Reginaldo Maar Nasser, Rodrigo Augusto Duarte Amaral The End of the Ooman Empire and the creaon of the

Iraqi state beyond Sykes-Picot: Between Imperialism and Revoluon

The End of the Ottoman Empire and the

creation of the Iraqi state beyond Sykes-

Picot: Between Imperialism and Revolution

El ﬁn del Imperio Otomano y la Creación del Estado

Iraquí más allá de Sykes-Picot: entre el imperialismo y la

revolución

O ﬁm do Império Otomano e a criação do estado iraquiano

para além de Sykes-Picot: Entre o Imperialismo e

Revolução

Reginaldo Mattar Nasser

Rodrigo Augusto Duarte Amaral

DOI: 10.5752/P.2317-773X.2020v8.n4.p35

Received in: September 06, 2020

Accepted in: October 19, 2020

A

The consensus in academic literature on the creation of modern states in the

Middle East is that the starting point for understanding this process occurs with

the Ottoman Empire disintegration and its replacement by European powers.

In the case of Iraq, a military campaign and the periods of British occupation

(1914-1920) and British mandate (1920-1932) in Mesopotamia paved the way for

the creation of the state of Iraq, signicantly inuencing their later political-his-

torical development. However, in addition to the diplomatic actions established

by international agreements and treaties under the guidelines established by

the League of Nations, this process did not occur in an empty space, as is often

mentioned in that same literature. The clashes over access to the region’s oil,

exemplied by the dispute over the Mosul region, demonstrate the political-

-economic character of the construction of new borders. Moreover, this was

not only the result of a planned political action by the British Empire, but also

resulted from anti-imperialist revolts across the region. In this way, Iraq’s nal

political outcome, and its subsequent development, reected not only the

presence of the imperial powers structures, but also the participation of local

communities and groups, in connection with international movements.

Keywords: Iraq. Ottoman Empire. British Empire. Mandate System. Oil, Arab Revolts.

R

Hay un consenso en la literatura académica sobre la creación de estados moder-

nos en Oriente Medio en que el punto de partida para comprender este proceso

se da en el momento de la desintegración del Imperio Otomano y su sustitución

1. Livre Docente em Relações Inter-

nacionais pela PUCSP, Professor da

Pontifícia Universidade Católica de São

Paulo (PUCSP), São Paulo, Brasil. Orcid:

https://orcid.org/0000-0001-5674-4197.

2. Mestre em Relações Internacionais

pelo PPGRI San Tiago Dantas, Professor

da Pontifícia Universidade Católica de

São Paulo, São Paulo, Brasil. Orcid:

https://orcid.org/0000-0002-7245-5448.

estudos internacionais • Belo Horizonte, ISSN 2317-773X, v. 8, n. 4, (dez. 2020), p. 35-58

por las potencias europeas. En el caso de Irak, la campaña militar y los períodos

de ocupación (1914-1920) y el mandato británico (1920-1932) en Mesopotamia

allanaron el camino para la creación del estado de Irak, inuyendo signicativa-

mente en su posterior desarrollo histórico-político.Sin embargo, además de las

acciones diplomáticas establecidas por acuerdos y tratados internacionales bajo

los lineamientos establecidos por la Liga de Naciones, este proceso no se dio en

un espacio vacío como suele mencionarse en esa misma literatura. Los enfrenta-

mientos por el acceso al petróleo de la región, ejemplicados por la disputa por

la región de Mosul, demuestran el carácter político-económico de la construc-

ción de nuevas fronteras.Y más, este resultado no fue únicamente el resultado

de la acción política planicada por el Imperio Británico, sino que también se

derivó de revueltas antiimperialistas en toda la región. De esta manera, el resul-

tado político nal de Irak, y su posterior desarrollo, reejó no solo la presencia

de estructuras de poder imperial, sino también la participación de comunidades

y grupos locales, en conexión con movimientos internacionales.

Palabras-clave: Irak. Imperio Otomano. Imperio Británico. Sistemas de manda-

tos. Petróleo. Revueltas Árabes.

R

Há um consenso literatura acadêmica sobre a criação dos Estados modernos no

Oriente Médio cujo ponto de partida para compreensão desse processo se dá no

momento da desintegração do Império Otomano e sua substituição pelas potên-

cias europeias. No caso do Iraque, a campanha militar e os períodos de ocupação

(1914-1920) e de mandato britânico (1920-1932) na Mesopotâmia prepararam o

caminho para a criação do estado do Iraque, inuenciando de forma signicativa

seu desenvolvimento político-histórico posterior. No entanto, para além das

ações diplomáticas estabelecidas por acordos e tratados internacionais soba par-

tir das diretrizes estabelecidas pela Liga das Nações, esse processo não ocorreu

num espaço vazio como, frequentemente, é mencionado nessa mesma literatu-

ra. Os embates por acessos ao petróleo da região, exemplicado pela disputa da

região de Mosul, demonstram o caráter político-econômico da construção das

novas fronteiras. Além disso, esse resultado não foi unicamente consequência

de uma ação política planejada pelo Império Britânico, mas derivou também das

revoltas anti-imperialistas em toda a região. Desta forma, o resultado políticono

Estado Iraque, e seu desenvolvimento subsequente, reetiu não apenas a pre-

sença das estruturas de poder imperiais, mas também devido a participação das

comunidades e grupos locais, em conexão com movimentos internacionais.

Palavras-chave: Iraque. Império Otomano. Império Britânico. Sistema de Man-

datos. Petróleo.RevoltasÁrabes.

Introduction

There are several similar elements between the British occupation

of 1920 in Mesopotamia and the role of the United States (USA) Coali-

tion Provisional Authority (CPA) in Iraq in 2003, both in the type of state

to be built and in the fact that state institutions must interact with the

population and, above all, which Iraqis should compose the government.

Another similarity concerns the role of the USA in both moments. Wood-

row Wilson and George W. Bush thought of imposing a new order on

the international system periphery and wonderedhow to make structural

transformations there, without jeopardizing the interests of the USA and

its allies. The USA denies that it had imperial ambitions, because it claims

that it does not intended to colonize the Iraqis, but rather to restore its

Reginaldo Maar Nasser, Rodrigo Augusto Duarte Amaral The End of the Ooman Empire and the creaon of the

Iraqi state beyond Sykes-Picot: Between Imperialism and Revoluon

sovereignty, leading it to self-government. In his presentation to the Unit-

ed Nations (UN) General Assembly in September 2003, despite speaking

of self-determination, President Bush, vehemently opposed any attempt

by the UN to transfer power to the Iraqis immediately. Bush used the lan-

guage of the trusteeship, according to which the USA would be a trustee

and the occupation of Iraq had the objective of promoting Iraqis welfare

until he could become sovereign.

Early in the First World War, the three Mesopotamian provinces

(Mosul, Baghdad and Basra) were the rst Ottoman Empire areas to be

occupied by British troops and, in 1932, Iraq became the rst mandated

state to obtain its independence, joining the League of Nations. But Iraq’s

own experience shows that it’s possible for a country to have its sover-

eignty recognized by the international community and, at the same time,

to be tutored by a great power. Under the 1922 treaty between Iraq and

the British crown, the basic provisions of the Iraqi Constitution provided,

and Britain pledged, to support and assist the armed forces of the King of

Iraq when necessary. The King agreed to fully consult Britain on how to

manage the country’s economy and nances. (DODGE, 2003, pp. X-XIII).

The military campaign and the occupation periods (1914-1920) and

British mandate (1920-1932)in Mesopotamia paved the way for the Iraq’s

State creation, signicantly inuencing its later political-historical devel-

opment. However, this process wasn’t only a consequence of British po-

litical action, but also derived from the Iraqi Revolution in 1920, which

made the agreements reect not only the structures of the imperial, Ot-

toman and British powers, but also the participation of local communities

and groups in determining subsequent developments. One eect of the

narrative that consider Iraq as an articialstate (BARR, 2011) is that it ends

up minimizing the impacts on British imperial violence and the actions

of anti-imperialist revolts. To imagine that Iraq’s borders were created

in the rooms of imperial rulers through decrees as if they were acting in

a territorial vacuum, a kind of “empty map”, is to neglect the dynamics

of the struggle between social, revolutionary and counter-revolutionary

forces and their claims of rights and autonomy. (PURSLEY, 2015).

