M. Florencia Rubiolo, Diego Telias Compeção entre China e Estados Unidos na América Lana: evolução, perspecvas e implicações no contexto do COVID-19

Competição entre China e Estados Unidos

na América Latina: evolução, perspectivas

e implicações no contexto do COVID-19

China-United States competition in Latin America:

evolution, perspectives, and implications in the

COVID-19 context

La competencia entre China y Estados Unidos en América

Latina: evolución, perspectivas e implicancias en el

contexto del COVID-19

M. Florencia Rubiolo1

Diego Telias2

DOI: 10.5752/P.2317-773X.2021v9.n3.p43

Recebido em: 31 de agosto de 2020

Aprovado em: 29 de junho de 2021

R

Na última década, a China se estabeleceu como um ator-chave no sistema

internacional e sua inuência se irradia para todos os cantos do mundo. A

América Latina não é exceção a esse fenômeno. A participação econômica da

China na região teve impactos políticos que levaram à competição inevitável

com os Estados Unidos. É neste contexto de competição que surge a pandemia

COVID-19, com profundas consequências para os países latino-americanos. O

objetivo deste artigo é analisar as relações entre a América Latina e a China no

contexto da competição com os Estados Unidos e a pandemia do COVID-19. O

artigo aborda como a competição evoluiu, principalmente na área da saúde após

o surto de COVID-19. Para isso, são discutidas as principais ações da China na

região a partir de uma perspectiva teórica da economia política internacional e a

partir de conceitos como diplomacia de máscaras e “wolf warrior diplomacy”.

Palavras-chave: China. América Latina. Estados Unidos. COVID-19. Rota da

Seda Sanitária.

A

In the last decade, China has established itself as a key player in the international

system and its inuence irradiates to all corners of the world. Latin America is

no exception to this phenomenon. Chinese economic involvement in the region

had political impacts that have led to inevitable competition with the United

States. It is in this context of competition that the COVID-19 pandemic emerges

bringing profound consequences for Latin American countries.

1. CIECS (CONICET y UNC) Doctora

en Relaciones Internacionales (UNR,

Argentina). Investigadora Adjunta en

el Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones

Cientíﬁcas y Técnicas de Argentina

(CONICET, CIECS). Correo electrónico:

frubiolo@gmail.com

2. Pontiﬁcia Universidad Católica de

Chile & Universidad ORT Uruguay.

Candidato a Doctor en Ciencia Política

de la Universidad Católica de Chile

(Becario CONICYT PFCHA/DOCTORADO

BECAS NACIONALES/2019 – 2119032) y

docente de la Facultad de Administraci-

ón y Ciencias Sociales de la Universidad

ORT Uruguay. Correo electrónico:

detelias@uc.cl

estudos internacionais • Belo Horizonte, ISSN 2317-773X, v. 9, n. 4, (dez. 2021), p. 43-62

The aim of this article is to analyze the relations between Latin America and

China in the context of competition with the United States and the COVID-19

pandemic. The article addresses how competition has evolved, particularly in the

health area after the COVID-19 outbreak. To this end, the main actions of China

in the region are discussed from a theoretical perspective of political economy

and drawing on concepts as mask diplomacy and wolf warrior’s diplomacy.

Keywords: China. Latin America. United States. COVID-19. Health Silk Road.

R

En la última década, China se ha consolidado como un actor clave en el sistema

internacional y su inuencia se irradia a todos los rincones del mundo. América

Latina no es una excepción a este fenómeno. La participación económica china

en la región tuvo impactos políticos que han llevado a una competencia inevitable

con Estados Unidos. Es en este contexto de competencia donde surge la pandemia

COVID-19 que trae profundas consecuencias para los países latinoamericanos.

El objetivo de este artículo es analizar las relaciones entre América Latina y

China en el contexto de la competencia con Estados Unidos y la pandemia de

COVID-19. El artículo aborda cómo ha evolucionado la competencia, partic-

ularmente en el área de la salud después del brote de COVID-19. Para ello, se

discuten las principales acciones de China en la región desde una perspectiva

teórica de economía política internacional y a partir de conceptos como la diplo-

macia de las mascarillas y la “wolf warrior diplomacy”.

Palabras clave: China. América Latina. Estados Unidos. COVID-19. Ruta de la

Seda Sanitaria.

Introduction

The world has profoundly changed since 1978, when Deng Xiaop-

ing took the rst steps that led to China’s integration into the world econ-

omy some decades later. The process of opening-up and the market-driv-

en reforms arrived at a major milestone in 2001 when the country entered

the World Trade Organization. This symbol of the PRC’s economic trans-

formation was followed a few years later, in 2010, by its consolidation as

a global economic player becoming the second largest world economy.

Today, China’s role as a global power is unquestionable and its in-

uence irradiates to every corner of the world. Latin America and the Ca-

ribbean (LAC) is not an exception, as Beijing’s interest in approaching the

region has been growing steadily in the last two decades. Almost every

LAC economy has seen an unprecedented growth in its export numbers,

related to China’s enormous demand. Among other commodities, ex-

ports of copper, crude oil, iron ore and soybeans skyrocketed, starting a

decade-long commodity boom from 2003. Given LAC countries econom-

ic structure, trade became the outstanding pillar of bilateral relations as

Chinese needs of natural resources soared.

Almost twenty years went by, China already has a foot in the region

in many more dimensions and multilateral and bilateral aspects than at

the beginning of the century. Contemporary China`s emerging impacts

on the world are evolving in all manner of messy and complex ways

which make analysis dicult; in that sense economic engagement has

M. Florencia Rubiolo, Diego Telias Compeção entre China e Estados Unidos na América Lana: evolução, perspecvas e implicações no contexto do COVID-19

political impacts, whether it is planned or not (GARLICK, 2020). China’s

engagement in Latin America, encouraged by domestic needs, have led to

inevitable competition with the United States, an aspect that is observed

in several regions of the world, though in Latin America acquires greater

importance given that for decades it has been considered the backyard of

the US. In the context of a more active Chinese policy in LAC through the

Belt and Road Initiative and Trump’s tougher position as a response, the

COVID-19 pandemic struck.

