Mónika Szente-Varga, Amadea Bata-Balog Migração de retorno da Venezuela para a Europa: de volta às raízes?

Migração de retorno da Venezuela para a

Europa: de volta às raízes?

Return migration from Venezuela to Europe:

Back to the Roots?

Migración de retorno de Venezuela a Europa:

¿Regreso a las raíces?

Mónika Szente-Varga1

Amadea Bata-Balog2

DOI: 10.5752/P.2317-773X.2021v9.n3.p75

Recebido em: 19 de setembro de 2020

Aceito em: 21 de novembro de 2020

R

O êxodo da Venezuela aumentou de intensidade até a pandemia de Covid-19. As

chegadas à Europa foram signicativamente inferiores às da América Latina, mas

também cresceram e mostraram uma mudança na composição, incluindo uma

percentagem decrescente de pessoas de origem europeia. Este estudo investiga

a migração da Venezuela para a Espanha, Itália e Hungria no século 21. Ele

começa com uma estrutura teórica detalhada e, em seguida, examina uxos de

migração especícos. A análise cobre as principais características desses movi-

mentos migratórios, incluindo antecedentes, motivos e motivações, tamanho,

distribuição geográca e indicadores relacionados à integração. Métodos mistos

são usados, qualitativos e quantitativos. Os resultados mostram que a atual emi-

gração da Venezuela para a Espanha, Itália e Hungria pode ser considerada como

migração de retorno, pois os uxos originais existiram nos séculos 19 e 20, e os

atuais contrauxos não só incorporam os descendentes de imigrantes, mas tam-

bém baseiam-se nos sistemas e redes migratórias existentes entre esses países.

Palabras chave: Migração internacional; Venezuela; Espanha; Itália; Hungria

A

The exodus from Venezuela increased in intensity until the Covid-19 pandemic.

Arrivals in Europe were signicantly lower than in Latin America, but also grew

and displayed a shift in composition, including a decreasing percentage of peo-

ple with European origins. This study investigates migration from Venezuela to

Spain, Italy, and Hungary, in the 21st century. It begins with a detailed theoretical

framework and then examines the particular migratory ows. The analysis covers

the major features of these migration moves, including antecedents, reasons and

motivations, size, geographical distribution, and indicators related to integration.

Mixed methods are used, both qualitative and quantitative. Findings show that

current emigration from Venezuela to Spain, Italy, and Hungary can be considered

1. Historian (PhD in 2005, University of

Szeged; Habilitation in 2014, University

of Szeged). Associate Professor at

Ludovika - University of Public Service in

Budapest, Hungary. Email: szevamoni@

gmail.com.

2. PhD Student at Ludovika - Univer-

sity of Public Service, Doctoral School

of Public Administration Sciences.

Senior Researcher at Mathias Corvinus

Collegium (MCC). Email: bata-balog.

amadea@uni-nke.hu.

estudos internacionais • Belo Horizonte, ISSN 2317-773X, v. 9, n. 3, (set. 2021), p. 75-95

as return migration because original ows existed in the 19th and 20th centuries, and

current counterows not only incorporate descendants of immigrants, but are also

based on the existing migratory systems and networks between these countries.

Keywords: International migration; Venezuela; Spain; Italy; Hungary

R

El éxodo de Venezuela aumentó en intensidad hasta la pandemia de Covid-19.

Las llegadas a Europa fueron signicativamente más bajas que en América Lati-

na, pero también crecieron y mostraron un cambio en la composición, incluido

un porcentaje decreciente de personas de origen europeo. Este estudio investiga

la migración de Venezuela a España, Italia y Hungría, en el siglo XXI. Comienza

con un marco teórico detallado y luego examina los ujos migratorios parti-

culares. El análisis cubre las principales características de estos movimientos

migratorios, incluidos antecedentes, razones y motivaciones, tamaño, distribuci-

ón geográca e indicadores relacionados con la integración. Se utilizan métodos

mixtos, tanto cualitativos como cuantitativos. Los resultados muestran que la

emigración actual de Venezuela a España, Italia y Hungría puede considerarse

como migración de retorno, porque los ujos originales existieron en los siglos

XIX y XX, y los contraujos actuales no solo incorporan a los descendientes

de inmigrantes, sino que también se basan en los sistemas y redes migratorias

existentes entre estos países.

Palabras clave: Migración internacional; Venezuela; España; Italia; Hungría

Initial considerations

In our contemporary world, globalization, global warming, politi-

cal, and economic circumstances, as well as advances in transportation

and communication fuel international mobility, making its pattern more

complex in nature and geographically more diverse. According to the vo-

lume and composition of the migrant outows, three basic migratory

phenomena dominate movements in Latin America today: “north-south

intracontinental migration to the United States and Canada; interregio-

nal migration […]; and transoceanic migration to Europe, Japan, and Aus-

tralia” (DURAND; MASSEY, 2010, p. 20). This study will focus on the

latter, investigating migration ows from Venezuela to three particular

European countries: Spain, Italy and Hungary.

The ongoing socioeconomic crisis, repression of political dissent

and growing violence in Venezuela has triggered “the largest external

displacement crisis in Latin America’s recent history” (IOM, 2020): appro-

ximately 4.5 million people have left by October 2019 (R4V, 2020), more

than 10% of the population. Nearly 80% of migrants and refugees are

in Latin America and the Caribbean (UNHCR-IOM, 2019), and a much

smaller portion headed for Europe. Therefore, due to relatively low num-

bers, less scholarly attention has been paid to overseas migratory moves.

Yet, it is important investigating Venezuelan migration to the old conti-

nent, on the one hand, because numbers have been on the rise, and, on

the other hand, for the reason of its special context.

Countries were selected for the analysis on the basis of historical ties

– that is, the existence of previous migratory experience and of a diaspora

in Venezuela – and representativeness with respect to the presence of Ve-

Mónika Szente-Varga, Amadea Bata-Balog Migração de retorno da Venezuela para a Europa: de volta às raízes?

nezuelans in Europe. Among the immigrants who settled in Venezuela in

the 19th and 20th centuries there were Spaniards, Italians and Hungarians

and all three countries have diaspora groups, though of dierent size, in

this South American country. As for the current emigration and exodus

from Venezuela, Spain is the home of the biggest Venezuelan diaspora

in Europe, whereas Italy follows in second place (CARA LABRADOR,

2019). Hungary might be negligible concerning sheer numbers, but its

unique and unknown features can complement the general trends and

characteristics derived from the previous two cases.

