151

Nir Boms, Kivanc Ulusoy Rival American Allies: Turkey and Israel in the Eastern Mediterranean

Rival American Allies: Turkey and Israel in

the Eastern Mediterranean

Aliados rivales de Estados Unidos: Turquía e Israel en el

Mediterráneo oriental

Aliados americanos rivais: Turquia e Israel no

Mediterrâneo Oriental

Nir Boms

Kivanc Ulusoy

DOI: 10.5752/P.2317-773X.2020v8.n4.p151

Received in: September 21, 2020

Accepted in: December 16, 2020

A

The contemporary dynamics between Israel and Turkey have been confronta-

tional at recent times though this doesn’t seem to aect the relations in other

areas as the trade balance advancing towards the $8 million shows. This article

focuses on the relations between Israel and Turkey within the context of the

East Mediterranean geopolitics. Reviewing its shift from a quasi-alliance to a sti

geopolitical rivalry in the region, the article explores scenarios for near future.

Keywords: Israel. Turkey. East Mediterranean geopolitics.

R

La dinámica contemporánea entre Israel y Turquía ha sido conictiva en los

últimos tiempos, aunque esto no parece afectar las relaciones en otras áreas, ya

que la balanza comercial avanza hacia los $ 8 millones. Este artículo se centra en

las relaciones entre Israel y Turquía en el contexto de la geopolítica del Mediter-

ráneo Oriental. Al revisar su cambio de una cuasi-alianza a una dura rivalidad

geopolítica en la región, el artículo explora escenarios para el futuro cercano.

Palabras clave: Israel. Turquia. Geopolítica del Mediterráneo Oriental.

R

A dinâmica contemporânea entre Israel e Turquia tem sido conituosa recen-

temente, embora isso não pareça afetar as relações em outras áreas, já que a

balança comercial está avançando para US $ 8 milhões. Este artigo enfoca as

relações entre Israel e a Turquia no contexto da geopolítica do Mediterrâneo

Oriental. Revendo sua mudança de uma quase aliança para uma rivalidade geo-

política rígida na região, o artigo explora cenários para um futuro próximo.

Palavras-chave: Israel. Turquia. Geopolítica do Mediterrâneo Oriental.

152

estudos internacionais • Belo Horizonte, ISSN 2317-773X, v. 8, n. 4, (dez. 2020), p. 151-165

Introduction

“Even if you gave me the gold of the world I would not accept.”

(OKE, 1982) answered Sultan Abdulhamid to the request of Theodor

Herzl, the founder of the Zionist movement oering 150 million pounds

of gold for the permission to settle in Palestine. “While I am alive I would

rather push a sword into my body than see the land of Palestine is tak-

en away from the Islamic State. This will never happen. I will not start

cutting our bodies while we are alive.” (THE DIARY OF THEODORE

HERZL, s/d) Nevertheless, following the meeting between Herzl and the

Sultan in 1901, Herzl was convinced that the hope for Palestine lies in

the Ottoman capitol. He issued a postcard featuring a picture of himself

and the Sultan with a Hebrew blessing above his head. Zionist leaders

like Ben Gurion and Yizhak Ben Zvi were convinced that Ottomanisa-

tion – giving up foreign citizenship and acting as Ottoman citizens– is

the preferred strategy for the Zionist movement. Convinced of this idea,

Ben Gurion even pursued a law degree in Turkey (ZOHAR, 1986). The

contemporary dynamics between Israel and Turkey have been confron-

tational at recent times though this doesn’t seem to aect the relations in

other areas as the trade balance advancing towards the $8 million shows.

(AYDOGAN, 2017) This article focuses on the relations between Israel

and Turkey within the context of the East Mediterranean geopolitics. Re-

viewing its shift from a quasi-alliance to a sti geopolitical rivalry in the

region, the article explores scenarios for near future.

A Fragile Friendship, 1949-1990

Becoming the rst Muslim country to do so, Turkey recognized

Israel in March 1949 and sent its Ambassador, Seyfullah Esin, as the chief

of mission to Tel Aviv in 1950. Being non-Arab allies to the West in the

Middle East, Israel and Turkey had common interests such as the wa-

ter conict with Syria. Israel, barely surviving it’s war of independence,

aimed to break its isolation in the midst of a hostile Arab environment in

the early years of the Cold War period. Turkey, joining NATO in 1952,

considered the relations with Israel as a balancing act against the Soviet

threat nding footholds in the Middle East and the Eastern Mediterra-

nean . Turkey signed the Baghdad Pact (1955) as a result of this obsession

with the Soviet threat. Despite seeing itself as an independent regional

player, Turkey understood the necessity to cooperate with Israel to con-

front with the emerging power balance in the region. However, it’s public

opinion could accept Israel’s conduct only to an extent. Hence it returned

its Ambassador to Ankara in 1958, as a response to the Sinai war when

Israel conspired with the UK and France against Egypt. It would do so a

number of additional times in the future.

