstanding, the advisory body of the Brazilian
presidency armed that dierent perceptions regarding the situation of
the Arab world in the post Arab Spring period do not mean divergences
per se, only dierent ways of dealing with the matter.
Therefore, despite the promising strategic partnership, changes
in the international scenario and in the domestic environment have
hindered the intensity of bilateral relations in recent years. The Arab
Spring profoundly reoriented relations in the Middle East, provoking a
relative withdrawal from Brazil and deepening Turkey’s engagement in
its region. In the meantime, both countries have faced, especially since
2013, a complex and fragile domestic political conjuncture, with grow-
ing popular manifestations and institutional instability, culminating in
the soft coup d’état in Brazil – through the impeachment process of
President Dilma Rousse –and in the attempt of military coup in Tur-
key, both in 2016.
Final Remarks
The analysis of the ocial statements of Brazil and Turkey in the
last decade, in a comparative perspective, allows us to recognize the
points of agreement and disagreement in the interests agenda of each
country, as well as to identify the themes that are of more relevance for
one country or the other. The independent variable is the fact that the
countries are emerging and considered medium powers by the literature.
The dependent variables were the positions regarding subjects present in
their international agenda. The comparison of the discourses allows us to
conclude that the two countries converge in some general subjects, but
that their histories, national interests, and projection in dierent regions
give them dierent positions in several topics of their respective agen-
das. Overall, Turkey’s positioning is rhetorically stronger than Brazil’s,
with rmer and more assertive positions, except for the issue of Human
Rights, in which Turkey tends to have a more defensive position than
Brazil.
Regarding the Arab Spring, Brazil and Turkey naturally dealt dif-
ferently with the events. Brazil, of which some analysts expected more
assertive positions by virtue of the more emphatic defense of Human
Rights under Dilma Rousse’s administration, followed its tradition of
caution regarding regime change, condemning violations of rights, but
opposing external interference in domestic matters. Hence, the country
did not take sides with governments and possible regime changes, guar-
anteeing the possibility of establishing good relations with the States in-
volved, whatever the outcome of the riots.
Turkey has gone through several contradictions that have put an
end to the policy of good relations with its neighbors (the so called “Zero
Problems with the Neighbors” policy). By prioritizing the promotion of
its democratic model, Turkey counted on heavy riots that would gen-
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André Luiz Reis da Silva, Gabriela Dorneles Ferreira da Costa Brazil and Turkey in the 21st century: strategic interests in comparave perspecve
erate rapid changes in regimes, allowing the country to maintain good
relations with the new governments of that time. This is what happened
with Tunisia and Egypt. Meanwhile, the situation in Libya and, above all,
in Syria, bound Turkey to the discourse of necessity of regime change,
causing a rupture in diplomatic relations with the governments in power,
and involving Ankara in its neighbors’ civil wars. In this way, a Turk-
ish lapse in the projection of scenarios has led to the dismantling of the
successful regional policy of the last decade. As a result, while Turkey
suered with negative consequences both politically and economically,
Brazil was able to remain politically well-disposed in the region undergo-
ing only economic losses.
Table 1 – Synthetic frame: strategic interests in comparative perspective
BRAZIL TURKEY
a) Economic development model
The government presents two main axes in its development model:
poverty reduction and technological development. Presence of the
State as an inducer of the economy.
Turkey focuses its economic growth on attracting foreign investments,
which fosters its industrialization and promotes its exports. The State
is present as the main regulator, and controls some important sectors,
although the private sector is strong.
b) Relations with the USA
Strategic Dialogue – Commercial Difficulties. Differences of vision in
various themes, such as the Doha Round, humanitarian intervention,
nuclear issue and the Middle East.
The US was Turkey’s main ally during the Cold War, despite some
occasional deviations. Since 2003, there have been some frictions, but
countries still have close ties.
c) Defense of multipolarity
Imminence of a multipolar world. Brazil seeks to insert itself in this
new order with two purposes: on the one hand, to promote commu-
nication between the already consolidated poles; on the other hand,
to ensure that the poorest and minor States are actually represented,
building an inclusive multilateralism.