The geopolitical disputes and social revolts that spread throughout

the Middle East region were concealed in a series of agreements, treated

by diplomatic conferences. Thus, we understand that only a closer exam-

ination of the historical context allows us to understand what was really

at stake. The economic objectives in the British negotiations with France

on the Middle East mark another post-war period chapter and referred

to Britain’s desire to guarantee oil supplies in the future. British Empire

negotiators were determined to earn a de jure sanction for their country

by the de facto military occupation of Mosul as an integral part of the new

Iraqi state. In exchange for giving up what had initially been agreed, un-

der the Sykes-Picot Agreement for Mosul, France should obtain a stake in

the oil company to work on the oil concession for the area, once the con-

cession was formally granted by the Turkish Petroleum Company (TPC).

(ENGDAHL, 2004, p.42).

Thus, although oil issues appeared marginally in these treaties, we

understand that they were inextricably linked to border issues. The 1923

estudos internacionais • Belo Horizonte, ISSN 2317-773X, v. 8, n. 4, (dez. 2020), p. 35-58

Lausanne Conference, remembered for the redenition of Turkish bor-

ders in Anatolia, was the space where powers debated whether to include

Mosul in Iraq, which on the other hand was related to the presence of oil

companies in that region. And despite diplomatic representatives’ omis-

sions or denials on the importance of oil matter at the conference, it was

a crucial one. In a correspondence between the British Admiralty and its

Foreign Oce, written days before the opening of the Lausanne Confer-

ence, this theme appears clearly giving us the key to understanding British

politics in the region: “from a strategic point of view the essential point is

that Great Britain should control the territories on which the oilelds are

situated ”. (BRITISH ADMIRALTY apud SLUGLETT, 2007, p.72).

Albeit, another variable was relevant to the decision-making pro-

cess of Middle Eastlines: the interference, resistance and interest of dif-

ferent local social groups. From the British imperial perspective on the

eastern front of the First World War, a paradox appears. The British did

their utmost to preserve and even increase their power in the region,

while giving guarantees of access to land and independence to the Arab

leaders of the 1916 revolution in exchange for support to ght the Ot-

tomans.Therefore, if, on the one hand, the powers devised seemingly

blatant imperialist schemes to divide the land between the British and

French authorities, on the other hand they had to deal with the local in-

terests that were already manifesting in that space. Much of the literature

on political change, “development” or “modernization”, understands the

state’s image as an active agent interfering in native communities with-

out any resistance, as if they were asleep. This is a distorted image, since

the communities of Mesopotamian peoples, the tribal chiefs, were equal-

ly concerned with penetrating the state and converting their tribal power

into state power (POOL, 1980, p.340).

Another important parallel process, that in a way inuenced British

behavior in the Middle East, came with the consequence of the Bolshevik

revolution in Russia. The threat that appeared for the British with the

Bolshevik revolution was less about the Soviet maneuverability south of

its territory, and more about the inuence of Communist ideology as a

possible engine of revolutionary movements in the region.

Therefore, this article aims to develop an analysis of the Iraqi state

creation process based on the disintegration of the Ottoman empire and

the direct British involvement in its constitution, looking not only at for-

mal, diplomatic and international law aspects, but also at other evident

social dynamics. Here we highlight fundamental themes that made up

this process, namely: the importance of the oil issue in the territorial de-

nitions and British post-Ottoman control; the role of the social actors in

the Arab revolts, partly resisting this process, partly associating with this

process; the dispute over Mosul as a key territory for the consecration

of British power and access to one of the region’s oil sources; and nally

the role of another internationalist project that came with the Russian

Revolution of 1917 already as an alternative to the liberal international

model represented by the North Atlantic powers. It is thought that it is

essential to understand the dynamics of these actors (agency), for a clear

comprehension of the precepts established in the Treaties and Formal

Reginaldo Maar Nasser, Rodrigo Augusto Duarte Amaral The End of the Ooman Empire and the creaon of the

Iraqi state beyond Sykes-Picot: Between Imperialism and Revoluon

Agreements that have consolidated themselves as the main aspect in

the literature on the topic of Ottoman disintegration. Such Treaties and

Agreements are means and not ends of this process, after all, it is based

on the understanding that the International law is an international policy

instrument. Therefore, a set of rules, discourses and techniques that its

subjects and actors use to regulate their relations and accomplish certain

social ends. (JOUANNET, 2014).

In this case, the British mobilizations of power with the “winning”

powers of the First War of the time (France and the USA), also with the

defeated ones (Turkey and Germany), as well as with local actors, com-

pose this macro process of creation of what we today call of Iraq.

Empire and imperialism in the Middle East in the early 20th century

At the beginning of the 20th century, basic rules were established,

within the imperialist framework, for the subsequent economic, social

and political development of the Middle East. These processes did not

operate in a vacuum and when they intruded on the social, economic

and cultural life of the region, the transformations were radical. New so-

cial classes were created, while others were destroyed. The urban centers

were destroyed and rebuilt within the new imperialist parameters. The

introduction of new agricultural methods, property rights and markets

has rapidly transformed rural life. The imperial dispute between Brit-

ish and Ottomans isolated urban areas from their traditional agricultural

hinterlands. The scenario was one of crisis and social discontent. The in-

crease in prices interacted with the growing scarcity and were aggravated

by the eects of the economic blockade by the belligerent armies on both

sides, resulting from poor harvests and crop failures between 1913 and

1918. The province of Mosul, for example, were in a state of public calam-

ity in November 1918, when thousands of inhabitants died of starvation.

(ULRICHSEN, 2014).

The emergence of new classes and the experimentation of new

forms of political expression gave a new color to social struggles. This

process of expansion of empire spreading the modern economic system

in the Middle East meant that investors, landowners and traders start-

ed to orient production to the international market. All these economic

transformations with signicant social impacts could not have occurred

without a concomitant political process that suited the expansion of the

world economy. (GELVIN, 2011)

The expansion of European empires meant that the entire globe

was inserted into the European system of international law by the First

World’s War end. Thus, at the same time the liberal internationalist pro-

posal, led by the USA, was to dismantle existing empires and facilitate the

transformation of their territories into sovereign and independent states,

another change was taking place: the emergence of a new international

administration system under the auspices of the League of Nations. Until

the beginning of the 20th century, sovereign states were the only actors

recognized by international law, but with the creation of the League, in-

ternational institutions emerged as a new actor providing international

estudos internacionais • Belo Horizonte, ISSN 2317-773X, v. 8, n. 4, (dez. 2020), p. 35-58

law with a new range of ambitions and strategies for the conduct of Inter-

national relations. (ANGHIE, 2004, p. 114-115).

Initially, the main challenge for the League of Nations was to take

responsibility for dealing with the inherited colonial structure. After

months of negotiations and some reluctance, the political leaders of the

Western powers ended up accepting the US proposal to create the man-

date system, which proved to be a compromise between those who pro-

posed colonial expansion and those who advocated for genuine indepen-

dence. The annexation of the German and Ottoman colonial territories,

the empires vanquished in Africa, Asia and the Middle East, was simply

not viable, but neither was providing autonomy to these peoples. In order

to get out of this imbroglio, the formula guardianship (or trusteeship)

was adopted. That is, although states continue to be the main actors in

the Mandate System, the principle of sovereignty has taken on a very

dierent character than existed until then. International institutions, in-

stead of being products of sovereign states, were given the task of cre-

ating sovereignty in territories where their inhabitants were considered

incapable of exercising the principle of self-determination of peoples. It

was in the Mandate System that law and international institutions were

able to carry out experiments and develop techniques that would hardly

be possible in the sovereign western world (ANGHIE, 2004, p. 133 - 135).

While in the 19th century the division between Europe and “un-

civilized” non-Europe was formulated mainly through the elaboration

of racial and cultural categories, the League of Nations characterized the

dierences between the civilized and the “non-civilized” in economic

terms: the “advanced” versus the “outdated”. According to the League’s

patronizing (and evolutionary) language, spelled out in Article 22 of the

League of Nations Convention established by the Versailles Treaty, man-

dates should be implemented in territories “inhabited by peoples not yet

able to stand by themselves under the strenuous conditions of the modem

world” (TREATY OF VERSAILLES, 1919, article 22, p.56). They referred

to the European powers that would be in this “stage”, capable of helping

them to prepare for self-government. It was understood that:

“Certain communities formerly belonging to the Turkish Empire have reached

a stage of development where their existence as independent nations can be pro-

visionally recognized subject to the rendering of administrative advice and assis-

tance by a Mandatory until such time as they are able to stand alone.” (TREATY

OF VERSAILLES, 1919, article 22, p.56).

