Carlos Hernán Gonzalez Parias, Juan Camilo Mesa Bedoya, Maria Camila Alzate

The Role of Internaonal Actors in the Negoaon Process Between the Colombian Government and the Farc-Ep: a Necessary and Controlled Parcipaon

The Role of International Actors in

the Negotiation Process Between the

Colombian Government and the Farc-Ep: a

Necessary and Controlled Participation

Rol de Actores Internacionales en el Proceso de

Negociación de Entre el Gobierno Colombiano y las Farc-

Ep: Una Participación Necesaria y Controlada

O Papel dos Actores Internacionais no Processo de

Negociação Entre o Governo Colombiano e a Farc-Ep: Uma

Participação Necessária e Controlada

Carlos Hernán Gonzalez Parias1

Juan Camilo Mesa Bedoya2

Maria Camila Alzate3

DOI: 10.5752/P.2317-773X.2022v10.n2.p59

Recebido em: 10 de maio de 2021

Aprovado em: 11 de abril de 2022

A

One of the major objectives of the Juan Manuel Santos´ (2010-2018) adminis-

tration was the consolidation and completion of the negotiation process for an

agreement with the FARC-EP to end the armed conict between these parts. To

achieve this, it was necessary to mobilize and align the state apparatus, including

foreign policy. The objective of this article is to determine the role played by the

international community in the negotiation process between the Colombian

government and the FARC-EP guerrilla group in the Cuban capital. The above,

concealed by a qualitative method based on the press’ documentary review

and ocial speeches. This article demonstrates that Colombian foreign policy

established as objectives, on the one hand, to internationalize the process to

obtain legitimacy and support in a possible post-conict phase, but also to limit,

between negotiations, the participation of the dierent international actors.

Keywords: Colombian Foreign Policy, Havana´s Negotiation Process, Neoclassi-

cal Realism, Internationalization.

R

Uno de los grandes objetivos de la administración de Juan Manuel Santos

(2010-2018) fue la consolidación y nalización del proceso de negociación de

un acuerdo con las FARC-EP que pusieran n al conicto armado entre estas

1.Doutor, Tecnológico de Antioquia.

E-mail: carlosheg@gmail.com.

2. Doutor, Institución Universitaria Esu-

mer. E-mail: mesabedoya@gmail.com.

3. Graduanda, Institución Universitaria

Esumer. E-mail: mcamilalzater@gmail.

com.

estudos internacionais • Belo Horizonte, ISSN 2317-773X, v. 10, n. 2, (jun. 2022), p. 59-77

partes. Para su logro, fue necesario la movilización y alineación del aparato

estatal, incluyendo a la política exterior. El objetivo del presente artículo consiste

en determinar el rol jugado por la comunidad internacional en el proceso de

negociación entre el gobierno colombiano y el grupo guerrillero Farc-Ep, en la

capital cubana. Lo anterior, bajo un método de corte cualitativo, basado en la

revisión documental de prensa y de discursos ociales. El articulo evidencia que

la política exterior colombiana estableció como objetivos, por una parte, inter-

nacionalizar el proceso con la pretensión de lograr legitimidad y respaldo en una

eventual etapa de posconicto, pero también limitar, durante las negociaciones,

la participación de los diferentes actores internacionales.

Palabras Clave: Política Exterior Colombiana, Proceso de Negociación de la

Habana, Realismo neoclásico, Internacionalización.

R

Um dos principais objetivos da administração de Juan Manuel Santos (2010-

2018) era a consolidação e conclusão do processo de negociação de um acordo

com as FARC-EP que pusesse m ao conito armado entre estas partes. Para

o conseguir, foi necessário mobilizar e alinhar o aparelho de Estado, incluindo

a política externa. O objetivo deste artigo é determinar o papel desempenhado

pela comunidade internacional no processo de negociação entre o governo

colombiano e o grupo guerrilheiro das FARC-EP na capital cubana. O acima

exposto, sob um método qualitativo, baseado numa revisão documental da im-

prensa e em discursos ociais. O artigo mostra que a política externa colombia-

na estabeleceu como objetivos, por um lado, internacionalizar o processo com o

objetivo de conseguir legitimidade e apoio numa eventual fase pós-conito, mas

também limitar, durante as negociações, a participação dos diferentes atores

internacionais.

Palavras-chave: Política Externa Colombiana, Processo de Negociação de Hava-

na, Realismo Neoclássico, Internacionalização.