Our goal in this paper is to analyze the relations between Latin

America and China in the context of a competition with the United States

and the emergence of the COVID-19 pandemic. While it is not the pur-

pose of this article to delve into the dierences within the region, it is

worth noting that relations with China and competition have been dier-

ent in each country. As a guiding question we propose to outline how the

competition between the two powers evolved with a particular focus in

the health area, before and after the outbreak of the pandemic. This will

allow us to fully delve into the relations between China and Latin Amer-

ica and discuss China’s main foreign policy actions in the region within

the framework of this competition and COVID-19 in the health arena.

The theoretical approach reects a political economy perspective, under-

lining the relation between both aspects in Chinese international and for-

eign policy, as well as the articulation between economic means and po-

litical goals, and the use of economic incentives and sanctions or threats,

to inuence a third State’s behavior (BALDWIN, 1985; BLANCHARD;

RIPSMAN, 2013).

The article is structured as follows: after the introduction, in sec-

tion two we analyze how the competition between the United States and

China took shape from the Obama’s pivot to the Trump administration

but also considering this competition as an inevitable phenomenon ac-

counting Chinese foreign policy as a response to domestic needs rather

than a search for positioning in the global level. In the third section, we

describe in detail this competition in the health area, focusing on the

Health Silk Road, the debates on the World Health Organization and con-

textualizing the emergence of the pandemic. In the fourth section, the

central part of the article, we analyze the competition of the United States

and China towards Latin America in this new context of COVID-19, con-

sidering the so-called mask diplomacy and wolf warriors’ diplomacy. We

conclude this article with brief nal remarks.

China, the United States and the emerging global competition

Implications of a rising China have been analyzed through dier-

ent theories of international relations. One cornerstone of this debate is

the conclusion of Allison (2017) that war between China and the United

States (US) is likely, based on the” Thucydides Trap” which means that

when a rising power threatens to displace the incumbent, war is the like-

liest result. This pessimistic view is shared by many realists’ scholars that

consider that mutual fears and incompatible strategic objectives will pre-

destinate both countries to an intense competition (FRIEDBERG, 2011;

estudos internacionais • Belo Horizonte, ISSN 2317-773X, v. 9, n. 4, (dez. 2021), p. 43-62

MEARSHEIMER, 2014). As Walt said, “for realists, therefore, China’s rise

is not good news and it is likely to have deleterious eects on global sta-

bility” (2018, p. 14).

Liberal scholars oer more optimistic visions as they focus on the

interdependent condition of our world which connected with global in-

stitutions and skillful diplomacy have consequences of discouraging war,

so it could limit potential rivalry and oer a cooperation path. Ikenberry

(2018) underlines, from a liberal perspective, the capacity of the American

liberal order to survive due to its integrative tendency, shared leadership,

how economic gains are spread, and the capacity to accommodate dier-

ent models of capitalism and strategies of development. Following this

idea, this author argues that even if China’s rise could end US hegemony,

the liberal world order will hardly be undermined.

This debate goes beyond this simplication between realist and

liberal approaches. Some scholars prefer a state’s agency approach instead

of structural explaining forces that prioritize only changes in distribution

of power. Foot (2014), for example, focuses on constraints on conict that

are insuciently appreciated in the realist approaches, as the domestic

political-economic priorities of both countries. Others also argue that

China has not enough power to challenge the US position in the world

order (SHAMBAUGH, 2013) and its capabilities are far behind as it does

not have a high GDP per capita, its military gap with the US is still huge,

and its soft power is not well developed yet.

Going beyond the theoretical aspect, it is necessary to analyse

the growing competition between China and the United States in re-

cent years, of which BRI seems to be one of the latest chapters. Actis

and Creus (2020) distinguish three moments in this dispute: the pivot

strategy during the Obama administration starting in 2011, Xi Jinping’s

arrival to power in 2013, and Trump’s election. The accusations by for-

mer US President Donald Trump appear to have marked a turning point

in relations. While the concerns and discussions about China’s growth

precede this, his rhetoric about the trade imbalance marks one of the key

points in this competition. However, the US accusations went beyond the

trade balance and pointed to China’s subsidies in key sectors, the issue of

intellectual property rights and the diculty of participating in public

acquisitions in China (ROSALES, 2020).

In that sense, US competition with China is not merely commer-

cial but also technological. The main concern seems to be centered on

China’s advances in science and technology. This competition in the

technological dispute implies a structural and systemic conict, a ten-

sion between an established and an emerging power. However, it is

worth noting that this conict or competition is prior to the pandemic

and what COVID-19 did was to make it more evident (ACTIS; CREUS,

2020). So what is explained below is part of a much more complex sce-

nario of this competition.

In 2019 this competition seemed to focus on the Belt and Road Ini-

tiative which is a Chinese emblematic economic and political strategy,

with a focus on investment in infrastructure designed to “improve phys-

ical connectivity along a maritime and continental silk route” (MAYER,

M. Florencia Rubiolo, Diego Telias Compeção entre China e Estados Unidos na América Lana: evolução, perspecvas e implicações no contexto do COVID-19

2018, p. 1228). According to Nolan (2019, p. xxi), Xi Jinping has made the

new Silk Road “a key part of China’s international relations”. This Initia-

tive was rst introduced as the One Belt, One Road (OBOR) in September

2013, during Xi’s speech at Kazakhstan’s Nazarbayev University, where

he proposed to build a “Silk Road Economic Belt”. In October 2013, he

proposed to build a “21st Century Maritime Silk Road” during his speech

at the Indonesian House of Representatives.

In 2015, this project was renamed as the Belt and Road Initiative

(BRI) in an ocial document released by the National Development and

Reform Commission (2015). The “belt” was designed to connect China

to Europe through Central Asia and Russia; to the Middle East through

Central Asia; and to Southeast Asia, South Asia and the Indian Ocean.

