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Special Issue: A Hundred Years Since the End of the Ottoman Empire – Introduction

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The idea of publishing this special issue of *Revista Estudos Internacionais* emerged after the *Second International Seminar on the Middle East*, which was organized by the Department of International Relations at PUC Minas and by the Middle East and North Africa Study Group (GEOMM, PUC Minas) between 11th and 13th of September 2019. The topic of the seminar was entitled "A Hundred Years Since the End of the Ottoman Empire". Needless to say, the defeat of the Ottoman Empire in the First World War and the Treaty of Sèvres (10th of August, 1920) represented not only the last phase of its existence, but it inaugurated a new era for the international relations in the Middle East. The collapse of the Ottoman Empire had consequences that are still felt in the region to this day. The Ottoman political legacy reverberated in the relations among the various ethnic-religious minorities and nation states that emerged on the ruins of the empire. It played a part in the ways in which the changing forces vying for power and influence in the region acted, as well as in the formation of the political views of Muslims, Christians, Jews, and other local religious communities. Thus, our aim was to bridge between the historical dimension of the Ottoman geopolitics and society and the contemporary challenges related to Turkey's complex ambitions with respect to Europe, Middle East, and Central Asia.

Researchers from seven countries (Germany, Argentina, Brazil, Israel, Lebanon, Romania, and Turkey) and from eleven different higher education institutions (PUC Minas, PUC São Paulo, UFMG, UFRGS, USP, UNIFESP, UNESP, National University of Rosario, University Alexandru Ioan Cuza, University of Innsbruck and University of Tel Aviv) took part in this dossier. This special edition consists of ten papers that deal with historical as well as recent perspectives. They vary from local to regional and world affairs.

The first section of the dossier pertains to a number of historical and political topics. Naif Bezwan in his article "The Status of the Non-Muslim Communities in the Ottoman Empire: A Non-Orientalised Decolonial Approach" sheds light on the relation between the Ottoman Empire and its non-Muslim communities from a historical perspective.

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He argues for the necessity of understanding the dynamics and the rationale behind Ottoman policies and practices toward these communities. **Youssef Cherem** and **Danny Zahreddine** then focused on a central component of the reforms and of the international relations of the Ottoman Empire in the 19th century: the juridical status of non-Moslem, particularly Christian, minorities. Thus, in their contribution "Integration, conflict, and autonomy among religious minorities in the late Ottoman Empire: the Greek-Catholic (Melkite) Church and sectarian turmoil in Mount Lebanon and Damascus", Youssef Cherem and Danny Zahreddine examined two key aspects: the official recognition of the Greek Catholic (Melkite) religious community in 1848 and the multilayered conflict in Mount Lebanon and Damascus in 1860. The impact of the defeat in the Balkan War (1912-1913) as a critical moment for the Ottoman Empire has been covered by **Edmar Avelar Sena**, **Guilherme Di Lorenzo Pires** and **Alaor Souza Oliveira**. Their contribution to this issue is entitled "Between a Traumatic Past and an Uncertain Future: a study on the representations of the Ottoman defeat in the Balkan War (1912-1913)". It looked at the representation of the Ottoman defeat in the editorials of the *La Jeune Turquie*, an Ottoman newspaper published in Paris at the time of the Balkan Wars. **Rodrigo Augusto Duarte Amaral** and **Reginaldo Mattar Nasser**'s contribution "The creation of the Iraqi state beyond Sykes-Picot: Between Imperialism and Revolution", analyzed how the end of the Ottoman Empire shaped the policies of the British and the French succeeding powers in the region. Thus, the Iraqi case reveals the local struggles for the independence of the Arab country and the policies of domination of European forces in the region after the conclusion of the Sykes-Picot agreement. Next **Gabriel Leanca** emphasized on the "Eastern Question", which is a central theme of International Relations in the 19th century. In his article "The Ottoman Empire and Europe from the late Westphalian order to the Crimean system: the 'Eastern Question' Revisited" he looks at how center-periphery relations had an impact on the world balance of power.

The second section of the dossier introduces more directly the question of the Ottoman legacy in contemporary Turkish politics. In their contribution entitled "The End of the Ottoman Empire and the Evolution of the Middle East Security Complex", **Jorge Mascarenhas Lasmar** and **Leonardo Santa Rita** discover connections and intersections that bridge between several phases of the Middle Eastern geopolitical playground. Then **Nir Boms** and **Kivanc Ulusoy**'s "Rival American Allies: Turkey and Israel in the Eastern Mediterranean" analyze and dissect how periods of rapprochement alternated at key moments with rivalry and misunderstanding between the Ottoman Empire and the Yishuv, between the Republic of Turkey and Israel, respectively.

The last section of this issue is dedicated to the relations between the Ottoman Empire, Turkey, respectively and Latin America. Thus, **Rubén Paredes Rodríguez**, in his article entitled "Turkish-Ottoman relations with Latin America: a journey through the time capsule", sheds light on three distinct periods: the first one studies the transition from the imperial regime to the republican government (1923); the second refers to the evolutions that had an impact on these ties in the second half

of the 20ᵗʰ century; finally, the third one covers the last two decades. Focusing on the same topic, **André Luiz Reis da Silva** and **Gabriela Dorneles Ferreira da Costa** in their contribution entitled "Brazil and Turkey in the 21ˢᵗ century: strategic interests in comparative perspective", stress upon the setting of the bilateral agenda between Brazil and Turkey in the last decades. Finally, **Arlene Clemesha** and **Silvia Ferabolli** explored in a critical fashion the ways in which the Middle Eastern studies evolved in Brazilian and Latin American intellectual context. In the article "Studying the Middle East from Brazil: reflections on a different worldview", the two authors examine the limits and the possibilities of Latin American research in this particular field, as well as its relation with the Anglo-Saxon intellectual tradition on this wide topic.

We hope that the readers of this special issue of *Revista Estudos Internacionais – "A Hundred Years Since the End of the Ottoman Empire"* – will enrich their knowledge on the Middle Eastern past and present. *Last, but not least*, we wish to believe that this thematic number of our journal will push forward the research in the field of the Middle Eastern studies in Brazil and more generally in Latin America.

The Status of the Non-Muslim Communities in the Ottoman Empire: A Non-Orientalised Decolonial Approach

El status de las comunidades no musulmanas en el Imperio Otomano: un enfoque descolonial no orientalizadoTítulo em espanhol

O status das comunidades não muçulmanas no Império Otomano: uma abordagem descolonial não orientalizada

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ABSTRACT

With a focus on the key developments and critical junctures that shaped and reshaped the relationship between the Ottomans and its non-Muslim subject communities, this paper seeks to understand the dynamics and the rationale behind the Ottoman policies and practices vis-a-vis non-Muslim communities. It will do so by offering a periodisation of Ottoman rule along four major pathways, each of which also provides the title of the respective section. The first period is referred to as *structural exclusion by toleration* over centuries, from the conquest of the respective territories to their incorporation into the imperial domain. The second phase is entitled *integration via politics of recognition* which basically covers the *Tanzimat* era (1838-1876). The third period is put under the heading of *coercive domination and control,* roughly corresponding to the Hamidian Period (1876-1908). And finally, the last period is concerned with the Young Turks regime (1908-1918), discussing its politics and policies towards non-Muslims communities framed under the title of *nation-building by nation-destruction*.

These section headings act both as hypothesis and structuring elements of the pe-riodisation presented. As such they shall help identify the dominant paradigm of each period pertinent to the status and situation of the communities under consideration, while connecting them in a plausible manner. This paper is motivated by a non-Orientalised decolonial approach to the study of the Ottoman empire as well as the nation-states established in the post-Ottoman political geographies.

Keywords: Non-Muslim communities. Ottoman reforms. Millet System. Decolonial approach.

Resumen

Con un enfoque en los desarrollos clave y las coyunturas críticas que dieron forma y remodelaron la relación entre los otomanos y sus comunidades de sujetos no musulmanes, este documento busca comprender la dinámica y el fundamento detrás de las políticas y prácticas otomanas frente a los no musulmanes. Comunidades musulmanas. Lo hará ofreciendo una periodización del dominio otomano a lo largo de cuatro vías principales, cada una de las cuales también proporciona el título de la sección respectiva. El primer período se denomina exclusión estructural por tolerancia durante siglos, desde la conquista de los respectivos territorios hasta su incorporación al dominio imperial. La segunda fase se titula Integración a través de políticas de reconocimiento que cubre básicamente la era Tanzimat (1838-1876). El tercer período se clasifica bajo el título de dominación y control coercitivo, que corresponde aproximadamente al período Hamidiano (1876-1908). Y finalmente, el último período se refiere al régimen de los Jóvenes Turcos (1908-1918), discutiendo su política y políticas hacia las comunidades no musulmanas enmarcadas bajo el título de construcción nacional por destrucción nacional.

Los títulos de los capítulos actúan como hipótesis y como elementos estructurantes de la periodización presentada. Como tales, ayudarán a identificar el paradigma dominante de cada período pertinente al estado y situación de las comunidades en consideración, al mismo tiempo que las conecta de manera plausible. Este artículo está motivado por un enfoque descolonial no orientalizado del estudio del imperio otomano, así como de los estados-nación establecidos en las geografías políticas post-otomanas.

Palabras clave: comunidades no musulmanas. Reformas otomanas. Sistema Millet. Abordaje decolonial.

Resumo

Com foco nos principais desenvolvimentos e conjunturas críticas que moldaram e remodelaram a relação entre os otomanos e suas comunidades não-muçulmanas, este artigo busca compreender a dinâmica e a lógica por trás das políticas e práticas otomanas vis-à-vis Comunidades muçulmanas. Ele fará isso oferecendo uma periodização do domínio otomano ao longo de quatro caminhos principais, cada um dos quais fornece também o título da respectiva seção. O primeiro período é denominado de exclusão estrutural por tolerância ao longo dos séculos, desde a conquista dos respectivos territórios até sua incorporação ao domínio imperial. A segunda fase é intitulada integração via política de reconhecimento que cobre basicamente a era Tanzimat (1838-1876). O terceiro período é colocado sob o título de dominação e controle coercitivos, correspondendo aproximadamente ao Período Hamidiano (1876-1908). E, finalmente, o último período trata do regime dos Jovens Turcos (1908-1918), discutindo suas políticas e políticas em relação às comunidades não muçulmanas enquadradas sob o título de construção da nação pela destruição da nação. Os títulos dos capítulos funcionam como hipótese e elementos estruturantes da periodização apresentada. Como tal, devem ajudar a identificar o paradigma dominante de cada período pertinente ao status e à situação das comunidades em questão, ao mesmo tempo que os conecta de maneira plausível. Este artigo é motivado por uma abordagem descolonial não orientalizada do estudo do império otomano, bem como dos estados-nação estabelecidos nas geografias políticas pós-otomanas.

Palavras-chave: comunidades não muçulmanas. Reformas otomanas. Sistema Millet. Abordagem decolonial.

Introduction

The Ottoman Empire existed for over six centuries and was both a land-based and maritime empire, at times ruling indirectly through indigenous elites and at times sending out settlers to colonise new areas (MIKHAIL; PHILLIOU, 2012). It ruled over an ethnically and religiously diverse population in the Balkans, Asia Minor, Iraq, Syria, the Arab peninsula, and Northern Africa. It is considered as the most religiously diverse empire in Europe and Asia and was home to large groups of Christians and a significant number of Jews (KIESER, 2019, p. 4).

By their very nature empires are large macro-historical entities. An empire, as Tilly observes, is a large composite polity linked to a central power by indirect rule whereby,

> "[t]he central power exercises some military and fiscal control in each major segment of its imperial domain, but tolerates the two major elements of indirect rule: (1) retention or establishment of particular, distinct compacts for the government of each segment; and (2) exercise of power through intermediaries who enjoy considerable autonomy within their own domains in return for the delivery of compliance, tribute, and military collaboration with the center" (TILLY, 1997, p. 3).

Despite the difficulties involved, historically grounded huge comparisons of big structures and large processes can help us "establish what must be explained, attach the possible explanations to their context in time and space, and sometimes actually improve our understanding of those structures and processes" (TILLY, 1989, p. 145).

Before examining each period in some detail, I shall make some methodological, terminological, and contextual remarks concerning how the subject matter should be framed. To begin with, this paper will largely avoid using the term "minority" as it is a modern category, which was adopted by the Ottoman Empire during the Tanzimat period. More importantly, talking about minorities in imperial settings like the Ottoman is somewhat problematic because, depending on what criteria is used, the designation of minority and majority could immediately change[1]. For example, in Rumeli, there was a clear Christian majority with substantial portions of Muslim minorities, whereas in Anatolia there was a clear Muslim majority with substantial portions of Christians, Jews, and other groups. In the same vein, if one takes nationality as the main criterion for establishing minorities and majorities, things may even get more complicated, as many national-cultural groups were dispersed across imperial domains, while retaining some core areas where they make up a majority.

The same applies to the Turks who were an absolute minority within the empire (Levene 2013, p.24). The centre and capital city of the Ottoman Empire, Istanbul, is a case in point. As late as the Balkan wars of 1911-1913, roughly equal portions of Muslim and Christian subjects lived in Istanbul, but during the twentieth century Christian populations also diminished, as Sharkey notes, "historic Christian communities persisted but dwindled as a proportion of the population" (SHARKEY, 2017, p. 2). So, the Ottoman empire was essentially a composite of two core political geographies: Anatolia (or Asia Minor) and Rumeli (or the land of the Romans).[2] The former was regarded by Ottoman ruling elites as

1. Hans-Lukas Kieser has rightly pointed out that the millet communities were called "minorities" in Western terminology, as well as in the Lausanne Treaty (July 24, 1923) which laid down the post-Ottoman order in the Middle East, and led to the proclamation of the Turkish republic on 29. October 1923. Since there was no clear majority even in the imperial core region in ethno--religious terms, the term "population group", Kieser concludes, is more accurate, referring that Ottomans themselves used the word unsur ("element") (KIESER, 2019, p. 2).

2. For example, the Arabic-speaking Orthodox Christians called themselves simply the Rum, a collective noun which could mean alternatively "Byzantines", "Anatolians", "Greeks or "Orthodox Christians" in Ottoman Turkish, while in Syrian Arabic, Rum could also mean `"Ottomans" in addition to the other possible meanings (MASTERS, 2001, p. 50).

constituting the territorial core of the empire where its initial victories and conquests were achieved, while Rumeli was perceived as possessing the empire's most significant cities and wealthiest stretches of farmland (GINGERAS, 2016, p.56).

This leads me to my *second point,* relating to the term "non-Muslim" which comprises such a large category of diverse peoples and confessional groups that are anything but monolithic and homogenous. The term "non-Muslim" refers to multiple communities composed of Christians, Jews and others that lived across the imperial domains extending over different geographies marked by significant cultural, societal and confessional and class differences (SHARKEY, 2017, p. 16 ff.). That is why the turn of phrase non-Muslim should not in any way be understood as assigning a primordial, monolithic and unchanging mass of peoples, or as oppositional to Muslim communities or vice versa. It is therefore neither about a "clash of civilizations" nor grounded in any assumption that posits a binary opposition between cultures and civilizations. Cultural distinctions, to paraphrase Said, cannot be seen as "frozen reified set of opposed essences" to be evoked for the purposes of adversarial knowledge production drawn from supposedly irreconcilable things (SAID, 2004, p. 352).

This brings me to my *third point*: Each period here under consideration is shaped by a set of historical developments and socio-economic processes that affected the nature of the relations between the Ottomans, its rivals and as well its subject communities. While keeping in mind that there were always considerable amounts of overlap between the four main eras presented here, the periodization is constructed as a heuristic framework "in which significant patterns of fact can be identified, causal relationships investigated and phenomena classified" (LEVENE, 2005, p. 66). As such, it is intended to provide points of reference against which commonalities and differences, as well as continuities and variations, in the conduct of the Ottoman public policies towards non-Muslim minorities⁄confessional groups can be better assessed.

Put differently, the periodisation offered here is not taken to mean that the outcomes were inevitable or the shift from one period to the other was predetermined at all. Nor is it meant to deny the significant areas of overlap between the periods, or the power and agency of the communities involved to shape their lives under ever-changing and challenging circumstances. Even under conditions of structural exclusion there were many non-Muslim communities across the Ottoman empire, especially those located predominantly in thriving ports, such as Izmir and Salonica where

> "non-Muslim entrepreneurs enjoyed two major advantages: they possessed the necessary human capital and they were perfectly embedded in local networks. While the former was a necessary skill to bypass local Muslim groups, the latter gave them a distinct advantage over Europeans" (EMRENCE, 2008, p.300).

In his masterfully examined study on Christians and Jews in the Ottoman Arab World, Bruce Masters shows the same trend in the Fertile Crescent from Aleppo to Beirut and almost as far as Damascus:

> "Christian merchants were able to supplant eventually their Jewish rivals for second place in the trading hierarchy. By way of contrast, Jewish merchants predominated in the all-important Indian trade with Iraq, although Christian and Muslim merchants were also active" (MASTERS, 2001, p. 143).

This trend is most visible during the Tanzimat period. Despite the fact that during the Tanzimat period the overwhelming majority of Christians and Jews living in the Ottoman Arab were not merchants - indeed in the cities of the region, most remained craftsmen or low-skilled workers - a Christian commercial middle class emerged in every port on the eastern Mediterranean seaboard and in Mosul and Damascus as well, while a parallel Jewish bourgeoisie was present in Baghdad and Basra (MASTERS, 2001, p. 144.). It follows that non-Muslims communities under the Ottoman rule were not simply passive recipients of a changing world order imposed on them but rather "they took an active lead in devising strategies to cope with change and benefit from it, thereby determining their own futures" (MASTERS, 2001, p 15.). As stated by Makdisi (2002) the "Christians as a whole were routinely described as infidels, yet they were tolerated; others such as Yezidi Kurds and Druzes were often described as heretics, but their heresy was often overlooked" (MAKDISI, 2002, p. 774.).

The *fourth point* is that not all communities were equally affected by Ottoman policies. For example, as Braude points out in the case of the Iberian Jews (i.e. Jews who had been expelled from Spain and Portugal in 1492) that of all the *dhimmi* communities, they alone were Ottoman subjects by *choice*, not by conquest, a characteristic that "distinguished them from the Christian communities and proved a source of suspicion in the eyes of their fellow subjects and of acceptance in the eyes of their masters" (BRAUDE, 2014, p. 37). In a similar vein, the Greeks' relationship to the Ottomans is considered to have been multi-layered, as different elements of the population had different privileges and responsibilities with "varying degrees of autonomy verging on effective independence" (BRAUDE, 2014, p. 25).

Finally, while trying to understand the factors related to the subject under review, it is important to emphasize the significance of the geographical/regional dimensions. More specifically, the geostrategic location of the settlement areas in combination with the level of effective rule by the Ottomans are among the factors that played a significant role in the degree of autonomy from, or exposure to, Ottoman governance. For example, owing to the lack of control and access to their settlement, the Maronites - one of the most important and influential Christian communities in the Fertile Crescent - were in a position to challenge the Ottoman policies. This meant that the leaders and dignitaries of this community "could flaunt in their mountain redoubts their disregard for many of the legal restrictions imposed on non-Muslims elsewhere, building new churches and monasteries, openly carrying arms, and riding horses. What was unthinkable in the rest of the sultan's domains could occur almost seamlessly in Mount Lebanon, with the open conversion to Christianity by individuals from two politically dominant clans of the Mountain, the Sunni Shihab and the Druze Abu-Lammac, in the early nineteenth century without apparent repercussion" (MASTERS, 2001, p. 43-44). This degree of freedom on the part of the Maronite community resulted from "the existence of their patriarch and church hierarchy outside the zone of direct Ottoman control" that gave the Maronites everywhere an opportunity for freedom of political action not shared by most other Christians in the Ottoman period (MASTERS, 2001, p. 44).

Taken together, the "Ottoman imperial paradigm [was] based on a hierarchical system of subordination along religious, class, and ethnic lines" (MAKDISI, 2002, p. 768). The fundamentally subdued and precarious status of communities was defined by the Ottoman policies of accommodation and suppression (MAKDISI, 2002, p. 777) on the one hand, and change and adaptation on the parts of the communities involved on the other (MASTERS, 2001, p. 13).

Having clarified the terminological and methodological understanding of this paper, in what follows, I shall discuss the dynamics and processes that shaped the situation of all communities under Ottoman rule - Muslim and non-Muslim alike.

An Overview of historical Context

It should be clear from the above that the bulk of the phenomena, institutions and ideas dealt with in this paper are nothing but modern occurrences and experiences. Whether it be the industrial revolution or the rise of capitalism as a global system or the changing rules of colonial expansionism or the logic of direct rule, the nation-state formation or the concepts of modernization and national emancipation - all of these were the features of modernity which emerged over the course of the 18th century and became ever more relevant to the Ottoman empire during the course of the nineteenth century up until its dissolution in the wake of the First World War.

The story, then, is not simply one about a medieval empire caught in its death throes versus the civilised European Great Powers. Nevertheless, the Ottoman predicament stands and falls with its diminishing power to expand further. Following a couple of momentous defeats and interventions during the course of the eighteenth century by the rival powers, the Ottoman Empire itself, once a fearsome "imperial aggressor", became subject to a more powerful imperialism (SHARKEY, 2017, p. 95).[3] Moreover, from the late eighteenth century onward, it faced an increasingly disobedient Christian population supported by Russia along with the other European powers that "increasingly pressed claims for the protection of entire communities. But unlike all the other powers, Russia could claim the demographically largest and strategically most significant of all, the Rum" (BRAUDE, 2014, p. 43). This state of affairs was accompanied and reinforced by the combined effects of "European thought, the Enlightenment, liberalism, and nationalism as well as the powerful engines of Europe's capital and industry" (ibid.). All of this undermined the basic assumptions of the Ottoman order, chipped away at its economy and fundamentally affected its heterogeneous social fabric.

At the turn of the nineteenth century, three major factors can be identified as causally relevant to the historical context under consideration: the Ottoman drive towards effective rule across imperial domains, European expansionism in the context of an ever-shifting balance of power in economical, technological and ideological terms at the expense of the Ottoman Empire, and the collective aspirations and actions for emancipation on the part of diverse subject communities under Ottoman

3. Important among these events were the Treaty of Karlowitz of 1699, which followed an Ottoman defeat by the Habsburg Empire and the loss of territories, the Treaty of Küçük Kaynarca of 1774, which provided the Russian with tremendous influence over the Orthodox Christian population in the Ottoman Empire, and finally, Napoleon's invasion of Egypt in 1798, which inaugurated a French occupation of the country that lasted for three years (SHARKEY, 2017, p. 95 ff.).

rule. However, the ways in which this trivalent interrelationship evolved is anything but straightforward, as it involved a complex and conflictual matrix of power relations with many convergences and divergences of interests and changing patterns of alliance and hostility.

The nature of these power relations with their multiple conflicts and convergences can be captured in what historian Leon Carl Brown called "the Eastern Question system" i.e. the long process of dismembering of the Ottoman empire without disturbing the European balance of power from the late eighteenth century until just after the First World War (BROWN, 1984, p. 5). Out of this process came an "elaborate, multiplayer diplomatic game involving many different European states as well many different Middle Eastern states" (BROWN, 1984, p. 5). Continuing for generations, Brown maintains, "the Eastern Question itself created a particular attitude toward politics and diplomacy among the players involved which still exists" (BROWN, 1984, p. 7).

While contingent upon conflicting as well as intersecting interests around the "Eastern question", this peculiar balance of power with its ever-shifting alliances ultimately determined the character of relations and interactions among the unequal parties throughout the 19th century up to the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire in the wake of the First World War. The late Ottoman period can be seen as an unfolding of the triangular relationship between the politics of the European Great Powers, the national aspirations of various nationalist movements, and the Ottoman politics of centralisation and nation-building. The imperial designs of the European Great Powers on the Ottoman Empire, however, provided the Ottomans both with political opportunities as well as a threat to its domination. Equally, the struggles of the emergent national movements for autonomy and/or independence provided both justification for intervention by the one or other European power on behalf of the respective community, and justification for the Ottoman state to more rigorously impose direct rule, nation-building or reforms, respectively.

Historian Hanioğlu seems to take issue with the fact that nationalist movements, the aspirations of local rulers, and international encroachments exerted an ever-stronger pull in the opposite direction, as "the imperial center took advantage of the possibilities afforded by modern technology to launch an ambitious attempt to centralize and modernize the mechanisms of control over the loosely held periphery" (HANIOČLU, 2008, p.4). Makdisi (2002), in turn refers to a fundamental shift from the earlier imperial paradigm of accommodation to "an imperial view suffused with nationalist modernization rooted in a discourse of progress" (2002, p. 769). Accordingly, Ottoman modernization

> "supplanted an established discourse of religious subordination in which an advanced imperial center reformed and disciplined backward peripheries of a multi-ethnic and multi-religious empire which led to the birth of Ottoman Orientalism" (ibid.).

Referring to the European power politics throughout the nineteenth century, Michael Mann suggests that the Great Power diplomacy was consciously geared to the very opposite of hegemonic stability theory. All agreements had accordingly two objectives:

"to prevent any single Power becoming hegemonic in any region of Europe and to preserve order, emphasizing that "order" was meant to different powers differently. For the reactionary monarchs, it meant regulating both international and domestic strife and repressing reform. For the liberal Powers, it meant avoiding revolution by allowing bourgeois and "national" self-determination" (MANN 2012A, p. 281ff.).

Diplomats had to preserve peace and order, "including reactionary class and market order, by avoiding hegemony, while coping "with the rise of the nation at odds with the existence of many existing states" (ibid.)

What the foregoing makes clear is that there were fundamental differences between the interests, perceptions and expectations of the parties involved - uniquely reflected in the ways they approached the reformation/modernization of Ottoman order. For the Ottomans, "reforms" meant the restoration of Ottoman power so as to be at least on equal footing with, if not superior to, the European Powers. Indeed, this was a basic strategy of the Ottomans that took shape in the early decades of the 19th century and reached its apogee by the1850s and beyond. This included both modernisation and "Westernisation" of the central State, as well the imposition of effective domination and control on the periphery. Many communities across the Ottoman realm, in turn, regarded reforms as creating conditions of possibility for their gradual emancipation and provided momentum for autonomy, a drive that also became more and more effective following the first decade of the 19th century. The European Great Powers, on the other hand, viewed the reforms as a launch pad for territorial expansion, as well as economic and political penetration, into the Ottoman realm.

The problem was that the Ottoman politics of effective rule played out under conditions where the rules of the game of power politics began to change. As masterfully explained by Wilhelm Grewe in an extensive Study on *Epochs of International Law,* from the early decade of nineteenth century, the dynamics of power politics and rivalries began to be regulated by "the International Legal Order of the British Age 1815 -1919, with its legal institutions of the new colonial Law of Nations. The age of British predominance rendered the international legal order of the nineteenth century its specific character (GREWE, 2000, p. 429 ff.). The most important feature of this change was expressed in the assertion of the *principle of effectiveness* that gradually became the regulating norm behind the colonial expansion and associated rivalries among the powers involved. In tracing the origins of this principle during the *longue durée* of colonisation, Grewe (2000) demonstrates how the older "right of discovery" was replaced by the principle of "effective occupation" that became the standard legal title for the acquisition of colonial territory in the British age. "The new wave of European expansion and taking possession of further colonies, which began in the last quarter of the nineteenth century", Grewe (2000) maintains, "took place against the background of the generally recognised validity of this title" (GREWE, 2000, p. 545). As a result, the law of 'civilised' nations only recognised the property and sovereignty of a nation in unpopulated regions, "if that nation was executing an actual occupation, i.e. founding a settlement and making actual use of it" (GREWE, 2000, p. 399.).

4. Referring to the establishment of a French protectorate in Tunisia in 1881, the British occupation of Egypt in 1882, and the Bulgarian annexation of Eastern Rumelia in 1885, historian Hanioğlu observed that all these drew no more than formal protests from the Ottoman government because "Abdülhamid II carefully evaded direct confrontations with the Great Powers and studiously avoided taking risks for regions only nominally under Ottoman control (HANIOGLU, 2008, p. 130).

5. For example: "Between 1899 and 1914, a total of 86,111 Syrians entered the United States, 90 percent of whom are estimated to have been Christians. Still others went to Latin America where communities of "Turcos" could be found in Sao Paulo, Caracas, Buenos Aires, and Mexico City by the start of the First World War. Syrian Jews also migrated both to the US and Mexico, as well as to Britain. Between 1871 and 1909, 60,653 Syrians entered Argentina, the largest single destination for Syrian immigrants in Latin America. But unlike the pattern of emigration to the US and Mexico, the stream of migrants going to the New World's southern hemisphere was more evenly divided between Muslims and Christians and even included Druzes" (MASTERS, 2001, p. 145).

6. For a very instructive synopsis along with comments on annotated bibliography see AVIV, Efrat. Entry Millet System in the Ottoman Empire. Oxford Islamic Studies, last modified: 28 November 2016. DOI: 10.1093/OBO/9780195390155-0231

Translated into the code of conduct among the Great Powers, this shift basically meant either effective rule on the territories claimed or the loss of sovereignty over them. The requirement of effectiveness posed a great threat to the Ottoman rule over its possessions, especially over those territories where military and administrative control was but nominal or where a greater degree of autonomy existed.[4] To conclude, at every critical juncture during the 19th century, the peculiar dynamics of the said trivalent relationship between the European Great power politics, the identity politics of subject peoples and the Ottoman policies of centralising and increasingly nationalising the empire at work. However, in times where these factors came together to act in a *zero-sum game* manner, the outcomes were the most devastating. This deadly coming together of factors was particularly evident before and during the Russo-Ottoman War (1877–78), the Balkan Wars (1911-1913), and finally World War One (1914-1918).

As will be shown in this paper, all of this fundamentally affected the status and destiny of non-Muslim and Muslim communities alike. One important outcome of this process was the mass migration on the part of non-Muslim communities from the Lebanese mountains and elsewhere to the Americas, including Brazil[5]. As will discussed in more detail below, the Russo-Ottoman war ended with the near collapse of the Ottoman Empire, the Balkan Wars ended with almost complete loss of the empire's European dominions, while World War One caused the Armenian genocide, expulsions and extermination of the Greek and other minorities and, finally, the collapse of the Ottoman Empire itself. In the remainder of this article, I will outline the contentious status of minorities and its evolution along the proposed line of argumentation and will conclude by summarising the main points.

1. Structural Exclusion by Toleration

Ruling over a vast amount of territories with a heterogeneous population made up of diverse groups of people can be regarded as one of the central criteria for the success and survival of any empire. Following the conquest of foreign territories, including the conquest of Constantinople in 1453, where a majority Christian population lived, the Ottomans were faced with the daunting task of having to deal with the sheer diversity of population, territories and ethno-religious communities in the region.

Out of this process emerged elements of what would come to be known as *millet* (BARKEY, 2008, p. 12). The millet system is widely held as a long-lasting example of a form of non-territorial autonomy and "innovation that Ottoman rulers used to organize the empire's religious groups from the conquest of Constantinople in 1453 to the nineteenth century" (BARKEY; GAVRILIS, 2016 p.24).

Before discussing the meaning and implications of the *millet* as a politico-administrative system, some terminological clarifications would be appropriate. The term *millet* is derived from the Arabic word Millah, meaning 'nation' or 'community' (AVIV, 2016)[6]. The idea behind this system stems from the Sharia's (Islamic law) treatment of members of reli-

gions regarded as People of the Book (Ahal-al-Kitab), that is, followers of religions who believe in the presence of the Almighty. Under the Sharia, the *Ahal-al-Kitab* could be granted the political status of *Dhimmis*, whereby they entered into a pact, or Dhimma with the Muslim ruler to accept subordination to Islam, and the requirement to pay a special tax, the *Jizya* (AVIV, 2016). In Koranic tradition thewere considered as protégés who had to pay additional poll taxes (KIESER, 2019). In short, non-Muslim minorities were *tolerated* "provided that they accepted their inferior status vis-à-vis Islam and that they regularly paid their taxes" (LORY, 2015, p. 371).

There is, however, an interesting debate about the initial use of the term Millet, and its application as a ruling technique over subject communities, as well as the scope of the 'system', notably whether or not it was solely restricted to non-Muslims or if it was also applicable to Muslims (TAŞ, 2014, p. 498-526 ff.)[7]. Whilst some scholars show a very receptive disposition towards the merits of the millet (QUER, 2013, p. 79 ff.)[8], others have problematised the sole use of the "millet system paradigm" to describe Ottoman rule over non-Muslim communities (BRAUDE, 1982, p. 70ff; PAPADEMETRIOU, 2015, p. 22). The latter have argued that the millet system was not at all in circulation during the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, implying that it is rather a late Ottoman conception and can therefore be considered as a "foundation myth" of the Ottoman Empire (BRAUDE, 1982, p.77; DASKALOV; VEZENKOV, 2005, p.6 ff.). However, others maintain that there are earlier references to the *millets* in the Ottoman tax registers, which indicate that non-Muslim subjects were part of the political-religious vocabulary of the Empire long before they were recognised as autonomous corporations in terms of public law in the 19th century (URSINUS, 1989, p. 202-207).

On a more abstract level, the millet system can be seen as an Ottoman response to the imperative to make heterogeneous populations both legible and governable (BARKEY, 2008, p. 21). Accordingly, the Ottomans were not interested in conducting systematic purification of 'unwanted elements' or indigenous communities of conquered territories. Tolerance, assimilation, and intolerance were thus all on the menu of strategies designed to squeeze resources out of minorities and to enforce allegiance to the imperial state (BARKEY, 2008, p.18). The system allowed rulers "to efficiently organize the empire's population into communities by devolving power to trusted intermediaries and community leaders who in turn were held responsible for governing the community and resolving conflicts both within the community and with other millets" (BARKEY; GAVRILIS, 2016, p. 24). Equally, by giving a degree of recognition as a community with tangible autonomy in the religious and legal realms, irrespective of their place in the empire, the millet system allowed the leaders of communities to act with a sense of confidence, (ibid.). Accordingly, each Millet (the Greek Orthodox, the Catholic, Jewish, and Armenian Millet) was granted autonomy to set its own laws, and to collect and distribute its own taxes (AVIV, 2016).

Placing the treatment of non-Muslims in the Ottoman Empire within the context of Islamic law, Masters maintains that Muslim authorities recognized "the rights of believers in the monotheistic faiths to remain at

7. Contrary to the scholars considering the millet as related only to the non-Muslim communities, Taş (2014) maintains that the Kurds as majority Muslim community used the millet practice as form of fiscal, judicial and administrative autonomy over their region and applied their customary laws over disputes between their members, concluding that the millet practice can be a potential source for plural modern nation-states to draw on in understanding how diversity in a plural society might peacefully be managed as it "offers a unique blend of territorial and non-territorial rights for different communities" (TAS, 2014, p. 498).

8. For example, according Giovanni M. Quer (2013), although the millet system originates from a different legal and political tradition with aspects that may be incompatible with the Western democratic tradition, it can be seen "as a model of diversity management offers available solutions to contemporary multicultural Europe in terms of both collective rights accommodation and formulation of minority and majority groups' interests" (QUER, 2013, p. 79 ff.).

peace within the *umma*, as long as they recognized Islam's political authority over them. In the process, this understanding became embodied in the concept of the *ahl al-dhimma* ("the people of the contract"). This guaranteed the rights of the non-Muslims to property, livelihood, and freedom of worship in return for extra taxes (t*he jizya)* and the promise not to help Islam's enemies" (MASTERS, 2001, p. 20). This understanding gradually became prevalent, and developed into a "concrete legal form in a document known as the *"Pact of Umar"*, a religious code of conduct, indicating both the social marginalisation and political subordination of non-Muslims along with their protection to that effect (MASTERS, 2001, p. 22).

As far as its application to non-Muslim minorities was concerned, the millet was constructed in non-territorial terms. The 'autonomy' was then granted on the basis of religious affiliation and not on a regional or territorial basis. The leader of each religious community was obliged to undertake responsibility for the actions of his community and was directly answerable to the government. It is maintained that in the case of the Greek (*Rum milleti*), for example, the Ottomans saw the Greek Orthodox ecclesiastical hierarchy as a resource for generating cash income. They primarily became known as tax farmers (*mültezim*) for cash income derived from the Church's widespread holdings. The Ottoman state granted individuals the right to take their positions as hierarchs in return for yearly payments to the state (PAPADEMETRIOU, 2015, p. 3). On that view, the Church was considered by the Ottomans as a fiscal institution within the larger Ottoman economic and social context (PAPADEME-TRIOU, 2015, p. 6). Accordingly, the organisation of millet was designed to act as an effective way of tax collection, as well as an instrument for shaping intra-communal power relations and reproducing subordination and hierarchies: "Time and again, the Ottoman state responded to requests from petitioning clergy by coming to their aid, and using the state's coercive authority, to make sure that the payments were made" (PAPADEMETRIOU, 2015, p. 4).

The millets as constituted in the nineteenth century were hierarchically organized religious bodies with a decidedly political function. Each millet was headed by a cleric, otherwise known as the patriarch or chief rabbi, or in Ottoman Turkish, the *millet başı*. Although the millet başı were appointed by the sultan, and were required to be resident in Istanbul, they were largely free to order the affairs of their community as long as they remained loyal to the sultan (MASTERS, 2001, p. 61). As the millet involved a "series of arrangements, varying in time and place, that afforded each of the major religious communities a degree of legal autonomy and authority" (BRAUDE, 2014, 16). it can be concluded that the millet was not a firmly established structure endowed with binding and predictable norms, but rather it was a variable technique of governance, premised on a set of arrangements that were periodically negotiated, renewed and enacted, and were always subject to shifting dynamics of power between the respective leaders of each community and the imperial state. What rendered the *millet* regulation both striking and unstable was its combination of elements of indirect rule with elements of direct rule. Bearing in mind the inherently contradictory nature of both modes of rule, the

millet formation by and large offered a viable scheme of protection under the Muslim rule, to be sure, at the expense of structural inequality, marginalisation and exclusion from the central areas of the imperial polity. Though important in its historical context, the millet can hardly be seen as a normative exercise in tolerance and recognition with enduring and inspiring features for the present-day quest for conflict resolution. If anything, the millet needs a very critical reconstruction, and reappropriation in light of the development of international law and democratic principles.

However divergent the views on the origins, meanings and implications of the millet are, one thing is certain: it first rose to prominence during the Tanzimat period. It was during this period that the millet became established as way of addressing the rights and legal status of non-Muslim confessional groups, while simultaneously giving rise to the formation of new communities in the mode of the millet organisation. The immediate causes and outcome of this process are the subject of the next section.

2. Integration through Politics of Recognition (Tanzimat Period)

In the Ottoman studies Tanzimat (lit. reorganization) era is commonly referred to as the "westernisation" and "modernisation" of the educational, military and political structures of the Empire (THE OXFORD DICTIONARY OF ISLAM, 2003, Tanzimat entry). It was during this period that major reforms were enacted calling for equality for all Ottoman subjects. These reforms resulted in the codified millet autonomy in relation to non-Muslim minorities for the first time. In terms of the status of non-Muslim minorities, two major imperial edicts are of significant importance. The first was the *Gülhane Prescript* of 1839, named after the park where it was first read, and second the Reform Edict of 1856 (*Hatt-ı Humayın).* In general, both documents are often cited as a hallmark of the religious pluralism within the Ottoman Empire, demonstrating the protection of the rights of all subjects, regardless of religious creed, despite the state's affiliation with Islam (THE OXFORD DICTIONARY OF ISLAM, 2003, Tanzimat entry). In what follows, I shall examine the significance and implications of both documents in some detail.

The *Gülhane Prescript* was a declaration of intention, outlining a regime of political and legal equality between Christians and Muslims (GINGERAS, 2009, p. 19)[9]. *The Hatt-ı Humayun* draws on the first but took a more radical step towards equal treatment and civil rights by granting non-Muslim minorities the right to constitute themselves as self-governing entities with its own constitution (*nizâmnâme*) and an elected assembly. This represented a major change that affected the Rûm millet (Greek-Orthodox), the Armenian millet, the Christian millet (both Protestant and Catholic), as well as the Jewish millet. Excluded from this scheme, however, were the Nestorian Syriacs (*Asuri*), Syriac Christians (Süryani), Yezidis as well as other non-Muslim minorities (KIESER, 2019, p. 3).

The internal rules of the millets were subject to periodic review by the central government and an assembly to be composed of the community's clerics and laity, creating a potential for future democratization of millet governance, seeing by some clergy as undermining their authori-

9. Hatt-i Şerif (the Noble Prescript of Gülhane) made as part of Ottoman reforms protected the rights and property of subjects, affirmed the restoration of Sharia as law; instituted protections of life, honor, and property; fixed taxation according to wealth; granted all subjects the right to public trial and verdict; promised an even distribution of military service across the population; and extended rights to all subjects, whether Muslim or non-Muslim.

ty" (MASTERS, 2001, p. 138 ff.). This politics of *millets* was also motivated by a fine-tuned policy of divide and rule, aimed at augmenting the extraction of resources and keeping the communities manageable, whilst counteracting the growing Tsarist Russian influence over the Orthodox Christian communities across the Balkans and elsewhere.

The reform edicts led to the formation of new *millets*, and "further encouraged Christian elites to articulate and refine religious identity as a means to obtain political power" (MASTERS, 2001, p. 61). Alongside the already existing millets mentioned above, new millet structures, namely the *Uniate Armenian* (1831) and *Melkite Catholics* (1848) and Protestant Millet (1847), were established and recognised, leading smaller and formerly less active Christian sects to take their success as a model.

The declaration of Muslim–Christian equality created confusion and discontent, resulting in gradual replacement of the millet system by a more uniform code of law and civic responsibility (GINGERAS, 2009, p. 19). Faced with the challenge of nationalism and ensuing disintegration of the Empire, Istanbul attempted to defuse them by creating a new patriotic identity, that is, the Ottoman identity based on dynastic and imperial allegiance. For this purpose, in January 1869 a law entitled "nationality or citizenship law" (*Tabiiyet Kanunu)* was passed, stating that "all individuals born of an Ottoman father and an Ottoman mother, or only an Ottoman father, are Ottoman subjects" (AHMAD, 2014, p. 3-4).

Although prerogatives and privileges seen as the preserve of Muslims communities remained largely unchanged (GINGERAS, 2009, p. 19), the reforms nonetheless resulted in the empowerment of national-religious communities, and gave rise to the assertion of communal aspirations towards more emancipation which was in turn deemed by many as a threat to the predominant pattern of relations. Both reform edicts were perceived as "dismantl[ing] the legal hierarchy governing the relations between Muslims and non-Muslims established by the *Pact of Umar* with the blunt justification that such steps were necessary to save the empire" (MASTERS, 2001, p. 137). Indeed many saw the reforms as exacerbating the economic crisis of the Ottoman empire, fostering its dependency on European loans, while failing to stifle ethnic and religious separatism encouraged by Great Britain and France, and provoked unrest among Muslims (HANIOČLU, 2008, p.110). A large number of people also viewed the reforms as empowering the non-Muslim communities, at the expense of their own situation. The growing sectarian antagonism led to violent outbursts across the imperial domains. The most tragic among them occurred in Aleppo 1850 and in 1860 with the civil war in Lebanon and the subsequent Damascus riot.[10] The violent nature of these clashes has been described by historian Sharkey who notes that "the 1860 Maronite-Druze skirmishes escalated into massacres, including one that killed 5,000 people on a single day in July" (SHARKEY, 2017, p. 150)

Sharkey (2017) also emphasizes how the intercommunal violence sprang "from the collapse of the feudal order, changes in Ottoman policies, shifts in the local economy, and the rising tide of sectarianism as factors that mixed together and exploded" (SHARKEY, 2017, p. 150). However, despite the situation 'exploding' it is important to note here,

10. "The spark that set off the Aleppo riot of 1850", according to Sharkey, "was a report that spread among Muslims of the eastern quarters, to the effect that Ottoman authorities were about to impose a new military draft. Making matters worse was the new Ottoman policy of taxing Muslims directly" (SHARKEY, 2017, p. 147). Similarly, Masters (2001) notes how, the "[v]iolence targeting foreign or domestic Christians took place in Aleppo in 1850, Mosul in 1854, Nablus in 1856, Jeddah in 1858, and Egypt in 1882. Muslim anger could also be directed at Jews, as occurred in the Mosul riot or in Baghdad in 1889. But across the region, the descent into sectarian violence served to segregate Muslims from Christians, rather than pit Muslims against all non-Muslims indiscriminately as the Christians had become associated with the most obvious manifestations of change" (MASTERS, 2001, p. 130).

as Masters (2001) suggests that "it was not so much equality with the non-Muslims, that the Muslims were protesting, but their perception that the Christians were now in the ascendancy" (MASTERS, 2001, p. 132).

Moreover, the communal empowerment and the increasing visibility of communities in terms of building new churches, holding public religious processions, and vaunting their connections to the militarily dominant Europeans that had once existed largely outside the public gaze of Muslims "rubbed salt into the Muslims' psychological wound" (ibid.). The result was an increasing politicisation of religion and promotion of sectarianism. This was elevated to a basic strategy of the Ottoman politics once the Russo-Ottoman War of 1877–78 broke out. This war once more changed the entire geopolitical landscape of the empire in fundamental ways, and fateful effects on the fortunes of non-Muslims and Muslims alike. One important outcome of the war was the ascendancy of Sultan Abdülhamid II (1842-1918) to power.

3. Control and Coercive Domination (Hamidian Period, 1876–1909)

If reactions against granting equal treatment and equality before the law were still somehow manageable throughout the Tanzimat period, the Russo-Ottoman War of 1877–78 not only led to the reversal of the reform legislation, but also to the rise of a deeply suspicious and hostile politics, especially towards Orthodox communities. The war indeed marked a watershed moment in the last quarter of 19th century of the Ottoman empire, creating new geopolitical realities, while shifting the balance of power on an unprecedented scale.

In April 1877, Russia declared war on the Ottoman Empire following an agreement, signed in mid-January, with Austria-Hungary that allowed Russia freedom of movement in the Balkans in exchange for Austro-Hungarian rule over Bosnia and Herzegovina (FORTNA, 2008, p. 46). The war took place against a background of a peasant rebellion against Ottoman rule in the Balkans in 1875. In July 1885, Slav peasants revolted against their Muslim landowners in Herzegovina followed by a fresh rebellion in Bulgaria that took place in April 1876. In July 1876, Serbia and Montenegro declared war on the Ottoman state (HANIOČLU, 2008, p. 111). Of course, Russia, keen to exploit the weaknesses of the Ottoman Empire, as it had done for centuries at many critical junctures in the empire's history, was quick to support the rebellion by taking the lead in the war.

The Russo-Ottoman war of 1877–78 turned out to be a disaster for the Ottomans. The San Stefano Treaty of March 3, 1878 marked the high point of Russian expansion at the expense of the Ottoman Empire. "Not only did the treaty award Russia certain territorial gains, it granted independence and additional territory to the ostensibly Ottoman states of Montenegro, Rumania, and Serbia" (HANIOČLU, 2008, p. 121). The treaty also sanctioned

> "internal reforms in various Ottoman areas, including Armenia; and a massive financial indemnity to Russia causing continuing exodus of Muslim refugees from lost territory into the shrunken borders of the Ottoman Empire, forcing the state to use scarce funds to feed and shelter them" (FORTNA, 2008, p. 46).

In defeat, the Ottomans were forced to make major concessions to Bulgaria in March 1878 as part of the Treaty of San Stefano, which established a "greater Bulgaria" that extended from the Black Sea to the Aegean Sea. Alarmed by these Russian gains, Britain, Austria-Hungary, and Germany intervened in favour of the Ottomans and compelled Russia to revoke some of the concessions imposed on the Ottomans, which forced Russia to withdraw from Ottoman territories. As Mann notes, "[s]ome were declared independent states, and others were given to Austria in order to preserve the Balkan balance of power" (MANN, 2012A, p. 281). Although Bulgaria became autonomous, it was reduced in size and divided into two parts. Macedonia remained within the confines of the Ottoman Empire, whereas Serbia and Montenegro were recognized as sovereign states (AHMAD, 2014, p. 5).

The Congress of Berlin in 1878 "created a Bulgaria that was autonomous but tributary and an Eastern Rumelia that was semi-autonomous, with a Christian governor who was to be appointed by the Ottoman government" (KASABA, 2004, p. 46). Historian Todorova notes that not only were the size, shape, stages of growth of the different Balkan states almost exclusively regulated by great power considerations with regards to "the rules of the balance-of-power game" but so too was their very existence. (TODOROVA, 2009, p. 169). The impact of the war and subsequent treaty for the Ottomans was huge as Keyder (1997) observes,

> "Balkan nationalism culminated in a massive loss of territory following the 1877-78 war with Russia. The empire lost more than a third of its lands, especially the provinces where its non-Muslim population had constituted the majority. Social and economic conditions shifted radically, as did the causes of the empire's dismantling" (KEYDER, 1997, p. 33).

One important outcome of the war was the dissolution of the newly established Ottoman parliament in February 1878. Sultan Abdülhamid used the war with Russia as a pretext to suspend the constitution, introduced on 23 December 1876, for the next thirty years. Under the constitution all Ottomans would become equal before the law, enjoying the same rights and obligations regardless of ethnicity or religion, though Islam remained the religion of the state (AHMAD, 2014, p. 5). Following the dissolution of the parliament, the sultan began to construct new methods of administration by promoting an efficient bureaucracy in control of the periphery, reinstating an old Ottoman emphasis on personal loyalty on the parts of bureaucrats "as an indispensable qualification for employment in the civil service" (HANIOGLU, 2008, p. 123 ff.). During his reign Pan-Islamism became established as a guiding strategy which transformed "a religio-political instinct into a politico-religious policy" (BRAUDE, 2014, p. 47). The aim was twofold: first, to mould the Muslim elements of the empire into a cohesive whole in order to build a core identity, a policy that was also facilitated by enormous demographic change brought about by the loss of territory heavily populated by Christians, and the influx of Muslim refugees, which increased the Muslim proportion of the Ottoman population to 73.3 percent. The second aim was the "use of Pan-Islamic propaganda as a wild card directed against colonial powers who ruled over substantial Muslim populations" (HANIOČLU, 2008, p. 130).

Sultan Abdulhamid embarked on an ambitious set of policies towards centralising and regularising the control of the central government, modernising the armed forces and education system, and creating a loyal elite (FORTNA, 2008, p. 48). He was particularly concerned with strategic infrastructure projects, such as internal communications and the railway infrastructure "that would improve the efficiency of the Ottoman army and facilitate greater control over the imperial peripheries as well as investment in a widespread intelligence network" (BLOXHAM, 2005, p.46). Conflicts in the Balkans and the consequent Ottoman-Russian War led to dramatic territorial losses for the Ottoman Empire in the Balkans, the Caucasus and the entirety of Cyprus. As a consequence, Abdülhamid considered the political principles of the preceding reform period a failure and instead implemented policies designed to empower the (Sunni) Muslims and to assimilate the Alevis, Yezidis and Shiites. This was because "the empire increasingly considered Asia Minor its core land given the territorial losses of previous decades" (KIESER, 2019. p. 3).

One crucial development during the Hamidian regime was the emergence of the Armenian national movement, namely the two revolutionary parties, *Hunchak* ("The Bell") and *Dashnaktsutyun* (the Armenian Revolutionary Federation, ARF) (FORTNA, 2008, p. 54). The Armenian nationalist political parties were established "in the late 1880s in the comparative safety of Russian Armenia at about the same time as organized constitutionalist Muslim groups were being formed in opposition to Abdulhamid's autocratic rule" (BLOXHAM, 2005, p. 49). As Bloxham indicates in the early 1890s, "the parties, particularly the Hunchaks, infiltrated Ottoman Armenia to coordinate revolutionary activity and import arms. Following the model of Bulgarian nationalists, the Huncak led the movement to recapture the attention of the powers, sometimes by ostentatious, terrorist methods and assassinations that also reveal a debt to the Russian populists" (BLOXHAM, 2005, p. 50). Thus, we can see how at this time, in order to divert attention to the Armenian plight "Armenian revolutionaries stepped up acts of violence and sabotage in the hope of provoking European intervention" (HANIOČLU, 2008, p. 131).

The overall situation led to the "Hamidian massacres", a series of atrocities carried out by Ottoman forces and Muslim irregulars against the Armenians in the Ottoman Empire between 1894 and 1896. The Ottoman authorities increased their repression of Armenians, raised taxes on Armenian villages, and aroused nationalistic feelings and resentment against Armenians among the neighbouring Kurds. When, in 1894, the Armenians in the Sasun region refused to pay an oppressive tax, Ottoman troops and Kurdish tribesmen killed thousands of them and burned their villages. Another wave of killing began in September 1895, when the Ottoman authorities' repression of an Armenian protest in Istanbul turned into a massacre. The incident was followed by a series of massacres in towns with Armenian communities that culminated in December 1895, when nearly 3,000 Armenians who had taken refuge in the cathedral of Urfa (modern Şanlıurfa) were burned alive (BLOXHAM, 2005, p. 67). "Tragically for the Armenians'', Braude concludes, "their hopes for national independence arose at the end of a century-long succession of

Christian uprisings in the Balkans. And their aspirations were centered in Anatolian territory that the leaders of the Ottoman Empire in its last decades came to regard as the last bastion of what remained of their empire" (BRAUDE, 2014, p. 36).

Thus, the Russo-Ottoman War created the conditions under which Armenian aspirations for communal emancipation was responded to with state-organised mass violence. The violence was organised by an Empire that was continuously in pursuit of a more centralising, homogenising and nationalising form of Pan-Islamist politics, and was accompanied by increasingly radicalised national movements, with the European Powers unwilling to take effective diplomatic and political initiatives in order to stop the plight of the Armenian community or to prevent the escalation of the conflict. Such was the background against which the İttihat *ve Terakki Cemiyeti* (Committee of Union and Progress, CUP), otherwise known as the Young Turks, took over the state power in 1908.

4. Politics of nation-building by communal extermination and expulsion (CUP Rule, 1908-18)

Tilly's dictum "war made the state and the state made war" provides a powerful metaphor to think about the post-World War I geopolitical constellations in the post-Ottoman geography in general, and for the geopolitical situation of minorities in particular. The European Great Powers' politics towards the Ottoman empire, the ever increasing level of national conflicts in the Balkans, and the Ottoman politics of centralisation and homogenisation entered into a completely new era with the ascendancy of the Turkish nationalist movement, the Committee for Union and Progress (CUP), culminating in a military coup in 1908.

For a while, the removal of the Abdülhamid regime and ensuing reinstitution of the constitution, which was suspended in February 1878 on the pretext of the Russo-Ottoman war, was met with hope and a sense of optimism. But the constitution that was supported by all in the days of the revolution was soon "used against many to eradicate traditional privileges in the name of equality before the law, and to threaten the very fabric of millet communities amid the denigration of the the millet institutions as "government within the government" (SOHRABI, 2018, p. 844 ff.). Contrary to its promises for more democratic and inclusive governance, the CUP proceeded to reinforce a nationalist politics based on "eradication of difference", pushing a multiethnic state towards becoming "an imperial nation-state" (SOHRABI, 2018, p. 844).

The more the Young Turks established their power grip on the Ottoman state apparatus, the less they were inclined to introduce reforms and to address the aspirations of other nationalities. The dictatorial rule of the CUP was then confronted with an upsurge in national insurgencies initially from the Balkan peoples. The overall situation was exacerbated by the interventions of the Great Powers on behalf of one or another party to the conflicts. The key ingredients of this conflict escalation - the politics of the Great Powers, the politics of the nationalising elite of the Ottoman state, and the politics of national independence of subject peo-

ples – were once again at work, coming together to produce the most disastrous consequences. The murderous dynamics of conflict escalation worked to their fullest on the cusp of the Balkan Wars (8 October 1912 – 18 July 1913). Just one year after Italy's invasion of Libya, the armies of Bulgaria, Greece, Serbia, and Montenegro attacked the Ottoman forces in a concerted effort to gain independence from the Ottoman empire. The first of the Balkan Wars led to the partitioning of Ottoman Macedonia and Thrace by the Balkan States, further causing Albania's declaration of independence (GINGERAS, 2016, p.56).

The outcomes of these events were immeasurably devastating. The Ottomans suffered huge losses in the Balkan Wars, losing 83 percent of its territory, and 69 percent of its population in the European provinces. Most of its Muslim population was left behind, and many fled to Anatolia. Muslims were the majority community in the Ottoman Balkans before the war began, and were the largest single religious community (AHMAD, 2014, p. 46; GINGERAS, 2016, p. 56). The loss of Rumeli, seen as the empire's keystone and the cradle of the CUP, radicalized and scarred the country's leadership permanently. The Balkan Wars brought about "the greatest mass migration in the empire's history and produced legacies of the conflict that would continue to linger well into the Great War and beyond" (GINGERAS, 2016, p.56).

The Balkan disasters in combination with the CUP's decision to take part in the First World War fundamentally altered the parameters of the imperial politics and polity. This shift was reflected both in mindset and in the public policies of the CUP leadership. The war was seen as opportunity by the CUP leadership (AKSAKAL, 2008, p. 179ff.), especially the alliance with Germany which was regarded "as a desirable path to reclaiming the empire's independence and economic stability" (AKSAKAL, 2008, p. 190). In March of 1914, the Young Turks then entered World War One on the side of the Central Powers (Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Bulgaria). They attacked to the east, with the aim of capturing the city of Baku as part of the Caucasus campaign against Russian forces in the Caucuses. "The whole of the war in the Near East and the Balkans", observes Bloxham, "was drawn along ethnic-national lines and every imperial power was seeking advantage in their opponents' territory by offering incentives to nascent ethnic/religious/nationalist movements therein" (BLOXHAM, 2005, p. 94). Accordingly, the locus of ethnic conflict spread fully into the Caucasus, where it had long been simmering. Germany coveted the mineral resources of the Caucasus for the sustenance of its war effort, while the door had reopened in an unlikely fashion for the pursuit of the CUP's expansionist ambitions (BLOXHAM, 2005, p. 100.).

The pan-Turanian and pan-Islamic campaigns conducted in the Caucasus, in Persia, and the Arab lands respectively "miscalculated the effect of Ottoman propaganda on other Turkic and Muslim peoples" (BLOXHAM, 2005, p. 69). The politics of expansion led to a disastrous defeat at the battle of Sarikamish (December 1914/January 1915). "In early 1915", notes historian David Fromkin, "Enver, as Minister of War, and Talaat, as Minister of the Interior, claimed that the Armenians were openly supporting Russia. In reprisal they ordered the deportation of the entire

Armenian population from the northeastern provinces to locations outside of Anatolia" (FROMKIN, 2001, p. 212). The treatment of the Armenians was particularly brutal as "[r]ape and beating were commonplace. Those who were not killed at once were driven through mountains and deserts without food, drink or shelter. Hundreds of thousands of Armenians eventually succumbed or were killed" (FROMKIN, 2001, p. 212).

The systematic killings and deportations during the War led to the total destruction of the Armenian people of the Ottoman Empire (MELSON, 1992, p. 29ff.). Referring to the politics of the CUP, the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador Johann von Pallavicini in a diplomatic dispatch, dated 7 Nov. 1915, described the policy of the CUP as a means of 'creating a national state through the annihilation of foreign elements' (PALLAVICINI *apud* BLOXHAM, 2005, p. 94). Many scholars have explained how the mass killing in the late Ottoman empire, and the Armenian genocide as causally related to the logic of nation-building, the national security strategies of nationalising and homogenising elites, and the politics of national and cultural homogenisation in the context of world war marked by rivalries among the great powers (MYLONAS, 2012, p. 48; AKÇAM, 2004, p. 44; GÖÇEK, 2011, p. 52).

