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estudos internacionais • Belo Horizonte, ISSN 2317-773X, v. 8, n. 4, (dez. 2020), p. 80-96
Between a Traumatic Past and an
Uncertain Future: a study on the
representations of the Ottoman defeat in
the Balkan War (1912-1913)
Entre un pasado traumático y un futuro incierto: un estudio
sobre las representaciones de la derrota otomana en la
guerra de los Balcanes (1912-1913)
Entre um passado traumático e um futuro incerto: um
estudo sobre as representações da derrota otomana na
Guerra dos Balcãs (1912-1913)
Edmar Avelar Sena
Guilherme di Lorenzo
Alaor Souza Oliveira
DOI: 10.5752/P.2317-773X.2020v8.n4.p80
Received in: October 29, 2020
Accepted in: November 20, 2020
A
The defeat in the Balkan War (1912-1913) was a critical moment for the Otto-
man Empire. It was a traumatic event that challenged the established principles
and projects and initiated a period of profound uncertainty regarding the future
of the Empire. The article seeks to analyze some of the representations about
the trauma of the defeat and the future of the Ottoman Empire through the ed-
itorials of an Ottoman newspaper, La Jeune Turquie, which was published in Paris
during the conict. The intention is not to present a detailed and comprehensive
picture of the various narratives about the conict but to assess some of the im-
passes about the event. More specically, we seek to present the Balkan War as
a liminal period. It was a traumatic experience that constituted a rearrangement
of existing tendencies, unveiling new expectations for the future. The argument
presented here is that more than a “point of no return,” the defeat brought a
new horizon of expectations on the Ottoman leaders.
Keywords: Ottoman Empire. Balkan Wars. Nationalism.
R
La derrota en la Guerra de los Balcanes (1912-1913) fue un momento crítico
para el Imperio Otomano. Fue un evento traumático que desaó los princip-
ios y proyectos establecidos e inició un período de profunda incertidumbre
81
Edmar Avelar Sena, Guilherme di Lorenzo, Alaor Souza Oliveira Between a Traumac Past and an Uncertain Future:
a study on the representaons of the Ooman defeat in the Balkan War (1912-1913)
sobre el futuro del Imperio. El artículo busca analizar algunas de las repre-
sentaciones sobre el trauma de la derrota y el futuro del Imperio Otomano
a través de las editoriales de un periódico otomano, La Jeune Turquie, que
se publicó en París durante el conicto. La intención no es presentar una
imagen detallada y completa de las diversas narrativas sobre el conicto, sino
evaluar algunos de los impases sobre el evento. Más especícamente, busca-
mos presentar la Guerra de los Balcanes como un período liminal. Fue una
experiencia traumática que constituyó un reordenamiento de las tendencias
existentes, desvelando nuevas expectativas para el futuro. El argumento que
aquí se presenta es que más que un “punto sin retorno”, la derrota trajo un
nuevo horizonte de expectativas a los líderes otomanos.
Palabras clave: Imperio Otomano. Guerras Balcánicas. Nacionalismo.
R
A derrota na Guerra dos Balcãs (1912-1913) foi um momento crítico para o
Império Otomano. Foi um evento traumático que desaou os princípios e
projetos estabelecidos e deu início a um período de profunda incerteza quanto
ao futuro do Império. O artigo busca analisar algumas das representações sobre
o trauma da derrota e o futuro do Império Otomano por meio dos editoriais de
um jornal otomano, La Jeune Turquie, publicado em Paris durante o coni-
to. A intenção não é apresentar um quadro detalhado e abrangente das várias
narrativas sobre o conito, mas avaliar alguns dos impasses sobre o evento. Mais
especicamente, procuramos apresentar a Guerra dos Balcãs como um período
liminar. Foi uma experiência traumática que constituiu um rearranjo de tendên-
cias existentes, desvelando novas expectativas para o futuro. O argumento aqui
apresentado é que mais do que um “ponto sem volta”, a derrota trouxe um
novo horizonte de expectativas para os líderes otomanos.
Palavras-chave: Império Otomano. Guerras Balcânicas. Nacionalismo.
Introduction
The Balkan War (1912-1913), a conict that involved the Ottoman
Empire and the Balkan League, was one of the main events that pre-
ceded the Great War. The conict’s outcome was disastrous for the Ot-
toman Empire, which lost most of the remaining territorial possessions
on the European continent. The ghting broke out on October 8, 1912,
with Montenegro’s declaration of independence. The crisis deepened rap-
idly, and soon the other three states became involved in the conict. On
June 10, 1913, the London Treaty was signed, marking the end of the war
between the Ottoman Empire and the Balkan League (YOLCU, 2015).
However, the conict continued between Bulgaria and the other states
over the division of the conquered territory. In this scenario, the Otto-
man Empire had a brief involvement, regaining Adrianopolis’s strategic
city (Edirne) in July 1913 (YOLCU, 2015).
The Balkan War was a critical moment for the Ottoman Empire.
It was a traumatic event that challenged the principles and projects hith-
erto in force and opened a period of profound uncertainty regarding the
future of the Empire. The eects of the war were not limited to the Em-
pire’s international relations but also impacted its domestic politics. In
January 1913, a coup d’état brought the Committee of Union and Prog-
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estudos internacionais • Belo Horizonte, ISSN 2317-773X, v. 8, n. 4, (dez. 2020), p. 80-96
ress (CUP) to power, imposing a one-party government and altering the
political dynamics established with the Young Turk Revolution in 1908
(YOLCU, 2015). In this scenario, political leaders faced the challenge of
reestablishing the principles that guaranteed the cohesion of the Otto-
man political community, threatened by the emergence of new separatist
movements and the aggressiveness of the Great Powers.
The Ottoman Empire’s traditional historiography presents the de-
feat as a crucial moment for the rise of Turkish nationalism (YOLCU,
2015). According to this historiography, the defeat imposed a new reality
on the leaders of the Ottoman Empire, who were forced to abandon the
Ottoman project and to adopt a new national project centered on the eth-
nic cleavage. This perspective, however, is not a consensus in historiogra-
phy. Many historians are more reticent about the triumph of Turkish na-
tionalism in the post-war period. For many, other projects were equally,
if not more, important (GINIO, 2005).
In light of this, the article seeks to analyze some of the representa-
tions about the trauma of the defeat and the future of the Ottoman Em-
pire through the editorials of an Ottoman newspaper, La Jeune Turquie,
which was published in Paris during the conict. The intention is not to
present a detailed and comprehensive picture of the various narratives
about the conict but to assess some of the impasses about the event.
