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The end of the Ottoman Empire and the

evolution of the Middle East security

complex

El ﬁn del Imperio Otomano y la evolución del complejo de

seguridad de Oriente Medio

O ﬁm do Império Otomano e a evolução do complexo de

segurança do Oriente Médio

Jorge M. Lasmar

Leonardo C. A. Santa Rita

DOI: 10.5752/P.2317-773X.2020v8.n4.p166

Received in: November 10, 2020

Accepted in: January 27, 2020

A

Since the demise of the Ottoman Empire, the Middle East has undergone sever-

al abrupt political changes and became the stage of a series of regional conicts

and disputes by Great Powers that greatly impacted how this regional security

complex evolved. Using the theoretical framework of both the School of Co-

penhagen and the English School, we retrace how these security and insecurity

dynamics has been in an unended process of constant evolution since the fall

of the Empire and how these processes are embedded in the larger context of

systemic great power management.

Keywords: Security. Regional Security Complex. Middle East. Ottoman Empire

R

Desde la desaparición del Imperio Otomano, Oriente Medio ha experimentado

varios cambios políticos abruptos y se ha convertido en el escenario de una serie

de conictos regionales y disputas de las grandes potencias que impactaron

enormemente en la evolución de este complejo de seguridad regional. Utilizan-

do el marco teórico tanto de la Escuela de Copenhague como de la Escuela de

Inglés, recordamos cómo estas dinámicas de seguridad e inseguridad han estado

en un proceso sin n de evolución constante desde la caída del Imperio y cómo

estos procesos están integrados en el contexto más amplio de sistemas sistémi-

cos. gran gestión de energía.

Palabras clave: Seguridad. Complejo Regional de Seguridad. Oriente Médio.

Império Otomano.

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Jorge M. Lasmar, Leonardo C. A. Santa Rita The end of the Ooman Empire and the evoluon of the Middle East security complex

R

Desde o m do Império Otomano, o Oriente Médio passou por várias mu-

danças políticas abruptas e se tornou o palco de uma série de conitos region-

ais e disputas entre as grandes potências que impactaram fortemente a forma

como este complexo de segurança regional evoluiu. Usando o arcabouço

teórico da Escola de Copenhague e da Escola Inglesa, retraçamos como essas

dinâmicas de segurança e insegurança estão em um processo ainda não termi-

nado de constante evolução desde a queda do Império e como esses processos

estão inseridos no contexto mais amplo e sistêmico da administração das

grandes potências.

Palavras-Chave: Segurança. Complexo de Segurança Regional. Oriente Médio.

Império Otomano.

The fall of the Empire: From unity to overlay

The “Sick Man of Europe”. That is how Western powers referred

to the Ottoman Empire during almost the entire 19th century (CATH-

ERWOOD, 2006). Undoubtedly, this expression is loaded with Euro-

centrism and an overt imperialist bias. Nevertheless, it does reect the

Western Europe’s prevailing view about the Empire. In fact, it even re-

ects the view of some within the Empire. Napoleon’s conquest of Egypt

in 1798 brought out to the Ottoman elite the feeling that there was an

increasing chasm between the Empire and the European powers. This

feeling could already be felt in several areas ranging from the econom-

ic and military passing through the public administration and reaching

all the way to state governance. Increasingly, the question of how the

Empire should try to implement Western European standards of devel-

opment dominated much of the internal debates of the Ottoman elites

(CATHERWOOD, 2006).

Throughout the 19th century and the rst years of the 20th centu-

ry, the Ottoman Empire equated ‘modernization’ with ‘Westernization’.

During this period, the Empire engaged in an attempt of modernization

that coexisted with domestic revolutions and crises. In the political and

statesmanship sphere, the Empire created new institutions aiming to

modernize, westernize and secularize its bureaucracy and public admin-

istration. These new organizations intended to substitute the traditional

ones with institutions whose practices were closer to the Western Euro-

pean model (ZÜRCHER, 2019). This domestic ‘modernization’ push was

also followed by the adoption of international practices that were aimed

at both demonstrating the Empire’s acceptance of (European) interna-

tional society’s primary institutions

as well as at constituting evidence of

its membership to it. Thus, the Empire also went to great lengths to adapt

its diplomatic and international law practices so that they would conform

with those norms prevailing within the European international society

(IS). In fact, this process - which culminated with the signing of the 1856

Treaty of Paris - was a seen as a necessary condition for the Ottomans to

be recognized as legitimate participants in the European concert (PAL-

ABIYIK, 2014). In retrospect, the Ottoman Empire’s bid for membership

1. Primary institutions are deﬁned as

“relatively fundamental and durable

practices that are constitutive of actors

and their patterns of activity in relation

to each other (BUZAN, 2004b:164). They

differ from both ‘secondary institu-

tions’, i.e. “those referred to by regime

theory” (BUZAN, 2004b:166) as well as

‘domestic political institutions’ which

refer to “organizations in a government

that create, enforce, and apply laws”

(BODDY-EVANS, 2020). For an overview

of the evolution of the primary institu-

tions of the Middle East see (BUZAN,

GONZALEZ-PELAEZ, 2009).

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within (Western) IS during its last years illustrate the argument that the

expansion of Western IS occurred in a vanguardist

way in which those

who were not engulfed by European inuence were obliged to make con-

cessions and adapt to the imposed model (BUZAN, 2010).In fact, as Welsh

states, it is now clear that “in the early part of the twentieth century, hi-

erarchical practices were evident in the particular ways in which self-de-

termination—the new standard of membership in IS—was applied to the

crumbling Ottoman and Austro-Hungarian empires after the conclusion

of the First World War” (WELSH, 2017, p.157).

In this context, the Ottoman Empire and its leaders - especially

those known as Young Turks

- went to a great extent to modernize

their country and to be recognized as a legitimate

force by the Euro-

pean powers. Nevertheless, unlike Japan which was successful in its

recognition (albeit with reservations), a series of questionable choices

on the part of the Ottomans ultimately contributed to the very fall of

the Empire (CATHERWOOD, 2006). An example of such questionable

choices was the alliance with Germany in the First World War. How-

ever, interestingly enough, the ideas also played a great role in this

process. Some of the very Western ideas that the Ottoman reformists

endorsed eventually contributed to the dissolution of the Empire. For

example, European nationalist-inspired ideals helped to motivate upris-

ings of local minorities that inevitably led to a weakening of Istanbul’s

dominance (MATHER, 2014).

After the end of the First World War, and the subsequent disso-

lution of the Empire, the Ottoman domains that comprised the present

states of Israel, Jordan, Syria, Lebanon, Iraq and the Palestinian territo-

ries became directly under the control of England and France (CATHER-

WOOD, 2006). From that moment on, a single empire started a process

that eventually gave rise to an entire regional security complex and its

sub-complexes. As local leaders of these new territories begun to gov-

ern under the tutelage of external powers, the local politics also begun

to involve and reect the larger dynamics of both regional and global

disputes between these two powers. The relations between Beirut and

Baghdad, for example, were no longer just the straightforward interac-

tions amongst two cities in the same country. At that moment, what was

once a centralized unit gave rise to a region marked by the new presence

of external political units. However, Middle East (ME) Regional Security

Complex (RSC) did not immediately emerge with these changes (BU-

ZAN, WÆVER, 2003).