The CUP increasingly saw "the Ottoman entity as ethnically single rather than as a diverse multiplicity of peoples while defining loyalty to the state as function of supposed ethnic reliability" (LEVENE, 2014, p. 4, Volume). With the outbreak of the First World War, the Great Powers' designs on the Ottoman Empire intensified, as was "the Ottomans' ambition to create a homogeneous state on the basis of either ethnicity or religion, through a Pan-Turkic and Pan-Islamic expansionist policy" (AKÇAM, 2004, p. 21). Accordingly, as long as Anatolia remained ethnically pluralistic, "it would be vulnerable to subversion and partition", a mindset leading the CUP to conclude that the "homogenization of Anatolia was the surest solution to the dilemma they faced" (REYNOLDS, 2011, p 150). This led to both the extermination of the Armenians and the state-guided demographic transformation of Eastern Anatolia which included Muslim Kurds, Albanians, Circassians (REYNOLDS, 2011, p. 149).

Bloxham (2005) has emphasised how "the complexities and contingencies of state policy-making in a period of prolonged wartime crisis" are more relevant to the understanding of the Armenian genocide than a prior genocidal intent. The Armenian case is thus best understood as "a process of cumulative radicalization towards a policy of genocide, a radicalization with its roots in the interaction of great power imperialism, Near Eastern nationalism, and the decline of the Ottoman Empire" (BLOXHAM, 2005, p. 96). The cumulative use of mass murder was maintained by "the intimate relationship between intention and contingency" (*ib*. 2005, p. 63). The genocide is then explained as emerging "from a series of more limited measures implemented regionally that developed into an empire-wide programme through a process of cumulative policy radicalization which, in the early summer of 1915, culminated in an policy of general killing and death by attrition" (BLOXHAM, 2005, p. 69). The Armenian Genocide, along with the killing of Assyrians and the expulsion of the Anatolian Greeks, laid the groundwork for the more homogeneous nation-state that emerged from the ashes of the empire (SUNY, 2011, p. 41).

Taken together, the Balkan Wars and World War One provided the conditions, opportunities and expediencies for the CUP regime to execute its politics of state transformation and nation-building through national, religious and cultural homogenisation of a multicommunial and multicultural Empire by genocidal violence. I refer to this particular politics and its outcomes as "nation-building by nation-destruction"[11] to indicate the processes and policies of extermination and expulsion of communities by state-organised political violence, a violence that resulted from the generation of new forms of state power seeking to homogenise societies, if deemed necessary, by resorting to ethnic cleansing and genocide (BLOXHAM; GERWARTH, 2011, p.3; BLOXHAM; MOSES, 2011, p. 138 ff.).

The concept of "nation-building by nation-destruction" is intended to combine the contrasting aspects, namely the "regenerative" and destructive nature, of this process of nation-building in an instructive dialectical concept. My argument is that this conceptualisation may shed some light on the complexities of this matter, and lead to a better understanding of some of the processes and policies of state formation and nation-building in many other places. If that is the case, this concept would allow us to study the dual character of the process without being trapped into affirmative positions or reducing the inherently destructive features of such policies to the level of intended consequences along an unavoidable path of national modernization and regeneration.

11. The idea of "nation-building by nation-destruction" draws its inspiration from Connor Walker's argument that reads as follows: "Since most of the less developed states contain a number of nations and since the transfer of primary allegiance from these nations to the state is generally considered the sine qua non of successful integration", Walker maintains, "the true goal is not 'nation-building' but 'nation-destroying'" (WALKER, 1994, p. 42.). I am paraphrasing this idea as "nation-building by nation-destruction", widening its scope to include not just less developed states, but developed ones too.

Conclusions and Discussion

This essay has examined the situation and status of non-Muslim communities within the Ottoman Empire by offering a periodisation to examine commonalities and differences as well as changes and continuities. The periods have been defined as *structural exclusion by toleration*, *Integration by a politics of recognition of difference* (Tanzimat Phase, 1838-1876), *coercive domination and control* (Hamidian Period, 1876-1908), *politics of nation-building by nation-destruction* (the CUP period, 1908-1918). This periodisation has proven to be of explanatory value in terms of identifying the dominant mechanism within each period, while establishing relationships among the periods as they shifted from one to another. The periodisation, however, is not meant to suggest that outcomes were inevitable and that the shift from one period to another was predetermined. Rather, it is referred to as an heuristic device to more precisely understand the salient features of Ottoman policies towards the subject non-Muslim communities.

My focus has been on non-Muslim minorities, yet the elements of this framework can equally be applied to the non-Turkish but Muslim peoples such as the Kurds and others. The post-Ottoman Turkish state, the "Republic of Turkey" (1923), did not only emerge out the ashes of the Ottoman Empire, but more fundamentally founded on the institutional and ideological framework together with its core military, bureaucratic and administrative staff as well as policy paradigmas laid out by the CUP regime (BEZWAN, 2008, p. 138 ff.).

Since its inception in 1923, the successive governments of the Turkish republic (i.e. the legal and political successors of the dissolved Ottoman Empire)[12] have, to varying degrees, adopted elements of CUP politics of nation-building by nation-destruction. With the extermination and expulsion of Christian communities from Anatolia, except for a small Jewish community and tiny Christian groups in and around Istanbul, there were non-Muslims left to be targeted. There were instead mainly Muslim communities, such the Kurds and others, to them the politics of negation and forced assimilation through the use of state-organised mass violence turned. It is beyond the scope of this article to address this question but suffice it to say that this fact lies at the roots of many fundamental problems of which Turkey is today faced.

In *Remapping the Ottoman Middle East*, a meritorious and nicely framed study, Cem Emrence (2011) suggests that the Ottoman Middle East is essentially defined by three historical trajectories during the nineteenth century:

> "the coast, the interior, and the frontier. The coastal framework represented the port-cities and commercial hinterlands of western Anatolia and the eastern Mediterranean littoral; the interior path marked the inland experience of Anatolia, Syria and Palestine; and the frontier incorporated the contentious borderland regions of eastern Anatolia, Iraq and the Arabian Peninsula" (EMRENCE, 2011, p. 4).

These trajectories produced long-term outcomes, with "economy on the coast, politics in the interior, and contention in the frontier served as primary processes that initiated regional paths in the late Ottoman Empire" (EMRENCE, 2011, p. 4). While the coast became the spatial seat of modernity, embodying middle-class values, global interactions, and a broad public sphere, state-led transformation and conservative values dominated the inland regions where the legitimacy of the state and moral values of Sunni Islam characterized the interior. In the frontiers, in turn, geopolitical competition blocked the path to successful state-building, allowing the local interests to bargain effectively with the central state for autonomy (EMRENCE, 2011, p. 7). This state of affairs is then expressed in socially and materially distinct political geographies during the nineteenth century with different developmental and institutional outcomes. This ranges from *thin rule* in the arid frontiers where rural religious networks operating on protection rents clashed with the Ottoman state over centralization, to *contested rule* on the coast where non-Muslim middle classes enjoyed the spoils of foreign trade and European services, but with limited political leverage with the Ottoman state, to *consensual rule* in the interior "where the unrivalled hegemony of the late Ottoman state was backed up by bureaucratic institutions, domestic markets, and a powerful Sunni bloc" (EMRENCE, 2011, p. 6-7).

This paper has demonstrated that Ottoman policies and practices towards different subject communities were ultimately determined by the coercive capacity of the state and its intersectionality with exigencies and expediencies of the balance of power under each prevailing and ever-shifting geopolitical circumstances at a given historical juncture. In other words, a general reference to the 'thinness' and 'thickness' of the Ottoman rule in a given region is not self-explanatory, and indeed can be

12. Referring to the argument of the state continuity between the Ottoman Empire and the Turkish Republic, ÖKTEM maintains that the concept of the continuing state differs from that of the successor state, emphasising that the former is not only "entitled to the predecessor's rights, but is also bound by the predecessor's obligations" (2011, p. 581). The Ottoman legacy, he laconically adds, "is a Pandora's box that may unveil all kinds of surprises" (ibid.)

misleading when it comes to explaining both the rationale behind Ottoman policies and its historical outcomes. The article has shown that the majority of the cases of mass violence, for example, was planned and executed by the Ottoman authorities along with the power of mass mobilization of the distressed, loyal or potentially very influenceable segments of the mainly Muslim population. This occurred not because the region in question was thinly ruled, but because of an interplay of factors - among them the coercive capacity of the state, the mobilisational of power and the opportunity structures provided by the context of war - which have always been determinant. As has been shown, even in instances where the lack of authority seems to have played a role in intercommunal conflicts, notably the mass violence in the Fertile Crescent, Aleppo (1850) and in Mount Lebanon and Damascus (1860), the real, or perceived effects of state consolidation and policies are strikingly present (MASTERS, 2001, p. 132ff; SHARKEY, 2017, p. 150ff.).[13]

By state coercive capacity, I mean the sanctioning power of managing military conscription, collection of tax revenues, collective actions on the part of the subject communities and communal relations between them, while counteracting the encroachments of the rival European powers[14]. Bearing in mind that the balance of power produced both constraining and enabling effects on the Ottoman politics, this paper highlights the importance of focusing on the ways and means by which the state coercive capacity was put into action, the specific historical circumstances under which it was enacted, and finally, the opportunity structure, as provided by the balance of power among the external and internal actors involved in the process, under which it was executed.

In an article on *The Ottoman Legacy in the Balkans* historian Bernard Lory (2015) has rightly emphasized that rather than producing a discourse of identity and/or discourse of rejection history as a discipline of the mind, and historical narrative should be more inclusive (LORY, 2015, p. 405). Bearing that in mind, I believe that one way of promoting an inclusive perspective on the Ottoman history is a non-Orientalised and yet critical, reflective and relational approach towards the Ottoman legacies and the politics of nation-states emerging out of the dissolution of the Ottoman empire, be they in the Balkans or in the Middle East. In this study, I have attempted to establish a case for a non-Orientalised decolonial approach to the study of the Ottoman empire, and the nation-states constructed in the post-Ottoman political geographies. I use the term "decolonial" both in the sense of political and societal emancipation, and of deconstructing state-engineered official historiographies/ideologies that affirm or justify the authoritarian legacies, injustices and oppressions in the past and present. It is thus best understood as a epistemic disobedience against what Spivak called "epistemic violence" that constitutes "the colonial subject as Other" and "the asymmetrical obliteration of the trace of that Other in its precarious Subjectivity" (SPIVAK, 2010, p. 35). It is this violence that is "exerted against or through knowledge" by means of using epistemic frameworks that legitimise and enshrine the practices of domination (GALVÁN-ÁLVAREZ, 2010, p.12).

I therefore hope that this paper has been able to provide some ideas and arguments for an approach towards a non-Orientalised decolonial un-

13. Having said that, this is not to suggest that the Muslim communities (Turks, Kurds, Arabs, Circassians and others) are to be excused from committing violent actions and or taking part in massacres conducted against various non Muslim communities over the course the Tanzimat period to the Hamidian to the Young Turks. "The spark that set off the Aleppo riot of 1850, Historian Sharkey, "was a report that spread among Muslims of the eastern quarters, to the effect that Ottoman authorities were about to impose a new military draft. Making matters worse was the new Ottoman policy of taxing Muslims directly "(SHARKEY, 2017, p. 147). Violence targeting foreign or domestic Christians took place in Aleppo in 1850, Mosul in 1854, Nablus in 1856, Jeddah in 1858, and Egypt in 1882. Muslim anger could also be directed at Jews, as occurred in the Mosul riot or in Baghdad in 1889. But across the region, the descent into sectarian violence served to segregate Muslims from Christians, rather than pit Muslims against all non-Muslims indiscriminately as the Christians had become associated with the most obvious manifestations of change" (MASTERS, 2001, p. 130).

14. In the recent literature the concept of state capacity is taken to mean "extractive, coercive, and administrative capacity" (WHITE, 2018, p,130), which is built on the works of two scholars, Michael Mann and Theda Skocpol. The latter had argued that general components of state capacity can be identified as "the stable administrative-military control of a given territory", "loyal and skilled officials" and "plentiful financial resources" (1985, p. 16). Mann in turn makes distinction between two basic forms state power with different combinations of strengths: first, "despotic power, the range of actions that the state elite is empowered to make without consultation with civil society groups; and second, infrastructural power, the capacity of the state to actually penetrate civil society and implement its actions across its territories (MANN, 2008, p. 355). Despotic power refers to the ability of state elites to make arbitrary decisions without consultation with the representatives of major civil society groups. Infrastructural power in turn is the capacity of a state, whether despotic or democratic, to actually penetrate society and implement logistically political decisions throughout the realm and thus enabling states to diffuse their power through or penetrate their societies, while the exercise of despotic power is by a state that has a degree of authoritative "power over" society. So states may be strong in either of two quite different ways (MANN, 2012B, p.13).

derstanding of the Ottoman legacies. If so I shall conclude by highlighting the importance of studies which offer colonial and postcolonial approaches to the analysis of the Ottoman empire (AHMAD, 2014, p.1ff.; DERINGIL, 2003; KÜHN, 2003; MAKDISI, 2002; ELDEM, 2015)[15], as well as the significance of decolonial knowledge production and epistemic disobedience in challenging dominant ideologies (MIGNOLO, 2011, p. 119, p. 17 ff; 2009 p. 160).

While emphasizing the importance of a non-Orientalised decolonial approach to the study of the Ottoman Empire and as well as the successive nation-states in the Middle East and beyond, I have embraced the emancipatory, critical and deeply humanistic potentials and intellectual legacy of "Orientalism". The purpose of keeping alive its powerful and inspiring critique of imperial and colonial politics, and their discourses of justification across the globe is twofold: first, to expand and further develop the conceptual frames provided by "Orientalism" in order to facilitate decolonial thinking and knowledge production. And relatedly, second, to take a firm position against attempts to use "Orientalism" as a protective shield for the defense of colonial and cruel policies and practices wherever they occur and whoever commits them.

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In an inspiring article on Ottoman Orientalism, Maksidi (2002) has rightly emphasized that for the most part, "studies of Orientalism have focused on how Europeans have represented the Orient, or how Eastern societies (Ottomans and others) have resisted these portrayals-as if resistance were the only paradigm in which to study the encounter between non-Western worlds and Western powers" (MAKSIDI, 2002, p. 795), indicating that there has been a reluctance to discuss representations of otherness advanced by non-Western regimes as simultaneous strategies of resistance and empowerment, of inclusion and exclusion (ibid., 795). In the same vein, Historian Feroz Ahmad (2014) has suggested that although the Ottoman Empire is recognized as an empire, few writers have discussed Ottoman imperialism, suggesting that like other cases of colonial rule that were challenged by the national movements, the "Ottomans also were forced to decolonize when confronted with emerging nationalism and national movements of their own subjects during and after the French Revolution" (AHMAD, 2014, p.2ff.).

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The End of the Ottoman Empire and the creation of the Iraqi state beyond Sykes-Picot: Between Imperialism and Revolution

El fin del Imperio Otomano y la Creación del Estado Iraquí más allá de Sykes-Picot: entre el imperialismo y la revolución

O fim do Império Otomano e a criação do estado iraquiano para além de Sykes-Picot: Entre o Imperialismo e Revolução

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ABSTRACT

The consensus in academic literature on the creation of modern states in the Middle East is that the starting point for understanding this process occurs with the Ottoman Empire disintegration and its replacement by European powers. In the case of Iraq, a military campaign and the periods of British occupation (1914-1920) and British mandate (1920-1932) in Mesopotamia paved the way for the creation of the state of Iraq, significantly influencing their later political-historical development. However, in addition to the diplomatic actions established by international agreements and treaties under the guidelines established by the League of Nations, this process did not occur in an empty space, as is often mentioned in that same literature. The clashes over access to the region's oil, exemplified by the dispute over the Mosul region, demonstrate the political--economic character of the construction of new borders. Moreover, this was not only the result of a planned political action by the British Empire, but also resulted from anti-imperialist revolts across the region. In this way, Iraq's final political outcome, and its subsequent development, reflected not only the presence of the imperial powers structures, but also the participation of local communities and groups, in connection with international movements.

Keywords: Iraq. Ottoman Empire. British Empire. Mandate System. Oil, Arab Revolts.

RESUMEN

Hay un consenso en la literatura académica sobre la creación de estados modernos en Oriente Medio en que el punto de partida para comprender este proceso se da en el momento de la desintegración del Imperio Otomano y su sustitución

por las potencias europeas. En el caso de Irak, la campaña militar y los períodos de ocupación (1914-1920) y el mandato británico (1920-1932) en Mesopotamia allanaron el camino para la creación del estado de Irak, influyendo significativamente en su posterior desarrollo histórico-político.Sin embargo, además de las acciones diplomáticas establecidas por acuerdos y tratados internacionales bajo los lineamientos establecidos por la Liga de Naciones, este proceso no se dio en un espacio vacío como suele mencionarse en esa misma literatura. Los enfrentamientos por el acceso al petróleo de la región, ejemplificados por la disputa por la región de Mosul, demuestran el carácter político-económico de la construcción de nuevas fronteras.Y más, este resultado no fue únicamente el resultado de la acción política planificada por el Imperio Británico, sino que también se derivó de revueltas antiimperialistas en toda la región. De esta manera, el resultado político final de Irak, y su posterior desarrollo, reflejó no solo la presencia de estructuras de poder imperial, sino también la participación de comunidades y grupos locales, en conexión con movimientos internacionales.

Palabras-clave: Irak. Imperio Otomano. Imperio Británico. Sistemas de mandatos. Petróleo. Revueltas Árabes.

Resumo

Há um consenso literatura acadêmica sobre a criação dos Estados modernos no Oriente Médio cujo ponto de partida para compreensão desse processo se dá no momento da desintegração do Império Otomano e sua substituição pelas potências europeias. No caso do Iraque, a campanha militar e os períodos de ocupação (1914-1920) e de mandato britânico (1920-1932) na Mesopotâmia prepararam o caminho para a criação do estado do Iraque, influenciando de forma significativa seu desenvolvimento político-histórico posterior. No entanto, para além das ações diplomáticas estabelecidas por acordos e tratados internacionais sob a partir das diretrizes estabelecidas pela Liga das Nações, esse processo não ocorreu num espaço vazio como, frequentemente, é mencionado nessa mesma literatura. Os embates por acessos ao petróleo da região, exemplificado pela disputa da região de Mosul, demonstram o caráter político-econômico da construção das novas fronteiras. Além disso, esse resultado não foi unicamente consequência de uma ação política planejada pelo Império Britânico, mas derivou também das revoltas anti-imperialistas em toda a região. Desta forma, o resultado político no Estado Iraque, e seu desenvolvimento subsequente, refletiu não apenas a presença das estruturas de poder imperiais, mas também devido a participação das comunidades e grupos locais, em conexão com movimentos internacionais.

Palavras-chave: Iraque. Império Otomano. Império Britânico. Sistema de Mandatos. Petróleo.RevoltasÁrabes.

Introduction

There are several similar elements between the British occupation of 1920 in Mesopotamia and the role of the United States (USA) Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) in Iraq in 2003, both in the type of state to be built and in the fact that state institutions must interact with the population and, above all, which Iraqis should compose the government. Another similarity concerns the role of the USA in both moments. Woodrow Wilson and George W. Bush thought of imposing a new order on the international system periphery and wonderedhow to make structural transformations there, without jeopardizing the interests of the USA and its allies. The USA denies that it had imperial ambitions, because it claims that it does not intended to colonize the Iraqis, but rather to restore its

sovereignty, leading it to self-government. In his presentation to the United Nations (UN) General Assembly in September 2003, despite speaking of self-determination, President Bush, vehemently opposed any attempt by the UN to transfer power to the Iraqis immediately. Bush used the language of the trusteeship, according to which the USA would be a trustee and the occupation of Iraq had the objective of promoting Iraqis welfare until he could become sovereign.

Early in the First World War, the three Mesopotamian provinces (Mosul, Baghdad and Basra) were the first Ottoman Empire areas to be occupied by British troops and, in 1932, Iraq became the first mandated state to obtain its independence, joining the League of Nations. But Iraq's own experience shows that it's possible for a country to have its sovereignty recognized by the international community and, at the same time, to be tutored by a great power. Under the 1922 treaty between Iraq and the British crown, the basic provisions of the Iraqi Constitution provided, and Britain pledged, to support and assist the armed forces of the King of Iraq when necessary. The King agreed to fully consult Britain on how to manage the country's economy and finances. (DODGE, 2003, pp. X-XIII).

The military campaign and the occupation periods (1914-1920) and British mandate (1920-1932)in Mesopotamia paved the way for the Iraq's State creation, significantly influencing its later political-historical development. However, this process wasn't only a consequence of British political action, but also derived from the Iraqi Revolution in 1920, which made the agreements reflect not only the structures of the imperial, Ottoman and British powers, but also the participation of local communities and groups in determining subsequent developments. One effect of the narrative that consider Iraq as an *artificialstate* (BARR, 2011) is that it ends up minimizing the impacts on British imperial violence and the actions of anti-imperialist revolts. To imagine that Iraq's borders were created in the rooms of imperial rulers through decrees as if they were acting in a territorial vacuum, a kind of "empty map", is to neglect the dynamics of the struggle between social, revolutionary and counter-revolutionary forces and their claims of rights and autonomy. (PURSLEY, 2015).

The geopolitical disputes and social revolts that spread throughout the Middle East region were concealed in a series of agreements, treated by diplomatic conferences. Thus, we understand that only a closer examination of the historical context allows us to understand what was really at stake. The economic objectives in the British negotiations with France on the Middle East mark another post-war period chapter and referred to Britain's desire to guarantee oil supplies in the future. British Empire negotiators were determined to earn a *de jure* sanction for their country by the *de facto* military occupation of Mosul as an integral part of the new Iraqi state. In exchange for giving up what had initially been agreed, under the Sykes-Picot Agreement for Mosul, France should obtain a stake in the oil company to work on the oil concession for the area, once the concession was formally granted by the Turkish Petroleum Company (TPC). (ENGDAHL, 2004, p.42).

Thus, although oil issues appeared marginally in these treaties, we understand that they were inextricably linked to border issues. The 1923

Lausanne Conference, remembered for the redefinition of Turkish borders in Anatolia, was the space where powers debated whether to include Mosul in Iraq, which on the other hand was related to the presence of oil companies in that region. And despite diplomatic representatives' omissions or denials on the importance of oil matter at the conference, it was a crucial one. In a correspondence between the British Admiralty and its Foreign Office, written days before the opening of the Lausanne Conference, this theme appears clearly giving us the key to understanding British politics in the region: "from a strategic point of view the essential point is that Great Britain should control the territories on which the oilfields are situated". (BRITISH ADMIRALTY *apud* SLUGLETT, 2007, p.72).

Albeit, another variable was relevant to the decision-making process of Middle Eastlines: the interference, resistance and interest of different local social groups. From the British imperial perspective on the eastern front of the First World War, a paradox appears. The British did their utmost to preserve and even increase their power in the region, while giving guarantees of access to land and independence to the Arab leaders of the 1916 revolution in exchange for support to fight the Ottomans.Therefore, if, on the one hand, the powers devised seemingly blatant imperialist schemes to divide the land between the British and French authorities, on the other hand they had to deal with the local interests that were already manifesting in that space. Much of the literature on political change, "development" or "modernization", understands the state's image as an active agent interfering in native communities without any resistance, as if they were asleep. This is a distorted image, since the communities of Mesopotamian peoples, the tribal chiefs, were equally concerned with penetrating the state and converting their tribal power into state power (POOL, 1980, p.340).

Another important parallel process, that in a way influenced British behavior in the Middle East, came with the consequence of the Bolshevik revolution in Russia. The threat that appeared for the British with the Bolshevik revolution was less about the Soviet maneuverability south of its territory, and more about the influence of Communist ideology as a possible engine of revolutionary movements in the region.

Therefore, this article aims to develop an analysis of the Iraqi state creation process based on the disintegration of the Ottoman empire and the direct British involvement in its constitution, looking not only at formal, diplomatic and international law aspects, but also at other evident social dynamics. Here we highlight fundamental themes that made up this process, namely: the importance of the oil issue in the territorial definitions and British post-Ottoman control; the role of the social actors in the Arab revolts, partly resisting this process, partly associating with this process; the dispute over Mosul as a key territory for the consecration of British power and access to one of the region's oil sources; and finally the role of another internationalist project that came with the Russian Revolution of 1917 already as an alternative to the liberal international model represented by the North Atlantic powers. It is thought that it is essential to understand the dynamics of these actors (agency), for a clear comprehension of the precepts established in the Treaties and Formal

Agreements that have consolidated themselves as the main aspect in the literature on the topic of Ottoman disintegration. Such Treaties and Agreements are means and not ends of this process, after all, it is based on the understanding that the International law is an international policy instrument. Therefore, a set of rules, discourses and techniques that its subjects and actors use to regulate their relations and accomplish certain social ends. (JOUANNET, 2014).

In this case, the British mobilizations of power with the "winning" powers of the First War of the time (France and the USA), also with the defeated ones (Turkey and Germany), as well as with local actors, compose this macro process of creation of what we today call of Iraq.

Empire and imperialism in the Middle East in the early 20th century

At the beginning of the 20th century, basic rules were established, within the imperialist framework, for the subsequent economic, social and political development of the Middle East. These processes did not operate in a vacuum and when they intruded on the social, economic and cultural life of the region, the transformations were radical. New social classes were created, while others were destroyed. The urban centers were destroyed and rebuilt within the new imperialist parameters. The introduction of new agricultural methods, property rights and markets has rapidly transformed rural life. The imperial dispute between British and Ottomans isolated urban areas from their traditional agricultural hinterlands. The scenario was one of crisis and social discontent. The increase in prices interacted with the growing scarcity and were aggravated by the effects of the economic blockade by the belligerent armies on both sides, resulting from poor harvests and crop failures between 1913 and 1918. The province of Mosul, for example, were in a state of public calamity in November 1918, when thousands of inhabitants died of starvation. (ULRICHSEN, 2014).

The emergence of new classes and the experimentation of new forms of political expression gave a new color to social struggles. This process of expansion of empire spreading the modern economic system in the Middle East meant that investors, landowners and traders started to orient production to the international market. All these economic transformations with significant social impacts could not have occurred without a concomitant political process that suited the expansion of the world economy. (GELVIN, 2011)

The expansion of European empires meant that the entire globe was inserted into the European system of international law by the First World's War end. Thus, at the same time the liberal internationalist proposal, led by the USA, was to dismantle existing empires and facilitate the transformation of their territories into sovereign and independent states, another change was taking place: the emergence of a new international administration system under the auspices of the League of Nations. Until the beginning of the 20th century, sovereign states were the only actors recognized by international law, but with the creation of the League, international institutions emerged as a new actor providing international

law with a new range of ambitions and strategies for the conduct of International relations. (ANGHIE, 2004, p. 114-115).

Initially, the main challenge for the League of Nations was to take responsibility for dealing with the inherited colonial structure. After months of negotiations and some reluctance, the political leaders of the Western powers ended up accepting the US proposal to create the mandate system, which proved to be a compromise between those who proposed colonial expansion and those who advocated for genuine independence. The annexation of the German and Ottoman colonial territories, the empires vanquished in Africa, Asia and the Middle East, was simply not viable, but neither was providing autonomy to these peoples. In order to get out of this imbroglio, the formula guardianship (or trusteeship) was adopted. That is, although states continue to be the main actors in the Mandate System, the principle of sovereignty has taken on a very different character than existed until then. International institutions, instead of being products of sovereign states, were given the task of creating sovereignty in territories where their inhabitants were considered incapable of exercising the principle of self-determination of peoples. It was in the Mandate System that law and international institutions were able to carry out experiments and develop techniques that would hardly be possible in the sovereign western world (ANGHIE, 2004, p. 133 - 135).

While in the 19th century the division between Europe and "uncivilized" non-Europe was formulated mainly through the elaboration of racial and cultural categories, the League of Nations characterized the differences between the civilized and the "non-civilized" in economic terms: the "advanced" *versus* the "outdated". According to the League's patronizing (and evolutionary) language, spelled out in Article 22 of the League of Nations Convention established by the Versailles Treaty, mandates should be implemented in territories "inhabited by peoples not yet able to stand by themselves under the strenuous conditions of the modem world" (TREATY OF VERSAILLES, 1919, article 22, p.56). They referred to the European powers that would be in this "stage", capable of helping them to prepare for self-government. It was understood that:

> "Certain communities formerly belonging to the Turkish Empire have reached a stage of development where their existence as independent nations can be provisionally recognized subject to the rendering of administrative advice and assistance by a Mandatory until such time as they are able to stand alone." (TREATY OF VERSAILLES, 1919, article 22, p.56).

The creators of the League tried to cover up that the mandates could be another way of securing their strategic interests in the Middle East, while apparently disregarding the principle of peoples' self-determination. Thus, when the Mandate System was implemented, this artifice was immediately denounced by means of a series of revolts in various parts of the British and French empires (ANGHIE, 2008; PEDERSEN, 2006).

The region corresponding to the Middle East, at that time, was configured as a fundamental space for the British empire repositioning, a vital link in its communications with the East connecting Cairo, Baghdad, to India, Singapore, Australia and New Zealand. However, at that time, there was no consensus among members of the British government as to the extent to which Britain should seek to take over the spoils of the

Ottoman empire. Some claimed that new annexations could burden the imperial administration, which was going through difficult times due to the costs of war. However, as the war progressed, that point of view lost ground to those who felt that it was necessary to control as much territory as possible in order to maximize Britain's position in the final peace agreement, *vis-à-vis* the defeated enemy and his wartime allies, who also wanted the spoils' share. (CROZIER, 1979).

Gradually, the territories in the Middle East began to be defined, even before war's end. A series of secret agreements and commitments made by the British Empire during the First World War with the Arabs (*Eg:* McMahon-Huseyn correspondences of 1915-16), Jews (*Eg*: Balfour Declaration of 1917) or with their European allies (*Eg:* 1915 Constantinople Agreement, 1916 Sykes-Picot Agreement). Great Britain adopted the assumption that the end of the Ottoman empire would leave a "power *vacuum*" in this key area (KENT, 1996, p.165-198).

After 1918, Britain faced a series of problems due to the various war agreements, most of the times, contradictory and/or ambiguous. Several promises were made. Sometimes to different Arab leaders regarding a future Arab state, although they did not specify how far British support would go, what their territorial limits would be, or the degree to which it would be truly independent. Other times to France, where British made concessions to reinforce their fighting spirit in Europe. Clearly, the promises of independent states in Syria and Mesopotamia had the sole purpose of encouraging the Arabs to fight alongside the British. For reasons of security, economic interests, and maintenance of imperial communications, and mainly oil, Britain felt that it had no choice but to occupy the area before another power did it in its place. (KENT, 1976).

When the war ended, Britain found itself at the forefront of the Middle East simply because it was alone in the military occupation of the region with an army, mostly coming from various regions of the Empire. Presenting it as a justification for its claims, Britain argued that it had paid the highest costs of war there and, therefore, should be granted with the greatest gains. (DAVIS, 2010). Britain's military strategy during the war allowed it to have considerable political advantages in negotiations with other victorious powers after the defeat of the Ottoman Empire. The British launched massive attacks from India and Egypt, involving around a million combatants, which allowed British troops to occupy Mesopotamia and parts of the Levant quickly. At the same time, the Bolshevik government of Russia renounced the claims made by its predecessor and denounced the imperialist plots of the French and English by disseminating texts of the agreements mediated by Tsarist Russia, as was the case with the Sykes-Picot agreement (SCHAYEGH; ARSAN, 2015).

Another obstacle to the implementation of secret agreements came from the USA in the figure of President Woodrow Wilson, who advocated for the end of secret diplomacy and that, about the independence of the colonies, "the interests of the populations involved must have the same weight as the colonial power" (WILSON *apud* GELVIN, 2011 p.442-443).

The European powers that won the First World War met at the San Remo Conference in April 1920, within League of Nations frame-

work and decided to assign the French mandate to Syria and Lebanon; and Mesopotamia and Palestine under the British mandate. Initially, the British and French governments feared that the new League of Nations mandate would put them under strict limits on their management. Diplomat Mark Sykes protested about the new times saying that "imperialism, annexation, military triumph, prestige, burdens of the white man, were purged from the popular political vocabulary" and, as a consequence, the diplomat continued, "Protectorates, spheres of interest or influence, annexations will no longer be able to be part of diplomatic negotiations." Although this vision of radical change did not happen, the mandate system represented, in a way, a rupture with previous forms of imperial sovereignty. (SYKES *apud* DODGE, 2003, p.13). Economic exploitation and subjugation of local populations came with a new international liberal guise in the early 20th century, which gave European imperialism a new face.

The importance of the Petroleum issue in the foundation of the post-Ottoman Middle East.

Still little addressed in the academic literature, which is guided almost entirely by European diplomatic conferences, if we examine the historical process involving imperial competition in the Middle East, we will realize that oil played a fundamental role in the construction of the international order. During the First World War, industrial development demanded increasing amounts of oil, which came to supplant coal as an energy source in some military sectors.

Once oil began to be widely used by the world's navies, it was considered essential for the Great Powers that supplies and reserves should be freely available. They made sure to ensure that their own access to sources. Hence the guidelines of British oil policy were formulated very quickly: Britain should be in a position of political influence or control in territories where oil was known, or equally important, thought likely, to exist, and that other powers should be excluded as far as possible, both politically and commercially, from these areas (SLUGLETT, 2007, p. 66). At the end of the First World War, no Great Power was unaware of the strategic importance of the new fuel for future economic and military security. (ENGDAHL, 2004, p38-39).

In this context, the war policy was revised, shifting the focus to the eastern front, where Britain was expected to achieve some victories by offsetting Germany's conquests in Europe. It wasn't believed that peace could be achieved before 1919. When the armistice took place in November 1918, decisions had already been taken in relation to the Middle East, which would have profound historical consequences in the future. (MILLMAN, 2014). Actually, before the beginning of the war, Sir Edward Gray, British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, sent ultimatums to the Ottoman government, protesting its plans to create an oil company in the vilayets of Mosul, Baghdad and Basra, arguing that any company created in the vilayets needed to offer the D'Arcy group[3] at least a 50% stake in its operations. On March 19, 1914, an agreement was signed that merged the interests of the TPC and the D'Arcy group, the new group

3. In April 1909, businessman Willian Knox D›Arcy was appointed director of the newly founded Anglo-Persian Oil Company, which would later become British Petroleum. (BRITANNICA, 2020a).

asked the Ottoman government to grant oil in the vilayets of Baghdad and Mosul, but the outbreak of the war prevented a final agreement (ME-JCHER, 1972, p.377).

Regarding the British government's interests in Middle Eastern oil in the years before the war, two facts deserve to be highlighted. First, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs wasn't prepared to accept for Mesopotamia any company that would give the D'Arcy group less than 50% of the shares. Second, on May 20, 1914, the British government signed an agreement with the Anglo-Persian Petroleum Company (APOC), which gave it a majority stake and vote in the decisions of the oil companies involved. The government's purchase of shares set a precedent for possible government involvement in Iraq's oil regions. (MEJCHER, 1972, p.378).

The combination of British national interests and changing priorities during the war, with strategic situations on the Eastern Front, the Middle East and the Caucasus, significantly influenced the objectives of the British Empire, as well as its insertion in these regions. The importance of oil, in 1918, became the crux of British politics throughout the Middle East and the Caucasus, configuring what some called "oil imperialism". (SLADE; FISCHER; MOHR, 1928).

Despite the signing of the Mudros Armistice, on October 30, 1918, which ended conflicts between the Ottoman Empire and the Allies in the Middle East, Lieutenant-General William Marshall occupied Mosul on November 2 of the same year, to guarantee Britain to retain oil for the "right of conquest". (KENT, 1976; ENGDAHL, 2004). Almost immediately after the end of the Sykes-Picot Agreement, the War Committee returned to discuss the interests of the British Empire in the Middle East. At a committee meeting on July 6, 1916, Mark Sykes signaled the strategic relevance of the region for Great Britain, emphasizing the great value of "immense oil areas". According to him, although the Flanders camps could decide the battle, Germany was also fighting for the Middle East. Sir Arthur Hirtzel, senior British officer in India, agreed with Sykes' opinion, expressing his assessment in two memos on the subject, dated May 25 and October 31, 1916. (KENT, 1976, p.124-125).

The Foreign Office memorandum of March 1918 had noted that this was a matter which cannot be treated as a purely commercial venture but must be envisaged as a national responsibility, which admits of no half-measures or ill-considered action. At a conference at the India Office later in the year, Colonel A. T. Wilson explained that: "oil is the only immediately available asset of the Occupied Territories, the only real security the Iraq administration are in a position to offer for the loan which they will undoubtedly require in the near future from the British Treasury". (WILSON *apud* SLUGLETT, 2007, p. 69).

Historical reports often recall the sudden advance on Mosul in 1918 and the bold capture of the city shortly after the negotiation of the Turkish armistice, but the reasons that led to this are not properly addressed. Strategically, the capture of Mosul had been a fundamental tactical move within the range of alternatives in British great strategy which still sought to establish connections with Armenia and southern Russia. Furthermore, Mosul had been the gateway to the Turkish-German forces that threat-

ened Baghdad and its closure was a desirable goal for British commanders in Mesopotamia. Mosul's takeover seemed to fit well for the blow to Syria, the mountain ranges north of Mosul appeared as a safe northern border to the open plains of Iraq; but in August 1918, when the time came for action, there was no plan for a united Iraq. Mosul still belonged to the sphere attributed to the French by the Sykes-Picot Agreement. (MEJCHER, 1972).

Although this agreement was considered obsolete by experts like Mark Sykes, the French government, insisted on its validity. On the other hand, Lloyd George had already affirmed to his cabinet that, in the case of Syria, he would use the right of conquest to reopen the whole question of the bargain made with France. Militarily, for Mosul, there was a pause in front of Marshall's forces in the summer of 1918. The Mesopotamian campaign had ended in a dead end on the northern borders of Baghdad vilayet. However, Lloyd George's plans for how to make use of the British occupation of Syria offered space for interested British pressure groups and the Admiralty in adjacent Iraq. At the end of July and during the following weeks, when there was no military advantage in advancing in Mesopotamia, it was the oil interests and the concern of the Admiralty about the future oil situation in the Empire that put the most severe pressure on the Cabinet. (MEJCHER, 1972, 382-383).

In April 1919, even before the signing of the Treaty of Versailles, a provisional oil agreement had been signed by the British and French oil ministers, Long and Bérenger. Before that, the French handed over Mosul to Britain in December 1918, receiving nothing in return. Therefore, the Long-Bérenger agreement was a reckoning of this situation, solving the problem by making over Deutsche Bank's former 25% share in the TPC (confiscated during the war by the Custodian of Enemy Property) to French interests. Later, it was formalized in the San Remo Agreement, as we'llsee (KENT, 1976, p.140).

In this context, US government strongly opposed themselves to the San Remo Agreement that stablished that companies that would work in the Iraqi oil fields should be under British permanent control. According to the State Department a clear violation of the Open-Door liberal principle, for the protection of equal privileges among countries trading. In addition, it contested the TPC claims, questioning the validity of the original concession. However, the British government feared that continued American opposition was likely to jeopardize the whole future development of Iraqi oil. So, they agreed for the accommodation of the USA interests, to the extent of approximately a quarter of the Company's capital share, later in 1923. This marks an alliance relationship between the British and the North American in the division of portions of the development of the oil markets in the region. (SLUGLETT, 2007, p.70).

In 1920, the British empire oil policy evolution had become closely associated with oil companies in Mesopotamia, recognizing the need to control oil sources and suppliers both in the areas of the Empire and in their areas of influence, such as Persia and Mesopotamia, as well as in areas explored by companies under their control such as APOC and the Royal Dutch-Shell group. Although Mesopotamia always appeared as an important strategic area for the British Empire, because of the Persian

Gulf and India, the war brought an entirely new situation. The British Empire was confronted not only with military commitments - which, at the end of the war, provided an administration whose main objective was to occupy enemy territories, followed later by an administration of the mandate - in addition to competing with its allies for control over areas of the Ottoman Empire. (KENT, 1976 p. 156). In that context, the British empire was both facing a diplomatic dispute against other great powers, mostly USA and France, meanwhile trying to control the surging uprising in Baghdad result of the remnants of interest of the 1916 revolting Arabs, who fought the Ottoman Empire with British support in the context of the First World War (SLUGLETT, 2007).

During the first half of the war, when economic reasons still did not play a relevant role in its interest in the region, London allowed the French to enter Mosul. After that, however, among his political concerns about Mesopotamia, it was hoped to restore Mosul to his own sphere of influence. His political relations with France began to turn to that end in several attempts at settlement in the immediate post-war years. In April 1920 - as part of the San Remo Agreement - in exchange for regaining Mosul, Great Britain agreed to grant France a stake in its oil, which depended, however, on negotiations with the Royal Dutch-Shell group, as established in the Long-Berénger Agreement, which would later be revised. As a result of this agreement, the French *Compagnie Française de Petroles* (CFP) acquired a 25% share in the TPC. The other shareholders were the APOC with 47.5%, the Anglo-Saxon Petroleum Company 22.5% and the remaining 5% *Calouste Gulbenkian*. British control was recognition of the legality of its title for Mesopotamian oil. Although this agreement was also ready in draft, in April 1920, it never reached the Cabinet for ratification, and was overtaken by events that required modification of the Anglo-French agreement (KENT, 1976, p.140).

The 1920 agreements show how closely the Mesopotamian issue has intertwined with energy policy. In 1920, Mesopotamian oil, still commercially hypothetical, came to occupy an important place in British diplomatic and military concerns in the Middle East. At the end of the First World War, concerns on oil shortages became central to international politics. After the war, the change in the international scenario - with the eclipse of Germany, the breakup of the Ottoman Empire and the conquest of a strong bargaining position on the part of the winners, Great Britain and France - made the problem even more complicated, and the Mesopotamia with its oil potential has become an important key problem in resolving Anglo-French relations. Britain's main concern was essentially the need to secure oil for its Navy. (KENT, 1976, p.157).

After the end of the First World War, the main imperial rivals of the British in the great Middle East (Germany, Ottoman Empire and Russia) collapsed, thus eliminating concern for the defense of India. The APOC had consolidated its operations in Khuzestan where it was planning major expansions, relying on the protection of British troops in Mesopotamia, as well as its alliances with local leaders. At the global level, the British diplomatic machine was being led, for the first time, by a group of politicians specialized in the so-called "Eastern Question" and in the new-

ly created "Middle East" region. Lord George Curzon[4], one of the most important politicians at the helm of the Foreign Office, has also become known as the leading expert on the "Persian Question". A long-cherished dream of securing Western approaches to India as well as ensuring the continued monopoly of British control over Iran's oil resources and the Persian Gulf area. (EHSANI, 2014, p.55-56).

In the early 1920s, the three pillars of British imperial power were: control of world sea routes, control of world banking and finance, and control of strategic raw materials for energy purpose, namely petroleum. But the British Empire was not alone, a new threat from a former colony, the USA, was rising within the internationalized capitalist economic structure. (ENGDAHL, 2004, p.50).

However, in 1921, after the Cairo Conference and the appointment of Faysal Ibn Huseyn as King of Iraq, the pattern of British general strategy followed in the coming years is discernible. Control of areas where oil was strongly suspected should be invested in Britain through the agency's mandate. If other powers tried to get their nationals to participate, Britain would be prepared to renounce part of the TPC's interest in order to maintain its political position. Until the status of the disputed territories was finally decided, no oil prospecting or research would be allowed. Finally, any concession would have to be ratified by the Iraqi cabinet and parliament. In a political structure built with the support of the British, by a political elite recognized by the British mandate as legitimate. In this scenario, it is clear why British interests would tend to be favored. But an issue was still sensitive. The Mosul question. (AMERICAN PEACE SOCIETY, 1925)

The Mosul oil, Iraq's northern border special location and the financial problems and difficulties of the Iraqi government, formed the main concerns of Anglo-Iraqi relations during the two years following the ratification of the treaty by the Constituent Assembly in June 1924. The exploitation of Iraqi oil by any or all of the allied powers demanded that Mosul remain part of Iraq and ensure that Iraq would be able to defend its territory, avoiding as little as possible the scarce financial and strategic resources of the Iraqi government, again emphasizing its strong British dependence (SLUGLETT, 2007, p.65).

Therefore, the Mosul question was rightly predicted to be the most intractable of all the problems of the peace agreement in Turkey, and the matter was postponed to the later sessions of the Lausanne Conference in 1923. Notorious international policy analyst Harold Nicolson at the time highlighted Lord Curzon's rhetorical and diplomatic ability to undermine the Turkish case, but he underscores the great delicacy of the situation, especially in view of the British fear of provoking another crisis with Turkey. (SLUGLETT, 2007, p.71-72).

The territorial issue of Mosul was finally established in July 1926 with the establishment of the tripartite agreement between Turkey, Iraq and England (TRIPP, 2007, p.59). So, what is proved is that the events between the ratification of the treaty and the final ratification of the Mosul boundary served to emphasize Iraq's continuing subordination to Britain. Therefore, it became evident that there were no alternatives that could resist the British resolutions for the Middle East territories by the middle of the 1920s.

After that, the mandate formed a period of general cooperation with Britain, in contrast to the sharp conflicts of the earlier years. Consequently, the two governments started to lose the formal ties bind them, and Britain began to relax its direct control of Iraq. (SLUGLETT, 2007, p.91).

Arab revolts and the participation of local actors in the process of Ottoman disintegration and creation of Iraq

The name attributed to the Sykes-Picot agreement came after the two diplomats Sir Mark Sykes, from the British war office and François Georges-Picot, French consul in Beirut, participated in secret negotiations carried out between 1915 and 1916 in which the former provinces of the Ottoman Empire would be by the British and French in zones of control. Although there is a surprising consensus among journalists and historians who see Sykes-Picot as one of the causes of artificial borders in the Middle East, the agreement was already obsolete at the end of the First World War (PURSLEY, 2015). However, regardless of the facts, Sykes-Picot has become one of the most representative symbols of Western treachery and conspiracy to usurp the sovereignty of the peoples of the region in the region. (RENTON, 2016). This idea of anti-imperialist resistance in the Middle East began to take shape in the context of Ottoman disintegration in at least two moments: in the struggle for independence against the Ottoman empire and, subsequently, against the European presence in the region. Understanding how this historical process took place is fundamental to comprehend the formation of Middle East states.

The role of the Arab rebels in the Middle East against the Ottomans was crucial to the victory of western Europeans on the eastern front of the First War. It is estimated that more than 50,000 Arabs died in battle between 1916-18 against the Ottomans. In fact, an ideological battle was evident at the beginning of the First War, in which the Ottomans tried to appeal to an Islamic solidarity that was supposed to protect itself against Western invaders. In November 1914 the sultan-caliph issued a call to *jihad*, urging Muslims the world over to unite behind the Ottoman Empire in its confrontation with the Triple Entente. It portrayed the Entente powers as states bent on destroying Muslim sovereignty around the globe and warned Muslims that unless they responded to the *jihad*, Islam faced extinction. However, the tactic proved to be ineffective. There were many who did not agree that the Ottoman Empire would be the legitimate "Islam protector". (CLEVELAND; BUNTON, 2009, p.153).

In 1915, for example, Jamal Pasha, one of the representatives of the triumvirate who led the Ottoman government, imposed drastic measures in the Arab territories under his leadership. He imprisoned notable Arabs on suspicion of disloyalty and sent them to military courts to be questioned and tried. Many were hanged in a public square, which was a shock to Arab society at the time. (CLEVELAND; BUNTON, 2009, p.154). The problem was aggravated when the British managed to articulate themselves with this unsatisfied portion of society under Ottoman power. Between July 1915 and March 1916, Mecca emir Sharif Huseyn Ibn Ali - who proclaimed the 1916 Uprising - communicated with the British high commissioner in

Egypt, Sir Henry McMahon, establishing the conditions for the British-Arab alliance against the Ottomans. It meant that the British were informally agreeing on the possibility of recognition of an independent Arab state, which had never been formalized along the lines thought by the Arabs led by Huseyn. The Arab revolt path to Damascus followed from Hijaz (Red Sea coast in present-day Saudi Arabia) through the port city of Aqaba (captured in 1917) and then on the right flank of British general Allenby in the final offensive of 1918. The military forces of Sharif Huseyn were commanded by his son, Amir Faysal, who was assisted by a group of former Iraqi Ottoman officers and a small contingent of British military advisers, including Captain T. E. Lawrence (FROMKIN, 2009. p.156-157).

The military and autonomous ability of the Hashemites[5] caught the attention of the British. However, Sharif Huseyn's support base was not built circumstantially. His conditions were established even before the context of the First War from his notorious position as Sharif (supervisor, leader) in the Mecca region who, despite recognizing that he had been under the Ottoman empire since 1500, maintained a great degree of local autonomy, including with an own army capable of sustaining not only the independence of the Kingdom of Hejaz for almost ten years (1917-1926)[6], but also serving as a local base for the establishment of Iraq and Transjordan (present-day Jordan) (CLEVELAND; BUNTON, 2009, p. 157-161).

The term "Sharifian" refers to those individuals who were associated with the Sharif of Mecca›s revolt in the Hijaz against Ottoman Imperial rule and to those who were involved in the temporary administrations in Syria and Jordan between the end of Ottoman rule and the beginnings of the Mandate System. Most "Sharifians" were officers in the Ottoman armies and had, in the confusion of war and military defeat, found their way to Hijaz and Syria at different times and by many assorted paths. Most of them came from lower social backgrounds. In the Ottoman Empire, only some urban cities had infrastructure for military education and insertion of people in the military. Baghdad housed one of the few military preparatory schools in the Arab provinces of the Ottoman Empire, and most of the Sharifian officers had their introduction to military life through their attendance at this school, which provided the opportunity for social and political advancement unavailable to Ottoman Arabs elsewhere in the Empire. In many ways, these Sharifians were the core of the movement for Arab independence and a major political beneficiary of that struggle in past-Ottoman Iraq. They were the material and military basis for Hashemite success (POOL, 1980, p. 332-340).

Later, on the foundation of the new Iraq, the great majority of the Sharifians depended on the new state, as they had depended on the Empire, for their daily bread. Unlike the older breed of Ottoman officers, they were not assured of converting their position in the state apparatus into a position in society: the war had intervened, the Empire had been dissolved and they were still quite young. Unlike the tribal leaders that tried to resist European presence in the Mesopotamia region, they had no "natural" followers and no ready-made clientele. In fact, their position resembled that of their leader, the Amir Faysal, in that it was one of total political dependency. (POOL, 1980, p. 332-340).

5. The Hashemites were represented by three main individuals, Sharif Ibn Huseyn leader of the 1916 Arab Uprising, and his sons Faysal and Abdulah, both respectively kings of Iraq and Transjordan (now Jordan) after the Cairo conference in 1921, representing the link that materialized British interests in the territories under the mandate system. (BRITANNICA, 2020b)

6. The loss of the kingdom of Hejaz took place in dispute with the Saud family, which started a military campaign against the Hashemites in 1924, whose administrative effort at that time was mostly focused on Iraq and Transjordan in the Mandates context. (CLEVELAND; BUNTON, 2009, p. 232)

It is also important to note that Huseyn's revolting leadership was not unanimous among Arabs. Some Arab public figures accused Huseyn of being a traitor, condemning his actions dividing the Ottoman-Islamic Empire at a time when unity was most needed. The Arab Revolt did not constitute a total uprising against the Ottoman Empire. Rather, it was a more narrowly based enterprise relying on tribal levies from Arabia and dominated by the Hashemite family. There can be no question, however, that Arabs applauded the final triumph of the revolt—the capture of Damascus in 1918—and that it laid the foundations for the Arabs' claim to an independent state. (CLEVELAND; BUNTON, 2009, p.161). And more than that, this revolutionary inspiration would stimulate other important movements in the region in the following years.

At the time, when Faysal wrote this he had every expectation that he would become king of Syria. Indeed, one year later he was elected King of Syria by the Syrian Congress in March 1920 and his brother Abdallah was elected King of Iraq by a separate meeting of Iraqis shortly after. (POOL, 1980, p. 337) But they soon became kings without reigns, since at the same time France claimed its rights over Syrian territory, as determined by the powers in the League of Nations. As expected, these decisions deeply displeased the Arabs, since when asked to make a choice between Faysal and France, Britain opted for its European ally. (YAVUZ, 2017).

With the Mesopotamia campaign, the British had drawn the Ottoman provinces of Basra and Baghdad into their Persian Gulf sphere of interest. Without staking an explicitly colonial claim to Iraq, Sir Henry asserted that "the established position and interests of Great Britain" necessitated "special administrative arrangements" to secure the provinces of Baghdad and Basra "from foreign aggression, to promote the welfare of the local populations and to safeguard our mutual economic interests" this represented in essence, the integration of Mesopotamia into Britain's trusteeship system in the Persian Gulf within the auspices determined sequentially by the League of Nations in the Mandate System. (ROGAN, 2015, p.381)

The Treaty of Sèvres (August 1920) intended to formalize Ottoman surrender to Great Britain and France, as well as the agreements between Great Britain and France made in San Remo (April 1920), transferring legal titles to the territories to be maintained as League of Nations mandates. (SCHAYEGH, C; ARSAN, A, 2015).

So, without receiving what the British promised, the same rebels that initially tried to install an autonomous political center in Greater Syria between 1918-20 were expelled by the French. The Franco-Syrian war from March to June 1920 demonstrated the strength of an international power over a brave Arab group that overestimated itself. The Arab nationalist bloc in the government urged Faysal to challenge the allied powers, while more cautious voices advised him to seek a compromise that could somehow satisfy French demands and still preserve the Syrian kingdom. Unsure of what advice to follow, Faysal tried to open negotiations with the French commander in Beirut, General Henri Gouraud, but he was unwilling to compromise and ordered his troops to march in Syria. On July 24, 1920, French forces easily defeated Faysal's army, occupied Damascus and forced the king of Syria into exile in Europe. The

independent Arab state in Greater Syria was eliminated shortly after it was proclaimed (YAVUS, 2017, p.583)

The 1916 Arab Revolt spirit of success against the Ottomans left gaps in power in the peripheral regions of Mesopotamia and the Levant, added to the attempt, albeit unsuccessful, to sustain an independent Arab state in Syria between 1918-20, inspired many the struggle for independence in a scenario of redefinitions and uncertainties in the Middle East. It was at that time that tribal forces not aligned with the Hashemites, rebelled against the British presence in the region off the Tigris and Euphrates rivers between May and October 1920 (MCNABB, 2016).

There are several controversies in historiography regarding the causes and motivations that caused the 1920 revolution in Iraq, as well as opposing reports of personalities involved in this historical process at the time of its occurrence and in retrospect. For a long time, these events were presented in the literature as indisputable facts, but in fact they were part of the narrative presented by the British authorities. Regardless of how it is analyzed[7], the fact is that the 1920 Revolution was an attempt by Iraqis to obtain their freedom from a violent occupation. Thus, as in other revolutions involving agrarian societies, in Iraq the revolt against abusive taxes introduced by the British administration was the denotator of the movement. The nature of the social and political struggle unleashed, involved various political groups as a complex process involving tactical and strategic changes. The spirit of initial cooperation between Shiites and Sunnis, since the biggest contradiction was a socio-economic dimension, would then be replaced by animosity, with the encouragement of the British who adopted the motto: divide to rule (KADHIM, 2012).

Sometimes called as an insurgency, rebellion and revolt, we chose to call events of resistance the British presence in Iraq in 1920 as a revolution. Mainly because - in addition to other factors in that context, such as the end of the First World War and the approval by the League of Nations of the Mandate System - its effects led to significant changes in the Iraqi political structure. Therefore, we consider the category of political revolutions that, by popular force, transform the structures of the State, but do not necessarily transform the social structures, as do the social revolutions (SKOCPOL, 1979, p.4). The main goal of the revolution: to reclaim Iraq from six and a half centuries of uninterrupted foreign rule (1258–1920). The population, except for a minority of the affluent, was united against a domineering British occupation that had replaced the equally exploitative four-century Ottoman occupation (KADHIM, 2012, p.4; 7).

AlthoughIraq 1920 Revolution lasted only six months, it was in fact an important parallel movement that took place on the most important cities (Baghdad, Basra, Hilla) margins and was essentially an uprising carried out by tribal forces[8], but there were also a noncombatant involvement of the urban areas. Intellectuals in Baghdad and other major cities contributed to the ideological framing of the revolution and provided the tribes with valuable awareness and a sense of nationalist direction (KADHIM, 2012, p.6).

If, on the one hand, the main cities like Baghdad, Hilla and Basra were not taken over by the rebels due to the high British occupying mil-

7. To have a dimension of the different historical narratives about the 1920 revolution, it is recommended to read the first chapter of the book "Reclaiming Iraq" by Abbas Kadhim (2012).

8. For a greater dimension of which were these tribes, their leaders and how they connect themselves, it is recommended to read the article by Amal Vinogradov: The 1920 Revoltion Iraq Reconsidered: The role of Tribes in National Politics, 1972.

itary capacity in them, the marginal cities such as Karbala, Najaf, Kufa, Samarra, Fallujah and Diwaniyya, were the space of greatest dispute between occupiers and rebels. There, tribal forces besieged, attacked, and finally captured them after the initial evacuation of the British. And they managed to occupy, but it would be short lived. Later, when the tribes were being subjected to overwhelming British bombardment, these cities were the first to surrender and to accept all the British conditions, while the tribes remained fighting until the end of the revolution. When in the fifth month of revolution the first city was taken over by the British, a domino effect began and in a few weeks the revolutionary forces lost total control of these cities. As soon as the tribes lost the city of Ṭwairij—between Ḥilla and Karbala —on 12 October 1920, notables in Karbala, began to form a committee to negotiate a surrender with the British. The city opened its gates a week later. The same happened to Najaf after the capture of Kufa. The British captured Kufa on 17 October 1920, and Najaf surrendered the next day.(KADHIM, 2012, p.6).

Over 6,000 to 10,000 Iraqis were killed, with the loss of around 500 British and Indian troops. Despite the evident British military superiority, it was the huge cost of this operation, over 40 million pounds sterling, which led to a change in British policy. Also, USA pressured the British, because it had a legal obligation to rule Iraq (this is the actual definition of a mandate) but it was a tiresome duty (LLEWELLYN-JONES, 2015, p.276).

While these events did not follow the patterns of "major revolutions" such as the French or Russian Revolutions, that resulted in great political and social transformations. Iraqi 1920 revolution did not have immediate transformation, and as expected, the removal of British presence in Iraq. Even though, it is important to consider the levels of public participation, the social and political networks involved in the events (KADHIM, 2012, p.8). We understand that these resistance movements did result in major changes in the way Britain intended to govern Iraq during mandate system. Also, it encouraged the emergence of a nationalist feeling never seen before in that region. In fact, an Iraqi identity was beginning to exist there.

The 1920 uprising was a political revolution as evidenced by the changes it imposed on the existing political structure, reversing British policy in Iraq. The British claimed that the events of June–October 1920 didn't impact in the process of political construction in Iraq, however it did succeed in "discrediting the India Office policy thoroughly, and it assured a much larger measure of participation by the Iraqis in their first national government" (MARR; AL-MARASHI, 2017, p.19-23), and also promoting Arabs to administrative posts in Iraq (LLEWELLYN-JONES, 2015, p.276).

Even before the first communications with Sharif from Mecca, the British, through British India, invaded Basra in what would today be southern Iraq in 1914, on the eve of the First World War. The action was part of a daring project, Lord Hardinge, the Viceroy of India, pointed out to the Secretary of State for India that the purpose was to "create an immense impression in the Middle East, especially in Persia, Afghanistan and on our frontier, and would counteract the unfortunate impression in the Middle East created by want of success in the Dardanelles" (HARDINGE

apud, LLEWELLYN-JONES, 2015, p.274). By 1915 the Government of India stated that it expected to annex at least Baghdad and Basra. It was between 1918-20, that such domain was established, in that period Iraq was administered by Sir Arnold Wilson (Iraq's Acting Civil Commissioner), he was an Indian Army Officer and later in Indian Political Department, with considerable experience in the Middle East. In that context, an "Iraq Occupied Territories Code" was created following the model of Indian laws and under the authority of members of the Indian Political Department. (LLEWELLYN-JONES, 2015, p.275). This replaced the old ottoman form of administrations of the region. However, this model proved to be insufficient, and Iraqis realized after six years of heavy-handed military administration that Britain's promises had not been made in good faith.