The creators of the League tried to cover up that the mandates could

be another way of securing their strategic interests in the Middle East,

while apparently disregarding the principle of peoples’ self-determina-

tion. Thus, when the Mandate System was implemented, this artice was

immediately denounced by means of a series of revolts in various parts of

the British and French empires (ANGHIE, 2008; PEDERSEN, 2006).

The region corresponding to the Middle East, at that time, was

congured as a fundamental space for the British empire repositioning,

a vital link in its communications with the East connecting Cairo, Bagh-

dad, to India, Singapore, Australia and New Zealand. However, at that

time, there was no consensus among members of the British government

as to the extent to which Britain should seek to take over the spoils of the

Reginaldo Maar Nasser, Rodrigo Augusto Duarte Amaral The End of the Ooman Empire and the creaon of the

Iraqi state beyond Sykes-Picot: Between Imperialism and Revoluon

Ottoman empire. Some claimed that new annexations could burden the

imperial administration, which was going through dicult times due to

the costs of war. However, as the war progressed, that point of view lost

ground to those who felt that it was necessary to control as much terri-

tory as possible in order to maximize Britain’s position in the nal peace

agreement, vis-à-vis the defeated enemy and his wartime allies, who also

wanted the spoils’ share. (CROZIER, 1979).

Gradually, the territories in the Middle East began to be dened,

even before war’s end. A series of secret agreements and commitments

made by the British Empire during the First World War with the Arabs

(Eg: McMahon-Huseyn correspondences of 1915-16), Jews (Eg: Balfour

Declaration of 1917) or with their European allies (Eg: 1915 Constantino-

ple Agreement, 1916 Sykes-Picot Agreement). Great Britain adopted the

assumption that the end of the Ottoman empire would leave a “power

vacuum” in this key area (KENT, 1996, p.165-198).

After 1918, Britain faced a series of problems due to the various war

agreements, most of the times, contradictory and/or ambiguous. Several

promises were made. Sometimes to dierent Arab leaders regarding a

future Arab state, although they did not specify how far British support

would go, what their territorial limits would be, or the degree to which it

would be truly independent. Other times to France, where British made

concessions to reinforce their ghting spirit in Europe. Clearly, the prom-

ises of independent states in Syria and Mesopotamia had the sole purpose

of encouraging the Arabs to ght alongside the British. For reasons of

security, economic interests, and maintenance of imperial communica-

tions, and mainly oil, Britain felt that it had no choice but to occupy the

area before another power did it in its place. (KENT, 1976).

When the war ended, Britain found itself at the forefront of the

Middle East simply because it was alone in the military occupation of the

region with an army, mostly coming from various regions of the Empire.

Presenting it as a justication for its claims, Britain argued that it had paid

the highest costs of war there and, therefore, should be granted with the

greatest gains. (DAVIS, 2010). Britain’s military strategy during the war

allowed it to have considerable political advantages in negotiations with

other victorious powers after the defeat of the Ottoman Empire. The

British launched massive attacks from India and Egypt, involving around

a million combatants, which allowed British troops to occupy Mesopo-

tamia and parts of the Levant quickly. At the same time, the Bolshevik

government of Russia renounced the claims made by its predecessor and

denounced the imperialist plots of the French and English by disseminat-

ing texts of the agreements mediated by Tsarist Russia, as was the case

with the Sykes-Picot agreement (SCHAYEGH; ARSAN, 2015).

Another obstacle to the implementation of secret agreements came

from the USA in the gure of President Woodrow Wilson, who advocat-

ed for the end of secret diplomacy and that, about the independence of the

colonies, “the interests of the populations involved must have the same

weight as the colonial power” (WILSON apud GELVIN, 2011 p.442-443).

The European powers that won the First World War met at the

San Remo Conference in April 1920, within League of Nations frame-

estudos internacionais • Belo Horizonte, ISSN 2317-773X, v. 8, n. 4, (dez. 2020), p. 35-58

work and decided to assign the French mandate to Syria and Lebanon;

and Mesopotamia and Palestine under the British mandate. Initially, the

British and French governments feared that the new League of Nations

mandate would put them under strict limits on their management. Diplo-

mat Mark Sykes protested about the new times saying that “imperialism,

annexation, military triumph, prestige, burdens of the white man, were

purged from the popular political vocabulary” and, as a consequence, the

diplomat continued, “Protectorates, spheres of interest or inuence, an-

nexations will no longer be able to be part of diplomatic negotiations.” Al-

though this vision of radical change did not happen, the mandate system

represented, in a way, a rupture with previous forms of imperial sover-

eignty. (SYKES apudDODGE, 2003, p.13). Economic exploitation and sub-

jugation of local populations came with a new international liberal guise

in the early 20th century, which gave European imperialism a new face.

The importance of the Petroleum issue in the foundation of the post-

Ottoman Middle East.

Still little addressed in the academic literature, which is guided

almost entirely by European diplomatic conferences, if we examine the

historical process involving imperial competition in the Middle East, we

will realize that oil played a fundamental role in the construction of the

international order. During the First World War, industrial development

demanded increasing amounts of oil, which came to supplant coal as an

energy source in some military sectors.

Once oil began to be widely used by the world’s navies, it was con-

sidered essential for the Great Powers that supplies and reserves should

be freely available. They made sure to ensure that their own access to

sources. Hence the guidelines of British oil policy were formulated very

quickly: Britain should be in a position of political inuence or control in

territories where oil was known, or equally important, thought likely, to

exist, and that other powers should be excluded as far as possible, both

politically and commercially, from these areas (SLUGLETT, 2007, p. 66).

At the end of the First World War, no Great Power was unaware of the

strategic importance of the new fuel for future economic and military

security. (ENGDAHL, 2004, p38-39).

In this context, the war policy was revised, shifting the focus to the

eastern front, where Britain was expected to achieve some victories by

osetting Germany’s conquests in Europe. It wasn’t believed that peace

could be achieved before 1919. When the armistice took place in No-

vember 1918, decisions had already been taken in relation to the Middle

East, which would have profound historical consequences in the future.

(MILLMAN, 2014). Actually, before the beginning of the war, Sir Edward

Gray, British Secretary of State for Foreign Aairs, sent ultimatums to

the Ottoman government, protesting its plans to create an oil company

in the vilayets of Mosul, Baghdad and Basra, arguing that any company

created in the vilayets needed to oer the D’Arcy group

at least a 50%

stake in its operations. On March 19, 1914, an agreement was signed that

merged the interests of the TPC and the D’Arcy group, the new group

3. In April 1909, businessman Willian

Knox D›Arcy was appointed director of

the newly founded Anglo-Persian Oil

Company, which would later become

British Petroleum. (BRITANNICA, 2020a).

Reginaldo Maar Nasser, Rodrigo Augusto Duarte Amaral The End of the Ooman Empire and the creaon of the

Iraqi state beyond Sykes-Picot: Between Imperialism and Revoluon

asked the Ottoman government to grant oil in the vilayets of Baghdad

and Mosul, but the outbreak of the war prevented a nal agreement (ME-

JCHER, 1972, p.377).

Regarding the British government’s interests in Middle Eastern oil

in the years before the war, two facts deserve to be highlighted. First,

the Ministry of Foreign Aairs wasn’t prepared to accept for Mesopo-

tamia any company that would give the D’Arcy group less than 50% of

the shares. Second, on May 20, 1914, the British government signed an

agreement with the Anglo-Persian Petroleum Company (APOC), which

gave it a majority stake and vote in the decisions of the oil companies in-

volved. The government’s purchase of shares set a precedent for possible

government involvement in Iraq’s oil regions. (MEJCHER, 1972, p.378).

The combination of British national interests and changing prior-

ities during the war, with strategic situations on the Eastern Front, the

Middle East and the Caucasus, signicantly inuenced the objectives of

the British Empire, as well as its insertion in these regions. The impor-

tance of oil, in 1918, became the crux of British politics throughout the

Middle East and the Caucasus, conguring what some called “oil imperi-

alism”. (SLADE; FISCHER; MOHR, 1928).

Despite the signing of the Mudros Armistice, on October 30, 1918,

which ended conicts between the Ottoman Empire and the Allies in

the Middle East, Lieutenant-General William Marshall occupied Mosul

on November 2 of the same year, to guarantee Britain to retain oil for

the “right of conquest”. (KENT, 1976; ENGDAHL, 2004). Almost imme-

diately after the end of the Sykes-Picot Agreement, the War Committee

returned to discuss the interests of the British Empire in the Middle East.