Buzan and Wæver (2003) dene a Regional Security Complex as “a

set of units whose major processes of securitization, desecuritization, or

both are so interlinked that their security problems cannot reasonably

be analyzed or resolved apart from one another” (BUZAN, WÆVER,

p.44, 2003). Hence, although it is true that the region later became a re-

gional security complex, it did not full the requisite necessary for the

demarcation of an RSC straight way. That is to say that the region did

not become immediately formed by independent units operating in an

anarchic system with durable patterns of amity and enmity and with the

material element of the balance of power associated with a geographical

2. According to Buzan, “The vanguardist

account emphasizes the centrality of

Europe in the expansion story and pro-

jects a rather one-way view of cultural

transmission from the West to the rest

of the world” (BUZAN, 2010, p.1).

3. The Young Turks were a Turkish

Nationalist group that rose to power in

the early 20th century (CATHERWOOD,

2006)

4. Here, once again, the Ottoman Empire

equated legitimacy to membership in

Western Europe’s IS.

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Jorge M. Lasmar, Leonardo C. A. Santa Rita The end of the Ooman Empire and the evoluon of the Middle East security complex

demarcation. (BUZAN, WÆVER, 2003). At the same time, although one

could argue that the region operated as a proxy RSC between France and

the United Kingdom, that was not the case. As Buzan and Wæver argue,

to “European imperial powers, the world was their region. Under these

circumstances of successful global scale imperialism by great powers, the

scope for independent regional security dynamics was small” (BUZAN,

WÆVER 2003, p.15).

In fact, English and French occupation of the region took place in

two ways: via direct domination - as the British mandate from Palestine

- and through association with local leaders - such as the Hashemite clan

that still holds power in Jordan nowadays (CATHERWOOD, 2006). The

presence of these external powers in the region then, made the develop-

ment of an autonomous RSC impossible. These powers reproduced larg-

er social and political identities at the regional level assimilating much of

the then existing local patterns of security. Much of the wider patterns

of amity/enmity and balance of power existing between France and the

United Kingdom, was transferred to the region assimilating the exist-

ing local security dynamics. For example, the interactions between the

Hashemites in Jordan and Iraq and the Syrians and Lebanese became

directly subordinate to the larger dynamics surrounding the relation-

ship between France and England. Thus, the region transitioned from a

centralized political unit to a non-RSC. According to Buzan and Wæver

(2003), Non-RSCs exists in two situations. The rst are those in which

the units are so isolated from each other that their processes of securiti-

zation and desecuritization cannot be interconnected. The second, are

those cases in which the regional security dynamics is dominated by

external powers in what they call overlay (BUZAN, WÆVER, 2003). The

latter is exactly the case in question.

Surely, it is important to note that France and England did not oc-

cupy the entire territory of the ME. Foreign powers did not dominate

Saudi Arabia, Iran and the newly born Republic of Turkey. Moreover,

Egypt soon achieved its independence in 1922 (CATHERWOOD, 2006).

However, at the time, these countries did not immediately evolve into

an independent regional security complex. Iran, which was a monarchy

at the time, had just emerged from a convoluted domestic crisis that in-

volved revolutions and coups. Additionally, Iran was then strongly in-

uenced by the British who regarded the region as central to the “Great

Game”

of power in the region (KAMRAVA, 2011). The same can be said

about Egypt. Even after gaining their ocial independence in 1922, the

Egyptians were still ocially tutored by the British on topics such as for-

eign policy and national defense (CLEVELAND, BURTON, 2009).

In the case of Saudi Arabia, the House of Saud controlled the desert

region of Najd, on the Arabian Peninsula. In 1924, Ibn Saud (king of the

Saudis) took the position of Hussein (leader of the Hashemite clan) in

Hijaz and advanced the construction of modern Saudi Arabia (CLEVE-

LAND, BURTON, 2009). The Saudi consolidation, however, did not both-

er foreign powers. This is because the kingdom then seemed feeble and

the European powers did not have much interest in the remote interior

of the desertic Arabian Peninsula. Even so, in a treaty signed in 1927, Ibn

5. The “Great Game” was a period of

power dispute between Russian and

British Empires in the ME, Central and

South Asia (CATHERWOOD, 2006).

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Saud pledged to not threaten the British protectorates in the south of the

peninsula (CLEVELAND, BURTON, 2009).

The English and French also were not very concerned with the

newly funded Republic of Turkey. Mustafa Kemal, a.k.a. Ataturk, initiat-

ed a nationalist movement aimed at creating a Turkish Identity. To this

end, he sought to discontinue important institutions of the Ottoman Em-

pire by creating new ‘Turkish’ institutions in its lieu. This process created

a complex struggle for autonomy and national unity that resulted in a

series of conicts and millions of lives lost. Thus, under the British and

French eyes, Turkey was not a relevant regional player as it was essential-

ly struggling for its own existence (KAMRAVA, 2011).

Hence, the early non-formation of a regional security complex can

be related more to European Imperialism (overlay) rather than due to

the inexistence of regional disputes and rivalries. But it is necessary to

remember that Overlay is not the only mechanism by which the great

powers interfere in a region. According to Buzan and Wæver (2003), great

powers can also act through penetration which “occurs when outside

powers make security alignments with states within an RSC” (BUZAN,

WÆVER, p. 46, 2003). According to the authors, penetration is a some-

what “milder” form of external interference in an RSC but that was not

what occurred in the ME at the end of the First World War as the Euro-

pean powers presence in the region eectively absorbed and assimilated

the logic of the regional balance of power and patterns amity/enmity via

direct military occupation and practices of colonialism.

However, although the presence of France and England in the ME

during the inter-war period was marked by overlay, it was also respon-

sible for the beginning of the creation of new patterns of amity/enmity

that would deeply aect the region today. British and French colonialism

left indelible marks that deeply aected the pattern of social organization

in the ME and the way regional actors related to each other. The some-

what abrupt departure of the European powers in the region also not

only caused new actors to emerge but also created a dispute to grab the

power and space left by the colonizers that became one the main drivers

of the regional security architecture in the immediate post-World War II

period. (CATHERWOOD, 2006).

An example of this process can be seen in how some countries in

the region organized they newly independent countries. Countries such

as Jordan, Iraq until 1958, Egypt until 1952, and the small countries of

the British protectorates in the Persian Gulf, all became monarchies due

to the direct inuence of the British. In addition to the fact that England

is also a monarchy, it also used its relations with local dynasties as an

intermediate element of its realm as a way to guarantee the continuity

of its (indirect) authority over the region while at the same time guaran-

teeing a certain level of legitimacy (CLEVELAND, BURTON, 2009). This

British modus operandi allowed the power transition to be much more

obvious in its former domains since the new leaders were in collaboration

with the British (KAMRAVA, 2011).