Introduction

Colombia´s foreign policy during the two Juan Manuel Santos (2010-

2018) administrations, experienced a turning point regarding the way the

previous administration was conducted. This change is expressed in as-

pects such as the restoration of battered relations with neighbouring cou-

ntries (Ecuador and Venezuela), reincorporation into regional dynamics,

active participation in multilateral spaces, the use of South-South coope-

ration as a foreign policy instrument (GONZÁLEZ; MESA; MONTOYA,

2018), among others. However, perhaps the main bet of both government

periods was the consolidation of the negotiation process with the FARC-

-EP. While the search for resolution of the armed conict is largely at the

root of domestic policy, because of the dierent levels of internationali-

zation achieved by the Colombian conict, much of the country´s foreign

policy was directed towards this main objective. One of the aims of the

country´s foreign policy, before and during the formal commencement of

negotiations, was to involve the international community, seeking to le-

gitimize the process, to obtain political support and to procure commit-

ments in international cooperation for the post-conict phase. Therefore,

the objective of this article is to characterize the international commu-

Carlos Hernán Gonzalez Parias, Juan Camilo Mesa Bedoya, Maria Camila Alzate

The Role of Internaonal Actors in the Negoaon Process Between the Colombian Government and the Farc-Ep: a Necessary and Controlled Parcipaon

nity´s participation in the negotiation process. It is based on the assump-

tion that such participation was limited and controlled by the Colombian

government. That is, the country´s foreign policy, understood as a stra-

tegic and intentional construction, incorporated as one of its objectives,

limited participation of the international community in the process. This

article is structured in four parts. The rst is responsible for presenting

and justifying the selection of the theoretical reference, which consists

of an adaptation of the neoclassical realism developments. The second

section is responsible for presenting a brief contextualization of the Co-

lombian armed conict and the manners in which it has internationali-

zed and inuenced the State´s foreign policy. The following analyses the

dierent roles, limits and scopes of international participation during the

negotiation process in Havana. Finally, a series of reections and conclu-

sions are given.

Theoretical and conceptual references

This article is developed based on the neoclassical realism theory

(NCR). The neoclassical realistic research program has a renewed inte-

rest in reconciling the relationship between internal, external, and idea-

tional factors (GONZÁLEZ; MUÑOZ, 2020, p. 26), which are assumed as

diatomic by various theories of International Aair.

Based on this argument, the theory postulates four dimensions, the

rst being the independent variable, which corresponds to the stimuli

perceived from the international system. Then, there are the so-called

intervening variables, which consist of variables of the level of units: per-

ceptions of leaders making foreign policy decisions, the strategic culture

of the state, institutional design around foreign policy and the State-So-

ciety relationship. Concerning the introduction of the variables involved,

(FERNANDES, 2015) states that it results in the possibility of relativizing

the assumption of rationality of agents, considering contexts of distor-

tion and incomplete information, as well as perceptions nuanced by ins-

titutional and historical features (FERNANDES, 2015, p. 206). The third

group of variables, at the intermediate level, is the foreign policy process:

the realisation of the perception process, decision-making and the sub-

sequent policy implementation; that is, that these factors work to “chan-

nel, mediate and (re) direct” foreign policy (SCHWELLER, 2004). Finally,

there is the dependent variable, which corresponds to the foreign policy

response made by the State.

estudos internacionais • Belo Horizonte, ISSN 2317-773X, v. 10, n. 2, (jun. 2022), p. 59-77

Figure 1: Neoclassical Realism Model

Source: (RIPSMAN; TALIAFERRO; LOBELL, 2016, p. 34)

Another aspect highlighted by the NCR is that it places importance

on foreign policy executives (FPE). In high proportion, a state´s foreign

policy is inuenced and formulated by a small group of high-level leaders

and ocials. Neoclassical realists consider that foreign policy is not a fai-

thful and accurate reection of the state´s power capabilities, since, at the

moment of the design and decision-making process, involving elites and

leaders, there are distortions mediated by the perceptions of those deci-

sion-makers and limitations regarding the use of such resources. But the-

se distortions do not necessarily imply inhibition of the implementation

of foreign policy and objectives, more than that, they can also facilitate

and expedite this process.

For this analysis, emphasis is placed on the variables involved in

perceptions of decision-making leaders in foreign policy and the state´s

strategic culture.

About the former, leaders make such decisions based to a large ex-

tent on their perceptions and calculations of the relative power and inten-

tions of other states. The leader´s images are presented as cognitive lters

that intervene the time leaders process information from the international

environment: what they pay attention to, when and how to prepare to res-

pond to possible threats and opportunities (TALIAFERRO, 2006, p. 485)

and (RIPSMAN; TALIAFERRO; LOBELL, 2016, p. 34). Strategic culture is

due to all interrelated beliefs, norms and assumptions; it is assumed as a sta-

te memory, which intervenes as guidance to leaders and decision-makers

about possible paths, methods and strategies to be employed in response

to a foreign policy situation. It provides information to decision-makers,

about what is appropriate or inappropriate, based on the country´s tradi-

tion of external behaviour. This is a political calculation, sometimes the le-

vel of threat or opportunity can lead to action against the strategic culture.

