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Turkish-Ottoman relations with Latin
America: a journey through the time
capsule
Las relaciones turco-otomanas con América Latina: un
recorrido a través de las cápsulas del tiempo
Relações turco-otomanas com a América Latina: uma
viagem pelas cápsulas do tempo
Ruben Paredes
DOI: 10.5752/P.2317-773X.2020v8.n4.p188
Received in: September 21, 2020
Accepted in: January 29, 2020
AbstrAct
In this article we propose to address the opening of three Time Capsules to re-
construct three clearly identiable contexts, each providing information for the
analysis of what international relations between the Ottoman Empire/Turkey
with Latin America have been like. In this way, we seek to analyze the content
of the links through the density of the macro-relationships that developed over
time, in order to make a cognitive map of the state of situation, taking into
account not only the interests of the actors but also the endogenous and exog-
enous conditions. In that line are raised three contexts of opening the Capsules
of Time. The rst in 1923, when the Empire died and the Republic of Turkey
was born; the second at the end of the 20th century; and the third in 2019, span-
ning almost the rst two decades of the 21st century.
Keywords: Ottoman Empire. Turkey. Relations. Latin America.
R
En el presente artículo proponemos abordar la apertura de tres Capsulas del Ti-
empo para reconstruir tres contextos claramente identicables, cada uno de ellos
brindando información para el análisis de cómo han sido las relaciones interna-
cionales entre el Imperio Otomano/Turquía con América Latina. De ese modo,
buscamos analizar el contenido de los vínculos a través de la densidad de las
macro-relaciones que se desarrollaron en el tiempo, con el n de realizar un mapa
cognitivo del estado de situación, atendiendo no solo a los intereses de los actores
sino también a los condicionantes endógenos y exógenos. En esa línea se plantean
tres contextos de apertura de las Capsulas del Tiempo. El primero en 1923, cuan-
do muere el Imperio y nace la República de Turquía; el segundo a nes del siglo
XX; y el tercero en 2019, abarcando casi las dos primeras décadas del siglo XXI.
Palabras clave: Imperio Otomano. Turquía. Relaciones. América Latina.
189
Ruben Pared Turkish-Ooman relaons with Lan America: a journey through the me capsule
R
Neste artigo propomos abordar a abertura de três Cápsulas do Tempo para
reconstruir três contextos claramente identicáveis, cada um fornecendo
informações para a análise de como têm sido as relações internacionais entre
o Império Otomano/Turquia com a América Latina. Dessa forma, buscamos
analisar o conteúdo dos elos através da densidade das macro-relações que se
desenvolveram ao longo do tempo, a m de fazer um mapa cognitivo do estado
de situação, levando em conta não apenas os interesses dos atores, mas também
as condições endógenas e exógenas. Nessa linha são levantados três contextos
de abertura das Cápsulas do Tempo. A primeira em 1923, quando o Império
morreu e a República da Turquia nasceu; o segundo no nal do século XX; e a
terceira em 2019, abrangendo quase as duas primeiras décadas do século XXI.
Palavras-chave: Império Otomano. Turquia. Relações. América Latina.
Introduction
In the 21st century there was a strong interest in diversifying and
deepening external relations between the Republic of Turkey and Latin
America through several specic initiatives. However, the links between
the two actors are not recent and can be studied in line with dierent
regional and international contexts over time.
Precisely, to understand what the international relations between
the two actors have been, we propose to make a novel approach, not far
from the current reality that we have to live, where streaming has changed
the way we consume audiovisual services, among other issues the pop-
ular TV series. In this sense, a three-season lag can be raised to analyze
from a perspective of International Relations what the link between two
actors from distant regions that make up the international system has
been like. On the one hand, the then Ottoman Empire (later Republic of
Turkey) and on the other, the region of Latin America.
The script that is proposed for each of the seasons is the opening of
three Time Capsules - recalling the Westinghouse idea - that were bur-
ied with the idea of them opening at a certain date and thus providing
knowledge about the historical context analyzed. The Time Capsules
were created by Westinghouse and were presented at the World Exhibi-
tion of New York as part of their exhibition. The rst measured 2.28 me-
ters, weighed 363 kg, and had an inner diameter of 16 centimeters with
a nickel and silver alloy, harder than steel. At rst it was sought to bury
them with the aim that they are open in the future, but given the devel-
opment of the technology, they were also placed in space. Inside, varied
articles such as books, diverse objects and brochures were kept that were
intended to provide knowledge to all of humanity about a context of his-
tory when they were opened.
In this article we propose to address the opening of three Time
Capsules to reconstruct three clearly identiable contexts, each providing
information and tools for the analysis of what international relations be-
tween the Ottoman Empire/Turkey have been like with Latin America.
In this way, we seek to analyze the content of the links through the densi-
ty of the macro-relationships that developed over time, in order to make
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a cognitive map of the state of situation, taking into account not only the
interests of the actors but also the endogenous and exogenous conditions.