The model of occupation was largely based on nineteenth-century ideas of the "white man's burden," a predilection for direct rule, and a distrust of local Arabs' capacity for self-government. It was proved inefficient. Therefore, the first attempt of British administration, the imposition of the Indian colonial model, failed after a nationalist revolt in 1920 (MARR; AL-MARASHI, 2017, p.17). Later, on 1 October 1920, Sir Percy Cox landed in Basra to assume his responsibilities as high commissioner in Iraq and implemented the change in British perspective for Iraq. The first decisive step in creating new Iraqi states political institutions and the new British role in it, took place at the Cairo Conference of 1921, and in a way considered the need to give more voice to local actors. It seemed that the pressure of the 1920 revolution had some effect.

With the definition of a monarchical model, on 27 August 1921, Faysal was installed as king. As a monarch imposed on Iraq by an alien, dominant power, Faysal was always conscious of the need to put down roots in Iraq and to appeal to its different ethnic and sectarian communities if the monarchy were to remain. With Faysal's accession, the Iraqi nationalists who had served with him in the war and who had formed the backbone of his short-lived government in Syria returned to Iraq. Staunchly loyal to Faysal, Arab nationalist in outlook, yet willing to work within the limits of the British mandate, these repatriated Iraqis rapidly filled the high offices of state, giving Faysal the support he lacked elsewhere in the country. This handful of young, Ottoman-educated Arab lawyers, officers, and civil servants soon achieved a position in Iraqi politics second only to that of the British and Faysal, displacing the older notables originally installed by the British. This also had the effect of Arabizing the regime, a process intensified by the shift from Turkish to Arabic in the administration and the school system. Strong pan-Arab orientation, it thwarted the development of a more inward-looking. Also, as a result of Cairo's Conference, it established a native Iraqi army (MARR. AL-MARASHI, 2017, p.20-21).

Throughout the decade of Faysal's reign, the structure of the Iraqi state was established. This decade was marked by several agreements between the Iraqi kingdom and the British in order to secure their interests in the country for later. Between 24 October 1922 and 25 February 1924, a Constituent Assembly was established to elect the country's first parliament, to draft a constitution and to ratify the Anglo-Iraq treaty of 1922, designed to allow for local self-government while giving the British control of foreign

and military affairs. Thereafter, the form of government was incorporated into the organic law of 1925, in which Iraq was defined as a hereditary constitutional monarchy, with an elected bicameral legislature. Islam was the religion of the state, and Sharia courts, for Sunnis and Shiites, maintained jurisdiction over personal status. Other basic national institutions were quickly created. The Iraqi army, which was to be a national symbol and an essential instrument of state authority, was founded in 1921 and expanded after 1932 independence. (CLEVELAND; BUNTON, 2009, p.207).

Since the establishment of a national government, Iraqis have increased their political participation through the organization of political parties. Three parties formed in 1921, one by the group in power led by the Hashemite family and two by opposition parties seen later as the nationalist alternative in the country, the Watani Party (Patriotic) and the Nahda Party (Awakening) both had the same political objective: terminating the mandate and winning independence, but they differed on the means of realizing it. The Iraqi nationalists were far from satisfied with the parliamentary system established by the mandate. They demanded independence as a matter of right, as promised in war declarations and treaties, rather than as a matter of capacity for self-government as laid down in the mandate. Various attempts were made to redefine Anglo-Iraqi relations, as embodied in the 1926 and 1927 treaties, without fundamentally altering Britain's responsibility. For these Iraqi nationalists, British treaties seemed to be an impediment to the country's true economic development. They argued that there were two governments in Iraq, one foreign and the other national. (TRIPP, 2008, p.52-57)

In July 1927, the British government had promised King Faysal that it would recommend Iraq for admission to the League of Nations. In 1932, Britain's promise of September 1929 was part of a wider policy of retreat from an absolutist form of empire toward a more liberal or informal type of empire. (SILVERFARB, 1982, p.11-22) By the beginning of 1930 it was established another Anglo-Iraqi Treaty that would consummate Iraqi path to independence: it relinquished the mandate and withdrew its ground troops but retained airbases in Iraq. The British government had withdrawn all British and Indian ground troops from Iraq, but it still maintained squadrons of military Aircraft, stationed at Mosul, Hinaidi (five miles from Baghdad), and Shaiba (ten miles from Basra), plus a seaplane anchorage at Basra, after independence. (SILVERFARB, 1982, p.23; 31).

It was in the thirteenth annual assembly of the League of Nations, on October 3, 1932, that was voted unanimously to admit the Kingdom of Iraq to membership. Iraq was the first and only mandated territory to shed its tutelary status and be granted independence through collective agreement. However, British never really went out of Iraq, whether formally through the 1930 treaty, or informally through the close relationship with the Iraqi Hashemite elite (TRIPP, 2008, p.73).

This process therefore reveals that the British appointment of Fayşal was both a modification of the original Iraqi plan for independence, due to pressure from Iraqi society, but also a move to secure British interests by installing a government more friendly to the empire than the one established by the revolution leaders of previous year.

Confrontation between different internationalisms

Initially, the Peace Conference in Paris appeared as an unprecedented historic moment for colonized, marginalized and stateless peoples around the world to achieve self-determination. With the strengthening of international institutions, the subjugated peoples believed they could take the fight against imperialism, through their representatives, to the international arena and imagined President Wilson as an icon of their aspirations (MANELA,2007). But there were two antagonistic worlds in that world order that began to structure itself in 1919. One was represented in Paris, revealed in the treaties, agreements and the various diplomatic negotiations that multiplied around the world. The other reality was in everyday common actions, where people faced all sorts of social and economic problems. Furthermore, diplomatic actions by peacemakers took place in the shadow of real massacres in repressions against anti-colonial rebellions in Sierra Leone, Saigon, Congo, Egypt, Iraq, Syria, Kenya and South Africa. From then on, the imperial powers, with the intention of maintaining their dominions, began to face social and political movements, whose demands for greater participation and demands for independence expanded rapidly around the world as a result of promises not kept by the imperial powers. It can be said that anti-colonial nationalism is emerging at this moment as a major force in world affairs. (GROVOGUI, 1996).

Three years after the 1917 Russian revolution, the defeat of the German Revolution and the retreat of revolutionary forces across Europe put an end to the projected dream of an imminent world revolution, which made it imperative that the Komintern began to pay special attention to the movements of national liberation in colonial countries. Concerns about the influence of the Bolshevik revolution in the Eastern Question can be noticed through letters, reports and political demonstrations by British diplomats, military and politician (GUPTA, 2017).

In a letter addressed to Churchill in 18 August 1920, Field Marshal Sir Henry Wilson, the Chief of the Imperial General Staff, warned that "In view of the dispersion of our forces, in view of the dangerous weakness to which we are reduced in all theaters" it is possible that there are a number of revolutionary attempts in Ireland, Egypt, Mesopotamia, India and other theaters. (WILSON *apud* ULLMAN 2019). In 1920's fall, British Major Bray, an intelligence officer linked to the Political Department at the India Office, wrote three reports on the causes of unrest in Mesopotamia with information collected by British intelligence. His conclusion was that revolts were inflated from Berlin and Moscow and that the Soviets in particular, saw advantages to be gained from the spread of the revolution in the Middle East. (MACFIE, 1999).

Curzon and Milner, those primarily responsible for the administration of Mesopotamia, were directly opposed to the proposition to decrease British troops in Georgia and Persia, arguing that this would be equivalent "to an invitation to the Bolsheviks to enter and make themselves master of North Persia (...) would be an end to the Anglo-Persian Agreement which had been concluded with the object of establishing decent conditions and providing a barrier against Bolshevism" (CURZON *apud* ULLMAN, 2019 p. 365). They also warned that the end of the

Agreement, which served as a model for the administrations of Egypt and Mesopotamia, would disappear with time, allowing the Bolsheviks to penetrate the borders of Mesopotamia and Persia. It can be said that they clearly described what was conventionally called the domino effect.

The geopolitical rivalry that opposed the British and Tsarist empires was resized by ideological confrontation. In order to unite all anti-imperialist forces, the Comintern established that new tactics of action were needed. This new moment is well portrayed by Zinoviev's declaration at the First Congress of the Peoples of the East held in Baku in September 1920, which even called for a "holy war against British imperialism". Congress drew the attention of the British Cabinet, which published a document in December 1920, warning of the fact that the Soviet regime had as one of its main objectives, "the world revolution" at any cost. (YENEN, 2015)

In a telegram addressed to the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Russia, Kamenev was betting on the revolutionary potential of the revolts in Iraq to the extent that it could spread throughout the region:

> The insurrections in Mesopotamia have brought to the front the entire policy of the British Government in Central Asia. The British troops in Persia are operating from Bagdad. The evacuation of Mesopotamia which is being sought in some political circles [in England] must entail the evacuation of Persia; on the other hand, pressure on the British troops in North Persia will strengthen the position of the Mesopotamian insurgents. Britain has no troops to send to Mesopotamia except those which are in India and which she is afraid to move. A revolution along the line Enzeli-Hamadan-Bagdad threatens the most vital interests of the British Empire and breaks the status quo in Asia created by the Treaty of Versailles. (KAMENEV *apud* ULLMAN, 2019, p.374).

Although sometimes exaggerated, the perception of the Bolshevik threat on the part of the colonial government had its *raison d'être*. The Red Army, assisting local forces, took just one month, February 17 to March 17, 1921, to successfully establish a communist government in Georgia. This military campaign coincided with a successful diplomatic action that resulted, in the same month, in the conclusion of agreements for the beginning of "normalization" of the relations between the Soviet government and the three nationalist regimes that came to power in the territories on the south flank from Russia: Turkey, Afghanistan and Persia. Countries that the British Empire had long considered strategically vital to its domination (GÖKAY, 1997).

Russia, whose expansionism had always been regarded by the British as the main threat to India, remained a matter of concern. However, from 1917 onwards the threat seemed to come not so much from the strength of arms, but from the communist ideology that could find fertile soil in the entire region of Asia and the Middle East among the nationalist movements whose growth the war had given impetus to. The editorials of major British newspapers and reports from colonial administrations made alarming predictions about the effects of the combined forces of Bolshevism and nationalism (ULMAN, 2019).

Even though it had no direct influence on the manifestation of Iraqi resistance to the British presence in the 1920s, it is possible to say that the Bolshevik revolution and its internationalist aspiration represented a threat to British eyes, being one important variable in British equation to sustain its power in Iraq, in that period.

Conclusion

The Middle East emerged in 1923 completely different from that of 1914. New political movements and ideologies appeared in the emerging debates around the identities and development trajectories of nation-states. A new political class rebelled against the post-war mandate system, while British and French colonial administrators struggled to adapt to the new realities of territorial domination.

The tactics and objectives of colonial rule have changed over time due to political redefinitions and anti-imperialist revolts that have spread across the world. All states under mandate started their existence under some form of military occupation, or indirect rule, whether they were republics like Lebanon and Syria, or monarchies like Iraq and Transjordan. British authorities ensured the pursuit of their interests in access to oil, presence in military installations and communications through a series of unpopular treaties imposed on monarchs and/or parliaments that tried to maintain their *statusquo* in a delicate balance between submission to imperial powers and maintaining a certain popular support, but always inclined to serve British interests. When Britain left Iraq in 1932, it was clear that British empire felt able to take the risk, because most of the economic and political elite were ahead of Iraq kingdom through British intermediation. That was the main reason, rather than because of a belief that Iraq has reached a condition that allowed it independence.

In this process, it's important to highlight the significant role played by international disputes in the structuring of the State. As political elites operate in their domestic and international environment, their dominance positions are conditioned not only by issues within the national sphere, but fundamentally by the opportunities and challenges arising from the international sphere. The decision by the British to reward the notable Sunnis for their loyalty to positions of dominance in the new Iraqi state and to maintain the privileges of landowners, enabled them to build a lasting alliance with the conservative social forces that would dominate Iraqi politics until the Iraqi revolution in 1958.

There are several academic works that approach historical processes exclusively within national perspectives, forgetting the transnational connections between the countless revolts, revolutions and reactions. There are few attempts to insert them within a single field of perspective, framing them as parts of the same global historical moment: a broadly inherent international anti-colonial nationalist revolution.

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Integration, conflict, and autonomy among religious minorities in the late Ottoman Empire: the Greek-Catholic (Melkite) Church and sectarian turmoil in Mount Lebanon and Damascus

Integración, conflicto y autonomía entre las minorías religiosas a finales del Imperio Otomano: la Iglesia greco-católica (melquita) y la agitación sectaria en el Monte Líbano y Damasco

Integração, conflito e autonomia entre as minorias no fim do Império Otomano: a Igreja Greco-Católica (Melquita) e os confrontos sectários no Monte Líbano e em Damasco

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Abstract

The 19th century was a time of social and political upheaval for the Ottoman Empire. To contend with dwindling territories, uprisings, unrest, and international military, political, and economic pressure, it had to overcome structural deficiencies in the armed forces, economy, and State bureaucracy that kept it lagging behind its European counterparts. The modernizing impetus ultimately took the form of full-fledged legal and institutional reform by mid-century, transforming but also unsettling the Ottoman State and society. In this article we discuss a central component of those reforms and of the international relations of the Ottoman Empire in the nineteenth century: the legal status of non-Moslem minorities. We frame our discussion in the analysis of two moments: the official recognition of the Greek-Catholic (Melkite) religious community in 1848 and the sectarian civil conflict in Mount Lebanon and Damascus in 1860. The intersecting vectors of economic religious and political interests in their local, regional and international dimensions will be fleshed out, evincing a more nuanced and multilayered, and less monolithic and state-centered, approach toward the international relations of the late Ottoman Empire and the working of its institutions.

Keywords: Ottoman Empire. Religion. Lebanon. Syria. Melkites. Druze.

ReSUMen

El siglo XIX fue una época de agitación social y política para el Imperio Otomano. Para hacer frente a territorios perdidos, levantamientos, presiones y disturbios militares, políticos y económicos internacionales, tuvo que superar las deficiencias estructurales en las fuerzas armadas, la economía y la burocracia estatal que lo mantenían detrás de sus homólogos europeos. El impulso modernizador terminó tomando la forma de una profunda reforma legal e institucional a mediados de siglo, transformando, pero también perturbando, el estado y la sociedad otomanos. En este artículo, discutimos un componente crucial de estas reformas y relaciones internacionales en el Imperio Otomano del siglo XIX: el estatus legal de las minorías no musulmanas. Incluimos nuestro debate en el análisis de dos momentos: el reconocimiento oficial de la comunidad religiosa greco-católica (melkita) en 1848 y el conflicto civil sectario en Monte Líbano y Damasco en 1860. Discutiremos los vectores de intersección de intereses económicos, religiosos y políticos en su dimensión local, regional e internacional, mostrando un enfoque más matizado y multifacético y menos monolítico y estatocéntrico de las relaciones internacionales del Imperio Otomano tardío y el funcionamiento de sus instituciones.

Palabras clave: Imperio Otomano. Religión. Líbano. Siria. Melquitas. Drusos.

ReSUMO

O século XIX foi uma época de turbulência social e política para o Império Otomano. Para lidar com perda territórios, levantes, distúrbios e pressões militares, políticas e econômicas internacionais, ele teve de superar as deficiências estruturais nas forças armadas, na economia e na burocracia do Estado que o mantiveram atrasado em relação aos seus homólogos europeus. O ímpeto modernizador acabou assumindo a forma de uma profunda reforma jurídica e institucional em meados do século, transformando, mas também perturbando, o Estado e a sociedade otomanos. Neste artigo, discutimos um componente crucial dessas reformas e das relações internacionais do Império Otomano no século XIX: o status jurídico das minorias não muçulmanas. Enquadramos nossa discussão na análise de dois momentos: o reconhecimento oficial da comunidade religiosa greco-católica (melquita) em 1848 e o conflito civil sectário no Monte Líbano e Damasco em 1860. Os vetores de intersecção de interesses econômicos, religiosos e políticos em suas dimensões locais, regionais e internacionais serão iluminados, evidenciando uma abordagem mais matizada e multifacetada e menos monolítica e estatocêntrica em relação às relações internacionais do Império Otomano tardio e ao funcionamento de suas instituições.

Palavras-chave: Império Otomano. Religião. Líbano. Síria. Melquitas. Drusos

Introduction: The Ottoman Empire and the "Eastern Question"

The twilight of the eighteenth century did not bode well for the prospects of the ruling House of Uthman in the coming decades, which witnessed constant setbacks at the hands of European powers. The Ottomans were pushed to make an alliance with Great Britain against the French in Egypt (1798–1801), defeated in the long war for Greek independence (1822–1829), then against their nominal subject, Muhammad[3] (Mehmet) Ali, ruler of Egypt, whose dominions extended to most of the Ottoman Middle East possessions and Sudan. Mehmet Ali's army was only held back in Syria by dint of British intervention. By then, both the Ottomans and the Egyptian Khedive had soon realized that their destiny lied increasingly in their ability to adapt, modernizing its army and State apparatus along the lines of their European counterparts. The roots of reform lie earlier, in the ex-

3. Throughout this text we have opted to employ a simplified transliteration of Arabic words and names. Diacritics have been suppressed, and long vowels, where needed, are marked as a grave accent (^). Hamza is marked by a closing single quote mark (') and 'ayn, by an opening single quote mark ('). Proper nouns follow the most usual spelling in English.

tinction of the Janissaries in 1826 and the formation of a modern army (Nizam-e Jedid), and even before, in the massacre of the Mamluks by Mehmet Ali in Cairo in 1811 and his far-reaching state-building reforms, but much of the modernizing impetus that was to prove so momentous for future developments was fostered by Sultan Abdulmejid I (reigned 1839–1861) and continued under his brother and successor Abdulaziz (r. 1861–76).

The reforms needed to face the geopolitical and economic challenge meant a total overhaul of the Ottoman State apparatus through modernization (new law codes, ministries, a new bureaucracy structure, reform of the armed forces, a new taxation system, new land laws, etc.) and the creation of an economic infrastructure (railways, ports, postal service, banks, urbanization and industrialization).

Starting in the 16th century, the Ottoman Empire lagged behind other European powers in terms of State revenue, a situation which is congruent to their relative deficit in armed power and a series of military setbacks in the eighteenth century (KARAMAN; PAMUK, 2010). The tax-farming system syphoned revenue away from the State. For a population of around 20 million in the Balkans and Anatolia, it was estimated that by 1809 State revenue "scarcely equalled 2.25 million British pounds […] By comparison, Britain, with only 9.5 million inhabitants in 1787-90 had an average annual revenue of 16.8 million pounds, while France with a population of 24 million had revenues equal to 18 million pounds in 1787 and 24 million pounds in 1789" (LEVY, 1982, p. 239). Moreover, according to Findley (2012, p. 56), the Ottoman bureaucracy totaled between a paltry 1,000 and 1,500 scribes by the end of the eighteenth century.

The difficulty was compounded by rising costs of increasing and maintaining a modern army, and inflation.[4] Military reform depended on fiscal (SHAW, 1975; KARAMAN; PAMUK, 2010), bureaucratic (FINDLEY, 2012), and economic modernization – all of which were interdependent. A crucial aspect was how to deal with concomitant rising costs and plummeting revenue due to inflation:

> The Ottoman economy went through one of its worst periods between 1770 and 1840. Adjusted for inflation, government expenditures may have tripled under Selim and Mahmud. The government could not cope without reorganizing and centralizing its finances. Still the effects of crisis were felt at all levels of the economy, and Mahmud II carried out the most drastic coinage debasements in Ottoman history (FINDLEY, 2010, p. 49).

The reformist wave was characteristically spearheaded by the sector linked to the government's foreign relations. The reforms undertaken by Sultan Abdulmejid I (r. 1839–1861) and his brother Abdulaziz I (r. 1861–76) were implemented by the cosmopolitan elite, dubbed by Bunton and Cleveland (2009) as the "French knowers" (in fact, Abdulmejid I himself spoke French, and Abdulaziz was the first sultan to visit Western Europe).

Momentous changes were brought about by the expansion of the European State system, the capitalist economy (the free-trade Anglo-Ottoman Treaty of 1838) and nationalism (autonomy and later independence of the European provinces). The Ottoman Empire was deeply affected by these trends, both within the power structure and regarding the Sublime Porte's relation to its subjects, throughout the 19th century. The entrance of the Ottoman Empire in the "European Concert" (Treaty of Paris, 1856) inaugurates a pe-

4. In an ironic twist of history, "Ottoman society rejected westernizing reform in the reign of Selim III, but the same society accepted it, in a definitive and irreversible manner, less than two decades later, in the reign of Mahmud II (1808-1839)." (LEVY, 1982, p. 242).

riod of thorough institutional reforms, known as Tanzimat, whose goal was to modernize the State to face the long decline of the Empire's relative power on the European stage. One of the key constituents of the process of "reorganization" or "restructuring" (whence the meaning of the word "Tanzimat"), was the improved legal status of its non-Muslim subjects, enacted with the direct participation of European powers in the drafting of their decrees – the Edict of Gülhane of 1839 and the Reform Edict of 1856. It is important to bear in mind that, although the Ottoman Empire had become a recognized actor in international society and has never been directly colonized or completely dominated by European powers, its very survival depended on a delicate interplay between autonomy, reforms and international alliances, and its status as a "second-class member" of the European Concert derives both from its military and economic fragility and from the European balance of power (Austria-Hungary, United Kingdom, France, Prussia / Germany, and Russia).

The Tanzimat period (1839-1876), the subsequent period of authoritarianism under Sultan Abdulhamid (r. 1876-1909), as well as the turbulent period of the Young Turks Revolution (1909) and the First World War can be seen as permeated by the interdependence of international relations and the Ottoman political system. As symbolic and economic exchanges with the West deepened, structures and attitudes towards modernity, as well as political currents, that emerged during this period would inform future generations.

In this context, interreligious relations are a privileged locus, a "prism" for a reading of the modernization process and creation of modern states in the aftermath of the collapse of the Ottoman Empire. Issues that arose during or immediately after this "long 19th century" are at the root of modernization and state-building processes in Europe (Balkans, Central and Eastern Europe) and the Middle East and North Africa.

In this article, we will deal specifically with one of the main vectors of autonomy *vis à vis* the central administration of the Empire, constituting a crucial and sensitive feature of the internal and international political landscape of the Ottoman Empire – the issue of non-Muslim "minorities". We shall first briefly sketch the symbolic and institutional field that defined these relations within the scope of the religious and legal practices of Islam and regarding the political reforms of the Ottoman Empire in the 19th century. The traditional hierarchical form of social and political organization in the Empire will undergo profound changes during the 19th century, under European influence and internal reforms, in the shadow of monumental economic and geopolitical challenges.

We shall then turn our attention to two case studies: the seemingly inconsequential[5] and often overlooked establishment of the Melkite millet in 1848 and the momentous sectarian conflicts in Mount Lebanon in 1860 as events that both reflected and helped shape the course of modernization and integration with the Western international/economic order. In both cases we witness the dialectic between integration, conflict, and autonomy, in a delicate negotiation between communities and local authorities, the center of power in Constantinople, and the European powers directly or indirectly involved in this process. Finally, we conclude considering the impacts, continuities, and ruptures established in this process, which still echo in the social, political, and symbolic structure in some countries in the Middle East.

5. In hindsight, one could easily dismiss and explain away the Melkite union with the Roman Catholic Church and its subsequent recognition as an autonomous millet by the Ottoman Empire as simply a result of European political, economic and religious encroachment upon native religious communities, just one in a series of Churches in the Middle East that split and united with Rome (whence its slightly derogatory epithet "Uniate Churches"). However, as we shall endeavor to demonstrate, the Melkite case presents its own cultural and religious peculiarities, which cannot be wholly subsumed into an economic or political explanation of foreign influence. Local and regional dynamics (in politics, economy, and society) must be given pride of place side by side broader Mediterranean confluences with the European powers. Moreover, the development of the Melkite Church and its community has been taken as a mere backdrop for other, more momentous developments, such as the creation of autocephalous (i.e., autonomous) Orthodox Churches in the Balkans in the latter half of the 19th century.

Islamic attitudes toward other religions

The issue of tolerance of Islam toward other religions has been extensively discussed (FRIEDMANN, 2003; CRONE, 2009; DERINGIL, 2000; GODDARD, 2000; SHARKEY, 2017; LITTLE, 1976; O'SULLIVAN, 2006; BAER; MAKDISI; SHRYOCK, 2009; BRAUDE; LEWIS, 1982, *inter alia*). Among its most public and political features, some brief comments are in order. Apologists of all hues, whether Muslim or not, are prone to quote verse 2:256 of the Koran:

> No compulsion is there in religion. Rectitude has become clear from error. So whosoever disbelieves in idols and believes in God, has laid hold of the most firm handle, unbreaking; God is All-hearing, All-knowing [Tr. Arberry]

Yet, the hermeneutical issue is not so easily settled. According to Crone (2009), there are several traditional interpretations of this verse (which were subsequently carried over or modified by modern exegetes):

- It was abrogated, because it had appeared at a time when Muhammad should compromise with the population of Mecca, since he had no power at the time.
- It was historically restricted and irrelevant afterwards: it only meant that *Muslims in Medina, at the time of the revelation* should not try to force their children to convert.
- It only applied to the so-called Peoples of the Book ("Ahl al-Kitab"). The "pagans" only had two options, the sword or the conversion). According to a contemporary expounder, Amr Abd al-Aziz: "the verse was revealed specifically about Christians and Jews. Idolaters and similar godless and permissive people have to be compelled to adopt Islam, since they cannot be accepted as dhimmis and do not deserve any consideration because of their godlessness, stupidity, error and foolishness" (*apud* Crone, 2009).
- It was descriptive, according to the mu'tazilites (an interpretation later accepted by other groups): there was no compulsion *for God*, neither for Muslims nor for others. But *men*, for various reasons, could force the practice (and not, by definition, belief). This served both for the good of the community as a whole (the maintenance of an Islamic public order) and for the descendants of the "convert".

It was in the 19th-20th centuries that interpretations of this passage took a new turn, to accommodate in a certain way the post-Enlightenment Western perspective. Indeed, a similar mutation has occurred with the concept of jihad in the XIX century, according to Cook (2015).

However, in many traditionalist clerical milieux there still persists a variation of those historical interpretations. Crone sums up the theological debate: "everybody is agreed that Islam goes in for religious freedom, but not on what it means, except that Christians and Jews shouldn't be forced to convert. Everything else is unclear" (CRONE, 2009). What are then, the features of this freedom given to the *dhimmis* – Jews, Christians and possibly others –, whose religions can be tolerated)?

The Muslim attitude toward the so-called "Peoples of the Book" (Ahl

al-Kitab) or "Protected People" (Ahl al-Dhimma) can be briefly summarized as ambiguous and supercilious. As noted by Ussama Makdisi (BAER; MAKDISI; SHRYOCK, 2009), tolerance does not mean equality. There was no policy of forced conversion for dhimmis, but one of subordination, especially in the public space. There was an expectation of a game between visibility and invisibility, autonomy and submission, freedom and coercion. The visibility of Jews and Christians should not be ostentatious, and could frequently be discriminatory (such as sumptuary laws). There was autonomy in the sense that the religious communities were allowed to follow their own religious laws, chiefly in the domain of personal status – yet this autonomy was also given to the Muslim communities (accounting for the abysmal gap between the State and society in the pre-modern period). In other words, for most of the time the population was left to their own devices.

According to Sharkey:

> Muslim leaders [...] combined tolerance on the one hand, with a scorn for and persistent mild denigration of Christian beliefs on the other. This treatment, combined subsequently with various inducements (such as tax breaks and professional opportunities), made conversion to Islam quite attractive for the Christian people placed under Muslim rule (SHARKEY, 2017, p. 38).

In this context, a central feature of the Ottoman system of government came into play: the assimilation and integration of conquered peoples, which composed an empire that spanned three continents, including the central lands of the Islamic world.

Ethnic and religious diversity in the Ottoman Empire

Although the empire's bureaucracy assimilated its various ethnic components into a centralized Islamic-dynastic unity (the elite identifying themselves as Ottoman, not Turkish), based on a religious premise (the officially recognized religious communities, the millets), there was a split between ethnicity and religion in the various regions of the empire:

- Albanians could be Muslims (Sunnis, Bektashis), Orthodox or Catholics; [FOOTNOTE: The Bektashis were a sufi order. "Bektāšīs believed that formal worship was incumbent only on outsiders (zahirler) and that the šarīṬa was not directed to individuals, having rather the cosmic function of maintaining order in the universe." (ALGAR, 1989)]
- Bulgarians, Orthodox or Muslims (pomaks);
- Greeks and Bosnians could be orthodox or Muslim;
- Turks could be Sunnis, Shias or Sufis (or variations and syncretism between these divisions)
- There were Jews who converted to Islam (the Dönmeh);
- Kurds could be Sunnis or Yezidis;
- Jews could be Arabs (Mizrahim), Sephardic (Ladino speakers, with a strong presence in Saloniki);
- There were orthodox "Greeks" (karamanlides) who wrote Ottoman Turkish in the Greek alphabet;

• Arabs could be Sunnis, Shiites, Druze, Alawites, Orthodox, Catholics or Protestants...

> The question is: who was the "Ottoman"? Was he Sadık Pasha, né Michael Izador Czaykowski, a Polish count who entered the Ottoman service in the 1830s, converted to Islam, and went on to pursue a distinguished military career? Or was he Amir Bashir Shihab, a Christian Lebanese who in the early 1820s "practiced Sunni Islam in public and Christianity in private, [and] allowed a Maronite priest to take charge of his spiritual life"? Or was he the Druze and Alewi chieftain in the Lebanese mountains who practiced taqiya (dissimulation), while "by centuries old tradition" taking his disputes to Ottoman Sunni Shariat courts? Or was he Grand Vizier Mehmed Sokollu (Sokolovič, 1505–1579), whose brother, the monk Makarios, ruled as the Patriarch of the Serbian Church at Peč? (DERINGIL, 2000, p. 550).

The very social fabric of Ottoman society, and even more of its elite, was originally a "melting pot", due to the intensive practice of having concubine slaves and the *devshirme*. According to Peirce, after an initial period in which there were marriages to Anatolian potentate daughters (the first two generations), no royal consort was Muslim or Turkish (PEIRCE, 1993, p. 37). The attitude towards the conversion of non-Muslims to Islam that seems to have predominated was essentially pragmatic, especially when it came to skilled labor: in Deringil's expression, "go through the motions and you are accepted" (DERINGIL, 2000).

The two institutions that dealt with this internal and external plurality were, respectively, the millet system and capitulations. Regarding millets, although they were only formally characterized in the nineteenth century (BRAUDE, 1982), the traditional Islamic governance policy of the dhimmis provided more latitude than the European policy of *cuius regio, eius religio*:

> [W]hereas the Ottoman Empire was strict in its condition of political allegiance but accommodated a religious allegiance out of state, the European countries conflated the two and deemed any religion other than the state religion a potential source of disloyalty or treason (BERGER, 2014, p. 161).

Yet one could also inversely argue that, once one excludes a religious group out of the legitimate participants of the political game, that group is relegated to a dichotomous and subordinate position consisting either of asserting an unwavering allegiance out of existential fear or engaging in open rebellion. Either way, the French Revolution and subsequent policies that extended popular sovereignty would eventually make this point moot.

This structure of recognition and autonomy, separation and subordination of religious communities would be affected by two contradictory forces. The modernization brought about by the Tanzimat is inherently unstable: on the one hand, there was a push for integration with a certain legal equality between Muslim and non-Muslim subjects; on the other hand, autonomy, privileges and socio-economic development were linked to Europe (eventually leading to nationalism and independence). We have chosen here to expound two cases that epitomize this tension: the official recognition of the Greek-Catholic (Melkite) millet and the civil war in Mount Lebanon in 1860.

The establishment of the Melkite millet in 1848

The Greek Catholic or Melkite Church is a Byzantine rite Church that separated from the Greek Orthodox and united with the Roman Catholic Church in 1724. Most of them dwelt in cities, which were the base of their bishoprics, and were Arabic speakers. Contrary to an "ethnic" theory for the split with the Orthodox, "the patriarchs and bishops until 1724 were mostly of Arab origin" (WALBINER, 2003, p. 11).

The union with Rome is the result of a long process, in fits and starts, enmeshed with local and international rivalries.[6] Already in 1684 Euthymius al-Ṣaifi, metropolitan of Tyre and Sidon, united with Rome. His independence from the Orthodox patriarch of Antioch, who resides in Damascus, was supported by local potentates and French merchants (WALBINER, 2003, p. 11). Institutional build up and support by foreign powers, missionaries, and local and international merchants was fundamental to strengthen the pro-Catholic cause among Orthodox communities. They made the mountains of Lebanon their first strongholds: the Monastery of the Savior (Dayr al-Mukhalliṣ), whose construction started in 1708, and the Monastery of St. John, in Shuwayr (WALBINER, 2003, p. 11). In the period up to 1724, several metropolitans sent their professions of faith to Rome, and the patriarchs had an ambiguous position toward this trend. The crucial step in official communion with Latin Christendom came from the important city of Aleppo, in present northwest Syria.

The presence of Western Catholic missions and socio-economic factors made the majority of the population of the city of Aleppo in the early seventeenth century pro-Catholic. The election of the first "officially" Catholic patriarch took place in 1724, when the Damascenes elected Seraphim Tânâs, named patriarch under the name of Cyril VI. However, when the Sublime Porte confirmed the election of the monk Sylvester (a Greek) to the patriarchy, Cyril fled to Shuwayr, where he was confirmed patriarch by the pope in 1729 (MASTERS, 2004, p. 89). Sylvester's policy alienated Aleppo's population (who had apparently supported his nomination because they had not been consulted on Cyril's election in Damascus, according to Masters). Catholics in the city, in a petition supported by Muslims, claimed that Sylvestros' policy had caused many Christians to leave the city, thus causing economic harm – a threat that would be repeated several times (MASTERS, 2004, p. 91).

The Catholics struggled for institutional support in Aleppo. The Metropolitan of Aleppo, Maximos al-Hakim, declared himself a Catholic and was appointed by the pope in 1730. Maximos got approval from Istanbul through the "gift" of 45 bags of silver coins. After several twists and turns, with both communities appealing to local judges and in Istanbul, and after an exile in Lebanon, Maximos returned to Aleppo in 1734. The question remains: why did conversion to Catholicism occur mainly in two major cities (Istanbul, with the Armenians, and Aleppo)? According to Masters, the two main hypotheses put forward – the presence of European traders (and also missionaries) and the desire to affirm an ethnic (Arab) identity – are not satisfactory. These two hypotheses cannot account for several anomalies: the city of Izmir, which had a much stronger presence of European traders, and Damascus, a quintessentially Arab city, did not

6. Whose beginnings we can attribute to the Counter-Reformation: the establishment of Eastern colleges in Rome in the 16th century and of the Sacra Congregatio de Propaganda Fide in 1622. (Ruthenians / Ukrainians had previously separated from the Orthodox in the Union of Brześś in 1595-96, with subsequent unions in 1646 in Uzhhorod / Ungvár and in 1664 in Mukachevo).

embrace the Catholic cause so fervently. Furthermore, Armenians and Jacobites[7] did not have a strong "linguistic gap" between the liturgical language and the vernacular. Thus, something else must be at play.

According to Masters, a plausible explanation is that "Catholicism met the political, cultural, and spiritual needs of an emergent Christian mercantile bourgeoisie and they embraced it with enthusiasm" (MASTERS, 2004, p. 96). One aspect of this change is reflected in the creation of lay brotherhoods (HEYBERGER, 1996). Another crucial factor was the maintenance of Byzantine traditions (married clergy, fermented bread, holidays, etc.). A psychological transformation, according to Masters, was also at stake:

> They were protected behind that all-important façade of tradition, while committing themselves to a place in a new economic and political world-order, increasingly dominated by the West. (MASTERS, 2004, p. 97)

Figure 1 – Melkites in Lebanon and Syria – Historical and Contemporary Presence

7. The Jacobite or Syriac Orthodox Church is Monophysite (non-Chalcedonian) Christian Church. As the Maronites, they follow the West Syriac Antiochene rite, but with extensive use of Syriac as a liturgical language. The Syriac Catholic Church emerged between the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries and has around 150,00 faithful. Its patriarch resides in Beirut. The Syriac Orthodox Church has more than 2 million followers mainly in Syria, India (Malankara Syrian Orthodox Church), and elsewhere in the diaspora. There is also a sizable recently converted community in Guatemala.

It is also worth noting the allure of Catholicism to women, who had more freedom and agency in the face of the stricter restrictions of the Orthodox Church. Missionaries valued more the role of women, who began to become literate or choose a life of celibacy (Orthodox monasteries were common to men and women), culminating in their insertion in the capitalist economy at the end of the nineteenth century and in public life (although not in politics) around the same time. The missions were also influential for the Arabic "renaissance" (Nahda) in the late 19th century, with figures such as the Melkite Nasif al-Yaziji (1800–71), the Maronite/Protestant Butrus al-Bustani (1819–83) , who participated in the translation of the Bible into Arabic, and the writer Faris/Ahmad Shidyaq (Maronite, and later Anglican and finally Muslim).

It would be the case, then, of "elective affinities" and a "hybrid" worldview, although not necessarily political for the time being. The identity was strengthened by the "persecutions" at the hands of the Orthodox, by a hierarchy that could be perpetuated (note Euthymius's effort to appoint bishops), the refuge granted on Mount Lebanon by the local potentates (Druze) and the Maronites,[8] and the capacity to use economic and political power (WALBINER, 2003, p. 14). In this regard, its presence in Egypt is illustrative. According to Crecelius:

> the diasporas of the so-called Melkite or Greek Catholic Christians to the Mediterranean seaports of Egypt and the Levant was one of the most important developments affecting trade between Egypt and Syria and between these two provinces and Europe (CRECELIUS, 2010, p. 156).

Establishing themselves with great success in the Levant, the Melkites supplanted Europeans in commerce at the end of the eighteenth century. They acted as agents for the governor of Acre, Ahmad Jazzar Pasha, in the lucrative cotton trade, defending his monopoly. After the 1770s, the Mamluk *shaykh al-balad* in Egypt, Ali Bey al-Kabir, transferred Egyptian customs from Jews to the Melkites, who then controlled customs at all ports except Suez. Given these connections, they profited greatly from import and export monopolies (CRECELIUS, 2010, p. 158).

Issawi (1982, p. 261) noted that

> foreign or minority groups played a very important role as intermediaries between Western capital and the local population: Chinese in Southeast Asia, Indians in Burma and East Africa, Lebanese in West Africa and so on (...) The function of the *millets* was essentially that of middlemen between the Muslim masses and the forces that were transforming them, i.e., European capital and enterprise and modernizing Middle Eastern governments.

The historian Bruce Masters affirms that the need to institutionalize its distinct status that lead to the official recognition of the Melkite millet in 1848 was more a result of what could be characterized as an "identity policy" – borrowing Hobsbawm's term: "protonationalism" – than a question of dogma (MASTERS, 2010).[9] The Melkites, although primarily of Arabic demanded a millet separate from the one that would cover all Catholics (the Armenian Catholic millet had been recognized in 1830). However, Greek Catholics did not identify themselves with a

8. The Druze religion is an esoteric offshoot of Isma'ili Shiism. The Druze people are concentrated in the Levant (present-day Israel, Syria, and Lebanon). The Maronites are Catholic a community that has been in union with Rome since the 13th century. They follow the Syriac-Antiochene rite. Originated from a monastic community in near the Orontes river, present-day Syria, the sought refuge from other Christian groups, and later from Moslems, in Mount Lebanon. They progressively adopted the Arabic language for daily usage and literature both sacred and profane, and also for most of the liturgy.

9. Hobsbawm defines protonationalism as "Certain variants of feelings of collective belonging which already existed and which […] could fit in with modern states and nations" (HOBSBAWM, 2012, p. 46).

"national Church" (like the Orthodox Bulgarian Church, recognized as a millet in 1870). The argument used by the Melkites was that they were simply the Byzantine Christians (Rûm) of Syria (Suriya, not Bilâd al-Shâm), and that they had never deviated from loyalty to either the Pope or the Sultan (as the Orthodox Greeks had).[10]

In the Ottoman Empire in the nineteenth century , Christians and, to a lesser degree, Jews, thrived not only on commerce and industry but also in the liberal professions, forming a large portion of the urban middle class, public servants, and foreign companies. In commerce, industry, liberal professions, and the bureaucracy, they naturally amassed a great deal of wealth – though, as Issawi noted, "the vast majority remained in the ranks of the petty bourgeoisie or lower". (ISSAWI, 1982, p. 262). This situation of relative prosperity and privileged status (as perceived by the Muslim population) did not change until the nationalist upheavals of the middle 20th century.

Figure 2 - Minority shares in the import-export
sectors of Trabzon (1884) and Beirut (1848).

Source: Kuran, 2011, p. 192.

10. The policy of the orthodox millet, centered on the figure of the ecumenical patriarch of Constantinople, was founded on the latter's claim of authority over all orthodox subjects in the empire. Paradoxically, Ottoman unification offered the possibility of claiming more direct control of the Orthodox by the patriarch of Constantinople, especially after the Mamluks (Jerusalem was very important to be conceded autonomy to, but the other headquarters, Alexandria and Antioch, elected their own leaders). The quest to strengthen the ecumenical patriarch's authority was also linked to Catholic missionaries, active at least since the mid-seventeenth century.
The two millets recognized in the 18th century - Armenian and Orthodox - had their own liturgical languages, and Christians who were neither Armenian nor Orthodox were under the "political" jurisdiction of the Armenian patriarch.

From the mid-nineteenth century onwards, most importers and exporters in major cities of the Empire – Alexandria, Baghdad, Aleppo, Beirut, Izmir, Trebzon, and even Istanbul – were held in the hands of either foreigners or local minorities (Figures 1 and 2). In this, the local Christian minorities in Aleppo were no exception. "In Aleppo, Muslims maintained a major presence in commerce, but all the wealthiest merchants were Christian." (KURAN, 2011, p. 193.) Therefore, foreign commercial presence alone does not explain such a prolonged, winding shift in religious allegiance as the process Melkite-Orthodox divide.

Figure 3 - Muslim and minority shares of major Ottoman traders, 1912.

Source: Kuran, 2011, p. 193.

This peculiar position was fostered, besides the reforms, by foreign protection and foreign education. "As of the mid-nineteenth century, in Aleppo alone more than 1,500 non-Muslim Ottomans were engaged in international trade under a foreign government's protection." (KURAN, 2011, p. 201). Many local Christians were favored by the so-called system of capitulations, whereby European subjects and their local protégés were granted exemption from the jizyah impositions (MASTERS, 2009) and other taxes, payed the same amount of customs duties as the Muslims (3%, compared to 5% paid by dhimmis) and legal protection through a legal concession named berat (MASTERS, 2004, p. 74).

A notable development was the increase in power of local Consuls, who intervened on behalf of their nationals and local allies. Bruce Masters also adds that "Many of the critics of the protégé system also point to its wholesale abuse for either monetary or political gain by the European consuls who obtained berats far in excess of the numbers to which they were entitled." (MASTERS, 2004, p. 78).[11]

The Christians' socio-economic status was, through the reforms carried out since the period of Egyptian occupation, raised by Westernizing reforms, increasing juridical equality, and European protection, being a source of resentment for the Muslim majority (DERINGIL, 2015, p. 38; HADDAD, 2015). The Tanzimat reforms were put to test, surprisingly, not in the central or more prosperous European domains of the empire, but in the events in Mount Lebanon and Damascus.

The massacres of 1860 in Mount Lebanon and Damascus

In the first centuries of Ottoman dominion, Mount Lebanon and its environs were able to secure a certain autonomy *vis-à-vis* the Sublime Porte. The Maronites and the Druze were the core constituents of an autonomous emirate in Mount Lebanon from the 16th century onwards, particularly after the rule of Emir Fakhr el-Din al Ma'an (ruled 1591-1635).

France had developed ancient political ties with the Maronites and claimed to be protectors of the Catholics of the Ottoman Empire, whereas the Maronites regarded France as their allies and supporters in a hostile environment, perched high in their strongholds in Mount Lebanon. Maronite identity was, then, shaped throughout the centuries

11. "By the end of the eighteenth century, when the Ottoman population was around 30 million, the Austrian alone were protecting 200,000 Ottoman subjects (...) By 1808, Russia had extended protection to 120,000 people, mostly Greeks. In 1882, "foreign subjects" accounted for 112,000 of the 237,000 residents of Galata, Istanbul's leading commercial district; most were natives. In 1897, half of all the Jews in Egypt were foreign nationals" (KURAN, 2011, p. 201).

largely through the relationship with the Catholic Church and France (HEYBERGER, 2018; ARSAN, 2016) They would also be instrumental in the crystallization of a Christian-centered, Maronite based nationalism (HAKIM, 2013; KAUFMAN, 2014) and Lebanese independence (ARSAN, 2015; FIRRO, 2002)

Religious missions, such as the Franciscans and Dominicans, and later the Jesuits, helped to keep the relationship with Rome constant and deepened a sense of distinct Maronite identity. In addition, the creation of the Maronite College in Rome in 1584 for Maronite seminarians was also of great importance.

The institutionalization of what is known as sectarianism or communitarianism in the Lebanese political and social context emerged in the nineteenth century, as a result of the confluence of regional and international factors. As Usama Makdisi writes, "it is imperative to dispel any illusion that sectarianism is simply or exclusively a native malignancy or a foreign conspiracy" (MAKDISI, 2000, p. 2). Sectarianism, as conceptualized by Makdisi, is "refers to the deployment of religious heritage as a primary marker of modern political identity" (MAKDISI, 2000, p. 7). Here we follow Makdisi's lead, situating the fateful events in the context of the Ottoman modernizing reforms.

Until the middle of the nineteenth century, the social structure in Lebanon could be described as a local variant of the Ottoman pattern:

- Muslims and dhimmis (mostly commoners, with a large peasant base);
- The "nobles" (*manâsib*) and the "commoners" (*'amma*)
- Local potentates and central power
- Muqata'jis (tax farmers, holders of an *iqtâ'a* or *iltizâm*)

The social division was expressed by a feudal stratum (mostly Druze) and a mainly peasant base (most Christians). The nobles lived by extracting income, through *iqtâ'a* or by renting land. There were often conflicts among the nobility or with central power (see Fakhr el-Din in the seventeenth century and Bashir Shihab II in the 19th). "Local rulers (...) generally controlled a port, trade route or vital produce (coffee, cotton, silk, etc.)" (TRABOULSI, 2012, p. 4).

Revolts concerning taxation were common. Emir Bashir Shihab II (1788–1840) (the Sunni dynasty of Shihab had succeeded that of the Ma 'an in the seventeenth century) allied with Druze leader Bashir Jumblat against the tax revolt in 1820-21. The alliance ends in 1825, when Shihab tries to extend his power at the expense of the Druze lords. Jumblat opposes Shihab (now openly declared a Christian) and gets help from the governor (*wâli*) of Damascus. Shihab, on the other hand, already had as an ally the governor of Acre, who managed to attract Jumblat to his city and behead him. As a result, the Druze lords were stripped of their fiefdoms, only two of which remaining in their hands. These lands were distributed among the Shihab family, who got closer to the Maronite Church (TRABOULSI, 2012, p. 11).

Bashir Shihab II helped with the invasion and Egyptian control of the Levant, under the command of Ibrahim Pasha, son of Muhammad Ali, governor of Egypt. The policies implemented in Egypt's government

were reproduced in Syria. Industry and foreign trade were stimulated. The State had a monopoly on silk, and Beirut being established as a mandatory entrepôt for the product. Ibrahim Pasha's government was not popular with the local population, due to high taxes, forced labor and military service. To fight a Druze revolt in Ḥawrân, which had spread to Beqaa and Wadi al-Taym, Ibrahim had armed the Christians against the Druze and others. The catalyst for Christians to join the revolt was the decision to retake their weapons. In 1840, Maronites, Druze, Shiites and Sunnis started a revolt against Bashir. The revolt was mainly led by popular leaders (*sheykh shabib*) (TRABOULSI, 2012, p. 13).

With European support (the British feared the Ottoman weakening vis-à-vis Russia), Ibrahim is defeated and retreats to Acre. The new emir, Bashir Milhim Qasim (Bashir III), took over with foreign support. Yet the Maronite Church wanted the continuation of the emirate of the Shihab, the Druze wanted instead a return to the previous status quo (HARRIS, 2014, p. 140). The Ottomans and the British supported the return of properties to Druze (TRABOULSI, 2012, p. 14), while the Maronites and Melkites of the Shuf and Jezzin did not want the Druze to return to further increase the tax, on top of the tax they were already paying (HARRIS, 2014, p. 140).

At that time, there was a social, political and economic disjunction between the Christians and the Druze:

> a Druze bloc, primarily tribal, in which the tributary and military function dominated, and a Christian bloc, with a wide peasant and artisan base and commercial/financial ramifications (TRABOULSI, 2012, p. 15).

If in the north Christian *manisib* extracted income from Christian peasants, in the south, Druze *manisib* dominated Christian peasants. Druze commoners paid little tax, if at all. As Traboulsi shows, Christians benefited much more from the expansion of regional and international trade and industrial and artisanal production in cities on commercial routes – Deyr al-Qamar, Zahlehh, Beirut (TRABOULSI, 2012).

After the fall of Bashir III, the Druze, supported by the British, demanded a Muslim governor, while the Maronites defended a Christian governor. Although the Druze theoretically demanded a Muslim governor, they did not welcome Governor Ömer Pasha, a Muslim Croat, sent by Istanbul to administer Mount Lebanon directly from Deyr al-Qamar.

Austrian Chancellor Metternich proposed a division of the north, with a Christian governor, and the south, with a Druze governor – the system known as *Qaimaqamatayn*. Neither party accepted the agreement well: the Maronite Church demanded that southern Christians (60% of the population) be under the authority of the northern *qaimaqam*, while the Druze demanded complete control over Mount Lebanon.

Figure 4 - The Qàim Maqamiya System - Mount Lebanon (1842 - 1861)

A series of conflicts emerged in this context:

- intra-elite conflicts: in the South, the Jumblats did not accept the appointment of Amin Arslan as *qaimaqam*; in the North, the Khazins opposed the Abi Lama'as.
- the *muqata'jis* resisted the implementation of the 1858 Ottoman land ownership law;
- conflicts between the returning Druze and commoners
- cities freed themselves from the control of the *muqata'jis* - Amchit from the Khazin; Ghazir, from Hubaysh, Deyr al-Qamar, from the Druze Abu Nakads, and Zahlehh from the Abi Lama'as. Zahleh also managed to connect with the wilaya of Beirut, and afterwards of Sidon, escaping the administrative sphere of Mount Lebanon.

The revolt against the rule of the muqata'jis broke out in late 1858 under the leadership of Tanius Shahin (1815–95), and controlled the Kesrawân region for two years. A directly elected council had Shahin as president. According to Traboulsi, they were pioneers in implementing the provisions of Tanzimat. They railed against excessive or additional taxes, demanded the establishment of a court to settle conflicts between sheiks and the people, called for an end to the sheikhs' political and legal privileges, political participation (appointment of a governor), and the abolition of feudal mores – forced labor, "gifts" for sheiks (coffee, tobacco, sugar, soap), distinctive clothing and kissing the sheikhs' hands. Two tendencies emerged in the revolt: the "bourgeois", according to which the criterion of distinction should be property, and the peasant, who demanded equality with the Christian sheikhs and with the Muslim majority of the Empire. The Maronite Church steered a middle path between the peasants and the conservative upper strata of the Maronite clergy and society.

The so-called "events of 1860"[12] can be interpreted under the prism of the social and political struggles in the northern districts and against the backdrop of the wider measures of the Tanzimat:

> The fighting in the southern part of Mount Lebanon was initiated by the Druze leadership as a preemptive measure to ward off the possible repercussions of the Kisrawan revolt but, more importantly, to overcome the social and political agitation of their 'own' Christian commoners (TRABOULSI, 2012, p. 33).

12. The Lebanese have a tendency of euphemistically calling their wars and conflicts mere "events" (al-ahdath), such as in the last Civil War (1975-1990).

The city of Deir al-Qamar fell, resulting in an estimated massacre of 900 to 2,000 Christians. The Druze claim that there were about 4,000 weapons in the city, but, according to Christian reports, the weapons had already been collected by Turkish authorities, from which protection was expected. The Druze also sacked the Orthodox villages of Hasbaya (where 17 Sunni Shihab sheikhs were killed) and Rashaya. Zahleh was pillaged, having received no help from the Maronites in the Mountain. Both communities took the opportunity to expel Shiites from their respective territories (TRABOULSI, 2012, p. 35). In the end, around 11,000 persons lost their lives in the Lebanon conflict (FAWAZ, 1994, p. 226).

Sectarian conflict spilled over to Damascus and took a different turn. In 1860, after simmering tensions, the mob went berserk, going after the Christians, especially in the quarter of Bab Touma, which was virtually razed to the ground. The violence lasted for days. There was killing, looting, burning, rape and abduction of women and children. The Turkish authorities were negligent; the Moslem religious leaders, the ulama, abstained; the police and irregular troops actively participated in the riots. The rampage soon turned to Westerners: "Foreign consulates were an early target, a measure of Muslim belief in foreign plots and resentment against the humiliations inflicted on them by the Western powers." (FAWAZ, 1994, p. 89).[13] According to estimates 12,000 people perished in Damascus in a week (FAWAZ, 1994, p. 226; SALIBI, 1988, p. 138). Many were saved by the Algerian emir Abd al-Qadir, a resident of Damascus at the time. The number of displaced, injured, maimed, or abducted, or of those who lost their property and livelihood, is impossible to ascertain.

13. An eyewitness to the massacre was the American vice-consul in Damascus, Mikhail Mishaqa, who wrote a history of the conflict. Mishaqa was a Greek Catholic who had business in Egypt, Galilee, Syria, and Lebanon and converted to Protestantism by American missionaries (ROGAN, 2004).

The sense of upended social order explains, according to Masters (2004), the series of popular riots aimed at Christians: Aleppo (1850), Mo-

sul (1854), Nablus (1856), Jeddah (1858), Egypt (1882) (MASTERS, 2004; POLLEY, 2020; SHARKEY, 2017, p. 146). Fawaz (1994, p. 99-100) argues that economic resentment was at play both in Aleppo and in Damascus. On the other hand, Grehan contends that "the origins of these disturbances lay not in the penetration of the modern world economy but in the extended political crisis that shook the Ottoman Empire during the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries." (GREHAN, 2015, p. 491.)

The Damascus affair also illustrates the opposition to the Tanzimat. Spurred by economic resentment and socio-political grievances, the crowd turned against the most visible signs of what they perceived as their humiliation and gave vent to their anger. Moslems in Damascus celebrated the fall of Zahleh, the Melkite stronghold in the Beqaa and their rivals in grain and livestock trade, at the hands of the Druze (FAWAZ, 1994, p. 81). Whereas the strife in Mount Lebanon pitted Druze against Maronite, in Damascus the mob attacked mainly Melkites, who had cultural and commercial ties with foreigners, especially the French merchants. Significantly, the mobs spared the Jews and poor Christian neighborhoods (SHARKEY, 2017, p. 215).

Pressure from the massacres on Mount Lebanon and Damascus prompted Istanbul to send Foreign Minister Fuad Pasha to Beirut, where he arrested the governor, Khurshid Pasha and several Druze leaders, including Said Jumblat. In Damascus, the reaction was brutal. Fuad Pasha arrested and executed Governor Ahmad Pasha, officers, soldiers and officials (TRABOULSI, 2012, p. 35).

> The authorities arrested hundreds of Muslim men, and publicly executed scores of them. Records identified the executed by their professions, thereby offering some insight into class origins: they included lemonade sellers, barbers, bead traders, carpenters, and other assorted shopkeepers and artisans. On one day in August 1860 alone, Ottoman authorities executed 167 men as their families and other members of the public looked on; they then suspended the corpses of 57 of them in bazaars and streets, and on gate-posts, as grisly memorials of the punishment (SHARKEY, 2017, p. 151-152).

As foreign pressure mounted, a French expeditionary force of 6,000 men was sent to Beirut. The government of Mount Lebanon was structured through the 1860 *Règlement Organique*, as an autonomous area governed by a non-Lebanese Christian appointed by the Sublime Porte.

Several authors tended to view these events in 1860 either as an outbreak of atavism, or as a plot by foreign powers (Turkish historiography) or the Ottoman Empire (Arab historiography) (MAKDISI, 2000, p. 5–6). Fuad Pasha himself described the events as "a very old thing", adopting a paternalistic and authoritarian imperial language, consistent with the ongoing Tanzimat reforms (MAKDISI, 2002). This period, between the fall of Bashir Shihab II and the establishment of *Mutasarrifiyah* – "long peace" from 1860 to 1914 (AKARLI, 1993) – can be contextualized as a period of transition in the context wider range of reforms from the Ottoman Empire in the second half of the nineteenth century. As Makdisi states:

> Sectarianism emerged as a practice when Maronite and Druze elites, Europeans and Ottomans struggled to define an equitable relationship of the Druze and Maronite "tribes" and "nations" to a modernizing Ottoman state (MAKDISI, 2000, p. 6).

The intermingling of foreign and domestic politics, together with the redefinition of social and political roles and a deepening of economic insertion, were crucial aspects in the definition of Lebanon's political structure after the First World War under the French mandate.

Conclusion

Both cases dealt with here resulted from changes in the social, economic and geopolitical context in the Levant in the 19th century. The crucial milestones of these changes were:

    a) the European political, cultural, economic and religious presence;

    b) the integration of Christian communities and individuals in the discourse and a worldview of modernity and the recognition and strengthening of their religious identity, and

    c) the Ottoman reform policy, both at the imperial and local levels.

These factors concurred both to the gruesome events in Mount Lebanon and Damascus in 1860 and to the creation of an autonomous region in Mount Lebanon, leading to the formation of the Lebanese State in the 20th century. Foreign missions, schools, trade, and diplomacy were instrumental in creating a new social, and subsequently political mindset among the Christian subjects of the Empire in the Middle East. Aleppo was the center of Catholic missions in the region, that the port cities of Tire, Beirut, Sidon and Acre had European consuls and commerce dominated by Christians (LONGVA, 2012). This presence was fundamental for the creation of Uniate churches from the eighteenth century onwards (the Chaldean union in Iraq had several setbacks and another dynamic). Until then, the only Catholics in the Middle East had been either Latin-rite (foreigners) or Maronite. The conflicts between 1840 and 1860, culminating in the massacres on Mount Lebanon and Damascus, served to reaffirm, under the aegis of international protection and intervention, the autonomy of Mount Lebanon in the context of Tanzimat, confirming a Maronite desire and serving as a basis, after the destruction of the Ottoman Empire, for the establishment of the State of Greater Lebanon under the French. Furthermore, ties with Europe, and specifically with France, fostered the development of non-Arab nationalism under Maronite hegemony (FIRRO, 2002; HAKIM, 2013; KAUFMAN, 2014). Western education, through missionaries or local agents, was a decisive aspect of this process, and at the beginning of the 20th century, literacy was almost universal among Maronites, unlike other communities, Christian or not (LONGVA, 2012).

One must bear in mind that religion in the Ottoman Empire (and in many cases, in the contemporary Middle East) is quite different from a contemporary context in which individuals are shaken and sometimes uprooted from an assigned social belonging and urged to actively identify with one cult or faith available in the spiritual and social "market", sometimes dissolving these phenomena in a literally transnational and "cross-cultural" movement (ROY, 2014).[14]

In the Ottoman Empire, religion was a cultural and social marker that is often divorced from faith and practice.[15] It is significant that Protestant missions in the Middle East failed to win many converts (MAKDISI,

14. This type of identification is the opposite of social contexts in which the identification of an individual is a social marker that, in the end, does not need to be linked to faith (the case of the communist Shiite, the "atheist Protestant" or "secular Jew"), but in a "civic religion" (as in the Roman Empire), merely social or nominal - see the charge that "nominal Catholics" are not "true" Christians, or the more extreme charge of evangelicals that "traditional" Christians are only nominal Christians, and the accusation by Salafists / Wahhabis that all other Muslims are unfaithful (kufar or...).