More specically, we seek to present the Balkan War as a liminal peri-
od. It was a traumatic experience that constituted a rearrangement of
existing tendencies, unveiling new expectations for the future. The argu-
ment presented here is that more than a “point of no return,” the defeat
brought a new horizon of expectations on the Ottoman leaders.
The defeat led to the advent of an uncertain scenario concerning
the identity of the political community. In the Ottoman Empire, the
cultural identities were uid, multiethnic, and multireligious. With the
emergence of nationalist movements in the Empire, including Turkish
nationalism, this condition was disputed. In the decades following the
end of the Great World War, the implantation of Turkish nationalism
aimed to overcome the identity’s uidity of the Empire and promote the
idea of a nation-state. The Turkish State, under the leadership of Kemal
Attaturk, sought to arm its modern and secular character through re-
forms that brought the country closer to the West, or to the idea of the
West as was imagined by Republican leaders. In this process, the reli-
gious dimension was separated from the public space. In the early years
of the republic, the narrative about Turkish identity incorporated three
crucial aspects into its core: secularization, nationalism, and westerni-
zation. Turkish leaders sough to distance themselves from the legacy of
the Ottoman Empire, and, with this, they refuted symbols and identities
linked to the Ottoman period.
This article seeks to look at the Imperial period from a perspec-
tive that recognizes the ideological complexity of that period. The main
objective is to evaluate how dierent identities and projects, more than
being excluded, overlap each other in a scenario characterized by a plu-
rality of voices.
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Edmar Avelar Sena, Guilherme di Lorenzo, Alaor Souza Oliveira Between a Traumac Past and an Uncertain Future:
a study on the representaons of the Ooman defeat in the Balkan War (1912-1913)
Trends in the historiography on the relationship between nationalism (s)
in the Ottoman Empire and the Balkan War (1912-1913)
When looking at the past to make sense of events, dierent nar-
ratives are possible, and, as a result, events can be organized in dier-
ent ways, given dierent meanings. As Nader Sohrabi argues, it is pos-
sible to note two classic narratives about the Balkan War, reproduced,
to some extent, by the nationalist discourses of the countries involved
in the conict. On the one hand, there are those narratives that blame
the CUP’s “Turkish chauvinism” as a factor that precipitated national-
ist reactions from ethnic and religious minorities. On the other hand,
there is the understanding that Turkish nationalism was a reaction to mi-
nority uprisings and not its cause (SOHRABI, 2018, p.2). This perspective
suggests that the Empire’s successive wars imposed a new cultural and
demographic reality favorable to the emergence of Turkish nationalism
(SOHRABI, 2018, p.4).
According to Ramazan Öztan (2018), the historiography of the Ot-
toman Empire at the beginning of the 20th century acted more as a na-
tional historiography of Turkey (ÖZTAN, 2018, p .65-66). Öztan argues
that it is possible to identify an inclination of Turkish historiography of
the early years of the Republic to see the Ottoman Empire’s History from
a teleological perspective. For this historiography, the traumatic experi-
ence of defeat brought an end to the Ottomanist project, precipitating a
hegemonic project linked to Turkish ethnic nationalism (ÖZTAN, 2018,
p.66). The traditional narrative portrays this event as a mythical founda-
tional moment: a “point of no return” in Turkish nationalism’s ascendan-
cy. It was an episode that foreshadowed the Empire’s imminent collapse
(ÖZTAN, 2018, p.66).
The theme of the signicance of defeat as a foundational moment
is recovered more nuanced in more contemporary studies. Umut Uzer
(2016), for example, argues that the politicized awareness of Turkish iden-
tity was a reaction to the spread of separatist nationalisms throughout
the 19th century (UZER, 2016, p.7). The author considers that the rise of
Turkish nationalism was caused by the belligerence of Serbian, Bulgari-
an, Albanian, and Arab national identities, and the Ottoman defeats in
the Balkans. Uzer emphasizes the failure of 1913 as a pivotal moment for
Turkish nationalism. According to Uzer:
While some stirrings of Turkish nationalism existed earlier, it would not be in-
correct to say that Turkish nationalism started to become an inuential ideology
only after the Balkan Wars of 1912–13. Only gradually did it penetrate the minds
of the intellectuals and the masses (UZER, 2016, p. 7).
It is possible to see a teleological direction in this narrative about
Turkish national identity. According to Uzer, the defeat imposed an un-
avoidable reality for the Ottoman leaders “as most of these territories
were lost to new nationalist states, the establishment of a Turkish nation-
al state became the logical end result for Turks” (UZER, 2016, p16).
This interpretation, although widespread, is not consensual in his-
toriography. Some works contest this view by establishing an opposite
causal relationship: the centralizing and homogenizing “turquifying”
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project promoted by the Ottoman leaders caused the reaction of many
ethnic and religious communities (ZEINE, 1973). These are works that
generally address the History of national movements from the perspec-
tive of dierent ethnic groups.
Recent historiography criticizes both of the above perspectives
because these narratives give precedence to the ethnic component in
the discourses and political projects at the beginning of the 20th centu-
ry. For example, Eyal Ginio (2005) argues that the religious framework
gained importance in opposition to other cultural aspects in the ocial
speeches of the Empire after the conict in 1913. For Ginio, the war
was a historical inection moment that marked a change in the CUP
attitude. During and after the defeat in 1913, the transition from a secu-
lar Ottomanism to an Islamic-Ottomanism is noticeable (GINIO, 2005,
p.159). According to Ginio:
The Balkan wars proved the frailty of the secular Ottoman identity. The failure
of an Ottoman collective identity spelled the end of the imagined secular ‘Otto-
man nation’. Nevertheless the wars emphasized the vitality of Islam and its fun-
damental linkage and potential for the Ottoman dynasty (GINIO, 2005, p. 177).
This reading points to a dierent direction from those adopted by
more traditional approaches. However, Ginio’s argument shares with the
above perspectives the principle that it is possible to point out the Otto-
man Empire’s hegemonic ideology after the war. Other authors, howev-
er, prefer to point out the uncertain, exible, and even “experimental”
character of political and cultural identities in the early 20th century in
the Ottoman Empire.
Eissenstat (2015), for example, argues that, since the 19th century,
the political and intellectual elites of the Empire sought to deal with
the problems arising from international competition and the increase
of internal divisions based on a modernization project that promoted,
among others aspects, the construction of a shared “national Ottoman”
feeling (EISSENSTAT, 2015). For Eissenstat, this project was a reaction
of the elites to an adverse scenario and had practical and instrumental
foundations. The author explains the Empire’s vacillating and contradic-
tory approach concerning defensive ideologies and the proposed politi-
cal community project.