The hypothesis is that 21st-century emigration from Venezuela to

Spain, Italy, and Hungary can be considered as return migration because

original ows existed from Europe to South America in previous centu-

ries, and current counterows not only incorporate descendants of im-

migrants, but also have been based on the existing migratory systems

and networks between these countries. It has to be noted though that the

composition of this migration move is mixed and has been changing over

the years in a way that returnees tend to form decreasing percentages.

This essay begins with a theoretical framework and seeks to provi-

de a comprehensive summary of the existing approaches concerning the

concept and the truly complex phenomenon of return migration. Then, it

goes on to examine the migratory ows Spain-Venezuela-Spain, Italy-Ve-

nezuela-Italy and Hungary-Venezuela-Hungary. The analysis covers the

reasons and size of the primary move as well as the motives of ‘return’,

the shifts in the volume and composition of current migratory ows, the

geographical distribution of the arrivals and the indicators related to inte-

gration. The research is based on qualitative analysis of press articles and

quantitative evaluation of statistical data provided by national statistical

oces, and international organizations, such as The World Bank.

Deﬁnitions and Typologies of Return Migration

Return migration has been the subject of various interpretations

since the 1960s, though admittedly it was under inquiry with less atten-

tion than initial migration, due to its scarce measurability and compa-

rability (CASSARINO, 2004, p. 253; KOSER, 2000), and because it is less

voluminous than emigration or immigration. When it comes to an analy-

sis in the context of return migration, multiple profound questions arise –

alongside seemingly ‘simple’ ones on who returns, when, and why – whi-

ch can only be explained with an interdisciplinary and multi-dimensional

theoretical and methodological approach. Migratory movements tting

under the generic denomination of return migration are of a very va-

ried nature. Hence, there is a conceptual vagueness with which the many

existing synonyms are used in this regard. Synonyms for the term return

migration include reux migration, return ow, homeward migration,

counter-current, second-time migration, repatriation or ‘retromigration’.

The term return voluntary migration is generally used when “migrants

return to their country of origin, by their own will, after a signicant pe-

riod of time abroad” (DUSTMANN; WEISS, 2007, p. 238). When people

move to a second destination, it is called transit migration. Often used as

estudos internacionais • Belo Horizonte, ISSN 2317-773X, v. 9, n. 3, (set. 2021), p. 75-95

a synonym of return migration, but according to Bovenkerk (1974), remi-

gration or re-immigration is when one migrates back to the same destina-

tion after a period of return to his/her origin country. New emigration is

actually moving from the destination country to a new destination after

returning from the origin country. It mostly occurs when one cannot nd

his/her calculations. Finally, it is circular migration when round-trip mo-

vements between two places include more than one return. It takes place

mostly in the framework of labour migration systems. All the migration

types established by Bovenkerk – except in the case of transit migration –

comprise at least one return movement, reecting to the fact that return

migration is usually part of a more complex migration history and that

return does not necessarily imply the endpoint of the migration story.

As of the aim of the study, the concept of return migration will be in

the focus, which can be further elaborated. The decision of moving – just

as for emigration as well as for return migration – can be made by choice

or it can be forced (deportation, expulsion). However, regarding the typo-

logies, what must be taken into account is how much they are related to

the migration motives, the causes of leave and return, intentions, and suc-

cess of the migration. According to Gmelch (1980, p. 137-138), two dimen-

sions are concerned: the length of time migrants intend to remain abroad

and their reason(s) for returning. In both purposes, dierentiation is made

with respect to the migrants’ intentions – both the initial immigration

and later on the emigration plans – whether they dedicated their moves

to be temporary or permanent. Intentions suggest outcomes for returnees

in correspondence with the achievement of their objectives as a reason of

migration, ergo those who intend temporary settlement are more likely

to return as soon as their goals are fullled. Correspondingly, permanent

thinkers can have two ends to return: forcing factors pulled them home

although they were meant to stay with successful circumstances or, on

the account of failing to accomplish their goals, they choose to go back.

Some would argue that there is hardly a specic denition of the

returnee, but multiple conceptualizations exist based on a successful or

unsuccessful return (TOVAR; VICTORIA, 2013) that is assessed by the so-

cio-economic integration of the migrants as well as their contribution to

development – often veriable long after their return. According to this

approach, returned emigrants are referred to as “successes” or “failures”

(BOVENKERK, 1974; WIEST, 1978). In order to explain whether return is

a consequence of a positive or a negative selection process, Cerase (1974)

developed four types of migration taking into account accomplishment or

lack of accomplishment: (1) return of failure: unsuccessful migration expe-

rience with failed integration into the host society (this being the reason to

return); (2) return of conservativism: when the migration motive was to se-

cure an income to be consumed at home (typically successful); (3) return of

retirement: when moving to the homeland after working years; (4) return of

innovation: when after return the social and nancial capital gained abroad

is invested in the home country – its success depends on the follow-up.

Regarding the approach of this study, another typology must be

highlighted, which is developed in the time perspective of emigration: in-

tergenerational migration or ‘roots migration’. Members of the second – less re-

Mónika Szente-Varga, Amadea Bata-Balog Migração de retorno da Venezuela para a Europa: de volta às raízes?

gularly third – generation have signicant potentials to return to the place

where their parents are from (WESSENDORF, 2007, p. 1083). Important

triggers in their decision are the inclination or the relation to those who

intend to perpetuate the national heritage and identity (family, friends or

a bigger diaspora community). The likeliness of return is often higher for

those who participate in ethnic organizations and social networks, consu-

me ethnic media, and regularly travel to their parents’ homeland.

Motives to Return and Theories at Glance

Traditional interpretations of migration perceive migration as a

one-time movement (CASSARINO, 2004; ILLÉS; KINCSES, 2009), mean-

while, it emerges as a recurring event in the concept of return migra-

tion. Numerous theories exist on migration, but there is not one general

theory that would alone explain such a complex-natured phenomenon as

international migration (MASSEY et al., 1993, p. 432; ARANGO, 2000, p.