The American relationship with Ankara and Tel-Aviv also had a di-

lemma from the start, as both countries had their own geopolitical inter-

ests. Their visions for the region occasionally conict with the Western

priorities. Instead of being America’s proxies in the Middle East, they have

searched for being its partners. Their relations have been sensitive to re-

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Nir Boms, Kivanc Ulusoy Rival American Allies: Turkey and Israel in the Eastern Mediterranean

gional power struggle during the Cold War (HALE, 2002). For instance,

the crisis of June 1964 when Turkey threatened to intervene in Cyprus to

prevent the intercommunal clashes between the Greek and Turkish Cy-

priots in the island was a watershed in relations. President Johnson sent a

letter to the Prime Minister Inonu on 5 June to prevent the intervention

and a possible war between Turkey and Greece. Stating that “adhesion to

NATO, in its very essence means that NATO countries will not wage war

on each other.”, the letter underlines “…a military intervention in Cyprus

by Turkey could lead to direct involvement by the Soviet Union” (PRESI-

DENT JOHNSON, 1964, p. 354). This letter the US conditioned Turkey’s

decision to diversify its relations, especially the sources of military equip-

ment in the coming decades (ULUSOY, 2016). Israel also needed military

assistance in its wars against Arab neighbors. The same administration de-

layed it until after election day in 1964 and in 1968 (LITTLE, 1993). Fearing

that acquiring atomic weapons would push Arab radicals into Moscow’s

line, the American administration expected Israel to drop its nuclear weap-

ons plan and act as conventional deterrent with American hardware. Until

the 1970’s Israel struggled to survive in wars with Arab states while Turkey

sought to build alliances in the region. The Cyprus issue left Turkey in

need to increase its friends to defend its case at the UN. Turkey sided with

Egypt in the 1967 war and participated the Organization of the Islamic

Conference in 1969. Disappointed with the American response to its case in

Cyprus, Turkey denied the US the use of its airbases to supply Israel in the

1973 war; allowed the Soviet jets to support Syria in the war; and deepened

economic relations to oset the eects of the American embargo after its

1974 intervention in Cyprus. Failing to secure aid from the West, Turkey

expanded its economic relations with the Gulf countries, Iraq and Iran.

The Golden Era (1990-2002)

The 1990’s marks the beginning of the golden era in Turkey-Israel

relations. Israel, condent in its military strength and alliance with the

US projected a positive atmosphere in the peace process with Palestinians

following the Madrid conference of 1991 (BERELOVICH, 2014). Turkey,

freed from the Cold War and now seeking to further position itself as

American ally had seen less obstacles in furthering the alliance with Is-

rael. Israel became a natural ally for Turkey facing with Syrian aid to

PKK, Iran’s policy of exporting its Islamic revolution- a threat to Turkey’s

secular regime- and the EU’s lukewarm attitude to membership. In need

of allies with common threat perceptions about Syria, Iran and Islamic

radicalism, Israel welcomed Turkey (UZER, 2013). Turkey has never lost

its desire to play a role in regional politics. The Oslo agreement was an

opportunity to expand inuence by playing a mediating role in the Pal-

estinian conict. Following the appointment of Ambassador to Israel and

a tourism agreement in 1992, Turkey and Israel signed a series of agree-

ments including a double-taxation and bilateral investment treaty, uni-

versity exchange and environmental cooperation (BERELOVICH, 2014).

The strategy was to deepen cooperation in low policy areas not to draw

reactions from the region.

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This positive atmosphere was cultivated by high-level visits between

the countries in the early 1990s during which the trade volume increased

from more than 90 million dollars in 1989 to more than 600 million dollars

in 1997. They signed military cooperation agreements including intelli-

gence-sharing and training. Israel gained access to the Turkish airspace for

training and the air force modernization. Already in 1992, the two nations’

defense ministers signed a document on cooperation followed by a mem-

orandum on mutual understanding and guidelines (1993), a Security and

Secrecy agreement (1994) and a military training and industry cooperation

agreement (1996). The deepening military relationship brought a biannual

dialogue mechanism in 1997. In 1998, the Israeli arms sales to Turkey since

the early 1990s reached to 1 billion dollars including 630 million dollars

deal in December 1996 to upgrade Turkey’s F4 Phantoms. This turned

Turkey into a market for Israeli defense industry and expanding the trade

volume to almost 2 billion dollars in 2000 (INBAR, 2001; LEVIN, 2000)

The military-strategic partnership lied at the core of expanding

relations between the two countries along the 1990s and the joint mari-

time maneuvers code-named Reliant Mermaid demonstrated the US sup-

port for the increasing Turkish-Israeli partnership (BISHKU, 2006). In the

1998 Syria-Turkey crisis over Syria’s support of the PKK, Turkey relied on

its relations with Israel, sharing information about the PKK’s activities

(OZCAN, 2011). With the end of the crisis on 20 October, Turkey coerced

Assad to agree to its terms. Turkey’s ability to impose its will on Syria was

the result of its military ties with Israel (MAKOVSKY, 1998). These com-

prehensive military agreements triggered reactions from the region. Iraq

and Egypt protested the Israeli-Turkish alignment as an anti-Arab part-

nership. Feeling encircled by Turkey and Israel, Syria tried to improve its

relations with Turkey through expelling the PKK leader Ocalan, nego-

tiating a provisional agreement about sharing the Euphrates’ water and

shelving the Hatay question

. Israel worked to prevent the confrontation

between Turkey and Syria, fearing that its peace talks with Syria regard-

ing the Golan Heights could be hampered.