At a committee meeting on July 6, 1916, Mark Sykes signaled the strategic

relevance of the region for Great Britain, emphasizing the great value

of “immense oil areas”. According to him, although the Flanders camps

could decide the battle, Germany was also ghting for the Middle East.

Sir Arthur Hirtzel, senior British ocer in India, agreed with Sykes’ opin-

ion, expressing his assessment in two memos on the subject, dated May

25 and October 31, 1916. (KENT, 1976, p.124-125).

The Foreign Oce memorandum of March 1918 had noted that

this was a matter which cannot be treated as a purely commercial ven-

ture but must be envisaged as a national responsibility, which admits of

no half-measures or ill-considered action. At a conference at the India

Oce later in the year, Colonel A. T. Wilson explained that: “oil is the

only immediately available asset of the Occupied Territories, the only

real security the Iraq administration are in a position to oer for the loan

which they will undoubtedly require in the near future from the British

Treasury”. (WILSON apud SLUGLETT, 2007, p. 69).

Historical reports often recall the sudden advance on Mosul in 1918

and the bold capture of the city shortly after the negotiation of the Turk-

ish armistice, but the reasons that led to this are not properly addressed.

Strategically, the capture of Mosul had been a fundamental tactical move

within the range of alternatives in British great strategy which still sought

to establish connections with Armenia and southern Russia. Furthermore,

Mosul had been the gateway to the Turkish-German forces that threat-

estudos internacionais • Belo Horizonte, ISSN 2317-773X, v. 8, n. 4, (dez. 2020), p. 35-58

ened Baghdad and its closure was a desirable goal for British commanders

in Mesopotamia. Mosul’s takeover seemed to t well for the blow to Syria,

the mountain ranges north of Mosul appeared as a safe northern border to

the open plains of Iraq; but in August 1918, when the time came for action,

there was no plan for a united Iraq. Mosul still belonged to the sphere at-

tributed to the French by the Sykes-Picot Agreement. (MEJCHER, 1972).

Although this agreement was considered obsolete by experts like

Mark Sykes, the French government, insisted on its validity. On the other

hand, Lloyd George had already armed to his cabinet that, in the case

of Syria, he would use the right of conquest to reopen the whole question

of the bargain made with France. Militarily, for Mosul, there was a pause

in front of Marshall’s forces in the summer of 1918. The Mesopotamian

campaign had ended in a dead end on the northern borders of Baghdad

vilayet. However, Lloyd George’s plans for how to make use of the British

occupation of Syria oered space for interested British pressure groups

and the Admiralty in adjacent Iraq. At the end of July and during the

following weeks, when there was no military advantage in advancing in

Mesopotamia, it was the oil interests and the concern of the Admiralty

about the future oil situation in the Empire that put the most severe pres-

sure on the Cabinet. (MEJCHER, 1972, 382-383).

In April 1919, even before the signing of the Treaty of Versailles, a

provisional oil agreement had been signed by the British and French oil

ministers, Long and Bérenger. Before that, the French handed over Mo-

sul to Britain in December 1918, receiving nothing in return. Therefore,

the Long-Bérenger agreement was a reckoning of this situation, solving

the problem by making over Deutsche Bank’s former 25% share in the

TPC (conscated during the war by the Custodian of Enemy Property) to

French interests. Later, it was formalized in the San Remo Agreement, as

we’llsee (KENT, 1976, p.140).

In this context, US government strongly opposed themselves to the

San Remo Agreement that stablished that companies that would work

in the Iraqi oil elds should be under British permanent control. Accord-

ing to the State Department a clear violation of the Open-Door liberal

principle, for the protection of equal privileges among countries trading.

In addition, it contested the TPC claims, questioning the validity of the

original concession. However, the British government feared that con-

tinued American opposition was likely to jeopardize the whole future

development of Iraqi oil. So, they agreed for the accommodation of the

USA interests, to the extent of approximately a quarter of the Company’s

capital share, later in 1923. This marks an alliance relationship between

the British and the North American in the division of portions of the de-

velopment of the oil markets in the region. (SLUGLETT, 2007, p.70).

In 1920, the British empire oil policy evolution had become closely

associated with oil companies in Mesopotamia, recognizing the need to

control oil sources and suppliers both in the areas of the Empire and in

their areas of inuence, such as Persia and Mesopotamia, as well as in

areas explored by companies under their control such as APOC and the

Royal Dutch-Shell group. Although Mesopotamia always appeared as an

important strategic area for the British Empire, because of the Persian

Reginaldo Maar Nasser, Rodrigo Augusto Duarte Amaral The End of the Ooman Empire and the creaon of the

Iraqi state beyond Sykes-Picot: Between Imperialism and Revoluon

Gulf and India, the war brought an entirely new situation. The British

Empire was confronted not only with military commitments - which, at

the end of the war, provided an administration whose main objective was

to occupy enemy territories, followed later by an administration of the

mandate - in addition to competing with its allies for control over areas

of the Ottoman Empire. (KENT, 1976 p. 156). In that context, the British

empire was both facing a diplomatic dispute against other great powers,

mostly USA and France, meanwhile trying to control the surging upris-

ing in Baghdad result of the remnants of interest of the 1916 revolting Ar-

abs, who fought the Ottoman Empire with British support in the context

of the First World War (SLUGLETT, 2007).

During the rst half of the war, when economic reasons still did

not play a relevant role in its interest in the region, London allowed the

French to enter Mosul. After that, however, among his political concerns

about Mesopotamia, it was hoped to restore Mosul to his own sphere of

inuence. His political relations with France began to turn to that end in

several attempts at settlement in the immediate post-war years. In April

1920 - as part of the San Remo Agreement - in exchange for regaining

Mosul, Great Britain agreed to grant France a stake in its oil, which de-

pended, however, on negotiations with the Royal Dutch-Shell group, as

established in the Long-Berénger Agreement, which would later be re-

vised. As a result of this agreement, the French Compagnie Française de

Petroles(CFP)acquired a 25% share in the TPC. The other shareholders

were the APOC with 47.5%, the Anglo-Saxon Petroleum Company22.5%

and the remaining 5%Calouste Gulbenkian. British control was recogni-

tion of the legality of its title for Mesopotamian oil. Although this agree-

ment was also ready in draft, in April 1920, it never reached the Cabinet

for ratication, and was overtaken by events that required modication

of the Anglo-French agreement (KENT, 1976, p.140).

The 1920 agreements show how closely the Mesopotamian issue

has intertwined with energy policy. In 1920, Mesopotamian oil, still com-

mercially hypothetical, came to occupy an important place in British dip-

lomatic and military concerns in the Middle East. At the end of the First

World War, concerns on oil shortages became central to international

politics. After the war, the change in the international scenario - with the

eclipse of Germany, the breakup of the Ottoman Empire and the con-

quest of a strong bargaining position on the part of the winners, Great

Britain and France - made the problem even more complicated, and the

Mesopotamia with its oil potential has become an important key problem

in resolving Anglo-French relations. Britain’s main concern was essential-

ly the need to secure oil for its Navy. (KENT, 1976, p.157).

After the end of the First World War, the main imperial rivals of the

British in the great Middle East (Germany, Ottoman Empire and Russia)

collapsed, thus eliminating concern for the defense of India. The APOC

had consolidated its operations in Khuzestan where it was planning major

expansions, relying on the protection of British troops in Mesopotamia,

as well as its alliances with local leaders. At the global level, the British

diplomatic machine was being led, for the rst time, by a group of pol-

iticians specialized in the so-called “Eastern Question” and in the new-

estudos internacionais • Belo Horizonte, ISSN 2317-773X, v. 8, n. 4, (dez. 2020), p. 35-58

ly created “Middle East” region. Lord George Curzon

, one of the most

important politicians at the helm of the Foreign Oce, has also become

known as the leading expert on the “Persian Question”. A long-cherished

dream of securing Western approaches to India as well as ensuring the

continued monopoly of British control over Iran’s oil resources and the

Persian Gulf area. (EHSANI, 2014, p.55-56).

In the early 1920s, the three pillars of British imperial power were:

control of world sea routes, control of world banking and nance, and

control of strategic raw materials for energy purpose, namely petroleum.

But the British Empire was not alone, a new threat from a former colo-

ny, the USA, was rising within the internationalized capitalist economic

structure. (ENGDAHL, 2004, p.50).