283), nor return migration (CONTANT; MASSEY, 2002; GMELCH, 1980).

Nonetheless, depending on the exact research question, most of the mi-

gration theories that were originally created to throw light upon initial

migration processes are applicable in explaining and classifying return

ows and their outcomes, of course with the necessary adaptation to the

logic of return migration. Often, they oer dierent hypotheses, which

corroborate the idea that they should rather be treated as complementary.

As in the general case of migration, the task of most of the studies on the

phenomenon of returning has been to carry information on the various

factors or social attributes that intervene in the process of returning to

the native land, showing the empirical regularities or uniformities that

are observed around the aforementioned return (CASTILLO, 1997, p. 33).

In order to do so, studies (eg.: HARE, 1999; CONTANT; MASSEY, 2002;

DE BREE; DAVIDS; HAAS, 2010) often refer to general theories of volun-

tary migration such as neoclassical economics, push and pull theory, the

new economics of labour migration, structuralism, transnationalism and

social network theory among others.

The earliest consideration in explaining population movements

– size and direction – was Ravenstein’s migration laws (1885), which are

applicable to return migration ows as well. Return migration can be un-

derstood in the context of each signicant migration ow – with a time

phase shift – creating a counterow with a smaller magnitude than the

initial outow. The further developed assumption by Lee (1966) introdu-

ced the push and pull factors that regulate migration decision and direc-

tion. The decision to return is often driven by a set of inuencing negati-

ve, so-called “push” factors in the host country – such as in the case of less

voluntary migration from Venezuela –, and “pull” factors indicating the

attraction or positive attributes of the motherland –, which indeed more

commonly have a bearing on return migration decision (GMELCH, 1980,

p. 140). Intervening obstacles and personal factors might be also inherent

in the decision and motivation.

As far as the neoclassical approach is concerned, international migra-

tion is caused by wage dierentials between countries and markets, as

estudos internacionais • Belo Horizonte, ISSN 2317-773X, v. 9, n. 3, (set. 2021), p. 75-95

well as by higher expected earnings in the host countries (TODARO, 1969,

p. 140). Along these lines, emigration intension is permanent to raise and

maximise wages in the place of destination, thus untimely return “is con-

sidered a ‘failure’ caused by miscalculation” (TEZCAN, 2019, p. 3). Those

with failed migration experience do not have considerable assets acquired

abroad, so they will not invest in their country after their homecoming.

The new economics of labour migration (NELM) – unlike neoclassical

theory – oers the idea that emigration and return migration decision

is determined in the household, not being made at the individual level

(STARK, 1991). Migrants are preoccupied to minimise their risks and cer-

tainly aspire to achieve their goals and earn sucient assets and knowled-

ge (STARK; BLOOM, 1985). In case integration is unsuccessful, the pro-

jected return is then periodically postponed. Thus, return is viewed as a

“calculated strategy”. In connection with the NELM perspective, one can

refer to remittances, which – other than their development potential – are

constituents of a strategy set out to diversify the household resources inas-

much as to minimise risks (CONSTANT; MASSEY, 2002). Return then

is foreseen to be a successful migration experience. Even though these

theories are laid in the success-failure paradigm, the following thesis will

show that they cannot fully explain the return migration phenomenon.

The structural approach to return migration introduces a new unders-

tanding by the realization that the return is very much related to social

and institutional factors. Structural thinkers of return migration focus on

the cruciality of the return decision and the reintegration of the migrants

that are based on the nancial and economic resources brought back to

origin countries. As the original theory corresponds to the global imba-

lance of capital distribution and development, so does the return logics.

Migration decision is presented in a more deterministic form, inasmuch

as movements are outcomes of a broader structural process. However,

again when it comes to the development nexus, a substantial relationship

is concerned with the links between the returnee’s expectations and the

conditions at the home country, in particular the social and economic

context (CASSARINO, 2004, p. 257). (Perceived) positive change at home

can contribute to return decisions, whereas the lack of change or negative

alterations in comparison with the situation at the time of emigration

may deter people from going back (CONDON; OGDEN, 1996, p. 45).

Attention has been paid to the transnational aspects of international

(re)migration experiences and practices in order to explain persisting mi-

gratory and return ows. Transnationalism attaches importance to the

connections that migrants establish between countries; exchanges and

interactions across borders that can create powerful social and economic

ties between migrants’ host and origin countries. Return is apparently not

the endpoint of the migration cycle, so transnational migrants are percei-

ved as part and parcel of a circular system, beneting from the economic

and political situation both in the country of origin and destination (POR-

TES, 1997). Therefore, resilient bonds with the previous and successful

integration in the latter are not substitutes or opposites, but could com-

plement each other (VAN HOUTE et al., 2015, p. 692). “Migrants have be-

come increasingly important, not only as a source of remittances, invest-

Mónika Szente-Varga, Amadea Bata-Balog Migração de retorno da Venezuela para a Europa: de volta às raízes?

ments, and political contributions, but also as potential “ambassadors” or

lobbyists in defence of national interests abroad” (NYBERG-SORENSEN

et al., 2002, p. 18). Returnees with their new transnational identities can

have a signicant impact on their motherland, in a way that it can cause

remarkable transformation in the local economy, politics, and culture.

Coupled with migration systems and the analysis of migration as

a social process, it is social network theory that – similarly to transnatio-

nalism – explains return as an outcome of strong social and cultural ties

and suggests that, in the long run, these networks will keep migration

and remigration between the sending and the receiving country in pla-

ce (TILLY, 2007; BOYLE, 2009). Return aects and is aected by social

structures that increase the availability of resources and information. In

the developmental context, this social capital of returnees – that is inhe-

rent in the structure of people’s relationships (PORTES, 1998) – facilitates

their eective initiatives.

Overall, despite their sometimes contrasting interpretations, the

above mentioned theories make it clear that there are numerous reasons

for people moving abroad and returning home, and they can be explai-

ned in very dierent ways. Nonetheless, these theoretical schemes do not

represent a theoretical body proper, capable of systematically, coherently,

and globally explaining such a collective phenomenon as return migra-

tion (SINATTI, 2014, p. 12-13).