According to Carlos Escudé, from a theoretical-methodological perspec-
tive, the global macro-relationship comprises the broad political frame-
work on which a bilateral relationship is based and translates into expres-
sions and actions of governments in the political-diplomatic dimension
that make it possible to move forward on micro-relations. The dimension
of the global macro-relationship is the one that sets – to a greater extent –
the rules of the game of linkage. For their part, micro-relations are articu-
lated around a plurality of specic problems which oversee a multiplicity
of individual, public, and private actors – state agencies, the business sec-
torial and investment groups (ESCUDÉ, 1991). In this work, we will focus
on the content of macro-relations between Turkey and Latin America. In
this line, three contexts of opening the capsules of time are raised. The
rst in 1923, when the Empire died and the Republic of Turkey was born;
the second at the end of the 20th century; and the third in 2019, spanning
almost the rst two decades of the 21st century.
The Ottoman Empire’s ties to Latin America until 1923
With the opening of the rst capsule in 1923, we can understand
what the path of international relations between the Ottoman Empire
and Latin America was like in the context, events, and interests of these
actors. That is why it is important to start with the inuence of exoge-
nous conditions.
The Ottoman Empire had about 600 years of life and expanded
throughout the Middle East and North Africa (MENA), reaching to the
gates of Austria in 1683, passing before the Balkans, and reaching the
borders of Crimea. As Turk rightly argues: “The Turkish people played a
very important role in the history of mankind because it formed 16 great
empires such as the Huns, the Heavenly Turks, Ottoman Selyuquis and
nally the Turkish Republic” (TURK, 2010, p. 2). But above all, the West’s
contact with the East through the Ottoman Empire redened the borders
of the long-known world, with the construction of identities in relational
terms, emphasizing otherness (i.e. Christian Europe versus Islamic Otto-
man imperial political unity).
For this reason, the importance of the latter as a reference point
cannot be overlooked, since the “Turkish” has been present in the change
of eras that marked the development of universal history. That is to say,
“The Turks have opened and closed eras, with the fall of the Western
Roman Empire in the 5th century by the Huns (Ancient Age) and with
the fall of the Byzantine Empire in the fteenth century by the Ottomans
(Middle Ages). Anatolia, present-day Turkey, is arguably the cradle of
Eastern and Western civilization, which for centuries inhabited that land
and left their legacies, footprints and teachings for humanity” (TURK,
2010, p. 2).
It is worth mentioning that Madrid and Istanbul, both heads of
vast empires that contested the dominance of the Mediterranean in the
sixteenth century, ignored each other in the last centuries (VALLEJO
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Ruben Pared Turkish-Ooman relaons with Lan America: a journey through the me capsule
FERNÁNDEZ CELA, 2010). Only at the end of the eighteenth century,
both empires will have a rapprochement, coinciding with the twilight of
one and the decay of the other. The signing of the Treaty of Peace, Friend-
ship and Trade between Spain and the Ottoman Empire of 14 September
1782, sealed by King Charles III and Sultan Abd-lhami I (1774-1789) ended
more than two centuries of hostilities (VALLEJO FERNÁNDEZ CELA,
2001, p. 20). Until then, the contacts were non-existent. This explains why
there was no “strong orientalist current in Spain” compared to France
and Britain whose interests were in reaching a portion of territory of the
vast Ottoman Empire.
This situation gave account of an atmospheric imperialism, where
another active actor was added in the international reconguration as was
the Empire of the Tsars, with territorial pretensions over the Ottoman
Empire. However, it should not be overlooked that with the beginning
of the renaissance and religious reform in Europe, together with the new
technologies that allowed invention and innovation in the development
of capitalism, coupled with the system of post-Congress power of Vienna
of 1815, were gradually aecting the Ottoman State. This process intensi-
ed in the 19th century, forcing the Ottomans to make several attempts
at reforms known as Tanzimat in the political, economic, and military
dimensions- to introduce Modernity and modernization into the empire.
Despite this, the secret diplomacy, and interests of much of the
powers of the pentarchy were conditioning the future of the Ottoman
Empire with territorial losses, which were exacerbated by World War I.
At the time, the so-called “sick man of Europe” was a euphemism that
made him part of a continent that saw him not as his own but as a strang-
er, another threatening and agonizing of the virus of European fever in-
tended to distribute the territories.
World War I had a devastating eect on the Ottoman Empire. This
produced a signicant geopolitical design where the problems that exist
today in the MENA region have their origin, precisely, in the decisions
made by the winning powers.
As Mehmet Necati Kutlu rightly submits, “in this geopolitical con-
text of dispute over the Ottoman territory the tactic of fragmentation of
many peoples was applied, where separatism and segregation were en-
couraged from the outside” (EQUILIBRIUM GLOBAL, 2018).
For this reason, the disintegration of the Ottoman Empire through-
out the 19th century is marked by several stages, in which reformist at-
tempts by sultans and rulers are preceded by increasing European pene-
tration in all areas. The culmination of the latter was the secret Sykes-Pi-
cot agreement sealing the fate of the Ottoman Empire as a multi-ethnic
and multinational unit and which started the path towards the formation
of the Republic of Turkey.