Despite pointing out certain convergences between the centraliza-
tion process and “turquicant” measures promoted by the leaders, Eissen-
stat recognizes that the loss of Balkan territory and the inux of Muslim
refugees favored the tendency to characterize the “Ottoman nation” in
religious terms, without, however, abandon the project of “civil national-
ism” (EISSENSTAT, 2015, p.458). Eissenstat endorses Ginio’s argument by
arguing that religious discourse was strategic in propaganda promoted
by the Empire. However, Eissenstat emphasizes the Ottoman Empire’s
adaptive character. According to the author, since the 19th century, the
Ottoman leadership has adopted speeches and projects pragmatically to
respond to new challenges.
Nader Sohrabi also employs an instrumental and pragmatic ap-
proach to identities to understand states’ directions during and after the
Balkan War. For Sohrabi, the salience of national identities needs to be
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Edmar Avelar Sena, Guilherme di Lorenzo, Alaor Souza Oliveira Between a Traumac Past and an Uncertain Future:
a study on the representaons of the Ooman defeat in the Balkan War (1912-1913)
understood both as a cause and as an outcome of the conict. According
to the author, security challenges, driven by centrifugal forces, led to a
centralizing and homogenizing project in the early 20th century. How-
ever, this project was not openly “turquifying” (SOHRABI, 2018, p. 4-5).
Sohrabi moves away from an essentialist view of identities and ar-
gues that the uidity and malleability of identities in the early 20th cen-
tury allowed political actors to exploit identities in order to guarantee
political gains in a scenario of growing competition (SOHRABI, 2016, p.
32).In this scenario, elites and intellectuals were crucial in the process of
politicizing ethnic identities. But Sohrabi argues that the war experience
was the main factor that explains the national identities consolidation.
According to Sohrabi:
(...) in an atmosphere of increasing violence, threat of war, and the possibility
of diminishing territorial claims, nothing xed identities more rmly than the
need for protection and allies that could secure resources needed for survival or
preserving a way of life (SOHRABI, 2016, p. 33).
In opposition to Eissensat and Ginio, Sohrabi understands that
CUP leaders adopted a softer version of religious discourse in the concep-
tion of “neo-Ottoman nationalism” (SOHRABI, 2018, p. 6). According to
Sohrabi, there was a rearrangement of the hierarchy between the central
elements of Ottoman identity, forming concentric circles whose inner
circle was formed by a Turkish core. On the other hand, Islam represent-
ed a larger circle that contained the Turkish core and other Muslim eth-
nic groups. Finally, the Ottoman identity encompassed all communities,
Muslims and non-Muslim (SOHRABI, 2018, p. 12).
Present in the argument of Sohrabi and Eissenstat, and shared to
some extent by the other authors presented here, is the understanding
that the centralization process promoted by the Ottoman leaders was one
of the central factors in the escalation of the conict between the Empire
and the movements in search of regional autonomy. The point of dis-
agreement is whether these measures represented a “Turkifying” project
or not.
Erol Ülker (2005) draws attention to the literature’s lack of agree-
ment about what the Empire’s “Turkication” process is. According to
the author, the term” is used more generally as a synonym for central-
ization policies. However, Ülker nds evidence that after the defeat, the
empire deliberately adopted “Turkication” measures in some regions. In
this perspective, the Balkan War acted as a “catalyst”, transforming “the
already existing Turkish consciousness of Young Turks into nationaliza-
tion policies” (ÜLKER, 2005, p. 622).
Besides that, Ülker argues that many approaches misread the Otto-
man policies because they generalize measures implemented in a given
province as evidence of a general political project. The author argues that
“Young Turks employed dierent measures in the dierent regions of
the empire and for the dierent communities” (ÜLKER, 2005, p. 622). In
the Arab provinces, the tendency towards “Turkication” was less pro-
nounced. In these regions, the Empire chose to defend a discourse of re-
ligious unity. In Anatolia, however, the “Turkication” project was much
more pronounced, reecting the notion that Anatolia was the “Turkish
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homeland”. In this central region, the CUP adopted explicit measures to
favor the Turks and promoted forced migrations to homogenize the re-
gion (ÜLKER, 2005, p. 625).
This review intended to illustrate the diversity of interpretations
about the eects of war on the rise of national movements and ideologies
in the Ottoman Empire. In this sense, it is essential to assess how each
discourses articulated dierent conceptions of political community. The
argument presented here is that the study of the narratives elaborated
in that period allows us to capture some of the expectations about the
future, which is was intrinsically connected to how each narrative con-
ceived the idea of political community.
Historical events as a moment of re-articulation between past and
future
The study of “critical junctures” has a long tradition in the political
sciences and in international relations. Traditional approaches conceive
“critical junctures” as decisive moments that occur in a relatively short
period of time, involving an event or a set of events, which result in pro-
found changes, altering historical trajectories in “irreversible directions”
(CAPOCCIA, 2016; HALL, 2016; MAHONEY et al., 2016).
While this perspective contributes to understanding the process-
es of State-building, it presents some analytical dangers. One is to take
critical moments as irreversible points in a teleological evolution. In
other words, there is a risk of portraying these moments as events that
point to an inevitable end, thereby losing the window of opportunities
present in each event. It is important to remember that the chain of
events considered critical is part of the rationalization eort made a
posteriori by the researchers. The researchers select, among the various
events that occurred in the past, those that they consider to be the most
relevant and establish a connection between them. Thus, depending on
the narrative proposed by the researcher, it is possible to select dierent
events, give dierent meanings to them, and establish distinct connec-
tions between them.
This article aims to evaluate the Balkan War as a liminal period,
characterized by a sequence of signicant events that reordered social
representations and generated new expectations for the future. The ar-
gument put forward is that the war experience opened a complex period,
which brought out existing contradictions and engendered new tenden-
cies, reecting an uncertain future (ÖZTAN, 2018).
This article uses the concept of “historical event”, proposed by Wil-
liam Sewell, to investigate the conict’s impacts on Ottoman History.
According to Sewell, an event is “(1) a ramied sequence of occurrences
that (2) is recognized as notable by contemporaries, and that (3) results in
a durable transformation of structure”. In this perspective, what distin-
guishes events from everyday occurrences is the signicance attributed
by those who experience them, directly or indirectly (BEREZIN, 2012).