Consequences and Outcomes of Return Migration

Return migration has considerable impact both on countries of

origin, transit, and destination, as well as on the migrants themselves,

transforming demography, impacting development, trade, and interna-

tional relations, and sometimes putting a burden on health, security, and

human rights too (JEFFERY; MURRISON, 2011). It would be a rather im-

possible venture to elaborate on each ground, and as it is not in the scope

of the study, primarily the migration-development nexus, coupled with

integration instances will be inspected concerning return migration.

The “successes” or “failures” question on the positive or negative

selection process with regard to return migration is a fundamental issue

when analysing the eects of counterows on the sending societies. In

case the return is the result of the migrants’ socio-economic failure in the

host country, their impacts on the origin country are expected to be less

constructive, while if the migrants’ experience is positive, returning with

new skills, capital, and plans for investment, they are more likely to take

part in the development of their nation.

Another approach though, according to Cassarino (2004, p. 271) is

that in order “to strengthen the link between return migration and de-

velopment at home, return should not simply be viewed as a voluntary

act on the part of the migrant but, above all, as a proof of readiness”. In

this sense, return pertains to a process of resource mobilisation (both

material and intangible capital, skills and knowledge), and not only wil-

lingness, but actual preparation. Respecting all this, one can examine the

impact of returnees on the motherland in terms of development.

estudos internacionais • Belo Horizonte, ISSN 2317-773X, v. 9, n. 3, (set. 2021), p. 75-95

Nevertheless, exploring the variation of return migration outco-

mes, the impact of human capital is regularly under inquiry. The degree

to which returnees can successfully integrate and / or appear as actors

of change depends on the aforementioned migration experience, prepa-

redness, and the applicability of the specic skills, knowledge, social, and

nancial capital that the emigrated returnee acquired abroad. Evidence

shows growth and innovation trajectories with regard to the returnees’

human capital investment are determined by structural factors, local po-

wer relations, traditions as well as values in home countries (GLORIUS,

2013; CASSARINO, 2004).

In relation to human capital and scientic and technological resour-

ces, the phenomenon of ‘brain return’ in the context of ‘brain drain – brain

gain’ discourse arises as a developmental factor especially for less develo-

ped countries of origin. The emigration of highly skilled labor usually im-

pacts sending countries negatively. However, the return of these formerly

emigrated individuals – with knowledge, skills, and social networks, i.e.

relatives-acquaintances’ interpersonal or organized-institutional ties (PO-

ROS, 2011) – may reverse the brain drain into signicant brain gain for

the origin country (MAYR; PERI, 2008). This is why initiatives and poli-

cies in support of return migration are decisive in the long run.

Remittances are considered to be a positive consequence of migra-

tion, which might balance up to a certain extent the negative eects of

emigration and brain drain. They serve various purposes: provide nan-

cial help to family members at home and also “prepare the return of donors

themselves by maintaining and reinforcing their economic and social capi-

tal in their origin countries” (ALBERTINI et al., 2019, p. 1700). According

to remittance behaviour (GRIECO, 2004, p. 243-252), the level of remittan-

ces sent by migrants peak soon after arrival and although it continues to

decline through time, remittances and the probability to return correlate.

Last, but not least, it is the reception and integration of return mi-

grants that can pose serious challenges to transit and origin countries.

Reintegration into the home country is inuenced by a number of fac-

tors, including the returnee’s gender, status, work, previous contact with

the return country, personal migration experience, language, and reinte-

gration programs. Social and cultural reintegration and economic incor-

poration of returnees are considered as key to migrants’ economic and

social success in home countries (POROS, 2011).

There is also a correlation between the preparedness for return

and the mobilization of resources in terms of the reintegration successes

(CASSARINO, 2004) and those who are integrated successfully are often

well-placed to contribute to the development of their countries of origin.

Integration successes, in fact, can be evaluated only after a substantial

time spent in the home country after return. Education, health, housing

and the labour market are domains that have been consistently identied

as critical at the local level to ensure the possibility of integration. Ho-

wever, this is not, incidentally, to say that other domains or contexts are

not essential to be considered. Factors that might hinder or promote in-

tegration can be the existence of a sizeable co-ethnic community and the

number and composition of those who arrive, contact with the country

Mónika Szente-Varga, Amadea Bata-Balog Migração de retorno da Venezuela para a Europa: de volta às raízes?

of origin, language, and integration programs – these will be considered

in the analysis. It is governmental policies that can foster the institutio-

nal and legal framework of reintegration by lifting migration boundaries

and assisting migrants in accessing employment and public services. All

the same, if counter-currents are poorly governed, it can also negatively

impact on development.

Having a clearer grasp of the manifold phenomenon of return mi-

gration, this review goes on to the case-study investigating the particular

migratory ows originating from Venezuela to Spain, Italy, and Hungary

with a special focus on returns.

Venezuelan Migration

Venezuela can be characterized as a country of sporadic immigra-

tion in the 19th century, an immigration destiny for most of the 20th century

and a country of massive emigration in the 21st century, in the context of in-

ternational migration (GARCÍA ARIAS; RESTREPO PIÑEDA, 2019, p. 72-

74; PÁEZ; PHÉLAN, 2018, p. 323). In order to have a better understanding

of migratory ows, it is convenient to use a more specic periodization.

Table 1. Periodization of Immigration to Venezuela

According to Susan Berglund According to Tomás Páez and Mauricio Phelan

1810-1900 Experimental Stage of Immi-

graon 1824-1936 Frustrated Immigraon

1900-1945 Foreigners as Trouble-makers 1936-1945 The Transion

1945-1961 Postwar Immigraon 1945-1958 Open Doors

1961-1992 Immigraon and Democrac

Governments

1958-1970 The Beginning of Democracy

1970-1983 Crude Oil Boom

Source: BERGLUND, 1994, p. 173-209; PÁEZ; PHELAN, 2018, p. 319-355.