The Turkish-Israeli alignment further beneted from the US bro-

kered Oslo process

. But, seeds of future conict were also in sight. Largely

disregarding the criticism of the regional states through its active participa-

tion in the peace process, Turkey aimed to increase its power and presence

in the Middle East through ties with Israel. Despite Turkey’s expectation

from Israel to confront challenges to its territorial integrity from Iraq and

Syria, their diverging perspectives towards the two key issues - the future

of Iraq and the Cyprus question- created a backlash in the relations. Isra-

el supported the status quo, defending the Kurdish autonomy within Iraq.

Turkey’s military relations with Israel worried Greece and Cyprus. When

Israeli F-16 ghters ventured in the Cypriot space in April 1998, Cypriot

media accused Israel of carrying reconnaissance ights for Turkey over the

island to photograph the S-300 anti-craft missiles purchased from Russia.

Immediately apologizing the incident, Israel did not want to be dragged

into another conict in the Eastern Mediterranean

. It followed a cautious

policy towards Greece, a member of the EU. Turkey similarly sought cor-

dial relations with Iran, considered as a primary enemy to Israel.

1. Ocalan was sheltered in Syria since

the early 1980s. The Hatay question

was the long-lasting border issue

between Turkey and Syria since its

foundation as an independent country in

the 1960s.

2. Turkey supported the process not only

with strong diplomatic moves such as

ﬁnancial contribution to the Palestinian

Authority, participating the Arms Control

and Regional Security Working Group of

the Madrid process in 1993 and joining

temporary international presence in

Hebron in 1997 but also with concrete

projects such as the large scale water

project, namely the peace pipeline to

transport the Turkish water to Syria,

Israel and Jordan.

3. Israel did not want the deterioration

of its relations with Cyprus which had

appointed ambassador to Tel-Aviv in

1993. Ekavi Athanassopoulou, Israeli-

-Turkish security ties: regional reactions,

(Jerusalem: The Harry S. Truman

Research Institute for the Advancement

of Peace, 2001), pp. 18-21.

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Nir Boms, Kivanc Ulusoy Rival American Allies: Turkey and Israel in the Eastern Mediterranean

A Period of Change (2002 – 2009)

Turkey’s relations with Israel were inuenced by regional politics

and domestic politics. Both changed in the 2000’s. Reshuing started in

the Middle East as a result of developments such as the September 11.

The changing American strategy towards the region coupled with the

collapse of the peace process and the second intifada (TOCCI; HUBER,

2013). Turkey’s politics began to change with the rise of of the political

Islam, further centering the Palestinian question. The questioning of sec-

ularism in domestic politics made dicult to sustain uniform identity in

foreign policy. Coming of the Justice and Development Party (AKP) to

power in 2002 with a “conservative” project quickly created a dierent

political tone and brought the questioning of Turkey’s strategic partner-

ship with Israel (AYATA, 2004). Accusing Israel of committing “genocide”

in Jenin in 2002, the Prime Minister Bülent Ecevit of the three-partite

coalition government -the Democratic Left Party (DSP); the Motherland

Party (ANAP) and the Nationalist Action Party (MHP)- was already a

sign of discomfort with close relations with Israel. In 2004, The AKP’s

head Tayyip Erdogan accused Israel of “state terrorism” due to killings

of 60 Palestinians in Gaza. Turkey’s pressure continued when Israel (and

the West) did not approve of Hamas’s victory in the Palestinian elections

in 2006. When Hamas took over the control over the Gaza strip, Erdo-

gan recognized the legitimacy of the isolated movement and invited its

leader-in-exile, Khaled Meshaal, to Ankara

. This was part of AKP’s long-

term strategy for intrusion in the regional politics. By raising the Pales-

tinian card like previously done by Syria, Iran and Egypt, Turkey found

a convenient way of intervening Middle Eastern aairs (DURAN, 2006).