Signicant events are generally given political and cultural signicance
by those who experience them. Events considered to be important are
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Edmar Avelar Sena, Guilherme di Lorenzo, Alaor Souza Oliveira Between a Traumac Past and an Uncertain Future:
a study on the representaons of the Ooman defeat in the Balkan War (1912-1913)
dierent from the ordinary events of daily life because they are inection
points in History. Signicant events become a reference in the collective
perception of the passage of time (MAST, 2006, p. 117).
Sewell suggests that the expectation generated by historical events
usually produces more signicant events, thus creating a sequence of signif-
icant events. Still, he does not detail the links between the experienced past
and the expectations engendered by historical events (BEREZIN, 2012). In
this sense, this paper argues that it is essential to capture the temporal com-
plexity of historical events to avoid teleological narratives. This article is in
line with Arlette’s argument that the analysis of historical events requires
assessing how such events articulate past and future (FARGE, 2002).
On the one hand, the experience of events does not occur in isola-
tion from the set of individual and collective experiences that already ex-
ist. Events happen in a context marked by “perceptions and sensitivities”
established before their occurrence (FARGE, 2002). They are coded, clas-
sied, and ordered within a pre-existing broader socially representative
scheme (BEREZIN, 2012, p. 620).
On the other hand, the eects of a signicant event transcend the
immediate temporality and change the historical context. In addition to
the direct impacts on social and political relations, signicant events be-
come essential components of social representations (FARGE, 2002). As
Arlette Farge observes, changing conjunctural and structural patterns
involves changing expectations for the future, generating a set of new
meanings and representations that guide individuals’ actions and prac-
tices (FARGE, 2002). In other words, events matter, as they allow those
who experience them to contemplate new relationships and connections
among dimensions of social and political life. These are moments of in-
ection in which new possibilities and new visions of possible paths are
engendered (BEREZIN, 2012, p. 620).
In this perspective, the historical event is not synonymous with iso-
lated events or the “great deeds of great men”, typical of positivist history.
As the philosopher Paul Ricoeur (1992) argues, contemporary historiog-
raphy has rehabilitated the event as an important dimension of History.
According to Ricoeur, despite the uniqueness of each historical event, it
is possible to observe in its occurrence the inection between past and fu-
ture. For individual and collective consciousness, it is in the “eventuality
of the present” (l’événementialité du présent) that the past incorporated into
the experience and the expectation of the future intersect (RICOEUR,
1992). For Ricoeur:
The event takes place in the very constitution of historical time where
the memory of what was, the expectation of what will be, and the pres-
ent emergence of what we do and experience as agents and patients of
History are joined (RICOEUR, 1992, p. 34)
1
.
This excerpt conceives an event as the intersection of the experi-
enced past and the expected future. This conception avoids the dangers
of a teleological notion of events because it considers the possibilities at
a given historical moment. The passage also draws attention to the fact
that individuals are able to aect History, but, on the other hand, they are
also aected by History.
1. L’événement prend place dans la
constitution même du temps historique
où se conjoignent la mémoire de ce qui
fut, l’expectation de ce quis era et le
surgissement présent de ce que nous
faisons et subissons comme agentes et
patients de l’histoire.
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Decisively, the Balkan War was a historical event. It was a period
of transformation. However, more than an irreversible moment for the
countries involved, the war was a period when new expectations were
created from an unprecedented and signicant experience (YAVUZ,
2013). It is a liminal period
2
of reorientation of existing tendencies and the
creation of new meanings that overlap with those that already existed.
In this sense, the analysis of newspapers of the time is a useful
approach that allows the researcher to contemplate facets of the debate
about the Empire’s past and future. The study of the editorials of La Jeune
Turquie reveals how the war experience was elaborated by a group that
presented itself as a representative of Ottoman interests on French soil.
“La Jeune Turquie: Organe des Intérêts Géneraux de l’Empire Ottoman”
La Jeune Turquie (The Young Turkey) was a french newspaper pub-
lished in Paris in which frontispice it dened itself as an “organ for
the defense of the general interests of the Ottoman Empire”, rst pub-
lished in 1910. The newspaper’s issues preserved and available for con-
sultation in The National Library of France cover the period between
1910 and 1914, suggesting that its circulation ceased at the eve of the
Great War.
The defense of Ottoman Empire’s interests, however, was not linked
to any image of the Empire in abstract. As the title suggests, the news-
paper’s political aliation was explicitly favorable to the CUP regime,
implying the reproduction of images of Ottoman history that marked a
deep cut with the previous Hamidian regime (1876-1909), portrayed as a
period of tyranny. In this sense, in April 2, 1910 editorial:
At the day after the magnicent eort by which Turkey freed itself
from Hamidian tyranny, there was an inux of sympathies towards
our country. It seemed to Europe that it found again a part of itself, or
rather than this part, this member of the great European family, long
paralysed, would be reborn to life. The lively and generous blood of
freedom would circulate again and make Turkey a true nation among
other nations!
3
With this re elaboration of the past, La Jeune Turquie could create a
legitimacy for the CUP regime as a restoration of historical trends of the
Ottoman Empire, marking an opposition to the reign of Sultan Abdül
Hamid II, that would be the real exceptional moment in Ottoman his-
tory, due to its despotism incompatible with the values of the European
family of nations.
In this sense, it is important to recover the late 19th century
meaning of the European family of nations. This notion lays on the
principle which suppose an hierarchy among nations based, in one
hand, on the conscience of a moral sentiment of European societies and
a normative-psychological dictum about right and wrong in civilized
contemporaries and, in other hand, the consciousness of that moral
sentiment and civilizational standard as objectively true for everybody.
Martti Koskenniemi (2004) argues that this conscience/consciousness
laid at the origins of International Law in the 19th century and, as a
2. According to the anthropologist Victor
Turner, a liminal period is a complex
and dramatic period of time in which
long-lasting processes and trends are
succeeded by “social dramas”, which
“made explicit many of the contradic-
tions hidden in these processes and
generate new myths, symbols, and
paradigms” (TURNER, 1974, p. 99).
3. Au landemain du magnifique effort
par lequel la Turquie s’affranchit de la
tyrannie hamidienne, ce fut vers notre
pays un afflux de sympathies. Il samblait
à l’Eurupe qu’elle retrouvait une partie
d’elle-même, ou plutôt que cette partie,
ce membre de la grande famille euro-
péenne, longtemps paralysé, renaisait à
la vie. Le sang vivace et généreux de la
liberté allait y circuler à nouveau et faire
de la Turquie une nation véritable parmi
les autres nations !
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Edmar Avelar Sena, Guilherme di Lorenzo, Alaor Souza Oliveira Between a Traumac Past and an Uncertain Future:
a study on the representaons of the Ooman defeat in the Balkan War (1912-1913)
consequence, as long as International Law was a product of European
civilizational process, the “civilized” category could not be completely
applied outside of that region.