In this context, endogenous conditions have also been present. In
the nineteenth century, Latin America undertook the process of decolo-
nization of the Spanish Bourbon crown in 1810, with the May Revolution
of the Viceroyalty of the Río de la Plata generating a contagion eect
on the captaincy of Chile and Venezuela but also on the jewels of the
Spanish empire, the Viceroyalty of Upper Peru and New Spain (Mexico).
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For much of the 19th century we will attend wars of independence, civil
wars, secessionisms and a “long wait” for the formation of modern states.
It was only in the last quarter of a century, once consolidated and inserted
into the model of capitalism of laissez-faire- laissez-passer as commodity
exporting economies, only some of the Latin American states undertook
formal contact with the Ottoman Empire.
During this period, the Ottoman Empire also undertook a number
of reforms for example: “The reform of education that paved the way for
European-style opening in engineering, military schools, public admin-
istration is the second stage of this important policy change. In addition,
the Empire sent dozens of young students to be training programs in
Western Europe to create a new generation of skilled civil bureaucrats for
the state. Interestingly, the students returned with a liberal and critical
thought of the Ottoman system, in addition, with the intention of carry-
ing out a coup” (TURK, 2010, p. 3).
Undoubtedly, the profound changes that went through the empire
were the economic ones, which impacted the social structure. The pro-
cess of shifting from a traditional economy to a capitalism dependent on
the export of raw materials was preceded by“a long period (1792-1853)
during which epidemics and wars, economic stagnation, and demograph-
ic decay had been the salient features of the Ottomans’ world. The de-
crease in population, especially of Anatolia and Rumili, was so severe
that the government sought to attract immigrants from Europe by oer-
ing incentives such as tax exemptions” (KARPAT, 1985:177).
The attraction of migrants from the Caucasus, the Balkans and Crimea
to counteract the demographic decline led to a re-islamization of the empire’s
population to the detriment of the multinational and multiethnic nature of
the empire. Until then, the legitimacy of the state was based on the idea of
fair order and Islam was an important element in terms of regulating state
aairs, however, the reforms introduced had other eects (TURK ,2010).
According to Karpat, the economic situation worsened: “Some oth-
er particular causes of economic dislocation for certain groups were the
destruction of the major part of the vineyards by phylloxera; the opening
of the Suez Canal, which caused the trade routes to shift southward; and
the collapse of the silk industry due to a disease that killed the local worms
over the period from 1875 to 1885 and made it necessary to buy silkworm
eggs from France and ship the cocoons there” (KARPAT, 1985, p.178).
The consequence of all this led to the emigration of many citizens
of the empire in search of better living conditions, which initiated an
unthinkable bond until then with Latin America. Whether as Ottoman
citizens or simply Turks, the arrival of dierent communities generated
a diaspora that will turn its Ottoman identity to the Arab, Jewish, or Ar-
menian thing with the future of time.
1
After 1890 and during the Great War, the emigration of Ottoman
communities to host countries in Latin America was the reason for the
need for consular and diplomatic links. This explains the presence of the
so-called ‘‘Turks’’ as colloquially called the citizens of the empire and
which today constitute a considerable amount of the Latin American
population. For example, Brazil has 9 million, Argentina 3.5 million,
1. One case is Armenians, who were
the victims of genocide through a plan
with different stages: disarmament, in-
tellectual beheading, emasculation, and
deportation. The arrival of Armenians
in Latin America will be an issue of the
negative agenda between Turkey and
Latin America to this day.
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Ruben Pared Turkish-Ooman relaons with Lan America: a journey through the me capsule
Venezuela 1.6million, Chile 1.1 million, Mexico 1.1 million and Colom-
bia 800,000 descendants of immigrants who arrived in the new world
(TASAM, 2016).
By virtue of the above, the macro-relationships were of a non-exis-
tent and sporadic nature. On the one hand, these focused on the immigra-
tion issues of the empire’s citizens who came to the new world escaping
the reality they were going through. On the other, trade ows were scarce
despite the interest of deepening the link. Distance, communications, and
language were made up of factors that hindered higher-level relationships.
This explains why only the visit of Emperor Peter of Brazil is re-
corded in 1871 and 1876 in a personal capacity and not on an ocial visit.
More formal relations with the still Cuba under Spanish rule (with the
opening of the Honorary Consulate of Havana in 1873) and with the two
empires that existed in Latin America. On the one hand, Peter II of Brazil
opened a Honorary Consulate in 1859 in Istanbul and on the other, Em-
peror Maximilian of Mexico sent a representative in 1864 to the Ottoman
capital. At rst, the relations were in consular nature with the aim of
meeting the needs of the Ottoman citizens, despite being Syrians, Leb-
anese, Jews, Armenians, Palestinians, and Druze who would then stop
using the name ‘Ottoman’.
With Argentina, diplomatic relations began in 1909, demonstrating
in the last years of the Ottoman Empire a certain degree of development.
However, after the Great War, ties were resumed and formalized with
the signing of the 1926 Treaty of Friendship (BOTTA, 2012). Then, Brazil
and Mexico in 1927 and in 1928 respectively signed the Treaties of Friend-
ship and Peace, thus initiating diplomatic relations with modern Turkey.