The cited investigations coincide in that the rst period of immi-

gration embraces the era from the independence until the end of the Se-

cond World War, and divide this early era into two, considering either the

Venezuelan economic crisis of the turn of the century and the subsequent

European military intervention in 1902 or the beginning of the Spanish

Civil War in 1936 as the dividing line. Both investigations treat the years

between 1945 and the beginning of the democratic political period (1958

and 1961 respectively) as a separate period, characterized by a major in-

ow of European immigrants. Immigration did continue in the years

afterwards, but its origins gradually shifted from Europe to South Ame-

rica. People eeing from insecurity in neighbouring Colombia as well as

from dictatorship in the Southern Cone started to form the bulk of new

arrivals (OSORIO ÁLVAREZ, 2014, p. 323).

The last quarter of the 20th century can be considered as a period

of transition with respect to migration trends characterizing Venezuela;

there was a shift in the dominating direction, from immigration to emi-

estudos internacionais • Belo Horizonte, ISSN 2317-773X, v. 9, n. 3, (set. 2021), p. 75-95

gration. The background factors were both international and internal.

Following the end of dictatorships in Spain and Portugal in the middle of

the 1970s, a peaceful democratic transition took place in both countries

and they succeeded in joining the European Communities in 1986. These

changes decreased outows from the Iberian Peninsula and greatly con-

tributed to converting it into a destination of migrants, both for returnees

and newcomers (MOLNÁR; SZENTE-VARGA, 2020, p. 80-81).

The general economic crisis in Latin America of the beginning of

the 1980s played an important role in discrediting and bringing down

governments, but while these were military dictatorships in Brazil and

Argentina and, thus, the path was opened to civilian rule and a transition

to democratic political life, the crisis in Venezuela aected negatively the

democratic political system, to be further shaken by the social costs of the

introduction of neoliberal reforms at the end of the decade (SKIDMORE;

SMITH; GREEN, 2010, p. 234-235). All this resulted in less emigration

from South American countries towards Venezuela and the return of va-

rious people, in particular, political exiles to their homelands. Venezue-

lans themselves started to look for opportunities abroad. This combined

outward ow, which at the beginning was rather modest, turned into

a major exodus in the 21st century with the further deterioration of the

internal conditions in Venezuela itself (GOULART; TEIXEIRA DELGA-

DO, 2017, p. 101-108; HEGEDŰS, 2019, p. 163-170).

The major receiving countries are in South America, but move-

ment towards Europe, though much smaller in volume, has also been

rising until the outbreak of the Covid-19 pandemic. In the following, mi-

gratory ows from Venezuela to Spain, Italy, and Hungary are examined

together with their respective antecedents. The rst two are the principal

destination countries on the old continent, whereas the latter does not

outstand for its size but due to its unknown nature.

Spain

Spaniards have migrated to Venezuela since the very formation of

the country. Approximately 20,000 settled in agricultural colonies in the

19th century, followed by Spanish republicans, arriving at the end of the

1930s, rst half of the 1940s. After the Second World War, Venezuela be-

came the major destination of Spaniards in the Americas, and the decade

which experienced the major inows was the 1950s (CASTRO TRUJIL-

LO, 2019, p. 392). The direction of the migration began to alter after the

death of Franco in 1975, which marked the beginning of a counterow of

returnees. The major destinations in Spain were the places of origin: the

Canary Islands and Galicia. By the end of the 20th century, 46,388 people

were registered in Spain, who had been born in Venezuela. 82% had Spa-

nish nationality and only the rest carried other, for example Venezuelan

passports (Table 2). These data correspond to 1998, the year of the electo-

ral victory of Hugo Chávez, and the starting point of this analysis.

In order to examine Venezuelan migration to Spain, it would be

convenient to use statistics from both sides of the Atlantic. However, it

seems that the Venezuelan government is reluctant to disclose data of

Mónika Szente-Varga, Amadea Bata-Balog Migração de retorno da Venezuela para a Europa: de volta às raízes?

the people who leave, therefore Spanish sources will be used, mainly the

Padrón Municipal, drawn up with an annual frequency since 1996 by the

Spanish municipalities. The data is processed and published by the Na-

tional Institute of Statistics (Instituto Nacional de Estadística, INE). Anybo-

dy can register in the padrón with valid identication and residence. No

work permit is needed, which allows both regular and irregular migrants

to register. Being in the padrón has important benets that can raise the

standard of living of the immigrants: accession to public health care and

education. Therefore, irregular migrants are likely to feature, too, ma-

king the registry rather accurate and reliable.

Nonetheless, it is necessary to draw attention to the shortcomings

of the padrón with respect to this research. The number and residence

of people of Venezuelan background can be investigated either looking

at Venezuelan nationals in Spain or people born in Venezuela – having

Spanish or non-Spanish citizenships – residing in the country. The second

number is, of course, higher and reects better the migration phenome-

non in question, as it also includes the descendants of Spanish emigrants

in Venezuela, who have Spanish nationality due their parents or grandpa-

rents. Notwithstanding, Spanish people who had emigrated to Venezuela

and later returned do not feature in the statistics, nor do the children of

Venezuelan immigrants born already in Spain.

Table 2: Venezuelan migration to Spain (1998-2019)

People residing in Spain 1998 2003 2008 2013 2018 2019

Having Venezuelan naonality 8,986 29,716 58,317 56,338 95,633 137,776

Born in

Venezuela

Spanish 38,136 50,075 83,524 100,051 141,678 159,392

Non-Spanish 8,252 21,522 61,069 62,093 113,393 164,435

Born in Venezuela (total) 46,388 71,597 144,593 162,144 255,071 323,827

Source: INE, 2020a; INE, 2020b.

Venezuelan migration to Spain has grown spectacularly in the last

20 years. The number of Venezuelan nationals living in the country mul-

tiplied more than fteen fold, whereas the number of people in Spain

who had been born in Venezuela – irrespectively of nationality – grew

more than nine times. Both data sets display similar characteristics. The-

re was a peak of arrivals in 2003-2004, possibly as a result of insecurity

and anxiety caused by the failed coup d’etat in 2002 and the general strike

(2002-2003) in Venezuela. Numbers stagnated around 2013, most proba-

bly because of expectations of a change due to the terminal illness of

Hugo Chávez. Arrivals grew again in the second half of the 2010s, and

kept gathering speed by reason of an increasing necessity to leave Vene-

zuela (DEKOCKER, 2019, p. 293-336). Thus, the biggest growth can be

seen in the last column of Table 2, which refers to the years 2018-2019. It

was the Covid-19 pandemic that put an abrupt end to Venezuelan migra-

tion to Spain.

estudos internacionais • Belo Horizonte, ISSN 2317-773X, v. 9, n. 3, (set. 2021), p. 75-95

The time span of two decades allows for the observation of certain

tendencies. Sticking to the group of people born in Venezuela, it calls the

attention that the number of Spanish nationals had always exceeded tho-

se of the non-Spaniards, yet the dierence was getting smaller with the

passing of years and for the rst time, in 2019, the order changed, out of

the 323,827 Venezuela-born people registered in the padrón, 50.8% were

non-Spanish and 49.2% were Spanish nationals.