In what regards the French domains - such as the current Leba-

non and Syria - the situation has evolved dierently. Because France is a

171

Jorge M. Lasmar, Leonardo C. A. Santa Rita The end of the Ooman Empire and the evoluon of the Middle East security complex

country with a long republican tradition, it did not seek to associate itself

with monarchic dynasties. Thus, it pulverized its relations with various

local leaders and exercised a stronger direct presence. (KAMRAVA, 2011).

This French modus operandi produced two important legacies for the

region: The rst of them is that both Syria and Lebanon evolved into

republican regimes when they gained independence. The second legacy,

on the other hand, is related to the fact that, as a result of spreading local

leaderships and exercising a more direct dominance in the region, France

hampered the political transition in Syria and Lebanon and fostered some

conicts that had lasting consequences for the regional security architec-

ture. (KAMRAVA, 2011).

Another important legacy of the European presence in the ME,

and perhaps the most striking, is the issue of Palestine. Despite the enor-

mous discussions about the origin of the conict, the fundamental role

that the British played in its emergence is undeniable (CATHERWOOD,

2006; SINGH, 2011). The English mandate in Palestine had a dierent

type of organization because, instead of allying themselves with a single

local leadership, the British preferred to exercise direct domination in

the region progressively formulating policies that prevented the concen-

tration of forces with an Arab leadership. This was one of the main con-

tributing factors that subsequently prevented the emergence of cohesion

amongst local Arab forces during the war against the Zionists in 1948.

(KHALID, 2008).

The British are also responsible for the emergence of the conict

not only due to the policies deliberately adopted but also for negligence.

During their mandate in Palestine, the British allowed, in what appears to

be tacit support for the Zionist interpretation of the Balfour Declaration,

the migration of thousands of Jewish to Palestinian territory, increasing

social tension in the region (CATHERWOOD, 2006). The British were

also negligent in their process of leaving the region. By not establishing

any transitional governmental mechanisms, the British allowed the subse-

quent power struggle to develop in a very violent way (CATHERWOOD,

2006). This stance from England allowed for the European Jewish issue to

be exported to Palestine and become one of the main elements that would

dictate the ME’s social dynamics of amity/enmity in the future.

Hence, the troubled evolution of the ME non-Regional Security

Complex shortly after the fall of the Ottoman Empire set the tone for

what was to come. From a centralized unit (Ottoman Empire) to an over-

lay RSC, what was seen in the ME was an abrupt transition of power and

a complete rearrangement of regional forces. However, although it over-

came purely regional security dynamics, foreign occupation in the ME

served as an incubator for new power relations and the re-arrangement

of the regional structure of amity/enmity.

Post-World War II

The period immediately after the Second World War was marked

by the end of the overlay in the ME and the beginning of the formation of

an RSC with its own dynamics. The Israel/Palestine issue, the element of

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Arab nationalism and Pan-Arabism, as well as the relationship between

Islamism and politics were the main essentially regional elements that

contributed to the re-design of the power relations and the patterns of

amity/enmity in the ME. However, the elements of macrosecuritization

of the Cold War did not allow the evolution of a standard RSC. The whole

security issue in the ME, as well as practically all over the world, was ab-

sorbed by the power struggle between the US and the USSR. The ensuing

regional security complex, therefore, was an RSC centralized by foreign

powers, in which the global disputes between the US and the USSR dom-

inated much of the regional social dynamics. However, the local patterns

of securitization and desecuritization were suciently interconnected to

congure an RSC in its own (BUZAN, WÆVER, 2003). According to Bu-

zan and Wæver (2003), an RSC is centralized:

Because the core actor is globally orientated, the security dynamics of the region

are hugely distorted and suppressed. But since all other actors in the region have

their concerns linked to each other, a general map of global security would still

show a clear regional formation of densely knit connections compared to a lack

of connections in and out of the region for most units. This therefore can still be

treated as an RSC (BUZAN, WÆVER, p. 56, 2003).

One of the main security issues in the ME since the end of the Otto-

man Empire is, of course, the conict between Israelis and Palestinians.

Since the departure of the British from the region, a series of conicts

have emerged, the most obvious culminating in the creation of the state

of Israel in 1948. These conicts were marked by the organization of the

Zionist forces in contrast to the disorganization of the local Arab forces,

by the massive expulsion of the Arab populations from territories occu-

pied in 1948, by the not-so-obvious support that the Zionists received, and

by the power struggles between the Arab nations involved in the conict

(ROGAN, SHLAIM, 2008).

This initial support received by the Zionists was not necessarily ob-

vious as it was quite dierent from that which followed throughout the

Cold War. Most of the armaments and military equipment that the Israeli

used in the 1948 war originated in the European socialist bloc. Coun-

tries like Czechoslovakia, Poland, and even the Soviet Union sent many

weapons to Zionists to ght the Palestinians and found the state of Israel

(SHLAIM, 2008). This support, however, would not last long as power

struggles, both regional and systemic, would lead to rearrangements in

alliances across the ME.

Another important aspect of the 1948 war, which is fundamental

to understanding the evolution of RSC in the ME, was the power rela-

tionship between the other Arab countries during the conict. On one

side, there was the pro-Hashemite bloc, headed by the kingdoms of Jor-

dan and Iraq, and whose geopolitical objective was the creation of an

“Arab Kingdom” as had been promised to them by the British in return

for their support in organizing a revolt against the Ottoman Empire and

which would encompass much of the Levant, including the territory of

Palestine. On the other side, there was the anti-Hashemite bloc, led by

Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Syria, whose objective was precisely to prevent

the plans of the clan led by the king of Hashemite Jordan to materialize

8. In summation, macrosecuritization

is a major securitization process that

absorbs all others (BUZAN, WÆVER,

WILDE, 1997).

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Jorge M. Lasmar, Leonardo C. A. Santa Rita The end of the Ooman Empire and the evoluon of the Middle East security complex

(SHLAIM, 2008). These geopolitical movements of Arab leaders in the

ME demonstrate that the overlay no longer existed in the post-Mandate

period and that local forces were already re-shaping the dynamics of the

regional security and insecurity structure.

The conict between Israelis and Palestinians has had a signicant

role in this process of re-shaping the security and insecurity structure

of the ME. Two specic events that marked this conict demonstrate

the inuence of the Cold War dynamics in the Region: the 6 Days War

and the Yom Kippur War. These two important conicts clearly demon-

strate how regional interests and disputes - especially in Nasserist Egypt

and in the preemptive stance of the State of Israel – reect the broader

systemic dispute between the US and the Soviet Union and how it man-

ifested itself in the ME (CLEVELAND, BURTON, 2009). In summation,

during the 1967 Six-Day War, a coalition of Arab states led by Egypt ini-

tiated some provocative moves towards Israel which, in turn, responded

quickly with a preemptive attack, bringing the war to a quick end. The

result was terrible for the Arabs and even more so for the Palestinians.