The Republic of Turkey and Latin America until the end of the 20th century
At the moment of opening the second capsule, the existence of a
long period of duration can be identied, marked by the deepening of
the geographical and diplomatic distance.This situation responded to the
presence of exogenous conditions typical of the development of interna-
tional politics as well as endogenous conditions inherent in each actor.
For this reason, mutual irrelevance was the distinctive character of Turk-
ish-Latin American relations during this period.
About exogenous conditions, it can be said that the interwar period
was marked by three forms of penetration into the MENA under the aus-
pices of League of Nations under the mandate regime, the protectorate
and/or direct occupation. The end of the central empires also meant the
end of the once enemy of the West and the crystallization of the territorial
distribution project avoiding any kind of Turkish inuence in the region.
Systemic changes explain the irrelevance in which the relations
fell. On the one hand, the crisis of pure capitalism aected both actors,
Latin America, and the Republic of Turkey, which until then had reached
international insertion as commodity exporting countries. On the other
hand, the attempts to channel the capitalist system had as a counter to
the emergence of totalitarianisms in Europe and Asia, and with them, the
sliding to World War II.
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To this end, the world was conditioned by the development of the
Cold War, with a bipolar system, where both actors were under the um-
brella of American inuence. Turkey became NATO’s southern ank,
providing the second army in numerical terms and America Latina in the
natural-inuenced region of the United States. While both actors partic-
ipated in the liberal order of the second post-war period (UN, IMF, WB,
GATT) this did not result in a strategic rapprochement, on the contrary,
the distances were greater. This was highlighted in the political dimen-
sion with the 1982 Falklands War, in which Turkey openly supported
Britain as an ally within the framework of NATO.
As for endogenous conditions, Latin America in this period went
through the economic dimension by a dislocation of the development
model which led it to undertake a new one. The adoption of Industrial-
ization by Import Substitution model allows to understand why the trade
link with Turkey was not deepened. In the political dimension, the region
went through the emergence of nationalist populism as well as institution-
al instability and the presence of coups, coupled with the emergence of
armed left-wing movements in the 60s and 70s. In other words, there was
a common denominator around national security for fear of red danger.
On Turkey’s side, the war of independence spread until 1923 when
the Republic was nally created, previously ending the sultanate in 1922
(and the caliphate in 1924). The country set out on the path of building a
modern, secular, and nationalist state with the gure of the father of the
homeland, Kemal Ataturk, who sought to give Turkey a new identity, far
from the Ottoman past.
As Turk rightly holds up, “from then on the Turkish Republic be-
gan its ambitious project to cut the ties of a thousand years of its history,
ideology and culture” (Turk, 2010, p. 5). For example, the new assembly
raised that sovereignty came from the general will, including women
with the right to vote; a new professional bureaucracy was established.
Thus, nationalism has been applied to create a new modern nation and to
replace the Ummah (Muslim community) through the assimilation of the
practices of state institutions, the new elite aimed to create a “modern”
nation and “a national identity” (CETIN, 2004, p.351).
To this end, and to modernize the state and provide it with a new
identity, the capital was moved to Ankara. First, Islamic institutions were
replaced by new Western and nationalists. Following this line, religious
schools were closed, and education came under the jurisdiction of the new
Ministry of Education. The Sharia Courts were also abolished and the
constitutional status of Islam as the ocial religion of the Turkish people
withdrew from the Constitution in 1928 (AHMAD, 1990; KARPAT, 1985;).
Second, Arabic writing was replaced by the Latin alphabet, with the
purpose of cutting o society’s relationship with its Islamic faith and The
Ottoman past. In addition, legal gures such as marriage, divorce and in-
heritance laws were amended in accordance with European laws. As a re-
sult, the Swiss Civil Code was incorporated, along with the Italian Crim-
inal Code and the German Trade Code in the second lustrum of the 20th.
As in Latin America, the military corporation was imbued with the
power to defend the republic but was not a passive player in political life.
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The Turkish army dismissed democratically elected governments on no
less than four occasions, two through coups in 1960 and 1980, and two
others through the threat to the institutional break in 1971 and 1997, re-
spectively. In other words, in Turkey the modernization project emerged
as an elite project, designed, and imposed from above, as in many coun-
tries of the so-called Third World.
Regarding macro-relations, there was no density of issues on the exter-
nal agenda between the two actors. Turkey as a kind of cyclops looked inward
in order to consolidate the republic and the West to achieve state moderniza-
tion and international integration. For its part, Latin America went through
recurrent political and economic crises and prioritized the external relation-
ship to the West, particularly the United States. This explains why only dip-
lomatic relations were established with 7 Latin American countries (Argenti-
na, Brazil, Chile, Peru, Cuba, Mexico, and Venezuela), without the presence
of cultural and military attaches. It is worth mentioning that several Latin
American countries related indirectly to Turkey for participating in Peace-
keeping Operations in Cyprus. Highlighting the case of Uruguay, which be-
came the rst country in the region to recognize the Armenian genocide in
1965, which would be joined by other countries several decades later.