Koskenniemi’s approach usefully shed light to the ambiguous sta-
tus of the late Ottoman Empire towards Europe. Although it is consid-
ered that the Ottomans was formally admitted as a part of the European
family of nations with the signature of the Treaty of Paris, in 1856, when
the Ottoman Sultan was recognized as equal to European monarchs, the
Ottoman Empire was never in fact accepted as an equal member, remain-
ing as an “other” by which Europeans dierentiated themselves as a col-
lective identity (GÖL, 2003, p. 1).
It is reasonable to suppose that La Jeune Turquie’ evocation of the
image of Ottoman Empire as a part of, a member of “the great European
family” was a statement towards French public opinion of the civilized
conscious/consciousness shared by Ottomans as much as Europeans. But
it is also reasonable to suppose the perception of the dierence between
Ottomans and Europeans due to the own necessity of an organ for the
defense of the general interests of the Ottoman Empire. It is found in the
same editorial cited above:
To satisfy one, to ght the others, our national press, publishing in the Empire,
could not serve because insuciently read, or rather not read at all beyond the
frontiers of our country.
[...]
The need for an organ for the defense of the general interests of the Ottoman
Empire was essential.
The road was therefore clear, we could embark on it without fear, there was a
beautiful patriotic work to be completed. And this is how we were led to found
La Jeune Turquie.
La Jeune Turquie will be the organ for the defense of the general interests of the
Ottoman Empire. Flag bearer, in France, of our beautiful country, it will make
the ag of the Fatherland oat high.
[...]
To the foreign press, which often, if not always, judges the Eastern
question in its own way and according to its various ambitions, La Jeune
Turquie will reclaim that there is in this Eastern Question an Ottoman
point of view which must take precedence over the others.
4
Considering the exposure, how could La Jeune Turquie be inter-
preted as a research object? It must be said that the newspaper does
not fit sufficiently well in the tradition of the Ottoman francophone
press. The notion of an Ottoman francophone press comprehends a
set of titles and publications edited and published in French language
in Ottoman territory. It refers to an editorial tradition in the Empire
with the first Ottoman regular journal in French language established
by French journalist Alexandre Blacque at Smyrna (Izmir) - Le Cour-
rier de Smyrne, between 1828 to 1831. Le Courrier was followed in time
by other titles in French which aimed to defend interests of the French
colonies in Ottoman territories (BARUH, 2017, p.299). However, even
the Ottoman government contributed to the establishment of an Ot-
toman francophone press, with the publication of the official jour-
nal, Takvim-i Vekayi, in French with title of Moniteur ottoman, between
1831 and 1843 (BARUH, 2017, p.300). Important to say that, as time
went by, the francophone press in Ottoman Empire became not only
4. Pour satisfaire l’une, pour combattre
les autres, notre presse nationale, se
publiant dans l’Empire, ne pouvait sufire
parce qu’insuffisamment lue, ou plutôt
pas lus du tout au-delà des frontière de
notre pays.
[...]
La nécessité d’un organe de défense
des intérêts généraux de l’Empire
Ottoman s’imposait.
La route était donc libre, nous pouvions
nous y engager sans crainte, il y avait là
une belle oeuvre patriotique àa ccomplir.
Et c’est ainsi que nous fûmes conduits à
fonder La Jeune Turquie.
La Jeune Turquie sera l’organe de dé-
fense des intérêts géneraux de l’Empire
Ottoman. Porte-Drapeau, en France, de
notre beau pays, elle fera flotter haut
l’oriflamme de la Patrie.
[...]
A la presse étrangère qui, souvent, pour
ne pas dire toujours, juge la ques-
tion d’Orient à sa façon et selon ses
ambitions diverses, La Jeune Turquie
rapellera qu’il y a dans cette Question
d’Orient un point de vue ottoman qui
doit primer tour les autres.
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estudos internacionais • Belo Horizonte, ISSN 2317-773X, v. 8, n. 4, (dez. 2020), p. 80-96
the press read by French colonies in Ottoman territories, but also the
press read by Ottoman francophone elites, until the outbreak of the
Great War (ATEȘ, 2015).
In the case of La Jeune Turquie, although it’s records were catalogued
by The National Library of France as Ottoman francophone press, it must be
considered that the journal was not published in Ottoman territories, but
in Paris, aiming to dialogue with the Parisian ottoman colony and with
the French public opinion. This aspect is meaningful considering the im-
portance of Paris as the capital city of the expansionist French Third Re-
public (1870-1940) and, as a consequence, the capital city of a rival empire
of the Ottomans in the age of the imperialist competition and the capital
city of one of the Great Powers prior to the Great War.
As porte-drapeau of Ottoman interests towards French public
opinion, La Jeune Turquie was clearly an unofficial journal. Beyond
that, the newspaper also was directed to the Ottoman community in
Paris. According to Klaus Kreiser (2000, 333-336), Parisian belle époque
exerted a fascination over the modernized Ottoman elite that could
be noticed in writings of many Ottoman intellectuals of that time.
There are many reasons to justify the phenomena, which could be
summarized in three main factors. Firstly, the role played by French
language in some ethos of Ottoman elite. In addition to the fact that
French was the language of access to the highest positions in Ottoman
bureaucracy, the main newspapers read by Constantinople elite were
published in French.
Secondly, it was above all to Paris where it used to go Ottoman
intellectuals and students in their formative years, often with Ottoman
government patronage, aiming to form human resources needed for the
Empire to promote its modernisation process. Such politics began with
the Tanzimat, in 1836, and lasted until the Great War. Finally, it was in
Paris where the Young Turks movement was formed in opposition to
the Hamidian regime. In Paris, according to Erdal Kaynar (2012, p.31)
the westernised Ottoman elite, among them the Young Turks, could
establish “a bond in world scale” with European elites. The fascination
with bourgeois way of life of the belle époque cultivated by Ottoman elite
made Paris the Mecca of the modern world for westernised Ottomans
(ibidem, p.32).
The establishment of a journal for the defense of Ottoman interests
in Paris had particular cultural sense, located at the highly westernized
Young Turk’s images of modernity, as much as an strategic eort to inter-
vene in European public opinion - even if limited to metropolitan France
- in order to promote, in the terms of the cited above, the Ottoman point
of view of the Eastern Question. La Jeune Turquie’s discourse could be,
therefore, understood as a discourse negotiated in-between, which means,
according to Homi Bhabha (1994, p.29, emphasis added),
The contribution of negotiation is to display the ‘in-between’ of this
crucial argument; it is not self contradictory, but significantly performs [...]
the problems of judgement and identification that inform the political space of its
enunciation.