For this analysis and following the theoretical references, the foreign

policy shall be understood as a state strategy with projection towards other

states, actors and conditions at the international level where the priorities,

objectives, means and instruments necessary to achieve them are mani-

Carlos Hernán Gonzalez Parias, Juan Camilo Mesa Bedoya, Maria Camila Alzate

The Role of Internaonal Actors in the Negoaon Process Between the Colombian Government and the Farc-Ep: a Necessary and Controlled Parcipaon

festly, intentionally and consented to. It is formulated by people in ocial

or authority positions. The formulation process involves both actors (inte-

rest groups, elites, organised civil society, the media, subnational govern-

ments, non-governmental organizations, among others) as well as factors

(the image of decision-makers, ideational, cultural, state institutionality,

state-to-society relationship, among others) (GONZÁLEZ, 2021, p. 22)

A short brief on Colombian internal armed conﬂict.

The researchers´ group of the National Centre for Historical Me-

mory of Colombia (2014), divide the Colombian armed conict into four

stages. The rst between 1958 and 1982, a stage characterized by the tran-

sition from partisan to subversive violence, in this period the creation of

guerrilla groups were energized. The second, between 1982 and 1996, a

stage essentially marked by international inuenced, the decline of the

Cold War along with the positioning of drug tracking on the global

agenda, as well as an almost exponential expansion of the guerrilla groups

that marked the state´s institutionality. The third, between 1996 and 2005,

a stage inuenced by an issue that redrawn the international stage in mi-

litary terms, and the ght against terrorism, fuelled by the escalate of ar-

med conict due to the simultaneous expansion of guerrillas and parami-

litary groups. The fourth, between 2005 and the present, a stage marked

by a state´s military oensive in terms of counterinsurgent ghting and

peace process that developed Juan Manuel Santos’s government with the

FARC-EP, a process supported by the international community.

It should be emphasized that there is no consensus at the beginning

of Colombia´s internal armed conict. Dierent authors have postulated

that the conict in Colombia dates to the beginning of the republican

stage at the beginning of the nineteenth century, others start the stage of

the violence, initiated after the assassination of the liberal warlord Jorge

Eliécer Gaitán. There is also a legal precedent that frames the beginning

of the internal armed conict in 1985, this precedent is law 1448 of 2011

which entered into force during the Juan Manuel Santos government, a

law that, among others, recognises the existence of the conict and its

political and social causes (YEPES, 2018) cited by (MESA; YEPES, 2020).

There is also no consensus on the dates of foundation of Colombian

guerrillas, however, there is a coincidence that the creation of these takes

place in the 1960s, in which the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia

(FARC for its acronyms in Spanish), The National Liberation Army (ELN

for its acronyms in Spanish) and the People´s Liberation Army (EPL for

its acronyms in Spanish) are simultaneously born (MESA; YEPES, 2020).

It can be said that there is a common ideological denominator in

the creation of the Colombian guerrilla organizations, composed of the

peasant heritage of land struggles and discontent with the restrictions

on political participation of the Frente Nacional4 (the National Front), the

inuence of the Chinese and Cuban revolutions and even the May revolu-

tion of ´68 in France and the mobilization against the Vietnam War in the

United States, as well as the lack of guarantees for political participation

(MESA; YEPES, 2020). In fact, this latter aspect was the trigger for the

4. In the history of Colombia it is known

as “

El Frente Nacional

(The National

Front)”, a period between 1958 and

1974 during which, thanks to a great

agreement, the main Colombian political

parties, Liberals and Conservatives

divided power, excluding from it all the

other political movements that existed

at that historical time in Colombia

(MESA, 2009, p. 159).

estudos internacionais • Belo Horizonte, ISSN 2317-773X, v. 10, n. 2, (jun. 2022), p. 59-77

creation of the April 19th Movement (M-19), created in 1970 because of

voter fraud in that year´s presidential elections.

Between 1970 and 1980, dierent subversive organizations emer-

ged whom gradually signed peace processes. These include the Worker´s

Revolutionary Party (PRT for its acronyms in Spanish) and the Quintín

Lame Movement, the latter in the claim of indigenous territories.