However, in 1921, after the Cairo Conference and the appointment

of Faysal Ibn Huseyn as King of Iraq, the pattern of British general strate-

gy followed in the coming years is discernible. Control of areas where oil

was strongly suspected should be invested in Britain through the agency’s

mandate. If other powers tried to get their nationals to participate, Britain

would be prepared to renounce part of the TPC’s interest in order to main-

tain its political position. Until the status of the disputed territories was -

nally decided, no oil prospecting or research would be allowed. Finally, any

concession would have to be ratied by the Iraqi cabinet and parliament.

In a political structure built with the support of the British, by a political

elite recognized by the British mandate as legitimate. In this scenario, it is

clear why British interests would tend to be favored. But an issue was still

sensitive. The Mosul question. (AMERICAN PEACE SOCIETY, 1925)

The Mosul oil, Iraq’s northern border special location and the -

nancial problems and diculties of the Iraqi government, formed the

main concerns of Anglo-Iraqi relations during the two years following

the ratication of the treaty by the Constituent Assembly in June 1924.

The exploitation of Iraqi oil by any or all of the allied powers demanded

that Mosul remain part of Iraq and ensure that Iraq would be able to

defend its territory, avoiding as little as possible the scarce nancial and

strategic resources of the Iraqi government, again emphasizing its strong

British dependence (SLUGLETT, 2007, p.65).

Therefore, the Mosul question was rightly predicted to be the most

intractable of all the problems of the peace agreement in Turkey, and the

matter was postponed to the later sessions of the Lausanne Conference

in 1923. Notorious international policy analyst Harold Nicolson at the

time highlighted LordCurzon’s rhetorical and diplomatic ability to un-

dermine the Turkish case, but he underscores the great delicacy of the

situation, especially in view of the British fear of provoking another crisis

with Turkey. (SLUGLETT, 2007, p.71-72).

The territorial issue of Mosul was nally established in July 1926 with

the establishment of the tripartite agreement between Turkey, Iraq and En-

gland (TRIPP, 2007, p.59). So, what is proved is that the events between the

ratication of the treaty and the nal ratication of the Mosul boundary

served to emphasize Iraq’s continuing subordination to Britain. Therefore,

it became evident that there were no alternatives that could resist the Brit-

ish resolutions for the Middle East territories by the middle of the 1920s.

4. Served as Viceroy of India from 1899

to 1905, during the First World War

served in the War Cabinet of Prime Mi-

nister David Lloyd George as Leader of

the House of Lords, as well as the War

Policy Committee. Between 1919-24 he

served as Secretary of State for Foreign

Affairs. (MOSLEY, 2021).

Reginaldo Maar Nasser, Rodrigo Augusto Duarte Amaral The End of the Ooman Empire and the creaon of the

Iraqi state beyond Sykes-Picot: Between Imperialism and Revoluon

After that, the mandate formed a period of general cooperation with Brit-

ain, in contrast to the sharp conicts of the earlier years. Consequently,

the two governments started to lose the formal ties bind them, and Britain

began to relax its direct control of Iraq. (SLUGLETT, 2007, p.91).

Arab revolts and the participation of local actors in the process of

Ottoman disintegration and creation of Iraq

The name attributed to the Sykes-Picot agreement came after the

two diplomats Sir Mark Sykes, from the British war oce and François

Georges-Picot, French consul in Beirut, participated in secret negotiations

carried out between 1915 and 1916 in which the former provinces of the

Ottoman Empire would be by the British and French in zones of control.

Although there is a surprising consensus among journalists and historians

who see Sykes-Picot as one of the causes of articial borders in the Middle

East, the agreement was already obsolete at the end of the First World

War (PURSLEY, 2015). However, regardless of the facts, Sykes-Picot has

become one of the most representative symbols of Western treachery and

conspiracy to usurp the sovereignty of the peoples of the region in the

region. (RENTON, 2016). This idea of anti-imperialist resistance in the

Middle East began to take shape in the context of Ottoman disintegration

in at least two moments: in the struggle for independence against the

Ottoman empire and, subsequently, against the European presence in the

region. Understanding how this historical process took place is funda-

mental to comprehend the formation of Middle East states.

The role of the Arab rebels in the Middle East against the Otto-

mans was crucial to the victory of western Europeans on the eastern

front of the First War. It is estimated that more than 50,000 Arabs died in

battle between 1916-18 against the Ottomans. In fact, an ideological battle

was evident at the beginning of the First War, in which the Ottomans

tried to appeal to an Islamic solidarity that was supposed to protect itself

against Western invaders. In November 1914 the sultan-caliph issued a

call to jihad, urging Muslims the world over to unite behind the Ottoman

Empire in its confrontation with the Triple Entente. It portrayed the En-

tente powers as states bent on destroying Muslim sovereignty around the

globe and warned Muslims that unless they responded to the jihad, Islam

faced extinction. However, the tactic proved to be ineective. There were

many who did not agree that the Ottoman Empire would be the legiti-

mate “Islam protector”. (CLEVELAND; BUNTON, 2009, p.153).

In 1915, for example, Jamal Pasha, one of the representatives of the

triumvirate who led the Ottoman government, imposed drastic measures

in the Arab territories under his leadership. He imprisoned notable Arabs

on suspicion of disloyalty and sent them to military courts to be questioned

and tried. Many were hanged in a public square, which was a shock to Arab

society at the time. (CLEVELAND; BUNTON, 2009, p.154). The problem

was aggravated when the British managed to articulate themselves with

this unsatised portion of society under Ottoman power. Between July

1915 and March 1916, Mecca emir Sharif Huseyn Ibn Ali - who proclaimed

the 1916 Uprising - communicated with the British high commissioner in

estudos internacionais • Belo Horizonte, ISSN 2317-773X, v. 8, n. 4, (dez. 2020), p. 35-58

Egypt, Sir Henry McMahon, establishing the conditions for the British-Ar-

ab alliance against the Ottomans. It meant that the British were informally

agreeing on the possibility of recognition of an independent Arab state,

which had never been formalized along the lines thought by the Arabs

led by Huseyn. The Arab revolt path to Damascus followed from Hijaz

(Red Sea coast in present-day Saudi Arabia) through the port city of Aqaba

(captured in 1917) and then on the right ank of British general Allenby in

the nal oensive of 1918. The military forces of Sharif Huseyn were com-

manded by his son, Amir Faysal, who was assisted by a group of former

Iraqi Ottoman ocers and a small contingent of British military advisers,

including Captain T. E. Lawrence (FROMKIN, 2009. p.156-157).

The military and autonomous ability of the Hashemites

caught the

attention of the British. However, Sharif Huseyn’s support base was not

built circumstantially. His conditions were established even before the

context of the First War from his notorious position as Sharif (supervisor,

leader) in the Mecca region who, despite recognizing that he had been un-

der the Ottoman empire since 1500, maintained a great degree of local au-

tonomy, including with an own army capable of sustaining not only the

independence of the Kingdom of Hejaz for almost ten years (1917-1926)

but also serving as a local base for the establishment of Iraq and Trans-

jordan (present-day Jordan) (CLEVELAND; BUNTON, 2009, p. 157-161).

The term “Sharian” refers to those individuals who were associat-

ed with the Sharif of Mecca›s revolt in the Hijaz against Ottoman Imperi-

al rule and to those who were involved in the temporary administrations

in Syria and Jordan between the end of Ottoman rule and the beginnings

of the Mandate System. Most “Sharians” were ocers in the Ottoman

armies and had, in the confusion of war and military defeat, found their

way to Hijaz and Syria at dierent times and by many assorted paths.

Most of them came from lower social backgrounds. In the Ottoman Em-

pire, only some urban cities had infrastructure for military education and

insertion of people in the military. Baghdad housed one of the few mili-

tary preparatory schools in the Arab provinces of the Ottoman Empire,

and most of the Sharian ocers had their introduction to military life

through their attendance at this school, which provided the opportunity

for social and political advancement unavailable to Ottoman Arabs else-

where in the Empire. In many ways, these Sharians were the core of

the movement for Arab independence and a major political beneciary of

that struggle in past-Ottoman Iraq. They were the material and military

basis for Hashemite success (POOL, 1980, p. 332-340).

Later, on the foundation of the new Iraq, the great majority of the

Sharians depended on the new state, as they had depended on the Em-

pire, for their daily bread. Unlike the older breed of Ottoman ocers,

they were not assured of converting their position in the state apparatus

into a position in society: the war had intervened, the Empire had been

dissolved and they were still quite young. Unlike the tribal leaders that

tried to resist European presence in the Mesopotamia region, they had

no “natural” followers and no ready-made clientele. In fact, their position

resembled that of their leader, the Amir Faysal, in that it was one of total

political dependency. (POOL, 1980, p. 332-340).