There was still hope for a dierent path. Erdogan visited Israel in

May 2005, “oering to serve as a Middle East peace mediator and look-

ing to build on trade and military ties”. He told Prime Minister Sharon

that anti-Semitism was “a crime against humanity” (MYRE, 2005a). Er-

doğan and Sharon decided to establish a hotline for intelligence exchange

about security issues in addition to cooperation in areas from education

to commerce and science (MYRE, 2005b). In 2006, Turkey began to de-

velop a joint Israeli-Palestinian Industrial park. Israeli President Shimon

Peres and Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas addressed the Turkish

parliament a day apart in November 2007. Peres was the co-panelist of

Erdoğan, facing his harsh reactions at the Davos World Economic Forum

in January 2009

. This event was critical to consolidate Erdoğan’s power

in domestic politics and triggered a dierent perspective about Turkey’s

role in the Middle East on the eve of the Arab Spring

Before Davos, Turkey and Israel had advanced negotiations to con-

nect each other through ve pipelines transporting oil, natural gas, wa-

ter, electricity, and possibly ber optic cables through the Eastern Med-

iterranean. The Med-Stream project initiated in 2007 was followed by a

decision to construct an oil pipeline from Ceyhan to Ashkelon in 2008

(TURKISH…, 2008). They decided to enter deeper cooperation in defense

industry and intelligence sharing. Turkey barred Israel from the NATO

led military exercise, Anatolian Eagle, of October 2009. When asked to

4. Defending the electoral victory of Ha-

mas was a matter of political integrity

for Erdogan who portrayed the AKP as a

conservative democratic party and him-

self as its leader challenging the secular

status quo in a moderate way through

using democratic mechanisms.

5. Erdoğan, accusing Israel of crimes

against humanity during the Operation

Cast Lead and vowing that he would ne-

ver return to Davos, he stormed out the

debate on Israel’s Gaza offensive. See,

“Recep Erdogan storms out Davos after

clash with Israeli president over Gaza”,

The Guardian, 30 Januar 2009.

6. Receiving a hero’s welcome on his

return to Istanbul after accusing Israel

of “knowing very well how to kill” in Da-

vos, Erdogan’s prestige increased in the

Turkish public opinion. See, “Turkish PM

greeted by cheers after Israel debate

clash”, The Guardian, 30 January 2009

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comment about this decision, the foreign minister Ahmet Davutoglu,

linked it with the Gaza situation, noted that “we hope the situation in

Gaza will be improved, that the situation will be back to the diplomatic

track. And that will create a new atmosphere in Turkish-Israeli relations

as well.” (BORGER, 2009). In response, Israel moved to deepen its rela-

tions with Cyprus and Greece in regard to energy interests.

Deterioration of the Relations (2010 – 2020)

The past decade had seen deteriorating relations, a sharper turn

of policies and stronger hostile actions and rhetoric. A “reprimanded”

diplomatic meeting between the Deputy Foreign Minister Ayalon and

the Turkish Ambassador Oguz Çelikkol at the Israeli Foreign Ministry

was a prelude to a dicult decade to come. Reports from the meeting

done in public format reveled that Deputy Minister refused to shake the

Ambassador’s hand and made him sit on a lower chair during a meeting

at the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Aairs (ISRAEL…, 2020). This humili-

ation act opened a decade of confrontation. While Davos marked a turn

in relations, the Arab Spring was a watershed for already fragile alliance

(MAOZ, 2016). Turkey saw the wave of uprisings as an opportunity to

position itself as an inuential member of the international community.

This was in line with the foreign minister Davutoglu’s broader foreign

policy perspective of “strategic depth” going hand in hand with the dis-

course of “zero problems with neighbors” (YEŞİLTAŞ; BALCI, 2013). For

Davutoğlu, the Arab Spring provided a fertile ground for Turkey to be a

key foreign policy player. For this, Turkey had to cultivate ties not only

with the Middle Eastern states but also with other countries from the Bal-

kans to Black Sea and Caucasus where Turkey had historically important

relations due to the Ottoman past (YALVAC, 2012).

The Arab Spring found Turkey and Israel inevitably on opposite

sides. Ankara supported the anti-authoritarian drive of the Arab revolts

(KÖSE, 2013). Concerned with the instability that could possibly come out,

Jerusalem was more comfortable with cautious stance. Israel was encour-

aged by the pro-Western forces that appeared to have initially gain trac-

tion in Syria. In tandem to the AKP’s embrace of Islamic political identity,

Turkey encouraged the Islamist groups, such as Jabhat al-Nusra or Ahrar

al-Sham against the Asad regime (STARR, 2014). The ties with Islamists

groups including Hamas with active base in Turkey made relations with

Israel further fragile. The tensions faced another blow on 31 May 2010,

when the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) intercepted at international waters a

six-ship otilla including a Turkish vessel, namely Mavi Marmara, trying to

break the Gaza blockade. The IDF forces killed eight Turkish citizens and

one Turkish American on board. The Turkish passenger ship was carrying

humanitarian goods to Gaza under blockade by Israel and Egypt since

Hamas’ control of the Strip in 2007. The violence that the IDF soldiers

committed was widely condemned and the UN Security Council issued a

statement calling for a prompt, impartial, credible and transparent inqui-

ry. The Secretary General Ban Ki-moon urged Israel to lift the blockade.