The data of the INE permits the investigation of the geographical

distribution of the Venezuelan inow (Table 3). Traditionally, the most

popular destinations were the Canary Islands and Galicia, since these had

been the most common places of origin. The descendants tended to go

back to where their ancestors had come from, possibly because they still

had some family ties or property there, and emotional reasons could also

play a part.

Table 3: Geographical distribution of Venezuelans in Spain (2013-2019)

2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019

Canary Islands 47,917 47,555 47,374 48,682 52,454 58,413 66,593

Catalonia 19,504 19,579 21,144 23,836 28,483 35,216 44,476

Galicia 21,454 21,171 21,214 22,179 24,396 28,165 33,717

Community of Madrid 31,160 30,654 33,536 39,301 49,191 66,421 90,254

Valencian Community 10,902 10,711 11,194 12,630 15,149 19,578 27,164

Source: INE, 2020.

Until very recently, that is, 2017, the most numerous group of Ve-

nezuelans in Spain could be found on the Canary Islands. It was only in

the last two years that Madrid took the lead. As the composition of migra-

tion coming from Venezuela changed, including an increasing number

of non-Spaniards, so did the preferences of settlement within Spain, as

people tended to choose places with more opportunity to work (PÁEZ;

PHELAN, 2018, p. 245), heading towards Catalonia, the Community of

Madrid, and the Valencian Community. Numbers in the latter case are

still relatively low, but this Community produced the biggest growth ra-

tio between 2018 and 2019.

Italy

According to the Council of Foreign Relations (CFR), approxima-

tely 50,000 Venezuelans lived in Italy as of 2017 (CARA LABRADOR,

2019). The data of the Italian Statistical Oce (ISTAT) with respect to

Venezuelan nationals – available between 2003 and 2019 on a yearly ba-

sis –, however, are much lower. An increasing tendency can be noted in

the last 15 years, with a temporary decrease in the rst half of the 2010s;

therefore, the results in 2011 (5,808) and 2016 (5,849) were almost identical

(ISTAT, 2020). A steep rise followed in the second half of the decade, and

numbers almost doubled between 2013 and 2019.

Mónika Szente-Varga, Amadea Bata-Balog Migração de retorno da Venezuela para a Europa: de volta às raízes?

Table 4: Venezuelan migration to Italy (2003-2019)

People residing in Italy 2003 2008 2013 2018 2019

Having Venezuelan naonality 3,388 5,219 5,138 7,347 9,185

Source: ISTAT, 2020.

Table 4 however displays only Venezuelan nationals. Therefore,

the arrival of people from Venezuela with Italian passports remains hi-

dden in the statistics above. This is the reason why there is such a big

dierence between the 2017 numbers (ISTAT: 6,327 vs. CFR: 50,000). The

most popular destinations within Italy are Lombardy and Lazio. Milan

and Rome are the homes of the most numerous Venezuelan communities

in the country.

Similarly to Spain, migration between Italy and Venezuela has had

historic antecedents, reaching back to the 19th century. Around 2,700 Ita-

lians settled in Venezuela in the 1800s, mostly in agricultural colonies,

and were later followed by other fellow countrymen. Nonetheless, the

overall number of Italians did not increase signicantly, possibly due to

the high ratio of returnees. According to the 1926 census, 3,009 Italians

were living in Venezuela. In 1941 numbers were almost the same (BER-

GLUND, 1994, p. 177-184). The biggest inux of Italians took place in the

second half of the 1940s and the decade of the 1950s, with the result that

121,733 Italians gured in the 1961 census, making up more than 20% of

the foreign population of the country (CUNILL GRAU, 1994, p. 160), ran-

king 2nd only after the Spanish. Return migration was frequent. Italians

did not need to wait till the end of the Franco or the Salazar regime, like

the Spanish and the Portuguese, and Italy was a founding member of

the European Economic Community, established by the Treaty of Rome.

Therefore, it is not so surprising that “the return rate, at least for Italians,

[has been] extraordinarily high” (BERGLUND, 1994, p. 206). In 2018, Ita-

lians numbered 142,817, making the Italian community in Venezuela the

11th biggest in the world and the 3rd in Latin America – after the ones in

Argentina and Brazil (STATISTA, 2018). In comparison, according to the

zuela in 2018 (INE, 2019). The numbers have been decreasing in both

cases due to moves to Europe.

Hungary

Hungarians are among the foreigners who have settled in Vene-

zuela, yet their numbers were much smaller compared to those of the

Spanish and the Italians, therefore called less attention. Arrivals were

sporadic both in the 19th century and also in the rst decades of the 20th

century. The number of Hungarians living in Latin America in the inter-

war period is estimated to have exceeded 150,000-180,000 (ANDERLE,

2010, p. 188), with a concentration in Brazil and Argentina. According to

the 1941 census, only 104 Hungarians lived in Venezuela (TORBÁGYI,

2004, p. 229). The rst major wave of Hungarian immigration reached

estudos internacionais • Belo Horizonte, ISSN 2317-773X, v. 9, n. 3, (set. 2021), p. 75-95

the Venezuelan shores after the Second World War (BANKO, 2016, p. 63-

75; SZONDY; SERES, 2011, p. 194-195). It comprised of about 4,000 peo-

ple with dierent political convictions and social backgrounds, including

those had collaborated with the far-right leadership in Hungary, others,

who had ed from the advance of the Soviet Red Army, and also those

who left because of the Sovietization and the formation of a one-party

system. By the end of the 1940s Hungary became part of the Socialist

bloc, which entailed the closing down of borders. The only time fron-

tiers opened up was during and immediately after the 1956 Revolution,

when approximately 200,000 people emigrated from the country. The

great majority did not get to Latin America, though. Following the oer

of the Venezuelan government to receive Hungarian refugees, around

1,000-1,500 arrived in the second half of the 1950s (TORBÁGYI, 2004, p.