2011). As we have seen, in the Ottoman Empire, as well as in many contemporary situations, religious belonging is "a matter of fact". Conversion is the exception, not the norm. It is, therefore, perfectly possible for a Turk to remain a Muslim even though she drinks alcohol, does not pray and does not don the hijab, or that an Israeli remains a Jew even though he thinks, like the founders of the State of Israel, that the Bible is a national epic, closer to myth than historical reality – even though fundamentalists of all stripes would staunchly deny legitimacy to this "ecumenical" identities in the public space.

The challenge of maintaining the territorial integrity of an extensive political unit, characterized by a multireligious and multiethnic population, is faced by most Empires. They search for an elusive formula that would maintain social contentment and political stability, ensure constant tax collection and military conscription, and garner allegiance.

The Ottoman Empire was no different in this sense. For a long time, its political and economic structure made it a formidable contender for supremacy in the European stage. The rise of industrial capitalism, nationalism, and the modern, rational bureaucratic apparatus (in the Weberian sense) and military encroachment and cultural challenge instigated a vigorous response that transformed the structure of the Ottoman State. Even if ultimately the survival of the Ottoman Empire rested on the European balance of power, the Tanzimat gave it a new lease on life. Yet the paradoxes of Ottomanism as a new overarching political identity would not be unraveled until its utter dissolution during World War I and its tragic consequences for the Ottoman Middle East.

As noted, one of the main features of the Tanzimat reforms lay in law and the juridical status of non-Moslems, and the minorities were a central component of the institutional and economic modernization of the Empire and of its international relations. The military conflicts between the Empire and the great European powers shaped the course of nationalist movements in Eastern Europe and the Middle East (including episodes of ethnic cleansing and forced migrations), the sectarian conflicts in Lebanon and the Balkans, and ultimately played an essential role in the creation of Greater Lebanon in 1920. We hope that further studies of the intricate intermingling of religion and power in International Relations seriously and critically reconsider the crucial role of religions identities in the construction of the modern international states system.

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Between a Traumatic Past and an Uncertain Future: a study on the representations of the Ottoman defeat in the Balkan War (1912-1913)

Entre un pasado traumático y un futuro incierto: un estudio sobre las representaciones de la derrota otomana en la guerra de los Balcanes (1912-1913)

Entre um passado traumático e um futuro incerto: um estudo sobre as representações da derrota otomana na Guerra dos Balcãs (1912-1913)

Edmar Avelar Sena
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ABSTRACT

The defeat in the Balkan War (1912-1913) was a critical moment for the Ottoman Empire. It was a traumatic event that challenged the established principles and projects and initiated a period of profound uncertainty regarding the future of the Empire. The article seeks to analyze some of the representations about the trauma of the defeat and the future of the Ottoman Empire through the editorials of an Ottoman newspaper, *La Jeune Turquie*, which was published in Paris during the conflict. The intention is not to present a detailed and comprehensive picture of the various narratives about the conflict but to assess some of the impasses about the event. More specifically, we seek to present the Balkan War as a liminal period. It was a traumatic experience that constituted a rearrangement of existing tendencies, unveiling new expectations for the future. The argument presented here is that more than a "point of no return," the defeat brought a new horizon of expectations on the Ottoman leaders.

Keywords: Ottoman Empire. Balkan Wars. Nationalism.

RESUMEN

La derrota en la Guerra de los Balcanes (1912-1913) fue un momento crítico para el Imperio Otomano. Fue un evento traumático que desafió los principios y proyectos establecidos e inició un período de profunda incertidumbre

sobre el futuro del Imperio. El artículo busca analizar algunas de las representaciones sobre el trauma de la derrota y el futuro del Imperio Otomano a través de las editoriales de un periódico otomano, La Jeune Turquie, que se publicó en París durante el conflicto. La intención no es presentar una imagen detallada y completa de las diversas narrativas sobre el conflicto, sino evaluar algunos de los impases sobre el evento. Más específicamente, buscamos presentar la Guerra de los Balcanes como un período liminal. Fue una experiencia traumática que constituyó un reordenamiento de las tendencias existentes, desvelando nuevas expectativas para el futuro. El argumento que aquí se presenta es que más que un "punto sin retorno", la derrota trajo un nuevo horizonte de expectativas a los líderes otomanos.

Palabras clave: Imperio Otomano. Guerras Balcánicas. Nacionalismo.

RESUMO

A derrota na Guerra dos Balcãs (1912-1913) foi um momento crítico para o Império Otomano. Foi um evento traumático que desafiou os princípios e projetos estabelecidos e deu início a um período de profunda incerteza quanto ao futuro do Império. O artigo busca analisar algumas das representações sobre o trauma da derrota e o futuro do Império Otomano por meio dos editoriais de um jornal otomano, La Jeune Turquie, publicado em Paris durante o conflito. A intenção não é apresentar um quadro detalhado e abrangente das várias narrativas sobre o conflito, mas avaliar alguns dos impasses sobre o evento. Mais especificamente, procuramos apresentar a Guerra dos Balcãs como um período liminar. Foi uma experiência traumática que constituiu um rearranjo de tendências existentes, desvelando novas expectativas para o futuro. O argumento aqui apresentado é que mais do que um "ponto sem volta", a derrota trouxe um novo horizonte de expectativas para os líderes otomanos.

Palavras-chave: Império Otomano. Guerras Balcânicas. Nacionalismo.

Introduction

The Balkan War (1912-1913), a conflict that involved the Ottoman Empire and the Balkan League, was one of the main events that preceded the Great War. The conflict's outcome was disastrous for the Ottoman Empire, which lost most of the remaining territorial possessions on the European continent. The fighting broke out on October 8, 1912, with Montenegro's declaration of independence. The crisis deepened rapidly, and soon the other three states became involved in the conflict. On June 10, 1913, the London Treaty was signed, marking the end of the war between the Ottoman Empire and the Balkan League (YOLCU, 2015). However, the conflict continued between Bulgaria and the other states over the division of the conquered territory. In this scenario, the Ottoman Empire had a brief involvement, regaining Adrianopolis's strategic city (Edirne) in July 1913 (YOLCU, 2015).

The Balkan War was a critical moment for the Ottoman Empire. It was a traumatic event that challenged the principles and projects hitherto in force and opened a period of profound uncertainty regarding the future of the Empire. The effects of the war were not limited to the Empire's international relations but also impacted its domestic politics. In January 1913, a coup d'état brought the Committee of Union and Prog-

ress (CUP) to power, imposing a one-party government and altering the political dynamics established with the Young Turk Revolution in 1908 (YOLCU, 2015). In this scenario, political leaders faced the challenge of reestablishing the principles that guaranteed the cohesion of the Ottoman political community, threatened by the emergence of new separatist movements and the aggressiveness of the Great Powers.

The Ottoman Empire's traditional historiography presents the defeat as a crucial moment for the rise of Turkish nationalism (YOLCU, 2015). According to this historiography, the defeat imposed a new reality on the leaders of the Ottoman Empire, who were forced to abandon the Ottoman project and to adopt a new national project centered on the ethnic cleavage. This perspective, however, is not a consensus in historiography. Many historians are more reticent about the triumph of Turkish nationalism in the post-war period. For many, other projects were equally, if not more, important (GINIO, 2005).

In light of this, the article seeks to analyze some of the representations about the trauma of the defeat and the future of the Ottoman Empire through the editorials of an Ottoman newspaper, *La Jeune Turquie*, which was published in Paris during the conflict. The intention is not to present a detailed and comprehensive picture of the various narratives about the conflict but to assess some of the impasses about the event. More specifically, we seek to present the Balkan War as a liminal period. It was a traumatic experience that constituted a rearrangement of existing tendencies, unveiling new expectations for the future. The argument presented here is that more than a "point of no return," the defeat brought a new horizon of expectations on the Ottoman leaders.

The defeat led to the advent of an uncertain scenario concerning the identity of the political community. In the Ottoman Empire, the cultural identities were fluid, multiethnic, and multireligious. With the emergence of nationalist movements in the Empire, including Turkish nationalism, this condition was disputed. In the decades following the end of the Great World War, the implantation of Turkish nationalism aimed to overcome the identity's fluidity of the Empire and promote the idea of a nation-state. The Turkish State, under the leadership of Kemal Attaturk, sought to affirm its modern and secular character through reforms that brought the country closer to the West, or to the idea of the West as was imagined by Republican leaders. In this process, the religious dimension was separated from the public space. In the early years of the republic, the narrative about Turkish identity incorporated three crucial aspects into its core: secularization, nationalism, and westernization. Turkish leaders sough to distance themselves from the legacy of the Ottoman Empire, and, with this, they refuted symbols and identities linked to the Ottoman period.

This article seeks to look at the Imperial period from a perspective that recognizes the ideological complexity of that period. The main objective is to evaluate how different identities and projects, more than being excluded, overlap each other in a scenario characterized by a plurality of voices.

Trends in the historiography on the relationship between nationalism (s) in the Ottoman Empire and the Balkan War (1912-1913)

When looking at the past to make sense of events, different narratives are possible, and, as a result, events can be organized in different ways, given different meanings. As Nader Sohrabi argues, it is possible to note two classic narratives about the Balkan War, reproduced, to some extent, by the nationalist discourses of the countries involved in the conflict. On the one hand, there are those narratives that blame the CUP's "Turkish chauvinism" as a factor that precipitated nationalist reactions from ethnic and religious minorities. On the other hand, there is the understanding that Turkish nationalism was a reaction to minority uprisings and not its cause (SOHRABI, 2018, p.2). This perspective suggests that the Empire's successive wars imposed a new cultural and demographic reality favorable to the emergence of Turkish nationalism (SOHRABI, 2018, p.4).

According to Ramazan Öztan (2018), the historiography of the Ottoman Empire at the beginning of the 20th century acted more as a national historiography of Turkey (ÖZTAN, 2018, p .65-66). Öztan argues that it is possible to identify an inclination of Turkish historiography of the early years of the Republic to see the Ottoman Empire's History from a teleological perspective. For this historiography, the traumatic experience of defeat brought an end to the Ottomanist project, precipitating a hegemonic project linked to Turkish ethnic nationalism (ÖZTAN, 2018, p.66). The traditional narrative portrays this event as a mythical foundational moment: a "point of no return" in Turkish nationalism's ascendancy. It was an episode that foreshadowed the Empire's imminent collapse (ÖZTAN, 2018, p.66).

The theme of the significance of defeat as a foundational moment is recovered more nuanced in more contemporary studies. Umut Uzer (2016), for example, argues that the politicized awareness of Turkish identity was a reaction to the spread of separatist nationalisms throughout the 19th century (UZER, 2016, p.7). The author considers that the rise of Turkish nationalism was caused by the belligerence of Serbian, Bulgarian, Albanian, and Arab national identities, and the Ottoman defeats in the Balkans. Uzer emphasizes the failure of 1913 as a pivotal moment for Turkish nationalism. According to Uzer:

> While some stirrings of Turkish nationalism existed earlier, it would not be incorrect to say that Turkish nationalism started to become an influential ideology only after the Balkan Wars of 1912–13. Only gradually did it penetrate the minds of the intellectuals and the masses (UZER, 2016, p. 7).

It is possible to see a teleological direction in this narrative about Turkish national identity. According to Uzer, the defeat imposed an unavoidable reality for the Ottoman leaders "as most of these territories were lost to new nationalist states, the establishment of a Turkish national state became the logical end result for Turks" (UZER, 2016, p16).

This interpretation, although widespread, is not consensual in historiography. Some works contest this view by establishing an opposite causal relationship: the centralizing and homogenizing "turquifying"

project promoted by the Ottoman leaders caused the reaction of many ethnic and religious communities (ZEINE, 1973). These are works that generally address the History of national movements from the perspective of different ethnic groups.

Recent historiography criticizes both of the above perspectives because these narratives give precedence to the ethnic component in the discourses and political projects at the beginning of the 20th century. For example, Eyal Ginio (2005) argues that the religious framework gained importance in opposition to other cultural aspects in the official speeches of the Empire after the conflict in 1913. For Ginio, the war was a historical inflection moment that marked a change in the CUP attitude. During and after the defeat in 1913, the transition from a secular Ottomanism to an Islamic-Ottomanism is noticeable (GINIO, 2005, p.159). According to Ginio:

> The Balkan wars proved the frailty of the secular Ottoman identity. The failure of an Ottoman collective identity spelled the end of the imagined secular 'Ottoman nation'. Nevertheless the wars emphasized the vitality of Islam and its fundamental linkage and potential for the Ottoman dynasty (GINIO, 2005, p. 177).

This reading points to a different direction from those adopted by more traditional approaches. However, Ginio's argument shares with the above perspectives the principle that it is possible to point out the Ottoman Empire's hegemonic ideology after the war. Other authors, however, prefer to point out the uncertain, flexible, and even "experimental" character of political and cultural identities in the early 20th century in the Ottoman Empire.

Eissenstat (2015), for example, argues that, since the 19th century, the political and intellectual elites of the Empire sought to deal with the problems arising from international competition and the increase of internal divisions based on a modernization project that promoted, among others aspects, the construction of a shared "national Ottoman" feeling (EISSENSTAT, 2015). For Eissenstat, this project was a reaction of the elites to an adverse scenario and had practical and instrumental foundations. The author explains the Empire's vacillating and contradictory approach concerning defensive ideologies and the proposed political community project.

Despite pointing out certain convergences between the centralization process and "turquificant" measures promoted by the leaders, Eissenstat recognizes that the loss of Balkan territory and the influx of Muslim refugees favored the tendency to characterize the "Ottoman nation" in religious terms, without, however, abandon the project of "civil nationalism" (EISSENSTAT, 2015, p.458). Eissenstat endorses Ginio's argument by arguing that religious discourse was strategic in propaganda promoted by the Empire. However, Eissenstat emphasizes the Ottoman Empire's adaptive character. According to the author, since the 19th century, the Ottoman leadership has adopted speeches and projects pragmatically to respond to new challenges.

Nader Sohrabi also employs an instrumental and pragmatic approach to identities to understand states' directions during and after the Balkan War. For Sohrabi, the salience of national identities needs to be

understood both as a cause and as an outcome of the conflict. According to the author, security challenges, driven by centrifugal forces, led to a centralizing and homogenizing project in the early 20th century. However, this project was not openly "turquifying" (SOHRABI, 2018, p. 4-5).

Sohrabi moves away from an essentialist view of identities and argues that the fluidity and malleability of identities in the early 20th century allowed political actors to exploit identities in order to guarantee political gains in a scenario of growing competition (SOHRABI, 2016, p. 32).In this scenario, elites and intellectuals were crucial in the process of politicizing ethnic identities. But Sohrabi argues that the war experience was the main factor that explains the national identities consolidation. According to Sohrabi:

> (...) in an atmosphere of increasing violence, threat of war, and the possibility of diminishing territorial claims, nothing fixed identities more firmly than the need for protection and allies that could secure resources needed for survival or preserving a way of life (SOHRABI, 2016, p. 33).

In opposition to Eissensat and Ginio, Sohrabi understands that CUP leaders adopted a softer version of religious discourse in the conception of "neo-Ottoman nationalism" (SOHRABI, 2018, p. 6). According to Sohrabi, there was a rearrangement of the hierarchy between the central elements of Ottoman identity, forming concentric circles whose inner circle was formed by a Turkish core. On the other hand, Islam represented a larger circle that contained the Turkish core and other Muslim ethnic groups. Finally, the Ottoman identity encompassed all communities, Muslims and non-Muslim (SOHRABI, 2018, p. 12).

Present in the argument of Sohrabi and Eissenstat, and shared to some extent by the other authors presented here, is the understanding that the centralization process promoted by the Ottoman leaders was one of the central factors in the escalation of the conflict between the Empire and the movements in search of regional autonomy. The point of disagreement is whether these measures represented a "Turkifying" project or not.

Erol Ülker (2005) draws attention to the literature's lack of agreement about what the Empire's "Turkification" process is. According to the author, the term" is used more generally as a synonym for centralization policies. However, Ülker finds evidence that after the defeat, the empire deliberately adopted "Turkification" measures in some regions. In this perspective, the Balkan War acted as a "catalyst", transforming "the already existing Turkish consciousness of Young Turks into nationalization policies" (ÜLKER, 2005, p. 622).

Besides that, Ülker argues that many approaches misread the Ottoman policies because they generalize measures implemented in a given province as evidence of a general political project. The author argues that "Young Turks employed different measures in the different regions of the empire and for the different communities" (ÜLKER, 2005, p. 622). In the Arab provinces, the tendency towards "Turkification" was less pronounced. In these regions, the Empire chose to defend a discourse of religious unity. In Anatolia, however, the "Turkification" project was much more pronounced, reflecting the notion that Anatolia was the "Turkish

homeland". In this central region, the CUP adopted explicit measures to favor the Turks and promoted forced migrations to homogenize the region (ÜLKER, 2005, p. 625).

This review intended to illustrate the diversity of interpretations about the effects of war on the rise of national movements and ideologies in the Ottoman Empire. In this sense, it is essential to assess how each discourses articulated different conceptions of political community. The argument presented here is that the study of the narratives elaborated in that period allows us to capture some of the expectations about the future, which is was intrinsically connected to how each narrative conceived the idea of political community.

Historical events as a moment of re-articulation between past and future

The study of "critical junctures" has a long tradition in the political sciences and in international relations. Traditional approaches conceive "critical junctures" as decisive moments that occur in a relatively short period of time, involving an event or a set of events, which result in profound changes, altering historical trajectories in "irreversible directions" (CAPOCCIA, 2016; HALL, 2016; MAHONEY *et al.*, 2016).

While this perspective contributes to understanding the processes of State-building, it presents some analytical dangers. One is to take critical moments as irreversible points in a teleological evolution. In other words, there is a risk of portraying these moments as events that point to an inevitable end, thereby losing the window of opportunities present in each event. It is important to remember that the chain of events considered critical is part of the rationalization effort made a posteriori by the researchers. The researchers select, among the various events that occurred in the past, those that they consider to be the most relevant and establish a connection between them. Thus, depending on the narrative proposed by the researcher, it is possible to select different events, give different meanings to them, and establish distinct connections between them.

This article aims to evaluate the Balkan War as a liminal period, characterized by a sequence of significant events that reordered social representations and generated new expectations for the future. The argument put forward is that the war experience opened a complex period, which brought out existing contradictions and engendered new tendencies, reflecting an uncertain future (ÖZTAN, 2018).

This article uses the concept of "historical event", proposed by William Sewell, to investigate the conflict's impacts on Ottoman History. According to Sewell, an event is "(1) a ramified sequence of occurrences that (2) is recognized as notable by contemporaries, and that (3) results in a durable transformation of structure". In this perspective, what distinguishes events from everyday occurrences is the significance attributed by those who experience them, directly or indirectly (BEREZIN, 2012). Significant events are generally given political and cultural significance by those who experience them. Events considered to be important are

different from the ordinary events of daily life because they are inflection points in History. Significant events become a reference in the collective perception of the passage of time (MAST, 2006, p. 117).

Sewell suggests that the expectation generated by historical events usually produces more significant events, thus creating a sequence of significant events. Still, he does not detail the links between the experienced past and the expectations engendered by historical events (BEREZIN, 2012). In this sense, this paper argues that it is essential to capture the temporal complexity of historical events to avoid teleological narratives. This article is in line with Arlette's argument that the analysis of historical events requires assessing how such events articulate past and future (FARGE, 2002).

On the one hand, the experience of events does not occur in isolation from the set of individual and collective experiences that already exist. Events happen in a context marked by "perceptions and sensitivities" established before their occurrence (FARGE, 2002). They are coded, classified, and ordered within a pre-existing broader socially representative scheme (BEREZIN, 2012, p. 620).

On the other hand, the effects of a significant event transcend the immediate temporality and change the historical context. In addition to the direct impacts on social and political relations, significant events become essential components of social representations (FARGE, 2002). As Arlette Farge observes, changing conjunctural and structural patterns involves changing expectations for the future, generating a set of new meanings and representations that guide individuals' actions and practices (FARGE, 2002). In other words, events matter, as they allow those who experience them to contemplate new relationships and connections among dimensions of social and political life. These are moments of inflection in which new possibilities and new visions of possible paths are engendered (BEREZIN, 2012, p. 620).

In this perspective, the historical event is not synonymous with isolated events or the "great deeds of great men", typical of positivist history. As the philosopher Paul Ricoeur (1992) argues, contemporary historiography has rehabilitated the event as an important dimension of History. According to Ricoeur, despite the uniqueness of each historical event, it is possible to observe in its occurrence the inflection between past and future. For individual and collective consciousness, it is in the "eventuality of the present" (*l'événementialité du présent*) that the past incorporated into the experience and the expectation of the future intersect (RICOEUR, 1992). For Ricoeur:

> The event takes place in the very constitution of historical time where the memory of what was, the expectation of what will be, and the present emergence of what we do and experience as agents and patients of History are joined (RICOEUR, 1992, p. 34)[1].

This excerpt conceives an event as the intersection of the experienced past and the expected future. This conception avoids the dangers of a teleological notion of events because it considers the possibilities at a given historical moment. The passage also draws attention to the fact that individuals are able to affect History, but, on the other hand, they are also affected by History.

1. L'événement prend place dans la constitution même du temps historique où se conjoignent la mémoire de ce qui fut, l'expectation de ce quis era et le surgissement présent de ce que nous faisons et subissons comme agentes et patients de l'histoire.

Decisively, the Balkan War was a historical event. It was a period of transformation. However, more than an irreversible moment for the countries involved, the war was a period when new expectations were created from an unprecedented and significant experience (YAVUZ, 2013). It is a liminal period[2] of reorientation of existing tendencies and the creation of new meanings that overlap with those that already existed.

In this sense, the analysis of newspapers of the time is a useful approach that allows the researcher to contemplate facets of the debate about the Empire's past and future. The study of the editorials of *La Jeune Turquie* reveals how the war experience was elaborated by a group that presented itself as a representative of Ottoman interests on French soil.

"La Jeune Turquie: Organe des Intérêts Géneraux de l'Empire Ottoman"

La Jeune Turquie (*The Young Turkey*) was a french newspaper published in Paris in which frontispice it defined itself as an "organ for the defense of the general interests of the Ottoman Empire", first published in 1910. The newspaper's issues preserved and available for consultation in The National Library of France cover the period between 1910 and 1914, suggesting that its circulation ceased at the eve of the Great War.

The defense of Ottoman Empire's interests, however, was not linked to any image of the Empire in abstract. As the title suggests, the newspaper's political affiliation was explicitly favorable to the CUP regime, implying the reproduction of images of Ottoman history that marked a deep cut with the previous Hamidian regime (1876-1909), portrayed as a period of tyranny. In this sense, in April 2, 1910 editorial:

> At the day after the magnificent effort by which Turkey freed itself from Hamidian tyranny, there was an influx of sympathies towards our country. It seemed to Europe that it found again a part of itself, or rather than this part, this member of the great European family, long paralysed, would be reborn to life. The lively and generous blood of freedom would circulate again and make Turkey a true nation among other nations![3]

With this re elaboration of the past, *La Jeune Turquie* could create a legitimacy for the CUP regime as a restoration of historical trends of the Ottoman Empire, marking an opposition to the reign of Sultan Abdül Hamid II, that would be the real exceptional moment in Ottoman history, due to its despotism incompatible with the values of the European family of nations.

In this sense, it is important to recover the late 19th century meaning of the European family of nations. This notion lays on the principle which suppose an hierarchy among nations based, in one hand, on the conscience of a moral sentiment of European societies and a normative-psychological dictum about right and wrong in civilized contemporaries and, in other hand, the consciousness of that moral sentiment and civilizational standard as objectively true for everybody. Martti Koskenniemi (2004) argues that this conscience/consciousness laid at the origins of International Law in the 19th century and, as a

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2. According to the anthropologist Victor Turner, a liminal period is a complex and dramatic period of time in which long-lasting processes and trends are succeeded by "social dramas", which "made explicit many of the contradictions hidden in these processes and generate new myths, symbols, and paradigms" (TURNER, 1974, p. 99).

3. Au landemain du magnifique effort par lequel la Turquie s'affranchit de la tyrannie hamidienne, ce fut vers notre pays un afflux de sympathies. Il samblait à l'Europe qu'elle retrouvait une partie d'elle-même, ou plutôt que cette partie, ce membre de la grande famille européenne, longtemps paralysé, renaisait à la vie. Le sang vivace et généreux de la liberté allait y circuler à nouveau et faire de la Turquie une nation véritable parmi les autres nations !

consequence, as long as International Law was a product of European civilizational process, the "civilized" category could not be completely applied outside of that region.

Koskenniemi's approach usefully shed light to the ambiguous status of the late Ottoman Empire towards Europe. Although it is considered that the Ottomans was formally admitted as a part of the European family of nations with the signature of the Treaty of Paris, in 1856, when the Ottoman Sultan was recognized as equal to European monarchs, the Ottoman Empire was never in fact accepted as an equal member, remaining as an "other" by which Europeans differentiated themselves as a collective identity (GÖL, 2003, p. 1).

It is reasonable to suppose that *La Jeune Turquie*' evocation of the image of Ottoman Empire as a part of, a member of "the great European family" was a statement towards French public opinion of the civilized conscious/consciousness shared by Ottomans as much as Europeans. But it is also reasonable to suppose the perception of the difference between Ottomans and Europeans due to the own necessity of an organ for the defense of the general interests of the Ottoman Empire. It is found in the same editorial cited above:

> To satisfy one, to fight the others, our national press, publishing in the Empire, could not serve because insufficiently read, or rather not read at all beyond the frontiers of our country.
> [...]
> The need for an organ for the defense of the general interests of the Ottoman Empire was essential.
> The road was therefore clear, we could embark on it without fear, there was a beautiful patriotic work to be completed. And this is how we were led to found La Jeune Turquie.
> La Jeune Turquie will be the organ for the defense of the general interests of the Ottoman Empire. Flag bearer, in France, of our beautiful country, it will make the flag of the Fatherland float high.
> [...]
> To the foreign press, which often, if not always, judges the Eastern question in its own way and according to its various ambitions, La Jeune Turquie will reclaim that there is in this Eastern Question an Ottoman point of view which must take precedence over the others.[4]

Considering the exposure, how could *La Jeune Turquie* be interpreted as a research object? It must be said that the newspaper does not fit sufficiently well in the tradition of the Ottoman francophone press. The notion of an Ottoman francophone press comprehends a set of titles and publications edited and published in French language in Ottoman territory. It refers to an editorial tradition in the Empire with the first Ottoman regular journal in French language established by French journalist Alexandre Blacque at Smyrna (Izmir) - *Le Courrier de Smyrne,* between 1828 to 1831. *Le Courrier* was followed in time by other titles in French which aimed to defend interests of the French colonies in Ottoman territories (BARUH, 2017, p.299). However, even the Ottoman government contributed to the establishment of an Ottoman francophone press, with the publication of the official journal, *Takvim-i Vekayi*, in French with title of *Moniteur ottoman,* between 1831 and 1843 (BARUH, 2017, p.300). Important to say that, as time went by, the francophone press in Ottoman Empire became not only

4. Pour satisfaire l'une, pour combattre les autres, notre presse nationale, se publiant dans l'Empire, ne pouvait sufire parce qu'insuffisamment lue, ou plutôt pas lus du tout au-delà des frontière de notre pays.
[...]
La nécessité d'un organe de défense des intérêts généraux de l'Empire Ottoman s'imposait.
La route était donc libre, nous pouvions nous y engager sans crainte, il y avait là une belle oeuvre patriotique àa ccomplir. Et c'est ainsi que nous fûmes conduits à fonder La Jeune Turquie.
La Jeune Turquie sera l'organe de défense des intérêts géneraux de l'Empire Ottoman. Porte-Drapeau, en France, de notre beau pays, elle fera flotter haut l'oriflamme de la Patrie.
[...]
A la presse étrangère qui, souvent, pour ne pas dire toujours, juge la question d'Orient à sa façon et selon ses ambitions diverses, La Jeune Turquie rapellera qu'il y a dans cette Question d'Orient un point de vue ottoman qui doit primer tour les autres.

the press read by French colonies in Ottoman territories, but also the press read by Ottoman francophone elites, until the outbreak of the Great War (ATEȘ, 2015).

In the case of *La Jeune Turquie*, although it's records were catalogued by The National Library of France as *Ottoman francophone press*, it must be considered that the journal was not published in Ottoman territories, but in Paris, aiming to dialogue with the Parisian ottoman colony and with the French public opinion. This aspect is meaningful considering the importance of Paris as the capital city of the expansionist French Third Republic (1870-1940) and, as a consequence, the capital city of a rival empire of the Ottomans in the age of the imperialist competition and the capital city of one of the Great Powers prior to the Great War.

As *porte-drapeau* of Ottoman interests towards French public opinion, *La Jeune Turquie* was clearly an unofficial journal. Beyond that, the newspaper also was directed to the Ottoman community in Paris. According to Klaus Kreiser (2000, 333-336), Parisian *belle époque* exerted a fascination over the modernized Ottoman elite that could be noticed in writings of many Ottoman intellectuals of that time. There are many reasons to justify the phenomena, which could be summarized in three main factors. Firstly, the role played by French language in some *ethos* of Ottoman elite. In addition to the fact that French was the language of access to the highest positions in Ottoman bureaucracy, the main newspapers read by Constantinople elite were published in French.

Secondly, it was above all to Paris where it used to go Ottoman intellectuals and students in their formative years, often with Ottoman government patronage, aiming to form human resources needed for the Empire to promote its modernisation process. Such politics began with the *Tanzimat*, in 1836, and lasted until the Great War. Finally, it was in Paris where the Young Turks movement was formed in opposition to the Hamidian regime. In Paris, according to Erdal Kaynar (2012, p.31) the westernised Ottoman elite, among them the Young Turks, could establish "a bond in world scale" with European elites. The fascination with bourgeois way of life of the *belle époque* cultivated by Ottoman elite made Paris the Mecca of the modern world for westernised Ottomans (ibidem, p.32).

The establishment of a journal for the defense of Ottoman interests in Paris had particular cultural sense, located at the highly westernized Young Turk's images of modernity, as much as an strategic effort to intervene in European public opinion - even if limited to metropolitan France - in order to promote, in the terms of the cited above, the Ottoman point of view of the Eastern Question. *La Jeune Turquie's* discourse could be, therefore, understood as a discourse negotiated *in-between*, which means, according to Homi Bhabha (1994, p.29, emphasis added),

> The contribution of negotiation is to display the 'in-between' of this crucial argument; it is *not* self contradictory, but *significantly performs* [...] *the problems of judgement and identification that inform the political space of its enunciation.*

La Jeune Turquie and the Balkan Wars (1912-1913)

In this section, it will be discussed how the liminal event of the Balkan Wars was represented in the pages of *La Jeune Turquie*, highlighting discursive cleavages produced by the radical transformation of the journal's political space of enunciation due to Ottoman defeat for the Balkan League.

The Balkan Wars implied the almost complete withdrawal of the Ottomans from Europe. In the following weeks to the war declaration by Montenegro in October 8, 1912, and the formation of the Balkan League, in which joined Bulgaria, Greece and Serbia, in October 17, the Ottoman borders in Europe withdraw until the lines of Çatalca, thereabout only 60 kilometers from Constantinople. In Paris, the Ottoman confidence on the war, expressed in *La Jeune Turquie* issue of October 9, 1912, gave place to images of terrifying events and the Ottoman defeat in the following issues. In an editorial published in November 14, 1912, only a month since the beginning of the war, it is written:

> So, to transform the two hundred thousand men of the ordu of Thrace into a nameless mob, to completely sweep away two provinces where only Adrianople and Scutari today defend the honor of the Ottoman arms, to make tremble the successor of Mahomet II [sic] in Constantinople, it only took a month!
> Today the Ottoman soldiers, without bread, without cartridges, without leaders, shivering, fleeing with haggard eyes the plains where the Balkan guns spit an invisible death whisper superstifiously that the times have come and that, if they want to rest in the ground of Islam, it will be prudent of them to seek their last asylum under the funeral cemeteries of Asia. Today, an immense and pitiful exodus sends back to Constantinople a terrified crowd and transforms the capital into a vast encampment of nomads.[5]

It is not the objective of this present work to evaluate the horrors of the war. However, it is noticeable that terrifying descriptions of the war such as cited above, occupy the journal pages in the first weeks of the conflict. According to Y. Doğan Çetinkaya (2014), images of atrocities in the battlefield compose an *atrocity propaganda* strategy, through which it was aimed to mobilize and the nationalisation of the masses as a bet for reversing the low morale of the Ottomans after de defeat.

Based on Çetinkaya's (2014) approach, which Ottoman nation was mobilised during Balkan Wars in the pages of La Jeune Turquie? It is meaningful to observe that, with the outbreak of the war, the journal did not apply the term *nation* to designate the Ottomans or the Empire. The word often used was *homeland* (*patrie*) and that was because the journal sustained the principle of *Ottomanism* in order to justify the Empire's territorial integrity.

The Ottomanist discourse was already presented in the October 9, 1912 editorial, at the eve of the war, when *La Jeune Turquie* affirmed that "the [European] cabinets well know that [...] there are as much Christians as Muslims among the citizens who would defend the Ottoman homeland".[6] More enthusiastically, in the editorial of October 30, 1912,

> Should we believe, along with many war correspondents, that the Christians have brought an element of weakness and disorganization into our

5. Ainsi donc, pour transformer en une cohue sans nom les deux cent mille hommes de l'ordou de Thrace, pour balayer entièrement deux provinces où seules Andrinople et Scutari défendent aujoud'hui l'honneur des armes ottomanes, poru faire trembler dans Constantinople le successeur de Mahomet II, il a suffu d'un mois! Aujoud'hui les soldats ottomans, sans pain, sans cartouches, sans chefs, grelottants, fuyant avec des yeux hagards les plaines où les canons balkaniques crachent une mort invisible murmurent superstifieusement que les temps sont venus et que, s'ils veulent reposer en terre d'Islam, in sera prudent de leur part de chercher leur dernier asile sous les cippes fun´raires des cimerières d'Asie. Aujoud'hui, une immense et pitoyable exode fair refluer vers Constantinople une foule terrifiée et transforme la capitale n un vaste campement de nomades.

6. Les cabinets savent bien [...] qu'il y a d'ailleurs autant de chrétiens que de musulmans parmi les citoyens qui défendraient maintenant la patrie ottomane.

7. Faut-il croire, avec de nombreux correspondants de guerre, que les chrétiens ont apporté dans notre vaillante armée un élément de faiblesse et de désorganisation? Jusqu'à la preuve contraire nous nois y refusons. L'admirable élan avec lequel toutes les nationalités, toutes les religions ont contribué à l'organisation des secours aux blessés prouve que la belle théorie de l'ottomanisme a porté ses fruits et que pour tous, Arméniens, Grecs, Arabes ou Turcs, il n'y a maintenant qu'une préoccupation: La patrie est en danger!

8. Ogni male non vien per nuocere, disent les Italiens: Puisse ce proverbe se réaliser dans la Turquie de demain! Peut-être d'abord l'amputation actuelle - malgré tous nos regrets - contribuera-t-elle à faciliter la réalisation de l'unité nationale et en même temps celle des réformes qui s'imposent si nous voulons faire de l'Empire un État fort et prospère. Déjà, pour viriliser nos âmes énervées par l'influence néfaste de Byzance, un ancien ministre propose d'enlever à Constantinople son titre de capitale et de transporter le coeur de la Turquie à l'intérieur, au centre du pays, sous un climat plus rude, dans le milieu le plus sain des laboureurs que seuls font les peuples grands et les armées invincibles. Des Turcs, et non des Levantins, de citoyens et non des mercantis, des soldats et non des fonctionnaires, voilà ce qu'il nous fault. Il faudra que les hommes d'Etat de demain, reprenant les belles théories de l'ottomanisme travaillent à unir Arméniens, Arabes et Turc dans le giron de la patrie mutilée. Ils y réussiront par l'éducation civique du peuple, que suivront aussitôt des réformes libérales. Et immédiatement après, ils devront s'occuper de la mise en valeur du pays, seule capable de nous rendre riche et forts.

9. Panser les plaies, réorganiser et mettre en valeur ce qui nous reste de l'Empire, cette tâche a de quoi permettre à nos hommes d'Etat de monter leurs facultés et se consoler en prouvant que, même après cette guerre désastreuse et cette amputtation, la Turquie peut encore faire figure dans le monde.

10. Là, toutes les populations sont de même religion et il sera facile de les concilier, en leur faisant comprendre leur intérêt commun. Peut-être même – quelque cruel nous soit cet aveu – la perte du tiers de notre Empire sera-t-elle pour nous un soulagement. Nos provinces d'Europe étaient, en effect, une lourde charge qui, sans nous garantir aucun profit, coûtait beaucoup d'efforts et d'attentions, tout en nous aliénant une bonne partie de l'opinion occidentale.

valiant army? Until proven otherwise, we refuse to do so. The admirable enthusiasm with which all nationalities and all religions have contributed to the organization of relief for the wounded proves that the fine theory of Ottomanism has borne fruit and that for everyone, Armenians, Greeks, Arabs or Turks, it now there is only one preoccupation: The homeland is in danger![7]

However, as long as the defeat became an irreversible reality for the Ottomans, a profound inflexion marked *La Jeune Turquie*'s discourse. The prior enthusiastic Ottomanism gave place to a wide and ambiguous horizon of expectations, marked by a rage of future possibilities for the Empire and the Ottoman homeland. Such inflection firstly appeared in the journal's pages in the editorial of January 22, 1913. The Ottomanism started to gain a new shape, hanging between a Turkism and a wilder moderniser allegiance to the Empire:

> *Ogni male non vien per nuocere*, say the Italians: may this proverb come true in the Turkey of tomorrow! Perhaps first of all the current amputation - despite all our regrets - will help to facilitate the achievement of national unity and at the same time that of the reforms which are necessary if we want to make the Empire a strong and prosperous state. Already, to virilize our souls irritated by the harmful influence of Byzantium, a former minister proposes to remove Constantinople from the title of capital and to transport the heart of Turkey to the interior, to the center of the country, under a harsher climate, in the healthiest environment of laborers in which great peoples and invincible armies are made. Turks, not Levantines, citizens and not merchants, soldiers and not officials, this is what we need.
> It will be necessary that the statesmen of tomorrow, taking up the beautiful theories of *Ottomanism*, work to unite Amenians, Arabs and Turks in the bosom of the mutilated homeland. They will succeed through the civic education of the people, which will immediately follow liberal reforms. And immediately afterwards, they will have to take care of the development of the pause, the only one capable of making us rich and strong.[8]

The April 22 editorial assessed the effects of the war, demanding the leaders an effort to lead the Empire towards a normality state. At that time, the Ottomans needed to strive to "Healing the wounds, reorganizing and enhancing what remains of the Empire (…)" (LA JEUNE TURQUIE, April 22, 1913)[9]. According to the editorial, the priority should be to preserve what had left of the Empire, leveraging all its possibilities. There was an attempt to present a favorable depiction of the conjuncture, despite the defeat. The defeat made it more homogeneous and, therefore, easier to manage. The image shown by the newspaper was of the "amputation of a sick member" which would allow the Empire to restore its vitality:

> There, all the populations are of the same religion and it will be easy to reconcile them, by making them understand their common interest. Perhaps even - however cruel this admission may be - the loss of a third of our Empire will be a relief for us. Our European provinces were, in effect, a heavy burden which, without guaranteeing us any profit, cost a lot of effort and attention, while alienating us much of Western opinion (LA JEUNE TURQUIE, April 22, 1913)[10].

After the signing of the London treaty on June 10, the war was over for the Ottoman Empire. However, the conflict continued among the Balkan countries, and the Ottoman leaders were still facing an uncertain

scenario. There was a fear that the conflict could bring the Great Powers into the region. In this scenario, the editorial expresses an apprehension about a possible division of the Empire into spheres of influence by the European powers. According to the editorial of July 9:

> They are already talking about areas of influence, the Muscovite is already eyeing Armenia, England is taking up Mehmed-Ali's dream and Germany is thinking of carving out the lion's share between Alexandretta and the Persian Gulf. As for France, threatened by seeing its rivals share this magnificent Empire which was undoubtedly sovereign twenty years ago, it can only remember that Lebanon still considers it as its first protector (LA JEUNE TURQUIE, July 9, 1913)[11].

On the other hand, the uncertain scenario also led to more optimistic expectations[12]. The editorial pointed to the possibility of the Empire taking back the lost territory in the face of the enemies' potential weakening. Since the crisis had not yet resolved, chance and the imponderable could intervene in the course of events. The conflict among the adversaries was portrayed as an unexpected opportunity. According to the editorial, the ottomans should:

> (..) never be despaired because the yesterday's ruthless winner can be betrayed by fortune, and tomorrow lose, by force, what he conquered by force (...). Now, by a sort of miracle, circumstances offered Turkey an unexpected opportunity for revenge (LA JEUNE TURQUIE, July 9, 1913)[13].

It is important to observe that the optimism was not limited to the possibility of retaking the lost territories, but it was related to the expectations that the Empire would resume its protagonism in the Mediterranean. The edition of September 10 expresses the acknowledgment of the impossibility of recovering the lost territory. But according to the editorial, the Empire could flourish again, even if the territories were not recovered:

> The Ottoman Empire, diminished but concentrated, amputated but more homogeneous, returned from its illusions about the guarantees of integrity, supported by an educated army and stationed modern battleships, will not only be able to defend its heritage, but will also play the role of a real power in the depths of the Mediterranean (LA JEUNE TURQUIE, September 24, 1913).[14]

In the editorials, the optimism about the Empire's future was conditional: optimism echoed the possibility of change and not the existence of a favorable international environment. The editorial presents a narrative that highlights both the need for development and modernization and the affirmation of patriotism. These two facets were intertwined in the conception of a strong national identity, as can be seen in the excerpt:

> Of course, I don't think we should be xenophobic, but let us be careful that the flag follows the goods, the guns the rail and that the battleships are ready to enter the ports abroad (LA JEUNE TURQUIE, September 10, 1913)[15].

On the other hand, the editorials' representation of the international situation outlines a very adverse picture. It is possible to observe the feeling of an imminent threat. The Empire could rise again if, and only if, it carried out the much-needed modernization. Otherwise, the situation was one of extreme vulnerability. The danger of separatism and the inter-

11. Déjà l'on parle de zones d'influence, déjà le Moscovite couve des yeux l'Armenie, l'Angleterre reprend le rêve de Mehmed-Ali et l'Allemagne songe à se tailler la part du lion entre Alexandrette et le Golfe Persique. Quant à la France, ménacée de voir ses rivaux ou émules se partager ce magnifique Empire où son influence était incontestablement souveraine il y a mins de vingt ans, elle ne peut que se rappeler que le Liban la considère toujours comme sa protectrice au premier chef. Et c'est ainsi que les soldats jouent aux dés le marteau du Prophète avant même que le martyr n'ait rendu le dernier soupir.

12. It is not possible to infer whether the authors sincerely believed in this possibility or whether it was just propaganda. Still, it is important to understand how the newspaper sought to frame the situation to the European public and how it signified the present and the future.

13. ne faut jamais désespérer et que l'impitoyable vainqueur d'hier peut être trahi par la fortune à son tour et perdre demain par la force ce qu'il a conquis par la force. (…) A cette nouvelle, tous les coeurs ottomans ont frémi. Voilà que, par une sorte de miracle, les circonstances offraient à la Turquie une occasion inespérée de revanche.

14. L'Empire Ottoman, diminué mais concentré, amputé mais plus homogène, revenu de ses illusions sur les garanties d'integrité, appuyé sur une armée instruite et garé par des cuirassés modernes, pourra non seulement défendre son patrimoine, mais encore jouer le rôle d'une véritable puissance au fond de la Méditerraanée.

15. Certes, je ne pense pas que nous devions nous montrer xénophobes, mais prenons garde que le pavillon suit la marchandise, les canons le rail et que les cuirassés sont prêts á entrer dans les ports concédés à l'étranger.

vention of the Great Powers are present in the editorials. For example, the editorial of July 9 presents a situation marked by challenges and dangers:

> No doubt separatist tendencies could well manifest themselves in certain provinces, supported and corrupted by foreign gold. There is no doubt that there is no shortage of unscrupulous financiers and statesmen who believed they were accomplishing a fine feat in blaming Turkey's name on many nations (LA JEUNE TURQUIE, July 9, 1913)[16].

On the eve of the Great War, the editorial of January 14 presents a bleak and pessimistic scenario for the Empire. There is a sense of urgency regarding the implementation of modernization policies. The concern is not limited to the fear of the emergence of new separatist movements in the remaining provinces, stimulated by the great powers. The very core of the Empire, Asia Minor, was in danger of being occupied by foreign forces:

> We must understand, ourselves, that it is both our duty and our interest to regenerate our provinces of Asia Minor as quickly as possible, under penalty of seeing them follow the fate of most of our possessions from Europe[17] (LA JEUNE TURQUIE, January 14, 2014).

Almost tragically, it is possible to see a sentiment that the moment of rupture was close. The apprehension was a product not of a prophecy but of an assessment that the Ottoman Empire was a vulnerable State in an unstable international system. For the editorial of January, "the occupation and partition of Asia Minor could quickly follow the first incident that would ignite the powder" (LA JEUNE TURQUIE, January 14, 1914)[18]. It does not mean that the Ottomans were convinced that the Empire would come to an end soon. However, the expectations of the future were uncertain more than ever.

Conclusion

Based on the assumption that people act according to how they interpret reality, making sense of historical events is a fundamental element of the analysis of critical junctures. It is important to note that the concatenation of events does not lead to a sequence of "points of no return". As much as the events presented in this paper are undoubtedly crucial for the construction of Turkish nationalism, this does not mean that the individuals who experienced these events perceived them according to the nationalist narrative constructed years later. Indeed, it is possible to find in the Ottoman defeat "objective" facts that help explain the collapse of the Empire (ÖZTAN, 2018, p.67). Bearing this in mind, it is crucial to the researchers to understand how the men and women of the past assessed the historical contexts in which they lived.

The Balkan War was a traumatic experience that represented, above all, a re-articulation of expectations about the future of the Ottoman Empire. It was a crucial moment not because it determined the only possible fate, but because it introduced a scenario marked by deep uncertainties. As Öztan argues:

> (...) more than anything else the Balkan Wars ushered in an era of political uncertainty and reshuffled debates over the future of the Ottoman Empire. The postwar era was characterized less by broad consensus than by debate and disagreement (ÖZTAN, 2018, p.68).

16. Cet odieux project se réalisera-t-il? Nous voulons encore espérer que non. Sans doute des tendances séparatistes pourraient bien se manifester dans certaines provinces, soutenues et corrompues par l'or étranger. Sans doute it ne manque pas de financiers et d'hommes d'Etat sans scrupules qui croirairent accomplir un bel exploit en raynt le nom de la Turquie de nombre des nations.

17. Nous devons comprendre, nous-mêmes, qu'il est à la fois de notre devoir et de notre intérêt de régénérer le plus rapidement possible nos provinces d'Asie Mineure, sous peine de les voir suivre le sort de la majeure partie de nos possessions d'Europe.

18. L'occupation et le partage de l'Asie-Mineure pourraient donc suivre à bref délai, le premier incident qui metrait le feu aux poudres.

This article endorses the argument that the defeat in 1913 is an crucial moment in Ottoman Empire History not because it sealed the fate of the Empire, but because it created a new reality and introduced new expectations. It was a complex period filled with ambiguities. The analysis of a newspaper's editorials does not allow us to make generalizations. Still, this effort enables us to glimpse some facets, among many, of the debate that existed at the time.

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Studying the Middle East from Brazil: reflections on a different worldview

Estudiar el Medio Oriente desde Brasil: reflexiones sobre una cosmovisión diferente

Estudando o Oriente Médio a partir do Brasil: reflexões sobre uma visão de mundo diferente

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Abstract

This paper describes and analyses the experiences of two Brazilian professors in teaching History and International Relations of the Middle East and the Arab World, both at undergraduate and graduate levels. Essentially, this paper is an exercise of comparison between the limits faced – but also the possibilities found – by the authors in the development of their activities as Latin American professors promoting the study of the Middle East and the Arab World in Brazil. Its main aim is to help scholars involved with these subject-matters to reflect on their pedagogical practices and on the knowledge they are promoting (or inhibiting) with their research proposals and teaching procedures. Anchored in the methodological techniques of participant observation and critical curriculum analysis, this paper reaches the conclusion that the socialisation of Brazilian scholars in the Anglo-Saxon scholarship on the Middle East must be mediated by a critical posture towards any parochial knowledge that pretends to be global. When the critical approach to academic literature is not the case, scholars tend to become more reproducers of the discourses produced in the North about the region than thinkers of the Global South capable of offering their educatees a space of knowledge production that is meaningful to them as Brazilian students.

Keywords: Middle East. Arab World. Pedagogy.

Resumen

Este artículo describe y analiza las experiencias de dos docentes brasileños en la enseñanza de Historia y Relaciones Internacionales en el Oriente Medio y el Mundo Árabe, tanto en cursos de pre-grado como de pos-grado. Este artículo, essencialmente, es un ejercicio para comparar los límites enfrentados, pero también las posibilidades encontradas, por los autores en el desarrollo de sus actividades como maestros latinoamericanos que promueven el estudio del Medio Oriente y el mundo árabe en Brasil. Su objetivo principal es ayudar a los

académicos involucrados en este tema, a reflexionar sobre sus prácticas pedagógicas y sobre el conocimiento que están promoviendo (o inhibiendo) con sus propuestas de investigación y procedimientos de enseñanza. Baseado en las técnicas metodológicas de observación participante y análisis crítico del plan de estudios, este artículo concluye que la socialización de los eruditos brasileños en la literatura anglosajona sobre el Medio Oriente debe estar mediada por una postura crítica hacia cualquier conocimiento parroquial que pretenda ser global. Cuando no se toma tal posición, los académicos pueden volverse más reproductores de los discursos producidos en el Norte sobre la región que pensadores del Sur Global, capaces de ofrecer a sus estudiantes un espacio para la producción de conocimiento que sea significativo para ellos como estudiantes brasileños.

Palabras clave: Oriente Medio. Mundo Árabe. Pedagogía.

Resumo

Este artigo descreve e analisa as experiências de duas professoras brasileiras no ensino de História e Relações Internacionais do Oriente Médio e do Mundo Árabe, tanto na graduação quanto na pós-graduação. Essencialmente, este artigo é um exercício de comparação entre os limites enfrentados - mas também as possibilidades encontradas - pelas autoras no desenvolvimento de suas atividades como professoras latino-americanas promovendo o estudo do Oriente Médio e do Mundo Árabe no Brasil. Seu principal objetivo é auxiliar os acadêmicos envolvidos com essa temática a refletir sobre suas práticas pedagógicas e sobre o conhecimento que estão promovendo (ou inibindo) com suas propostas de pesquisa e procedimentos de ensino. Ancorado nas técnicas metodológicas da observação participante e da análise crítica do currículo, este artigo conclui que a socialização de estudiosos brasileiros na literatura anglo-saxônica sobre o Oriente Médio deve ser mediada por uma postura crítica em relação a qualquer conhecimento paroquial que se pretenda ser global. Quando tal posicionamento não é assumido, os acadêmicos podem se tornar mais reprodutores dos discursos produzidos no Norte sobre a região do que pensadores do Sul Global capazes de oferecer a seus educandos um espaço de produção de conhecimento que seja significativo para eles como estudantes brasileiros.

Palavras-chave: Oriente Médio. Mundo Árabe. Pedagogia.

> "In everything different from each other, nothing could cloud the friendship of the two Turks, the Syrian and the Lebanese - they were of fraternal and enemy nationalities".
> Postface by José Saramago to the novel by Jorge Amado, *The discovery of America by the Turks* (1994)

Introduction

The teaching and scholarly research of themes related to the peoples that have been called "Turks" in Latin America in general, and in Brazil in particular, is a relatively recent albeit rapidly developing field in universities throughout the region. In the main Brazilian universities, Arabic language and literature were the first programs to be established. They benefited from the strong Arab immigration to the region and the important *mahjar*[3] literature developed in the first half of the twentieth century, following the arrival in Brazil of many Arab immigrants with Ottoman passports, who were therefore called "Turks".

Several decades later, the language and literature programs were followed by the implementation of undergraduate courses and graduate

3. The Arabic term means "place of immigration", and was used to name the literary movement created by Arab immigrants in the Americas during the first half of the 20th century.

research lines in History, Anthropology, Political Science and International Relations. They were dedicated to Arab, Muslim, Turkish/Ottoman and Persian/Iranian studies, usually – but not exclusively – grouped under the great "Middle East" umbrella. The development of these courses has encountered important limitations, but also marked advantages. Firstly, these disciplines and research programs can be implemented together with the critique of Orientalism itself. Secondly, there exists a large potential for the exchange of experiences and knowledge between regions – the Middle East and Latin America – that are in dialogue with each other on the bases of comparable historical and political conditions (CLEMESHA, 2016).

This paper proposes an approach to Middle Eastern studies that focuses on less ethnocentric theoretical and analytical methods and perspectives and from a worldview that both avoids the essentialization of the peoples and societies of the region and recognizes the uniqueness of their historical, political, social, and cultural developments. To achieve this goal, the authors describe and analyze their experiences in undergraduate and graduate teaching of courses whose central theme is the Middle East and/or or the Arab World, two concepts that are often used as synonyms, but that have specifics that need to be discussed, if what is sought is a differentiated view of these regions. While the Middle East is an analytical category that describes a region that even today "no one knows" where it is, in the words of Roderic Davison in 1960 (DAVISON, 1960), the Arab World is the physical and ideational space constituted by the twenty-two members of the League of Arab States and its diasporas. While the Middle East is built by the external gaze of scholars who define its borders according to their teaching and research interests, the Arab World was – and has been – engendered by a historical process centred around the idea that those who speak Arabic and/or identify themselves as Arabs form a "diverse unit" and that the political, social, economic, and especially cultural dynamics that unite them – even in diversity – deserve a differentiated academic-intellectual engagement (FERABOLLI, 2015).

In order to promote this necessary dialogue, this study employs participant observation and critical curriculum analysis as its main methodological techniques. The paper is divided as follows: the first section is dedicated to the analysis of teaching and learning Arab and Middle Eastern studies in the Graduate Program in International Strategic Studies (PPGEEI) of the Federal University of Rio Grande do Sul (UFRGS) and in the undergraduate course in International Relations of the same university. The second section follows the same undertaking, but focusing on the field of Arab History at the Arabic Language, Literature and Culture course of the Department of Oriental Letters of the Faculty of Philosophy, Letters and Human Sciences (FFLCH) of the University of São Paulo (USP). Essentially, this paper is an exercise of comparison between the limits faced – but also the possibilities found – by the authors in the development of their activities as Latin American professors promoting the study of the Middle East and the Arab World in Brazil. Its main aim is to offer productive insights in order to help scholars involved with these subject-matters to also reflect on their pedagogical practices and on the knowledge they are promoting (or inhibiting) with their research proposals and teaching techniques.

A 2017 quantitative and qualitative research piece focusing on the Brazilian academic research on the Middle East, found that the University of São Paulo (USP) and the Federal University of Rio Grande do SUL (UFRGS) had produced the largest amount of theses and dissertations in the past decades on this study area. From 1996 to 2017, USP produced 100 thesis and dissertations related to Arabic or Middle Eastern topics, while UFRGS produced 18, followed closely by UNICAMP, with 17, UFSC with 13, PUCSP, with 13, UFPR with 12, UNB with 12, and so forth, totaling 266 works defended at Brazilian universities during that period. While the academic research produced at USP tended to concentrate on Arabic and culture related topics, with a lesser amount of research on International Relations, the contrary could be observed in regard to UFRGS, and other federal universities where the Middle Eastern studies were implemented more recently and typically in the International Relations courses. Therefore, the universities and programs chosen for this study hold very distinct realities in regard to when and how these programs were implemented. Notwithstanding, they currently face similar theoretical and methodological challenges, which allow them to be analysed in parallel and comparatively to a certain degree (CAMPONÊS DO BRASIL, 2016).

International Relations of the Middle East and the Arab World at UFRGS

The argument developed in this section is that destabilizing the Middle East discourse as a zone of perennial conflict in university classrooms requires direct and systematic interventions by academics entitled with the task of teaching Arab and Middle Eastern studies, both regarding the way the courses are constructed and the choice of the bibliography to be consulted. It is also argued that a specific focus on intra-Arab relations allows for more frequent use of concepts such as "cooperation", "development", "culture" and "Global South", which contributes to a more positive and empathetic look by students towards that space of the world inhabited mainly by peoples who identify themselves as Arabs and Muslims.

The Graduate Program in International Strategic Studies (PPGEEI) initiated its activities in 2011. During its first eight years of existence, eighty-five Master's dissertations and fifty Doctoral theses were defended. Of this amount, only nine dissertations had the Middle East (ME) or the Arab World (AW) as their subject matters, including individualized country studies. This small number of dissertations included at least three on Brazilian foreign policy to the Middle East or Arab countries, one on Afghanistan (a country whose inclusion in this list is questionable), one on United States (US) foreign policy to the Middle East, two on Iraq and two on Syria. Except for the cases of Brazilian foreign policy studies for AW/ME, almost all of these dissertations dealt with crises, conflicts and wars. No Doctoral thesis on the AW/ME has been defended since the foundation of the PPGEEI. It is difficult to understand how the Arab World, the third largest destination of Brazilian global exports, after only China and the United States, arouses so little interest in the PhD students of this program. When we make explicit the fact that the flow of Arab-Brazilian

trade exceeds US$ 19 billion per year (CÂMARA DE COMÉRCIO ÁRA-BE-BRASILEIRA, 2019) and that there are at least 11 million Brazilians of Arab descent living in the country (VIANA, 2020), this indifference seems even more troubling. This is not to suggest that trade flows or diaspora communities are the only elements to take into consideration when making up the choices of research topics in International Relations (IR), but they are not irrelevant data to be overlooked either.

In the first semester of 2019, a course was taught at the PPGEEI with the specific title of "International Relations of the Arab World". The objective of the professor responsible for the course was to build a differentiated perspective for the so-called Middle Eastern studies. She did so by first defining a new regional dimension to work with (the Arab World, instead of the Middle East), and then focusing on the social, political, economic and cultural dynamics that constitute the Arab region and its relations with the global North and South. Security issues were included in the syllabus, but they were taken out of the spotlight. In other words: crises, conflicts and wars involving Arab countries since the beginning of the 20th century have not been excluded from the program, but they were not the central focus of the course, as usually is the case in Middle Eastern studies. In addition, students were asked to write papers (in pairs) avoiding the reification of the Arab region as a zone of perennial conflict (although writing about conflicts was not forbidden). When writing their papers, they were also invited to avoid, wherever possible, themes revolving around regional conflicts or "proxy wars", where Arab actors are presented as mere puppets in the hands of the so-called global powers.

In the first round of presentations of the proposed articles, in the fifth week of class, the limits of the conception of a course centred on the International Relations of the Arab World with a less bellicose character were evident. Firstly, four classes of three hours each (therefore 12 hours) did not seem to be enough to make graduate students understand what constitutes an Arab political-cultural subject and what constitutes an Arab region, especially in its differentiation from the Middle East or the Mediterranean. At least half of the initial paper proposals submitted by students had Israel and Iran as objects of study. It is noteworthy that not once was Turkey mistaken for an Arab country (as Israel and Iran often are), and that Turkey's location in the world is debatable only in terms of Europe, the Mediterranean, Asia and to a lesser extent the Middle East. Turkey's participation in North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) is perhaps the most prominent feature in the eyes of International Relations/ International Strategic Studies students, resulting in the non-questioning of the non-Arabness of the Turks.