91
Edmar Avelar Sena, Guilherme di Lorenzo, Alaor Souza Oliveira Between a Traumac Past and an Uncertain Future:
a study on the representaons of the Ooman defeat in the Balkan War (1912-1913)
La Jeune Turquie and the Balkan Wars (1912-1913)
In this section, it will be discussed how the liminal event of the Bal-
kan Wars was represented in the pages of La Jeune Turquie, highlighting
discursive cleavages produced by the radical transformation of the jour-
nal’s political space of enunciation due to Ottoman defeat for the Balkan
League.
The Balkan Wars implied the almost complete withdrawal of the
Ottomans from Europe. In the following weeks to the war declaration by
Montenegro in October 8, 1912, and the formation of the Balkan League,
in which joined Bulgaria, Greece and Serbia, in October 17, the Ottoman
borders in Europe withdraw until the lines of Çatalca, thereabout only
60 kilometers from Constantinople. In Paris, the Ottoman condence on
the war, expressed in La Jeune Turquie issue of October 9, 1912, gave place
to images of terrifying events and the Ottoman defeat in the following
issues. In an editorial published in November 14, 1912, only a month since
the beginning of the war, it is written:
So, to transform the two hundred thousand men of the ordu of Thrace
into a nameless mob, to completely sweep away two provinces where
only Adrianople and Scutari today defend the honor of the Ottoman
arms, to make tremble the successor of Mahomet II [sic] in Constantino-
ple, it only took a month!
Today the Ottoman soldiers, without bread, without cartridges, without
leaders, shivering, eeing with haggard eyes the plains where the Balkan
guns spit an invisible death whisper superstiously that the times have
come and that, if they want to rest in the ground of Islam, it will be pru-
dent of them to seek their last asylum under the funeral cemeteries of
Asia. Today, an immense and pitiful exodus sends back to Constantinople
a terried crowd and transforms the capital into a vast encampment of
nomads.
5
It is not the objective of this present work to evaluate the horrors
of the war. However, it is noticeable that terrifying descriptions of the
war such as cited above, occupy the journal pages in the rst weeks of the
conict. According to Y. Doğan Çetinkaya (2014), images of atrocities in
the battleeld compose an atrocity propaganda strategy, through which it
was aimed to mobilize and the nationalisation of the masses as a bet for
reversing the low morale of the Ottomans after de defeat.
Based on Çetinkaya’s (2014) approach, which Ottoman nation was
mobilised during Balkan Wars in the pages of La Jeune Turquie? It is
meaningful to observe that, with the outbreak of the war, the journal did
not apply the term nation to designate the Ottomans or the Empire. The
word often used was homeland (patrie) and that was because the journal
sustained the principle of Ottomanism in order to justify the Empire’s ter-
ritorial integrity.
The Ottomanist discourse was already presented in the October 9,
1912 editorial, at the eve of the war, when La Jeune Turquie armed that
“the [European] cabinets well know that [...] there are as much Christians
as Muslims among the citizens who would defend the Ottoman home-
land ”.
6
More enthusiastically, in the editorial of October 30, 1912,
Should we believe, along with many war correspondents, that the Chris-
tians have brought an element of weakness and disorganization into our
5. Ainsi donc, pour transformer en une
cohue sans nom les deux cent mille
hommes de l’ordou de Thrace, pour
balayer entièrement deux provinces où
seules Andrinople et Scutari défendent
aujoud’hui l’honneur des armes ottoma-
nes, poru faire trembler dans Constanti-
nople le successeur de Mahomet II, il a
suffu d’un mois! Aujoud’hui les soldats
ottomans, sans pain, sans cartouches,
sans chefs, grelottants, fuyant avec
des yeux hagards les plaines où les
canons balkaniques crachent une mort
invisible murmurent superstifieusement
que les temps sont venus et que, s’ils
veulent reposer en terre d’Islam, in sera
prudent de leur part de chercher leur
dernier asile sous les cippes fun´raires
des cimerières d’Asie. Aujoud’hui, une
immense et pitoyable exode fair refluer
vers Constantinople une foule terrifiée
et transforme la capitale n un vaste
campement de nomades.
6. Les cabinets savent bien [...] qu’il
y a d’ailleurs autant de chrétiens que
de musulmans parmi les citoyens qui
défendraient maintenant la patrie
ottomane.
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estudos internacionais • Belo Horizonte, ISSN 2317-773X, v. 8, n. 4, (dez. 2020), p. 80-96
valiant army? Until proven otherwise, we refuse to do so. The admirable
enthusiasm with which all nationalities and all religions have contrib-
uted to the organization of relief for the wounded proves that the ne
theory of Ottomanism has borne fruit and that for everyone, Armenians,
Greeks, Arabs or Turks, it now there is only one preoccupation: The
homeland is in danger!
7
However, as long as the defeat became an irreversible reality for
the Ottomans, a profound inexion marked La Jeune Turquie’s discourse.
The prior enthusiastic Ottomanism gave place to a wide and ambiguous
horizon of expectations, marked by a rage of future possibilities for the
Empire and the Ottoman homeland. Such inection rstly appeared in
the journal’s pages in the editorial of January 22, 1913. The Ottomanism
started to gain a new shape, hanging between a Turkism and a wilder
moderniser allegiance to the Empire:
Ogni male non vien per nuocere, say the Italians: may this proverb come
true in the Turkey of tomorrow! Perhaps rst of all the current ampu-
tation - despite all our regrets - will help to facilitate the achievement
of national unity and at the same time that of the reforms which are
necessary if we want to make the Empire a strong and prosperous state.
Already, to virilize our souls irritated by the harmful inuence of Byz-
antium, a former minister proposes to remove Constantinople from the
title of capital and to transport the heart of Turkey to the interior, to the
center of the country, under a harsher climate, in the healthiest environ-
ment of laborers in which great peoples and invincible armies are made.
Turks, not Levantines, citizens and not merchants, soldiers and not
ocials, this is what we need.
It will be necessary that the statesmen of tomorrow, taking up the beau-
tiful theories of Ottomanism, work to unite Amenians, Arabs and Turks
in the bosom of the mutilated homeland. They will succeed through
the civic education of the people, which will immediately follow liberal
reforms. And immediately afterwards, they will have to take care of the
development of the pause, the only one capable of making us rich and
strong.