238-241), forming the second and last wave of Hungarian immigration to

the country (KUNCKEL DIETRICHNÉ, 2005).

The attitude of Socialist Hungary was far from friendly towards

Hungarian emigrants living outside the national frontiers. It was illegal to

leave the country and those who already resided abroad, no matter why

they had left – 1956 Revolution, Second World War, or before, in the inter-

war period because of the growing antisemitism or due to their sympathies

towards the political left which were not welcome in the Horthy system –

were seen with suspicion. The fact that they did not return was treated as

kind of a proof that they did not like the actual political system. Therefore,

they were a “bad image” for Socialist Hungary. The leadership went as far

as to consider Hungarian emigrants as its enemies. Consequently, keeping

in touch with them was not advisable or feasible. All this meant that the

Hungarian community in Venezuela developed on its own for more than

30 years, without direct contact with Hungary. At its peak, at the beginning

of the 1960s, it could reach 4,000 in numbers (ANDERLE, 2010, p. 172).

Later, with the passing of years, its size got smaller, due to the lack

of new arrivals and some departures. The latter did not mean returnees to

Hungary, but people who went on to live in other countries on the Ame-

rican continent. Hungarians, in general had a successful socio-economic

integration into Venezuela, and various members of the community got

rather prosperous. They managed to organize an intensive and fruitful

community life, centred on Casa Húngara in Caracas, providing opportu-

nity for scouting, charity and other social events, practicing Hungarian

language and dances, etcetera (SOLTÉSZ, 2020, p. 385-397).

Links with Hungary were reconnected after the regime change in

1989/90. The peaceful transition improved the image of the country, whi-

ch became even more attractive after its accession to the European Union

in 2004. First-generation Hungarians, already in their seventies or older,

did not tend to move back, but some of their children and grandchildren

were interested. Due to the deterioration of local circumstances, the pos-

sibility to leave soon turned into a necessity.

The move of Hungarians and their descendants from Venezuela to

Hungary is almost invisible in statistics, therefore it will be reconstruc-

ted upon press sources. One of the rst references goes back to August

2017, when Zsolt Semjén Deputy Prime Minister of Hungary, at the awar-

Mónika Szente-Varga, Amadea Bata-Balog Migração de retorno da Venezuela para a Europa: de volta às raízes?

ding ceremony of the Prizes for Hungarians Abroad (Külhoni Magyarsá-

gért Díjak), highlighted one of the winners, the Hungarian community

in Venezuela, and commented upon its growing diculties, adding that

“Hungary was their home, and that they could come any time, with their

families, and even those who did not speak Hungarian, because Hungary

would give them all the support they needed” (HORVÁTH, 2017). Then

almost a year later the rst wave of related articles appeared due to events

which took place in the excited atmosphere of the April 2018 General

Elections in the quiet village of Balatonőszöd, where locals mistook the

Venezuelan-Hungarians residing temporarily in the resort of the Hun-

garian government for illegal (African) migrants and reported them to

the police. “A new panic related to migrants was about to erupt when it

turned out that ‘only’ Venezuelan Hungarians were moved to the gover-

nment resort in Balatonőszöd” reported Magyar Narancs (FÓNAI, 2018);

“Migrant panic in Balatonőszöd – locals feared Venezuelan Hungarians”

wrote another paper, the HVG (2018).

The reasons for this reaction can be traced back to 2015, when an

unprecedented inux of refugees and migrants arrived in the country from

the Middle East and Africa. Since the beginning the Hungarian government

did not agree with the EU crisis management tools and used a Sovereignist

approach: built a fence along the southern border, refused to create a hot

spot on its territory and to participate in the EU’s refugee quota system.

The political and social discourse on migration intensied following 2015.

Irregular migration was securitized, “immigrants […] have been called the

enemies of Hungary” (KOPPER et al., 2017, p. 109) and presented as a threat,

forming a recurrent element of ocial government communication.

The news on Venezuelan Hungarians did not make headlines for

long in the spring of 2018. The newcomers were soon taken to Budapest,

being more cosmopolitan and also oering more opportunities to work.

According to Lukács (2018), around 60 people arrived every month. It

took another 10 months that the issue got back to the radar of the press.

The Index informed its readers on 21st February 2019 that the Hun-

garian state had received in secret around 300 Venezuelan exiles of Hunga-

rian origins. They were provided with Hungarian passports, ight tickets;

a place to live in Hungary for a year free of charge; programs of integra-

tion, including Hungarian and English language courses, and the neces-

sary papers to be able to work (FÖLDES, 2019). Other press agencies joined

in writing about the topic (Origo, Magyar Nemzet, Demokrata, 444.hu).

Based upon their reports, it can be deduced that the move was organized

with the help of the Hungarian embassy in Quito, and the Hungarian Cha-

rity Service of the Orden of Malta founded at the end of the 1980s by Csil-

la Freifrau von Boeselager (1941-1994) – born as Csilla Fényes in Budapest

and raised in Venezuela after the emigration of her family. The rst bigger

group from Venezuela arrived in April 2018. By the beginning of March

2019, Hungarian news got international attention and the BBC published

an article titled Venezuela crisis: Secret escape to anti-migration Hungary. It says

that “about 350 [people] have already arrived on plane tickets funded by the

state. Another 750 are on a list, waiting in Caracas, and more may follow”

(THORPE, 2019). Some Hungarian news organs informed about the BBC

estudos internacionais • Belo Horizonte, ISSN 2317-773X, v. 9, n. 3, (set. 2021), p. 75-95

article (SARKADI, 2019; HVG, 2019). Besides that, there has been very little

information, upon insistence that the success of these moves depended on

their non-publicized nature and that Venezuelans of Hungarians origins

staying in Venezuela could be vulnerable to retaliations.

Factors of Integration

Due to the short span of time, it would be too early to evaluate whe-

ther the integration of Venezuelans in Spain, Italy, and Hungary has been

successful or not. Nonetheless, it is possible to make a summary of factors

that might hinder or promote integration. The following areas will be

examined: number and composition of those who arrive, remittances,

contact with the country of origin, language, and integration programs.