In the tenth week of the course, a second round of discussions on the proposed papers was held. By that time, the conceptual boundaries – and the implications of building these identity boundaries for IR and area studies – between Arabs, Iranians, Persians, Muslims, Turks, Jews and Israelis were already clear. Nonetheless, the focus on regional power disputes, especially involving non-Arab actors, did not change. The hostile relations between Iran and Saudi Arabia seem to exert a special fascination on students, who understand these relations to be fundamentally mediated by

the opposition between Sunnis and Shiites. At the end of the semester, in the fifteenth class (totaling 60 hours/class), the final versions of the proposed papers were delivered and the themes covered by them were exactly the ones that follow: the smuggling of migrants in Libya and the European geopolitical dispute; the military industrial defense complex in Egypt; the dispute of narratives between Al-Jazeera and Al-Arabiya; the Middle East visions of Al-Jazeera; oil as a link between South Sudan and China; the Chinese-Saudi strategic rapprochement mediated by the convergence of the Saudi Vision 2030 and the Belt and Road initiative; the "proxy war" in the context of Saudi intervention in Yemen; the Saudi quest for power in the Middle East; and Hezbollah as a foreign policy tool of Shiism/Iran.

While the themes are pertinent and appropriate for a course on the Arab World taught in a graduate program in strategic studies, it is essential to note that the professor responsible for the course insisted that the topics covered by the papers avoided as much as possible security issues, and that students were invited to make a conscious effort to explore spaces for intra/inter-Arab cooperation, issues of Arab economic development, and the increasingly active participation of social movements in the Arab political scene. However, it seems that the place assigned to the Arab World by the world centers of knowledge production both in International Relations and Middle Eastern studies is accepted with little or no criticism by Brazilian students. And this is certainly constitutive (note that no causal relationship is being inferred here at all) of the difficulties Brazil faces in expanding bilateral trade and establishing more complex forms of strategic relations with its Arab partners, whether in the areas of social technology transfer, educational exchanges, and the development of joint research to solve or mitigate costly problems for both Brazilian and Arab peoples, such as desertification, food security, and water management, for example.

At the undergraduate level, the opening to "other" (and not "new") themes is facilitated by the way Middle Eastern studies are integrated into the IR curriculum. Firstly, International Relations of the Middle East is not exactly a course of the IR program at UFRGS, but an optional module that falls under the umbrella of Thematic Seminars and is only taught to the extent that a professor is willing to teach the course and the coordination agrees that the course needs to be taught. It is a delicate balance that has been maintained since 2018, the first year that the International Relations of the Middle East was taught as an undergraduate module at UFRGS.

At the first class, it becomes clear that students enroll in the course because they want to "know more" about the Middle East and the expectation of the kind of "more knowledge" that can be built in the classroom is certainly different from that of the PPGEEI. The professor in charge of the course during the two semesters it was offered (2018/01 and 2019/01) began each semester by asking what the students already knew about the Middle East and what they would like to know more about it. The answers were those expected: they know that there is a problem between Israel and "the Arabs"; they know that the Gulf monarchies are rich in oil, but that most of the region is poor; they know that there is a desert that divides North Africa from sub-Saharan Africa; they know that Iran is developing an atomic weapon and that this can be a problem; they know that women are oppressed by Islam; and they know, of course, that there

is a war against global terrorism, that its epicenter is the Middle East, and that the United States is leading that war. Unsurprisingly, these were exactly the topics that they wanted to know more about.

The professor then suggests building a course that reverses the logic on which these naive knowledges are based, in the language of Paulo Freire (FREIRE, 1968, 1996). The proposed course therefore a) aims to overcome the criticism on the extravagant spending of the Gulf oil monarchies and to focus on the various development funds and banks they maintain that promote development in the Arab World, Africa and Asia; b) suggests discussing the causes of poverty in the region, investigating the colonial origins of this poverty, but also analyzing the efforts of post-colonial states to overcome underdevelopment; c) seeks an analysis of the Sahara not as a barrier between North and South Africa, but as a bridge linking the continent and, within this perspective, drawing attention to Arab-African cooperation via summits held between the Arab League and the African Union; d) proposes to work on the Iranian nuclear program within the terms of racism in global politics and how the terms defining which states are able or not to handle nuclear weapons are highly racialized; e) invites students to center the debate on gender issues in the Middle East on Islamic feminist movements, moving Muslim women from the position of victims in which they are usually placed by the media (a view that is internalized by students) and demonstrating how they stand up to, negotiate, and resist patriarchy; f) proposes the comprehension of the logic and rationality of terrorism of both non-state groups and established states; g) rejects the construction of the discipline in the form of an evolutionary historical trajectory that begins in the World War I and ends with the War on Terror and proposes instead the study of thematic units built around the themes of differentiated state formations, the construction of national and supra-national identities, the search for development, South-South cooperation, and also regional conflicts[4].

The students accept the terms of the new methodological proposal and engage in the development of works that concentrate on such themes as the construction of Palestinian resistance; the foundations, performance and meanings of the Arab League; the new international perspectives of Saudi Arabia under the reign of Mohammed Bin Salman; Shiite political Islam; the Armenian diaspora in the United States; comparative studies between Turkish and Iranian secularism; the Westernization of Muslim fashion; post-colonialism and identity formation in the Arab World; Kurdish women's forms of resistance; the World Cup in Qatar; television media in the Arab World; Palestinian voices in Brazil; Saudi Arabia's Vision 2030; the perception of Porto Alegre's Jewish community about Israel; contemporary Arab cinema; and Queer resistance to Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS).

The greater openness of IR undergraduate students at UFRGS to other perspectives on the AW/ME and the relative reticence of the PPGEEI's students to these alternative worldviews may be due to the fact that undergraduates feel less pressured than graduate students to produce "relevant"[5] knowledge. As dictated by the rules of Orientalism, this kind of knowledge seeks more to explain "what went wrong" in the Middle East[6] than to understand how the peoples of the region constitute themselves as subjects of their own history.

4. This suggested program was one way – among various possible ways – the professor (one of the authors of this paper) found to approach Middle Eastern/Arab World studies differently. However, this should not be seen as reminiscent of a political correctness agenda. Moreover, the author understands the pressing need for discussing the ethical aspect of criticizing agendas put forward by the so-called Western powers and at the same time using instruments promoted precisely by these very powers (governmental and non-governmental international organizations or financial bodies, for example) in order to set public and security agendas worldwide.

5. See Lewis (2002).

6. For a critique of who/what determines what is legitimate knowledge in the Social Sciences in general and IR in particular see Mignolo (2002); Alatas (2003); Connel (2012); Tickner (2003).

Arab history teaching and research at USP

In July-August 2006, the Arabic Language, Literature and Culture course of the University of São Paulo (USP) decided to inaugurate the two disciplinary fields of Arab History and Philosophy, until then completely absent from the University of São Paulo. The context at that moment, which impacted heavily over several of the university's Arabic professors of Lebanese origin, was the Israeli invasion and bombing of the south of that country. The idea was that the best, possibly the only, means to contribute to a less stereotyped view of the Arabs in the local press, was to promote knowledge. The development of the field of Arab History was expected to help answer the frequent demands from the media - and distortions - that had grown exponentially since 9/11. The understanding of Arab history should help to explain that fundamentalism was not part of any a-historical Arabic nature or eternal Islamic character, but, rather, a specifically modern phenomenon, with its origins, causes, and main locations.

Given the growing influence of the theory of the "clash of civilizations", elaborated by Samuel Huntington in an extensive article in *Foreign Affair* (HUNTINGTON, 1993)[7] - where he stated that world conflict would from then on be determined by irreconcilable cultural differences, mainly between Muslims and Christians or the so-called "Judeo-Christian civilization" - it was important to treat the relations between Muslims, Christians, and Jews, in an historical and in-depth manner. Throughout the history of the Arab-Islamic caliphates, moments of communal tensions did occur, and some controversy does exist in regard to modes of taxation, among other norms and regulations, but there is no register of systematic persecution against Christian or Jew for the sole reason of their religious or cultural origins. Far from the misleading idea of a menacing empire, Islamic political-administrative structure was built on the basis of the institutionalization of tolerance in regard to the so-called "peoples of the book", that is, those who shared common biblical roots, derived from supposedly the same divine revelation, attributed to the same God. The mode of government orchestrated by the Arabs under Islam, made coexistence possible between religious groups considered unequal, thus being viewed as an historically advanced model for the period in which it was formed (seventh century A.D.), even if absolutely insufficient for current days in which the most radical equality between peoples would be required. The exercise of tolerance in regard to different religious groups was not however an Arab invention. It had been a common practice under the rule of Persian shahs, who did not expect their Cristian, Jewish, or pagan subjects to convert to Zoroastrianism. But under Arab and Islamic rule the institutionalisation of tolerance in relation to those considered *dhimmis*[8] - with all its limitations - was consolidated as a mode of government. Religious tolerance played a crucial role in the subsequent intellectual and scientific development, from the eighth to practically the twelfth century A.D. The first Arabic translators of the Greek philosophic manuscripts were Christians, such as Husayn Ibn Ishaq, in the IX century. In *Al Andalus*, more than tolerance *per se*, there flourished a rich symbiosis between Muslim, Jewish and Christian culture.

7. The concept of the "clash of civilizations" was not created by the Harvard professor Samuel Huntington, but based on a previous article by Bernard Lewis, published three years earlier, The roots of Muslim rage. The Atlantic Monthly, n. 266, September 1990. In 1996, Huntington consolidated his theory in the book The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996.

8. In Arabic dhimmi, or Ahl al-dhimma, refers to the "protected peoples", as described in the paragraph above.

It has been well established that the almost 800 years of Arab presence in the Iberian Peninsula contained a long period of unprecedented cultural flourishing, that left humanity an important precedent of coexistence and legacy in terms of philosophical, scientific and literary texts. It is also well known that the Jewish philosopher Maimonides wrote his main treaties in Arabic. However, some authors would prefer to view *Al Andalus* as the exception to the rule, rather than to historically explain its decline. For reasons that vary, some tend to look back at the Arabs in a teleological manner, attributing, for example, the lack of democracies among the Arab countries today, to an allegedly backward, authoritarian, and violent nature. For others, more sophisticated one must admit, the question that arises is that which was condensed by Bernard Lewis (2002) in the title of his above mentioned book *What Went Wrong?* In both cases, however, the argument stems from the view that the Arabs had been unable or unwilling to modernize.

The idea of a certain "Arab incapacity to modernize" reveals an ideological construction that intentionally ignores the political and administrative ottoman reforms of the nineteenth century, islamic reformism a few decades later, and the Arabic literary movement that grew at the turn of the twentieth century mainly in Beirut and Damascus (all of which are topics discussed in the second semester of the Arab history course), as well as the various intellectual tendencies in dispute in the main Arab countries of the Middle East throughout the twentieth century, centered around Marxism, nationalism, and fundamentalism. It also ignores the foreign domination, and local political forces, sometimes in dispute, others in governing alliances. Finally, it ignores that which the murdered historian and journalist Samir Kassir states clearly in his book *The Arab Disgrace* (KASSIR, 2006), *i.e.* that the *nahda*[9], or that which he chooses to call "modernity" among Arabs, was very much alive and active up until the 1970s. Had the Lebanese author been alive at the time of the 2011 uprisings, he would have had quite a bit to say about the rebirth of the *nahda*, even if only to once more explain its defeat and suppression in face of the authoritarian tendencies of the nationalist tradition (as with the military in Egypt or the Baath in Syria) or fundamentalist, such as ISIS or the different groups supported by Saudi Arabia, and acting throughout the region.

It is not our intention, nor would it be possible, to discuss here all the topics covered by the Arab history program, which begins in the pre-islamic period, and makes its way up to the beginning of the twentieth century. As for the disciplines of Modern Palestinian History, The History of Modern Egypt, and Arab Nationalism, they cover the XIX-XX centuries, and focus on specific regions of the Middle East. The Arab history program was conceived to allow the students to acquire basic and fundamental knowledge, such as understanding different timeframes, managing the periods in Arab and Islamic history, understanding the historical relations between the Arabic language and Islam, between religion and politics from the every origins of the *umma*,[10] Arab expansion, cultural flourishing, nineteenth century reformism, the local answers to colonialism, up to the origins and rise of fundamentalism in the nine-

9. In Arabic, awakening.

10. In Arabic, "community of destiny" or "community of faith", e.g. the community built by Muhammad and his successors, of those who embraced or accepted Islam.

teenth to twentieth centuries. At the same, we discuss some of the basic concepts in Arab history, that are peculiar to the Arabic scenario, and can only be understood in that context. The program, however, soon began operating on a different level. While building a corpus of knowledge among students who had never before studied any Arab history, it also, inadvertently, deconstructed a considerable amount of accumulated stereotypes - as if two parallel programs were developed, one explicit, and the other, resulting from the critical assessment of the subject proposed.

In slightly more than a decade since the beginning of the Arab history program, we have realized that the undergraduate students could identify, almost intuitively, some of the narratives linked to domination and colonialism, reproduced either in the media or in history texts. Accordingly, we have never faced any special difficulty when working with the students on the more specific, and possibly more polemic, bibliography related to the history of Palestine. On the contrary, we have had typically excellent discussions on the meaning of the *nakba*[11], and of the most recent historiographic advances in the field, in classrooms of 50, 60, or more students from all over campus, and not only from the Arabic course. This discipline begins analysing nineteenth century ottoman and mainly rural Palestine, then shifts over to nineteenth century Europe to study anti-Semitism, and the conditions of the Jews in the *shtetle*[12] of the Czarist pale of settlement, out of which Zionism would grow as one of the movements proposing emancipation. Then back to Palestine again. That is, the subject is dealt with in a manner that includes, and does not erase its inherent complexities.

With the undergraduate students, we also discuss Eurocentric periodization, which divides history into ancient, medieval, modern and contemporary periods, or classifications related to economic (feudalism) and cultural models (renaissance), that not only do not take Arab history into account, but in some cases exclude it. The renaissance, for example, is usually studied as an exclusively European process in history, in spite of the role played by Arabic philosophical texts - both translations of texts from ancient Greece, and treaties written by the most important Arab philosophers of the time.[13] When Saint Thomas Aquinas began reading Aristotle, he did so initially through the lens of the writings of Ibn Sina. Throughout the "Middle Ages", the Arabs not only "preserved" but developed the knowledge transmitted through the ancient Greek texts. As stated by Jack Goody (2008), the so called European renaissance would be better understood, not as the outcome of classical Greek culture, but as the continuation of cultural development in Islam as in China, regions which were extremely advanced, socially and culturally in that period of time. The perception, on the part of the students, of the profound European ethnocentrism implicit in the theoretical corpus and basic concepts of History, opens the path for a paradigmatic shift, which begins with the perception that development is not an exclusively European movement (from Greek civilization to the advent of capitalism, in a manner that excludes non-Europeans from civilizational progress) and leads all the way to the deconstruction of the idea of a world divided between East and West.

11. In Arabic, most commonly translated as catastrophe, although the term refers to a human feeling of deep misery.

12. In lídiche, meaning the small Jewish villages of the Czarist pale of settlement (approximately current-day Lithuania, parts of Poland, Belarus and Ukraine).

13. The field of Philosophy in the Arabic course is led by professor Attié Filho, and to understand some of the work developed in that field at the University of São Paulo (ATTIÉ FILHO, 2002).

However, the systematic study of the critique of orientalism is conducted in the graduate studies program. As a result, in 2016 an edition of *Tiraz*, the magazine of the Program of Graduate Arabic and Jewish Studies, was published with a selection of texts written by the students (TIRAZ, 2016). The articles demonstrated how these young researchers were already applying the theoretical and conceptual framework of the critique of orientalism to their research, as demonstrated not least by the topics chosen to investigate, but also the selection, and treatment of their sources. From the point of view of Brazilian researchers, the critique of nineteenth century European orientalism relates, in historical terms, to the ethnocentrism that accompanied and justified, three hundred years earlier, the domination of the indigenous peoples of America (WALLERSTEIN, 2007), and, in current days, to the position on the margins of the developed world which we (scholars in Brazil and Arab countries) certainly seem to exercise in common.

But difficulties do tend to occur when we receive graduate degree candidates who have not attended the Arabic course, or, in some cases, are not trained historians. The researcher of Arab history must be trained in both Arabic language and the methods of History - a long process which should ideally be initiated as an undergraduate student. Today, our Masters candidates have only two years to complete their thesis, and the PhD candidate, four. The time span in both cases is not nearly enough if the candidate lacks one or another basic formation. The lack of adequate training may also reveal itself in a tendency to reproduce, a-critically, misguiding concepts and views, present in so many of the texts available. The thesis advisor certainly has double the responsibility when this happens, and should be aware of how frequent it is for young researchers of Arab and Islamic history to end up with an ideologically tainted work, be it under the influence of the theory of the clash of civilizations/orientalism, be it under the influence of a militant pro-Arab standpoint - to mention but the extremes. The process of deconstructing the highly stereotyped view of the Arab World is not intended to generate its diametric and extreme opposite, but, on the contrary, to generate the conditions in which research in Brazilian universities may actually take advantage of the absence of the mode of imperialist designs which marked the birth of academic studies of the Arab Middle East, and still largely determine current relations with the Muslims of Europe.

Finally, our student mobility to and from the Arab universities is still very timid, but a couple of academic exchange agreements have allowed our students to complete their Arabic language studies, mainly in Egypt, but also Morocco and Oman. The agreement we had with Al Quds University, Palestine, did not work due to the fact that Israel does not concede student visas for those applying for Palestinian universities, but other agreements should make up for that unprecedented setback. To complete his or her formation at universities in an Arab country, where our students will be able to experience the culture, the dilemmas of the different, although in so many aspects, comparable world views, is a very desirable and fruitful encounter.

Conclusion

A comparative approach to the experiences narrated above, in two of the largest Brazilian universities, revealed that students' interests in the AW/ME related topics is not substantial and might be growing in quite the wrong direction under the inevitable influence of the North American security approach. The limitations in both size and capacity of these programs are to a great extent due to the lack of funding and to the virtual absence of stimulus for the development of exchange programs between faculty and students on both sides of the Atlantic. Arab embassies in Brazil have shown virtually no interest in promoting such exchanges, and Brazilian universities have also faced limited capacity to fund programs that could build knowledge and develop fields of intellectual, economic and social interest among Latin America and the Arab World – regions that are actually so close to each other.

With an estimated population of at least eleven million citizens of Arab descent, Brazil is home to the largest population of Arabs outside the Arab world. The members of the League of Arab States, together, represent the third largest destination for Brazilian world exports. The Arabic language has long been spoken in Brazil, beginning during the period of slavery when thousands of Muslims capable of communicating in Arabic were brought to the country as slaves. It then reached its peak with the massive immigration of Christian Arabs to Brazil at the beginning of the twentieth century. Brazil's trade balance with Arab countries has been favourable to Brazil for a long time, even in the case of the big oil exporting countries. Brazilian exports of manufactures – from refrigerators to cars, buses and airplanes – find in the Arab market important partners for high added value South-South trade.

As this article demonstrated, the socialisation of Brazilian scholars in the Anglo-Saxon literature on the Middle East must be mediated by a critical posture towards any parochial knowledge that pretends to be global. This critical positioning is a pre-requisite for them – for us – to evolve from mere reproducers of the discourses produced in the North about the region to actual thinkers of the Global South capable of offering their – to our – students a space of knowledge production from our place in the world. It also showed that destabilizing the Middle East discourse as a zone of perennial conflict in university classrooms requires direct and systematic interventions by academics entitled with the task of teaching Arab and Middle Eastern studies, both regarding the way the courses are constructed and the choice of the bibliography to be consulted. As it was seen, however, sometimes this has proven not to be enough. As shown comparatively, by the above related classroom and research group experiences, one might find it necessary to actually instigate debates around the question of representation, particularly media, literary, and historiographic representations. Finding commonalities between Eurocentric or other ethnocentric representations of both "the South" and "the East" has proven to be a very stimulating process, one capable of highly engaging the students, and promoting important avenues for open-end learning in terms of critical thinking.

Ultimately, the Brazilian academic community must be continuously reminded that colonialism, imperialism and wars are not part of the history of Brazil's relations with the Arab World. Therefore, why should Brazilian

students follow the Anglo-Saxon textbooks, curriculum and syllabi on the Middle East, unremarkably stuffed with wars, battles, and other domestic or international conflicts, most of them consequence of the very relationship of this region with the old and new colonial powers? It would be more productive for Brazilian students to get to know those peoples who have been developing peaceful and cooperative relations with us for decades – if not centuries. And these peoples are Arabs, and to know the historical process that constitute them as Arabs and how they relate to the world in general, and to the Global South – Latin America and Brazil in particular – *i.e.*, to our students' place of belonging in the world is essential for the development of deeper and more comprehensive relations between Brazil and the Arab World.

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The Ottoman Empire and Europe from the late Westphalian Order to the Crimean System: the 'Eastern Question' Revisited

El Imperio Otomano y Europa desde el último orden de Westfalia hasta el sistema de Crimea: la "cuestión oriental" revisada

O Império Otomano e a Europa do final da Ordem Westfaliana ao Sistema da Crimeia: a 'Questão Oriental' Revisitada

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ABSTRACT

The 'Eastern Question' is one of the most controversial and persistent subjects in the history of international relations. This article looks at two aspects of the evolution of the relations between the Ottoman Empire and Europe. The first one focuses on the importance of the 18th century in the emergence of the 'Eastern Question'. The second one emphasizes on several episodes that may reopen the debate on the origins of the Crimean War. Our research is an attempt to demonstrate that the 'Eastern Question' was only a piece of a larger puzzle. The more Russia was influential in world politics, the more her contribution became valuable for the stability of the international system. The idea to challenge in the early 1850's the heritage of the 18th century in world politics (meaning to marginalize Russia in European affairs), did not serve on the long run neither to the security of the Ottoman Empire, nor to the 'new multilateralism' put forward by Napoleon III.

Keywords: Ottoman Empire, late Westphalian international order, Eastern Question, Vienna system, Crimean War, Great Power Politics 18th-19th centuries

RESUMEN

La "cuestión oriental" es uno de los temas más controvertidos y persistentes en la historia de las relaciones internacionales. Este artículo analiza dos aspectos de la evolución de las relaciones entre el Imperio Otomano y Europa. El primero se centra en la importancia del siglo XVIII en el surgimiento de la "Cuestión Oriental". El segundo enfatiza varios episodios que pueden reabrir el debate sobre los orígenes de la Guerra de Crimea. Nuestra investigación es un intento de demostrar que la "cuestión oriental" era solo una pieza de un rompecabezas más grande. Cuanto más influyente se destacaba Rusia en la política mundial, más importante sería su contribución para la estabilidad del sistema internacional. La idea de desafiar a principios de la década de 1850, la herencia del siglo XVIII en la política mundial (es

decir, marginar a Rusia en los asuntos europeos), no sirvió a largo plazo ni para la seguridad del Imperio Otomano, ni para el nuevo multilateralismo, presentado por Napoleón III.

Palabras clave: Imperio Otomano, orden internacional tardío de Westfalia, cuestión oriental, sistema de Viena, guerra de Crimea, política de las grandes potencias en los siglos XVIII-XIX.

RESUMO

A 'Questão Oriental' é um dos assuntos mais polêmicos e persistentes na história das relações internacionais. Este artigo examina dois aspectos da evolução das relações entre o Império Otomano e a Europa. O primeiro enfoca na importância do século XVIII no surgimento da 'Questão Oriental'. O segundo enfatiza vários episódios que podem reabrir o debate sobre as origens da Guerra da Crimeia. Nossa pesquisa é uma tentativa de demonstrar que a 'Questão Oriental' era apenas uma peça de um quebra-cabeça maior. Quanto mais a Rússia se tornava influente na política mundial, mais sua contribuição se tornava valiosa para a estabilidade do sistema internacional. A ideia de desafiar, no início da década de 1850, a herança do século XVIII na política mundial (o que significa marginalizar a Rússia nos assuntos europeus), não serviu a longo prazo nem para a segurança do Império Otomano, nem para o novo multilateralismo apresentado por Napoleão III.

Palavras-chave: Império Otomano, ordem Westfaliana tardia, Questão Oriental, Sistema de Viena, Guerra da Crimeia, Política das grandes potências nos séculos XVIII-XIX

Introduction

In 1853, in the eve of the war between Russia and the Ottoman Empire, which shortly after became the Crimean war, Lord John Russell rejected the secret Russian proposal to dismantle the Ottoman Empire (CRPLGCT, 1854, p. 883). He did so not only because it was impossible to implement such an arrangement without risking a continental war, but because the proposal was made after several attempts from the Russian side to gain exclusive influence at Constantinople. And it was not only the quarrel between the Latin and the Greek churches, brought to the table in May 1850 by France, that first sounded the alarm at London. As a matter of fact, the first signs appeared in 1848, at a time when Nesselrode, tsar's minister of Foreign Affairs, tried to legalize the Russian military intervention at Bucharest which put an end to revolution. As one can expect, such initiatives did not go unnoticed neither in London, nor in Paris (LEANCA, 2013). But the decision of tsar Nicholas I to assist the Habsburgs in late autumn of 1848 in their fight to regain control over their empire restrained the British from acting in the Near Eastern affairs. The latter agreed that the Russians crush the Hungarian rebellion and were reluctant to align with the French in contesting the Russian projects for the European Turkey. In the eyes of the British government, the Habsburg Empire, no matter how authoritarian the Metternich regime was perceived in Europe, was the only political entity which could, by its geographical position, neutralize or at least weaken Russia's Near Eastern policy. But with Austria depending on Russia after 1848, the British statesmen had to get over their anxieties regarding France and its global ambitions and to openly oppose Russia in the Near East.

The collapse of the Habsburg Empire in 1848 and the well-known tendency of the Russians to dominate the Ottomans were both European problems, but in a very different way. Contrary to the general view regarding

the impact of the 1848 revolutions on the international politics (JELAVI-CH, 1984, p. 50), Russia was not able to change the status quo in its relation with the Ottoman Empire. In other words, Russia was not able to secure more treaty rights in the Ottoman Empire neither after the conclusion of the treaty of Adrianople of 1829, nor after the Saint-Petersburg Convention of 1834. The so-called Balta-Liman Convention of 1849, which should have legitimised, in Russian terms, the use of unilateral military means to crush civil unrest in Moldavia and Wallachia, did not go beyond practical arrangements respecting the administration of these two provinces. No alliance to counter Russia in the Near East was to be formed between France and Great Britain during the 1848 crisis either. However, the treaty of Adrianople and the other agreements that followed, were the absolute maximum the British and the French could accept in terms of Russian influence at Constantinople. On top of that, it was not the proposition itself which was made in 1853 to Lord John Russell that finally set the Concert of Europe on fire, but the fact that tsar Nicholas I remained adamant about securing unprecedented influence at Constantinople even after the British rejection of the scheme. A second Russian unauthorized occupation of the principalities, followed by the military preparations of the maritime powers against Russia and the violation of the Straits Convention by France and Great Britain thus marked the destruction of the European Concert as conceived at the end of the Napoleonic hegemony. To contain Russia in 1853, Britain had to seek common ground with imperial France, already prepared to embark in such a venture. But such an unprecedented rapprochement, which was to bring a major blow to Russia's Near Eastern interests, had, nevertheless, clear implications on the international system. Napoleon III and his advisors were not against the European Concert as a tool in preserving peace and finding ways to settle major disputes among great powers, but they were anxious to reverse the so-called Vienna political order and the diplomatic defeat suffered by France in the Near East in 1840. Clearly, in 1853, it was a turning point in centre-periphery relations and a major security dilemma: to preserve the Vienna order as it was meant to leave the Ottomans at the mercy of tsar Nicholas I; to resist Russia's projects for the Ottoman Empire meant to contain Russia in European affairs and thus redefine the core of the international system.

'Nous avons sur les bras un homme malade – gravement malade'

It is in these terms that tsar Nicholas I perceived the Ottoman Empire in 1853 (CRPLGCT, 1854, p. 877). His image of the Ottomans was actually not very different from that of the British, French, and Austrian statesmen of the same period of time. It suggested the idea that "Europe had political and moral obligations to manage the Ottoman collapse" (FRARY; KOZELSKY, 2014, p. 4). Despite the long life of this perception, it cannot serve as a satisfactory definition of the 'Eastern Question'. In the reading of Winfried Baumgart (1999), prominent historian and editor of primary diplomatic sources on the Crimean War, the "Eastern Question" is "the aggregate of all the problems connected with the withdrawal and the rollback of the Ottoman Empire from the areas which it had conquered since 1354 in Europe" (BAUMGART, 1999, p. 3-4). No doubt, this is a definition in which the European dimension is essential. It is also a distant echo of J. A. R. Marriott's (1917) vision: "The primary and most essential factor in the problem is […] the presence, embedded in the living flesh of Europe, of an alien substance.

That substance is the Ottoman Turk" (MARRIOTT, 1917, p. 3). The Ottomans, as well as the Russian Empire, were excluded from the European order as it was settled by the 1648 system of treaties. Winfried Baumgart, as many other historians, pinpoints the beginning of the 'Eastern Question' in the internationalization of the Greek rebellion during the 1820's. Thus, he does not pay much attention to the contribution of the 18th century to this international problem. Some other scholars located the 'Eastern Question' in a broader geopolitical scenery. For instance, the historian Dimitri Kitsikis (2002) conceptualized what he called the intermediary region, which was located between the very core of the international system and the very margins of it. Eastern and South-Eastern Europe, including Russia, Turkey and Greece are considered by Kitsikis to be part of this geopolitical depiction (KITSIKIS, 2002, p. 99-116). Recently, Jacques Frémeaux (2014) also used geographical and political instruments in defining the 'Eastern Question', regarded as a conglomerate (FREMEAUX, 2014, p. 12) and not as a homogeneous ensemble.

The 'Eastern Question', as a concept, operates within a fundamental distinction between the centre and the periphery of the international system. An asymmetrical relationship is established between the two categories. The centre tends to dominate the periphery, as well as the intermediary region. On this layer of analysis, one would have in mind the writings of the much-regretted Edward Said (2003). He argued that in western academic tradition, the 'geographical Orient' is connected to an imaginary Orient, which is subject to invention, distortion and narrative colonization (SAID, 2003, p. 99). According to Said (2003), it is power that manipulates most of these representations. It is power that distributes a specific geopolitical conscience over the 'Orient' in academic and public life that nullifies all contact with reality with respect to Eastern or Near Eastern peoples and societies. Such interpretation is not built upon a critique formulated in Soviet Communist style. It actually aims at fighting against the oblivion of facts, as Georges Corm points out, which can explain in a meaningful way, violence and political change in the Balkans and the Middle East. To sum up Corm's perspective, it is the European narcissism and will to intervene that are mostly overshadowed in the study of the Ottoman-European encounters (CORM, 2002, p. 10-13).

Other contributions have also to be taken into account when defining the 'Eastern Question'. Albeit well known for his in-depth social history of the Ottoman Empire, Halil Inalcik (2006) also turned his attention towards political and international history. As one would expect, the patriarch of the Ottoman studies is not very comfortable when using a cliché like the 'Eastern Question'. However, he refers to the 'so-called Eastern question' when he touches upon the subject of the Russian annexation of Crimea at the end of the 18th century. Inalcik (2006) wrote: "The new situation was labelled in European diplomacy as the Eastern Question, showing Western concern to preserve the Ottoman Empire, considered necessary for the European balance of power" (INALCIK, 2006, p. 113). In this particular case, Inalcik (2006), an international scholar of Turkish descent, shows a milder criticism towards the label put forward by the European chancelleries. That is to say that when European powers express concern over the Ottoman rollback, the 'Eastern Question' has a less malign connotation. Inalcik (2006) states that the solution to the 'Eastern Question' was postponed until 1856 on western religious grounds, thus admitting that the phenomenon existed.

Nonetheless, Inalcik (2006) denounces vigorously what he considers to be the reduction of the Ottoman Empire to "the conditions of a semi-colony of the Western powers" (INALCIK, 2006, p. 118). In the same fashion, the historian Cemal Kafadar (1998) labelled the 'Eastern Question' as a European question: "its responses were not necessarily based on Eastern realities". However, Kafadar admits the idea that "the impact of Europe, whether military, diplomatic or economic worked only in tandem with internal factors" (KAFADAR, 1998, p. 70). The criticism of the 'Eastern Question' as a historical concept was also fuelled by what certain historians described as the imperial turn in historiography (MIKHAIL; PHILLIOU, 2012, p. 721-745). But the revival of the imperial dimension in the study of international history had a boomerang effect, especially with respect to South-Eastern Europe and the Near East in their relation with the 'Eastern Question'. Firstly, because there was also an Ottoman orientalism (MAKDISI, 2002, p. 768-796). Secondly, not only that the imperial turn did not dislocate the national grand narratives of the past in the former territories of the Ottoman Empire (meaning that the sociological reality of nationalism could not be replaced with imperial nostalgia), but it fomented a reflection on other imperial polities of the modern times and on the ways in which global rivalry rose among them and why they collapsed.

In this asymmetrical relationship between centre and periphery, was the latter deprived of all means in order to play a role in the stability of the former? The answer to this question is not very simple to give. The historian Edward Ingram, referring to the Vienna order, cut the Gordian knot by pointing out that "The core [*of the Vienna system*] reposed in equilibrium only because it exported to the periphery its previously bellicist style [*meaning that of the Napoleonic era*]" (INGRAM, 2002, p. 225). Thus, Ingram states that "the Vienna System would last as long as it ignored [...] what happened in the Ottoman Empire" (INGRAM, 2002, p. 217). He actually considers that the Ottoman Empire and Persia "formed the Vienna system's operational core" (INGRAM, 2002, p. 206) – an idea that did not get the attention it deserved in the field of international history. In a critical article about the application of the so-called concert norms in the context of the Eastern affairs, Korina Kagan (1997) numbered four major features of what some scholars might consider to be a kind of security culture after 1815: the first one refers to "individual moderation, self-restraint and the forfeit of unilateral gains"; the second one evokes the path of "multilateralism and mutual consideration" in the management of crisis; the third one takes into consideration the will of all the "members of the club" not to separate from each other in the moment of decision. The last commitment would have imposed on the great powers "the avoidance of mutual threats and shows of force" (KAGAN, 1997, p. 18-19). If real, how effective these norms were in the context of the 'Eastern Question'? Korina Kagan (1997) draws rightfully the conclusion that "the Concert was a weak and ineffective institution that did not significantly constrain state behaviour" (KAGAN, 1997, p. 55). Following the same logic as Korina Kagan (1997), but based on a more refined scholarship on the Russian case, the historian Matthew Rendall (2000) reopens the debate on concert effectiveness during the Greek war for independence. He analyses how Russia behaved during that crisis and sheds light on the functioning of the European Concert and of its presumed norms outside the purely European arenas. Rendall (2000, p. 87) argues that "while the Concert of Europe embodied principles and norms, however, it lacked rules and procedures

for putting them into effect". Regarding the European Concert's involvement in the 'Eastern Question', Rendall (2000) notes: "Crucially, it was never clear whether its principles [*of the European Concert*] applied to the Ottoman Empire" (RENDALL, 2000, p. 87). To put it in a French realist's words, as Jean-Baptiste Duroselle (1984) may be described, "can one agree that the European Concert prevented wars or the absence of wars – caused by another factors – allowed the Concert to exist" (DUROSELLE, 1984, p. 279)? To be more precise, some of the reactions with respect to the European Concert also derived from a certain religiosity which distorted Paul W. Schroeder's (1986) meaningful hypotheses (SCHROEDER, 1986, p. 1-26) about multilateralism in the 19th century. Too much focus on systemic explanations in order to feed current European federalist grand narratives blurred the complex motivations that stood behind great power behaviour in various international contexts. Controversies on Schroeder's (1986) works also arose from his own findings, as Matthew Rendall (2000) rightfully pointed out. On one hand, Schroeder (1986) seems to have the intentions of an idealist in the field of diplomatic history. On another hand, he presents his thesis with the lucidity of the most pessimistic realist.

The heritage of the 18th century and why it matters

The decline of the Ottomans in world affairs started only when the Habsburgs and the Romanovs put forward a strategy of territorial expansion towards the line of the Danube and created powerful networks of clients within the sultan's possessions. In conjunction with the Iranian threat and the Russian appetite for late crusade and expansion into Asia and the Caucasus, the porous Ottoman frontiers have been continuously under siege from the end of the 17th century. Thus, the risk for the Balkans, which was the first territory conquered by the Ottomans at the beginning of their expansion towards the Catholic world (GEORGEON, 2005, p. 31), was paramount. And because significant resources had to be directed towards the European possessions of the sultan, the growing Russian and Austrian threat paved the way for the slow political awakening of the Arab speaking communities of the Ottoman Empire that exploded in the 19th century. While Austria was a pillar of European order, Russia started to play an international role only after tsar Peter the Great put an end to Sweden's imperial ambitions. This particular moment had tremendous consequences, as the vacuum of power that appeared in the region had to be filled somehow. Besides this aspect, there was something else: it was the slow destruction of the Westphalian order imposed by France in the 17th century with the help of Sweden in order to counter the Habsburg universal ambitions (SCHNAKENBOURG, 2011, p. 237-254). As we will show further on, the Ottomans were the indirect beneficiaries of this particular international order. That is to say that any serious threat to it had the potential to raise security concerns on the Bosporus. Once the ball has been set rolling in this direction, the Ottomans proved not to be in position to stop it. They were dragged into a spin that had long term consequences to their international position. However, the transformations of the international politics were not sudden and the Ottomans were by no means isolated.

In the eve of modernity, the French diplomacy, which was the most dynamic of the modern times, invented a way in which the Ottoman Empire could be integrated into the wider European balance of power. This was

not the result of some strident conception or of a short-term ambition, but of a solid and of a sharp vision that passed the test of time. While the French were accused of betraying the Christian faith by relying on the Ottomans in order to fulfil their political interests, the French defended themselves by revealing how much the capitulations granted to them by the sultan improved the situation of the Catholic pilgrims and merchants in the lands of the Infidels. Nonetheless, the French-Ottoman rapprochement was built upon a long and generally predictable Bourbon-Habsburg antagonism (BERENGER, 2003, p. 297-329). And, for the French, the main purpose was in the 17th century to inaugurate a balance of power within the Holy Roman Empire that fitted their security needs. A formal alliance between the French and the Ottomans was never formed, but, the quick *de facto* alliance at the time of François I was followed by a long-lasting political relation between the two entities. However, setbacks occurred as the French tried to use what looked like unlimited human and material resources of the Ottomans in order to create diversions against the Habsburgs. The Ottoman responses to the French demands were formulated, as one can imagine, according to their own security agenda. But to take into consideration only the fact that the French were looking for an ally of circumstance at Constantinople would not explain entirely what was behind the French position and it would not give us a real insight into the initial stages of the 'Eastern Question'. Actually, the French grand strategy included alongside the Ottoman Empire, Sweden, Poland and to a certain extent, Hungary. Thus, *les alliances de revers* represented a compound of relations of exceptional value. The French diplomacy not only endeavoured to create diversions against Austria, but also contributed significantly in fastening the ties among these allies at the periphery of the international system. It was also a condition that had to be met in order the grand strategy to survive. In the context of Russia's rise in world affairs in the first half of the 18th century, France took the relation with its junior Eastern partners on a different level: the creation of a long buffer zone, stretching from the Baltic to the Mediterranean was envisaged. It was multilateralism at its best in the 18th century. Among the three allies, the Ottoman Empire was the strongest and the richest one and it remained as such even after its crushing defeat at Vienna in 1683. This particular confrontation with the Habsburgs, in which the Poles mingled as well on the side of the Habsburgs under Rome's instigation, only turned the Ottoman political system north of the Danube (composed of Transylvania, Wallachia, Moldavia and the Crimean Khanate) more fragile, but not yet on the point of collapsing. However, the Ottomans were extremely far from their main chain of fortresses, supply lines and human resources. At the extremities of their Christian tributary states, control was difficult to maintain. It would have implied, on the long run, the redefinition of the state and of its central administration in order to fully intervene in these far-flung regions and dominions. But such plans were never advanced. Nevertheless, threats that occurred in other corners of the empire had to be dealt with too and Constantinople suited best the task of scrutinizing both North and South. Hence, what was difficult to achieve for the Ottomans, it was also for the Habsburgs. It meant a difficult control of the lands lost by the Ottomans even if inhabited by Christian populations. The Christian tributary states were ready to accept Habsburg rule, if situation occurred, but only after recognition of their full political autonomy and status within the Holy Roman Empire. The Habsburgs never agreed to such a concession. Thus, Ottoman rule was

preferred by these intermediary actors and a true Danube Monarchy never saw the day, even after the conquest of Transylvania.

Despite the Russian involvements in Sweden and Poland and the Russian-Austrian rapprochement after the death of Peter the Great, the French system at the borderlands of Europe preserved itself well in the first half of the 18th century. The less known treaty between Russia and the Ottoman Porte concluded at Pruth (1711), and the famous treaty of Belgrade (1739), proved that the Ottoman Empire was a relevant regional actor. Moreover, it showed that the problems of core and periphery could not be treated separately. The first treaty included a provision upon which Russia would find herself at war with the Ottomans if she would invade Poland again. The contribution of France to this agreement was not small. It was the French, using her envoys and several intermediaries on the battlefield, that prevented any hesitation of the Ottomans on advancing such a regional strategy. It was meant furthermore to tie a weak state like Poland to the more powerful and more organised Ottoman Empire. Moreover, it gave hope to the French that the Westphalian arrangements will be protected from a revisionist power like Russia. The second treaty, negotiated by Louis de Villeneuve, the French ambassador at Constantinople, went hand in hand with the Ottoman moderate victory over the Austrian forces. It recognized the Ottoman authority over all Walachia and Moldavia and left the Russians, the allies of Austria during this war, with no territorial gains after a rather good campaign. Not only that the French interceded with the opposing parties, but officially guaranteed the final settlement. Despite the fact that no formal provision about Poland was inserted in this particular treaty and that the alliance between Russia and Austria was still in place, the Ottomans notified the Francophile members of the Polish nobility that Russian violations of Polish territory would set the case for an Ottoman military intervention. Thus, the Ottoman interest in Polish affairs was clear, even if not simply altruistic. It also implied that the Ottomans get a share of the foreign influence in Polish affairs. And they had the back of the French for it for the sake of preserving as much as possible of what remained of the Westphalian order.

Almost thirty years of peace between the Ottomans and the Europeans passed since the negotiations of Villeneuve. To say that the Ottoman absence from the battlefields during the Seven Years War was a mistake it would not be true (AKSAN, 2012, p. 165-195). Nevertheless, the new context deserves more attention from the historians. And it is not only the fact that the Russians developed new combatting techniques and acquired glory by entering Berlin that must be pointed out, but also the relative isolation in which the Ottomans fell in Europe during this period of time. Moreover, the conclusion of the famous alliance between France and Austria in 1756 opened the door to a massive geopolitical transformation in Eastern Europe. What undermined the Sublime Porte's position was that France had to guarantee Austria against any aggression, including that of the Ottomans. It was true that the Habsburgs extended after 1739 their peace treaty with the Ottomans, but the fact that the sultan was not excluded in the mutual French-Austrian agreement made a negative impression at Constantinople. When the Russians (the allies of Austria, and *par ricochet*, of France against Prussia), spread the fake news of the French abandonment of their well-known policy towards the East, the Ottomans became dominated by frustration. While it was unquestionable that the French accepted and favoured the Russian intervention against Prussia and wanted the Ottomans to remain

neutral in this truly first world war, this was not at the expense of their influence at Constantinople. However, to believe that the Russian army was a mercenary force in a purely European war, it was a huge mistake which was made at Versailles. Russia's full recognition as a great European power was not formalised until 1779, but its influence in Europe after 1755 surpassed by far that of Peter the Great. Vergennes, the French ambassador at Constantinople, had to work hard in order to convince the Ottomans not to disturb the march of the Russian army through the polish lands. It was difficult for the French ambassador to be credible after encouraging the Ottomans to observe every move of the Russians in the region (LEANCA, 2019: 128).

The consequences of the Seven Years War for France, which was the friendliest Christian Power towards the Ottomans, were catastrophic. Not only that France lost Canada, but, because of its military defeats in Europe, it was not in position to support Sweden, Poland and the Ottoman Empire, if the situation would have demanded it. In the second half of the 18th century, all Eastern periphery of the international system fell gradually under the influence of Prussia, Austria and especially Russia (SCOTT, 2001, p. 249-250). Sweden managed to find its internal balance and resisted outside pressure on its political elites, but Poland was partitioned, which destabilised the whole region from the Baltic to the Mediterranean. It was evidence to the brutal change within the international system during the second half of the 18th century, but this was not all. As Paul W. Schroeder rightfully pointed out, the 'engulfing' of the Ottoman Empire had implications on great power politics which surpassed by far the polish question, to which it was much connected (DAVISON, 1996, p. 180; SCHROEDER, 1994, p. 20).

Two notable Ottoman initiatives have to be mentioned in the context generated by the Seven Years War. The first one was the natural attraction the Ottomans found in the Prussian star for its victories against Austria and France, as well as for its struggle against Russia. The second one was the Ottoman interest in the Polish affairs. The war that the Ottomans decided to make against Russia in 1768 had the purpose of establishing a shared influence in Poland with the other powers. The Prussian temptation was not only a failure but the first step towards a new evolution that influenced considerably the fate of the 1768-1774 war. It was the fact that Frederic II used the Ottoman proposal for an alliance in order to determine Catherine II to conclude a mutual assistance treaty between Russia and Prussia (SCOTT, 1977, p. 153-175). The Austrians would have been isolated by such an agreement. The treaty that came into existence also named areas of interest for Prussia and Russia. It meant free hand for Russia in what Prussia considered territories of no interest for her. Moreover, one has to take into account that there was no general treaty in Europe after the Seven Years War but two treaties which were concluded separately and where Russia was not present. Thus, she had free hand to choose what suited her interests better. In other words, Russia saw its influence recognized in the 'broader Middle East' before it was truly effective. It was the clear difference between *European* and *non-European affairs* that the Russian diplomacy actually validated and to which she remained much attached thereafter. And this is where the concept of 'Eastern Europe' and its cousin the 'Near-East' truly derive from. Thus, the 'Eastern Question' originated not only from an old cultural and religious root, but also from the age of Enlightenment and of its two most illustrious representatives. It is ironical that it came straight from a binding agreement in 1764 between Catherine

II of Russia and Frederic II of Prussia in which the Ottoman Empire was not even mentioned (LEANCA, 2019, p. 146).

In the war that followed between Russia and the Ottoman Empire, Prussia chose to tolerate the Russian expansion towards the south, if the Russian armies were to be successful. It thus paved the way for obtaining Catherine II's support for the partition of Polish lands. Austria had no choice but to participate in this massive geopolitical revolution. Vienna chose to abandon the idea of supporting the Ottomans, which was advocated by France, her ally in the West. For the Habsburgs, it was the only less expensive mean of minimizing the rapprochement between Prussia and Russia, and thus to save the very fragile balance of power in the Holy Roman Empire between the two German significant dynasties. The malfunctioning of the Ottoman supply line, the success of Orlov's expedition in Eastern Mediterranean, and the massive disobedience in the Ottoman military ranks during the 1768-1774 campaign made all the rest in order to facilitate the Russian epoch-making victory. Moreover, driven by hostility towards Prussia, Austria encouraged Catherine II Greek mesmerizing project, thus fomenting partition schemes of the sultan's domain. It becomes obvious why the Russian ambitions grew bolder in the Near-East. The annexation of Crimea by Russia (1783) was certainly a bigger blow to the Ottoman Empire than the Austrian annexation of Bukovina (1775). But they were not the only ones. By the treaty of Kuchuk-Kainardji (1774), the Ottomans were forced to agree that the Russians can 'speak' in the interest of the principalities of Moldavia and Wallachia. Thus, it appeared a form of *coimperium* in this bordering area which had incalculable consequences for the construction of peace in the region and in Europe, in general. The fiscal obligations of these two Christian provinces towards the Porte were to be rationalised, which paved the way for a *polizeistaat* and cameralist Russian policy in European Turkey. From this time onwards, the battle of the Russians with the Ottomans stretched over the forms of civilisation, technical achievements and sanitation. As shown in the historiography of the problem (DAVISON, 1976, p. 463-483), it is not true that Russia obtained by this treaty the right to protect all the orthodox living in the Ottoman Empire. However, as Vergennes observed, by inserting in an international treaty the obligation to protect Christians (AMAE-FRANCE-CADN, 1774), the Ottomans deprived themselves of fundamental elements of sovereignty at a time when a clear separation between internal and external juridical regimes was rising. By obtaining the right to interfere in the governance of the two principalities, which were fully part of the Ottoman Empire, a powerful diplomatic tool was to be put in the hands of the Russian diplomacy until the Crimean war.

Under the leadership of Vergennes, the French diplomacy found a very interesting solution in order to bring more stability to the Near Eastern affairs. While Austria's oriental ambitions were put in check by the French alliance, Russia had to be forced to restrain itself in a different fashion. It was by virtue of her status as a guarantor power of the Holy Roman Empire, alongside France, Austria and Prussia that Russia had to filter her policy at Constantinople. As a consequence of this situation, Russia agreed to provide explanatory interpretations of some provisions included in the treaty of Kuchuk-Kainardji. Thus, in the context of negotiating what became later the agreement of Teschen (1779) for the Holy Roman Empire, the Ainali--Kavak convention was signed. In both cases, the French had a crucial role. Certainly, France was not able to prevent the Russian annexation of Crimea

because the French statesmen judged the mission impossible without the support of the British Royal Navy. After the independence war in North America and despite Vergennes's openings at London on this specific matter, such a move was impossible to foresee. However, Vergennes succeeded in stopping the Ottomans from reacting to the Crimean crisis and threatened the Austrians with the break of the alliance if they would not give up plans to annex Moldavia and Wallachia. But after the conclusion of the French-Russian treaty of 1787, Russia was tied as never before to Europe. It also meant access for the Russian and Polish goods to the Marseille markets, as well as benefits from attracting the formidable French commercial network in the Ottoman Empire towards the Black Sea coastline sales counters. With such advantages for an economy with limited cash flow, a war with the Ottoman Empire would have been useless for the Russians (LEANCA, 2019, p. 230). It was actually the Sublime Porte that nullified this sophisticated approach by declaring war to Russia in 1787. Only the risk of a continental war (in the context of entente between Prussia and England over the Netherlands) and the outbreak of the French Revolution saved the Ottomans from ceding to Russia more than the Yedisan. If the European affairs would not have turned violent, the Ottomans would have been completely wiped out from the defensive line of the Danube by the Austrian and Russian forces.

While the French revolution opened up a new era in international politics, it did not change much in the geopolitics of the Ottoman Empire. The end of the French-Austrian alliance, as well as the disappearance of Poland (1795), favoured the revival of the French-Ottoman classical political relation (FIRGES, 2017, p. 47). But the initiatives of the French revolutionaries at Constantinople needed time. What once was the powerful ottoman army needed reform and long-term training. In 1797, the Ionian Islands were occupied by France, but the French-Ottoman proximity was of no use for the sultan. This time, the blow to the Ottoman sovereignty came unexpectedly from the French themselves. Napoleon, driven by Talleyrand's projects to bring havoc in Britain's economy, invaded Egypt in 1799 and, shortly after, entered Syria (LENTZ, 2012, p. 84). While the Ottomans managed partially to drive back the French, they were in no better position internationally. The French pushed the Ottomans into the arms of the Russians with which they even concluded a treaty of alliance (MOURAVIEFF, 1954, p. 16). Moreover, the Ionian Islands passed from the hands of the French to the hands of the Russians, thus stimulating the latter's appetite for the geopolitics of the Mediterranean. However, there can be no definitive judgement of Napoleon's Near Eastern policy. Once he became the master of Europe, the Ionian Islands re-entered among the French possessions and Poland reappeared on the map of Europe. In such extraordinary context, the Ottomans shifted sides and returned to their traditional anti-Russian policy. War between Russia and the Porte followed soon, but its fate depended on Napoleon's moves. The French emperor left the impression that he would leave room to Russia in the direction of the Danube after encouraging the Ottomans to resist tsar Alexander's occupation of Moldavia and Wallachia (PURYEAR, 1951: 266). Napoleon already controlled much of what once was Poland and, therefore, tsar Alexander regarded as justified the presence of his armies on the line of the Danube. With the growing mistrust between Russia and France, such a settlement could not pass the test of time. The fact that the Ottomans, by the treaty of Bucharest (1812), ceded half of Moldavia to Russia may have been regarded as foolish by those who were aware of Napoleon's preparations to

invade Russia. But when the Russian contribution to the defeat of French imperialism became obvious, the Ottomans found themselves in a rather correct position in relation to Russia. In other words, for the Ottomans, the 1812 arrangement was painful and useful in the same time.

From the Vienna order to the Crimean system: the last revival of the Ottoman Empire and the origins of its dissolution

The Vienna order occupies a special place in the history of international relations. It is considered to be the beginning of an almost forty years peace in Europe and the main chronological predecessor of the European integration policies. However, the aura surrounding the Vienna settlement should not restrain historians from analysing in a critical fashion the period in question and the dangers that existed in Europe in the aftermath of Napoleon's fall. One can trace the origins of the bloody French-German rivalry from this particular moment (LENTZ, 2013, p. 160). In short, the Vienna arrangement was actually less visionary than many of its apologists think. Nonetheless, one should admit that after decades of violence, war and coercion in the name of liberty, peace was finally achieved in Europe. Great Britain and Russia were the main guarantors of the new order. The first power dominated the sea and the second one dominated the land. At first glance, the Ottomans benefited from this era of relative calm and detente. But their absence from the crucial negotiations at Vienna, as it was the case during the diplomatic preliminaries of the Seven Years War, could not be beneficial for their security. The period of time between the fall of Napoleon and the outbreak of the Crimean War reveals the ambiguity in which the Ottomans found themselves in relation to Europe.

The Greek crisis was brought on the table of the European diplomats in a very unusual way. At its beginnings, it was strictly perceived as an internal issue of the Ottoman Empire. The key leaders of the Greek revolution, at least at the moment of its outbreak, were based in Russia. It goes without saying, particularly in the legitimist atmosphere of Restoration Europe, that tsar Alexander had no choice but to disavow any connection with them and their ambitious plans. Count Capodistrias, tsar's minister of Foreign Affairs, who was of Greek descent, had to leave office. In fact, the Russian position in the Concert of Europe was considered at Saint-Petersburg more important than exercising open protection for the pro-Russian orthodox factions throughout the Ottoman Empire. Thus, despite the massive sympathy for the Greek cause, Russia took no military action against the Porte in the first years of the rebellion. The Greek issue did not become a true European affair until 1823 when Lord Strangford, the British ambassador at Constantinople, advocated the idea of an armistice between the conflicting sides. His action was followed by the recognition of the Greeks as belligerents. The British tried in this way to control as much as they could the political emancipation of the Greeks and the likely internationalisation of this purely Ottoman internal conflict.

To reinforce its position, the British government sent Wellington, the hero that put down Napoleon, in a mission at Saint-Petersburg in 1826 in order to discourage a Russian unilateral military intervention against the

Ottomans. But Wellington was an unskilled diplomat. Count Nesselrode, a giant of diplomacy, convinced the illustrious British envoy to sign an agreement which allowed Russia to take action against the Ottomans with or without the participation of Great Britain. Needless to say, this bilateral arrangement was exactly the opposite of what the British statesmen had hoped for. Instead of restraining Russia and tying it down to the British line of conduct, it opened the door to her unilateral military intervention in the Ottoman Empire (COWLES, 1990, p. 688-720; BFSP, 1828, p. 629-639) and crushed the idea of consensus in the European Concert on the Greek issue. Moreover, it paved the way for the admission of the French in the negotiations ahead that were to take place precisely at London.

If the British and the Austrians opposed the use of coercive measures against the Ottomans, the French had a different approach to the crisis. Paris saw in the very unlikely self-restrain of Russia an opportunity to redefine the Vienna system according to its interests. Furthermore, it was a good chance to mediate between Great-Britain and Russia on a wide range of subjects relevant to international politics. In 1828, when it became clear that the Ottomans will not accept an European solution to the Greek question, tsar Nicholas I decided to make use of force precisely on the basis of the 1826 agreement, which was never denounced. While France could not bring into open her project of redrawing her north-eastern border (LEANCA, 2020), she obtained nevertheless in 1830 the diplomatic support of Russia for the annexation of the ottoman port of Algiers. Thus, besides the idea of compensating the French for their moderation, tsar Nicholas I manoeuvred skilfully in order to put pressure on the British presence in the Mediterranean. The British statesmen admitted that during the Greek crisis, they became 'the tools of Russia' (INGRAM, 1979, p. 49). However, the British defeat on the Near Eastern playground should not be overestimated. Closer as never before to Constantinople in September 1829, the Russian army halted its advance. The decision may have been justified from the military standpoint, but it also had a strategic and diplomatic motivation. The closest advisors of tsar Nicholas I convinced him that the advantages of maintaining the Ottoman Empire in Europe were superior to its rollback (KERNER, 1937, p. 287). On top of that, Russia was not isolated in Europe and Greece was freed. Nesselrode judged wisely to consider only minor territorial compensations in the aftermath of hostilities, which contradicted the idea of a Russian masterplan to swallow European Turkey. Nevertheless, the nature of the Russian-Ottoman treaty of Adrianople that followed the war was bilateral, not multilateral. That is to say that no collective guarantee was yet applied to the Ottoman Empire. Such a guarantee concerned only the newly created state of Greece. In other words, Russia preserved its special place in the coloured economy of the Ottoman foreign affairs. According to Nesselrode, Russia could use in Europe different principles of diplomatic action compared to those practiced in the Near East. On top of that, no French-British collaboration was yet possible on the muddy waters of the 'Eastern Question', which added more flavour to the epoch-making success of the Russian diplomacy in the autumn of 1829.

But the dominant position of Russia in the Near Eastern affairs was far from being indestructible. The unpredictable fall of Charles X in 1830 de-

tached France from Russia, thus opening a new era in Ottoman-European encounters. The creation of the Belgian state and the Polish revolution, no matter how peculiar they were, added new ingredients to the everlasting rivalry between powers at Constantinople. France sought a rapprochement with the Saint-James cabinet in order to counter what seemed to be, according to the liberal press, tsar's unaccountable and encroaching policies upon Europe and the Ottoman Empire. At first glance, the ties between France and Great-Britain seemed to have an effect on the Near Eastern affairs. But a true alliance between the two most liberal governments of Europe did not emerge from this special relation. The British closed their eyes to the annexation of Algiers, but they perceived the Entente Cordiale as a tool of containing France (BULLEN, 1974, p. 7). As for the Orleanist political elites, they had no reason to tie down their views on foreign affairs to those expressed on the other side of the Channel. The first Egyptian crisis (1833) did not show much of this divergence between the two powers; the Russian--Ottoman treaty of Unkiar-Iskelessi, concluded after the French mediation between Muhammad Aly and the Ottomans over Syria, placed London and Paris more or less on the same attitudinal line. By contrast, the second Egyptian crisis (1839) that posed an existential threat to the Ottoman Empire forced England to find common ground with Russia in order to discourage France from supporting the aggrandizement schemes of Muhammad-Aly at the expense of the sultan. As a result of Palmerston's ideas, the British gave a severe blow to France's Near Eastern policy and fomented in this way what we call the Rhine crisis (BROPHY, 2013). It was enough evidence to demonstrate the inextricable relation between the centre and the periphery of the international system.