However, the presence of several extra factors historically aect-
ed mutual relationships. To the well-known distance, the language,
the absence of cultural interactions, the meager levels of trade and the
low direct external investment, was added to the absence of the proper
Turkish diasporas until the arrival of the Gülen Movement in the 2000s
(GONZÁLEZ LEVAGGI, 2012).
The rst high-level visits were only in the 1990s. In this regard,
the ocial visit of then-President Carlos Menem of Argentina in 1992 to
Turkey and the tour of former Turkish President S. Demirel to Argentina,
Brazil, and Chile in 1995 are highlighted. Since then, Turkey’s Ministry
of Foreign Aairs has begun to look more closely the region in terms of
both diplomatic and trade relations. In 1998 Turkey raised the Plan of Ac-
tion towards Latin America and the Caribbean, which ultimately failed
because of the economic crises that were evident during 2000 and 2001
respectively at both latitudes.
Turkey’s restoration as a re-emerging power and renewed ties with
Latin America in the 21st century
At the time of opening the third capsule, and closer in time, it can
be said that the 21st century witnessed profound changes in the recon-
guration and operation of the International Order. The relative loss of
American power, the consolidation of an Asia-centric gravitational axis,
and the challenge of the liberal order built in the second post-war period
were added to the “rise of the rest” (ZAKARIA, 2004). In other words, the
increasing spread of power was recognized in all its dimensions among
the actors that make up the structure of the international system with the
rise of the so-called emerging powers.
Despite theoretical discussions and a lack of conceptual univocity
to denote what is meant as such, certain indicators have been used to ac-
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count for this. For example, political stability – regardless of the type of
regime implemented without respect for human rights – the model of de-
velopment and sustained economic growth over time, and the design and
implementation of an active but fundamentally assertive foreign policy in
the regional and international context. Therefore, in this ascent, not only
has the recognition of other international actors been important, but also
of the “self-perception” that countries, including under that name, sought
to project of themselves.
In this sense, when Goldman Sachs coined the acronym for BRICS
(Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa) he never thought about
the popularity that this select group of countries would gain in politi-
cal, academic and even international media circles. But this group did
not reect the true nature of an international system in full transforma-
tion. The performance achieved by other countries – according to the
above-mentioned indicators – had allowed membership to be expanded
by generating a large soup of letters when the Next
2
Eleven, CIVETS
3
or the recently named MIKTA appeared
4
(SERBIN, 2017). In any of these
three groups, a power synonymous with “model” for the region has been
included, for holding the sixteenth position in the world economy, the
sixth as a Member State associated with the European Union and for
owning the second largest army within NATO, as is the case of the Re-
public of Turkey.
Beyond the privileged transcontinental geographical location –
thanks to the control of the Bosphorus Strait and the Dardanelles that
separates 3% of its European territory from the rest located on the Anato-
lian peninsula on the Asian continent – the weight of history – because it
was a great empire that rivaled and cooperated alternately with the West
– and to possess a unique identity , Turkey has entered the select concert
of the emerging powers.
Among the reasons that lead to her identifying it there is the unique-
ness of the “Turkish miracle”, which is based on a triad that combines
market economy, democracy and Islam – and which the West did not hes-
itate to support – which became a model of regional stability. However,
like the rest of the emerging powers, favorable conditions in the second
decade of the 21st century have been reversed compared to the rst, and
Turkey has been no exception.
5
This context, as can be analyzed, was
marking international relations with Latin America.
Turkey’s restoration as a re-emerging power had a starting point
with the presence of endogenous conditions. In 2002 a new era was in-
augurated in the institutional life of the country when the Islamic Justice
and Development Party (AKP) rst came to power by the hand of Recep
Tayyip Erdogan, the then Prime Minister and currently strongman and
President of the Republic. With the turn of the century behind a stage
signied by the coups and trauma of the deep economic crisis of 2000 and
2001 when it sought to implement a model that combined national strate-
gic interests with the vision of projecting the country to the world. Since
then, it has coincided precisely with what the government has ocially
called Turkey’s “restoration” with the “re-emerging” power projections
in the international system.
6
2. The Next Eleven group is estimated
to be the next emerging powers of
the 21st century: Bangladesh, Egypt,
Indonesia, Iran, Mexico, South Korea,
Nigeria, Pakistan, Vietnam, Turkey, and
the Philippines.
3. The Economist Intelligence Unit na-
med the group of Colombia, Indonesia,
Vietnam, Egypt, Turkey, and Singapore
with this new one, albeit with less
marketing,
4. MIKTA is made up of Mexico, Indone-
sia, South Korea, Turkey, and Australia.
5. In the second decade of the 21st cen-
tury, the factors that allowed countries
to be renamed as emerging powers
are tested in the economic dimension,
which has already impacted some on
the domestic political situation as in
foreign policy actions. For example,
China is experiencing a slowdown in its
economic growth, with lower demand
for commodities from the world - with
the known impact on international
prices - coupled with the trade war with
the United States. Russia is another
example of how the crisis particularly
with Ukraine deepened the economic
problems - coupled with the blockade -
by barely putting dependence on crude
oil and gas exports at low international
prices. Brazil, the Latin American giant
that in the first decade of the 21st
century presented itself as a power, not
only went through an Orthodox eco-
nomic adjustment - with strong social
unrest - but also a political crisis and a
right-wing turn of its government.