The “road” seeks to connect China with Europe through the South Chi-

na Sea and the Indian Ocean; and the South Pacic through the South

China SEA (ALON; ZHANG; LATTEMANN, 2018). Six economic corri-

dors were designed to meet these connectivity goals3. Seven years after

the ocial launch, the Initiative has already surpassed the original terri-

torial scope, becoming a global enterprise.

Since its inception, the Initiative has generated a great amount of

academic discussion. Views among political analysts and intellectuals are

diverse. Chinese motivations behind the BRI have become a central con-

cern for studies around the world, ranging from a purely economic inter-

pretation, to a geopolitical and strategic-centered approach. According to

the rst group, BRI is focused on enhancing an open economy and im-

proving Chinese domestic development, as well as fostering international

cooperation (ZHOU, 2019; ZOU, 2018). This perspective is in line with the

ocial statements regarding the purpose and goals of the Initiative. In

May 2017 the CCP released a guiding document, stating that the Belt and

Road Initiative “is a Chinese proposal whose aim is to promote peaceful

cooperation and common development around the world” (OFFICE OF

THE LEADING GROUP FOR THE BELT AND ROAD INITIATIVE,

2017). Party leaders, and particularly Xi Jinping, have also stressed that

BRI is a fundamental part in the path to achieving the “Chinese dream”,

understood as the construction of a moderately well-o society, a rich

and powerful country and a dynamic and happy people (PARRA PÉREZ,

2017; JOHNSON, 2016).

Domestic concerns come to the front when considering the eco-

nomic motivations. Some of the interests fueling the plan are the need

to consume China’s industrial over-capacity; to expand or nd new mar-

kets for Chinese exports; the need to secure access to natural resources;

and nd new uses for surplus (CLARKE, 2018; YU, 2018). As Zhou (2019)

points out, the BRI complements China’s economic restructuring and

vice versa. The Initiative helps transform and upgrade the manufactur-

ing industry and alleviate the problem of overcapacity in traditional Chi-

nese industries increasing the demand of building materials (JOHNSON,

2016) and hi-tech industrial supplies for infrastructure projects abroad.

But besides the centrality of the domestic economic and political

aspects of the plan, BRI also reects strategic and geopolitical intentions

and concerns related to China’s role as a leading world power (ALON;

3. The six corridors are the New

Eurasian Land Bridge, the China-Mongo-

lia-Russia Economic Corridor (CMREC),

the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor

(CPEC), the China-Central and Western

Asia Economic Corridor, the China-Indo-

china Peninsula Economic Corridor, and

the Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar

Economic Corridor (BCIMEC).

estudos internacionais • Belo Horizonte, ISSN 2317-773X, v. 9, n. 4, (dez. 2021), p. 43-62

ZHANG; LATTEMANN, 2018) and to the need to maintain regional

stability. In line with this assertion, a common vision suggests that the

Initiative is in fact a grand strategy. As Rolland (2018) argues, it is “an

instrument at the service of the PRC’s vision for itself as the uncontested

leading power in the region in the coming decades”. Clarke (2018) also

adds that “BRI is an attempt to resolve the geopolitical dilemmas arising

from China’s ‘hybrid’ strategic orientation [maritime and continental];

and as a response to the opportunities and challenges presented by the

United States’ ‘pivot’ or ‘rebalance’ to the Asia Pacic from 2011”. Accord-

ing to Liang (2019), BRI is also pursuing the goal of becoming an alterna-

tive idea to complement and challenge existing international institutions.

Competition turned out to be inevitable given US perceptions and

reactions to Chinese international behavior. But also, because of a more

assertive and condent international policy emanating from Beijing,

which was mainly a response to domestic needs. In this sense, it can Chi-

na ends up emerging as a global power even if it was not a preconceived

goal, mainly because of the multiple interlinkages between China’s do-

mestic political economy and its external relations (GARLICK, 2019).

The health silk road and the WHO in China’s policy

Besides the highlighted economic and geopolitical dimensions of

the Belt and Road Initiative, there are several other aspects included in

this ambitious plan. Cultural, educational, and professional elds are also

addressed as part of the Chinese strategy, and people-to-people diploma-

cy is fundamental in the diusion of skills, knowledge, and cooperation

(BENABDALLAH, 2019). The health dimension was considered as a part

of the rst documents issued by the government to materialize the BRI.

As stated in the 2015 Vision and Actions document: “We should strength-

en cooperation with neighboring countries on epidemic information

sharing, the exchange of prevention and treatment technologies and the

training of medical professionals, and improve our capability to joint-

ly address public health emergencies”. (NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

AND REFORM COMMISSION, 2015).

China’s engagement with global health is not a new trend. During

the sixties, Africa became a destination of China’s health programs. Fol-

lowing Algeria’s war against French colonialism, Beijing sent its rst

overseas medical team in 1963 to the country (BRAUTIGAM, 2011). From

then on, China’s aid and programs towards the continent increased, par-

alleling the deepening of diplomatic ties. Most recently, during the Ebo-

la crisis in 2012-2014, China launched an unprecedented response to the

epidemic in west Africa, which became its largest ever health emergency

relief overseas (TANG; ZHIHUI; WENKAI; CHEN, 2017).

Regarding the Belt and Road, Beijing has not neglected the health

aspect in the initiative. The exible and adaptable nature of the strategy

allowed to introduce the idea of a Health Silk Road (HSR) as an extension

of an already deep Chinese engagement with global health in the last de-

cades. The idea of a HSR was rst mentioned in 2015 when the National

Health and Family Planning Commission unveiled the three-year plan

M. Florencia Rubiolo, Diego Telias Compeção entre China e Estados Unidos na América Lana: evolução, perspecvas e implicações no contexto do COVID-19

for Belt and Road health exchange and cooperation (2015-2017) (NHFPC,

2015) A year later, during a speech in Uzbekistan in June 2016, Xi Jin-

ping stressed the “need to deepen cooperation in medical care and health,

strengthen win-win cooperation in the alert of communicable diseases,

disease prevention and control, medical assistance and traditional medi-

cine, and build a Silk Road for health” (WANG; LI, 2019, p. 100).