The Israelis, in addition to imposing a signicant military defeat on the

Arabs, also managed to annex the territories of the West Bank, the Golan

Heights, the Gaza Strip, and the Sinai Peninsula (MASSOULIÉ, 1996).

The 1973 Yom Kippur War can be considered a direct consequence of

the events of June 1967. Only this time the Arabs attacked rst and took

the Israelis by surprise. Hostilities ended only with direct intervention

of the two superpowers and the underlining threat that there was a real

possibility that the conict would escalate to a global, even to nuclear,

war (MASSOULIÉ, 1996).

In both conicts, it is possible to observe how the areas of inu-

ence of the US and the USSR in the ME were sewn together and how the

regional disputes were quickly assimilated by the Cold War logic. The

Arabs, mainly Egypt, Syria, and republican Iraq, were massively support-

ed by the Soviet Union. The USSR, in turn, was interested in increasing

its sphere of inuence in the ME especially in the Mediterranean. The

United States, in turn, has been traditionally closer to the monarchies and

Turks (who are members of NATO) as well as greatly aligned with the

state of Israel as a form to contain Soviet interests in the region (CLEVE-

LAND, BURTON, 2009). Thus, the patterns of amity and enmity and the

dynamics of the regional balance of power were clearly penetrated and

centralized by systemic disputes. The rivalry between Arabs and Israe-

lis was embedded within the larger context of the macrosecuritization

of the ideological and material disputes between “Western Imperialism”

and “Communist Tyranny”.

The ideological component of the Cold War draws attention for

another important ideational ingredient of the securitization processes

in the ME: Arab Nationalism/Socialism. This ideological component has

had an important relationship with both the Cold War dynamics as well

as with the bid for membership in IS by the recently independent/auton-

omous states. Abdel Nasser’s Egypt had an important role in the devel-

opment and dissemination of the Arab Nationalism ideology. This ide-

ology included principles such as the need for a strong state, militarism,

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secularism (though not atheism), anti-imperialism and Pan-Arabism

(CLEVELAND, BURTON, 2009). The formers help explain the inuenc-

es of external ideologies and ideas in the region, while the latter is crucial

to understand why and how the regional patterns of amity and enmity

evolved as they did.

The Arab Nationalism/Socialism was thus a very important com-

ponent in the construction of the Middle Eastern alliances and an im-

portant driver of the alliances and alignments that took place on second

half of the 20th century. Since Nasser came to power in Egypt, a divi-

sion in the ME between conservative monarchic forces and progressive

republican forces began to be drawn. Traditionalist forces were repre-

sented mainly by the Hashemite kingdoms of Jordan and Iraq (until

1958), Saudi Arabia and Iran (until 1979). “Progressive” forces, on the

other hand, were initially represented by the republics of Egypt and

Syria. Iraq also joined this group in 1958 after it underwent a republican

military coup. This coup, and the subsequent change in Iraq’s align-

ment, became worrisome to the monarchical leaders of the ME who

feared that republican, secular, military and progressive movements

could spread within their territory and threat their monarchic social

order (HALLIDAY, 2005).

Another element of concern for conservative countries in the re-

gion was Nasserist Pan-Arabism. Nasser and the republican forces of the

ME, especially Syria, came to defend the unity of the Arab peoples under

a state which would be built based on the principles of Arab National-

ism/Socialism. In 1958, Egypt and Syria created the United Arab Repub-

lic (UAR) which intended to encompass all Arab states under Egyptian

leadership. However, due to issues such as the centralization of power in

Cairo as well as the non-accession of other countries, the UAR was short-

lived and ended in 1961 (ROMERO, 2015). This clash of ideas led to actu-

al conicts. An example was the conict in Yemen in the 1960s. Egypt,

which supported the formation of a republican government in North,

suered heavy casualties in the conict. Meanwhile, Jordan, Saudi Ara-

bia, Iran and even Israel supported the royalists who fought to preserve

the local Mutawakkilite Kingdom

(HALLIDAY, 2005).

Thus, one can establish a direct relationship between the move-

ment of Arab Nationalism/Socialism and several impacts of the Cold War

over the dynamics of the region. In fact, Fred Halliday (2005) states that

Nasser’s rise in Egypt and his ideology was what brought the Cold War

to the region:

The revolution of 1952 was to unleash a process of radicalisation that profoundly

aected Egypt as well as the Arab world. It brought the Cold War to the Arab

world, or, perhaps more accurately, allowed the Cold War to come to the Arab

world, aligning Arab states with one or other bloc in the Cold War itself, and

dividing Arab states themselves along Cold War lines. It also provided a new

ideological context for the rising tide of popular, if also conspiratorial, pressure

(from within the state and from outside) on states (HALLIDAY, p. 112, 2005).

As a matter of fact, the Nasser Pan-Arabism movement was strongly

built-in opposition to the Baghdad Pact. This agreement was spearheaded

by the United States and aimed primarily at containing the interests of

7. A state retrospectively known as

North Yemen that existed between 1918

and 1962 in the northern part of current

Yemen.

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Jorge M. Lasmar, Leonardo C. A. Santa Rita The end of the Ooman Empire and the evoluon of the Middle East security complex

the Soviet Union in the ME (HALLIDAY, 2005). Thus, the movement led

by Nasser brought another ideational element to the Cold War regional

dynamics: that of socialism. Local leaders, especially in Egypt and Syria,

evoked the need to create a socialism with “Arab characteristics” and to

adapt it to the political and social regional context. This Arab socialism

retained some dierences with the Soviet model but did advocated some

shared principles such as state-driven economics, aversion to nancial

capital, militarism, nationalism and anti-imperialism (CLEVELAND,

BURTON, 2009). Once again, local patterns of amity and enmity are be-

ing centralized and penetrate by the logic of systemic dispute.

This model of Arab Nationalism/Socialism lost its strength by the

mid-1970s. Facts such as the death of Nasser, the normalization of rela-

tions between Egypt and Israel and the subsequent rapprochement be-

tween Cairo and the West, especially in economic matters, contributed

to such waning (MASSOULIÉ, 1996). Nevertheless, Arab Nationalism/

Socialism acquired a new form in Iraq and Syria with the rise of the

Ba’ath party. In Damascus, the Assad family came to power, while in

Baghdad the military leader Saddam Hussein commanded the country.

Despite the weakening of the Pan-Arabism, some of its ideas such as so-

cialism, nationalism and anti-imperialism remained. So did the relation-

ship with the USSR (HALLIDAY, 2005). Indeed, it was during this period

that the Soviet Union built aerial and naval bases in Syrian territory (AL-

LISON, 2013).