6. In the Turkish cosmogony, from the
Ottoman imperial era to the present,
there have been 4 restorations: the first
has been Tanzimat - coinciding with
the incorporation of the ideological
legacy of the French Revolution only
in 1839; the second has occurred with
the establishment of the Republic after
the First World War; the third with the
adoption of the parliamentary system in
the 1950s; and the fourth and last, with
the implementation of a true multi-party
system that allowed the AKP to come to
power in 2002.
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On the one hand, “restoration” alludes to the need to restore Tur-
key to lost status, knowing how to capture the “spirit of the times” to
meet the challenges of a transforming global system. While it has not
been the rst restoration throughout its history, it is considered that the
latter has given it its place in the world, combining in the country a new
identity with a “strong democracy, a dynamic economy and an active
foreign policy”(DAVUTOGLU, 2014).
These three elements coincide with the indicators mentioned ut
supra, also acquiring a specic meaning according to the ocial self-per-
ception that during the rst decade of AKP’s rule raised in power. Turkey
re-emerged from an imperial past with no territorial pretensions in line
with the new international context and was called to play the role of re-
gional and international power.
“Strong democracy” had to leave behind the stigma that a moderate
religious party could not become in government under the parameters
of a secular republic, as had been founded in 1923 by the “Father of the
Homeland”, Kemal Ataturk. Democracy had to be built on a multi-party
system, regaining the “dignity” and “legitimacy” of the government with
the vote of all citizens, exalting as the main value and bulwark of freedoms
– political and civil – respect for the division of powers and the presence
of strong institutions outside of all inuence of the military corporation.
The philosophical basis for the democratic system was the recovery of the
citizen, assuring him the freedom to think, do and say without any pro-
hibition. Thus, Turkey committed to “will maintain its position of being
a state that contends with every kind of prohibition that restricts the free-
will of humans” (DAVUTOGLU, 2014, p. 9). The moral basis of democracy
should rest on the transparency and counterweights necessary to prevent
excesses and corruption, for which institutional recasting was necessary.
The result has been the political stability that resulted in the AKP’s
tenure in government with 16 consecutive elections won at each of the
levels of government for 17 years, demonstrating that democratic values
were compatible with Islamic heritage – until then relegated. However,
over time the criticism appeared when describing the new political sys-
tem, because it was perceived as a government of “conservative demo-
crats” (KARAVELI, 2017), which brought it closer to what the French
thinker Alain Rouquié dened as “hegemonic democracy” (ROUQUIÉ,
2017). In other words, the presence of formal elections that in their oper-
ation is far removed from liberal democracy.
The “dynamic economy” was conceived as the main asset in which
democracy as a political regime could respond to the needs of the pop-
ulation inward but also projected solidly to the world. In this sense, and
against the current of Latin America in the new century, Turkey has
opened its economy by pursuing neoliberal policies and an export orient-
ed economic development model. This makes it possible to understand
why the Turkish economic structure has similarities to that of developed
countries, as the services sector has the greatest weight (58.2%), followed
by the industrial sector (26.1%), the primary sector (10.1%) – which has
decreased its importance although it absorbs 30% of the labor force – and
the construction sector (5.2%) (WORLD BANK, 2014).
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estudos internacionais • Belo Horizonte, ISSN 2317-773X, v. 8, n. 4, (dez. 2020), p. 188-202
Macroeconomic achievements during the rst decade of the AKP
government positioned Turkey as one of the fastest growing emerging
economies. GDP has been multiplied 3.5 times; growth has been the av-
erage annual 5%; ination of 60% fell to a digit and unemployment fell to
9%. The competitiveness of the Turkish economy allowed exports of medi-
um-tech intermediate industrial goods to increase by positioning Turkish
rms internationally and attracting, thanks to the good business climate,
external direct investment (FDI) mainly from the European Union (EU).
The “active foreign policy” has been strategically designed to ac-
company the country’s process of political and economic transformation.
And this was structured on a theoretical corpus designed by those who
were Foreign Minister and Prime Minister, Ahmet Davutoglu, which
was called “Strategic Depth”. By applying this doctrine, Turkey managed
to enjoy unbeatable results in the international environment, more pre-
cisely in the nearby neighborhood.
Some of the principles formulated in foreign policy include the pol-
icy of zero problems with neighbors - which has involved looking back at the
Middle East, a region to which it turned its back for decades, recomposing
diplomatic ties in situ; multidimensionality - which has meant complemen-
tarity between new commitments, for example by intervening in the Israe-
li-Palestinian conict by supporting the Arab cause, with the old alliances
represented in NATO membership, without entering competition; autono-
my – understood as the ability to take action in areas of vital interest and in
which it can collide with Western allies, as has been the attempt to mediate
together with Brazil in the Iranian nuclear dossier; the multilateralism – by
running for a multipolar world with active participation as a member in
the multi-island spaces of the UN, NATO, the WTO, the G20, the Group
of Friends of Syria, Iraq and Afghanistan; the de-securitization of foreign
policy - which managed to restore the power of soft power history, cul-
ture and own resources over military reductionism in pursuit of building
backed-up image of threatening and aggressive backgrounds; and rhythmic
diplomacy - ready to act on the issues of the international agenda with a
professional and renewed diplomatic corps with the opening of 30 new
embassies in Africa, Latin America and Asia (BENLI ALTUNISIK, 2011).