As shown in this brief overview, China has become more proactive

in global health governance since the beginning of the century. But its

motivations and goals, as in the cases of other major powers, go beyond

the will to improve health and human security in developing countries.

Health engagement -in the form of aid, assistance, and cooperation- is

also used as a form of soft power that fullls domestic and foreign pol-

icy goals, including security, economic growth, and business interests

(BRÄUTIGAM, 2011).

In January 2017, Xi signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU)

with the World Health Organization that endorsed international health

regulation and promoted health security on the Silk Road (REN, 2018).

In August, 2017, China hosted the Belt and Road High-Level Meeting to

promote health cooperation, and the resulting document was the Beijing

Communiqué of The Belt and Road Health Cooperation & Health Silk

Road, which was adopted, among other partners, by the WHO, the UN-

AIDS and the OECD (NATIONAL HEALTH COMMISSION, 2017).

In this context it is important to address the relation between Chi-

na and the WHO. As we have seen, the World Health Organization has

endorsed international health regulation and promoted health security

within the Silk Road. The current director, Dr. Tedros Adhanom, was

elected through a secret vote by 194 member states (supported by China).

A couple of days after the election, Dr. Tedros reiterated the organiza-

tion’s adherence to the one-China principle (CHINA DAILY, 2017).

In his speech at the 2019 Belt and Road Forum, Xi Jinping referred

to exchanges and mutual understanding and the goal of cooperation

in the health area. However, beyond agreements and conferences, the

Health Silk Road was still considered as a rhetorical extension of China’s

Belt and Road Initiative (LANCASTER; RUBIN; RAPP-HOOPER, 2020).

In LAC, health was mentioned in the “Joint Cooperation Action Plan in

Priority Areas” - a document prepared in the China-CELAC Forum of

2018 - but not considered as a main area of cooperation, such as politics

and security, infrastructure and transportation, trade, investment and -

nances, agriculture, environmental cooperation, technology, among oth-

er (CELAC, 2018).

The Ministries of Foreign Relations of CELAC and China agreed

to intensify the dialogue and exchange in the health sector mainly in ar-

eas such as clinical medicine, disease control and prevention, response to

health emergencies, research and development and access to medicines.

They also committed to encourage and support direct cooperation be-

tween government, regional, local, and medical institutions, in order to

strengthen health systems of dierent countries of the region.

But since the COVID-19 outbreak, the Health Silk road gained

momentum within the Chinese foreign policy discourse. A highlight in

estudos internacionais • Belo Horizonte, ISSN 2317-773X, v. 9, n. 4, (dez. 2021), p. 43-62

this regard was Xi’s conversation with Italian Prime Minister, Giuseppe

Conte, in March 2020, in which he underlined the importance of the

construction of a Health Silk Road (XINHUANET, 2020). In that sense,

COVID-19 became an opportunity to include the multiple actions of the

Chinese government under the label of the HSR Initiative. Diverse do-

nations of medical supplies and scientic exchanges began to be consid-

ered part of it.

On the other hand, the Trump administration responded to the

health emergency by blaming China for covering up the outbreak, call-

ing it “China’s virus” and also accusing the WHO of being a Chinese

puppet. President Trump and U.S. Secretary of Health Alex Azar said

there was a failure by the WHO to provide information and, based on

that, Trump suspended the United States’ temporary contributions to the

organization. It is important to note that the U.S. is the largest contribu-

tor to the WHO (15.18%), followed by the Bill & Melinda Gates Founda-

tion (12.12%). In contrast, China contributes 0.21% of the nancial ow

(WHO, 2019).

In that context, in May 2020, the WHO organized the 73td World

Health Assembly (WHA), a meeting that annually brings together its

members. Taiwan participated in these meetings between 2009 and 2016

due to an agreement that had the endorsement of China (ASPINWALL,

2020). However, in the 70th Assembly (2017), Taiwan was not invited

to participate as an observer, mainly because of China’s pressures. This

situation repeated in the following years (2018-2019) neglecting the fact

that dierent countries, including the United States, released statements

criticizing the exclusion (US DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH & HUMAN

SERVICES, 2020).

China in Latin America: before and after covid-19

China - LAC Relations

Latin America-China relations skyrocketed in the last 20 years. Bi-

lateral relations with each country started to deepen through high prole

visits from Chinese Heads of State, beginning with President Jiang Ze-

min’s trip to the region in 2001. But, as Paz (2006) underlines, it was 2004

the actual turning point in the relations. Hu Jintao’s visit to Argentina,

Brazil, Chile, and Cuba on that year was the strongest sign of this change

of winds in the relationship (KOTSCHWAR, 2014), showing China’s

growing interest in gaining a foothold in Latin America. Since then, mu-

tual links have increasingly institutionalized, both in bilateral and multi-

lateral spaces in the economic and political arenas. It must be recognized

that trade has been and still is the indisputable pillar. Conditions such as

the complementarity of the economies, the ever increasing need for nat-

ural resources and raw materials from China, the pursuit of diversifying

export markets from the Latin American economies, the international

economic conditions -as the high commodity prices and the nancial

global crisis in 2008- were all factors that underpinned the boom (RU-

M. Florencia Rubiolo, Diego Telias Compeção entre China e Estados Unidos na América Lana: evolução, perspecvas e implicações no contexto do COVID-19

BIOLO, 2020). But besides the commercial relations, Beijing has shown

a constant and progressive engagement with the region through diverse

institutional channels.