5. The Hashemites were represented

by three main individuals, Sharif Ibn

Huseyn leader of the 1916 Arab Upri-

sing, and his sons Faysal and Abdulah,

both respectively kings of Iraq and

Transjordan (now Jordan) after the Cairo

conference in 1921, representing the

link that materialized British interests

in the territories under the mandate

system. (BRITANNICA, 2020b)

6. The loss of the kingdom of Hejaz took

place in dispute with the Saud family,

which started a military campaign

against the Hashemites in 1924, whose

administrative effort at that time was

mostly focused on Iraq and Transjordan

in the Mandates context.(CLEVELAND;

BUNTON, 2009, p. 232)

Reginaldo Maar Nasser, Rodrigo Augusto Duarte Amaral The End of the Ooman Empire and the creaon of the

Iraqi state beyond Sykes-Picot: Between Imperialism and Revoluon

It is also important to note that Huseyn’s revolting leadership was

not unanimous among Arabs. Some Arab public gures accused Huseyn

of being a traitor, condemning his actions dividing the Ottoman-Islamic

Empire at a time when unity was most needed. The Arab Revolt did not

constitute a total uprising against the Ottoman Empire. Rather, it was a

more narrowly based enterprise relying on tribal levies from Arabia and

dominated by the Hashemite family. There can be no question, however,

that Arabs applauded the nal triumph of the revolt—the capture of Da-

mascus in 1918—and that it laid the foundations for the Arabs’ claim to

an independent state. (CLEVELAND; BUNTON, 2009, p.161). And more

than that, this revolutionary inspiration would stimulate other important

movements in the region in the following years.

At the time, when Faysal wrote this he had every expectation that he

would become king of Syria. Indeed, one year later he was elected King of

Syria by the Syrian Congress in March 1920 and his brother Abdallah was

elected King of Iraq by a separate meeting of Iraqis shortly after. (POOL,

1980, p. 337) But they soon became kings without reigns, since at the same

time France claimed its rights over Syrian territory, as determined by the

powers in the League of Nations. As expected, these decisions deeply dis-

pleased the Arabs, since when asked to make a choice between Faysal and

France, Britain opted for its European ally. (YAVUZ, 2017).

With the Mesopotamia campaign, the British had drawn the Otto-

man provinces of Basra and Baghdad into their Persian Gulf sphere of inter-

est. Without staking an explicitly colonial claim to Iraq, Sir Henry asserted

that “the established position and interests of Great Britain” necessitated

“special administrative arrangements” to secure the provinces of Baghdad

and Basra “from foreign aggression, to promote the welfare of the local

populations and to safeguard our mutual economic interests” this repre-

sented in essence, the integration of Mesopotamia into Britain’s trusteeship

system in the Persian Gulf within the auspices determined sequentially by

the League of Nations in the Mandate System. (ROGAN, 2015, p.381)

The Treaty of Sèvres (August 1920) intended to formalize Ottoman

surrender to Great Britain and France, as well as the agreements between

Great Britain and France made in San Remo (April 1920), transferring

legal titles to the territories to be maintained as League of Nations man-

dates. (SCHAYEGH, C; ARSAN, A, 2015).

So, without receiving what the British promised, the same rebels

that initially tried to install an autonomous political center in Greater

Syria between 1918-20 were expelled by the French.The Franco-Syrian

war from March to June 1920 demonstrated the strength of an interna-

tional power over a brave Arab group that overestimated itself. The Arab

nationalist bloc in the government urged Faysal to challenge the allied

powers, while more cautious voices advised him to seek a compromise

that could somehow satisfy French demands and still preserve the Syrian

kingdom. Unsure of what advice to follow, Faysal tried to open negoti-

ations with the French commander in Beirut, General Henri Gouraud,

but he was unwilling to compromise and ordered his troops to march in

Syria. On July 24, 1920, French forces easily defeated Faysal’s army, oc-

cupied Damascus and forced the king of Syria into exile in Europe. The

estudos internacionais • Belo Horizonte, ISSN 2317-773X, v. 8, n. 4, (dez. 2020), p. 35-58

independent Arab state in Greater Syria was eliminated shortly after it

was proclaimed (YAVUS, 2017, p.583)

The 1916 Arab Revolt spirit of success against the Ottomans left

gaps in power in the peripheral regions of Mesopotamia and the Levant,

added to the attempt, albeit unsuccessful, to sustain an independent Arab

state in Syria between 1918-20, inspired many the struggle for indepen-

dence in a scenario of redenitions and uncertainties in the Middle East.

It was at that time that tribal forces not aligned with the Hashemites,

rebelled against the British presence in the region o the Tigris and Eu-

phrates rivers between May and October 1920 (MCNABB, 2016).

There are several controversies in historiography regarding the

causes and motivations that caused the 1920 revolution in Iraq, as well

as opposing reports of personalities involved in this historical process at

the time of its occurrence and in retrospect. For a long time, these events

were presented in the literature as indisputable facts, but in fact they were

part of the narrative presented by the British authorities. Regardless of

how it is analyzed

, the fact is that the 1920 Revolution was an attempt by

Iraqis to obtain their freedom from a violent occupation. Thus, as in oth-

er revolutions involving agrarian societies, in Iraq the revolt against abu-

sive taxes introduced by the British administration was the denotator of

the movement. The nature of the social and political struggle unleashed,

involved various political groups as a complex process involving tactical

and strategic changes. The spirit of initial cooperation between Shiites

and Sunnis, since the biggest contradiction was a socio-economic dimen-

sion, would then be replaced by animosity, with the encouragement of

the British who adopted the motto: divide to rule (KADHIM, 2012).

Sometimes called as an insurgency, rebellion and revolt, we chose

to call events of resistance the British presence in Iraq in 1920 as a revolu-

tion. Mainly because - in addition to other factors in that context, such as

the end of the First World War and the approval by the League of Nations

of the Mandate System - its eects led to signicant changes in the Iraqi

political structure. Therefore, we consider the category of political revo-

lutions that, by popular force, transform the structures of the State, but

do not necessarily transform the social structures, as do the social revo-

lutions (SKOCPOL, 1979, p.4).The main goal of the revolution: to reclaim

Iraq from six and a half centuries of uninterrupted foreign rule (1258–

1920). The population, except for a minority of the auent, was united

against a domineering British occupation that had replaced the equally

exploitative four-century Ottoman occupation (KADHIM, 2012, p.4; 7).

AlthoughIraq 1920 Revolution lasted only six months, it was in fact

an important parallel movement that took place on the most important

cities (Baghdad, Basra, Hilla) margins and was essentially an uprising

carried out by tribal forces

, but there were also a noncombatant involve-

ment of the urban areas. Intellectuals in Baghdad and other major cities

contributed to the ideological framing of the revolution and provided

the tribes with valuable awareness and a sense of nationalist direction

(KADHIM, 2012, p.6).

If, on the one hand, the main cities like Baghdad, Hilla and Basra

were not taken over by the rebels due to the high British occupying mil-

7. To have a dimension of the different

historical narratives about the 1920

revolution, it is recommended to read

the ﬁrst chapter of the book “Reclaiming

Iraq” by Abbas Kadhim (2012).

8. For a greater dimension of which

were these tribes, their leaders and

how they connect themselves, it is

recommended to read the article by

Amal Vinogradov: The 1920 Revoltion

Iraq Reconsidered: The role of Tribes in

National Politics, 1972.

Reginaldo Maar Nasser, Rodrigo Augusto Duarte Amaral The End of the Ooman Empire and the creaon of the

Iraqi state beyond Sykes-Picot: Between Imperialism and Revoluon

itary capacity in them, the marginal cities such as Karbala, Najaf, Kufa,

Samarra, Fallujah and Diwaniyya, were the space of greatest dispute be-

tween occupiers and rebels. There, tribal forces besieged, attacked, and

nally captured them after the initial evacuation of the British. And they

managed to occupy, but it would be short lived. Later, when the tribes

were being subjected to overwhelming British bombardment, these cities

were the rst to surrender and to accept all the British conditions, while

the tribes remained ghting until the end of the revolution. When in the

fth month of revolution the rst city was taken over by the British, a

domino eect began and in a few weeks the revolutionary forces lost

total control of these cities. As soon as the tribes lost the city of wairij—

between Ḥilla and Karbala —on 12 October 1920, notables in Karbala,

began to form a committee to negotiate a surrender with the British. The

city opened its gates a week later. The same happened to Najaf after the

capture of Kufa. The British captured Kufa on 17 October 1920, and Najaf

surrendered the next day.(KADHIM, 2012, p.6).