The position of tsar Nicholas I needs to be explained in order to shed light on the international situation of the Ottomans at this stage. Russia was regarded at London and Paris as a power that imposed in 1833 unilaterally to the Ottomans an unfair agreement that had implications for the future of the balance of power in Europe. The bottom line of such formidable accuse was the following one: the Straits had to be kept opened to the tsar's military fleet but close for the warships of the maritime powers. According to this interpretation, it was in these conditions that Russia guaranteed the Ottoman territorial integrity in case of an Egyptian assault. Contrary to this reading of the treaty of Unkiar-Iskelessi, the Russian side never had such intentions. Actually, as revealed by the publication of key documents from the Russian archives, Nesselrode intended to prevent the entry of the Royal Navy into the Black Sea, but not to transform the Ottoman Empire in a base of operations for Russia in the Mediterranean. The reason for this self-restrain was that an aggressive Russian maritime policy would have encouraged the French and British to ask the Ottomans for the same kind of treatment with respect to the Straits (HUREWITZ, 1975, p. 261-265). The Russian position in the Crimea and in the bordering regions, such as, for instance, in Moldavia and Walachia, would have been endangered by the supposed British and French military penetration of the Black Sea. It is thus easy to understand why the Straits Convention (1841) was another success, albeit the very last one, for Russia on the entrenched diplomatic battleground of the 'Eastern Question'. The Convention strictly forbade the access of

military vessels though the Bosporus and the Dardanelles, which served very well the Russian purpose of protecting the Crimea. In conjunction with the Münchengrätz agreement with Austria (1833), Russia was able to continue alone working for the political fragmentation of European Turkey. Thus, the Straits Convention was not a guarantee for the integrity and sovereignty of the Ottoman Empire. Despite the generous introduction attached to it, it was only a document referring to the collective use of the Bosporus and of the Dardanelles. If the Straits Convention would have served a larger purpose than this particular one, as the French diplomats suggested during the preliminary phases of the Crimean crisis, it should have in the first place nullified the 'Russian system' in the Ottoman Empire that had for basis the treaty of Kuchuk-Kainardji. But it was not the case, because the British preferred to leave things as they were at Constantinople instead of embarking in some perilous adventure with no clear agenda; it would have most probably brought back the French into the matter, just as during the Greek crisis. The 1841 convention was no victory of the European Concert against Russia and no miraculous cure for solving the 'Eastern Question'. The most tangible argument in this direction is the Crimean war itself. But the tacit agreement that took place between Great Britain and Russia made believe the latter that she might be on intimate terms with the former (PURYEAR, 1965, p. 51). The reverie of tsar Nicholas I, fomented by the exchanges he had with the British statesmen at London in 1844, ended sooner than expected.

While this article does not intend to branch out into a general discussion on the origins of the Crimean War, it has to touch upon what we consider to be its two intertwined sources. The first one has to be identified in the difficulties that surrounded the reintegration of Mount-Lebanon and Syria into the Ottoman administration after Muhammad-Aly's retreat from these regions. The second one refers to the crisis generated by the 1848 revolution at Bucharest and in Hungary.

It is not arguable that Russia was suspected in the West of intending to annex the Danube provinces. And, indeed, the Russians perceived Moldavia and Walachia as a periphery, albeit exterior, of their own empire, while the maritime powers continued to look at these two provinces through the Ottoman lens. Nevertheless, a real competition between Russia and the other powers at Iasi and Bucharest never truly passed the limit of secondary consular disputes. By contrast, the maritime powers, showed more interest regarding the Levantine territories of the Ottoman Empire than Russia. In fact, European projects in order to award to Jerusalem, Bethlehem and Nazareth the status of free cities have been formulated after the return of the Ottomans to Damascus (POPOFF, 1910, p. 225). Such initiatives had a departing point in the orientalist mentality of the western diplomats, as well as in the fact that the Ottoman political system did not improve after the promulgation of the Gülhane decree. Despite the fact that the 1844's massacres in Lebanon proved such a state sufficiently, it was actually no real alternative to the Ottoman rule neither in the Levantine territories, nor in Moldavia and Wallachia.

The Ottoman authority in the Levantine provinces, no matter how keen it was to assert itself as a reformed one, was trapped in a mixture of local interests combined with a set of growing aspirations expressed by the do-

minant powers in the region. In theory, modernisation and reinforcement of sultan's authority was the common denominator of the policies of the great powers for the Middle East after 1841. But reform and other western cures for 'the sick man of Europe' served many purposes, both of internal and external significance for each of the parties involved. Besides encouraging factional conflict in order to weaken the establishment of strong local networks of power, the Ottomans had a different war to fight. They intervened in the internal organization of the Orthodox church in order to tie it down to the authority of the sultan. As a matter of fact, Ottoman bureaucrats intervened in the election and removal of the patriarchs. But weakening the Orthodox Church was also envisaged by the British, who succeeded the Russians in the Ionian Islands and who experienced the opposition in 1838 of the bearded orthodox popes on several civil reforms (FAIREY, 2015, p. 79). As expected, the Russians were unpleasantly surprised by the Ottoman appetite for reform in the affairs of the Orthodox Church and by the British intrusion in such a delicate matter. On top of that, the Russians were worried by the progress of the French diplomacy in the Middle East. A large proportion of the Maronite leaders became the clients of France and a French consulate opened its gates at Jerusalem in 1843 (BOUYRAT, 2013, p. 279-432; NEUVILLE, 1948, p. 32-34). Russia asserted itself as the protector of Orthodoxy in the Ottoman Empire and France was entitled by its capitulations to assist the needs of the Catholic clergy in the Holy Land. Such a situation did not mean that both powers were ready to support whatever claim their clients would lay to the Ottoman authorities. Native Russian clergymen were critical of the ways in which the orthodox hierarchy in the Ottoman Empire, mainly of Greek descent, understood to interact with the believers in Syria. But France had its problems too. Its protectorate was in danger to pass to the Kingdom of Sardinia. Neither one of these complications interested the Ottomans, but from the beginning of the 1840's onwards, they were slowly dragged into a complex dispute that they thought they can handle by simply using delaying tactics.

When in 1842, the Orthodox requested to repair the church of the Holy-Sepulchre, both French and Russian diplomacies reacted. If it was true that the Orthodox had an authorisation to operate on the site, it did not mean that they could carry out the task. Adolphe de Bourqueney, the French ambassador at Constantinople, opposed the plan. Under sharp criticism from the French, the Ottomans were ready to change the terms of the approval given to the Greeks. Titov, the representative of the tsar, understood well that the purpose of the French was to undermine the privileges that Russia defended in the name of the Greek clergy. The status quo would have been altered. He thought that une déclaration de droits dispatched directly from Saint-Petersburg would be enough to silence 'the Europeans' (POPOFF, 1910, p. 316). But neither the French, nor the Russians got entirely what they hoped for because the Ottomans delayed their backing to one or the other position expressed on the matter. In fact, it was not the reparation itself that was at stake, but the advantages and the potential symbolic privileges that could be added for each side after such action. Only the Ottomans could resolve the issue. However, their decision regarding the Holy Places of Christianity became harder and harder to take. The election of Kyrillos

II on the orthodox episcopal seat of Jerusalem (KILDANI, 2010, p. 36) seem not that important at first glance, but actually increased the pressure on the Ottomans to pronounce a solution favorable to the Greeks. It was Russia that imposed this candidate and decided that the elected one must reside in Jerusalem, not in Constantinople, as previously. And if one takes into consideration the Russian sympathy for the Arab orthodox element (HOP-WOOD, 1969, p. 21; KILDANI, 2010, p. 66), it becomes obvious that the Latins had to counteract somehow these movements. Rome simply gave a new life to the diocese of Jerusalem, which was up until that time only nominal, and officially appointed Giuseppe Valerga as patriarch (1847). The French government did not like the choice made by the Pope because Valerga was Sardinian (KILDANI, 2010, p. 277-280). However, the theft of the Star from Bethlehem forced the French diplomats to engage in detailed discussions with the patriarch and to set up a plan in order to improve the situation of the fathers serving the Catholic church in the Holy Land. Otherwise, the protection of the French government would have been completely useless.

The 1848 revolution only paused for a quick period of time what seemed to be initially a struggle of influences between the Russian and the French consular offices in the Holy Land. But it was soon to be discovered that it was more than that. The bottom-up political movements across Europe did not only touch upon domestic affairs, they impacted significantly on international politics. While repression and restoration of order in Europe did silence the radical spirits, it did not foster tranquillity, but a race among ambitious actors at the immediate periphery of the international system. And there was only a matter of time before redistribution of influence among the great powers in the Middle East would have a boomerang effect on Europe.

The Ottomans had to deal with the seize of power by the revolutionaries in Bucharest. But the Ottoman envoys which were appointed to judge the events on site realized that the movement was not directed against sultan's authority, but against Russia and the creatures who patronized the regime that was just overthrown (LEANCA, 2013). It goes without saying that the Ottomans did not sympathise with the ideals expressed by the Parisian style new politicians from Bucharest. Nevertheless, under the influence of the French Republic's representatives in Constantinople, Suleyman-Pacha, the representative of the sultan at Bucharest, engaged in negotiations with the new power. Such way of dealing with the 'demagogues' legitimized the movement and its criticism towards the Russian reforms undertaken in Moldavia and Wallachia since the treaty of Adrianople. In such circumstances, the tsar authorized the army to cross the border in Moldavia. Unexpectedly, Nesselrode managed to reverse the decision. According to his views, a powerful response to the crisis would have been less manageable from the diplomatic point of view. Despite the fact that the Russian forces already crossed the Russian-Ottoman border, they started to retreat after a while. But orders were countermanded again, as the evolution of events at Bucharest was considered at Saint-Petersburg impossible to solve without a military demonstration. The Ottomans had no choice but to accept a joint occupation of Moldavia and Wallachia with the Russians and to come to terms with the fact that they have to negotiate with them an agreement. But one problem remained: the Russian occupation of the principalities was not recognized at Constantinople. The maritime powers supported the re-

sistance of the Ottomans to any attempt to drift out from the provisions of the treaty of Adrianople. But, again, the Russians did not show any signs of weakness or concern, as they considered Moldavia and Wallachia a display for their reformist and pre-revolutionary political culture.

However, the case for an international crisis was already set. The French republican diplomacy, tired of the delays of the Russians to recognize the new regime in Paris and by the violations committed against international law at Bucharest, approached the cabinet at Saint-James. While Stratford, the British ambassador at Constantinople, was closer in his position to Aupick, the French representative at the Porte, a united strategy of the maritime powers against Russia did not come into effect. The reason for this ambiguity resided in the differences between France and Great Britain with respect to the fall of the Habsburgs. The memorable and totally unexpected event had a significant impact on the Russian-Ottoman relations. The French diplomacy was less touched by the events at Vienna compared to the British. Once tsar Nicholas I ordered his troops to put an end to the Hungarian experiment, Russia found in Austria a powerful ally in order to settle her dispute with the Ottoman government over the two principalities. If Palmerston proved right on the medium term about the capabilities of Austria of preventing Russia's expansion towards the Danube, he was wrong in this regard on the short term. The Russian intervention not only produced a high number of Polish and Hungarian refugees south of the Danube (among them the leaders of the revolution), but threatened the Ottoman government with war if the asylum seekers were not handled to their respective states of origin. It is in this particular context that France and Great Britain assured for the very first time the Ottomans of their military assistance in case of war and offered protection to the refugees. Because the British squadron dropped anchor very near the Straits, Nesselrode accused Stratford that he was responsible for the violation of the 1841 convention. If the affair did not drift towards full scale war, it was nevertheless a repetition for the British and the French in case the crisis between Russia and the Ottomans turns into open hostility. Moreover, as we have mentioned at the beginning of this article, the Balta-Liman agreement (1849) did not add any other privilege to Russia with respect to Moldavia and Wallachia. Later on, in 1853, when prince Menchikov intended to get new concessions from the Ottomans, he had to return home with no tangible results, just like it happened in 1849.

General Aupick did not only watch closely the Russian occupation of Moldavia and Wallachia. He was eager to take action in order to settle the question of the Holy Places. His energic attitude has to be understood in the context of Louis-Napoleon's rise to power, which significantly revigorated the French foreign policy. Basically, the president Louis-Napoleon did not break with the principles of the Republic in terms of foreign affairs, but he was more inclined to take action in various international arenas compared to his predecessors. He was not totally against the ideals of the French Revolution, which did not mean that he sympathised uncritically with a more traditional view on France's mission in world affairs. By the same token, Louis-Napoleon criticised the Vienna settlement and envisaged to erase France's diplomatic defeat in the Near Eastern affairs in 1840. But he was not a radical reformist in terms of international politics (SOUTOU, 2009, p. 21-21). For him, concert diplomacy was a valuable instrument as long as it would keep the balance between liberal-nationalism and imperial forms of

government. Louis-Napoleon's moderate, but firm positions were also influenced by his close contacts with the *Catholiques engagés*. Favouring Catholic education in France went hand in hand with Louis-Napoleon's military support to reinstall Pope Pius IX in Rome after the success of revolution in 1849. It is in this atmosphere that the initiatives of general Aupick were formulated. His official correspondence shows that he knew that raising the issue of the Holly Places would not leave Russia indifferent. But he endorsed the idea of a more general approach on the matter. His reading of the situation was also supported by Émile Botta, the French consul at Jerusalem, and by Eugène Boré, a true advocate of the Franciscan cause in the Holy Land (AMAE-FRANCE-COURNEUVE, 1850). Asking reparation for the theft of the Star from Bethlehem was not considered enough in order to calm down the Catholics at Jerusalem. Only a firm demand to the Ottoman government in order to obtain the possession of places enumerated by the capitulations was considered suitable. In the context of Louis-Napoleon's involvement in the dispute regarding the Hungarian and Polish political refugees in the Ottoman Empire, Aupick became confident in a more substantial policy respecting the rights and privileges of the Catholic Church in the Holy Land. Albeit hesitant, La Hitte, the French minister of Foreign Affairs, approved the line of conduct suggested by his representative at Constantinople. The result was the famous note presented by Aupick to the Ottoman government the 28th of May 1850. The Russians understood with great difficulty in 1849 and in 1850 that they cannot alter the status quo. But they could not understand why France can engage in a process that can change the status quo with respect to the privileges of the Orthodox Church. Such contradictions set the path to the Crimean War.

Conclusion

The purpose of this critical *tour d'horizon* on preBismarkian 'Eastern Question' is to provide a framework for a broader reflection on the international system and its transformations during the modern era. It does not intent to depict the obvious rollback of the Ottoman Empire in a 19th century Darwinist fashion, but to look at it from a multi-layered perspective. Thus, we intended to give some insights into the functioning of the 'eternal triangle', composed of the classic European powers, Russia and the Ottoman Empire. The evolution of the 'Eastern Question' can be studied from many angles. However, we privileged the French-Russian relations because both France and Russia were the undisputed pillars of modern international relations. France represented the old Westphalian order in Europe. In turn, Russia had "both a role *in* and a relationship *to* Europe" (SCHUMACHER, 2014, p. 72). And this situation led to a paradoxical and intriguing system of communicating vessels between Russia's international position and the evolution of the Ottoman Empire in its last century of existence.

On one hand, the restrain of Russia on the Near Eastern affairs after the fall of Sebastopol had a positive impact on the Ottoman affairs. It strengthened multilateralism and, in a sense, got over most of the Russian-Ottoman conflictual inheritance of the 18th century. One has to recall the case of Moldavia and Wallachia. United in 1859 under the suzerainty of the sultan, these two principalities remained under the guarantee of the great powers. Despite the fact that their unification fuelled nationalism and crystallised statehood, the integrity and inviolability of the Ottoman

Empire was not affected. In the reading of Napoleon III, the architect of this change, more liberty given locally was not incompatible with imperial rule, on the contrary. The emergence of the *mutasharifiya* regime in Lebanon was a consequence of the same approach. In a word, bottom-top and top-bottom conflict resolution mechanisms were envisaged in order to maintain the Ottoman Empire alive. Moreover, one should recall the military neutralization of the Black Sea and the debut of the full Ottoman integration in international law.

On another hand, considering the balance of power that emerged after the Crimean War, one can state that the Ottomans tied themselves to a divided Europe. The more Russia was pushed to a distant line in European affairs, the more fragile the resulting arrangements for Europe were. The Russian diplomacy did tolerate the growth of Prussia in order to weaken the Crimean system, but not to the point of undermining its return on the Near Eastern and European stage. As the chances of the Ottomans to maintain themselves in the Balkans lessened in the second half of the 19th century, the creation of an international sub-system of states in this region grew stronger and stronger. Marginalised in world affairs by the German Empire, France and Russia became allies. Such a revolution in international politics paved the way for the last rapprochement between Constantinople and Berlin.

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Brazil and Turkey in the 21st century: strategic interests in comparative perspective[1]

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Abstract

This research aims to compare the strategic interests and the positioning at the foreign policy level of Brazil and Turkey in the 21st century, considering the rise to power of, respectively, Workers' Party (PT, in Portuguese) and Justice and Development's Party (AKP, in Turkish). Methodologically, it was used bibliographical research and analysis of speeches in the General Debate of the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) between 2010 and 2015. It was verified convergence between Brazil and Turkey in themes as the acknowledgment of the multipolarity of the World Order, the necessity of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) reform, the importance of the fortification of the global economic governance by G-20 and the compromise with the International Law, with the terrorism combat and with the Humans Right protections. As divergence point, it was verified the debates about the sort of reform to be implemented at the UNSC and some questions involving the Arab Spring, such as the military intervention at Libya in 2011. At last, some themes are more recurrent at one country's foreign policy than another's; as topics regarding Central Asia and Middle East, at Turkey's case, and subjects regarding BRICS and south-american regional integration, at Brazil's case.

Keywords: Brazil. Turkey. Foreign Policy. Strategic Interests.

Resumen

Esta investigación tiene como objetivo comparar los intereses estratégicos y el posicionamiento a nivel de política exterior de Brasil y Turquía en el siglo XXI, considerando el ascenso al poder, respectivamente, del Partido de los Trabajadores (PT, en portugués) y el Partido de la Justicia y el Desarrollo (AKP, en turco). Metodológicamente, se utilizó la investigación bibliográfica y análisis de los discursos

en el Debate General de la Asamblea General de las Naciones Unidas (AGNU) entre 2010 y 2015. Se verificó la ocurrencia de convergencia entre Brasil y Turquía en temas como el reconocimiento de la multipolaridad del Orden Mundial, la necesidad de la reforma del Consejo de Seguridad de las Naciones Unidas (CSNU), la importancia del fortalecimiento de la gobernanza económica global por parte del G-20 y el compromiso con el Derecho Internacional, con el combate al terrorismo y con las protecciones a los Derechos Humanos. Como punto de divergencia, se verificaron los debates sobre el tipo de reforma a implementar en el CSNU y algunas cuestiones relacionadas con la Primavera Árabe, como la intervención militar en Libia en 2011. Por último, se detectaron algunos temas que son más recurrentes en la política exterior de un país que en la de otro; como temas en materia regional de Asia Central y Medio Oriente, en el caso de Turquía, y temas de BRICS e integración regional sudamericana, en el caso de Brasil.

Palabras-clave: Brasil. Turquía. Política Exterior. Intereses Estratégicos.

RESUMO

Esta pesquisa tem como objetivo comparar os interesses estratégicos e o posicionamento no plano da política externa do Brasil e da Turquia no século 21, considerando a ascensão ao poder de, respectivamente, Partido dos Trabalhadores (PT) e Partido da Justiça e Desenvolvimento (AKP, em turco). Metodologicamente, utilizou-se a pesquisa bibliográfica e a análise de discursos no Debate Geral da Assembleia Geral das Nações Unidas (AGNU) entre 2010 e 2015. Foi verificada a ocorrência de convergência entre o Brasil e a Turquia em temas como o reconhecimento da multipolaridade da Ordem Mundial, a necessidade da reforma do Conselho de Segurança das Nações Unidas (CSNU), a importância do fortalecimento da governança econômica global pelo G-20 e o compromisso com o Direito Internacional, com o combate ao terrorismo e com as proteções dos Direitos Humanos. Como pontos de divergência, verificaram-se os debates sobre o tipo de reforma a ser implementada no CSNU e algumas questões envolvendo a Primavera Árabe, como a intervenção militar na Líbia em 2011. Por fim, foram detectados alguns temas que são mais recorrentes na política externa de um país do que na de outro; como temas relativos a questões regionais da Ásia Central e do Oriente Médio, no caso da Turquia, e assuntos relativos aos BRICS e à integração regional sul-americana, no caso do Brasil.

Palavras-chave: Brasil. Turquia. Política Externa. Interesses Estratégicos.

Introduction

The international transformations occurred with the Cold War's end and with the acceleration of the globalization process accentuated the multipolar tendencies of the international system, opening new possibilities for the international insertion of great peripheral States. Among the diverse concepts and analyses that have been elaborated to comprehend the emergence of intermediate countries, the BRIC concept – created in 2001 by Jim O'Neill, economist of the Goldman Sachs investment bank (O'NEILL, 2001) – was the most popularized, both in the media and in the academic field. In 2003, the BRIC used to correspond to 9% of the global GDP. Up to 2008, the economies of the four countries already corresponded jointly to 15% of the global economy, with their GDP adding up to nine trillion of dollars. In 2009, BRIC constituted a political discussion forum, and it embodied South Africa in 2011 (becoming "BRICS").

On the other hand, lots of works point other intermediate, medium or emerging powers as holders of significant capacities, mostly smaller than those of BRICS', but that can also influence regionally and, especially, affect the condition of regional power of BRICS countries (NOLTE, 2010). The emerging countries represent, increasingly, an object of interest for Brazilian foreign policy, as they constitute regional references of development, are intermediate States in terms of power and influence in the international system, and can support the Brazilian aspirations for medium power status. However, many have historical ties (economic and military) with developed countries. In this context, there is Turkey, holder of strategic importance in the Middle East and considered regional and intermediate power. This way, this research aims to identify the limits and the possibilities of international action of intermediate powers as Brazil and Turkey.

The following study has been developed in a context of frequents questionings about the similarities of the Brazilian and the Turkish behaviors at the international arena since the rise to power of the Worker's Party (PT, in Portuguese) and the Justice and Development Party (AKP, in Turkish). In that sense, the main objective of this research is to identify points of convergence and divergence in the international agenda of those countries, considering their respective political and social bases for the foreign policy formulation and their central axes of international integration.

Therefore, the core question to be answered is whether the position of these countries as emerging powers in the international system gives them convergent positioning, identifying if Turkey has been building routes of convergence with Brazil's foreign policy. To answer to this matter, the comparative method – a systemic procedure of case analysis – can be used, comparing the countries and establishing their similarities and differences, thus being "extremely useful to create and test propositions about the foreign policy behavior that apply to two or more cases" (ROSENAU, 1968, p. 308).

Foreign policy comparative analysis, based on a limited number of cases, has as methodology, basically, the identification and description of the core variables involved at the problem (LIJPHART, 1971). Here, the main independent variable is the fact that both countries are considered emerging. The international themes selected, identified as Brazilian strategic interests, act as dependent variables, which allow the observation of the similarities and differences in the foreign policies of these countries. The main intervenient variables are the relative capabilities (economic and military), their relative positions in their regions, their development models, their relations with the United States of America (USA), and their position regarding the debate on multipolarity. However, this research recognizes the difficulty of clearly separating the variables' orders, given the complexity of this analysis, generating overdetermination of variables, which can reinforce or exclude each other (HUDSON; VORE, 1995).

Thereby, seeking torender the comparison operational, the following variables have been chosen: a) economic development model; b) relations with the USA; c) defense of multipolarity; d) United Nations Security Council (UNSC)'s reform; e) climate change and development; f) terrorism and Humans Rights; g) nuclear research development; h) World

Trade Organization (WTO) – trade liberalization and the Doha Round; i) global economic governance (G-20); j) South-South cooperation; k) regional integration. The position of both countries regarding the events of the Arab Spring was also compared. Concerning the research techniques, the authors have used bibliographical research of both primary and secondary sources. So, the present work was built through the investigation of books and articles and through speech' analysis of the Brazilian and Turkish representatives' participation at the General Debate of the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) between 2010 and 2015.

Changes to Brazilian foreign policy

The revision of Brazil's matrix of international integration, which was in force in the 1990s, implied a redefinition of multilateral, regional and bilateral priorities. Brazil seeks a broad multilateral and universalist agenda, advocating mainly the multipolarity and the democratization of international decision-making bodies, such as the United Nations Security Council. The revaluation of multilateral forums for Brazil to present its points of view, win supporters and articulate channels of collective interests represents a new form of international integration, distinct from the previous matrix. A change in the scope of multilateral relations can be identified, with the expansion of strategic partnerships and coalition groups, seeking to advance diplomatically regarding the previous decade (AMORIM, 2004).

With the change of government in 2003, when Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva took over the presidency, multilateral policy remained central, but its content and strategies were reoriented. The new multilateral conception is based on a new reading of the international system, which identifies its power diffusion and multipolar tendencies, but recognizes its institutional constraint that hinders the insertion of developing countries. So, it defends the need for greater representation in discussion forums in order to democratize and increase the efficiency of organizations such as the United Nations. Regarding action, it seeks to explore new spaces of bargaining and negotiation, through intense use of articulation groups. According to Maria Regina Soares de Lima (2005), the Lula government's emphasis on multilateralism would be interrelated with the perception of Brazil's position in the international scenario as a medium power, "which sees in the mediation between the strong and weak its main contribution to the international stability and the recognition of its international projection not by force, but by parliamentary diplomacy" (LIMA, 2005, p. 15).

On the other hand, the multilateral agenda has gained new perspective, associating substantial issues of economic development and trade liberalization to the need for greater democratization of the decision-making process (mainly in the UN). It develops institutionalized coordination with developing countries, in forums such as IBSA and G-20. Thus, the Lula government accentuates the action on the horizontal-multilateral axis, conceiving an autonomous position for Brazil in the multilateral forums, as a great State, which would seek – by bargaining means rather than by good behavior – to gain greater visibility in the sphere of international power (PECEQUILO, 2008).

Thereby, in 2003, the country promoted the creation of two blocks, IBSA or G-3 (India, Brazil and South Africa) and the G-20. IBSA represents the institutionalization of the partnership between Brazil, India and South Africa, aiming to promote cooperation on "a wide range of topics ranging from trade to international security" (VIGEVANI; CEPALUNI, 2007, p. 296). The G-20 was established on 20 August 2003 during the preparatory meetings for the 5th WTO Ministerial Conference. The group focuses on agriculture, the central theme of the Doha Development Agenda (OLIVEIRA, 2005). The articulation with the countries known as BRIC (Brazil, Russia, India, and China) was institutionalized in June 2009, in the Russian city of Yekaterinburg, during the 1st BRIC Group Summit.

In that sense, Itamaraty[4] sought to increase the density of relations in spaces that were previously barely occupied by Brazilian diplomacy in the 1990s, with the approach to South American – especially the Andean – countries, Southern Africa and the Middle East, and to China, India and Russia. In addition, cooperation and deepening of partnerships with these countries allowed the construction of alliances of "variable geometry" such as the G-3, the G-20 and BRIC, in other words, these alliances potentiated Brazil's bilateral relations with countries classified as "strategic partnerships" (CERVO; BUENO, 2011).

By reinforcing its alliances with developing countries, Brazil gradually frees itself from the influence of traditional powers, acquiring greater autonomy. Thus, it is considered that the Brazilian foreign policy in the first decade of the new millennium has constituted a new matrix of international integration, in which it seeks to strengthen regional integration in South America and to recover Brazil's multilateral tradition of critical profile toward international asymmetries, as well as seeks to build strategic partnerships with similar countries in all continents (SILVA, 2015).

However, unlike the developmentalist matrix of the 1970s and 1980s, the new foreign policy matrix is more fluid and multidimensional, with flexible political arrangements, alliances, and strategic partnerships, combining actors, scenarios, and interests. The multidimensionality derives from diplomatic action and articulation in various plans (bilateral, multilateral and regional). It is observed that despite of the intensification of South-South cooperation, the traditional relations were not abandoned. Dilma Rousseff government (2011-2016) embraced this same conception, revealing a continuity regarding the foreign policy developed during the two mandates of President Lula, although some adjustments have been made in the program, mainly, due to the crisis situation that hit global economy and to the domestic political crisis that culminated in the impeachment process in 2016.

Changes to Turkish foreign policy

Turkey is included in a select group of countries that could surpass economically the G-7 countries, except the United States, according to Goldman Sachs forecasts for Next Eleven (N-11). This is due to the structure of the Turkish economy, whose level of maturity and development stands out among the N-11. In fact, Turkey went through several periods

4. Brazil's Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

of economic boom during the twentieth century. At first, the country adopted an import substitution policy, during which it set up its industrial base. Since the 1980s, however, Ankara has abdicated this project in favor of a liberalization strategy to attract foreign investment and boost the manufacturing industry, whose exports have become the engine of production expansion. Thus, Turkey began to integrate the route of international capital flows, boosting its trade balance.

If inclusion in the international market is the main virtue of the Turkish economy, government deficit and technological gap of some of its sectors are the main problems. Despite that, it should be noted that Turkey seems to have made considerable progress in terms of political stability. Throughout the previous century, the country has faced several coups d'état led by the army, which presented itself as the bastion of Turkish secularism. Since 2002, however, a party with Islamic roots that has been committed to institutionalizing democracy and preventing depositions of elected governments has been established. This process crystallizes the transformations of Turkish society, which seem to have already settled the necessary foundations to ensure long-term economic growth. Given its population and its strength in terms of military capabilities, it is presumed that Turkey's influence on the international system will tend to increase considerably in the next decades (WILSON; STUPNYTSKA, 2007, p. 5).

Turkey's international relations are articulated along three main axes, which shape the authorities' responses to the demands of the international system. In the first place, it is essential to connect the country to its geopolitical context, in a position of connection between Europe, Asia and the Middle East. Also important is the question of identity, as there is an important debate regarding the cultural belonging of the Turks, considering the fact that they are embedded in the crossing of different continents. Finally, the problems stemming from Turkish history must be emphasized, since the fact that the country was the seat of a great empire sometimes gives rise to pretensions of greatness in the practice and in the speeches of its leaders. These three factors intertwine and forge Turkish diplomacy (ALTUNISIK; TÜR, 2005).

For example, there are several elements that demonstrate the relevance of these aspects during the Cold War. Geopolitics became very important during the 1980s, due to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. The United States assigned much importance to Turkey, which was contemplated with new weapons. In that same period, Turkish aspiration to join the European Community generated many debates in civil society. Members of the Welfare Party (Refah Partisi – RP, in Turkish) even said that this interest was the result of a cruzade project. Subsequently, when the RP came to power, it considered necessary to approach Muslim countries, because the Muslim roots of the country would push it to do so. Other sectors, more linked to secularism, have criticized this position, arguing that Ankara needs to orient itself toward Europe if it wants to progress (ALTUNISIK; TÜR, 2005).

AKP's presence at the heart of the decision-making policies gives a more universal character to Turkish international relations. Although the party carries an inheritance of radical Islam, it has not turned its back on Eu-

rope; instead, retained the Turkish bid to join the European Union, which is, in fact, a majority's will of the local population. In addition, it has sought to be more active in the rest of the world, as evidenced by the creation of new embassies in Africa and Latin America. The government also encourages new partnerships in the Middle East, considering the region a priority. The rise of the AKP also increases the participation of the popular social classes in issues related to diplomacy, a novelty, as politics in the times of the secularists was, largely, applied from the top to the bottom (HIRO, 2009).

Relations between Turkey and the United States have undergone several oscillations since the end of World War II. During Clinton's administration, the proximity between the two governments remained, which was crystallized in Turkish cooperation in the Balkans, for example. As counterpart, Washington positioned itself in favor of Turkey's accession to the European Community and also favorably to the construction of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline. At that time, the commercial partnership also increased and, US entrepreneurs started to invest more in the Turkish market, especially in communications, energy and infrastructure (GÜN, 2009).This placidity in relations, however, ended at the Iraq War of 2003, as the Turkish Parliament did not authorize the installation of US troops in Turkish territory, despite the government's interest in doing so. After this event, relations between the two countries entered a phase of uncertainty. Another problem aroused from the Iraq War is the possibility of the emergence of a Kurdish state in the region (ALTUNISIK; TÜR, 2005).

Since Obama's government, few changes have occurred in relation to previous paradigms. The United States continues to argue that the fight against terrorism is one of the pillars of partnership with the Turks, also because Turkey faces this problem domestically due to the PKK (GÜN, 2009). There is also discord over relations with Iran, as Ankara has tried to avoid economic sanctions against Tehran. As a consequence of this position, Obama announced that new arms sales will be subject to Turkish behavior. Obama's criticisms on the Armenian genocide of the early twentieth century also sparked apprehension in the Turkish government, which evidently did not appreciate these comments.

Turkish belonging – or not – to Europe is materialized in the Turkish attempt to join the European Union (EU). Indeed, Ankara demanded entry into the European Economic Community as early as 1959 and obtained associate membership status four years later. In subsequent years, nevertheless, a series of political problems caused the Turkish authorities to avoid an official request to become a full member, being the invasion of Cyprus the main one. European Community countries have severely criticized this attitude, which has made the Turkish government aware of the impossibility of succeeding on this issue. In 1987, then, there was the official attempt, which was rejected two years later. It should also be pointed out that the negative answer was peremptory, without any prospect of reversal (ALTUNISIK; TÜR, 2005).

From the economic point of view, though, this situation changed in the following decade. In 1995, a Customs Union was established between Turkey and the European Union, which determines the free movement of goods between these regions. This rule, however, does not apply to agriculture,

as some European countries fear the competition from Turkish products (YILMAZ, 2008). In the wake of these events, the government has sought to implement measures aiming to the acceptance of its candidature to the European Union, such as further promotion of Human Rights and suspension of the death penalty. The biggest problem, nevertheless, derives from the fact that the Turkish population exceeds 70 million, raising fears in the European Union about its absorption. The atavistic dispute with the Greeks also does not favor Turkey. It cannot be ignored, either, that the idea of admitting a Muslim nation within Europe displeases many (ALTUNISIK; TÜR, 2005).

Brazilian strategic interests revealed at the United Nations General Assembly

In analyzing statements by President Dilma at the UN General Assembly (UNGA), we can perceive concepts that guide the foreign policy of her government. Among the most frequent and emphatic ones are the following: multilateralism and democratization of multilateral institutions (perspective of the rise of multipolarity and of greater participation of developing countries); UN reform (global governance crisis and the need for reforms, especially in the UNSC); sustainable development(economic development associated to the eradication of poverty, with the zealous use of natural resources and with environmentally sustainable patterns of production and consumption); economic-financial equilibrium (criticism toward the financial market and the monetary, exchange and commercial policies of developed countries); protection of Human Rights (creation of the principle of Responsibility while Protecting and criticism of Human Rights violation through cybernetic espionage).

The issues regarding multilateralism and democratization of multilateral institutions are linked to the premise of a recent transformation in the international order. Dilma and her foreign policy makers seek Brazil's international integration in a world that has recently become multipolar but has retained obsolete mechanisms of debate and cooperation between nations. In this sense, the government defends multilateralism as the most reasonable way of maintaining world peace and stability in this new multipolar system (ROUSSEFF, 2011; 2014). Furthermore, it advocates greater democracy in multilateral forums, since, in this new context, the absence of developing (and especially emerging) countries in multilateral discussions compromises the global governance process' efficiency and restricts the legitimacy of these institutions (ROUSSEFF, 2011; 2012; 2013; 2015).

UN reform is linked to the previous concepts, also associated to the view of loss of efficiency and legitimacy of the bodies that maintain their structure and operations based on the outdated system. According to that perception, Dilma maintains that the world suffers not only from an economic crisis, but also from a political trust and governance crisis (ROUSSEFF, 2011). The countries who have the power to take action in international institutions no longer have the power to make their decisions legitimate and to compel other States to put their resolutions into practice. Thus, in the midst of the demands for reform of the UN Security Council, the president reiterates Brazil's interest and commitment to take part in the group of permanent members as a Latin American representative. Defending that

Brazil is the greatest power in the region, Dilma's administration affirms that the country is likewise a reference in promoting peace, respect for Human Rights and promotion of multilateralism (ROUSSEFF, 2012; 2014).

The development matter during Lula's administration focused on the so-called South-South cooperation, so that the developing countries would gain more space in the international system. Moreover, even though the concept of development allied to peace was present in his foreign policy agenda, the main emphasis was on the economic issue. To claim that the economic aspect was abandoned in the Dilma's government would be a misunderstanding. What occurred, in fact, was a greater attention to the promotion of elements that should accompany economic development, such as peace and security. From this conception, Brazil, under Dilma's foreign policy, proposed to aid developing countries in issues that go far beyond the financial aspect; reaching themes such as cooperation in food security, agricultural technology, clean and renewable energy generation and combat of poverty and hunger. In this sense, Brazil achieved a great victory with its performance of Rio+20 conference (ROUSSEFF, 2012).

At the conference, which was a mark of multilateralism, the country was able to approve the inclusion of points such as the fight against hunger and poverty as a Sustainable Development Goal. Thus, the search for domestic achievement and promotion of international efforts for a sustainable development model that combines economic growth, eradication of poverty, conscious use of natural resources and sustainable patterns of consumption and production was a milestone in the foreign policy of the Dilma government regarding development, cooperation and environmental care (ROUSSEFF, 2012; 2014; 2015).

The search for economic-financial equilibrium is based on criticisms of deregulation of the financial market, Currency War, protectionism of developed countries, and exclusion of emerging countries from the debate on solutions to the 2008 global economic crisis (ROUSSEFF, 2011; 2012). President Dilma's questioning, in general, concerns the use of orthodox policies by developed countries, which have negative effects on developing countries, forcing emerging countries to adopt criticized defense measures (ROUSSEFF, 2012). The president calls for a greater regulation of financial markets, in view of the need to control the indiscriminate entry of speculative capital that leaves the economy volatile. In addition, she recriminates the so-called – by the then Finance Minister, Guido Mantega –Currency War, a maneuver by developed countries that leaves Brazil at disadvantage in international trade. Nevertheless, she repudiates protectionism, vehemently denying accusations that Brazil uses such mechanism. Besides, in all her speeches the president was emphatic in her call for a decentralization of the world economic debate (ROUSSEFF, 2011; 2012; 2013).The demand for greater participation of developing countries in economic policy decisions was constant; as well as the demand for the deepening of interactions between the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank (WB), the WTO, the UN, and multilateral forums that are more representative, such as the G-20 –Dilma's main instrument regarding economic debates at the international level – (ROUSSEFF, 2012).

Continuing Brazilian diplomatic tradition of defending the protection of Human Rights, President Dilma condemned violence against civil-

ians in insurgencies in the Middle East – in the context of the Arab uprisings. This led to debate on the principle of Responsibility while Protecting (RwP), a complement to the principle of Responsibility to Protect (R2P), which was questioned when humanitarian intervention in Libya became a military intervention for regime change (ROUSSEFF, 2011; 2012). The introduction of the Responsibility while Protecting principle was a daring move of the Dilma government's foreign policy, considered a concrete measure of demonstrating Brazil's ability to take diplomatic initiatives, underpinning Brazil's pursue for a permanent seat on the UNSC. Furthermore, the formulation of the principle marked a change of Brazilian position, which now admits the need for foreign intervention in certain circumstances. Another evidence of Brazil's tougher stance on Human Rights abuses under Dilma's government. Finally, another issue that was treated as a Human Rights violation by the president was the virtual espionage that assaulted the privacy of civilians, decision-makers and Brazilian strategic companies. It triggered efforts, especially in cooperation with Germany, to condemn such acts as a Human Rights violation (ROUSSEFF, 2013).

Turkish strategic interest revealed at the United Nations General Assembly

When analyzing statements by Turkish representatives in the General Debates of the United Nations General Assembly between 2010 and 2015, one can identify concepts that have been guiding Turkish foreign policy in this period. Among the most frequent and emphatic ones, are the following: multilateralism and democratization of multilateral institutions (perspective of the rise of multipolarity, UN reform, strengthening of the G-20, commitment to international law, defense of nuclear non-proliferation); protection of Human Rights (combat of terrorism and Islamophobia, concern for refugees); responsible development (commitment to humanitarian aid and cooperation with Least Developed Countries– LDCs –, notion of collective environmental responsibilities); and regional security and stability (promotion of democracy in the Middle East, encouragement of cooperation and economic interdependence with neighbors).

Turkey recognizes that the international system is in the process of multipolarization and, therefore, believes that it is necessary to adapt multilateral institutions to this new order. In this way, Turkey advocates for a reform in the UN system, especially in the Security Council – but not in the format intended by Brazil – (DAVUTOČLU, 2012; 2015; ERDOČAN, 2011; 2014; GÜL, 2010; 2013).Turkey also criticizes the traditional international financial institutions (IMF, WB etc) and emphasizes the role of the G-20 in overcoming the 2008 international economic crisis, advocating a strengthening of more democratic arrangements for such economic debates (DAVUTOČLU, 2015; GÜL, 2010). In addition to these traditional demands from emerging countries, Turkey also demands greater respect for international law, especially regarding equal treatment between States (GÜL, 2010). In this sense, it questions the double standards for issues such as nuclear non-proliferation. Double standards cases, according to the country, damage the credit of international institutions. Therefore, Turkey calls for a new approach to the issue of nuclear

non-proliferation; in order to be fair, it must have a more democratic and universal approach (GÜL, 2010).

In the point of Human Rights, Turkey criticizes the selectivity in statements proclaiming the protection of these rights. Thus, its representatives condemn what is considered as negotiability of these rights (DAVUTOČLU, 2012; ERDOČAN, 2011). Turkey advocates that Human Rights need to be respected unconditionally and emphasizes two types of violations that affect the country: Islamophobia and terrorism (DAVU-TOČLU, 2012; GÜL, 2013). For Turkey, the lack of confidence and lack of a sense of justice in the UN is a strengthening factor of terrorism and, so, the country reaffirms the necessity for reforms in this institution. It defends the combat of terrorism to be indiscriminate, regardless of political, ideological or religious orientation, and believes that combating terrorism is the greatest challenge of these days. In relation to Islamophobia, Turkish representatives affirm that prejudice and hate speech cannot be confused with freedom of expression (DAVUTOČLU, 2012; 2015).The issue of refugees is of utmost concern to Turkey, especially since the beginning of the Syrian Civil War. According to the Turkish government, the country sees the issue of refugees and migrants in a more comprehensive perspective than a mere State security issue. The Turks deal with the matter through the binomial development-humanitarian aid in order to seek long-term solutions to the problem (DAVUTOČLU, 2015; ERDOČAN, 2014).

Turkey desires to be a model for the States of its region and also wants to project itself as a regional power concerned with others States globally. For that reason, the Turkish foreign policy applies the concept of responsible development. In this sense, the country, taking advantage of its good economic moment, emphasizes its willingness to assist in the development of other countries, especially those known as Least Developed Countries and African countries (GÜL, 2010; 2013). Turkey emphasizes its collaboration with humanitarian aid and its proposal for cooperation based on the principle of mutual benefits. In this regard, the cooperation agency of Turkey (TIKA, in Turkish) stands out (ERDOČAN, 2011; GÜL, 2010). Regarding the environment, the country states that it should be considered as a global indivisible public good. Hence, the international community must assume collective responsibilities toward its protection (GÜL, 2010).

The core regional matter of Turkey is the promotion of regional security and stability, so that the country can develop itself and assume the role of regional power. Turkey – differently from Brazil – does not mention a process of regional integration, but stresses the importance of its efforts for greater cooperation in the different regions to which it belongs (Middle East, Caucasus, Balkans, and Central Asia) (DAVUTOČLU, 2015; GÜL, 2010). Turkey sought to disseminate its model of democracy in the Middle East, in order to create a favorable environment to the expansion of relations, especially economic, between the countries of the region. The Arab Spring was a timely event in that direction, allowing Turkey to project itself as a regional leader in rebuilding a democratic Middle East. Nevertheless, it is known that in the course of this process the instability of the region only worsened, damaging the Turkish doctrine of "Zero Problems with the Neighbors". Besides, throughout the speeches in the

UN General Debate, in the regional perspective Turkey also claims for the recognition of the Palestinian State and for the resolution of the Cyprus issue (ERDOČAN, 2011; GÜL, 2010, 2013). In both cases, the country demands respect for international law and uses this theme as an example of UN's fragility regarding conflict resolution, again pointing the lack of democracy and representativeness in the organization. The conjuncture situation in its region made the issues of the Syrian Civil War, the DAESH (Islamic State) and the Failed State of Libya being constants in the speeches (DAVUTOČLU, 2012; ERDOČAN, 2011; GÜL, 2013).

Brazil and Turkey Bilateral Relations

Relations between Brazil and Turkey have grown rapidly and become increasingly relevant to these countries in the last decade. Although there have been bilateral agreements for more than 150 years, only in recent years a strategic partnership has been achieved (LAZAROU, 2016). In this context, there were official visits, signing of agreements and establishment of covenants –which involved both government and private sector – signaling a change in the way these countries relate (BRAZIL, 2011c).

In 2003, an important agreement was signed on cooperation in defense-related matters in order to promote the exchange of personnel for practical training, participation in courses, seminars, and conferences (BRAZIL, 2003). The year of 2004 was a mark for bilateral relations due to the visit of Celso Amorim, the first Brazilian Foreign Minister to visit Turkey in an official mission (BRAZIL, 2006b, p. 227-228). In the same year, Brazilian Minister of Development, Industry and Foreign Trade, Luís Fernando Furlan, and Defense Minister, José Viegas, also visited Turkey. Brazil received Turkish National Economy Minister, Kemal Unakitan, in Brasilia for the 1st Meeting of Economic, Commercial and Industrial Cooperation between Brazil and Turkey (BRAZIL, 2010c). The result of the missions was noticed in the immediate trade increase in the following year (BRAZIL, 2011f).

Between 18 and 21 January 2006, Brazil received Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister of Turkey, Abdullah Gül, accompanied by a delegation of approximately 50 people. He participated in the creation of the Brazil-Turkey Business Council and also visited Embraer and Turkish Honorary Consulate. The arrival of Deputy Prime Minister served to show the soaring interest of the two countries in strengthening their political and trade relations (BRAZIL, 2006b). For this reason, a Joint High-Level Committee was set up to foster cooperation in the following areas: "political dialogue, economy and trade, science, technology, defense industry, finance, investment, tourism, culture, cooperation between diplomatic academies, and other areas of mutual interest" (BRAZIL, 2006a). This commission became responsible for the significant approximation in later years.

Due to the convergence in several matters, these countries have achieved a higher degree of cooperation in areas such as political consultations – through the High-Level Cooperation Commission – and energy cooperation – with the installation of Petrobras in Turkey. Petrobras and the Turkish Petroleum Corporation (TPAO) have identified potential cooperation themes in several sectors. So, they have started work-

ing together on oil and gas exploration on the Black Sea coast (BRAZIL, 2011c). In May 2009, President Lula made the first official visit of a Brazilian Head of State to Turkey. In his speech, President Lula emphasized the rapprochement between the two countries, with the creation of the High-Level Cooperation Commission, the installation of Petrobras in the country and the growth of bilateral trade.

By becoming conflict mediators, countries without great military or economic capabilities have found a way to exert influence on important issues in the international arena. Only so Brazil would be able to participate in peace and security issues in the Middle East, as suggested by President Lula (GHITIS, 2009). In this context, the former president was the mediator of an agreement signed in Tehran between Iranian President, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, and Turkish Prime Minister, Tayyip Erdogan, in May 2010. The agreement concerned the Iranian nuclear program, criticized and seen as a threat to regional security and the nuclear non-proliferation system by the United States (FONTEIJN; ASSL; INGRAM, 2010). This achievement was only made possible due to the participation of Brazil and Turkey in the negotiations, in view of the unsuccessful negotiations conducted by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in the previous year (SILVA, 2010).

Like Brazil, Turkey defends the right to develop nuclear energy research for peaceful purposes, in accordance with Article IV of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) (BRAZIL, 2010b; SILVA, LEÃES, 2014). The involvement in the Iranian issue has allowed Brazil and Turkey to bring positive influences in a region where the influence of the United States and Europe is viewed with apprehension by many (FONTEIJN; ASSL; INGRAM, 2010). Despite this effort, the UN Security Council approved a fourth round of sanctions on Iran. Turkey and Brazil were the only countries that voted against it, while Lebanon abstained (JORNAL DE BRASÍLIA, 2010). According to President Lula, the Tehran Declaration was not intended to solve all problems, but aimed at re-establishing dialogue, building trust between countries and overcoming controversies (BRAZIL, 2010d).

After joint efforts on the Iranian issue, the Prime Minister of Turkey came to Brazil in May 2010. Recep Tayyip Erdogan was at the inauguration of the General Consulate of Turkey in São Paulo, visited Embraer, met with President Lula and participated in the Brazil-Turkey Business Forum. This was the first visit of a Turkish Prime Minister to Brazil (ANATOLIA NEWS AGENCY, 2010). During this visit an action plan for the strategic partnership was established between the two countries (BRAZIL, 2010a).

Through this action plan, the strategic partnership can be built based on nine points. The first one is political dialogue and cooperation in multilateral forums, where both commit themselves to establishing interactions, exchanging information on their respective regions, especially on issues of peace and security. Brazil and Turkey have agreed to focus efforts on defending the goals of disarmament and non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. They have also pledged to articulate positions in multilateral forums. Furthermore, on the one hand, Brazil was in favor of bringing Tur-

key closer to MERCOSUR; on the other hand, Turkey manifested its interest in approaching BRICS and IBSA, in order to facilitate dialogue between these countries, as well as expressed its support to Brazil's rapprochement with the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) (BRAZIL, 2010a).

Second, the countries have defined the cooperation in the area of trade and investment. By that, these countries started to encourage the formation of public and private joint ventures in Brazil and Turkey as well as in third countries. They have highlighted cooperation with Africa, cooperation in research and development, and cooperation in the aeronautical sector. Third, it was pointed the energy cooperation, related to the presence of Petrobras in Turkey. Then, cooperation in the areas of biodiversity, as well as in the issues of environment and sustainable development. The sixth point is cooperation in the defense area, where countries reaffirmed their commitment to the 2003 agreement on this subject. The exchange for visits and training became the most important aspect, as well as the efforts for identifying business opportunities in the defense industry. For this purpose, it was proposed the creation of a joint working group on defense. The last three points deal with prevention of organized crime and terrorism, joint work in the area of science and technology, and cultural and educational cooperation (BRAZIL, 2010a).

As the same time of the establishment of the strategic partnership, trade relations increased significantly due to closer ties between the two countries. Trade increased by approximately 330% between 2002 and 2008, reaching US$ 2,195,456,920 until November 2011 (BRAZIL, 2011f). Brazilian exports are heavily concentrated in iron and iron ore, which accounted for approximately 30% of total volume of Brazil's exports to Turkey in 2011. But Brazil also exports soy, wheat, cotton, coffee, and tobacco to Turkey (BRAZIL, 2011d). Yet, Brazil imports a much more diversified list of intermediate goods such as iron and steel bars and wires, automobile bodywork accessories, artificial fiber yarns, and some types of motor vehicles (BRAZIL, 2011e).

The expansion of business is favored by the complementarity between the two economies. However, despite geographical distance, the greatest obstacle to trade relations is the so called cultural distance between the two countries: "insufficient institutional dialogue, limited integration of professional and business networks, restrictions to the transit and residence of professionals, and different patterns of consumption" (BRAZIL, 2009, p. 63). As these two economies expand and reach more fields globally, it becomes more urgent to overcome these differences.

The visit of President Dilma Rousseff in October 2011 served to reaffirm the interest of the two countries in narrowing ties, finding new affinities, and strengthening the strategic partnership. The countries signed acts in higher education, agreements on the transfer of convicted persons and juridical assistance in criminal matters (BRAZIL, 2011a). Proofs of the continuation of the close relations between the two countries in Dilma's government were Brazilian support for Turkey's candidacy for a non-permanent seat in the UN Security Council for the 2015-2016 mandate and, at the same time, Turkish appeal to Brazil's entry as an observer at the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (BRAZIL, 2011c).

However, the first major divergence faced by the countries was the situation in countries affected by the wave of riots during the Arab Spring. In general, Brazil and Turkey dealt differently with these events (BRAZIL, 2011b). Notwithstanding, the advisory body of the Brazilian presidency affirmed that different perceptions regarding the situation of the Arab world in the post Arab Spring period do not mean divergences per se, only different ways of dealing with the matter.

Therefore, despite the promising strategic partnership, changes in the international scenario and in the domestic environment have hindered the intensity of bilateral relations in recent years. The Arab Spring profoundly reoriented relations in the Middle East, provoking a relative withdrawal from Brazil and deepening Turkey's engagement in its region. In the meantime, both countries have faced, especially since 2013, a complex and fragile domestic political conjuncture, with growing popular manifestations and institutional instability, culminating in the soft coup d'état in Brazil – through the impeachment process of President Dilma Rousseff –and in the attempt of military coup in Turkey, both in 2016.

Final Remarks

The analysis of the official statements of Brazil and Turkey in the last decade, in a comparative perspective, allows us to recognize the points of agreement and disagreement in the interests agenda of each country, as well as to identify the themes that are of more relevance for one country or the other. The independent variable is the fact that the countries are emerging and considered medium powers by the literature. The dependent variables were the positions regarding subjects present in their international agenda. The comparison of the discourses allows us to conclude that the two countries converge in some general subjects, but that their histories, national interests, and projection in different regions give them different positions in several topics of their respective agendas. Overall, Turkey's positioning is rhetorically stronger than Brazil's, with firmer and more assertive positions, except for the issue of Human Rights, in which Turkey tends to have a more defensive position than Brazil.

Regarding the Arab Spring, Brazil and Turkey naturally dealt differently with the events. Brazil, of which some analysts expected more assertive positions by virtue of the more emphatic defense of Human Rights under Dilma Rousseff's administration, followed its tradition of caution regarding regime change, condemning violations of rights, but opposing external interference in domestic matters. Hence, the country did not take sides with governments and possible regime changes, guaranteeing the possibility of establishing good relations with the States involved, whatever the outcome of the riots.

Turkey has gone through several contradictions that have put an end to the policy of good relations with its neighbors (the so called "Zero Problems with the Neighbors" policy). By prioritizing the promotion of its democratic model, Turkey counted on heavy riots that would gen-

erate rapid changes in regimes, allowing the country to maintain good relations with the new governments of that time. This is what happened with Tunisia and Egypt. Meanwhile, the situation in Libya and, above all, in Syria, bound Turkey to the discourse of necessity of regime change, causing a rupture in diplomatic relations with the governments in power, and involving Ankara in its neighbors' civil wars. In this way, a Turkish lapse in the projection of scenarios has led to the dismantling of the successful regional policy of the last decade. As a result, while Turkey suffered with negative consequences both politically and economically, Brazil was able to remain politically well-disposed in the region undergoing only economic losses.

Table 1 – Synthetic frame: strategic interests in comparative perspective

	BRAZIL	TURKEY
a) Economic development model	The government presents two main axes in its development model: poverty reduction and technological development. Presence of the State as an inducer of the economy.	Turkey focuses its economic growth on attracting foreign investments, which fosters its industrialization and promotes its exports. The State is present as the main regulator, and controls some important sectors, although the private sector is strong.
b) Relations with the USA	Strategic Dialogue – Commercial Difficulties. Differences of vision in various themes, such as the Doha Round, humanitarian intervention, nuclear issue and the Middle East.	The US was Turkey's main ally during the Cold War, despite some occasional deviations. Since 2003, there have been some frictions, but countries still have close ties.
c) Defense of multipolarity	Imminence of a multipolar world. Brazil seeks to insert itself in this new order with two purposes: on the one hand, to promote communication between the already consolidated poles; on the other hand, to ensure that the poorest and minor States are actually represented, building an inclusive multilateralism.	After decades conditioning its foreign policy based on alignment with the United States, Turkey gained a more assertive view from 2002 on, advocating multipolarity and its role as a regional leader. There is an emphasis on Turkish capacity to assist in conflict resolution and in development promotion through international cooperation.
d) United Nations Security Council (UNSC)'s reform	It advocates a reform of the Security Council, with the greater presence of developing countries. Participates in the G-4 (Brazil, Japan, India, and Germany).	Criticizes the Security Council for failing to represent nations equitably. Veto power is also questioned. Crisis of Syria illustrates the inability of the UNSC to deal with international conflicts. Contrary to the G4 proposal.
e) Climate change and development	Defends the principle of "common but differentiated responsibilities". Signatory of the environmental protocols.	Is signatory to the Protocols of Montreal and Kyoto but does not usually highlight the environment issue in its official statements.
f) Terrorism and Humans Rights	Brazil participates in the UN Human Rights Council. It argues that there are violations in every country, without exception, and characterizes authoritarianism, xenophobia, misery, capital punishment, and discrimination as forms of Human Rights violation. It criticizes indifference to terrorism, but also advocates "responsibility while protecting".	Terrorism is central to Turkish foreign policy because of the conflict with the Kurdish separatist group, the PKK. In addition, terrorism is seen as a destabilizing element, which is particularly serious in the Middle East, a region that Turkey prioritizes in international relations. Combating terrorism is one way of promoting stability and the Turkish role in the region. The country is admonished for its Human Rights violations, mainly against the minorities as the Kurds, but the Turkish government has been careful to defend itself against criticism.
g) Nuclear research development	Brazil has abdicated nuclear weapons, allowing the use of nuclear energy only for peaceful purposes. It advocates disarmament and non-proliferation, but it supports the right of nuclear production for peaceful purposes.	Turkey has no pretension of obtaining an atomic bomb but considers sacred the right to nuclear technology for peaceful purposes. The country is developing its nuclear capability and has worked with Brazil to resolve the Iranian nuclear issue.
h) World Trade Organization (WTO) – trade liberalization and the Doha Round	Defends the positions of the commercial G-20, created in 2003.	Little action in the Doha Round. Turkish economy is essentially for the export of manufactured goods, made in industries that have European or North American FDI. At this point, the country remains with a positioning close to the richest States.
i) Global economic governance (G-20)	In order to overcome the economic crisis, it is necessary to coordinate the efforts of the countries within the multilateral organizations, such as the G-20, the IMF and the World Bank. To contain the recession, these agencies must foster a reformulation of the relationship between fiscal and monetary policy, as well as control over the currency war.	There is a need for changes in global economic governance, in order to enable the development of the poorest nations. Turkey also condemns the excessive liberalization of the financial sector, responsible for the latest economic crisis. However, the close ties with the US and the EU make Ankara's positioning not so clear on the issue.
j) South-South cooperation	Strengthening South-South cooperation in the last decade (especially with Africa and Latin America). Brazil became aware of its international responsibilities. Thus, the government is expanding its technical cooperation program with less developed countries, focusing on agriculture and food security, education, vocational training, justice, sport, health, environment, information technology, labor, urban development, and bioenergy.	There has been a great incentive to South-South cooperation since 2002, with the rise of AKP. It highlights the possibilities for Turkey to play a regional leadership role, resolving conflicts and promoting social economic development. In addition, Ankara also seeks to get closer to other developing or emerging countries, such as Brazil, China and Russia, showing that there are common interests, especially with regard to defending multipolarity in international relations.
k) Regional integration	Mercosur and South America remain a priority to Brazilian foreign policy. Avoiding harassment of major powers, ensuring regional security and deepening the integration process.	The Middle East is the priority of Turkish foreign policy, and its foreign policy formulators see a prominent role for the country in the region. However, the existence of many conflicts undermines the possibility of an eventual regional integration.

Source: Prepared by the authors, based on BRAZIL (2003,2010a, 2011a, 2011b, 2011c), DAVUTOČLU(2011, 2015), GÜL (2010, 2013), ERDOČAN (2011, 2014); KANAT (2014); AKMAN (2012), BABACAN (2011)

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Rival American Allies: Turkey and Israel in the Eastern Mediterranean

Aliados rivales de Estados Unidos: Turquía e Israel en el Mediterráneo oriental

Aliados americanos rivais: Turquia e Israel no Mediterrâneo Oriental

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ABSTRACT

The contemporary dynamics between Israel and Turkey have been confrontational at recent times though this doesn't seem to affect the relations in other areas as the trade balance advancing towards the $8 million shows. This article focuses on the relations between Israel and Turkey within the context of the East Mediterranean geopolitics. Reviewing its shift from a quasi-alliance to a stiff geopolitical rivalry in the region, the article explores scenarios for near future.