Although in this article we argue there has been an overall Chinese

approach to Latin America as a whole, it must be distinguished that the

region is not intrinsically homogeneous. Even though most of the region

shares signicant features -such as language, religion, transnational in-

digenous culture and a common colonial history- from an international

relations point of view, multiple variables have operated to dierentiate

the dierent parts of the continent. Regional integration processes, exter-

nal trade characteristics –particularly as a primary commodity exporting

countries-, intraregional interdependence, the emergence of Brazil as a

global player and a regional power (BERNAL MEZA, 2008), the role of

the United States since 2001, and the initiatives for political integration

(CABALLERO SANTOS, 2012) have dened a clearer boundary for the

South American region, dierentiating it from the rest of Latin America.

In this sense, South America relations with China show distinctive char-

acteristics, in contrast with México, Central America and the Caribbean.

As Wise (2020b) points out, while there is productive complemen-

tarity between China and the South American commodity-producing

countries, México and Central America have a weaker trade relation

-mostly a decitarian one- due to the fact that they have little to oer

to Chinese commodities demand. On top of this, Mexico´s and Central

America’s overdependence on the US market has also prevented a deeper

trade relation with China. Another particular feature in the case of Cen-

tral American and the Caribbean was, until recently, that most countries

maintained diplomatic relations with Taiwan. But after Panama shifted

its diplomatic allegiance from Taipei to Beijing in 2017 -which led to the

domincan Republic and El Salvador to follow suit in 2018- China’s pres-

ence in the isthmus consolidated, particularly through investments in the

banking sector and infrastructure projects in logistics, port services and

energy. (CELADA, 2019)

Besides the heterogeneity, which still presents many features that

dierentiate the subregional areas in LAC, China has had an active bi-

lateral and multilateral presence in the region as a whole. Strategic part-

nership (SP) diplomacy was among the rst tools Beijing implemented to

establish stronger and more stable political links with dierent countries

and regional institutions since the early nineties. The rst SP was signed

with Brazil in 1993. Although there is no exact meaning of the concept

(XU, 2017), in 2004 Premier Wen Jiabao (2004) gave some clarications

on how an ideal SP would be: by partnership it refers to cooperative and

win-win relations; by strategic it implies that the relation should be long-

term and stable. Besides this ocial view, political motives also underpin

Beijing’s SP diplomacy, aimed at maintaining friendly relations that favor

stable economic links, while also expanding its international inuence

(YU, 2015). After the rst SP with Brazil, which was upgraded to Compre-

hensive SP in 2012, several strategic partnerships were signed with Latin

American countries: Venezuela (signed in 2001, in 2014 was upgraded to

comprehensive), Mexico (2003, in 2013 comprehensive), Argentina (2004,

estudos internacionais • Belo Horizonte, ISSN 2317-773X, v. 9, n. 4, (dez. 2021), p. 43-62

in 2014 comprehensive), Perú (2008, in 2013 comprehensive), Chile (2012,

in 2016 comprehensive), Costa Rica (2015), Ecuador (2015, in 2016 compre-

hensive), Uruguay (2016), and Bolivia (2018) (RUBIOLO, 2020; XU, 2017).

This dynamic bilateral diplomacy towards the region was comple-

mented by an active participation in dierent multilateral institutions at

the regional level. The Inter-American Development Bank (IADB), the

Caribbean Development Bank (CDB), the Organization of American

States (OAS), the Latin American Parliament, and the Corporación An-

dina de Fomento are among them (ELLIS, 2009). And the political links

were also upgraded by a series of mostly Chinese-driven initiatives: 1)

The China Ministry of Foreign Aairs White paper on LAC released in

November 2008, spelling out China’s plan for its foreign relations with

Latin America; 2) the cooperation framework for 2015–2019, known as

“1+3+6,” announced in July 2014 by President Xi Jinping at the rst Sum-

mit of Leaders of China and Latin America and the Caribbean in Brasilia;

3) the adoption of the China-CELAC Cooperation Plan 2015–2019 and; 4)

the publication of the second white paper on LAC, launched to coincide

with Xi Jinping’s visit to the region in November 2016 (FORNES; MEN-

DEZ, 2018).

Among these, the China-CELAC Forum is considered a corner-

stone in the relation with Latin America (VADELL, 2018). It was origi-

nally proposed by Xi Jinping and approved by the CELAC countries in

2014 in La Habana. This process of institutionalization resembles the one

Beijing already had started with Africa – The China Africa Forum – and,

as pointed out by Yu (2015, p. 1049), “China is clearly attempting to trans-

plant its success in Africa into Latin America in order to expedite the

establishment of a presence in the latter continent and intensify economic

and political cooperation with this group of states”. Thus, it is not surpris-

ing that BRI has landed through the China-CELAC Forum.

Last step before the outbreak: LAC in BRI and the US response

Without neglecting the importance and driving force that domes-

tic economic interests and needs represent in BRI, we understand that the

geopolitical and geoeconomics aspects of it are key points to analyze the

extension of the initiative to other regions of the world, which were not

included in the original plan. Among them, Latin America is relatively a

newcomer. Although the region was not originally a part of the initiative,

during the II Ministerial Meeting of the CELAC-China Forum in Janu-

ary 2018, the representatives stated that “Latin American and Caribbean

countries are part of the natural extension of the Maritime Silk Route and

are indispensable participants in international cooperation of the Belt and

Road” (CELAC CHINA FORUM, 2018).

In November 2017, Panama became the rst Latin American coun-

try to access the BRI. The engagement of Latin American countries in the

initiative is diverse. Countries like Uruguay or Chile have shown great

interest in this Initiative. Both governments signed the MoU to access the

initiative, high-ranking ocials attended BRI forums and applied to enter

the AIIB. Uruguay was accepted as a member of the Bank in April 2020,

M. Florencia Rubiolo, Diego Telias Compeção entre China e Estados Unidos na América Lana: evolução, perspecvas e implicações no contexto do COVID-19

the second in Latin American after Ecuador (AIIB, 2020). There are also

six prospective members in the region: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile,

Peru, and Venezuela. Regarding other countries we could nd dierent

approaches with governments attending forums with ministries, signing

MoUs but not applying to the Bank as Cuba, Costa Rica and Panama.