The expansion of the Arab Nationalism/Socialism ideology is also

an important reection of the broader issues surrounding the expansion

of the European IS and the bid of young Middle Eastern countries for

its membership. This ideological set of ideas departed from Nasser and

reached from Saddam Hussein to Bashar al-Assad in their respective at-

tempts to adapt their regional and domestic political institutions to com-

ply with the Western norms and institutions. The central role that norms

and ideas such as secularism and nationalism had within this ideology are

an indicative of such attempt. However, the bid for membership in West-

ern IS was fraught with tensions. The actions and ideas adopted by the

Middle Eastern states during this period exposed the deep tensions, lim-

itations and contradictions that exist in interstate society. Local ideas and

movements marked by exacerbated nationalism, anti-imperialism and

the pan-Arabism ideology can also be seen as a reaction to both the van-

guardist expansion of Western IS as well as the inequalities inherent to

its membership. The ME bid for membership took place during what can

be termed the third phase of the Western society expansion. This phase

marks the accession of ex-colonies as members of Western IS. However,

while tensions, limitations and contradictions are inherent to all norma-

tive structures (SANDHOLTZ, 2007:13), there was a signicant degree of

normative tension between the regional social structure in formation and

the existing Western values and norms. This normative misalignment

created a normative sensitivity that left the regional IS especially prone to

instabilities. This is because the high degree of functional and normative

tension created between the forming regional institution and the broader

imposition of an uneven Western social structure. These tensions and

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contradictions reect the misalignment of the regional norms and values

with the perceived Western social reality. In other words, the vanguard-

ist expansion of Western values and norms were not fully aligned with

new forming regional collective representations and expectations. Thus,

this led to a prolonged legacy of domination and cultural dierences that

would generate long lasting instability. In fact, according to Buzan:

The vanguardist rendering of the third phase of the expansion story, with its

emphasis on cultural diversity and the revolt against the West, thus interprets

decolonization as the creation of a house divided: a coherent global imperial

order of insiders and outsiders deteriorates into an incoherent global disorder

where everyone is inside, but their squabbles threaten to bring the house down

(BUZAN, p. 8, 2010).

However, it is important to note that not all countries adopted the

ideas and values of the pan-Arabism movement nor those who did adopt-

ed it to the same degree. Turkey and Iran, for example, were neither deep-

ly involved in the conicts between Israelis and Arabs nor greatly aligned

with Arab nationalism/socialism. During much of the Cold War, Turkey

looked much more to the West rather than to the East and thus became

directly drawn into the global conict. Turkey’s strategic location made

the country a key part of NATO’s strategy to contain the USSR (LIKA,

2015; OUTZEN, 2012).

Iran, ruled by Shah Reza Pahlavi, was also an important ally of

the United States and the United Kingdom in their eorts of containing

Soviet interests in the region. However, due to the 1979 revolution, the

authoritarian regime of Pahlavi was overthrown by an Islamic popular

revolution led by Ayatollah Khomeini. Khomeini would become supreme

leader of the Islamic Republic of Iran and foster the question of political

Islam and religious fundamentalism (KAMRAVA, 2011). But the question

of political Islam and religious fundamentalism would not be restricted

to the Iranian revolution alone. In the last years of the Cold War, the

issue became central in the securitization and desecuritization process-

es of the ME. The emergence of jihadist movements, the rise of groups

such as Hezbollah and Hamas as well as the consolidation of the Saudi

kingdom as a regional power brought the ideas of radical political Islam

to the very center of the security debates in the region. The consolidation

of the United States as the only superpower after the fall of the USSR and

later the advent of the Global War on Terror, would further intensify the

decisive role of radical political Islam in the construction of ME’s amity

and enmity architecture and security dynamics.

From the end of the Cold War to the War on Terror

From the 1980s onwards there was a visible decline in the geopolit-

ical power of the Soviet Union. This decline culminated with the coun-

try’s ocial dissolution in 1991. From that point on, while the United

States became the only acting superpower, the Cold War bipolar rivalry

lost momentum in the ME as it did everywhere else. But the end of the

Cold War did not represent the end of the presence of external powers in

the Region. The US became the only external centralizing power in the

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Jorge M. Lasmar, Leonardo C. A. Santa Rita The end of the Ooman Empire and the evoluon of the Middle East security complex

region. Issues such as the war between Iran and Iraq, the invasion of Iraq

by Kuwait, the rise of radical extremist groups, the US invasion of Iraq

and the geopolitical dispute between Saudis and Iranians were all direct-

ly or indirectly inuenced by US’ foreign policies. Consequently, during

the post-Cold War period, new patterns of amity and enmity and a new

regional dynamic of balance of power emerged in the ME. Both, all of

which were ‘centralized’ by the United States.

The war between Iran and Iraq was a milestone in this reshaping

of the internal security dynamics in the ME and its centralization. At the

time, the Iranian revolution encouraged local forces to also overthrow

their respective leaders. At the same time, Saddam Hussein wished for an

opportunity to consolidate his power in Iraq and the region as the main

Arab leadership. (KAMRAVA, 2011). The dreadful war lasted from 1980

to 1988 and did not result in change in the status quo. However, the war

consolidated some changes in the regional institutional design: Firstly,

the US became the main power in the region; Secondly, Iran would be-

come central to the regional balance of power and patterns of amity and

enmity; Thirdly, Islam – and especially political Islam - would become a

crucial ideational element in the construction of the regional processes of

securitization and desecuritization.

The end of the war between Iran and Iraq happened simultaneous-

ly with the end of the Cold War. This is an important context because the

following decade, the 1990s, seemed to signal a broader transition to a

liberal democratic and capitalist world order marked by the consolidation

and expansion of the liberal order in Western IS. This transition briey

seemed to consolidate a social structure informed by principles of cooper-

ation, liberal peace and multilateralism. However, what followed was the

beginning of a process a re-negotiation of the identities and roles of the

great powers in the post- Cold War world undertaken directly through

their interaction and which is yet to attain its nal form.

In this process of re-negotiation, one of the rst key events that

marked this new moment in global geopolitics - and which directly con-

cerns the ME - was the rst Iraq intervention. Iraq, motivated by various

causes such as outstanding debts from the Iran war, Saddam Hussein’s

private interests as well as geopolitical objectives, decided to invade Ku-

wait. The international response came quickly through a US-led coalition

that quickly drove Iraqi forces out of Kuwait with the United Nations’

Security Council’s approval. The conict demonstrated not only that the

end of the Cold War did not undermined US’ position as the sole super-

power capable of projecting military force anywhere in the world but

also that the World had deeply changed, and its diplomatic actions were

no longer restricted by soviet rivalry. However, this episode marks yet

another deeper change.

The end of the Cold War brought about a radical process of change

in existing social and power structures resulting in a signicant transfor-

mation of interstate society. As a result, the bipolar power structure prev-

alent during the Cold War shifted towards a more fragmented, hierarchi-

cal, multi-layered and unipolar one. Simultaneously, both the ideological

rivalry between the superpowers and the long-standing threat of nuclear

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annihilation were de-macrosecuritized (at least as a matter of public con-

cern) (BUZAN; WÆVER, 2009, pp. 270-271). Simultaneously, the West-

ern liberal economy with its logic of interdependency steadily expanded

to cover most of the globe. Although it appears, at rst glance, that the

consolidation of a social structure of friends/rivals and the liberal order

would lead to a further narrowing of the legitimate uses of war and there-

fore its eventual obsolescence, in fact, these changes created conditions

for a transformation in the uses of war. In other words, the consolidation

of the liberal order transformed (rather than reducing or eliminating) the

legitimate and socially accepted uses of war.