Ankara immediately recalled its Ambassador from Tel Aviv in June 2010

7. The UN Human Rights Council report

issued in September 2010 underlined

that Israel’s military broke international

laws, that the action by commandos,

which left nine dead, was “dispropor-

tionate” and “betrayed an unacceptable

level of brutality”. Israel rejected the

report as “biased” and “one-sided”,

See, “Mavi Marmara: Why did Israel

stop the Gaza ﬂotilla?”, BBC News, 27

June 2016.

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Nir Boms, Kivanc Ulusoy Rival American Allies: Turkey and Israel in the Eastern Mediterranean

Turkey insisted on an apology from Israel, an international inves-

tigation on the otilla incident and the lifting of the blockade on Gaza.

Israel only accepted an international investigation and a marginal easing

of the blockade. The investigations about the incident most important of

which was the UN Palmer report issued in September 2011underlined the

excessive force that the IDF used but questioned the motivations of the

Turkish Humanitarian Relief Foundation (IHH), conrming the Israeli

reports of “organized and violent resistance from a group of passengers”.

The report accepted Israel’s blockade of Gaza as legal. In response, Turkey

expelled Israel’s ambassador. This growing rift did not prevent the two

countries to continue in bilateral relations in areas from economy to hu-

manitarian issues and logistics with companies entering bids in construc-

tion, mine clearing, pipeline building and diamond trade, the economic

relations between the two countries continued to grow

. Before the Mavi

Marmara crisis Israel’s imports from Turkey 154.7 million dollars in May

2010 and reached 210.7 million dollars in January 2013 (DANA, 2017).

While economic relations sustained, political relations continued

to deteriorate. Following Erdogan’s statement accusing Israel of the fall

of Egyptian President Mohamad Morsi in August 2013, Liberman com-

mented that “Erdogan is Nazi propagandist Goebbels’successor.” (KEN-

YON, 2013). Responding to a speech by Israeli Minister of Justice as

“Ayelet Shaked has same mindset as Hitler,” Erdogan underlined that the

ties with Israel will not be normalized as long as Israel continues to “kill

innocent children and continue its operations in Gaza.” (LAHAV, 2014).

In 2019, addressing senior ocials from its party in June, Erdogan stat-

ed that “whoever is on the side of Israel, let everyone know that we are

against them.” (STAFF, 2019). Responding to Israeli Minister of Foreign

Aairs who ordered his ministry to adopt measures to “stop Turkey’s in-

citement and subversion in East Jerusalem”, the Turkish Foreign Ministry

commented that Turkey “will never give up supporting our Palestinian

brothers and sisters in East Jerusalem, capital of Palestine under occupa-

tion and defending the Palestinian cause.” (UGURLU, 2019). In December

2019, Adnan Tanrıverdi, the retired army general and the chief advisor to

Erdogan, stated that “the Islamic world should prepare an army for Pal-

estine from outside Palestine.”

Commenting on Israel’s annexation bid,

further deteriorating the relations, the Foreign Minister Çavuşoglu said

that “Israel, encouraged by the support of certain countries, is continuing

its aggressive policies that are turning it into a racist, apartheid regime

(KALNINS, 2019).

A new area of tension emerged with the East-Med project, an un-

derwater pipeline that would transport natural gas from the Eastern Med-

iterranean to Europe. The proposed 1,180-mile undersea pipeline would

be able to transfer up to 12 billion cubic meters a year from oshore gas

reserves between Israel and Cyprus to Greece, and then onto other coun-

tries in southeast Europe. An agreement between Israel, Greece and Cy-

prus was signed in January of 2020 and ratied later that year much to the

shagreen of Turkey (DEVECE, 2020). For Israel, the construction of the

pipeline could oer great economic advantage, on top of security benets

and a strong alliance with the partnering countrie. For Turkey, the deal is

8. “Israeli ﬁrms in Turkey border mine

clearing bids”, www.globes.co.il, 2

June 2009; “At least 10 ﬁrms bid for

Israel-Turkey gas pipeline: Report”, Hur-

riyet Daily News, 25 March 2014; “The

Turks Are Back, and They’re Building

Half of Tel Aviv’s Towers”, Haaretz, 29

April 2016; “Israel Gives Green Light to

Six Foreign Construction Companies”,

Haaretz, 26 October 2016; “Turkish,

Israeli companies engage in big

diamond trade”, Hurriyet Daily News, 18

September 2017;

9. Retired Turkish general Adnan Tanrı-

verdi is founder of Turkish security ﬁrm

SADAT International Defense Consul-

ting[1]and has been a chief advisor to

Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan

since August 2016. See, MEMRI, “Chief

Advisor To Turkish President Erdoğan:

‘The Islamic World Should Prepare

An Army For Palestine From Outside

Palestine,” in Special Dispatch 8389, 2

December 2019.

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perceived as a threat to its core national interests including it’s own explo-

ration in the area. It was considered as a threat to a recently signed deal

with Libya, delimitating maritime jurisdictions in the Mediterranean Sea

(BASSIST, 2020). As a cumulative eect of more than a decade of deep-

ening tensions, in 2020 -and for the very rst time- the annual threat as-

sessment of Israel’s army addedTurkey’s policies in the region to its list of

challenges (GROSS, 2020).