The number and composition of Venezuelans – with or without Eu-

ropean ancestors – who has settled in Europe, has changed considerably

over the years. From a relatively small number of highly qualied peo-

ple with nancial resources, the tendency has shifted towards a growing

volume of less qualied newcomers, with less or no savings (EGUREN;

ESTRADA, 2018, p. 340). Needless to say, their successful integration is

more complicated.

Remittances can be rather useful in assessing the scale of integra-

tion. Looking at tables 5 and 6, huge dierences call the attention bet-

ween amounts sent to and from Venezuela. The latter are much higher,

implying socio-economically well integrated Spanish, Italian, and Hun-

garian colonies in South America, and also their readiness to help family

members and friends in Europe. It is important to note that quantities did

not decrease after 2016, but on the contrary, tended to increase despite

the rampant economic crisis in Venezuela. Since this tendency coincides

with a growth in migration ows towards the studied European coun-

tries, it could be interpreted as a preparation for emigration.

Table 5. Remittances sent from Venezuela (in million USD)

Receiving country2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018

Spain 571 627 548 468 524 501 503 523 562

Italy 94 97 99 104 101 133 136 130 147

Hungary 333666667

Source: THE WORLD BANK, 2020.

Table 6. Remittances sent to Venezuela (in million USD)

Sending country 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018

Spain 45 43 40 29 27 25 69 72 66

Italy 2 2 2 9 9 8 22 23 19

Hungary 000000000

Source: THE WORLD BANK, 2020.

Mónika Szente-Varga, Amadea Bata-Balog Migração de retorno da Venezuela para a Europa: de volta às raízes?

Remittances from Spain and Italy to Venezuela have been modest,

yet quantities show a substantial growth between gures until and after

2015, possibly due to the increase in the number of arrivals and in the size

of the Venezuelan communities in Europe, coupled with the deteriora-

tion of the situation in Venezuela itself.

A great bulk of those who have left Venezuela for Europe, have Euro-

pean ancestry. The Spanish and Italian communities have been in constant

contact with the mother country, and movements back and forth were quite

common. There were of course periods when one direction was dominating,

such as during the Franco dictatorship in Spain, but ties were not completely

lost. On the contrary, Hungarians in Venezuela were cut from ocial Hun-

gary for more than 30 years, and even though contacts were retaken after

1990, the closing of the Hungarian embassy in Caracas in the middle of the

same decade made this rapprochement more complicated. The second and

third-generation mostly learnt about Hungary from their parents and gran-

dparents, who had emigrated in the 1940s and 1950s. Therefore, there might

be a considerable dierence between the image they have of Hungary and

the actual conditions. This kind of dierence could also exist among the Spa-

nish Venezuelans and the Italo-Venezuelans, but is much less, due to constant

new arrivals and more intensive relations with the countries of origin.

Language barrier is a considerable obstacle in case of Hungarian.

It is not only a non-Indo-European language – that is, it is not even dis-

tantly related to Spanish –, but it is also very dicult to learn. Language

and in general, cultural dierences are much bigger in case of Venezuela

and Hungary, than those related to the two other countries. This and the

above-mentioned factors all had a part in the decision to provide com-

prehensive integration programs in Hungary, including housing, work

permit, language courses, etcetera.

Yet integration in Spain or Italy is not easy either. It is not uncom-

mon to nd highly qualied professionals working in completely dierent

areas. The Covid-19 pandemic provided a glimpse into the magnitude of

this group in the area of health care. When it was approved in Italy via

the Decree Cura Italia, that people with foreign medical and related qua-

lications already residing in the country could join the struggle against

the disease, “150 doctors, 30 nurses and 20 biologists” volunteered from

the Venezuelan community (FRONTERA VIVA, 2020).

In all three countries there are factors which help and hinder suc-

cessful integration, therefore many Venezuelans face challenges that

they cannot themselves overcome. Government support and help within

the diaspora are essential. Yet Covid-19 pandemic can put serious obsta-

cles into the process of integration. The crisis, which is not only a health

crisis, but also a social, political and economic one, will result in dwin-

dling nancial resources and also in the rearrangement of priorities, all

of which will possibly negatively aect the sustainability of integration

programs and the intensity of government attention.

Final considerations

The exodus from Venezuela has tended to grow in size, in particu-

lar in the second half of the 2010s. Arrivals in Europe were much lower

than in Latin America, but adhered to the general tendency of growth

until the Covid-19 pandemic interrupted interoceanic migratory ows,

estudos internacionais • Belo Horizonte, ISSN 2317-773X, v. 9, n. 3, (set. 2021), p. 75-95

bringing a temporary halt. Migration from Venezuela to Europe did not

only change in volume over time, but also in composition. The migration

phenomenon examined in this article started out basically as a return

or root migration and has later increasingly incorporated primary mi-

gration ows. Even though people from the latter group lack Spanish,

Italian, or Hungarian parents or grandparents, they do rely on the alrea-

dy existing links between Venezuela and the above-mentioned countries

when planning their emigration and future life. Consequently, it is not an

exaggeration to use return migration to characterize the whole process.

Regarding the usual pendulum movement of the migration phe-

nomenon, though counter-ows have always existed, theoretical and

empirical attention has been given more concern to primary mobility

processes. Yet, return migration is a fascinating and signicant subject for

investigation, being one of the most interconnected types of migration,

“characterized by macro-social, meso-relational and micro-individual si-

tuations, in which returning can be the product of an individual choice,

due to political, economic, social and cultural pressures in relation to the

departure and arrival contexts” (CATAÑO et al., 2015, p. 104). In the case

of people leaving Venezuela, for some, arriving in Europe means a per-

manent move. “My father ed from Hungary at the age of 17, in 1956. I

was born in Venezuela. We have been talking a lot about how strange the

ways of destiny are, and that now I need to ee back to the place he was

coming from. This is a complete circle” (ERDÉLYI, 2019). For many, on

the contrary, the move to the old continent is only part of the migratory

process that will continue in the future with the change of circumstan-

ces. Re-migration to Venezuela, onward migration within the European

Union is just some of the possibilities.

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