Taken together, these principles catapulted Turkey into a position
of power in the MENA region and, consequently, to occupy a privileged
place in the concert of the nations. In this sense, the “Strategic Depth” had
as its horizon the reintegration of the country into the international sys-
tem, rst using the region as a take-o platform for the global projection.
From these three aspects of “restoration,” Turkey’s self-perception
has been that of a power that re-emerged from a high-powered past that
once enjoyed. For this reason, Turkey has sought not to be seen as a mere
bridge between the West and the East or a free rider in a convulsing re-
gion, but as a “central” power in the international system. In other words,
it has adopted a “neo-Ottoman” revisionist vision without the pretenses
of being an empire in traditional terms, combining hard power – eco-
nomic and military performance – with soft power - in which
7
it recon-
ciled the Ottoman legacy and also the Sunni Islamic, a model for the
Middle East region (DALACOURA, 2017).
7. A clear example of soft power
exercised by Turkey have been the
soap operas that were sold to different
Latin American countries showing the
splendor of the then Ottoman Empire as
well as the cultural richness of modern
Turkey.
199
Ruben Pared Turkish-Ooman relaons with Lan America: a journey through the me capsule
At the time of opening the third capsule of time in 2019, the chang-
es were noticeable, especially in what it does to the density that macro-re-
lationships acquired like never before seen in Turkish-Latin American
relations. The new foreign policy designed in multidimensional terms
allowed Turkey to establish renewed ties with the region over the past
10 years. Through intense communication and close cooperation with
governments and other non-state actors, a strategic vision was raised in
the title of the Expansion in Latin America and the Caribbean of Turkey.
Thus, the Latin American region became vitally important, with its 605
million inhabitants and a GDP of more than $6 trillion and 1.72 trillion
foreign trade, rich natural resources, and emerging economy. Turkey’s
total trade volume in the region has increased nine-fold and is still ex-
panding compared to previous years.
Some initiatives, such as the 2006 Action Plan and the Declaration
of The Year of Latin America and the Caribbean, at the same time indicat-
ed that Turkey’s active foreign policy was beginning to deliver tangible
results. The “Action Plan 2006 involved the Ministries of Economy, In-
dustry and Trade of Latin American countries, as well as universities and
business sectors that participated in meetings, congresses and seminars
organized in order to deepen mutual knowledge and forge an agenda
based on reciprocal interests.
To this end, it was a rst step to achieve greater institutionaliza-
tion of diplomatic relations with the countries of the region, which had
been virtually inconsequential throughout the twentieth century. In this
regard, Turkey initiated a process of rapprochement and negotiations to
exchange political ideas with 14 of the most important countries in the
region (Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Ecuador, Guatemala, Colombia, Cos-
ta Rica, Cuba, Mexico, Peru, Chile, Paraguay, Uruguay, Venezuela). In
this line, new General Consulates were opened in Brazil and Colombia
and the establishment of Trade Promotion Oces under the Ministries of
Economy in Buenos Aires, Bogota, Caracas, Lima, Mexico DF, Santiago
de Chile, and Havana was promoted. Undoubtedly, Brazil was the cor-
nerstone of the relationship with the region, where progress was made
in signing the Action Plan for a Strategic Partnership. In addition to the
participation of other joint international initiatives, such as mediation in
Iran’s nuclear aair.
The strengthening of diplomatic relations was highlighted by Pres-
ident Erdogan’s ocial visits in 2015 to Colombia, Cuba, and Mexico and
in early 2016 Ecuador, Peru, and Chile. As a result of the July 2016 coup at-
tempt in Turkey, the presidential tours in Latin America were interrupted
but the region condemned the facts in solidarity with the Turkish people.
For their part, Latin American representatives such as Luiz Inácio Lula
Da Silva of Brazil, Hugo Chávez of Venezuela, Cristina Fernández de
Kirchner of Argentina and Enrique Peña Nieto of Mexico paid out by dip-
lomatic courtesy and interest the visits with tours that included Ankara.
A second step in relations was the Strategy for trade development with
Latin American countries presented by the Turkish Ministry of Economy to
conclude trade and economic agreements with the countries of the region.
In this order, Trade and Economic Cooperation Agreements were concluded
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estudos internacionais • Belo Horizonte, ISSN 2317-773X, v. 8, n. 4, (dez. 2020), p. 188-202
with 13 countries (Argentina, Brazil, Ecuador, Guatemala, Guyana, Jamaica,
Colombia, Cuba, Mexico, Paraguay, Peru, Chile and Uruguay) and follow-up
mechanisms were established through the Joint Economic Commission
8
.
Regarding free trade agreements, negotiations began - still ongoing - with
the Caribbean Community (CARICOM), with the Central American Inte-
gration System (SICA) and the Southern Common Market (MERCOSUR).