Although AKP’s actions and rhetoric toward Israel was negative and

uniform dissenting voices could still be observed in the Turkey. Just days

following the Marmara event, Fethullah Gülen, a chief opponent to Erdo-

gan and controversial U.S. resident who is considered Turkey’s most inu-

ential religious leader, criticized a Turkish-led otilla for trying to deliver

aid without Israel’s consent. He commented that the “failure to seek accord

with Israel before attempting to deliver aid was a sign of defying authority,

and will not lead to fruitful matters.” (LAURIA, 2010). Gülen is a foremost

critic and opponent of Erdogan. In fact, otherwise his positions on Israel

would not necessarily dier (JAFFE-HOFFMAN, 2020). Commenting on

the aair, Ali Aslan from Today’s Zaman (Gulen aliate) criticized the Flo-

tilla initiative as it did not help the objective of “zero problems with neigh-

bors” policy”. It would also hurt the peace process itself (ASLAN, 2010).

Another dissenting voice, though controversial and less main stream, was

a TV televangelist Adnan Oktar

. Oktar was known to host Israelis and

feature Israeli perspectives on his television shows and express very dis-

senting views. He said “3-5 people may strain the relations with Israel but

we are 70 million, on the other side Israel has millions of people… I don’t

see any problem between us. So we don’t have any tension, …bunch of

individual’s feud (referring diplomatic tension) is not our concern… who-

ever drops atom bomb on Israel, we will make their life unbearable”

Oktar and his inner circle ring were arrested in 2018 (TURKISH, 2018).

Other opposition voices to Erdogan- like that of Ali Babacan (former depu-

ty prime minister) and Abdullah Gul (former president) were both former

AKP members. They have expressed dierent voices when it came to Is-

rael. Babacan, during his foreign ministry term, while criticizing, some-

times condemning Israeli actions on Palestinian issue was likewise criti-

cizing Hamas by saying “Hamas should decide, terror or politics? We’re in

favor of politics.”The Former President Gul, though not publicly portray-

ing his dierent opinions with Erdogan during his oce term, appeared

to convey somewhat dierent views behind the closed doors as reveled

by WikiLeaks expressing “understanding of Israel’s need to take action

against terrorist attacks” (WIKILEAKS, 2009). While most of these voices

can be framed mainly as opposition to Erdogan, they still point to a more

pragmatic camp seeking to see a more constructive relations with Israel.

The Arab Spring and the Syrian War – an opportunity to Pivot?

The Syrian civil war became another point of contention between

two countries. Defectors from the Syrian army trained in Turkey paved

the way for the creation of the Free Syrian Army (FSA), also supported by the

West. As the conict progressed, Turkey, along with Qatar, preferred Isla-

10. Adnan Oktar was a TV preacher per-

ceived as a cult leader known for giving

televised sermons surrounded by young

women he refers to as his “kittens”.

11. Press event with Oktar and Religious

leaders, İsrail’e kim atom bombası

atarsa Gökkubbeyi başına geçiririz,

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FH-

Dp03jUadk

159

Nir Boms, Kivanc Ulusoy Rival American Allies: Turkey and Israel in the Eastern Mediterranean

mists rebellion factions such as Hayaat Tahrir Al-Shaam based in Northern

Syria (HASSAN, 2017). Turkey emerged as unique in its decision to per-

mit foreign and opposition ghters (as well as its own citizens) to cross its

southern border into the Syrian battleeld (STARR, 2014). While Turkey’s

actions in northern Syria had little direct inuence on Israel, the moves

which brought Islamist inuence to Syria and helped to set an Islamist tone

to the rebellion, appeared worrisome to Israel who sought to strengthen

the moderate rebels and limit the inuence of Islamists operating across

its own borders as well under its “good neighbor” program (BOMS, 2018).

Israel’s traditional support to the Kurds in the region became anoth-

er course of tension with Turkey. Following Turkey’s Peace Spring oper-

ation in November 2019, Israel’s Prime Minister Netanyahu was quick to

denounce, warning an “ethnic cleansing” and oering humanitarian aid

to the Kurds

. The issue was widely covered in Israeli media and triggered

additional statements like that of Ministry of Strategic Aairs saying Er-

dogan is “anti-Semitic racist who supports terrorism – slaughter the Kurds

without us making a moral voice heard and calling on the world to stop

it. We can’t stay indierent on this.” (ADNAN, 2019). Israel was surprised

by the American decision to withdraw forces from Syria and could push

the American President Trump to change course. Although Israel did not

maintain deep relations with the Syrian Kurds, it assisted Kurds in Iraq and,

overall, perceived them as a moderate ally for its geopolitical maneuvers in

the region. For Israel, the Turkish moves to capture territories in northern

Syria were actual evidence of not only Erdogan’s regional ambitions but

also his strategy of empowering actor’s hostile to Israel (GROSS, 2020).