Out of the twenty-four LAC countries that have diplomatic rela-

tions with China, only ve have not adhered to the BRI: Argentina, Bra-

zil, Bahamas, Colombia and Mexico. The case of Argentina is puzzling

because Mauricio Macri was one of the fewest LAC presidents who at-

tended an ocial forum of BRI in 2017 and the country is a prospective

member of the AIIB, however, at the G20 meeting in Buenos Aires, Ar-

gentina declined President Xi’s oer to sign on to further BRI projects

(WISE, 2020a).

One of the reasons for this decision is cost calculations in the coun-

tries with a close relation with the United States. This is the case of Co-

lombia, Mexico, and Bahamas. Another set of reasons is that signing to

BRI does not represent a clear upgrade of benets. In other words, incen-

tives for signing are not enough for some governments, such as Argen-

tina and Brazil, which already have a dynamic, multidimensional, and

deep economic and nancial relation with Beijing. A third reason could

be that there is no pressure coming from the Chinese government to sign

to BRI to maintain the benets coming from the bilateral links.

There is no doubt the United States has been following these cir-

cumstances closely. The intensication of the economic and diplomat-

ic relations between LAC countries and China, triggered by the export

boom of raw materials to China (oil, iron, copper and soy) in the last

two decades (URDINEZ; MASIERO, 2015), captured US attention even

before BRI. Bilateral trade with China linked LAC to the fate of Chinese

economy and resulted in concentration and dependence on the Chinese

market, which was not good news for the US. However, the invitation of

Wang Yi, Minister of Foreign Aairs of China, to LAC countries to join

the Belt and Road Initiative was a big alert for the Trump administration.

Confronting this situation, Mike Pompeo, US Secretary of State

has urged LAC countries to keep “opened eyes” for Chinese investments

and in December 2019, the US government launched the Growth in the

Americas initiative. This new mechanism was planned to “facilitate job

creation and accelerate economic growth in the Americas by promoting

the private sector as the primary engine of growth to develop critical

infrastructure of all types: energy, airports, ports, roads, telecom and

digital networks, among others” (US DEPARTMENT OF STATE, 2019).

The plan had still not been activated when COVID-19 hit LAC in early

March 2020.

China, LAC, and the US in the COVID-19 context

The outbreak of COVID-19 and its expansion to the region intensi-

ed the already existent trends in LAC relations with China and the US.

As a starting point for the analysis of this recent development, we identi-

ed three aspects that are becoming more prominent in Chinese engage-

estudos internacionais • Belo Horizonte, ISSN 2317-773X, v. 9, n. 4, (dez. 2021), p. 43-62

ment in the region, particularly in the health dimension. The rst one

is related to bilateral and multilateral cooperation during the outbreak

of the pandemia, particularly on transfer of knowledge and experiences

from Chinese ocials and specialists to LAC. The second one is what

mass media has called “mask diplomacy” and is related to the donations

that China has given to LAC countries in the rst semester of 2020. The

third aspect deals with the already extended perception of Latin America

and the Caribbean as an arena of competition for China and Taiwan and

how the US involvement in it.

Chinese health cooperation with LAC countries expanded during

the pandemia to assist the governments with their immediate responses

to local outbreaks. In the multilateral arena, eorts concentrated within

the China-CELAC forum. On March 24, China organized a videoconfer-

ence with LAC countries, where Chinese experts described its experience

with COVID-19 on prevention and control. Ocials from the 24 countries

which maintain relations with China, and from Nicaragua (which recog-

nizes Taiwan), along with representatives from the WHO, UNICEF, the

Pan American Health Organization, and the IADB attended the confer-

ence. Chinese experts also provided information about clinic treatment,

customs administration, and quarantine (MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AF-

FAIRS, 2020). Additionally, this kind of event was replicated bilaterally

with almost every country of the region. The conferences were held by

the Chinese central government, and also by provinces, hospitals and

universities.

In Argentina, for example, the Chinese Embassy promoted a con-

ference between the Argentinian Ministry of Health, Ginés González

García, and the Hospital of the Zhejiang University, where González

García expressed: “we want to learn from China, how it has managed to

contain it [the disease] and how it has minimized the consequences for

the Chinese people. I would like to take advantage of and use the tech-

niques and advice of China in my country” (XINHUA, 2020). Meetings

between China’s ambassadors and LAC Ministers of Health were also

held with Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Grenada, Trinidad and Tobago, Venezu-

ela, Panamá, among others.

A second trend that has characterized the relations between Chi-

na and LAC countries is related to donations. Myers and Barrios (2020)

argue that China’s so-called “mask-diplomacy” has been on the rise in

LAC due to governments grappling with COVID-19 and its social and

economic consequences. There are some features that we could identify

in this regard. Donations that arrived at the region were sent by dierent

Chinese entities: the central government, provinces, companies, founda-

tions and also by the Chinese community of the dierent countries. For

example Huawei, the Chinese telecommunications company that have

been in the center of the trade war with the US, donated N-95 masks to

hospitals in Brazil, protective goggles to the Uruguayan Government,

biosafety suits to Bolivia and thermal cameras to Argentina. Regarding

foundations, Jack Ma communicated that Alibaba would donate 2 million

masks, 400.000 testing kits and 104 ventilators to 24 countries (SOUTH

CHINA MORNING POST, 2020). Alibaba foundation was the most ac-

M. Florencia Rubiolo, Diego Telias Compeção entre China e Estados Unidos na América Lana: evolução, perspecvas e implicações no contexto do COVID-19

tive, but the region also received masks and kits from other foundations

like Mammoth Public Welfare Foundation of Shenzhen. Other entities

that donated medical equipment are dierent Chinese provinces which

have friendship or twinning agreements with cities in Latin America.