After decades conditioning its foreign policy based on alignment with
the United States, Turkey gained a more assertive view from 2002
on, advocating multipolarity and its role as a regional leader. There is
an emphasis on Turkish capacity to assist in conflict resolution and in
development promotion through international cooperation.
d) United Nations Security Council
(UNSC)’s reform
It advocates a reform of the Security Council, with the greater pres-
ence of developing countries. Participates in the G-4 (Brazil, Japan,
India, and Germany).
Criticizes the Security Council for failing to represent nations
equitably. Veto power is also questioned. Crisis of Syria illustrates the
inability of the UNSC to deal with international conflicts. Contrary to
the G4 proposal.
e) Climate change and development
Defends the principle of “common but differentiated responsibilities”.
Signatory of the environmental protocols.
Is signatory to the Protocols of Montreal and Kyoto but does not
usually highlight the environment issue in its official statements.
f) Terrorism and Humans Rights
Brazil participates in the UN Human Rights Council. It argues that
there are violations in every country, without exception, and char-
acterizes authoritarianism, xenophobia, misery, capital punishment,
and discrimination as forms of Human Rights violation. It criticizes
indifference to terrorism, but also advocates “responsibility while
protecting”.
Terrorism is central to Turkish foreign policy because of the conflict
with the Kurdish separatist group, the PKK. In addition, terrorism is
seen as a destabilizing element, which is particularly serious in the
Middle East, a region that Turkey prioritizes in international relations.
Combating terrorism is one way of promoting stability and the Turkish
role in the region. The country is admonished for its Human Rights
violations, mainly against the minorities as the Kurds, but the Turkish
government has been careful to defend itself against criticism.
g) Nuclear research development
Brazil has abdicated nuclear weapons, allowing the use of nuclear
energy only for peaceful purposes. It advocates disarmament and
non-proliferation, but it supports the right of nuclear production for
peaceful purposes.
Turkey has no pretension of obtaining an atomic bomb but considers
sacred the right to nuclear technology for peaceful purposes. The
country is developing its nuclear capability and has worked with Brazil
to resolve the Iranian nuclear issue.
h) World Trade Organization (WTO) – trade
liberalization and the Doha Round
Defends the positions of the commercial G-20, created in 2003.
Little action in the Doha Round. Turkish economy is essentially for the
export of manufactured goods, made in industries that have European
or North American FDI. At this point, the country remains with a
positioning close to the richest States.
i) Global economic governance (G-20)
In order to overcome the economic crisis, it is necessary to coordinate
the efforts of the countries within the multilateral organizations, such
as the G-20, the IMF and the World Bank. To contain the recession,
these agencies must foster a reformulation of the relationship
between fiscal and monetary policy, as well as control over the
currency war.
There is a need for changes in global economic governance, in order to
enable the development of the poorest nations. Turkey also condemns
the excessive liberalization of the financial sector, responsible for the
latest economic crisis. However, the close ties with the US and the EU
make Ankara’s positioning not so clear on the issue.
j) South-South cooperation
Strengthening South-South cooperation in the last decade (especially
with Africa and Latin America). Brazil became aware of its interna-
tional responsibilities. Thus, the government is expanding its technical
cooperation program with less developed countries, focusing on
agriculture and food security, education, vocational training, justice,
sport, health, environment, information technology, labor, urban
development, and bioenergy.
There has been a great incentive to South-South cooperation since
2002, with the rise of AKP. It highlights the possibilities for Turkey
to play a regional leadership role, resolving conflicts and promoting
social economic development. In addition, Ankara also seeks to get
closer to other developing or emerging countries, such as Brazil, China
and Russia, showing that there are common interests, especially with
regard to defending multipolarity in international relations.
k) Regional integration
Mercosur and South America remain a priority to Brazilian foreign pol-
icy. Avoiding harassment of major powers, ensuring regional security
and deepening the integration process.
The Middle East is the priority of Turkish foreign policy, and its foreign
policy formulators see a prominent role for the country in the region.
However, the existence of many conflicts undermines the possibility of
an eventual regional integration.
Source: Prepared by the authors, based on BRAZIL (2003,2010a, 2011a, 2011b, 2011c),
DAVUTOĞLU(2011, 2015), GÜL (2010, 2013), ERDOĞAN (2011, 2014); KANAT (2014);
AKMAN (2012), BABACAN (2011)
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