Over 6,000 to 10,000 Iraqis were killed, with the loss of around 500

British and Indian troops. Despite the evident British military superiority,

it was the huge cost of this operation, over 40 million pounds sterling,

which led to a change in British policy. Also, USA pressured the British,

because it had a legal obligation to rule Iraq (this is the actual denition of

a mandate) but it was a tiresome duty (LLEWELLYN-JONES, 2015, p.276).

While these events did not follow the patterns of “major revolu-

tions” such as the French or Russian Revolutions, that resulted in great

political and social transformations. Iraqi 1920 revolution did not have

immediate transformation, and as expected, the removal of British pres-

ence in Iraq. Even though, it is important to consider the levels of pub-

lic participation, the social and political networks involved in the events

(KADHIM, 2012, p.8). We understand that these resistance movements

did result in major changes in the way Britain intended to govern Iraq

during mandate system. Also, it encouraged the emergence of a nation-

alist feeling never seen before in that region. In fact, an Iraqi identity was

beginning to exist there.

The 1920 uprising was a political revolution as evidenced by the

changes it imposed on the existing political structure, reversing British

policy in Iraq. The British claimed that the events of June–October 1920

didn’t impact in the process of political construction in Iraq, however it did

succeed in “discrediting the India Oce policy thoroughly, and it assured

a much larger measure of participation by the Iraqis in their rst national

government” (MARR; AL-MARASHI, 2017, p.19-23), and also promoting

Arabs to administrative posts in Iraq (LLEWELLYN-JONES, 2015, p.276).

Even before the rst communications with Sharif from Mecca,

the British, through British India, invaded Basra in what would today be

southern Iraq in 1914, on the eve of the First World War. The action was

part of a daring project, Lord Hardinge, the Viceroy of India, pointed out

to the Secretary of State for India that the purpose was to “create an im-

mense impression in the Middle East, especially in Persia, Afghanistan and

on our frontier, and would counteract the unfortunate impression in the

Middle East created by want of success in the Dardanelles” (HARDINGE

estudos internacionais • Belo Horizonte, ISSN 2317-773X, v. 8, n. 4, (dez. 2020), p. 35-58

apud, LLEWELLYN-JONES, 2015, p.274). By 1915 the Government of In-

dia stated that it expected to annex at least Baghdad and Basra. It was be-

tween 1918-20, that such domain was established, in that period Iraq was

administered by Sir Arnold Wilson (Iraq’s Acting Civil Commissioner),

he was an Indian Army Ocer and later in Indian Political Department,

with considerable experience in the Middle East. In that context, an “Iraq

Occupied Territories Code” was created following the model of Indian

laws and under the authority of members of the Indian Political Depart-

ment. (LLEWELLYN-JONES, 2015, p.275). This replaced the old ottoman

form of administrations of the region. However, this model proved to be

insucient, and Iraqis realized after six years of heavy-handed military

administration that Britain’s promises had not been made in good faith.

The model of occupation was largely based on nineteenth-century

ideas of the “white man’s burden,” a predilection for direct rule, and a

distrust of local Arabs’ capacity for self-government. It was proved inef-

cient. Therefore, the rst attempt of British administration, the imposi-

tion of the Indian colonial model, failed after a nationalist revolt in 1920

(MARR; AL-MARASHI, 2017, p.17). Later, on 1 October 1920, Sir Percy

Cox landed in Basra to assume his responsibilities as high commissioner

in Iraq and implemented the change in British perspective for Iraq. The

rst decisive step in creating new Iraqi states political institutions and the

new British role in it, took place at the Cairo Conference of 1921, and in a

way considered the need to give more voice to local actors. It seemed that

the pressure of the 1920 revolution had some eect.

With the denition of a monarchical model, on 27 August 1921, Fay-

sal was installed as king. As a monarch imposed on Iraq by an alien, domi-

nant power, Faysal was always conscious of the need to put down roots in

Iraq and to appeal to its dierent ethnic and sectarian communities if the

monarchy were to remain. With Faysal’s accession, the Iraqi nationalists

who had served with him in the war and who had formed the backbone

of his short-lived government in Syria returned to Iraq. Staunchly loyal to

Faysal, Arab nationalist in outlook, yet willing to work within the limits

of the British mandate, these repatriated Iraqis rapidly lled the high of-

ces of state, giving Faysal the support he lacked elsewhere in the coun-

try. This handful of young, Ottoman-educated Arab lawyers, ocers, and

civil servants soon achieved a position in Iraqi politics second only to that

of the British and Faysal, displacing the older notables originally installed

by the British. This also had the eect of Arabizing the regime, a process

intensied by the shift from Turkish to Arabic in the administration and

the school system. Strong pan-Arab orientation, it thwarted the develop-

ment of a more inward-looking. Also, as a result of Cairo’s Conference,

it established a native Iraqi army (MARR. AL-MARASHI, 2017, p.20-21).

Throughout the decade of Faysal’s reign, the structure of the Iraqi

state was established. This decade was marked by several agreements be-

tween the Iraqi kingdom and the British in order to secure their interests

in the country for later. Between 24 October 1922 and 25 February 1924, a

Constituent Assembly was established to elect the country’s rst parliament,

to draft a constitution and to ratify the Anglo-Iraq treaty of 1922, designed

to allow for local self-government while giving the British control of foreign

Reginaldo Maar Nasser, Rodrigo Augusto Duarte Amaral The End of the Ooman Empire and the creaon of the

Iraqi state beyond Sykes-Picot: Between Imperialism and Revoluon

and military aairs. Thereafter, the form of government was incorporated

into the organic law of 1925, in which Iraq was dened as a hereditary con-

stitutional monarchy, with an elected bicameral legislature. Islam was the

religion of the state, and Sharia courts, for Sunnis and Shiites, maintained

jurisdiction over personal status. Other basic national institutions were

quickly created. The Iraqi army, which was to be a national symbol and an

essential instrument of state authority, was founded in 1921 and expanded

after 1932 independence. (CLEVELAND; BUNTON, 2009, p.207).

Since the establishment of a national government, Iraqis have in-

creased their political participation through the organization of political

parties. Three parties formed in 1921, one by the group in power led by

the Hashemite family and two by opposition parties seen later as the na-

tionalist alternative in the country, the Watani Party (Patriotic) and the

Nahda Party (Awakening) both had the same political objective: termi-

nating the mandate and winning independence, but they diered on the

means of realizing it. The Iraqi nationalists were far from satised with

the parliamentary system established by the mandate. They demand-

ed independence as a matter of right, as promised in war declarations

and treaties, rather than as a matter of capacity for self-government as

laid down in the mandate. Various attempts were made to redene An-

glo-Iraqi relations, as embodied in the 1926 and 1927 treaties, without

fundamentally altering Britain’s responsibility. For these Iraqi national-

ists, British treaties seemed to be an impediment to the country’s true

economic development. They argued that there were two governments

in Iraq, one foreign and the other national. (TRIPP, 2008, p.52-57)

In July 1927, the British government had promised King Faysal that

it would recommend Iraq for admission to the League of Nations. In 1932,

Britain’s promise of September 1929 was part of a wider policy of retreat

from an absolutist form of empire toward a more liberal or informal type

of empire. (SILVERFARB, 1982, p.11-22) By the beginning of 1930 it was

established another Anglo-Iraqi Treaty that would consummate Iraqi path

to independence: it relinquished the mandate and withdrew its ground

troops but retained airbases in Iraq. The British government had with-

drawn all British and Indian ground troops from Iraq, but it still main-

tained squadrons of military Aircraft, stationed at Mosul, Hinaidi (ve

miles from Baghdad), and Shaiba (ten miles from Basra), plus a seaplane

anchorage at Basra, after independence. (SILVERFARB, 1982, p.23; 31).

It was in thethirteenth annual assembly of the League of Nations,

on October 3, 1932, that was voted unanimously to admit the Kingdom

of Iraq to membership. Iraq was the rst and only mandated territory to

shed its tutelary status and be granted independence through collective

agreement. However, British never really went out of Iraq, whether for-

mally through the 1930 treaty, or informally through the close relation-

ship with the Iraqi Hashemite elite (TRIPP, 2008, p.73).