For example, in Uruguay the province of Sichuan donated 10.000 surgical

masks to the department of Lavalleja. Sister city linkages is one example

of China’s expansive subnational diplomacy (MYERS; BARRIOS, 2020)

This pandemia has shown that Latin America and the Caribbean is

an arena of competition between China and Taiwan. We need to consider

that from the 33 CELAC countries, 24 have relations with China and 9 to

Taiwan. To understand the importance of the Caribbean we should note

that ⅔ of the countries that have diplomatic relations with Taiwan are

located in this region. As we said before in 2020 the participation of Tai-

wan in the WHO became an important issue due to the COVID-19 and

the accusations of Taiwan that the organization failed to communicate

an early warning about transmission of the coronavirus (FINANCIAL

TIMES, 2020).

In LAC countries we identify this competition between China and

Taiwan in two circumstances. The rst one was cross-donations: Chinese

aid arrived in countries that do not recognize the PRC and Taiwan assisted

countries that recognize China. And the second one is about the defense

of some LAC countries of Taiwan participation in WHO. Regarding the

rst point, it is interesting to highlight donations from a Taiwanese foun-

dation to Santa Cruz, Bolivia. The foundation Tzu Chi donated to the

Municipal Government of Santa Cruz 30,000 masks, 4,000 safety glass-

es and 4,000 N-95 masks (GOBIERNO MUNICIPAL DE SANTA CRUZ

DE LA SIERRA, 2020). Chinese donations of equipment to Haiti, is also

an illustrative example of this cross-assistance process (LE NATIONAL,

2020). Regarding the WHO, in 2020 the Minister of Health of Belize, Pab-

lo Marin, requested the inclusion of a supplementary item entitled “Invit-

ing Taiwan to participate in the World Health Assembly as an observer”

in the provisional agenda for the 73th session of the WHA (WHO, 2020).

The governments of Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Nicaragua, Paraguay,

Saint Christopher and Nevis, Saint Lucia and Saint Vincent and the Gren-

adines also expressed support for the Taiwan invitation to the assembly.

Chinese diplomatic assertiveness and the race for the narrative

Along the lines of these tensions between Washington and Beijing

in the LAC region, there is also another issue that is emerging more

strongly in the context of the pandemia: the campaign to shape the nar-

rative (MYERS; BARRIOS, 2020). In this respect, Beijing has adopted

a more assertive -some could say aggressive- tone, as a clear response

to Washington’s intention to blame the country for the global expan-

sion of the virus. Chinese more assertive diplomatic rhetoric is known

as wolf warrior diplomacy. It was dubbed with this name after the Chi-

nese movies and refers to the combative discourse of diplomats intended

at defending China’s national interests, often in confrontational ways

(ZHIQUN, 2020).

estudos internacionais • Belo Horizonte, ISSN 2317-773X, v. 9, n. 4, (dez. 2021), p. 43-62

Before the COVID-19 outbreak Chinese diplomacy was becoming

increasingly active and confrontational, both in actions and in discourse

(SWAINE, 2010). As several observers pointed out, in the last decade Chi-

nese diplomacy has become more proactive, condent (SWAINE, 2010) and

assertive (CHRISTENSEN, 2012; PU, 2017; CHEN; PU; JOHNSTON, 2014;

CHANG LIAO, 2018). As Qin (2014) suggests, this Chinese assertiveness dis-

course narrative -or new assertiveness meme in terms of Johnston (2013)-,

took shape within the United States academic circles and expanded to oth-

er countries originating a heated debate over Chinese intentions, interests

and conditions that explain this shift. Both Qin (2014) and Johnston (2013)

underline that this assertiveness in China’s diplomacy is not such a new

feature. In turn, they argue that it reects more continuity than change.

Others underline the outstanding shift Chinese diplomacy has gone

through. Since 2008, and particularly with Xi’s accession to power in 2013,

Chinese diplomacy has changed the low prole set by Deng Xiaoping as a

guiding principle for China’s diplomacy, emphasizing that China should

‘hide its capabilities and bide its time’ (PU, 2017). The reasons behind this

shift are also controversial. Most authors identify at least the following:

1) domestic reasons such as nationalism and bureaucratic conditions; 2)

Chinese growing self-condence; 3) reaction to external incentives/con-

ditions. According to Scobell and Harold (2015), China’s assertiveness in

foreign policy became more evident after the 2008 nancial crisis driven

by a sense of self-condence or premature triumphalism. In line with this

argument, He and Feng (2012) suggest that China’s diplomacy is also re-

sponding to its expanding national interests that is a consequence of its

rising economic and political international status. Therefore, “it is nor-

mal for China to formulate new foreign policies compatible with the new

power conguration in the international system” (HE; FENG, 2012, p.

636). Furthermore, since 2010, US growing interest and presence in East

Asia under the Obama Administration and the Rebalance to Asia policy,

generated feelings of reactive insecurity in Beijing, which also fueled a

more condent posture (SCOBELL; HAROLD, 2015; D’HOOGHE, 2014).

But according to another line of authors, it was domestic rather than ex-

ternal factors, which had more inuence on China’s more assertive in-

ternational behavior. In this perspective, Liao (2018) identies three sets

of domestic conditions: conict among bureaucratic agents and political

elites (People’s Liberation Army, local government ocials and managers

of state-owned enterprises); the surge of nationalism, and the arbitrary

power of policy makers.

One of the most outstanding episodes that evidence China’s more

assertive diplomacy was the government’s reaction to the awarding of

the Nobel Peace Prize to Chinese human rights activist Liu Xiaobo in

2010. Besides forbidding Liu, his family and friends to attend the cere-

mony, Beijing also pressured diplomats from other countries into staying

away from the ceremony. Chinese actions, which included severe eco-

nomic and political sanctions on Norway4, created a negative image of

the government around the world (D’HOOGHE, 2018).

The recent issue with Sweden also reects Chinese stronger dip-

lomatic responses, in retaliation to criticism on human rights records.

4. “China cancelled high-level bilateral

meetings and cultural events, denied

Norwegian ofﬁcial visas, tightened up

on imports of Norwegian products and

in 2012 excluded Norway from the list

of countries that no longer require a

visa for a 72-hour stopover in Beijing”

(D’HOOGUE, 2014, p. 59).