8
The April 22 editorial assessed the eects of the war, demanding
the leaders an eort to lead the Empire towards a normality state. At that
time, the Ottomans needed to strive to “Healing the wounds, reorganiz-
ing and enhancing what remains of the Empire (…)” (LA JEUNE TUR-
QUIE, April 22, 1913)
9
. According to the editorial, the priority should be
to preserve what had left of the Empire, leveraging all its possibilities.
There was an attempt to present a favorable depiction of the conjunc-
ture, despite the defeat. The defeat made it more homogeneous and,
therefore, easier to manage. The image shown by the newspaper was
of the “amputation of a sick member” which would allow the Empire to
restore its vitality:
There, all the populations are of the same religion and it will be easy
to reconcile them, by making them understand their common interest.
Perhaps even - however cruel this admission may be - the loss of a third
of our Empire will be a relief for us. Our European provinces were, in
eect, a heavy burden which, without guaranteeing us any prot, cost a
lot of eort and attention, while alienating us much of Western opinion
(LA JEUNE TURQUIE, April 22, 1913)
10
.
After the signing of the London treaty on June 10, the war was over
for the Ottoman Empire. However, the conict continued among the
Balkan countries, and the Ottoman leaders were still facing an uncertain
7. Faut-il croire, avec de nombreux
correspondants de guerre, que les
chrétiens ont apporté dans notre
vaillante armée un élément de faiblesse
et de désorganisation? Jusqu’à la
preuve contraire nous nois y refusons.
L’admirable élan avec lequel toutes les
nationalités, toutes les religions ont
contribué à l’organisation des secours
aux blessés prouve que la belle théorie
de l’ottomanisme a porté ses fruits et
que pour tous, Arméniens, Grecs, Ara-
bes ou Turcs, il n’y a maintenant qu’une
préoccupation: La patrie est en danger!
8. Ogni male non vien per nuocere, disent
les Italiens: Puisse ce proverbe se réaliser
dans la Turquie de demain! Peut-être
d’abord l’amputation actuelle - malgré
tous nos regrets - contribuera-t-elle à
faciliter la réalisation de l’unité nationale
et en même temps celle des réformes qui
s’imposent si nous voulons faire de l’Em-
pire un État fort et prospère. Déjà, pour
viriliser nos âmes énervées par l’influence
néfaste de Byzance, un ancien ministre
propose d’enlever à Constantinople son
titre de capitale et de transporter le coeur
de la Turquie à l’intérieur, au centre du
pays, sous un climat plus rude, dans le mi-
lieu le plus sain des laboureurs que seuls
font les peuples grands et les armées in-
vincibles. Des Turcs, et non des Levantins,
de citoyens et non des mercantis, des
soldats et non des fonctionnaires, voilà ce
qu’il nous fault. Il faudra que les hommes
d’Etat de demain, reprenant les belles
théories de l’ottomanisme travaillent à
unir Arméniens, Arabes et Turc dans le
giron de la patrie mutilée. Ils y réussiront
par l’éducation civique du peuple, que
suivront aussitôt des réformes libérales.
Et immédiatement après, ils devront s’oc-
cuper de la mise en valeur du pays, seule
capable de nous rendre riche et forts.
9. Panser les plaies, réorganiser et
mettre en valeur ce qui nous reste de
l’Empire, cette tâche a de quoi permet-
tre à nos hommes d’Etat de monter leurs
facultés et se consoler en prouvant que,
même après cette guerre désastreuse
et cette amputtation, la Turquie peut
encore faire figure dans le monde.
10. Là, toutes les populations sont de
même religion et il sera facile de les
concilier, en leur faisant comprendre leur
intérêt commun. Peut-être même – quel-
que cruel nous soit cet aveu – la perte
du tiers de notre Empire sera-t-elle pour
nous un soulagement. Nos provinces
d’Europe étaient, en effect, une lourde
charge qui, sans nous garantir aucun
profit, coûtait beaucoup d’efforts et
d’attentions, tout en nous aliénant une
bonne partie de l’opinion occidentale.
93
Edmar Avelar Sena, Guilherme di Lorenzo, Alaor Souza Oliveira Between a Traumac Past and an Uncertain Future:
a study on the representaons of the Ooman defeat in the Balkan War (1912-1913)
scenario. There was a fear that the conict could bring the Great Powers
into the region. In this scenario, the editorial expresses an apprehension
about a possible division of the Empire into spheres of inuence by the
European powers. According to the editorial of July 9:
They are already talking about areas of inuence, the Muscovite is
already eyeing Armenia, England is taking up Mehmed-Ali’s dream and
Germany is thinking of carving out the lion’s share between Alexan-
dretta and the Persian Gulf. As for France, threatened by seeing its rivals
share this magnicent Empire which was undoubtedly sovereign twenty
years ago, it can only remember that Lebanon still considers it as its rst
protector (LA JEUNE TURQUIE, July 9, 1913)
11
.
On the other hand, the uncertain scenario also led to more optimis-
tic expectations
12
. The editorial pointed to the possibility of the Empire
taking back the lost territory in the face of the enemies’ potential weak-
ening. Since the crisis had not yet resolved, chance and the imponderable
could intervene in the course of events. The conict among the adversar-
ies was portrayed as an unexpected opportunity. According to the edito-
rial, the ottomans should:
(..) never be despaired because the yesterday’s ruthless winner can be
betrayed by fortune, and tomorrow lose, by force, what he conquered
by force (...). Now, by a sort of miracle, circumstances oered Turkey
an unexpected opportunity for revenge (LA JEUNE TURQUIE, July 9,
1913)
13
.
It is important to observe that the optimism was not limited to
the possibility of retaking the lost territories, but it was related to the
expectations that the Empire would resume its protagonism in the Med-
iterranean. The edition of September 10 expresses the acknowledgment
of the impossibility of recovering the lost territory. But according to the
editorial, the Empire could ourish again, even if the territories were not
recovered:
The Ottoman Empire, diminished but concentrated, amputated but
more homogeneous, returned from its illusions about the guarantees
of integrity, supported by an educated army and stationed modern
battleships, will not only be able to defend its heritage, but will also play
the role of a real power in the depths of the Mediterranean (LA JEUNE
TURQUIE, September 24, 1913).
14
In the editorials, the optimism about the Empire’s future was con-
ditional: optimism echoed the possibility of change and not the existence
of a favorable international environment. The editorial presents a narra-
tive that highlights both the need for development and modernization
and the armation of patriotism. These two facets were intertwined in
the conception of a strong national identity, as can be seen in the excerpt:
Of course, I don’t think we should be xenophobic, but let us be careful
that the ag follows the goods, the guns the rail and that the battleships
are ready to enter the ports abroad (LA JEUNE TURQUIE, September
10, 1913)
15
.