The reaction of the UN’s Security Council to the Iraqi military in-

vasion of Kuwait in 1990 was central to this trend

. The post-Cold War

attempts to criminalize wars of aggression and reject the use of war for

territorial gains have intensied. Coming immediately in the wake of

the Cold War and when interstate society was experiencing a moment

of great normative uncertainty, SC’s reaction to the invasion clearly de-

lineated that wars of aggression fought for territorial gains were not only

unacceptable but also that it was willing to use military force against the

aggressor state in order to enforce compliance. Hence, the SC was able

to reach a consensus in condemning this particular use of war as mark-

edly illegitimate in the post-Cold War era. To provide some details: the

SC resolutions not only authorized the collective use of military force

against Iraq, but it also explicitly condemned the use of military force for

territorial gains (UNSC, Res. 662); stated that the state of Iraq was legally

liable to pay for the damages caused by its acts (UNSC, Res. 674, Res.

687) and also stated that Iraq would need to compensate Kuwait for its

illegal actions (UNSC, Res. 692). The institutional enforcement of these

resolutions clearly demonstrated the shift that had occurred in interstate

society, which unlike a century ago, now no longer accepted territorial

wars of aggression as either legitimate or socially acceptable.

The post-Cold War narrowing of the institution of war was not

only the result of a historical process limiting the legitimate uses of war

but also embedded in the growth of the liberal economy as well as in

the broader transformations of the international environment. Taken

collectively, these transformations have impacted existing technologies

of interaction of states by not only increasing the overall density of in-

teractions amongst them but also by diversifying these patterns of in-

teraction. Thus, both the Iraq intervention and these broader changes in

global order clearly impacted both MENA’s regional dynamics as well as

the United States’ presence there.

The 1991 Gulf War resulted in an increasingly fragile and isolat-

ed Iraq followed by an increasingly regionally engaged US. Relations

between Baghdad and Washington deteriorate so badly that in 2003 the

United States decided to intervene in Iraq a second time on the grounds

that Saddam Hussein’s government was developing weapons of mass de-

struction. Unlike in 1991, the intervention did not obtain the UN Security

Council’s approval. Along with the invasion, the US advocated a regime

change that actually meant the transformation of the regional interna-

tional institutions towards ones more aligned with the US’ project of con-

8. Note, however, that the Security

Council has been very wary of declaring

a war as being a case of “aggression”,

even when it is explicitly so.

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Jorge M. Lasmar, Leonardo C. A. Santa Rita The end of the Ooman Empire and the evoluon of the Middle East security complex

solidating a broader ‘new’ post-Cold War liberal ‘global’ order. In its Iraq’s

discourse, the US clearly emphasized the importance of replacing local

institutions with liberal and democratic ones. This narrative was lined up

with its broader bid for the re-negotiating its identity and role in the post-

Cold War world and became known as Liberal Hegemony.

This narra-

tive was followed by concrete actions that signicantly impacted the RSC

of the ME transforming both the regional patterns of amity and enmity

as well the local balance of power as one of the main regional military

powers crumbled into a failed state (KAMRAVA, 2011).

This process of transformation was immediately felt in the tense

relations between Saudi Arabia and Iran. With the consolidation of Iran’s

regime and Saudi Arabia’s economic growth since the Oil Crisis, both

countries have been increasingly consolidating as regional poles of pow-

er. This process of redening the regional balance of power became ac-

celerated especially after the 2003 intervention in Iraq seemed to have

removed the latter from the equation. It also compounded their rivalry as

both competes for political inuence in the ME portraying diametrically

opposed views about the United States, Islam and regional politics.

In order to project its power and inuence in the region, Iran acts

heavily through proxy non-state actors. Tehran’s relationship with each

of these groups varies in the depth and objectives (IISS, 2019):

Image 1 - Iran and its regional partnerships

Source: IISS. Iran’s Networks of Inﬂuence in the Middle East. International Institute of

Strategic Studies. 2019

As an example of this modus operandi, Iran has also steadily grown

its inuence and presence in Iraq by providing direct support to selected

Shiite militias in the country such as Asaib Ahl al-Haq and the Badr Or-

9. The 1990s are also known as the

period of Liberal Hegemony, in which

the United States engaged in defending

its ideas and interests and consolida-

ting itself with the Cold War’s winning

power. According to Mearsheimer (2018)

“Liberal Hegemony is an ambitious

strategy in which a state aims to turn as

many countries as possible into liberal

democracies like itself while also pro-

moting an open international economy

and building international institutions”

(MEARSHEIMER, p.8, 2018).

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ganization. However, here again we can identify US’ attempts to counter

Iran and centralize the regional dynamics. One such attempt was the US

attack that killed the Iranian General Qassem Suleimani. He was the com-

mander of the Quds forces, an arm of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard

dedicated precisely to support pro-Iran groups outside Iran (IISS, 2019).

Saudi Arabia, in its lieu, seek to project their regional leadership in

both the sectarian/religious and the political/material arenas. With re-

gard to the sectarian aspect, Saudi Arabia nances groups (armed or not)

and educational institutions that corroborate its ocial interpretation of

Islam (TZEMPRIM et al. 2015). They also claim leadership as the guard-

ians of two of the three

most sacred sites for Islam, namely Mecca and

Medina. This discourse is used to capitalize the image of the Kingdom

as the Protector of the Faith (CERIOLI, 2018). Materially, the House of

Saud projects its inuences by providing military and political support to

conservative governments aligned with the Riyadh policy, although they

do not necessarily demand and ideological alignment with the regime as

is the case with Yemen (ARRAF, 2017).

Thus, the Saudi Iranian relationships constructs a complex set of di-

rect and indirect interactions in the ME which, in turn, constructs much

of the regional dynamics, social structure and balance of power. This

strong pattern of rivalry and enmity substantially carves much of the

regional security complex attributes. Yet, another important element also

permeates and shape these dynamics: The United States’ presence. Wash-

ington sees the Saudis as one its main allies in the region with a shared

common interest in containing Iranian inuence. The US and Saudi Ara-

bia have, thus, became somewhat mutually dependent. On the one hand,

the US provides political and military support for Riyadh. On the other,

the Ibn Saud family works to ensure the stability of the oil markets and

permits that the US uses its territory to project its military power in the

region (CERIOLI, 2018).