Keywords: Israel. Turkey. East Mediterranean geopolitics.

RESUMEN

La dinámica contemporánea entre Israel y Turquía ha sido conflictiva en los últimos tiempos, aunque esto no parece afectar las relaciones en otras áreas, ya que la balanza comercial avanza hacia los $ 8 millones. Este artículo se centra en las relaciones entre Israel y Turquía en el contexto de la geopolítica del Mediterráneo Oriental. Al revisar su cambio de una cuasi-alianza a una dura rivalidad geopolítica en la región, el artículo explora escenarios para el futuro cercano.

Palabras clave: Israel. Turquia. Geopolítica del Mediterráneo Oriental.

RESUMO

A dinâmica contemporânea entre Israel e Turquia tem sido conflituosa recentemente, embora isso não pareça afetar as relações em outras áreas, já que a balança comercial está avançando para US $ 8 milhões. Este artigo enfoca as relações entre Israel e a Turquia no contexto da geopolítica do Mediterrâneo Oriental. Revendo sua mudança de uma quase aliança para uma rivalidade geopolítica rígida na região, o artigo explora cenários para um futuro próximo.

Palavras-chave: Israel. Turquia. Geopolítica do Mediterrâneo Oriental.

Introduction

"Even if you gave me the gold of the world I would not accept." (OKE, 1982) answered Sultan Abdulhamid to the request of Theodor Herzl, the founder of the Zionist movement offering 150 million pounds of gold for the permission to settle in Palestine. "While I am alive I would rather push a sword into my body than see the land of Palestine is taken away from the Islamic State. This will never happen. I will not start cutting our bodies while we are alive." (THE DIARY OF THEODORE HERZL, s/d) Nevertheless, following the meeting between Herzl and the Sultan in 1901, Herzl was convinced that the hope for Palestine lies in the Ottoman capitol. He issued a postcard featuring a picture of himself and the Sultan with a Hebrew blessing above his head. Zionist leaders like Ben Gurion and Yizhak Ben Zvi were convinced that *Ottomanisation* – giving up foreign citizenship and acting as Ottoman citizens– is the preferred strategy for the Zionist movement. Convinced of this idea, Ben Gurion even pursued a law degree in Turkey (ZOHAR, 1986). The contemporary dynamics between Israel and Turkey have been confrontational at recent times though this doesn't seem to affect the relations in other areas as the trade balance advancing towards the $8 million shows. (AYDOGAN, 2017) This article focuses on the relations between Israel and Turkey within the context of the East Mediterranean geopolitics. Reviewing its shift from a quasi-alliance to a stiff geopolitical rivalry in the region, the article explores scenarios for near future.

A Fragile Friendship, 1949-1990

Becoming the first Muslim country to do so, Turkey recognized Israel in March 1949 and sent its Ambassador, Seyfullah Esin, as the chief of mission to Tel Aviv in 1950. Being non-Arab allies to the West in the Middle East, Israel and Turkey had common interests such as the water conflict with Syria. Israel, barely surviving it's war of independence, aimed to break its isolation in the midst of a hostile Arab environment in the early years of the Cold War period. Turkey, joining NATO in 1952, considered the relations with Israel as a balancing act against the Soviet threat finding footholds in the Middle East and the Eastern Mediterranean . Turkey signed the Baghdad Pact (1955) as a result of this obsession with the Soviet threat. Despite seeing itself as an independent regional player, Turkey understood the necessity to cooperate with Israel to confront with the emerging power balance in the region. However, it's public opinion could accept Israel's conduct only to an extent. Hence it returned its Ambassador to Ankara in 1958, as a response to the Sinai war when Israel conspired with the UK and France against Egypt. It would do so a number of additional times in the future.

The American relationship with Ankara and Tel-Aviv also had a dilemma from the start, as both countries had their own geopolitical interests. Their visions for the region occasionally conflict with the Western priorities. Instead of being America's proxies in the Middle East, they have searched for being its partners. Their relations have been sensitive to re-

gional power struggle during the Cold War (HALE, 2002). For instance, the crisis of June 1964 when Turkey threatened to intervene in Cyprus to prevent the intercommunal clashes between the Greek and Turkish Cypriots in the island was a watershed in relations. President Johnson sent a letter to the Prime Minister Inonu on 5 June to prevent the intervention and a possible war between Turkey and Greece. Stating that "adhesion to NATO, in its very essence means that NATO countries will not wage war on each other.", the letter underlines "…a military intervention in Cyprus by Turkey could lead to direct involvement by the Soviet Union" (PRESIDENT JOHNSON, 1964, p. 354). This letter the US conditioned Turkey's decision to diversify its relations, especially the sources of military equipment in the coming decades (ULUSOY, 2016). Israel also needed military assistance in its wars against Arab neighbors. The same administration delayed it until after election day in 1964 and in 1968 (LITTLE, 1993). Fearing that acquiring atomic weapons would push Arab radicals into Moscow's line, the American administration expected Israel to drop its nuclear weapons plan and act as conventional deterrent with American hardware. Until the 1970's Israel struggled to survive in wars with Arab states while Turkey sought to build alliances in the region. The Cyprus issue left Turkey in need to increase its friends to defend its case at the UN. Turkey sided with Egypt in the 1967 war and participated the Organization of the Islamic Conference in 1969. Disappointed with the American response to its case in Cyprus, Turkey denied the US the use of its airbases to supply Israel in the 1973 war; allowed the Soviet jets to support Syria in the war; and deepened economic relations to offset the effects of the American embargo after its 1974 intervention in Cyprus. Failing to secure aid from the West, Turkey expanded its economic relations with the Gulf countries, Iraq and Iran.

The Golden Era (1990-2002)

The 1990's marks the beginning of the golden era in Turkey-Israel relations. Israel, confident in its military strength and alliance with the US projected a positive atmosphere in the peace process with Palestinians following the Madrid conference of 1991 (BERELOVICH, 2014). Turkey, freed from the Cold War and now seeking to further position itself as American ally had seen less obstacles in furthering the alliance with Israel. Israel became a natural ally for Turkey facing with Syrian aid to PKK, Iran's policy of exporting its Islamic revolution- a threat to Turkey's secular regime- and the EU's lukewarm attitude to membership. In need of allies with common threat perceptions about Syria, Iran and Islamic radicalism, Israel welcomed Turkey (UZER, 2013). Turkey has never lost its desire to play a role in regional politics. The Oslo agreement was an opportunity to expand influence by playing a mediating role in the Palestinian conflict. Following the appointment of Ambassador to Israel and a tourism agreement in 1992, Turkey and Israel signed a series of agreements including a double-taxation and bilateral investment treaty, university exchange and environmental cooperation (BERELOVICH, 2014). The strategy was to deepen cooperation in low policy areas not to draw reactions from the region.

This positive atmosphere was cultivated by high-level visits between the countries in the early 1990s during which the trade volume increased from more than 90 million dollars in 1989 to more than 600 million dollars in 1997. They signed military cooperation agreements including intelligence-sharing and training. Israel gained access to the Turkish airspace for training and the air force modernization. Already in 1992, the two nations' defense ministers signed a document on cooperation followed by a memorandum on mutual understanding and guidelines (1993), a Security and Secrecy agreement (1994) and a military training and industry cooperation agreement (1996). The deepening military relationship brought a biannual dialogue mechanism in 1997. In 1998, the Israeli arms sales to Turkey since the early 1990s reached to 1 billion dollars including 630 million dollars deal in December 1996 to upgrade Turkey's F4 Phantoms. This turned Turkey into a market for Israeli defense industry and expanding the trade volume to almost 2 billion dollars in 2000 (INBAR, 2001; LEVIN, 2000)

The military-strategic partnership lied at the core of expanding relations between the two countries along the 1990s and the joint maritime maneuvers code-named *Reliant Mermaid* demonstrated the US support for the increasing Turkish-Israeli partnership (BISHKU, 2006). In the 1998 Syria-Turkey crisis over Syria's support of the PKK, Turkey relied on its relations with Israel, sharing information about the PKK's activities (OZCAN, 2011). With the end of the crisis on 20 October, Turkey coerced Assad to agree to its terms. Turkey's ability to impose its will on Syria was the result of its military ties with Israel (MAKOVSKY, 1998). These comprehensive military agreements triggered reactions from the region. Iraq and Egypt protested the Israeli-Turkish alignment as an anti-Arab partnership. Feeling encircled by Turkey and Israel, Syria tried to improve its relations with Turkey through expelling the PKK leader Ocalan, negotiating a provisional agreement about sharing the Euphrates' water and shelving the Hatay question[1]. Israel worked to prevent the confrontation between Turkey and Syria, fearing that its peace talks with Syria regarding the Golan Heights could be hampered.

The Turkish-Israeli alignment further benefited from the US brokered Oslo process[1]. But, seeds of future conflict were also in sight. Largely disregarding the criticism of the regional states through its active participation in the peace process, Turkey aimed to increase its power and presence in the Middle East through ties with Israel. Despite Turkey's expectation from Israel to confront challenges to its territorial integrity from Iraq and Syria, their diverging perspectives towards the two key issues - the future of Iraq and the Cyprus question- created a backlash in the relations. Israel supported the *status quo*, defending the Kurdish autonomy within Iraq. Turkey's military relations with Israel worried Greece and Cyprus. When Israeli F-16 fighters ventured in the Cypriot space in April 1998, Cypriot media accused Israel of carrying reconnaissance flights for Turkey over the island to photograph the S-300 anti-craft missiles purchased from Russia. Immediately apologizing the incident, Israel did not want to be dragged into another conflict in the Eastern Mediterranean[3]. It followed a cautious policy towards Greece, a member of the EU. Turkey similarly sought cordial relations with Iran, considered as a primary enemy to Israel.

1. Ocalan was sheltered in Syria since the early 1980s. The Hatay question was the long-lasting border issue between Turkey and Syria since its foundation as an independent country in the 1960s.

2. Turkey supported the process not only with strong diplomatic moves such as financial contribution to the Palestinian Authority, participating the Arms Control and Regional Security Working Group of the Madrid process in 1993 and joining temporary international presence in Hebron in 1997 but also with concrete projects such as the large scale water project, namely the peace pipeline to transport the Turkish water to Syria, Israel and Jordan.

3. Israel did not want the deterioration of its relations with Cyprus which had appointed ambassador to Tel-Aviv in 1993. Ekavi Athanassopoulou, Israeli--Turkish security ties: regional reactions, (Jerusalem: The Harry S. Truman Research Institute for the Advancement of Peace, 2001), pp. 18-21.

A Period of Change (2002 – 2009)

Turkey's relations with Israel were influenced by regional politics and domestic politics. Both changed in the 2000's. Reshuffling started in the Middle East as a result of developments such as the September 11. The changing American strategy towards the region coupled with the collapse of the peace process and the second intifada (TOCCI; HUBER, 2013). Turkey's politics began to change with the rise of of the political Islam, further centering the Palestinian question. The questioning of secularism in domestic politics made difficult to sustain uniform identity in foreign policy. Coming of the Justice and Development Party (AKP) to power in 2002 with a "conservative" project quickly created a different political tone and brought the questioning of Turkey's strategic partnership with Israel (AYATA, 2004). Accusing Israel of committing "genocide" in Jenin in 2002, the Prime Minister Bülent Ecevit of the three-partite coalition government -the Democratic Left Party (DSP); the Motherland Party (ANAP) and the Nationalist Action Party (MHP)- was already a sign of discomfort with close relations with Israel. In 2004, The AKP's head Tayyip Erdogan accused Israel of "state terrorism" due to killings of 60 Palestinians in Gaza. Turkey's pressure continued when Israel (and the West) did not approve of Hamas's victory in the Palestinian elections in 2006. When Hamas took over the control over the Gaza strip, Erdogan recognized the legitimacy of the isolated movement and invited its leader-in-exile, Khaled Meshaal, to Ankara[4]. This was part of AKP's long-term strategy for intrusion in the regional politics. By raising the Palestinian card like previously done by Syria, Iran and Egypt, Turkey found a convenient way of intervening Middle Eastern affairs (DURAN, 2006).

There was still hope for a different path. Erdogan visited Israel in May 2005, "offering to serve as a Middle East peace mediator and looking to build on trade and military ties". He told Prime Minister Sharon that anti-Semitism was "a crime against humanity" (MYRE, 2005a). Erdoğan and Sharon decided to establish a hotline for intelligence exchange about security issues in addition to cooperation in areas from education to commerce and science (MYRE, 2005b). In 2006, Turkey began to develop a joint Israeli-Palestinian Industrial park. Israeli President Shimon Peres and Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas addressed the Turkish parliament a day apart in November 2007. Peres was the co-panelist of Erdoğan, facing his harsh reactions at the Davos World Economic Forum in January 2009[5]. This event was critical to consolidate Erdoğan's power in domestic politics and triggered a different perspective about Turkey's role in the Middle East on the eve of the Arab Spring[6].

Before Davos, Turkey and Israel had advanced negotiations to connect each other through five pipelines transporting oil, natural gas, water, electricity, and possibly fiber optic cables through the Eastern Mediterranean. The Med-Stream project initiated in 2007 was followed by a decision to construct an oil pipeline from Ceyhan to Ashkelon in 2008 (TURKISH…, 2008). They decided to enter deeper cooperation in defense industry and intelligence sharing. Turkey barred Israel from the NATO led military exercise, Anatolian Eagle, of October 2009. When asked to

4. Defending the electoral victory of Hamas was a matter of political integrity for Erdogan who portrayed the AKP as a conservative democratic party and himself as its leader challenging the secular status quo in a moderate way through using democratic mechanisms.

5. Erdoğan, accusing Israel of crimes against humanity during the Operation Cast Lead and vowing that he would never return to Davos, he stormed out the debate on Israel's Gaza offensive. See, "Recep Erdogan storms out Davos after clash with Israeli president over Gaza", The Guardian, 30 Januar 2009.

6. Receiving a hero's welcome on his return to Istanbul after accusing Israel of "knowing very well how to kill" in Davos, Erdogan's prestige increased in the Turkish public opinion. See, "Turkish PM greeted by cheers after Israel debate clash", The Guardian, 30 January 2009

comment about this decision, the foreign minister Ahmet Davutoglu, linked it with the Gaza situation, noted that "we hope the situation in Gaza will be improved, that the situation will be back to the diplomatic track. And that will create a new atmosphere in Turkish-Israeli relations as well." (BORGER, 2009). In response, Israel moved to deepen its relations with Cyprus and Greece in regard to energy interests.

Deterioration of the Relations (2010 - 2020)

The past decade had seen deteriorating relations, a sharper turn of policies and stronger hostile actions and rhetoric. A "reprimanded" diplomatic meeting between the Deputy Foreign Minister Ayalon and the Turkish Ambassador Oguz Çelikkol at the Israeli Foreign Ministry was a prelude to a difficult decade to come. Reports from the meeting done in public format reveled that Deputy Minister refused to shake the Ambassador's hand and made him sit on a lower chair during a meeting at the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs (ISRAEL…, 2020). This humiliation act opened a decade of confrontation. While Davos marked a turn in relations, the Arab Spring was a watershed for already fragile alliance (MAOZ, 2016). Turkey saw the wave of uprisings as an opportunity to position itself as an influential member of the international community. This was in line with the foreign minister Davutoglu's broader foreign policy perspective of "strategic depth" going hand in hand with the discourse of "zero problems with neighbors" (YEŞİLTAŞ; BALCI, 2013). For Davutoğlu, the Arab Spring provided a fertile ground for Turkey to be a key foreign policy player. For this, Turkey had to cultivate ties not only with the Middle Eastern states but also with other countries from the Balkans to Black Sea and Caucasus where Turkey had historically important relations due to the Ottoman past (YALVAC, 2012).

The Arab Spring found Turkey and Israel inevitably on opposite sides. Ankara supported the anti-authoritarian drive of the Arab revolts (KÖSE, 2013). Concerned with the instability that could possibly come out, Jerusalem was more comfortable with cautious stance. Israel was encouraged by the pro-Western forces that appeared to have initially gain traction in Syria. In tandem to the AKP's embrace of Islamic political identity, Turkey encouraged the Islamist groups, such as *Jabhat al-Nusra* or *Ahrar al-Sham* against the Asad regime (STARR, 2014). The ties with Islamists groups including *Hamas* with active base in Turkey made relations with Israel further fragile. The tensions faced another blow on 31 May 2010, when the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) intercepted at international waters a six-ship flotilla including a Turkish vessel, namely *Mavi Marmara*, trying to break the Gaza blockade. The IDF forces killed eight Turkish citizens and one Turkish American on board. The Turkish passenger ship was carrying humanitarian goods to Gaza under blockade by Israel and Egypt since Hamas' control of the Strip in 2007. The violence that the IDF soldiers committed was widely condemned and the UN Security Council issued a statement calling for a prompt, impartial, credible and transparent inquiry. The Secretary General Ban Ki-moon urged Israel to lift the blockade. Ankara immediately recalled its Ambassador from Tel Aviv in June 2010[7].

7. The UN Human Rights Council report issued in September 2010 underlined that Israel's military broke international laws, that the action by commandos, which left nine dead, was "disproportionate" and "betrayed an unacceptable level of brutality". Israel rejected the report as "biased" and "one-sided", See, "Mavi Marmara: Why did Israel stop the Gaza flotilla?", BBC News, 27 June 2016.

Turkey insisted on an apology from Israel, an international investigation on the flotilla incident and the lifting of the blockade on Gaza. Israel only accepted an international investigation and a marginal easing of the blockade. The investigations about the incident most important of which was the UN Palmer report issued in September 2011underlined the excessive force that the IDF used but questioned the motivations of the Turkish Humanitarian Relief Foundation (IHH), confirming the Israeli reports of "organized and violent resistance from a group of passengers". The report accepted Israel's blockade of Gaza as legal. In response, Turkey expelled Israel's ambassador. This growing rift did not prevent the two countries to continue in bilateral relations in areas from economy to humanitarian issues and logistics with companies entering bids in construction, mine clearing, pipeline building and diamond trade, the economic relations between the two countries continued to grow[8]. Before the *Mavi Marmara* crisis Israel's imports from Turkey 154.7 million dollars in May 2010 and reached 210.7 million dollars in January 2013 (DANA, 2017).

While economic relations sustained, political relations continued to deteriorate. Following Erdogan's statement accusing Israel of the fall of Egyptian President Mohamad Morsi in August 2013, Liberman commented that "Erdogan is Nazi propagandist Goebbels' successor." (KENYON, 2013). Responding to a speech by Israeli Minister of Justice as "Ayelet Shaked has same mindset as Hitler," Erdogan underlined that the ties with Israel will not be normalized as long as Israel continues to "kill innocent children and continue its operations in Gaza." (LAHAV, 2014). In 2019, addressing senior officials from its party in June, Erdogan stated that "whoever is on the side of Israel, let everyone know that we are against them." (STAFF, 2019). Responding to Israeli Minister of Foreign Affairs who ordered his ministry to adopt measures to "stop Turkey's incitement and subversion in East Jerusalem", the Turkish Foreign Ministry commented that Turkey "will never give up supporting our Palestinian brothers and sisters in East Jerusalem, capital of Palestine under occupation and defending the Palestinian cause." (UGURLU, 2019). In December 2019, Adnan Tanrıverdi, the retired army general and the chief advisor to Erdogan, stated that "the Islamic world should prepare an army for Palestine from outside Palestine."[9] Commenting on Israel's annexation bid, further deteriorating the relations, the Foreign Minister Çavuşoglu said that "Israel, encouraged by the support of certain countries, is continuing its aggressive policies that are turning it into a racist, apartheid regime (KALNINS, 2019).

A new area of tension emerged with the East-Med project, an underwater pipeline that would transport natural gas from the Eastern Mediterranean to Europe. The proposed 1,180-mile undersea pipeline would be able to transfer up to 12 billion cubic meters a year from offshore gas reserves between Israel and Cyprus to Greece, and then onto other countries in southeast Europe. An agreement between Israel, Greece and Cyprus was signed in January of 2020 and ratified later that year much to the shagreen of Turkey (DEVECE, 2020). For Israel, the construction of the pipeline could offer great economic advantage, on top of security benefits and a strong alliance with the partnering countrie. For Turkey, the deal is

8. "Israeli firms in Turkey border mine clearing bids", www.globes.co.il, 2 June 2009; "At least 10 firms bid for Israel-Turkey gas pipeline: Report", Hurriyet Daily News, 25 March 2014; "The Turks Are Back, and They're Building Half of Tel Aviv's Towers", Haaretz, 29 April 2016; "Israel Gives Green Light to Six Foreign Construction Companies", Haaretz, 26 October 2016; "Turkish, Israeli companies engage in big diamond trade", Hurriyet Daily News, 18 September 2017;

9. Retired Turkish general Adnan Tanrıverdi is founder of Turkish security firm SADAT International Defense Consulting[1] and has been a chief advisor to Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan since August 2016. See, MEMRI, "Chief Advisor To Turkish President Erdoğan: 'The Islamic World Should Prepare An Army For Palestine From Outside Palestine," in Special Dispatch 8389, 2 December 2019.

perceived as a threat to its core national interests including it's own exploration in the area. It was considered as a threat to a recently signed deal with Libya, delimitating maritime jurisdictions in the Mediterranean Sea (BASSIST, 2020). As a cumulative effect of more than a decade of deepening tensions, in 2020 -and for the very first time- the annual threat assessment of Israel's army added Turkey's policies in the region to its list of challenges (GROSS, 2020).

Although AKP's actions and rhetoric toward Israel was negative and uniform dissenting voices could still be observed in the Turkey. Just days following the *Marmara* event, Fethullah Gülen, a chief opponent to Erdogan and controversial U.S. resident who is considered Turkey's most influential religious leader, criticized a Turkish-led flotilla for trying to deliver aid without Israel's consent. He commented that the "failure to seek accord with Israel before attempting to deliver aid was a sign of defying authority, and will not lead to fruitful matters." (LAURIA, 2010). Gülen is a foremost critic and opponent of Erdogan. In fact, otherwise his positions on Israel would not necessarily differ (JAFFE-HOFFMAN, 2020). Commenting on the affair, Ali Aslan from *Today's Zaman* (Gulen affiliate) criticized the Flotilla initiative as it did not help the objective of "zero problems with neighbors" policy". It would also hurt the peace process itself (ASLAN, 2010). Another dissenting voice, though controversial and less main stream, was a TV televangelist Adnan Oktar [10]. Oktar was known to host Israelis and feature Israeli perspectives on his television shows and express very dissenting views. He said "3-5 people may strain the relations with Israel but we are 70 million, on the other side Israel has millions of people… I don't see any problem between us. So we don't have any tension, …bunch of individual's feud (referring diplomatic tension) is not our concern… whoever drops atom bomb on Israel, we will make their life unbearable"[11]. Oktar and his inner circle ring were arrested in 2018 (TURKISH, 2018). Other opposition voices to Erdogan- like that of Ali Babacan (former deputy prime minister) and Abdullah Gul (former president) were both former AKP members. They have expressed different voices when it came to Israel. Babacan, during his foreign ministry term, while criticizing, sometimes condemning Israeli actions on Palestinian issue was likewise criticizing Hamas by saying "Hamas should decide, terror or politics? We're in favor of politics." The Former President Gul, though not publicly portraying his different opinions with Erdogan during his office term, appeared to convey somewhat different views behind the closed doors as reveled by WikiLeaks expressing "understanding of Israel's need to take action against terrorist attacks" (WIKILEAKS, 2009). While most of these voices can be framed mainly as opposition to Erdogan, they still point to a more pragmatic camp seeking to see a more constructive relations with Israel.

10. Adnan Oktar was a TV preacher perceived as a cult leader known for giving televised sermons surrounded by young women he refers to as his "kittens".

11. Press event with Oktar and Religious leaders, İsrail'e kim atom bombası atarsa Gökkubbeyi başına geçiririz, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FH-Dp03jUadk

The Arab Spring and the Syrian War – an opportunity to Pivot?

The Syrian civil war became another point of contention between two countries. Defectors from the Syrian army trained in Turkey paved the way for the creation of the *Free Syrian Army* (FSA), also supported by the West. As the conflict progressed, Turkey, along with Qatar, preferred Isla-

mists rebellion factions such as Hayaat Tahrir Al-Shaam based in Northern Syria (HASSAN, 2017). Turkey emerged as unique in its decision to permit foreign and opposition fighters (as well as its own citizens) to cross its southern border into the Syrian battlefield (STARR, 2014). While Turkey's actions in northern Syria had little direct influence on Israel, the moves which brought Islamist influence to Syria and helped to set an Islamist tone to the rebellion, appeared worrisome to Israel who sought to strengthen the moderate rebels and limit the influence of Islamists operating across its own borders as well under its "good neighbor" program (BOMS, 2018).

Israel's traditional support to the Kurds in the region became another course of tension with Turkey. Following Turkey's Peace Spring operation in November 2019, Israel's Prime Minister Netanyahu was quick to denounce, warning an "ethnic cleansing" and offering humanitarian aid to the Kurds[12]. The issue was widely covered in Israeli media and triggered additional statements like that of Ministry of Strategic Affairs saying Erdogan is "anti-Semitic racist who supports terrorism – slaughter the Kurds without us making a moral voice heard and calling on the world to stop it. We can't stay indifferent on this." (ADNAN, 2019). Israel was surprised by the American decision to withdraw forces from Syria and could push the American President Trump to change course. Although Israel did not maintain deep relations with the Syrian Kurds, it assisted Kurds in Iraq and, overall, perceived them as a moderate ally for its geopolitical maneuvers in the region. For Israel, the Turkish moves to capture territories in northern Syria were actual evidence of not only Erdogan's regional ambitions but also his strategy of empowering actor's hostile to Israel (GROSS, 2020).

However, the download spiral of relations was not constant and saw a number of attempts to set relations back at a cordial course. The first sign of improvement came in 2013, when Israel resumed the sale of electronic warfare systems to Turkey (LAPPIN, 2013). Frozen following the *Mavi Marmara* incident, the original deal worth 200 million dollars involved Israel's ELTA Systems Ltd., a subsidiary of Israel Aerospace Industries, delivering electronic systems for four Turkish Airborne Warning and Control Systems (AWAC) aircraft. This was followed by Israel's agreement to transfer materials from Turkey to Gaza to build a new hospital in February 2013 (BAR'EL, 2013). Despite deepening of relations, the *Mavi Marmara* deadlock and different perceptions that each side had about the regional developments after the Arab Spring prevented a breakthrough. That began to change when the civil wars in Libya and Syria required American involvement. The US, intensifying the P5+1 negotiation with Tehran on its nuclear file through talks in Istanbul and a high level meeting in Kazakhstan, needed its two key regional allies to cooperate with each other and pushed Israel to offer an apology to Turkey.

Netanyahu placed a call to Erdogan while closeted with Obama in a trailer on the tarmac at Ben Gurion airport before a departure to Jordan. Obama joined the call at one point. The American expectation was that the improvement of relations between Israel and Turkey would be a precursor to a renewed peace talks between Israel and the Palestinians, especially on territorial issues. This would also be a positive step leading to cooperation on other key issues such as the Syrian conflict (SHERWOOD;

12. Benjamin Netanyahu (tweet) "Israel strongly condemns the Turkish invasion of the Kurdish areas in Syria and warns against the ethnic cleansing of the Kurds by Turkey and its proxies. Israel is prepared to extend humanitarian assistance to the gallant Kurdish people" in Tweeter, 10 October 2019.

MACASKIL, 2013). The Obama administration underlined its displeasure at the Turkish-Israeli crisis despite efforts for reconciliation. Incidents like Erdogan's widely echoed statement regarding Zionism being a "crime against humanity" at a UN Summit made the Obama administration's task difficult as it triggers criticisms from the US Congress attempting to derail what the president saw as urgent, the cooperation over Syria where Turkey expected more American engagement (ISRAEL…, 2013).

Slightly more than a month after to the Israeli apology in May 2013, Erdogan visited Washington and raised many issues from the civil war in Syria to the relations with Iran and the burning situation in Iraq (BALCI, 2013; GÜRSEL, 2013). Obama pressurized Erdogan to ease tension with Iraq as Ankara's direct oil trade with Erbil provoked Baghdad's reactions considering this as a violation of the constitution[13]. Disapproving Ankara's direct contacts to Erbil, Obama was concerned that it might jeopardize Iraqi unity with Baghdad getting closer to Iran. The meeting between Erdogan and Obama provided a roadmap to deal with the Syrian conflict. Agreeing to endorse the Geneva initiative, Turkey decided to increase its support to the opposition, pressurizing Assad with sanctions and closing the door for open-ended negotiations. Seeking a timetable for the transition period for a new government, Turkey and the US decided about a cease fire monitored by international organizations, documenting the regime's human rights violations. Both Erdogan and Obama were against Assad to have power in the transition government. They wanted Syrian refugees to go back. The improvement in Turkey-US relations continued with the US Secretary of State John Kerry's visit on 12 September 2014. Kerry stated Turkey's role in the peace process and it's links to Hamas as a key asset.

The US pressures and the regional problems paved the way for a breakthrough between Turkey and Israel. The lack of a serious dialogue left them isolated facing with regional geopolitical and humanitarian problems. Israel needed a regional ally to support its policies towards Iran and against radical groups. Israel's pressures on Iran could become more credible with Turkey's support through permitting again to use airspace. In regard to the Palestinian issue, Netanyahu's policies, perceived as an attempt to consolidate the Israeli grip on the occupied territories, derived reactions from the EU countries. Therefore, reconciliation with Turkey, a valuable goal in itself, would help Netanyahu to correct its relations with Obama with whom he had tense relations. For Turkey, reconciliation with Israel would have both regional and transatlantic implications. Ankara aimed to regain its role as a mediator once provided a leverage over Syria and Israel in the talks on the Golan Heights in December 2008. The deterioration of the relations with Israel prevented Turkey to play a mediating role between Israel and Hamas during the *Pillar of Defense* strike on Gaza in December 2012 (ALTUNIŞIK; ÇUHADAR, 2010).

Reconciliation with Israel became crucial after the military takeover in Egypt on 3 July 2013. Egypt tried to block almost all mediating efforts by Turkey between Israel and Hamas. It blocked the American attempts to relaunch the peace process due to Turkey's support of the Morsi government and criticism of the coup by General Sisi (YEGIN, 2016). However, an unexpected economic factor came into place. The Syrian war resulted

13. The Iraqi constitution stipulates that all oil trade agreements must be approved by the central government

in the closure of many trade routes as Syria became unsafe for trucks. Turkey and Israel found themselves in an important juncture, enabling thousands of trucks to cross from Europe to Turkey – from Istanbul by sea to Haifa – and further via the Sheikh Hussein Bridge, to Jordan and beyond. Over 10,000 trucks had crossed in 2014 (RABINOVITCH; COHEN , 2014) with an average of 30-40 trucks a week in the subsequent years (PERETZ, 2018). Furthermore, the Open *Skies* policy, coming into effect in 2021, incentivized many Israelis to use Turkey as a travel hub and a tourist destination. In 2012, before *Open Skies* went into effect, 686 thousand people traveled to Turkey from Israel on 4,706 flights. In 2017, nearly 2 million did on 12,400 flights (PERETZ, 2018). This significant volume, decreasing in times of political tensions, remained an incentive to keep relations intact.

Conclusion

This article reviews the relations between Israel and Turkey. Currently captured at a very low point, the relations continuously deteriorated over the past two decades. During this period Turkey has been governed by the AKP led by Erdogan and Israel has been governed by governments led by Netanyahu. Some argue that the uncompromising character of the leaders played a significant role in the deterioration of relations. However, with harsh rhetoric, confrontational actions, active support of enemy factions by both sides (Hamas, the Islamists by Turkey / FSA and the Kurds by Israel), it might be surprising to observe that some key fundamentals. Diplomatic relations, growing trade relations, limited security cooperation and a very high volume of business and tourism are still maintained despite the complex character of relations particularly affected by the geopolitical rivalry in the Middle East and the Eastern Mediterranean. As underlined above, since 1948 and throughout the 20th century, the Israeli Turkish relations rested on a few pillars: their secular, "non-Arab" identity; a strong Western alliance; common enemies and security cooperation. Growing trade and tourism relations cemented these pillars and lasted a number of crisis points. The bilateral relations had their own slopes and turning points. Despite its secular identity Turkey saw itself as a Muslim county and maintained active membership in international Muslim forums. It could not ignore major events like the 1956 Sinai campaign, the events of 1967 or of 1973. Nevertheless, shared interests in relations reached a climax in the 1990's in parallel to the growing optimism surrounding the Israeli-Palestinian and Israeli-Jordanian peace process.

The relations began to deteriorate in 2002, especially following the rise of the AKP aiming to change the Turkish geopolitical outlook. Turkey's gravitation toward more Islamists agendas and partners, its renewed activities in Jerusalem on the Palestinian file and its positions on key issues such as Iran and terrorism have deepened a path of confrontation with Israel who began to get closer with moderate Arab states and intensify its campaign against Iran and the Muslim Brothers. Only fewer commonalties are now shared between the two countries and those – like the mediated limited collaboration on the Syrian front – were triggered by foreign players (the American influence on Israel and on Turkey as a

NATO member). The remining pillars: trade, limited security cooperation and tourism (which diminished to nothing during the Covid period) are limited in scope but nevertheless significant and helped, for example, Turkey to be one of the very first countries to renew flight to Israel on July 1st, 2020 (RAZ-CHAIMOVICH, 2020). The trajectory of deteriorating relations appears to hold at the end of 2020 as Turkey appears to further distance itself from the EU and NATO (including a confrontation with France navy) (IRISH, 2020) in parallel to its increasing involvement in Libya. The noticeable turning of the Hagia Sophia to an active Masque already drew parallels in Israel. Erdogan tweeted that "the revival of Hagia Sophia announces the restoration of freedom to Al Aksa" and triggered headlines like "After Hagia Sophia, Erdogan points to the Temple Mount." (INET, 2020) This trajectory will likely not change as long as long as Erdogan remains in power. However, the opposition to AKP and the alternative direction it offers regrading both, domestic and foreign policy may influence a changing course in the future.

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The end of the Ottoman Empire and the evolution of the Middle East security complex

El fin del Imperio Otomano y la evolución del complejo de seguridad de Oriente Medio

O fim do Império Otomano e a evolução do complexo de segurança do Oriente Médio

Jorge M. Lasmar
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ABSTRACT

Since the demise of the Ottoman Empire, the Middle East has undergone several abrupt political changes and became the stage of a series of regional conflicts and disputes by Great Powers that greatly impacted how this regional security complex evolved. Using the theoretical framework of both the School of Copenhagen and the English School, we retrace how these security and insecurity dynamics has been in an unended process of constant evolution since the fall of the Empire and how these processes are embedded in the larger context of systemic great power management.

Keywords: Security. Regional Security Complex. Middle East. Ottoman Empire

RESUMEN

Desde la desaparición del Imperio Otomano, Oriente Medio ha experimentado varios cambios políticos abruptos y se ha convertido en el escenario de una serie de conflictos regionales y disputas de las grandes potencias que impactaron enormemente en la evolución de este complejo de seguridad regional. Utilizando el marco teórico tanto de la Escuela de Copenhague como de la Escuela de Inglés, recordamos cómo estas dinámicas de seguridad e inseguridad han estado en un proceso sin fin de evolución constante desde la caída del Imperio y cómo estos procesos están integrados en el contexto más amplio de sistemas sistémicos. gran gestión de energía.

Palabras clave: Seguridad. Complejo Regional de Seguridad. Oriente Médio. Império Otomano.

RESUMO

Desde o fim do Império Otomano, o Oriente Médio passou por várias mudanças políticas abruptas e se tornou o palco de uma série de conflitos regionais e disputas entre as grandes potências que impactaram fortemente a forma como este complexo de segurança regional evoluiu. Usando o arcabouço teórico da Escola de Copenhague e da Escola Inglesa, retraçamos como essas dinâmicas de segurança e insegurança estão em um processo ainda não terminado de constante evolução desde a queda do Império e como esses processos estão inseridos no contexto mais amplo e sistêmico da administração das grandes potências.

Palavras-Chave: Segurança. Complexo de Segurança Regional. Oriente Médio. Império Otomano.

The fall of the Empire: From unity to overlay

The "Sick Man of Europe". That is how Western powers referred to the Ottoman Empire during almost the entire 19th century (CATHERWOOD, 2006). Undoubtedly, this expression is loaded with Eurocentrism and an overt imperialist bias. Nevertheless, it does reflect the Western Europe's prevailing view about the Empire. In fact, it even reflects the view of some within the Empire. Napoleon's conquest of Egypt in 1798 brought out to the Ottoman elite the feeling that there was an increasing chasm between the Empire and the European powers. This feeling could already be felt in several areas ranging from the economic and military passing through the public administration and reaching all the way to state governance. Increasingly, the question of how the Empire should try to implement Western European standards of development dominated much of the internal debates of the Ottoman elites (CATHERWOOD, 2006).

Throughout the 19th century and the first years of the 20th century, the Ottoman Empire equated 'modernization' with 'Westernization'. During this period, the Empire engaged in an attempt of modernization that coexisted with domestic revolutions and crises. In the political and statesmanship sphere, the Empire created new institutions aiming to modernize, westernize and secularize its bureaucracy and public administration. These new organizations intended to substitute the traditional ones with institutions whose practices were closer to the Western European model (ZÜRCHER, 2019). This domestic 'modernization' push was also followed by the adoption of international practices that were aimed at both demonstrating the Empire's acceptance of (European) international society's primary institutions[1] as well as at constituting evidence of its membership to it. Thus, the Empire also went to great lengths to adapt its diplomatic and international law practices so that they would conform with those norms prevailing within the European international society (IS). In fact, this process - which culminated with the signing of the 1856 Treaty of Paris - was a seen as a necessary condition for the Ottomans to be recognized as legitimate participants in the European concert (PALABIYIK, 2014). In retrospect, the Ottoman Empire's bid for membership

1. Primary institutions are defined as "relatively fundamental and durable practices that are constitutive of actors and their patterns of activity in relation to each other (BUZAN, 2004b:164). They differ from both 'secondary institutions', i.e. "those referred to by regime theory" (BUZAN, 2004b:166) as well as 'domestic political institutions' which refer to "organizations in a government that create, enforce, and apply laws" (BODDY-EVANS, 2020). For an overview of the evolution of the primary institutions of the Middle East see (BUZAN, GONZALEZ-PELAEZ, 2009).

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within (Western) IS during its last years illustrate the argument that the expansion of Western IS occurred in a vanguardist[2] way in which those who were not engulfed by European influence were obliged to make concessions and adapt to the imposed model (BUZAN, 2010).In fact, as Welsh states, it is now clear that "in the early part of the twentieth century, hierarchical practices were evident in the particular ways in which self-determination—the new standard of membership in IS—was applied to the crumbling Ottoman and Austro-Hungarian empires after the conclusion of the First World War" (WELSH, 2017, p.157).

In this context, the Ottoman Empire and its leaders - especially those known as Young Turks[3] - went to a great extent to modernize their country and to be recognized as a legitimate[4] force by the European powers. Nevertheless, unlike Japan which was successful in its recognition (albeit with reservations), a series of questionable choices on the part of the Ottomans ultimately contributed to the very fall of the Empire (CATHERWOOD, 2006). An example of such questionable choices was the alliance with Germany in the First World War. However, interestingly enough, the ideas also played a great role in this process. Some of the very Western ideas that the Ottoman reformists endorsed eventually contributed to the dissolution of the Empire. For example, European nationalist-inspired ideals helped to motivate uprisings of local minorities that inevitably led to a weakening of Istanbul's dominance (MATHER, 2014).

After the end of the First World War, and the subsequent dissolution of the Empire, the Ottoman domains that comprised the present states of Israel, Jordan, Syria, Lebanon, Iraq and the Palestinian territories became directly under the control of England and France (CATHERWOOD, 2006). From that moment on, a single empire started a process that eventually gave rise to an entire regional security complex and its sub-complexes. As local leaders of these new territories begun to govern under the tutelage of external powers, the local politics also begun to involve and reflect the larger dynamics of both regional and global disputes between these two powers. The relations between Beirut and Baghdad, for example, were no longer just the straightforward interactions amongst two cities in the same country. At that moment, what was once a centralized unit gave rise to a region marked by the new presence of external political units. However, Middle East (ME) Regional Security Complex (RSC) did not immediately emerge with these changes (BUZAN, WÆVER, 2003).

Buzan and Wæver (2003) define a Regional Security Complex as "a set of units whose major processes of securitization, desecuritization, or both are so interlinked that their security problems cannot reasonably be analyzed or resolved apart from one another" (BUZAN, WÆVER, p.44, 2003). Hence, although it is true that the region later became a regional security complex, it did not fulfil the requisite necessary for the demarcation of an RSC straight way. That is to say that the region did not become immediately formed by independent units operating in an anarchic system with durable patterns of amity and enmity and with the material element of the balance of power associated with a geographical

2. According to Buzan, "The vanguardist account emphasizes the centrality of Europe in the expansion story and projects a rather one-way view of cultural transmission from the West to the rest of the world" (BUZAN, 2010, p.1).

3. The Young Turks were a Turkish Nationalist group that rose to power in the early 20th century (CATHERWOOD, 2006)

4. Here, once again, the Ottoman Empire equated legitimacy to membership in Western Europe's IS.

demarcation. (BUZAN, WÆVER, 2003). At the same time, although one could argue that the region operated as a proxy RSC between France and the United Kingdom, that was not the case. As Buzan and Wæver argue, to "European imperial powers, the world *was* their region. Under these circumstances of successful global scale imperialism by great powers, the scope for independent regional security dynamics was small" (BUZAN, WÆVER 2003, p.15).

In fact, English and French occupation of the region took place in two ways: via direct domination - as the British mandate from Palestine - and through association with local leaders - such as the Hashemite clan that still holds power in Jordan nowadays (CATHERWOOD, 2006). The presence of these external powers in the region then, made the development of an autonomous RSC impossible. These powers reproduced larger social and political identities at the regional level assimilating much of the then existing local patterns of security. Much of the wider patterns of amity/enmity and balance of power existing between France and the United Kingdom, was transferred to the region assimilating the existing local security dynamics. For example, the interactions between the Hashemites in Jordan and Iraq and the Syrians and Lebanese became directly subordinate to the larger dynamics surrounding the relationship between France and England. Thus, the region transitioned from a centralized political unit to a non-RSC. According to Buzan and Wæver (2003), Non-RSCs exists in two situations. The first are those in which the units are so isolated from each other that their processes of securitization and desecuritization cannot be interconnected. The second, are those cases in which the regional security dynamics is dominated by external powers in what they call overlay (BUZAN, WÆVER, 2003). The latter is exactly the case in question.

Surely, it is important to note that France and England did not occupy the entire territory of the ME. Foreign powers did not dominate Saudi Arabia, Iran and the newly born Republic of Turkey. Moreover, Egypt soon achieved its independence in 1922 (CATHERWOOD, 2006). However, at the time, these countries did not immediately evolve into an independent regional security complex. Iran, which was a monarchy at the time, had just emerged from a convoluted domestic crisis that involved revolutions and coups. Additionally, Iran was then strongly influenced by the British who regarded the region as central to the "Great Game"[5] of power in the region (KAMRAVA, 2011). The same can be said about Egypt. Even after gaining their official independence in 1922, the Egyptians were still officially tutored by the British on topics such as foreign policy and national defense (CLEVELAND, BURTON, 2009).

In the case of Saudi Arabia, the House of Saud controlled the desert region of Najd, on the Arabian Peninsula. In 1924, Ibn Saud (king of the Saudis) took the position of Hussein (leader of the Hashemite clan) in Hijaz and advanced the construction of modern Saudi Arabia (CLEVELAND, BURTON, 2009). The Saudi consolidation, however, did not bother foreign powers. This is because the kingdom then seemed feeble and the European powers did not have much interest in the remote interior of the desertic Arabian Peninsula. Even so, in a treaty signed in 1927, Ibn

5. The "Great Game" was a period of power dispute between Russian and British Empires in the ME, Central and South Asia (CATHERWOOD, 2006).

Saud pledged to not threaten the British protectorates in the south of the peninsula (CLEVELAND, BURTON, 2009).

The English and French also were not very concerned with the newly funded Republic of Turkey. Mustafa Kemal, a.k.a. Ataturk, initiated a nationalist movement aimed at creating a Turkish Identity. To this end, he sought to discontinue important institutions of the Ottoman Empire by creating new 'Turkish' institutions in its lieu. This process created a complex struggle for autonomy and national unity that resulted in a series of conflicts and millions of lives lost. Thus, under the British and French eyes, Turkey was not a relevant regional player as it was essentially struggling for its own existence (KAMRAVA, 2011).

Hence, the early non-formation of a regional security complex can be related more to European Imperialism (overlay) rather than due to the inexistence of regional disputes and rivalries. But it is necessary to remember that Overlay is not the only mechanism by which the great powers interfere in a region. According to Buzan and Wæver (2003), great powers can also act through penetration which "occurs when outside powers make security alignments with states within an RSC" (BUZAN, WÆVER, p. 46, 2003). According to the authors, penetration is a somewhat "milder" form of external interference in an RSC but that was not what occurred in the ME at the end of the First World War as the European powers presence in the region effectively absorbed and assimilated the logic of the regional balance of power and patterns amity/enmity via direct military occupation and practices of colonialism.

However, although the presence of France and England in the ME during the inter-war period was marked by overlay, it was also responsible for the beginning of the creation of new patterns of amity/enmity that would deeply affect the region today. British and French colonialism left indelible marks that deeply affected the pattern of social organization in the ME and the way regional actors related to each other. The somewhat abrupt departure of the European powers in the region also not only caused new actors to emerge but also created a dispute to grab the power and space left by the colonizers that became one the main drivers of the regional security architecture in the immediate post-World War II period. (CATHERWOOD, 2006).

An example of this process can be seen in how some countries in the region organized they newly independent countries. Countries such as Jordan, Iraq until 1958, Egypt until 1952, and the small countries of the British protectorates in the Persian Gulf, all became monarchies due to the direct influence of the British. In addition to the fact that England is also a monarchy, it also used its relations with local dynasties as an intermediate element of its realm as a way to guarantee the continuity of its (indirect) authority over the region while at the same time guaranteeing a certain level of legitimacy (CLEVELAND, BURTON, 2009). This British modus operandi allowed the power transition to be much more obvious in its former domains since the new leaders were in collaboration with the British (KAMRAVA, 2011).

In what regards the French domains - such as the current Lebanon and Syria - the situation has evolved differently. Because France is a

country with a long republican tradition, it did not seek to associate itself with monarchic dynasties. Thus, it pulverized its relations with various local leaders and exercised a stronger direct presence. (KAMRAVA, 2011). This French modus operandi produced two important legacies for the region: The first of them is that both Syria and Lebanon evolved into republican regimes when they gained independence. The second legacy, on the other hand, is related to the fact that, as a result of spreading local leaderships and exercising a more direct dominance in the region, France hampered the political transition in Syria and Lebanon and fostered some conflicts that had lasting consequences for the regional security architecture. (KAMRAVA, 2011).

Another important legacy of the European presence in the ME, and perhaps the most striking, is the issue of Palestine. Despite the enormous discussions about the origin of the conflict, the fundamental role that the British played in its emergence is undeniable (CATHERWOOD, 2006; SINGH, 2011). The English mandate in Palestine had a different type of organization because, instead of allying themselves with a single local leadership, the British preferred to exercise direct domination in the region progressively formulating policies that prevented the concentration of forces with an Arab leadership. This was one of the main contributing factors that subsequently prevented the emergence of cohesion amongst local Arab forces during the war against the Zionists in 1948. (KHALID, 2008).

The British are also responsible for the emergence of the conflict not only due to the policies deliberately adopted but also for negligence. During their mandate in Palestine, the British allowed, in what appears to be tacit support for the Zionist interpretation of the Balfour Declaration, the migration of thousands of Jewish to Palestinian territory, increasing social tension in the region (CATHERWOOD, 2006). The British were also negligent in their process of leaving the region. By not establishing any transitional governmental mechanisms, the British allowed the subsequent power struggle to develop in a very violent way (CATHERWOOD, 2006). This stance from England allowed for the European Jewish issue to be exported to Palestine and become one of the main elements that would dictate the ME's social dynamics of amity/enmity in the future.

Hence, the troubled evolution of the ME non-Regional Security Complex shortly after the fall of the Ottoman Empire set the tone for what was to come. From a centralized unit (Ottoman Empire) to an overlay RSC, what was seen in the ME was an abrupt transition of power and a complete rearrangement of regional forces. However, although it overcame purely regional security dynamics, foreign occupation in the ME served as an incubator for new power relations and the re-arrangement of the regional structure of amity/enmity.

Post-World War II

The period immediately after the Second World War was marked by the end of the overlay in the ME and the beginning of the formation of an RSC with its own dynamics. The Israel/Palestine issue, the element of

Arab nationalism and Pan-Arabism, as well as the relationship between Islamism and politics were the main essentially regional elements that contributed to the re-design of the power relations and the patterns of amity/enmity in the ME. However, the elements of macrosecuritization[8] of the Cold War did not allow the evolution of a standard RSC. The whole security issue in the ME, as well as practically all over the world, was absorbed by the power struggle between the US and the USSR. The ensuing regional security complex, therefore, was an RSC centralized by foreign powers, in which the global disputes between the US and the USSR dominated much of the regional social dynamics. However, the local patterns of securitization and desecuritization were sufficiently interconnected to configure an RSC in its own (BUZAN, WÆVER, 2003). According to Buzan and Wæver (2003), an RSC is centralized:

> Because the core actor is globally orientated, the security dynamics of the region are hugely distorted and suppressed. But since all other actors in the region have their concerns linked to each other, a general map of global security would still show a clear regional formation of densely knit connections compared to a lack of connections in and out of the region for most units. This therefore can still be treated as an RSC (BUZAN, WÆVER, p. 56, 2003).

One of the main security issues in the ME since the end of the Ottoman Empire is, of course, the conflict between Israelis and Palestinians. Since the departure of the British from the region, a series of conflicts have emerged, the most obvious culminating in the creation of the state of Israel in 1948. These conflicts were marked by the organization of the Zionist forces in contrast to the disorganization of the local Arab forces, by the massive expulsion of the Arab populations from territories occupied in 1948, by the not-so-obvious support that the Zionists received, and by the power struggles between the Arab nations involved in the conflict (ROGAN, SHLAIM, 2008).

This initial support received by the Zionists was not necessarily obvious as it was quite different from that which followed throughout the Cold War. Most of the armaments and military equipment that the Israeli used in the 1948 war originated in the European socialist bloc. Countries like Czechoslovakia, Poland, and even the Soviet Union sent many weapons to Zionists to fight the Palestinians and found the state of Israel (SHLAIM, 2008). This support, however, would not last long as power struggles, both regional and systemic, would lead to rearrangements in alliances across the ME.

Another important aspect of the 1948 war, which is fundamental to understanding the evolution of RSC in the ME, was the power relationship between the other Arab countries during the conflict. On one side, there was the pro-Hashemite bloc, headed by the kingdoms of Jordan and Iraq, and whose geopolitical objective was the creation of an "Arab Kingdom" as had been promised to them by the British in return for their support in organizing a revolt against the Ottoman Empire and which would encompass much of the Levant, including the territory of Palestine. On the other side, there was the anti-Hashemite bloc, led by Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Syria, whose objective was precisely to prevent the plans of the clan led by the king of Hashemite Jordan to materialize

(SHLAIM, 2008). These geopolitical movements of Arab leaders in the ME demonstrate that the overlay no longer existed in the post-Mandate period and that local forces were already re-shaping the dynamics of the regional security and insecurity structure.

The conflict between Israelis and Palestinians has had a significant role in this process of re-shaping the security and insecurity structure of the ME. Two specific events that marked this conflict demonstrate the influence of the Cold War dynamics in the Region: the 6 Days War and the Yom Kippur War. These two important conflicts clearly demonstrate how regional interests and disputes - especially in Nasserist Egypt and in the preemptive stance of the State of Israel – reflect the broader systemic dispute between the US and the Soviet Union and how it manifested itself in the ME (CLEVELAND, BURTON, 2009). In summation, during the 1967 Six-Day War, a coalition of Arab states led by Egypt initiated some provocative moves towards Israel which, in turn, responded quickly with a preemptive attack, bringing the war to a quick end. The result was terrible for the Arabs and even more so for the Palestinians. The Israelis, in addition to imposing a significant military defeat on the Arabs, also managed to annex the territories of the West Bank, the Golan Heights, the Gaza Strip, and the Sinai Peninsula (MASSOULIÉ, 1996). The 1973 Yom Kippur War can be considered a direct consequence of the events of June 1967. Only this time the Arabs attacked first and took the Israelis by surprise. Hostilities ended only with direct intervention of the two superpowers and the underlining threat that there was a real possibility that the conflict would escalate to a global, even to nuclear, war (MASSOULIÉ, 1996).

In both conflicts, it is possible to observe how the areas of influence of the US and the USSR in the ME were sewn together and how the regional disputes were quickly assimilated by the Cold War logic. The Arabs, mainly Egypt, Syria, and republican Iraq, were massively supported by the Soviet Union. The USSR, in turn, was interested in increasing its sphere of influence in the ME especially in the Mediterranean. The United States, in turn, has been traditionally closer to the monarchies and Turks (who are members of NATO) as well as greatly aligned with the state of Israel as a form to contain Soviet interests in the region (CLEVELAND, BURTON, 2009). Thus, the patterns of amity and enmity and the dynamics of the regional balance of power were clearly penetrated and centralized by systemic disputes. The rivalry between Arabs and Israelis was embedded within the larger context of the macrosecuritization of the ideological and material disputes between "Western Imperialism" and "Communist Tyranny".

The ideological component of the Cold War draws attention for another important ideational ingredient of the securitization processes in the ME: Arab Nationalism/Socialism. This ideological component has had an important relationship with both the Cold War dynamics as well as with the bid for membership in IS by the recently independent/autonomous states. Abdel Nasser's Egypt had an important role in the development and dissemination of the Arab Nationalism ideology. This ideology included principles such as the need for a strong state, militarism,

secularism (though not atheism), anti-imperialism and Pan-Arabism (CLEVELAND, BURTON, 2009). The formers help explain the influences of external ideologies and ideas in the region, while the latter is crucial to understand why and how the regional patterns of amity and enmity evolved as they did.

The Arab Nationalism/Socialism was thus a very important component in the construction of the Middle Eastern alliances and an important driver of the alliances and alignments that took place on second half of the 20th century. Since Nasser came to power in Egypt, a division in the ME between conservative monarchic forces and progressive republican forces began to be drawn. Traditionalist forces were represented mainly by the Hashemite kingdoms of Jordan and Iraq (until 1958), Saudi Arabia and Iran (until 1979). "Progressive" forces, on the other hand, were initially represented by the republics of Egypt and Syria. Iraq also joined this group in 1958 after it underwent a republican military coup. This coup, and the subsequent change in Iraq's alignment, became worrisome to the monarchical leaders of the ME who feared that republican, secular, military and progressive movements could spread within their territory and threat their monarchic social order (HALLIDAY, 2005).

Another element of concern for conservative countries in the region was Nasserist Pan-Arabism. Nasser and the republican forces of the ME, especially Syria, came to defend the unity of the Arab peoples under a state which would be built based on the principles of Arab Nationalism/Socialism. In 1958, Egypt and Syria created the United Arab Republic (UAR) which intended to encompass all Arab states under Egyptian leadership. However, due to issues such as the centralization of power in Cairo as well as the non-accession of other countries, the UAR was short-lived and ended in 1961 (ROMERO, 2015). This clash of ideas led to actual conflicts. An example was the conflict in Yemen in the 1960s. Egypt, which supported the formation of a republican government in North, suffered heavy casualties in the conflict. Meanwhile, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Iran and even Israel supported the royalists who fought to preserve the local Mutawakkilite Kingdom[7] (HALLIDAY, 2005).

Thus, one can establish a direct relationship between the movement of Arab Nationalism/Socialism and several impacts of the Cold War over the dynamics of the region. In fact, Fred Halliday (2005) states that Nasser's rise in Egypt and his ideology was what brought the Cold War to the region:

7. A state retrospectively known as North Yemen that existed between 1918 and 1962 in the northern part of current Yemen.

> The revolution of 1952 was to unleash a process of radicalisation that profoundly affected Egypt as well as the Arab world. It brought the Cold War to the Arab world, or, perhaps more accurately, allowed the Cold War to come to the Arab world, aligning Arab states with one or other bloc in the Cold War itself, and dividing Arab states themselves along Cold War lines. It also provided a new ideological context for the rising tide of popular, if also conspiratorial, pressure (from *within* the state and from outside) on states (HALLIDAY, p. 112, 2005).

As a matter of fact, the Nasser Pan-Arabism movement was strongly built-in opposition to the Baghdad Pact. This agreement was spearheaded by the United States and aimed primarily at containing the interests of

the Soviet Union in the ME (HALLIDAY, 2005). Thus, the movement led by Nasser brought another ideational element to the Cold War regional dynamics: that of socialism. Local leaders, especially in Egypt and Syria, evoked the need to create a socialism with "Arab characteristics" and to adapt it to the political and social regional context. This Arab socialism retained some differences with the Soviet model but did advocated some shared principles such as state-driven economics, aversion to financial capital, militarism, nationalism and anti-imperialism (CLEVELAND, BURTON, 2009). Once again, local patterns of amity and enmity are being centralized and penetrate by the logic of systemic dispute.

This model of Arab Nationalism∕Socialism lost its strength by the mid-1970s. Facts such as the death of Nasser, the normalization of relations between Egypt and Israel and the subsequent rapprochement between Cairo and the West, especially in economic matters, contributed to such waning (MASSOULIÉ, 1996). Nevertheless, Arab Nationalism∕Socialism acquired a new form in Iraq and Syria with the rise of the Ba'ath party. In Damascus, the Assad family came to power, while in Baghdad the military leader Saddam Hussein commanded the country. Despite the weakening of the Pan-Arabism, some of its ideas such as socialism, nationalism and anti-imperialism remained. So did the relationship with the USSR (HALLIDAY, 2005). Indeed, it was during this period that the Soviet Union built aerial and naval bases in Syrian territory (AL-LISON, 2013).

The expansion of the Arab Nationalism∕Socialism ideology is also an important reflection of the broader issues surrounding the expansion of the European IS and the bid of young Middle Eastern countries for its membership. This ideological set of ideas departed from Nasser and reached from Saddam Hussein to Bashar al-Assad in their respective attempts to adapt their regional and domestic political institutions to comply with the Western norms and institutions. The central role that norms and ideas such as secularism and nationalism had within this ideology are an indicative of such attempt. However, the bid for membership in Western IS was fraught with tensions. The actions and ideas adopted by the Middle Eastern states during this period exposed the deep tensions, limitations and contradictions that exist in interstate society. Local ideas and movements marked by exacerbated nationalism, anti-imperialism and the pan-Arabism ideology can also be seen as a reaction to both the vanguardist expansion of Western IS as well as the inequalities inherent to its membership. The ME bid for membership took place during what can be termed the third phase of the Western society expansion. This phase marks the accession of ex-colonies as members of Western IS. However, while tensions, limitations and contradictions are inherent to all normative structures (SANDHOLTZ, 2007:13), there was a significant degree of normative tension between the regional social structure in formation and the existing Western values and norms. This normative misalignment created a normative sensitivity that left the regional IS *especially prone* to instabilities. This is because the high degree of functional and normative tension created between the forming regional institution and the broader imposition of an uneven Western social structure. These tensions and

contradictions reflect the misalignment of the regional norms and values with the perceived Western social reality. In other words, the vanguard-ist expansion of Western values and norms were not fully aligned with new forming regional collective representations and expectations. Thus, this led to a prolonged legacy of domination and cultural differences that would generate long lasting instability. In fact, according to Buzan:

> The vanguardist rendering of the third phase of the expansion story, with its emphasis on cultural diversity and the revolt against the West, thus interprets decolonization as the creation of a house divided: a coherent global imperial order of insiders and outsiders deteriorates into an incoherent global disorder where everyone is inside, but their squabbles threaten to bring the house down (BUZAN, p. 8, 2010).