M. Florencia Rubiolo, Diego Telias Compeção entre China e Estados Unidos na América Lana: evolução, perspecvas e implicações no contexto do COVID-19

The diplomatic row followed the announcement that Gui Minhai, the

Swedish publisher who was kidnapped and imprisoned in China without

a trial, would receive the Tucholsky Prize (OLSON, 2019). The Chinese

Ambassador to Sweden, Gui Congyou, stated on a radio interview that:

“We oppose even more resolutely any Swedish government ocials at-

tending the awarding ceremony. It will bring serious negative impacts on

our bilateral friendly cooperation and normal exchanges. We will surely

take countermeasures” (EMBASSY OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF

CHINA TO SWEDEN, 2019).

The COVID-19 pandemic context turned out to be a catalyst to

reinforce this already more assertive and self-condent diplomatic tone.

These reactions emanated both as a response to US and other countries’

critics, but also as a tool to shape the discourse over China’s responsi-

ble power image during the crisis. Chinese diplomats have responded to

criticism in Southeast Asia, Europe and more recently, Latin America.

According to Poling and Tran (2020), “Beijing’s wolf warriors reveal an in-

secure, belligerent China whose assistance rarely comes without a price”.

But rather than insecurity, we understand this behavior reects deeper

self-condence. There is no doubt that China’s more condent attitude

emanates in a major part from its increasing world inuence and eco-

nomic clout.

In Latin America one example was the controversy between the

Chinese Ambassador to Chile, Xu Bu, with the Chilean representative

Jaime Bellolio after the latter met Joshua Wong, one of the leaders of the

protest in Hong Kong (EL MOSTRADOR, 2019). But before COVID-19

there were not many examples of this type of response. However, in this

new situation, Chinese Embassies have been active in the press not only

promoting its agenda but also confronting dierent opinions.

On the one hand, Chinese embassies and ambassadors have shown

that China is working with the dierent governments in coping with the

virus in close coordination and providing support and sharing experi-

ences. This type of cooperative initiatives, that could be tagged as soft

power, try to build the idea that China has been transparent and respon-

sible, notifying the situation to the World Health Organization and crit-

icizing opinions that spread xenophobia or fear. With phrases like “Los

Hermanos sean unidos” (brothers be united) (ÁMBITO, 2020), the CCP is

portraying its will to unconditionally support Latin American countries.

On the other hand, embassies throughout the region have re-

sponded to any kind of perceived rhetorical attack on China. One exam-

ple was in Bolivia, where the Ambassador Huang Yazhong replied to an

article of the colombian journalist Patricia Janiot, that was replicated by

a Bolivian newspaper (TU REPÚBLICA, 2020). Other most known ex-

ample was the response of the Chinese embassy to Eduardo Bolsonaro,

federal Deputy and son of the Brazilian President Jair Bolsonaro, after

he blame China for the pandemia5 (EMBASSY OF CHINA IN BRAZIL,

2020). A third example in the region is the Peruvian case, where the

Chinese Embassy said that Mario Vargas Llosa made ridiculous com-

ments in an article when he stated that the “virus comes from China”

(LA VANGUARDIA, 2020).

5. “As suas palavras são extremamente

irresponsáveis e nos soam familiares.

Não deixam de ser uma imitação dos

seus queridos amigos. Ao voltar de Mia-

mi, contraiu, infelizmente, vírus mental,

que está infectando a amizades entre os

nossos povos”. Retrieved 18 july from:

https://twitter.com/EmbaixadaChina/

status/1240456558007508993?s=20

estudos internacionais • Belo Horizonte, ISSN 2317-773X, v. 9, n. 4, (dez. 2021), p. 43-62

Although unlike the cases of Sweden or Norway, or more recently

Australia, Latin America has not yet witnessed strong retaliation measures

from China, previous experiences and the increasing assertiveness of Chi-

nese diplomacy, is not to be overlooked by regional leaders. Based on the

economic overdependence almost all countries in the region have on Chi-

na, the potential use of economic sanctions or threats to use it, is a possible

scenario, one in which Latin America will have no tools to confront.

Final remarks

The rise of China and its consequences for the international system

are outstanding issues in international relations studies in the 21st century.

In that sense, the latest manifestation of the chinese ‘going global’ strategy,

a deepening and extension of it, is President Xi Jinping’s Belt and Road Initia-

tive (GARLICK, 2020). This project has been considered one of the largest in

China’s foreign policy in modern history and from a domestic perspective,

BRI represents a comprehensive and massive strategy oriented primarily to

function as a catalyst for Chinese economic growth (TAUBE; LI, 2020).

It is interesting to note that while there is some conviction that Chi-

na’s growth will inevitably bring consequences for the global order, there

are no major agreements beyond this idea (ZHANG, 2016). The COVID-19

pandemic and Trump’s response has made this competition evident, exac-

erbating the same forces that had been shaping the policies of these great

powers in the last few years. In that context, Latin America is a key region

to analyze how relations with China have progressed, rst through trade,

then on investment and nances, to nally understand the Belt and Road

Initiative in the region and how the pandemic COVID-19 impacts on it.

As aforementioned, it should be noted that these last two aspects are only

part of a much broader competition between the United States and China.

Our analysis of China-Latin America relations in the context of the

pandemic addresses Chinese donations (the so-called diplomacy mask),

a Chinese diplomatic assertiveness and a race for the narrative between

China and the United States. It is important to highlight that, as we have

mentioned, wolf warrior diplomacy is not something so new, and there

are already antecedents prior to COVID-19. However, in Latin Ameri-

ca we had not yet witnessed this type of “confrontations” and responses

from China. Does this armative diplomacy imply then that the aid of

the diplomacy mask comes with a price for Latin America? In turn, the

soft power that China has built in Latin America is damaged after the

pandemic and this assertive diplomacy? These aspects will also inevitably

become central concerns for the region in the years to come.

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