This process therefore reveals that the British appointment of Fayṣal

was both a modication of the original Iraqi plan for independence, due

to pressure from Iraqi society, but also a move to secure British interests

by installing a government more friendly to the empire than the one es-

tablished by the revolution leaders of previous year.

estudos internacionais • Belo Horizonte, ISSN 2317-773X, v. 8, n. 4, (dez. 2020), p. 35-58

Confrontation between different internationalisms

Initially, the Peace Conference in Paris appeared as an unprece-

dented historic moment for colonized, marginalized and stateless peoples

around the world to achieve self-determination. With the strengthening of

international institutions, the subjugated peoples believed they could take

the ght against imperialism, through their representatives, to the interna-

tional arena and imagined President Wilson as an icon of their aspirations

(MANELA,2007). But there were two antagonistic worlds in that world or-

der that began to structure itself in 1919. One was represented in Paris, re-

vealed in the treaties, agreements and the various diplomatic negotiations

that multiplied around the world. The other reality was in everyday com-

mon actions, where people faced all sorts of social and economic problems.

Furthermore, diplomatic actions by peacemakers took place in the shadow

of real massacres in repressions against anti-colonial rebellions in Sierra

Leone, Saigon, Congo, Egypt, Iraq, Syria, Kenya and South Africa. From

then on, the imperial powers, with the intention of maintaining their do-

minions, began to face social and political movements, whose demands

for greater participation and demands for independence expanded rapidly

around the world as a result of promises not kept by the imperial powers.

It can be said that anti-colonial nationalism is emerging at this moment as

a major force in world aairs. (GROVOGUI, 1996).

Three years after the 1917 Russian revolution, the defeat of the Ger-

man Revolution and the retreat of revolutionary forces across Europe put

an end to the projected dream of an imminent world revolution, which

made it imperative that the Komintern began to pay special attention

to the movements of national liberation in colonial countries. Concerns

about the inuence of the Bolshevik revolution in the Eastern Question

can be noticed through letters, reports and political demonstrations by

British diplomats, military and politician (GUPTA, 2017).

In a letter addressed to Churchill in 18 August 1920, Field Marshal Sir

Henry Wilson, the Chief of the Imperial General Sta, warned that “In view

of the dispersion of our forces, in view of the dangerous weakness to which we

are reduced in all theaters” it is possible that there are a number of revolution-

ary attempts in Ireland, Egypt, Mesopotamia, India and other theaters. (WIL-

SON apud ULLMAN 2019). In 1920’s fall, British Major Bray, an intelligence

ocer linked to the Political Department at the India Oce, wrote three re-

ports on the causes of unrest in Mesopotamia with information collected by

British intelligence. His conclusion was that revolts were inated from Berlin

and Moscow and that the Soviets in particular, saw advantages to be gained

from the spread of the revolution in the Middle East. (MACFIE, 1999).

Curzon and Milner, those primarily responsible for the adminis-

tration of Mesopotamia, were directly opposed to the proposition to de-

crease British troops in Georgia and Persia, arguing that this would be

equivalent “to an invitation to the Bolsheviks to enter and make them-

selves master of North Persia (...) would be an end to the Anglo-Persian

Agreement which had been concluded with the object of establishing

decent conditions and providing a barrier against Bolshevism” (CUR-

ZON apud ULLMAN, 2019 p. 365). They also warned that the end of the

Reginaldo Maar Nasser, Rodrigo Augusto Duarte Amaral The End of the Ooman Empire and the creaon of the

Iraqi state beyond Sykes-Picot: Between Imperialism and Revoluon

Agreement, which served as a model for the administrations of Egypt

and Mesopotamia, would disappear with time, allowing the Bolsheviks

to penetrate the borders of Mesopotamia and Persia. It can be said that

they clearly described what was conventionally called the domino eect.

The geopolitical rivalry that opposed the British and Tsarist empires

was resized by ideological confrontation. In order to unite all anti-imperi-

alist forces, the Comintern established that new tactics of action were need-

ed. This new moment is well portrayed by Zinoviev’s declaration at the

First Congress of the Peoples of the East held in Baku in September 1920,

which even called for a “holy war against British imperialism”. Congress

drew the attention of the British Cabinet, which published a document in

December 1920, warning of the fact that the Soviet regime had as one of its

main objectives, “the world revolution” at any cost. (YENEN, 2015)

In a telegram addressed to the Minister of Foreign Aairs of Russia,

Kamenev was betting on the revolutionary potential of the revolts in Iraq

to the extent that it could spread throughout the region:

The insurrections in Mesopotamia have brought to the front the entire policy

of the British Government in Central Asia. The British troops in Persia are

operating from Bagdad. The evacuation of Mesopotamia which is being sought

in some political circles [in England] must entail the evacuation of Persia; on

the other hand, pressure on the British troops in North Persia will strengthen

the position of the Mesopotamian insurgents. Britain has no troops to send to

Mesopotamia except those which are in India and which she is afraid to move. A

revolution along the line Enzeli-Hamadan-Bagdad threatens the most vital inter-

ests of the British Empire and breaks the status quo in Asia created by the Treaty

of Versailles. (KAMENEV apud ULLMAN, 2019,p.374).

Although sometimes exaggerated, the perception of the Bolshevik

threat on the part of the colonial government had its raison d’être. The Red

Army, assisting local forces, took just one month, February 17 to March 17,

1921, to successfully establish a communist government in Georgia. This mil-

itary campaign coincided with a successful diplomatic action that resulted, in

the same month, in the conclusion of agreements for the beginning of “nor-

malization” of the relations between the Soviet government and the three

nationalist regimes that came to power in the territories on the south ank

from Russia: Turkey, Afghanistan and Persia. Countries that the British Em-

pire had long considered strategically vital to its domination (GÖKAY,1997).

Russia, whose expansionism had always been regarded by the Brit-

ish as the main threat to India, remained a matter of concern. However,

from 1917 onwards the threat seemed to come not so much from the

strength of arms, but from the communist ideology that could nd fertile

soil in the entire region of Asia and the Middle East among the nationalist

movements whose growth the war had given impetus to. The editorials

of major British newspapers and reports from colonial administrations

made alarming predictions about the eects of the combined forces of

Bolshevism and nationalism (ULMAN, 2019).

Even though it had no direct inuence on the manifestation of Iraqi

resistance to the British presence in the 1920s, it is possible to say that

the Bolshevik revolution and its internationalist aspiration represented a

threat to British eyes, being one important variable in British equation to

sustain its power in Iraq, in that period.

estudos internacionais • Belo Horizonte, ISSN 2317-773X, v. 8, n. 4, (dez. 2020), p. 35-58

Conclusion

The Middle East emerged in 1923 completely dierent from that

of 1914. New political movements and ideologies appeared in the emerg-

ing debates around the identities and development trajectories of na-

tion-states. A new political class rebelled against the post-war mandate

system, while British and French colonial administrators struggled to

adapt to the new realities of territorial domination.

The tactics and objectives of colonial rule have changed over time

due to political redenitions and anti-imperialist revolts that have spread

across the world. All states under mandate started their existence under

some form of military occupation, or indirect rule, whether they were re-

publics like Lebanon and Syria, or monarchies like Iraq and Transjordan.

British authorities ensured the pursuit of their interests in access to oil,

presence in military installations and communications through a series

of unpopular treaties imposed on monarchs and/or parliaments that tried

to maintain their statusquo in a delicate balance between submission to

imperial powers and maintaining a certain popular support, but always

inclined to serve British interests. When Britain left Iraq in 1932, it was

clear that British empire felt able to take the risk, because most of the

economic and political elite were ahead of Iraq kingdom through British

intermediation. That was the main reason, rather than because of a belief

that Iraq has reached a condition that allowed it independence.

In this process, it’s important to highlight the signicant role played

by international disputes in the structuring of the State. As political elites

operate in their domestic and international environment, their domi-

nance positions are conditioned not only by issues within the national

sphere, but fundamentally by the opportunities and challenges arising

from the international sphere. The decision by the British to reward the

notable Sunnis for their loyalty to positions of dominance in the new Iraqi

state and to maintain the privileges of landowners, enabled them to build

a lasting alliance with the conservative social forces that would dominate

Iraqi politics until the Iraqi revolution in 1958.

There are several academic works that approach historical process-

es exclusively within national perspectives, forgetting the transnation-

al connections between the countless revolts, revolutions and reactions.

There are few attempts to insert them within a single eld of perspective,

framing them as parts of the same global historical moment: a broadly

inherent international anti-colonial nationalist revolution.

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