However, the download spiral of relations was not constant and

saw a number of attempts to set relations back at a cordial course. The

rst sign of improvement came in 2013, when Israel resumed the sale of

electronic warfare systems to Turkey (LAPPIN, 2013). Frozen following

the Mavi Marmara incident, the original deal worth 200 million dollars

involved Israel’s ELTA Systems Ltd., a subsidiary of Israel Aerospace In-

dustries, delivering electronic systems for four Turkish Airborne Warn-

ing and Control Systems (AWAC) aircraft. This was followed by Israel’s

agreement to transfer materials from Turkey to Gaza to build a new hos-

pital in February 2013 (BAR’EL, 2013). Despite deepening of relations,

the Mavi Marmara deadlock and dierent perceptions that each side had

about the regional developments after the Arab Spring prevented a break-

through. That began to change when the civil wars in Libya and Syria re-

quired American involvement. The US, intensifying the P5+1 negotiation

with Tehran on its nuclear le through talks in Istanbul and a high level

meeting in Kazakhstan, needed its two key regional allies to cooperate

with each other and pushed Israel to oer an apology to Turkey.

Netanyahu placed a call to Erdogan while closeted with Obama in a

trailer on the tarmac at Ben Gurion airport before a departure to Jordan.

Obama joined the call at one point. The American expectation was that

the improvement of relations between Israel and Turkey would be a pre-

cursor to a renewed peace talks between Israel and the Palestinians, espe-

cially on territorial issues. This would also be a positive step leading to co-

operation on other key issues such as the Syrian conict (SHERWOOD;

12. Benjamin Netanyahu (tweet) “Israel

strongly condemns the Turkish invasion

of the Kurdish areas in Syria and warns

against the ethnic cleansing of the

Kurds by Turkey and its proxies. Israel is

prepared to extend humanitarian assis-

tance to the gallant Kurdish people” in

Tweeter, 10 October 2019.

160

estudos internacionais • Belo Horizonte, ISSN 2317-773X, v. 8, n. 4, (dez. 2020), p. 151-165

MACASKIL, 2013). The Obama administration underlined its displeasure

at the Turkish-Israeli crisis despite eorts for reconciliation. Incidents like

Erdogan’s widely echoed statement regarding Zionism being a “crime

against humanity” at a UN Summit made the Obama administration’s

task dicult as it triggers criticisms from the US Congress attempting to

derail what the president saw as urgent, the cooperation over Syria where

Turkey expected more American engagement (ISRAEL…, 2013).

Slightly more than a month after to the Israeli apology in May 2013,

Erdogan visited Washington and raised many issues from the civil war in

Syria to the relations with Iran and the burning situation in Iraq (BALCI,

2013; GÜRSEL, 2013). Obama pressurized Erdogan to ease tension with

Iraq as Ankara’s direct oil trade with Erbil provoked Baghdad’s reactions

considering this as a violation of the constitution

. Disapproving Ankara’s

direct contacts to Erbil, Obama was concerned that it might jeopardize Iraqi

unity with Baghdad getting closer to Iran. The meeting between Erdogan

and Obama provided a roadmap to deal with the Syrian conict. Agreeing

to endorse the Geneva initiative, Turkey decided to increase its support to

the opposition, pressurizing Assad with sanctions and closing the door for

open-ended negotiations. Seeking a timetable for the transition period for a

new government, Turkey and the US decided about a cease re monitored

by international organizations, documenting the regime’s human rights

violations. Both Erdogan and Obama were against Assad to have power in

the transition government. They wanted Syrian refugees to go back. The

improvement in Turkey-US relations continued with the US Secretary of

State John Kerry’s visit on 12 September 2014. Kerry stated Turkey’s role in

the peace process and it’s links to Hamas as a key asset.

The US pressures and the regional problems paved the way for a

breakthrough between Turkey and Israel. The lack of a serious dialogue

left them isolated facing with regional geopolitical and humanitarian

problems. Israel needed a regional ally to support its policies towards Iran

and against radical groups. Israel’s pressures on Iran could become more

credible with Turkey’s support through permitting again to use airspace.

In regard to the Palestinian issue, Netanyahu’s policies, perceived as an

attempt to consolidate the Israeli grip on the occupied territories, derived

reactions from the EU countries. Therefore, reconciliation with Turkey,

a valuable goal in itself, would help Netanyahu to correct its relations

with Obama with whom he had tense relations. For Turkey, reconcilia-

tion with Israel would have both regional and transatlantic implications.

Ankara aimed to regain its role as a mediator once provided a leverage

over Syria and Israel in the talks on the Golan Heights in December 2008.

The deterioration of the relations with Israel prevented Turkey to play

a mediating role between Israel and Hamas during the Pillar of Defense

strike on Gaza in December 2012 (ALTUNIŞIK; ÇUHADAR, 2010).