This US centralization in the ME RSC can also be observed in

the Israeli Palestine issue on many occasions such as in the key role the

US had in the Oslo Accords (KAMRAVA, 2011) or more recently in the

Peace to Prosperity proposal made by the Donald Trump administra-

tion (WHITE HOUSE, 2020). The United States engaged as a key play-

er in the implementation of both agreements with a clear message: If

the conict between Israel and Palestine has a solution, that solution

requires Washington’s consent. Thus, although Buzan and Wæver (2003)

consider the ME Regional Security Complex as standard due to its own

internal dynamics and characteristics, we argue that the macrosecuri-

tization of the Cold War, followed by the central role the ME still has

in the US’s bid for a new understanding of unipolarity, though do not

eliminate the regional security dynamics are enough to distort, suppress

and, ultimately, centralize them.

Thus, it is important to understand the ME RSC within the broader

global game. The US presence and actions in the ME impacts the broader

post-Cold War international environment by functioning as a policy of

normative organization. The behavior adopted by the world’s sole super-

power in the region is not a novelty, but it does propel both the consoli-

10. The third being Jerusalem/Al-Quds

(Al Aqsa Mosque).

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Jorge M. Lasmar, Leonardo C. A. Santa Rita The end of the Ooman Empire and the evoluon of the Middle East security complex

dation of new identities and the institutionalization of new roles within

interstate society. By undertaking oshore military operations in the re-

gion, the US amplies the political and military gap between states and

also compounds the existing hierarchy in interstate society. Nevertheless,

the behavior of the sole superpower and the disagreements generated

by it also demonstrate that the collective identities that it is attempting

to construct are thus far shallowly internalized and therefore unstable

(LASMAR, 2015). All this then serves to generate an environment of un-

certainty and instability and seems to indicate that the end of the Cold

War brought about a re-negotiation of the meaning of great power man-

agement that will only acquire a more permanent form if, and when,

the US actions become socially perceived as symbolizing the new de facto

meaning of unipolarity.

Washington’s discourse to the region inextricably associates the

US position as the sole superpower with its unique capability to employ

material and human resources to manage the security threats in the re-

gion. Under the banner of its actions in the region, the US constructs a

new component in the identity of a superpower whereby the position

of a superpower is dependent, amongst other things, upon the capacity

to address oshore threats. The US centralization of the ME, therefore,

ultimately impacts the norms of great power management by creating

a series of additional criteria that must be met before a state can be rec-

ognized as a superpower within interstate society. Thus, the interaction

amongst great powers since the end of the Cold War represents a re-nego-

tiation of their identities and roles in the post- Cold War world and their

roles in the ME RSC play a key role in that game. However, this process

of re-negotiation has yet to attain its nal form. Recent changes in the

Chinese and Russia attitude towards both IS and the region demonstrate

that they also intend to oer alternative and revisionist views of what is

the new de facto meaning of the current international system’s polarity.

Similarly, at a regional level, Turkey and Qatar also have increasingly ad-

opted revisionist policies intended to advance their own alternative views

for what is the current meaning of the regional balance of power and

security dynamics.

Present and Future

In this context, recent episodes have demonstrated that there is a

mounting pressure for normative changes from both within and outside

the ME RSC. Turkey is becoming increasingly involved in regional con-

icts and clamming its role as a regional leader. Erdogan turned its backs

to the European Union and militarily intervened in both the Syrian Civil

War (MASCITELLI, 2019) and in the Nagorno-Karabakh conict. On the

ideational front, it is clear that Turkey is also trying to rebuild the coun-

try’s image and legacy as the bedrock of Islam. The recent decision made

by the President to reopen Hagia Sophia as a mosque and not as a his-

torical museum is one of the biggest examples that Turkey is distancing

itself from secularism and clamming its position in Islam and in the ME

(DANFORTH, 2020).

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Another important regional force aecting the amity/enmity dy-

namics in the ME is that of the State of Qatar. As other Persian Gulf States,

Qatar is known as an absolute monarchy as well as a rich oil and gas ex-

porter. However, the Qatari power goes beyond the energy markets as

the country has strong soft power capabilities. Qatar controls the greatest

media center in the region and use sports, particularly football, as a tool

to improve the country’s image and exercise inuence over its neighbors

(FAHY, 2018). Qatar has sought to rearm its political independence and

have established connections with Islamist groups and dissenting individ-

uals across the region (FAHY, 2018). As a result, since 2017 Qatar is isolat-

ed in the region as other Middle Eastern countries accuse Doha of using

Al-Jazeera to manipulate other countries’ domestic environment and of

supporting extremist groups such as Muslim Brotherhood, Hezbollah,

and even al-Qaeda and ISIS (IISS, 2019).

The adoption of a more revisionist behavior by Russia and China

also added signicant outside pressure to re-shape the regional ami-

ty/enmity dynamics. Since the Civil War had erupted in Syria in 2011,

Russia overtly increased its military presence in ME to unprecedented

levels in the post-Cold War era. Beyond Kremlin’s intentions to pre-

serve its positions in Eastern Mediterranean, the Russians supported

the Bashar al-Asad regime and the maintenance of the Syrian status

quo. This move was intended to directly oppose the U.S support of reb-

el groups and the Washington’s intentions of regime change (PEIPER,

2019). But, most importantly, is was also directly intended to counter

the broader US post-Cold War bid for a specic meaning of unipolarity.

And this was not an isolated action. Russia sees the broader ME - and,

more specically, US deep interests and involvement in the region - as

an important arena to counter Washington’s bid. For example, Russian

Russia is also one of the biggest supporters of Iran using a myriad of

economic tools to overcome the U.S sanctions against the Persian coun-

try (KHLEBNIKOV, 2019). Russia’s participation in the Syrian Civil War

and its support for Iran undoubtedly reveals the Kremlin’s revisionist

intentions against both the consolidation of a U.S backed Western order

as well as US’ centralization of the ME. Thus, Russia has been taking

a vanguardist reaction against the pressure exerted by Western interna-

tional order over traditional non-liberal regimes (BUZAN, 2010) and

the ME is at the center stage of such reactions.

Another great power that is increasingly – though discreetly -

turning its attention to the ME is China. China ocial discourse is that

of non-alliance, non-interference, and of never seeking a global hegemo-

ny. Thus, it does not act in the regional the same way as the Russians or

Americas. Nevertheless, the Chinese are steadily expanding their pres-

ence in the region (CHINA, 2019). China sees the region as key to sustain

its growth as it needs enormous quantities of oil coming from the ME

to keep its economy owing. Due to the region’s instability, the People’s

Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) established its rst overseas base in Dji-

bouti to protect Chinese interest in the Gulf of Aden (LIN, 2019). The

ME is also extremely strategically important for China as it is in the core

of China’s Belt and Road Initiative (GORDON, TONG, ANDERSON,

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Jorge M. Lasmar, Leonardo C. A. Santa Rita The end of the Ooman Empire and the evoluon of the Middle East security complex

2020). Thus, China has been clearly signaling the intention of increasing

its presence in the region. Additionally, China shares with Russia the

opposition over both the Western liberal order as well as the US’ bid to

consolidate its particular understandings regarding the system polarity

and the primary institutions of IS. China thus has been seeking to estab-

lish relations in the region without questioning the countries’ domestic

regimes and advocating its status and role as a great power (CHARAP,

DRENNAN, NOËL, 2017).