9
A higher density of issues appeared on the bilateral agenda, in a
clear sign of entrenchment of mutual ties and interests. These include the
elimination of the visa for Latin American citizens (except Cuba) and the
establishment of daily ights with The Turkish Airlines company to the
countries of the region.
However, a sensitive issue on the bilateral agenda has remained
generating diplomatic frictions, which revolves around the recognition
of the Armenian genocide. In chronological order, Venezuela on 14 July
2005 condemned the genocide and supported the historical claims made
by the Armenian people; Argentina, with 135 thousand descendants of
Armenians, sanctioned 2007 Law 26.199 of “Declaration of 24 April Day
of Action for Tolerance and Respect among Peoples”; Bolivia ocially
expressed its appreciation with Declaration No.122/2015; Brazil on 2 June
2015 issued the Federal Senate resolution under No. 550/2015 recognizing
the genocide of the Armenian people; and Paraguay on 29 October 2015
unanimously passed the law of the ocial recognition of the genocide
perpetrated against the Armenian people. (TASAM, 2018).
The MERCOSUR Parliament also adopted resolution 04/2007 at its
plenary meeting on 19 November 2007 in which it publicly acknowledges
the genocide on the Armenian people. For its part, the Latin American
Parliament composed of National Congresses and Assemblies through-
out Latin America passed on July 31, 2015, coinciding with the commem-
oration of the hundredth anniversary of the Armenian genocide, a draft
resolution ocially recognizing the issue.
Conclusions
Under the analysis carried out, it can be said that Turkish-Latin
American relations are long-standing and state-conditioned by the pres-
ence of exogenous and endogenous factors over time. This article sought
to reconstruct the context of these relationships using the timeframe of
the Time Capsules. Thus, with each of the openings, the information
obtained was valuable for the analysis of the three contexts in which mac-
ro-relations were developed at both latitudes.
With the opening of the rst capsule we can conclude that during the
existence of the Ottoman Empire and the Spanish Empire relations were
non-existent, even ignoring each other. This responded to the non-collision
interests pursued by each actor in the international system. On the one hand
the Ottoman Empire spread throughout Central and Eastern Europe, be-
coming a large multi-ethnic and multinational political unit whose main
threat was the Empire of Tsars. On the other hand, the main concern of the
Spanish empire was to maintain control and administration in its former col-
onies in the new world, far from the meddling of western European powers.
8. It is important to mention that the
commercial volume in the first decade of
the 21st century increased considerably,
especially given how meager it was
during the previous period. Foreign trade
made a significant leap from $2 billion
to $8 billion in 2015, placing Brazil in
the top spot followed by Mexico, Colom-
bia, Chile, and Argentina respectively.
9. In 2011, a free trade agreement was
signed with Chile taking advantage of
the previous agreement with the EU.
201
Ruben Pared Turkish-Ooman relaons with Lan America: a journey through the me capsule
It was only at the end of the 19th century, when the so-called ‘Sick
Man of Europe’ was losing territories, coupled with economic crises - and
its well-known social eects - Ottoman relations with Latin America
were established by the issue of immigration. The arrival of the so-called
‘Turks’ and their situation in the countries was the pretext for establish-
ing consular relations. However, it was after the Great War and once the
Republic of Turkey was created in 1923 that diplomatic relations with
Latin American countries were formalized.
The opening of the second capsule of time at the end of the twen-
tieth century allowed us to understand how endogenous and exogenous
factors conditioned Turkish-Latin American relations, reaching the point
of irrelevance. On the one hand, Turkey had to rebuild its secular and
national identity with an eye on Europe and Latin American countries to
overcome recurrent political and economic crises.
While both actors were participating in the same bloc during the
Cold War, international relations were formal and conducted through the
bureaucratic way of the respective chancelleries. It was only at the end of
the 20th century that there were ocial visits and attempts to channel
relations, which failed because of the economic crises of 2000 and 2001.
The opening context of the third Time Capsule in 2019 exposed
an intensication of Ties between Turkey and Latin America. In the 21st
century, changes in the international order coupled with internal chang-
es in each of the actors led to an approach like never before. Turkey was
not only recognized as an emerging power at the international level, but
it also self-perceived as a central power in international aairs that re-
emerged from a glorious past. In this sense, the design of a new multi-
dimensional foreign policy allows us to understand how it sought to ap-
proach Latin America with diplomatic initiatives and strategic projects of
regional cooperation and integration. Ankara’s diplomacy clearly found in
the region the political conditions for rapprochement, ideological harmo-
ny - with the presence of the so-called Latin American left turn - and the
search for membership of the Global South made it possible to strengthen
ties and shorten the distances that had separated them for years.
However, it cannot be overlooked that in the second decade of the
21st century that approach began to lose intensity. Changes in govern-
ments with dierent political signs in Latin America, new economic cri-
ses, as well as the so-called authoritarian drift in which Turkey plunged
after the 2016 coup attempt, helped to slow international ties.
In other words, when a new Time Capsule is opened in the future,
we will be able to reconstruct a new context, and thus learn how the
challenges and opportunities that are present in Turkey’s international
relations with Latin America were managed.
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