Reconciliation with Israel became crucial after the military takeover

in Egypt on 3 July 2013. Egypt tried to block almost all mediating eorts

by Turkey between Israel and Hamas. It blocked the American attempts

to relaunch the peace process due to Turkey’s support of the Morsi govern-

ment and criticism of the coup by General Sisi (YEGIN, 2016). However,

an unexpected economic factor came into place. The Syrian war resulted

13. The Iraqi constitution stipulates

that all oil trade agreements must be

approved by the central government

161

Nir Boms, Kivanc Ulusoy Rival American Allies: Turkey and Israel in the Eastern Mediterranean

in the closure of many trade routes as Syria became unsafe for trucks. Tur-

key and Israel found themselves in an important juncture, enabling thou-

sands of trucks to cross from Europe to Turkey – from Istanbul by sea to

Haifa – and further via the Sheikh Hussein Bridge, to Jordan and beyond.

Over 10,000 trucks had crossed in 2014 (RABINOVITCH; COHEN , 2014)

with an average of 30-40 trucks a week in the subsequent years (PERETZ,

2018). Furthermore, the Open Skies policy, coming into eect in 2021, in-

centivized many Israelis to use Turkey as a travel hub and a tourist des-

tination. In 2012, before Open Skies went into eect, 686 thousand people

traveled to Turkey from Israel on 4,706 ights. In 2017, nearly 2 million did

on 12,400 ights (PERETZ, 2018). This signicant volume, decreasing in

times of political tensions, remained an incentive to keep relations intact.

Conclusion

This article reviews the relations between Israel and Turkey. Cur-

rently captured at a very low point, the relations continuously deteriorated

over the past two decades. During this period Turkey has been governed

by the AKP led by Erdogan and Israel has been governed by governments

led by Netanyahu. Some argue that the uncompromising character of the

leaders played a signicant role in the deterioration of relations. However,

with harsh rhetoric, confrontational actions, active support of enemy fac-

tions by both sides (Hamas, the Islamists by Turkey / FSA and the Kurds

by Israel), it might be surprising to observe that some key fundamentals.

Diplomatic relations, growing trade relations, limited security coopera-

tion and a very high volume of business and tourism are still maintained

despite the complex character of relations particularly aected by the geo-

political rivalry in the Middle East and the Eastern Mediterranean. As

underlined above, since 1948 and throughout the 20

century, the Israeli

Turkish relations rested on a few pillars: their secular, “non-Arab” identi-

ty; a strong Western alliance; common enemies and security cooperation.

Growing trade and tourism relations cemented these pillars and lasted a

number of crisis points. The bilateral relations had their own slopes and

turning points. Despite its secular identity Turkey saw itself as a Mus-

lim county and maintained active membership in international Muslim

forums. It could not ignore major events like the 1956 Sinai campaign,

the events of 1967 or of 1973. Nevertheless, shared interests in relations

reached a climax in the 1990’s in parallel to the growing optimism sur-

rounding the Israeli-Palestinian and Israeli-Jordanian peace process.

The relations began to deteriorate in 2002, especially following

the rise of the AKP aiming to change the Turkish geopolitical outlook.

Turkey’s gravitation toward more Islamists agendas and partners, its re-

newed activities in Jerusalem on the Palestinian le and its positions on

key issues such as Iran and terrorism have deepened a path of confronta-

tion with Israel who began to get closer with moderate Arab states and

intensify its campaign against Iran and the Muslim Brothers. Only fewer

commonalties are now shared between the two countries and those – like

the mediated limited collaboration on the Syrian front – were triggered

by foreign players (the American inuence on Israel and on Turkey as a

162

estudos internacionais • Belo Horizonte, ISSN 2317-773X, v. 8, n. 4, (dez. 2020), p. 151-165

NATO member). The remining pillars: trade, limited security coopera-

tion and tourism (which diminished to nothing during the Covid period)

are limited in scope but nevertheless signicant and helped, for example,

Turkey to be one of the very rst countries to renew ight to Israel on

July 1

, 2020 (RAZ-CHAIMOVICH, 2020). The trajectory of deteriorat-

ing relations appears to hold at the end of 2020 as Turkey appears to fur-

ther distance itself from the EU and NATO (including a confrontation

with France navy) (IRISH, 2020) in parallel to its increasing involvement

in Libya. The noticeable turning of the Hagia Sophia to an active Masque

already drew parallels in Israel. Erdogan tweeted that “the revival of Ha-

gia Sophia announces the restoration of freedom to Al Aksa” and trig-

gered headlines like “After Hagia Sophia, Erdogan points to the Temple

Mount.” (INET, 2020) This trajectory will likely not change as long as

long as Erdogan remains in power. However, the opposition to AKP and

the alternative direction it oers regrading both, domestic and foreign

policy may inuence a changing course in the future.

163

Nir Boms, Kivanc Ulusoy Rival American Allies: Turkey and Israel in the Eastern Mediterranean

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