Questions about the recent policies of the United States towards the

region as well as the possible shifts that the Biden election might bring

about to these policies are also one of the possible big game-changers in

the ME’s RSC. Since the beginning of the events of Arab Spring, the U.S

policies towards the region have been received with suspicion by Middle

Eastern countries as well as seen as marking the US as an unreliable part-

ner. Episodes such as the lack of help to the Mubarak’s regime in Egypt

(PINTO, 2012) or the troop withdrawal within Iraqi and Syrian Kurd ter-

ritories have greatly added to a steady erosion of US’ leadership in the re-

gion. Another controversial decision was to unilaterally withdraw from

the nuclear treaty with Iran. Undoubtedly, these set of decisions under-

mined the US position in the ME RSC (EWERS, 2019) greatly contribut-

ing to the possibility of the erosion of its centralization and opening space

for a deep re-shaping of its regional dynamics of security and insecurity.

Conclusion

The end of the Ottoman Empire caused an abrupt transition in the

ME. What was once a centralized and somewhat coherent unit fragment-

ed into several new units that were immediately overlayed. In the post-

World War II era, the region begun a process of forming an autonomous

RSC but it became centralized and caught by the Cold War macrosecuri-

tization. With the demise of the Soviet Union, the ME RSC continued to

evolve in its own dynamics but was still largely inuenced by the remain-

ing superpower.

Thus, in a nutshell, since the fragmentation of the Ottoman Em-

pire, security issues in the ME region have evolved, to a large extent,

inuenced by the constant presence of great and superpowers in the local

Regional Security Complex. This is not to say that the regional dynamics

of the balance of power and the patterns of amity and enmity have not

evolved. The ME RSC has had a series of securitization and de-securiti-

zation processes suciently interconnected by regional actors. Neverthe-

less, these processes were, at some point, overlayed - as in the case of the

British and French occupation – suppressed – as it happened due to the

dynamics of the Cold War – distorted – as it happened and still happening

due to the US presence in the region.

Thus, to understand the dynamics of regional security is important

to understand the role of outside powers in the ME. This is because these

external great and superpower have displayed a vanguardist foreign pol-

icy towards the region that reects broader geopolitical games. The ad-

vance of Western society towards the ME in the last days of the Ottoman

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Empire and after its fall also introduced the newly formed countries of

the region as members of a Western IS. Thus, at the same time, Western

values and institutions were imposed on a cultural context that had dis-

tinct values and norms. The consequence was a formation of a complex,

constantly evolving regional security complex.

Finally, the ME is currently undergoing yet another process of nor-

mative change and re-shaping of its dynamics of security and insecuri-

ty. The recent events bring about important questions about the future

of the ME RSC. Will Russia’s and China’s presence in Syria extend over

time? How it will impact the regional dynamics? How have China’s in-

terests penetrated the ME? How could an eventual decrease in the US

leadership aect the RSC? How would the regional balance of power and

patterns of amity and enmity be aected in the event of Iran and/or Saudi

Arabia’s nuclearization? What role is Turkey to play in this re-negotiation

of the regional dynamics? These are all open questions that will guide

future debates on the complexities of the ME RSC.

Appendix: Summary of Middle East patterns of amity/enmity throughout

history, in chronological order

British Empire France Saudi Kingdom Iran Turkey

British Empire - Amity Neutral Amity Neutral

France Amity - Neutral Neutral Neutral

Saudi Kingdom Neutral Neutral - Neutral Neutral

Iran Amity Neutral Neutral - Neutral

Turkey Neutral Neutral Neutral Neutral -

Hashemite

Clan

Arabian Gulf

Monarchies

Republican

Arab Coun-

tries

Israel

Pre-revolutio-

nary Iran

Post-revolu-

tionary Iran

Turkey

Hashemite

Clan

Enmity/

Neutral

Enmity

Enmity/

Neutral

Neutral Enmity Neutral

Arabian Gulf

Monarchies

Enmity/

Neutral

Enmity/

Neutral

Enmity Neutral Enmity Neutral

Republican

Arab Coun-

tries

Enmity

Enmity/

Neutral

- Enmity

Enmity/

Neutral

Enmity/

Neutral

Enmity/

Neutral

Israel

Enmity/

Neutral

Enmity Enmity - Neutral Enmity

Neutral/

Amity

Pre-revolutio-

nary Iran

Neutral Neutral

Enmity/

Neutral

Neutral - - Neutral

Post-revolu-

tionary Iran

Enmity Enmity

Enmity/

Neutral

Enmity - - Enmity

Turkey Neutral Neutral

Enmity/

Neutral

Neutral/

Amity

Neutral Enmity -

Tradi-

tional

Monar-

chies

Iran Israel Turkey

Pre-2003

Iraq

Post-

2003

Iraq

Egypt Syria Lebanon Qatar

Tradi-

tional

Monar-

chies

- Enmity Neutral

Neutral /

Enmity

Enmity Neutral Neutral Enmity Neutral Enmity

Iran Enmity - Enmity Neutral Enmity Neutral

Enmity /

Neutral

Neutral/

Amity

Neutral/

Amity

Neutral /

Amity

11. Includes Jordan and the former

kingdom of Iraq.

12. Includes all the monarchies from

Arabian Peninsula.

13.Arab countries lead by Nasser’s

Egypt.

14. Includes all the monarchies from

Arabian Peninsula (except for Qatar) and

Jordan.

185

Jorge M. Lasmar, Leonardo C. A. Santa Rita The end of the Ooman Empire and the evoluon of the Middle East security complex

Israel Neutral Enmity - Neutral Enmity Neutral

Neutral/

Amity

Enmity

Neutral /

Enmity

Neutral

Turkey

Neutral /

Enmity

Neutral Neutral - Enmity Neutral Neutral Enmity Neutral

Neutral /

Amity

Pre-2003

Iraq

Enmity Enmity Enmity Enmity - - Enmity

Enmity /

Neutral

Neutral /

Enmity

Post-

2003

Iraq

Neutral Neutral Neutral Neutral - - Neutral Neutral Neutral Neutral

Egypt Neutral

Enmity /

Neutral

Neutral/

Amity

Neutral Enmity Neutral -

Neutral /

Enmity

Neutral

Neutral /

Enmity

Syria Enmity

Neutral/

Amity

Enmity Enmity

Enmity /

Neutral

Neutral /

Enmity

Neutral /

Amity

Neutral /

Enmity

Lebanon Neutral

Neutral/

Amity

Neutral /

Enmity

Neutral Neutral Neutral Neutral

Neutral /

Amity

- Neutral

Qatar Enmity

Neutral /

Amity

Neutral

Neutral /

Amity

Neutral /

Enmity

Neutral

Neutral /

Enmity

Neutral /

Enmity

Neutral -

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