However, it is important to note that not all countries adopted the ideas and values of the pan-Arabism movement nor those who did adopt-ed it to the same degree. Turkey and Iran, for example, were neither deep-ly involved in the conflicts between Israelis and Arabs nor greatly aligned with Arab nationalism/socialism. During much of the Cold War, Turkey looked much more to the West rather than to the East and thus became directly drawn into the global conflict. Turkey's strategic location made the country a key part of NATO's strategy to contain the USSR (LIKA, 2015; OUTZEN, 2012).

Iran, ruled by Shah Reza Pahlavi, was also an important ally of the United States and the United Kingdom in their efforts of containing Soviet interests in the region. However, due to the 1979 revolution, the authoritarian regime of Pahlavi was overthrown by an Islamic popular revolution led by Ayatollah Khomeini. Khomeini would become supreme leader of the Islamic Republic of Iran and foster the question of political Islam and religious fundamentalism (KAMRAVA, 2011). But the question of political Islam and religious fundamentalism would not be restricted to the Iranian revolution alone. In the last years of the Cold War, the issue became central in the securitization and desecuritization process-es of the ME. The emergence of jihadist movements, the rise of groups such as Hezbollah and Hamas as well as the consolidation of the Saudi kingdom as a regional power brought the ideas of radical political Islam to the very center of the security debates in the region. The consolidation of the United States as the only superpower after the fall of the USSR and later the advent of the Global War on Terror, would further intensify the decisive role of radical political Islam in the construction of ME's amity and enmity architecture and security dynamics.

From the end of the Cold War to the War on Terror

From the 1980s onwards there was a visible decline in the geopolit-ical power of the Soviet Union. This decline culminated with the coun-try's official dissolution in 1991. From that point on, while the United States became the only acting superpower, the Cold War bipolar rivalry lost momentum in the ME as it did everywhere else. But the end of the Cold War did not represent the end of the presence of external powers in the Region. The US became the only external centralizing power in the

region. Issues such as the war between Iran and Iraq, the invasion of Iraq by Kuwait, the rise of radical extremist groups, the US invasion of Iraq and the geopolitical dispute between Saudis and Iranians were all directly or indirectly influenced by US' foreign policies. Consequently, during the post-Cold War period, new patterns of amity and enmity and a new regional dynamic of balance of power emerged in the ME. Both, all of which were 'centralized' by the United States.

The war between Iran and Iraq was a milestone in this reshaping of the internal security dynamics in the ME and its centralization. At the time, the Iranian revolution encouraged local forces to also overthrow their respective leaders. At the same time, Saddam Hussein wished for an opportunity to consolidate his power in Iraq and the region as the main Arab leadership. (KAMRAVA, 2011). The dreadful war lasted from 1980 to 1988 and did not result in change in the status quo. However, the war consolidated some changes in the regional institutional design: Firstly, the US became the main power in the region; Secondly, Iran would become central to the regional balance of power and patterns of amity and enmity; Thirdly, Islam – and especially political Islam - would become a crucial ideational element in the construction of the regional processes of securitization and desecuritization.

The end of the war between Iran and Iraq happened simultaneously with the end of the Cold War. This is an important context because the following decade, the 1990s, seemed to signal a broader transition to a liberal democratic and capitalist world order marked by the consolidation and expansion of the liberal order in Western IS. This transition briefly seemed to consolidate a social structure informed by principles of cooperation, liberal peace and multilateralism. However, what followed was the beginning of a process a re-negotiation of the identities and roles of the great powers in the post- Cold War world undertaken directly through their interaction and which is yet to attain its final form.

In this process of re-negotiation, one of the first key events that marked this new moment in global geopolitics - and which directly concerns the ME - was the first Iraq intervention. Iraq, motivated by various causes such as outstanding debts from the Iran war, Saddam Hussein's private interests as well as geopolitical objectives, decided to invade Kuwait. The international response came quickly through a US-led coalition that quickly drove Iraqi forces out of Kuwait with the United Nations' Security Council's approval. The conflict demonstrated not only that the end of the Cold War did not undermined US' position as the sole superpower capable of projecting military force anywhere in the world but also that the World had deeply changed, and its diplomatic actions were no longer restricted by soviet rivalry. However, this episode marks yet another deeper change.

The end of the Cold War brought about a radical process of change in existing social and power structures resulting in a significant transformation of interstate society. As a result, the bipolar power structure prevalent during the Cold War shifted towards a more fragmented, hierarchical, multi-layered and unipolar one. Simultaneously, both the ideological rivalry between the superpowers and the long-standing threat of nuclear

annihilation were de-macrosecuritized (at least as a matter of public concern) (BUZAN; WÆVER, 2009, pp. 270-271). Simultaneously, the Western liberal economy with its logic of interdependency steadily expanded to cover most of the globe. Although it appears, at first glance, that the consolidation of a social structure of friends/rivals and the liberal order would lead to a further narrowing of the legitimate uses of war and therefore its eventual obsolescence, in fact, these changes created conditions for a transformation in the uses of war. In other words, the consolidation of the liberal order transformed (rather than reducing or eliminating) the legitimate and socially accepted uses of war.

The reaction of the UN's Security Council to the Iraqi military invasion of Kuwait in 1990 was central to this trend[8]. The post-Cold War attempts to criminalize wars of aggression and reject the use of war for territorial gains have intensified. Coming immediately in the wake of the Cold War and when interstate society was experiencing a moment of great normative uncertainty, SC's reaction to the invasion clearly delineated that wars of aggression fought for territorial gains were not only unacceptable but also that it was willing to use military force against the aggressor state in order to enforce compliance. Hence, the SC was able to reach a consensus in condemning this particular use of war as markedly illegitimate in the post-Cold War era. To provide some details: the SC resolutions not only authorized the collective use of military force against Iraq, but it also explicitly condemned the use of military force for territorial gains (UNSC, Res. 662); stated that the state of Iraq was legally liable to pay for the damages caused by its acts (UNSC, Res. 674, Res. 687) and also stated that Iraq would need to compensate Kuwait for its illegal actions (UNSC, Res. 692). The institutional enforcement of these resolutions clearly demonstrated the shift that had occurred in interstate society, which unlike a century ago, now no longer accepted territorial wars of aggression as either legitimate or socially acceptable.

The post-Cold War narrowing of the institution of war was not only the result of a historical process limiting the legitimate uses of war but also embedded in the growth of the liberal economy as well as in the broader transformations of the international environment. Taken collectively, these transformations have impacted existing technologies of interaction of states by not only increasing the overall density of interactions amongst them but also by diversifying these patterns of interaction. Thus, both the Iraq intervention and these broader changes in global order clearly impacted both MENA's regional dynamics as well as the United States' presence there.

The 1991 Gulf War resulted in an increasingly fragile and isolated Iraq followed by an increasingly regionally engaged US. Relations between Baghdad and Washington deteriorate so badly that in 2003 the United States decided to intervene in Iraq a second time on the grounds that Saddam Hussein's government was developing weapons of mass destruction. Unlike in 1991, the intervention did not obtain the UN Security Council's approval. Along with the invasion, the US advocated a regime change that actually meant the transformation of the regional international institutions towards ones more aligned with the US' project of con-

8. Note, however, that the Security Council has been very wary of declaring a war as being a case of "aggression", even when it is explicitly so.

solidating a broader 'new' post-Cold War liberal 'global' order. In its Iraq's discourse, the US clearly emphasized the importance of replacing local institutions with liberal and democratic ones. This narrative was lined up with its broader bid for the re-negotiating its identity and role in the post-Cold War world and became known as Liberal Hegemony.[9] This narrative was followed by concrete actions that significantly impacted the RSC of the ME transforming both the regional patterns of amity and enmity as well the local balance of power as one of the main regional military powers crumbled into a failed state (KAMRAVA, 2011).

This process of transformation was immediately felt in the tense relations between Saudi Arabia and Iran. With the consolidation of Iran's regime and Saudi Arabia's economic growth since the Oil Crisis, both countries have been increasingly consolidating as regional poles of power. This process of redefining the regional balance of power became accelerated especially after the 2003 intervention in Iraq seemed to have removed the latter from the equation. It also compounded their rivalry as both competes for political influence in the ME portraying diametrically opposed views about the United States, Islam and regional politics.

In order to project its power and influence in the region, Iran acts heavily through proxy non-state actors. Tehran's relationship with each of these groups varies in the depth and objectives (IISS, 2019):

9. The 1990s are also known as the period of Liberal Hegemony, in which the United States engaged in defending its ideas and interests and consolidating itself with the Cold War's winning power. According to Mearsheimer (2018) "Liberal Hegemony is an ambitious strategy in which a state aims to turn as many countries as possible into liberal democracies like itself while also promoting an open international economy and building international institutions" (MEARSHEIMER, p.8, 2018).

Image 1 - Iran and its regional partnerships

Source: IISS. *Iran's Networks of Influence in the Middle East*. International Institute of Strategic Studies. 2019

As an example of this modus operandi, Iran has also steadily grown its influence and presence in Iraq by providing direct support to selected Shiite militias in the country such as Asaib Ahl al-Haq and the Badr Or-

ganization. However, here again we can identify US' attempts to counter Iran and centralize the regional dynamics. One such attempt was the US attack that killed the Iranian General Qassem Suleimani. He was the commander of the Quds forces, an arm of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard dedicated precisely to support pro-Iran groups outside Iran (IISS, 2019).

Saudi Arabia, in its lieu, seek to project their regional leadership in both the sectarian/religious and the political/material arenas. With regard to the sectarian aspect, Saudi Arabia finances groups (armed or not) and educational institutions that corroborate its official interpretation of Islam (TZEMPRIM et al. 2015). They also claim leadership as the guardians of two of the three[10] most sacred sites for Islam, namely Mecca and Medina. This discourse is used to capitalize the image of the Kingdom as the Protector of the Faith (CERIOLI, 2018). Materially, the House of Saud projects its influences by providing military and political support to conservative governments aligned with the Riyadh policy, although they do not necessarily demand and ideological alignment with the regime as is the case with Yemen (ARRAF, 2017).

Thus, the Saudi Iranian relationships constructs a complex set of direct and indirect interactions in the ME which, in turn, constructs much of the regional dynamics, social structure and balance of power. This strong pattern of rivalry and enmity substantially carves much of the regional security complex attributes. Yet, another important element also permeates and shape these dynamics: The United States' presence. Washington sees the Saudis as one its main allies in the region with a shared common interest in containing Iranian influence. The US and Saudi Arabia have, thus, became somewhat mutually dependent. On the one hand, the US provides political and military support for Riyadh. On the other, the Ibn Saud family works to ensure the stability of the oil markets and permits that the US uses its territory to project its military power in the region (CERIOLI, 2018).

This US centralization in the ME RSC can also be observed in the Israeli Palestine issue on many occasions such as in the key role the US had in the Oslo Accords (KAMRAVA, 2011) or more recently in the Peace to Prosperity proposal made by the Donald Trump administration (WHITE HOUSE, 2020). The United States engaged as a key player in the implementation of both agreements with a clear message: If the conflict between Israel and Palestine has a solution, that solution requires Washington's consent. Thus, although Buzan and Wæver (2003) consider the ME Regional Security Complex as standard due to its own internal dynamics and characteristics, we argue that the macrosecuritization of the Cold War, followed by the central role the ME still has in the US's bid for a new understanding of unipolarity, though do not eliminate the regional security dynamics are enough to distort, suppress and, ultimately, centralize them.

Thus, it is important to understand the ME RSC within the broader global game. The US presence and actions in the ME impacts the broader post-Cold War international environment by functioning as a policy of *normative organization*. The behavior adopted by the world's sole superpower in the region is not a novelty, but it does *propel* both the consoli-

10. The third being Jerusalem/Al-Quds (Al Aqsa Mosque).

dation of new identities and the institutionalization of new roles within interstate society. By undertaking offshore military operations in the region, the US amplifies the political and military gap between states and also compounds the existing hierarchy in interstate society. Nevertheless, the behavior of the sole superpower and the disagreements generated by it also demonstrate that the collective identities that it is attempting to construct are thus far shallowly internalized and therefore unstable (LASMAR, 2015). All this then serves to generate an environment of uncertainty and instability and seems to indicate that the end of the Cold War brought about a re-negotiation of the meaning of great power management that will only acquire a more permanent form if, and when, the US actions become socially perceived as symbolizing the new *de facto meaning* of unipolarity.

Washington's discourse to the region inextricably associates the US position as the sole superpower with its unique capability to employ material and human resources to manage the security threats in the region. Under the banner of its actions in the region, the US constructs a new component in the identity of a superpower whereby the position of a superpower is dependent, amongst other things, upon the capacity to address offshore threats. The US centralization of the ME, therefore, ultimately impacts the norms of great power management by creating a series of additional criteria that must be met before a state can be recognized as a superpower within interstate society. Thus, the interaction amongst great powers since the end of the Cold War represents a re-negotiation of their identities and roles in the post- Cold War world and their roles in the ME RSC play a key role in that game. However, this process of re-negotiation has yet to attain its final form. Recent changes in the Chinese and Russia attitude towards both IS and the region demonstrate that they also intend to offer alternative and revisionist views of what is the new *de facto* meaning of the current international system's polarity. Similarly, at a regional level, Turkey and Qatar also have increasingly adopted revisionist policies intended to advance their own alternative views for what is the current meaning of the regional balance of power and security dynamics.

Present and Future

In this context, recent episodes have demonstrated that there is a mounting pressure for normative changes from both within and outside the ME RSC. Turkey is becoming increasingly involved in regional conflicts and clamming its role as a regional leader. Erdogan turned its backs to the European Union and militarily intervened in both the Syrian Civil War (MASCITELLI, 2019) and in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. On the ideational front, it is clear that Turkey is also trying to rebuild the country's image and legacy as the bedrock of Islam. The recent decision made by the President to reopen Hagia Sophia as a mosque and not as a historical museum is one of the biggest examples that Turkey is distancing itself from secularism and clamming its position in Islam and in the ME (DANFORTH, 2020).

Another important regional force affecting the amity/enmity dynamics in the ME is that of the State of Qatar. As other Persian Gulf States, Qatar is known as an absolute monarchy as well as a rich oil and gas exporter. However, the Qatari power goes beyond the energy markets as the country has strong soft power capabilities. Qatar controls the greatest media center in the region and use sports, particularly football, as a tool to improve the country's image and exercise influence over its neighbors (FAHY, 2018). Qatar has sought to reaffirm its political independence and have established connections with Islamist groups and dissenting individuals across the region (FAHY, 2018). As a result, since 2017 Qatar is isolated in the region as other Middle Eastern countries accuse Doha of using Al-Jazeera to manipulate other countries' domestic environment and of supporting extremist groups such as Muslim Brotherhood, Hezbollah, and even al-Qaeda and ISIS (IISS, 2019).

The adoption of a more revisionist behavior by Russia and China also added significant outside pressure to re-shape the regional amity/enmity dynamics. Since the Civil War had erupted in Syria in 2011, Russia overtly increased its military presence in ME to unprecedented levels in the post-Cold War era. Beyond Kremlin's intentions to preserve its positions in Eastern Mediterranean, the Russians supported the Bashar al-Asad regime and the maintenance of the Syrian status quo. This move was intended to directly oppose the U.S support of rebel groups and the Washington's intentions of regime change (PEIPER, 2019). But, most importantly, is was also directly intended to counter the broader US post-Cold War bid for a specific meaning of unipolarity. And this was not an isolated action. Russia sees the broader ME - and, more specifically, US deep interests and involvement in the region - as an important arena to counter Washington's bid. For example, Russian Russia is also one of the biggest supporters of Iran using a myriad of economic tools to overcome the U.S sanctions against the Persian country (KHLEBNIKOV, 2019). Russia's participation in the Syrian Civil War and its support for Iran undoubtedly reveals the Kremlin's revisionist intentions against both the consolidation of a U.S backed Western order as well as US' centralization of the ME. Thus, Russia has been taking a *vanguardist* reaction against the pressure exerted by Western international order over traditional non-liberal regimes (BUZAN, 2010) and the ME is at the center stage of such reactions.

Another great power that is increasingly – though discreetly - turning its attention to the ME is China. China official discourse is that of non-alliance, non-interference, and of never seeking a global hegemony. Thus, it does not act in the regional the same way as the Russians or Americas. Nevertheless, the Chinese are steadily expanding their presence in the region (CHINA, 2019). China sees the region as key to sustain its growth as it needs enormous quantities of oil coming from the ME to keep its economy flowing. Due to the region's instability, the People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) established its first overseas base in Djibouti to protect Chinese interest in the Gulf of Aden (LIN, 2019). The ME is also extremely strategically important for China as it is in the core of China's Belt and Road Initiative (GORDON, TONG, ANDERSON,

2020). Thus, China has been clearly signaling the intention of increasing its presence in the region. Additionally, China shares with Russia the opposition over both the Western liberal order as well as the US' bid to consolidate its particular understandings regarding the system polarity and the primary institutions of IS. China thus has been seeking to establish relations in the region without questioning the countries' domestic regimes and advocating its status and role as a great power (CHARAP, DRENNAN, NOËL, 2017).

Questions about the recent policies of the United States towards the region as well as the possible shifts that the Biden election might bring about to these policies are also one of the possible big game-changers in the ME's RSC. Since the beginning of the events of Arab Spring, the U.S policies towards the region have been received with suspicion by Middle Eastern countries as well as seen as marking the US as an unreliable partner. Episodes such as the lack of help to the Mubarak's regime in Egypt (PINTO, 2012) or the troop withdrawal within Iraqi and Syrian Kurd territories have greatly added to a steady erosion of US' leadership in the region. Another controversial decision was to unilaterally withdraw from the nuclear treaty with Iran. Undoubtedly, these set of decisions undermined the US position in the ME RSC (EWERS, 2019) greatly contributing to the possibility of the erosion of its centralization and opening space for a deep re-shaping of its regional dynamics of security and insecurity.

Conclusion

The end of the Ottoman Empire caused an abrupt transition in the ME. What was once a centralized and somewhat coherent unit fragmented into several new units that were immediately overlayed. In the post-World War II era, the region begun a process of forming an autonomous RSC but it became centralized and caught *by* the Cold War macrosecuritization. With the demise of the Soviet Union, the ME RSC continued to evolve in its own dynamics but was still largely influenced by the remaining superpower.

Thus, in a nutshell, since the fragmentation of the Ottoman Empire, security issues in the ME region have evolved, to a large extent, influenced by the constant presence of great and superpowers in the local Regional Security Complex. This is not to say that the regional dynamics of the balance of power and the patterns of amity and enmity have not evolved. The ME RSC has had a series of securitization and de-securitization processes sufficiently interconnected by regional actors. Nevertheless, these processes were, at some point, overlayed - as in the case of the British and French occupation – suppressed – as it happened due to the dynamics of the Cold War – distorted – as it happened and still happening due to the US presence in the region.

Thus, to understand the dynamics of regional security is important to understand the role of outside powers in the ME. This is because these external great and superpower have displayed a vanguardist foreign policy towards the region that reflects broader geopolitical games. The advance of Western society towards the ME in the last days of the Ottoman

Empire and after its fall also introduced the newly formed countries of the region as members of a Western IS. Thus, at the same time, Western values and institutions were imposed on a cultural context that had distinct values and norms. The consequence was a formation of a complex, constantly evolving regional security complex.

Finally, the ME is currently undergoing yet another process of normative change and re-shaping of its dynamics of security and insecurity. The recent events bring about important questions about the future of the ME RSC. Will Russia's and China's presence in Syria extend over time? How it will impact the regional dynamics? How have China's interests penetrated the ME? How could an eventual decrease in the US leadership affect the RSC? How would the regional balance of power and patterns of amity and enmity be affected in the event of Iran and/or Saudi Arabia's nuclearization? What role is Turkey to play in this re-negotiation of the regional dynamics? These are all open questions that will guide future debates on the complexities of the ME RSC.

Appendix: Summary of Middle East patterns of amity/enmity throughout history, in chronological order

	British Empire	France	Saudi Kingdom	Iran	Turkey
British Empire	-	Amity	Neutral	Amity	Neutral
France	Amity	-	Neutral	Neutral	Neutral
Saudi Kingdom	Neutral	Neutral	-	Neutral	Neutral
Iran	Amity	Neutral	Neutral	-	Neutral
Turkey	Neutral	Neutral	Neutral	Neutral	-

	Hashemite Clan	Arabian Gulf Monarchies	Republican Arab Countries	Israel	Pre-revolutionary Iran	Post-revolutionary Iran	Turkey
Hashemite Clan[11]	-	Enmity/ Neutral	Enmity	Enmity/ Neutral	Neutral	Enmity	Neutral
Arabian Gulf Monarchies[12]	Enmity/ Neutral	-	Enmity/ Neutral	Enmity	Neutral	Enmity	Neutral
Republican Arab Countries[13]	Enmity	Enmity/ Neutral	-	Enmity	Enmity/ Neutral	Enmity/ Neutral	Enmity/ Neutral
Israel	Enmity/ Neutral	Enmity	Enmity	-	Neutral	Enmity	Neutral/ Amity
Pre-revolutionary Iran	Neutral	Neutral	Enmity/ Neutral	Neutral	-	-	Neutral
Post-revolutionary Iran	Enmity	Enmity	Enmity/ Neutral	Enmity	-	-	Enmity
Turkey	Neutral	Neutral	Enmity/ Neutral	Neutral/ Amity	Neutral	Enmity	-

11. Includes Jordan and the former kingdom of Iraq.

12. Includes all the monarchies from Arabian Peninsula.

13. Arab countries lead by Nasser's Egypt.

14. Includes all the monarchies from Arabian Peninsula (except for Qatar) and Jordan.

	Traditional Monarchies	Iran	Israel	Turkey	Pre-2003 Iraq	Post-2003 Iraq	Egypt	Syria	Lebanon	Qatar
Traditional Monarchies[14]	-	Enmity	Neutral	Neutral / Enmity	Enmity	Neutral	Neutral	Enmity	Neutral	Enmity
Iran	Enmity	-	Enmity	Neutral	Enmity	Neutral	Enmity / Neutral	Neutral/ Amity	Neutral/ Amity	Neutral / Amity

Israel	Neutral	Enmity	-	Neutral	Enmity	Neutral	Neutral/ Amity	Enmity	Neutral / Enmity	Neutral
Turkey	Neutral / Enmity	Neutral	Neutral	-	Enmity	Neutral	Neutral	Enmity	Neutral	Neutral / Amity
Pre-2003 Iraq	Enmity	Enmity	Enmity	Enmity	-	-	Enmity	Enmity / Neutral	Neutral	Neutral / Enmity
Post-2003 Iraq	Neutral	Neutral	Neutral	Neutral	-	-	Neutral	Neutral	Neutral	Neutral
Egypt	Neutral	Enmity / Neutral	Neutral/ Amity	Neutral	Enmity	Neutral	-	Neutral / Enmity	Neutral	Neutral / Enmity
Syria	Enmity	Neutral/ Amity	Enmity	Enmity	Enmity / Neutral	Neutral	Neutral / Enmity	-	Neutral / Amity	Neutral / Enmity
Lebanon	Neutral	Neutral/ Amity	Neutral / Enmity	Neutral	Neutral	Neutral	Neutral	Neutral / Amity	-	Neutral
Qatar	Enmity	Neutral / Amity	Neutral	Neutral / Amity	Neutral / Enmity	Neutral	Neutral / Enmity	Neutral / Enmity	Neutral	-

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Turkish-Ottoman relations with Latin America: a journey through the time capsule

Las relaciones turco-otomanas con América Latina: un recorrido a través de las cápsulas del tiempo

Relações turco-otomanas com a América Latina: uma viagem pelas cápsulas do tempo

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Abstract

In this article we propose to address the opening of three Time Capsules to reconstruct three clearly identifiable contexts, each providing information for the analysis of what international relations between the Ottoman Empire/Turkey with Latin America have been like. In this way, we seek to analyze the content of the links through the density of the macro-relationships that developed over time, in order to make a cognitive map of the state of situation, taking into account not only the interests of the actors but also the endogenous and exogenous conditions. In that line are raised three contexts of opening the Capsules of Time. The first in 1923, when the Empire died and the Republic of Turkey was born; the second at the end of the 20th century; and the third in 2019, spanning almost the first two decades of the 21st century.

Keywords: Ottoman Empire. Turkey. Relations. Latin America.

Resumen

En el presente artículo proponemos abordar la apertura de tres Capsulas del Tiempo para reconstruir tres contextos claramente identificables, cada uno de ellos brindando información para el análisis de cómo han sido las relaciones internacionales entre el Imperio Otomano/Turquía con América Latina. De ese modo, buscamos analizar el contenido de los vínculos a través de la densidad de las macro-relaciones que se desarrollaron en el tiempo, con el fin de realizar un mapa cognitivo del estado de situación, atendiendo no solo a los intereses de los actores sino también a los condicionantes endógenos y exógenos. En esa línea se plantean tres contextos de apertura de las Capsulas del Tiempo. El primero en 1923, cuando muere el Imperio y nace la República de Turquía; el segundo a fines del siglo XX; y el tercero en 2019, abarcando casi las dos primeras décadas del siglo XXI.

Palabras clave: Imperio Otomano. Turquía. Relaciones. América Latina.

Resumo

Neste artigo propomos abordar a abertura de três Cápsulas do Tempo para reconstruir três contextos claramente identificáveis, cada um fornecendo informações para a análise de como têm sido as relações internacionais entre o Império Otomano/Turquia com a América Latina. Dessa forma, buscamos analisar o conteúdo dos elos através da densidade das macro-relações que se desenvolveram ao longo do tempo, a fim de fazer um mapa cognitivo do estado de situação, levando em conta não apenas os interesses dos atores, mas também as condições endógenas e exógenas. Nessa linha são levantados três contextos de abertura das Cápsulas do Tempo. A primeira em 1923, quando o Império morreu e a República da Turquia nasceu; o segundo no final do século XX; e a terceira em 2019, abrangendo quase as duas primeiras décadas do século XXI.

Palavras-chave: Império Otomano. Turquia. Relações. América Latina.

Introduction

In the 21st century there was a strong interest in diversifying and deepening external relations between the Republic of Turkey and Latin America through several specific initiatives. However, the links between the two actors are not recent and can be studied in line with different regional and international contexts over time.

Precisely, to understand what the international relations between the two actors have been, we propose to make a novel approach, not far from the current reality that we have to live, where *streaming* has changed the way we consume audiovisual services, among other issues the popular TV series. In this sense, a three-season lag can be raised to analyze from a perspective of International Relations what the link between two actors from distant regions that make up the international system has been like. On the one hand, the then Ottoman Empire (later Republic of Turkey) and on the other, the region of Latin America.

The script that is proposed for each of the seasons is the opening of three Time Capsules - recalling the Westinghouse idea - that were buried with the idea of them opening at a certain date and thus providing knowledge about the historical context analyzed. The Time Capsules were created by Westinghouse and were presented at the World Exhibition of New York as part of their exhibition. The first measured 2.28 meters, weighed 363 kg, and had an inner diameter of 16 centimeters with a nickel and silver alloy, harder than steel. At first it was sought to bury them with the aim that they are open in the future, but given the development of the technology, they were also placed in space. Inside, varied articles such as books, diverse objects and brochures were kept that were intended to provide knowledge to all of humanity about a context of history when they were opened.

In this article we propose to address the opening of three Time Capsules to reconstruct three clearly identifiable contexts, each providing information and tools for the analysis of what international relations between the Ottoman Empire/Turkey have been like with Latin America. In this way, we seek to analyze the content of the links through the density of the macro-relationships that developed over time, in order to make

a cognitive map of the state of situation, taking into account not only the interests of the actors but also the endogenous and exogenous conditions. According to Carlos Escudé, from a theoretical-methodological perspective, the global macro-relationship comprises the broad political framework on which a bilateral relationship is based and translates into expressions and actions of governments in the political-diplomatic dimension that make it possible to move forward on micro-relations. The dimension of the global macro-relationship is the one that sets – to a greater extent – the rules of the game of linkage. For their part, micro-relations are articulated around a plurality of specific problems which oversee a multiplicity of individual, public, and private actors – state agencies, the business sectorial and investment groups (ESCUDÉ, 1991). In this work, we will focus on the content of macro-relations between Turkey and Latin America. In this line, three contexts of opening the capsules of time are raised. The first in 1923, when the Empire died and the Republic of Turkey was born; the second at the end of the 20th century; and the third in 2019, spanning almost the first two decades of the 21st century.

The Ottoman Empire's ties to Latin America until 1923

With the opening of the first capsule in 1923, we can understand what the path of international relations between the Ottoman Empire and Latin America was like in the context, events, and interests of these actors. That is why it is important to start with the influence of exogenous conditions.

The Ottoman Empire had about 600 years of life and expanded throughout the Middle East and North Africa (MENA), reaching to the gates of Austria in 1683, passing before the Balkans, and reaching the borders of Crimea. As Turk rightly argues: "The Turkish people played a very important role in the history of mankind because it formed 16 great empires such as the Huns, the Heavenly Turks, Ottoman Selyuquis and finally the Turkish Republic" (TURK, 2010, p. 2). But above all, the West's contact with the East through the Ottoman Empire redefined the borders of the long-known world, with the construction of identities in relational terms, emphasizing otherness (i.e. Christian Europe versus Islamic Ottoman imperial political unity).

For this reason, the importance of the latter as a reference point cannot be overlooked, since the "Turkish" has been present in the change of eras that marked the development of universal history. That is to say, "The Turks have opened and closed eras, with the fall of the Western Roman Empire in the 5th century by the Huns (Ancient Age) and with the fall of the Byzantine Empire in the fifteenth century by the Ottomans (Middle Ages). Anatolia, present-day Turkey, is arguably the cradle of Eastern and Western civilization, which for centuries inhabited that land and left their legacies, footprints and teachings for humanity" (TURK, 2010, p. 2).

It is worth mentioning that Madrid and Istanbul, both heads of vast empires that contested the dominance of the Mediterranean in the sixteenth century, ignored each other in the last centuries (VALLEJO

FERNÁNDEZ CELA, 2010). Only at the end of the eighteenth century, both empires will have a rapprochement, coinciding with the twilight of one and the decay of the other. The signing of the Treaty of Peace, Friendship and Trade between Spain and the Ottoman Empire of 14 September 1782, sealed by King Charles III and Sultan Abd-lhami I (1774-1789) ended more than two centuries of hostilities (VALLEJO FERNÁNDEZ CELA, 2001, p. 20). Until then, the contacts were non-existent. This explains why there was no "strong orientalist current in Spain" compared to France and Britain whose interests were in reaching a portion of territory of the vast Ottoman Empire.

This situation gave account of an atmospheric imperialism, where another active actor was added in the international reconfiguration as was the Empire of the Tsars, with territorial pretensions over the Ottoman Empire. However, it should not be overlooked that with the beginning of the renaissance and religious reform in Europe, together with the new technologies that allowed invention and innovation in the development of capitalism, coupled with the system of post-Congress power of Vienna of 1815, were gradually affecting the Ottoman State. This process intensified in the 19th century, forcing the Ottomans to make several attempts at reforms known as *Tanzimat* in the political, economic, and military dimensions- to introduce Modernity and modernization into the empire.

Despite this, the secret diplomacy, and interests of much of the powers of the pentarchy were conditioning the future of the Ottoman Empire with territorial losses, which were exacerbated by World War I. At the time, the so-called "sick man of Europe" was a euphemism that made him part of a continent that saw him not as his own but as a stranger, another threatening and agonizing of the virus of European fever intended to distribute the territories.

World War I had a devastating effect on the Ottoman Empire. This produced a significant geopolitical design where the problems that exist today in the MENA region have their origin, precisely, in the decisions made by the winning powers.

As Mehmet Necati Kutlu rightly submits, "in this geopolitical context of dispute over the Ottoman territory the tactic of fragmentation of many peoples was applied, where separatism and segregation were encouraged from the outside" (EQUILIBRIUM GLOBAL, 2018).

For this reason, the disintegration of the Ottoman Empire throughout the 19th century is marked by several stages, in which reformist attempts by sultans and rulers are preceded by increasing European penetration in all areas. The culmination of the latter was the secret Sykes-Picot agreement sealing the fate of the Ottoman Empire as a multi-ethnic and multinational unit and which started the path towards the formation of the Republic of Turkey.

In this context, endogenous conditions have also been present. In the nineteenth century, Latin America undertook the process of decolonization of the Spanish Bourbon crown in 1810, with the May Revolution of the Viceroyalty of the Río de la Plata generating a contagion effect on the captaincy of Chile and Venezuela but also on the jewels of the Spanish empire, the Viceroyalty of Upper Peru and New Spain (Mexico).

For much of the 19th century we will attend wars of independence, civil wars, secessionisms and a "long wait" for the formation of modern states. It was only in the last quarter of a century, once consolidated and inserted into the model of capitalism of *laissez-faire- laissez-passer* as commodity exporting economies, only some of the Latin American states undertook formal contact with the Ottoman Empire.

During this period, the Ottoman Empire also undertook a number of reforms for example: "The reform of education that paved the way for European-style opening in engineering, military schools, public administration is the second stage of this important policy change. In addition, the Empire sent dozens of young students to be training programs in Western Europe to create a new generation of skilled civil bureaucrats for the state. Interestingly, the students returned with a liberal and critical thought of the Ottoman system, in addition, with the intention of carrying out a coup" (TURK, 2010, p. 3).

Undoubtedly, the profound changes that went through the empire were the economic ones, which impacted the social structure. The process of shifting from a traditional economy to a capitalism dependent on the export of raw materials was preceded by"a long period (1792-1853) during which epidemics and wars, economic stagnation, and demographic decay had been the salient features of the Ottomans' world. The decrease in population, especially of Anatolia and Rumili, was so severe that the government sought to attract immigrants from Europe by offering incentives such as tax exemptions" (KARPAT, 1985:177).

The attraction of migrants from the Caucasus, the Balkans and Crimea to counteract the demographic decline led to a re-islamization of the empire's population to the detriment of the multinational and multiethnic nature of the empire. Until then, the legitimacy of the state was based on the idea of fair order and Islam was an important element in terms of regulating state affairs, however, the reforms introduced had other effects (TURK ,2010).

According to Karpat, the economic situation worsened: "Some other particular causes of economic dislocation for certain groups were the destruction of the major part of the vineyards by phylloxera; the opening of the Suez Canal, which caused the trade routes to shift southward; and the collapse of the silk industry due to a disease that killed the local worms over the period from 1875 to 1885 and made it necessary to buy silkworm eggs from France and ship the cocoons there" (KARPAT, 1985, p.178).

The consequence of all this led to the emigration of many citizens of the empire in search of better living conditions, which initiated an unthinkable bond until then with Latin America. Whether as Ottoman citizens or simply Turks, the arrival of different communities generated a diaspora that will turn its Ottoman identity to the Arab, Jewish, or Armenian thing with the future of time.[1]

After 1890 and during the Great War, the emigration of Ottoman communities to host countries in Latin America was the reason for the need for consular and diplomatic links. This explains the presence of the so-called ''Turks'' as colloquially called the citizens of the empire and which today constitute a considerable amount of the Latin American population. For example, Brazil has 9 million, Argentina 3.5 million,

1. One case is Armenians, who were the victims of genocide through a plan with different stages: disarmament, intellectual beheading, emasculation, and deportation. The arrival of Armenians in Latin America will be an issue of the negative agenda between Turkey and Latin America to this day.

Venezuela 1.6million, Chile 1.1 million, Mexico 1.1 million and Colombia 800,000 descendants of immigrants who arrived in the new world (TASAM, 2016).

By virtue of the above, the macro-relationships were of a non-existent and sporadic nature. On the one hand, these focused on the immigration issues of the empire's citizens who came to the new world escaping the reality they were going through. On the other, trade flows were scarce despite the interest of deepening the link. Distance, communications, and language were made up of factors that hindered higher-level relationships.

This explains why only the visit of Emperor Peter of Brazil is recorded in 1871 and 1876 in a personal capacity and not on an official visit. More formal relations with the still Cuba under Spanish rule (with the opening of the Honorary Consulate of Havana in 1873) and with the two empires that existed in Latin America. On the one hand, Peter II of Brazil opened a Honorary Consulate in 1859 in Istanbul and on the other, Emperor Maximilian of Mexico sent a representative in 1864 to the Ottoman capital. At first, the relations were in consular nature with the aim of meeting the needs of the Ottoman citizens, despite being Syrians, Lebanese, Jews, Armenians, Palestinians, and Druze who would then stop using the name 'Ottoman'.

With Argentina, diplomatic relations began in 1909, demonstrating in the last years of the Ottoman Empire a certain degree of development. However, after the Great War, ties were resumed and formalized with the signing of the 1926 Treaty of Friendship (BOTTA, 2012). Then, Brazil and Mexico in 1927 and in 1928 respectively signed the Treaties of Friendship and Peace, thus initiating diplomatic relations with modern Turkey.

The Republic of Turkey and Latin America until the end of the 20th century

At the moment of opening the second capsule, the existence of a long period of duration can be identified, marked by the deepening of the geographical and diplomatic distance.This situation responded to the presence of exogenous conditions typical of the development of international politics as well as endogenous conditions inherent in each actor. For this reason, mutual irrelevance was the distinctive character of Turkish-Latin American relations during this period.

About exogenous conditions, it can be said that the interwar period was marked by three forms of penetration into the MENA under the auspices of League of Nations under the mandate regime, the protectorate and/or direct occupation. The end of the central empires also meant the end of the once enemy of the West and the crystallization of the territorial distribution project avoiding any kind of Turkish influence in the region.

Systemic changes explain the irrelevance in which the relations fell. On the one hand, the crisis of pure capitalism affected both actors, Latin America, and the Republic of Turkey, which until then had reached international insertion as commodity exporting countries. On the other hand, the attempts to channel the capitalist system had as a counter to the emergence of totalitarianisms in Europe and Asia, and with them, the sliding to World War II.

To this end, the world was conditioned by the development of the Cold War, with a bipolar system, where both actors were under the umbrella of American influence. Turkey became NATO's southern flank, providing the second army in numerical terms and America Latina in the natural-influenced region of the United States. While both actors participated in the liberal order of the second post-war period (UN, IMF, WB, GATT) this did not result in a strategic rapprochement, on the contrary, the distances were greater. This was highlighted in the political dimension with the 1982 Falklands War, in which Turkey openly supported Britain as an ally within the framework of NATO.

As for endogenous conditions, Latin America in this period went through the economic dimension by a dislocation of the development model which led it to undertake a new one. The adoption of Industrialization by Import Substitution model allows to understand why the trade link with Turkey was not deepened. In the political dimension, the region went through the emergence of nationalist populism as well as institutional instability and the presence of coups, coupled with the emergence of armed left-wing movements in the 60s and 70s. In other words, there was a common denominator around national security for fear of red danger.

On Turkey's side, the war of independence spread until 1923 when the Republic was finally created, previously ending the sultanate in 1922 (and the caliphate in 1924). The country set out on the path of building a modern, secular, and nationalist state with the figure of the father of the homeland, Kemal Ataturk, who sought to give Turkey a new identity, far from the Ottoman past.

As Turk rightly holds up, "from then on the Turkish Republic began its ambitious project to cut the ties of a thousand years of its history, ideology and culture" (Turk, 2010, p. 5). For example, the new assembly raised that sovereignty came from the general will, including women with the right to vote; a new professional bureaucracy was established. Thus, nationalism has been applied to create a new modern nation and to replace the *Ummah* (Muslim community) through the assimilation of the practices of state institutions, the new elite aimed to create a "modern" nation and "a national identity" (CETIN, 2004, p.351).

To this end, and to modernize the state and provide it with a new identity, the capital was moved to Ankara. First, Islamic institutions were replaced by new Western and nationalists. Following this line, religious schools were closed, and education came under the jurisdiction of the new Ministry of Education. The Sharia Courts were also abolished and the constitutional status of Islam as the official religion of the Turkish people withdrew from the Constitution in 1928 (AHMAD, 1990; KARPAT, 1985;).

Second, Arabic writing was replaced by the Latin alphabet, with the purpose of cutting off society's relationship with its Islamic faith and The Ottoman past. In addition, legal figures such as marriage, divorce and inheritance laws were amended in accordance with European laws. As a result, the Swiss Civil Code was incorporated, along with the Italian Criminal Code and the German Trade Code in the second lustrum of the 20th.

As in Latin America, the military corporation was imbued with the power to defend the republic but was not a passive player in political life.

The Turkish army dismissed democratically elected governments on no less than four occasions, two through coups in 1960 and 1980, and two others through the threat to the institutional break in 1971 and 1997, respectively. In other words, in Turkey the modernization project emerged as an elite project, designed, and imposed from above, as in many countries of the so-called Third World.

Regarding macro-relations, there was no density of issues on the external agenda between the two actors. Turkey as a kind of cyclops looked inward in order to consolidate the republic and the West to achieve state modernization and international integration. For its part, Latin America went through recurrent political and economic crises and prioritized the external relationship to the West, particularly the United States. This explains why only diplomatic relations were established with 7 Latin American countries (Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Peru, Cuba, Mexico, and Venezuela), without the presence of cultural and military attaches. It is worth mentioning that several Latin American countries related indirectly to Turkey for participating in Peacekeeping Operations in Cyprus. Highlighting the case of Uruguay, which became the first country in the region to recognize the Armenian genocide in 1965, which would be joined by other countries several decades later.

However, the presence of several extra factors historically affected mutual relationships. To the well-known distance, the language, the absence of cultural interactions, the meager levels of trade and the low direct external investment, was added to the absence of the proper Turkish diasporas until the arrival of the Gülen Movement in the 2000s (GONZÁLEZ LEVAGGI, 2012).

The first high-level visits were only in the 1990s. In this regard, the official visit of then-President Carlos Menem of Argentina in 1992 to Turkey and the tour of former Turkish President S. Demirel to Argentina, Brazil, and Chile in 1995 are highlighted. Since then, Turkey's Ministry of Foreign Affairs has begun to look more closely the region in terms of both diplomatic and trade relations. In 1998 Turkey raised the Plan of Action towards Latin America and the Caribbean, which ultimately failed because of the economic crises that were evident during 2000 and 2001 respectively at both latitudes.

Turkey's restoration as a re-emerging power and renewed ties with Latin America in the 21st century

At the time of opening the third capsule, and closer in time, it can be said that the 21st century witnessed profound changes in the reconfiguration and operation of the International Order. The relative loss of American power, the consolidation of an Asia-centric gravitational axis, and the challenge of the liberal order built in the second post-war period were added to the "rise of the rest" (ZAKARIA, 2004). In other words, the increasing spread of power was recognized in all its dimensions among the actors that make up the structure of the international system with the rise of the so-called emerging powers.

Despite theoretical discussions and a lack of conceptual univocity to denote what is meant as such, certain indicators have been used to ac-

2. The Next Eleven group is estimated to be the next emerging powers of the 21st century: Bangladesh, Egypt, Indonesia, Iran, Mexico, South Korea, Nigeria, Pakistan, Vietnam, Turkey, and the Philippines.

3. The Economist Intelligence Unit named the group of Colombia, Indonesia, Vietnam, Egypt, Turkey, and Singapore with this new one, albeit with less marketing,

4. MIKTA is made up of Mexico, Indonesia, South Korea, Turkey, and Australia.

5. In the second decade of the 21st century, the factors that allowed countries to be renamed as emerging powers are tested in the economic dimension, which has already impacted some on the domestic political situation as in foreign policy actions. For example, China is experiencing a slowdown in its economic growth, with lower demand for commodities from the world - with the known impact on international prices - coupled with the trade war with the United States. Russia is another example of how the crisis particularly with Ukraine deepened the economic problems - coupled with the blockade - by barely putting dependence on crude oil and gas exports at low international prices. Brazil, the Latin American giant that in the first decade of the 21st century presented itself as a power, not only went through an Orthodox economic adjustment - with strong social unrest - but also a political crisis and a right-wing turn of its government.

6. In the Turkish cosmogony, from the Ottoman imperial era to the present, there have been 4 restorations: the first has been Tanzimat - coinciding with the incorporation of the ideological legacy of the French Revolution only in 1839; the second has occurred with the establishment of the Republic after the First World War; the third with the adoption of the parliamentary system in the 1950s; and the fourth and last, with the implementation of a true multi-party system that allowed the AKP to come to power in 2002.

count for this. For example, political stability – regardless of the type of regime implemented without respect for human rights – the model of development and sustained economic growth over time, and the design and implementation of an active but fundamentally assertive foreign policy in the regional and international context. Therefore, in this ascent, not only has the recognition of other international actors been important, but also of the "self-perception" that countries, including under that name, sought to project of themselves.

In this sense, when Goldman Sachs coined the acronym *for BRICS* (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa) he never thought about the popularity that this select group of countries would gain in political, academic and even international media circles. But this group did not reflect the true nature of an international system in full transformation. The performance achieved by other countries – according to the above-mentioned indicators – had allowed membership to be expanded by generating a large soup of letters when the Next [2]Eleven, CIVETS [3] or the recently named MIKTA appeared[4] (SERBIN, 2017). In any of these three groups, a power synonymous with "model" for the region has been included, for holding the sixteenth position in the world economy, the sixth as a Member State associated with the European Union and for owning the second largest army within NATO, as is the case of the Republic of Turkey.

Beyond the privileged transcontinental geographical location – thanks to the control of the Bosphorus Strait and the Dardanelles that separates 3% of its European territory from the rest located on the Anatolian peninsula on the Asian continent – the weight of history – because it was a great empire that rivaled and cooperated alternately with the West – and to possess a unique identity , Turkey has entered the select concert of the emerging powers.

Among the reasons that lead to her identifying it there is the uniqueness of the "Turkish miracle", which is based on a triad that combines market economy, democracy and Islam – and which the West did not hesitate to support – which became a model of regional stability. However, like the rest of the emerging powers, favorable conditions in the second decade of the 21st century have been reversed compared to the first, and Turkey has been no exception.[5] This context, as can be analyzed, was marking international relations with Latin America.

Turkey's restoration as a re-emerging power had a starting point with the presence of endogenous conditions. In 2002 a new era was inaugurated in the institutional life of the country when the Islamic Justice and Development Party (AKP) first came to power by the hand of Recep Tayyip Erdogan, the then Prime Minister and currently strongman and President of the Republic. With the turn of the century behind a stage signified by the coups and trauma of the deep economic crisis of 2000 and 2001 when it sought to implement a model that combined national strategic interests with the vision of projecting the country to the world. Since then, it has coincided precisely with what the government has officially called Turkey's "restoration" with the "re-emerging" power projections in the international system.[6]

On the one hand, "restoration" alludes to the need to restore Turkey to lost *status,* knowing how to capture the "spirit of the times" to meet the challenges of a transforming global system. While it has not been the first restoration throughout its history, it is considered that the latter has given it its place in the world, combining in the country a new identity with a "strong democracy, a dynamic economy and an active foreign policy"(DAVUTOGLU, 2014).

These three elements coincide with the indicators mentioned *ut supra,* also acquiring a specific meaning according to the official self-perception that during the first decade of AKP's rule raised in power. Turkey re-emerged from an imperial past with no territorial pretensions in line with the new international context and was called to play the role of regional and international power.

"Strong democracy" had to leave behind the stigma that a moderate religious party could not become in government under the parameters of a secular republic, as had been founded in 1923 by the "Father of the Homeland", Kemal Ataturk. Democracy had to be built on a multi-party system, regaining the "dignity" and "legitimacy" of the government with the vote of all citizens, exalting as the main value and bulwark of freedoms – political and civil – respect for the division of powers and the presence of strong institutions outside of all influence of the military corporation. The philosophical basis for the democratic system was the recovery of the citizen, assuring him the freedom to think, do and say without any prohibition. Thus, Turkey committed to "will maintain its position of being a state that contends with every kind of prohibition that restricts the free-will of humans" (DAVUTOGLU, 2014, p. 9). The moral basis of democracy should rest on the transparency and counterweights necessary to prevent excesses and corruption, for which institutional recasting was necessary.

The result has been the political stability that resulted in the AKP's tenure in government with 16 consecutive elections won at each of the levels of government for 17 years, demonstrating that democratic values were compatible with Islamic heritage – until then relegated. However, over time the criticism appeared when describing the new political system, because it was perceived as a government of "conservative democrats" (KARAVELI, 2017), which brought it closer to what the French thinker Alain Rouquié defined as "hegemonic democracy" (ROUQUIÉ, 2017). In other words, the presence of formal elections that in their operation is far removed from liberal democracy.

The "dynamic economy" was conceived as the main asset in which democracy as a political regime could respond to the needs of the population inward but also projected solidly to the world. In this sense, and against the current of Latin America in the new century, Turkey has opened its economy by pursuing neoliberal policies and an export oriented economic development model. This makes it possible to understand why the Turkish economic structure has similarities to that of developed countries, as the services sector has the greatest weight (58.2%), followed by the industrial sector (26.1%), the primary sector (10.1%) – which has decreased its importance although it absorbs 30% of the labor force – and the construction sector (5.2%) (WORLD BANK, 2014).

Macroeconomic achievements during the first decade of the AKP government positioned Turkey as one of the fastest growing emerging economies. GDP has been multiplied 3.5 times; growth has been the average annual 5%; inflation of 60% fell to a digit and unemployment fell to 9%. The competitiveness of the Turkish economy allowed exports of medium-tech intermediate industrial goods to increase by positioning Turkish firms internationally and attracting, thanks to the good business climate, external direct investment (FDI) mainly from the European Union (EU).

The "active foreign policy" has been strategically designed to accompany the country's process of political and economic transformation. And this was structured on a theoretical corpus designed by those who were Foreign Minister and Prime Minister, Ahmet Davutoglu, which was called "Strategic Depth". By applying this doctrine, Turkey managed to enjoy unbeatable results in the international environment, more precisely in the nearby neighborhood.

Some of the principles formulated in foreign policy include the policy of *zero problems with neighbors* - which has involved looking back at the Middle East, a region to which it turned its back for decades, recomposing diplomatic ties *in situ*; *multidimensionality* - which has meant complementarity between new commitments, for example by intervening in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict by supporting the Arab cause, with the old alliances represented in NATO membership, without entering competition; *autonomy* – understood as the ability to take action in areas of vital interest and in which it can collide with Western allies, as has been the attempt to mediate together with Brazil in the Iranian nuclear dossier; the multilateralism – by running for a multipolar world with active participation as a member in the multi-island spaces of the UN, NATO, the WTO, the G20, the Group of Friends of Syria, Iraq and Afghanistan; the *de-securitization* of foreign policy - which managed to restore the power of soft power history, culture and own resources over military reductionism in pursuit of building backed-up image of threatening and aggressive backgrounds; and *rhythmic diplomacy* - ready to act on the issues of the international agenda with a professional and renewed diplomatic corps with the opening of 30 new embassies in Africa, Latin America and Asia (BENLI ALTUNISIK, 2011).

Taken together, these principles catapulted Turkey into a position of power in the MENA region and, consequently, to occupy a privileged place in the concert of the nations. In this sense, the "Strategic Depth" had as its horizon the reintegration of the country into the international system, first using the region as a take-off platform for the global projection.

From these three aspects of "restoration," Turkey's self-perception has been that of a power that re-emerged from a high-powered past that once enjoyed. For this reason, Turkey has sought not to be seen as a mere bridge between the West and the East or a free *rider* in a convulsing region, but as a "central" power in the international system. In other words, it has adopted a "neo-Ottoman" revisionist vision without the pretenses of being an empire in traditional terms, combining hard power – economic and military performance – with soft power - in which' it reconciled the Ottoman legacy and also the Sunni Islamic, a model for the Middle East region (DALACOURA, 2017).

7. A clear example of soft power exercised by Turkey have been the soap operas that were sold to different Latin American countries showing the splendor of the then Ottoman Empire as well as the cultural richness of modern Turkey.

At the time of opening the third capsule of time in 2019, the changes were noticeable, especially in what it does to the density that macro-relationships acquired like never before seen in Turkish-Latin American relations. The new foreign policy designed in multidimensional terms allowed Turkey to establish renewed ties with the region over the past 10 years. Through intense communication and close cooperation with governments and other non-state actors, a strategic vision was raised in the title of the Expansion in Latin America and the Caribbean of Turkey. Thus, the Latin American region became vitally important, with its 605 million inhabitants and a GDP of more than $6 trillion and 1.72 trillion foreign trade, rich natural resources, and emerging economy. Turkey's total trade volume in the region has increased nine-fold and is still expanding compared to previous years.

Some initiatives, such as the 2006 Action Plan and the Declaration of The Year of Latin America and the Caribbean, at the same time indicated that Turkey's active foreign policy was beginning to deliver tangible results. The "Action Plan 2006 involved the Ministries of Economy, Industry and Trade of Latin American countries, as well as universities and business sectors that participated in meetings, congresses and seminars organized in order to deepen mutual knowledge and forge an agenda based on reciprocal interests.

To this end, it was a first step to achieve greater institutionalization of diplomatic relations with the countries of the region, which had been virtually inconsequential throughout the twentieth century. In this regard, Turkey initiated a process of rapprochement and negotiations to exchange political ideas with 14 of the most important countries in the region (Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Ecuador, Guatemala, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Mexico, Peru, Chile, Paraguay, Uruguay, Venezuela). In this line, new General Consulates were opened in Brazil and Colombia and the establishment of Trade Promotion Offices under the Ministries of Economy in Buenos Aires, Bogota, Caracas, Lima, Mexico DF, Santiago de Chile, and Havana was promoted. Undoubtedly, Brazil was the cornerstone of the relationship with the region, where progress was made in signing the Action Plan for a Strategic Partnership. In addition to the participation of other joint international initiatives, such as mediation in Iran's nuclear affair.

The strengthening of diplomatic relations was highlighted by President Erdogan's official visits in 2015 to Colombia, Cuba, and Mexico and in early 2016 Ecuador, Peru, and Chile. As a result of the July 2016 coup attempt in Turkey, the presidential tours in Latin America were interrupted but the region condemned the facts in solidarity with the Turkish people. For their part, Latin American representatives such as Luiz Inácio Lula Da Silva of Brazil, Hugo Chávez of Venezuela, Cristina Fernández de Kirchner of Argentina and Enrique Peña Nieto of Mexico paid out by diplomatic courtesy and interest the visits with tours that included Ankara.

A second step in relations was the Strategy for trade development with Latin American countries presented by the Turkish Ministry of Economy to conclude trade and economic agreements with the countries of the region. In this order, Trade and Economic Cooperation Agreements were concluded

with 13 countries (Argentina, Brazil, Ecuador, Guatemala, Guyana, Jamaica, Colombia, Cuba, Mexico, Paraguay, Peru, Chile and Uruguay) and follow-up mechanisms were established through the Joint Economic Commission[8]. Regarding free trade agreements, negotiations began - still ongoing - with the Caribbean Community (CARICOM), with the Central American Integration System (SICA) and the Southern Common Market (MERCOSUR).[9]

A higher density of issues appeared on the bilateral agenda, in a clear sign of entrenchment of mutual ties and interests. These include the elimination of the visa for Latin American citizens (except Cuba) and the establishment of daily flights with The Turkish *Airlines* company to the countries of the region.

However, a sensitive issue on the bilateral agenda has remained generating diplomatic frictions, which revolves around the recognition of the Armenian genocide. In chronological order, Venezuela on 14 July 2005 condemned the genocide and supported the historical claims made by the Armenian people; Argentina, with 135 thousand descendants of Armenians, sanctioned 2007 Law 26.199 of "Declaration of 24 April Day of Action for Tolerance and Respect among Peoples"; Bolivia officially expressed its appreciation with Declaration No.122/2015; Brazil on 2 June 2015 issued the Federal Senate resolution under No. 550/2015 recognizing the genocide of the Armenian people; and Paraguay on 29 October 2015 unanimously passed the law of the official recognition of the genocide perpetrated against the Armenian people. (TASAM, 2018).

The MERCOSUR Parliament also adopted resolution 04/2007 at its plenary meeting on 19 November 2007 in which it publicly acknowledges the genocide on the Armenian people. For its part, the Latin American Parliament composed of National Congresses and Assemblies throughout Latin America passed on July 31, 2015, coinciding with the commemoration of the hundredth anniversary of the Armenian genocide, a draft resolution officially recognizing the issue.

Conclusions

Under the analysis carried out, it can be said that Turkish-Latin American relations are long-standing and state-conditioned by the presence of exogenous and endogenous factors over time. This article sought to reconstruct the context of these relationships using the timeframe of the Time Capsules. Thus, with each of the openings, the information obtained was valuable for the analysis of the three contexts in which macro-relations were developed at both latitudes.

With the opening of the first capsule we can conclude that during the existence of the Ottoman Empire and the Spanish Empire relations were non-existent, even ignoring each other. This responded to the non-collision interests pursued by each actor in the international system. On the one hand the Ottoman Empire spread throughout Central and Eastern Europe, becoming a large multi-ethnic and multinational political unit whose main threat was the Empire of Tsars. On the other hand, the main concern of the Spanish empire was to maintain control and administration in its former colonies in the new world, far from the meddling of western European powers.

8. It is important to mention that the commercial volume in the first decade of the 21st century increased considerably, especially given how meager it was during the previous period. Foreign trade made a significant leap from $2 billion to $8 billion in 2015, placing Brazil in the top spot followed by Mexico, Colombia, Chile, and Argentina respectively.

9. In 2011, a free trade agreement was signed with Chile taking advantage of the previous agreement with the EU.

It was only at the end of the 19th century, when the so-called 'Sick Man of Europe' was losing territories, coupled with economic crises - and its well-known social effects - Ottoman relations with Latin America were established by the issue of immigration. The arrival of the so-called 'Turks' and their situation in the countries was the pretext for establishing consular relations. However, it was after the Great War and once the Republic of Turkey was created in 1923 that diplomatic relations with Latin American countries were formalized.

The opening of the second capsule of time at the end of the twentieth century allowed us to understand how endogenous and exogenous factors conditioned Turkish-Latin American relations, reaching the point of irrelevance. On the one hand, Turkey had to rebuild its secular and national identity with an eye on Europe and Latin American countries to overcome recurrent political and economic crises.

While both actors were participating in the same bloc during the Cold War, international relations were formal and conducted through the bureaucratic way of the respective chancelleries. It was only at the end of the 20th century that there were official visits and attempts to channel relations, which failed because of the economic crises of 2000 and 2001.

The opening context of the third Time Capsule in 2019 exposed an intensification of Ties between Turkey and Latin America. In the 21st century, changes in the international order coupled with internal changes in each of the actors led to an approach like never before. Turkey was not only recognized as an emerging power at the international level, but it also self-perceived as a central power in international affairs that re-emerged from a glorious past. In this sense, the design of a new multidimensional foreign policy allows us to understand how it sought to approach Latin America with diplomatic initiatives and strategic projects of regional cooperation and integration. Ankara's diplomacy clearly found in the region the political conditions for rapprochement, ideological harmony - with the presence of the so-called Latin American left turn - and the search for membership of the Global South made it possible to strengthen ties and shorten the distances that had separated them for years.

However, it cannot be overlooked that in the second decade of the 21st century that approach began to lose intensity. Changes in governments with different political signs in Latin America, new economic crises, as well as the so-called authoritarian drift in which Turkey plunged after the 2016 coup attempt, helped to slow international ties.

In other words, when a new Time Capsule is opened in the future, we will be able to reconstruct a new context, and thus learn how the challenges and opportunities that are present in Turkey's international relations with Latin America were managed.

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