On the other hand, the editorials’ representation of the internation-
al situation outlines a very adverse picture. It is possible to observe the
feeling of an imminent threat. The Empire could rise again if, and only if,
it carried out the much-needed modernization. Otherwise, the situation
was one of extreme vulnerability. The danger of separatism and the inter-
11. Déjà l’on parle de zones d’influence,
déjà le Moscovite couve des yeux l’Ar-
menie, l’Angleterre reprend le rêve de
Mehmed-Ali et l’Allemagne songe à se
tailler la part du lion entre Alexandrette
et le Golfe Persique. Quant à la France,
ménacée de voir ses rivaux ou émules
se partager ce magnifique Empire où
son influence était incontestablement
souveraine il y a mins de vingt ans, elle
ne peut que se rappeler que le Liban la
considère toujours comme sa protectrice
au premier chef. Et c’est ainsi que les
soldats jouent aux dés le marteau du
Prophète avant même que le martyr
n’ait rendu le dernier soupir.
12. It is not possible to infer whether
the authors sincerely believed in this
possibility or whether it was just
propaganda. Still, it is important to
understand how the newspaper sought
to frame the situation to the European
public and how it signified the present
and the future.
13. ne faut jamais désespérer et que
l’impitoyable vainqueur d’hier peut être
trahi par la fortune à son tour et perdre
demain par la force ce qu’il a conquis
par la force. (...) A cette nouvelle, tous
les coeurs ottomans ont frémi. Voilà
que, par une sorte de miracle, les
circonstances offraient à la Turquie une
occasion inespérée de revanche.
14. L’Empire Ottoman, diminué mais
concentré, amputé mais plus homogène,
revenu de ses illusions sur les garanties
d’integrité, appuyé sur une armée
instruite et garé par des cuirassés mo-
dernes, pourra non seulement défendre
son patrimoine, mais encore jouer le
rôle d’une véritable puissance au fond
de la Méditerraanée.
15. Certes, je ne pense pas que nous
devions nous montrer xénophobes, mais
prenons garde que le pavillon suit la
marchandise, les canons le rail et que
les cuirassés sont prêts á entrer dans
les ports concédés à l’étranger.
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estudos internacionais • Belo Horizonte, ISSN 2317-773X, v. 8, n. 4, (dez. 2020), p. 80-96
vention of the Great Powers are present in the editorials. For example, the
editorial of July 9 presents a situation marked by challenges and dangers:
No doubt separatist tendencies could well manifest themselves in certain
provinces, supported and corrupted by foreign gold. There is no doubt
that there is no shortage of unscrupulous nanciers and statesmen who
believed they were accomplishing a ne feat in blaming Turkey’s name
on many nations (LA JEUNE TURQUIE, July 9, 1913)
16
.
On the eve of the Great War, the editorial of January 14 presents a
bleak and pessimistic scenario for the Empire. There is a sense of urgency
regarding the implementation of modernization policies. The concern is
not limited to the fear of the emergence of new separatist movements in
the remaining provinces, stimulated by the great powers. The very core of
the Empire, Asia Minor, was in danger of being occupied by foreign forces:
We must understand, ourselves, that it is both our duty and our interest
to regenerate our provinces of Asia Minor as quickly as possible, under
penalty of seeing them follow the fate of most of our possessions from
Europe
17
(LA JEUNE TURQUIE, January 14, 2014).
Almost tragically, it is possible to see a sentiment that the moment
of rupture was close. The apprehension was a product not of a prophecy
but of an assessment that the Ottoman Empire was a vulnerable State in
an unstable international system. For the editorial of January, “the oc-
cupation and partition of Asia Minor could quickly follow the rst inci-
dent that would ignite the powder” (LA JEUNE TURQUIE, January 14,
1914)
18
. It does not mean that the Ottomans were convinced that the Em-
pire would come to an end soon. However, the expectations of the future
were uncertain more than ever.
Conclusion
Based on the assumption that people act according to how they
interpret reality, making sense of historical events is a fundamental ele-
ment of the analysis of critical junctures. It is important to note that the
concatenation of events does not lead to a sequence of “points of no re-
turn”. As much as the events presented in this paper are undoubtedly cru-
cial for the construction of Turkish nationalism, this does not mean that
the individuals who experienced these events perceived them according
to the nationalist narrative constructed years later. Indeed, it is possible to
nd in the Ottoman defeat “objective” facts that help explain the collapse
of the Empire (ÖZTAN, 2018, p.67). Bearing this in mind, it is crucial to
the researchers to understand how the men and women of the past as-
sessed the historical contexts in which they lived.
The Balkan War was a traumatic experience that represented,
above all, a re-articulation of expectations about the future of the Otto-
man Empire. It was a crucial moment not because it determined the only
possible fate, but because it introduced a scenario marked by deep uncer-
tainties. As Öztan argues:
(...) more than anything else the Balkan Wars ushered in an era of political
uncertainty and reshued debates over the future of the Ottoman Empire.
The postwar era was characterized less by broad consensus than by debate and
disagreement (ÖZTAN, 2018, p.68).
16. Cet odieux project se réalisera-t-il?
Nous voulons encore espérer que non.
Sans doute des tendances sépara-
tistes pourraient bien se manifester
dans certaines provinces, soutenues
et corrompues par l’or étranger. Sans
doute it ne manque pas de financiers
et d’hommes d’Etat sans scrupules qui
croirairent accomplir un bel exploit en
raynt le nom de la Turquie de nombre
des nations.
17. Nous devons comprendre, nous-mê-
mes, qu’il est à la fois de notre devoir
et de notre intérêt de régénérer le plus
rapidement possible nos provinces
d’Asie Mineure, sous peine de les voir
suivre le sort de la majeure partie de
nos possessions d’Europe.
18. L’occupation et le partage de l’Asie-
-Mineure pourraient donc suivre à bref
délai, le premier incident qui metrait le
feu aux poudres.
95
Edmar Avelar Sena, Guilherme di Lorenzo, Alaor Souza Oliveira Between a Traumac Past and an Uncertain Future:
a study on the representaons of the Ooman defeat in the Balkan War (1912-1913)
This article endorses the argument that the defeat in 1913 is an cru-
cial moment in Ottoman Empire History not because it sealed the fate
of the Empire, but because it created a new reality and introduced new
expectations. It was a complex period lled with ambiguities. The analy-
sis of a newspaper’s editorials does not allow us to make generalizations.
Still, this eort enables us to glimpse some facets, among many, of the
debate that existed at the time.
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