In addition to the guerrilla groups, the phenomenon of paramilita-

rism emerged in the 1990s (GRUPO DE MEMORIA HISTÓRICA, 2014).

In the beginning, they were considered “Cooperatives of surveillance and

private security”, they led to the creation of the so-called United Self-De-

fense Forces of Colombia (AUC for its acronyms in Spanish), considering

themselves as “a Political-Military movement of an anti-subversive nature

in the exercise of the right to a legitimate self-defence” (EL TIEMPO, 1997).

Given the previous context, it can be said that from the middle of

the twentieth century to the present day the armed conict has been part

of Colombian political history, therefore domestic and foreign policy has

suered from conditioning. As Carolina Yepes (2018, p. 9) states “domes-

tic policy on the end of the armed conict in Colombia, has largely con-

ditioned and directed the formulation, design and implementation of the

foreign policy of the dierent Colombian governments”

One of the rst recognitions of the armed conict as a political pro-

blem was carried out by President Belisario Betancur (1982-1986). Prior to

this date, this issue was considered more of a problem of public order and

internal treatment in government policy, but from that point onwards

there was a kind of political recognition to the uprising in arms (GRUPO

DE MEMORIA HISTÓRICA, 2013). Belisario Betancur was the rst pre-

sident to devise an international strategy to support his eorts to achieve

peace at a local level, i.e., the design of a foreign policy strategy. Although

this strategy cannot be dened in the strict sense as an internationalisa-

tion strategy, it was an important eort to validate the peace process and

make it more coherent (BORDA, 2012).

The government that succeeded Betancur, that of Virgilio Barco

(1986-1990) accelerate a peace process with the M-19. To this end, it pre-

vented the armed conict from permeating the country´s foreign policy

agenda, as the main interest in this policy focused on obtaining resources

for strengthening the economy. However, at the end of this government,

as García (1992, p. 187) mentions, there was an interest in negotiating with

the FARC-EP, who proposed as mediators, former US President Jimmy

Carter and Venezuelan President Carlos Andrés Pérez “which meant a

new interest in linking the conict to the international context” (MESA;

YEPES, 2020) and, therefore, a new foreign policy strategy, designed and

implemented from an internal condition.

Between 1990 and 1994 during the Cesar Gaviria government, it

was characterized in foreign policy by the restoration of bilateral relations

with Cuba in the context of the process that was ahead with the M-19, so

that it is again observed, the domestic nuances in the State´s foreign policy.

Even amid the sharp escalation of violence during the last two decades of the

twentieth century and the deployment of an extensive repertoire of peace

initiatives, as occurred during the administrations of […] Belisario Betancur

Carlos Hernán Gonzalez Parias, Juan Camilo Mesa Bedoya, Maria Camila Alzate

The Role of Internaonal Actors in the Negoaon Process Between the Colombian Government and the Farc-Ep: a Necessary and Controlled Parcipaon

(1982-1986), Virgilio Barco (1986-1990) and César Gaviria (1990-1994) adminis-

trations, there was no considerable external participation. Nor was there any

strategy to link the peace processes in place to multilateral actors such as the UN

or the OAS, although there were some calls in this regard from dierent sectors

(FAWCETT, 2012, p. 117).

On the other hand, in Ernesto Samper´s government (1994-1998)

several developments in international relations and foreign policy took

place and had a direct connection to the armed conict. This is the case

with the submission to the Congress of the Republic of Additional Pro-

tocol II to the Geneva conventions, which involves regulations relating

to the protection of victims of non-international armed conicts, this is a

clear example of how internal and external stimuli coexist in the formu-

lation of the Colombian State´s foreign policy strategies.

Attempts at peace with the FARC-EP and the ELN were constant in

the Samper government, while as Tokatlian (2000) argues, the president´s

attempts to seek greater support abroad for his initiatives were constant,

through dierent actions in the pursuance of his government´s foreign policy.

Although the foreign policy was often conditioned in these periods,

previous dynamics of cases of internationalisation of the armed conict

were isolated and unsystematic. Nevertheless, as Borda (2012) highlights,

subsequent governments (Pastrana and Uribe) had clear foreign policy

strategies concerning the armed conict.

One of the most active governments in international dynamics, given

the peace process that went ahead with the FARC-EP, was that of Andrés

Pastrana (1998-2002). This negotiation, known as the Caguán peace process,

turned the interest of the international community to the country. A clear de-

monstration of this was the US interest in supporting a dialogued solution to

the conict with this guerrilla group. In fact, as Rojas (2007, p. 49 - 50) indicates:

At the beginning of the negotiation process with the FARC, the United States

was inclined to support this alternative, albeit with some discrepancy. The State

Department thought it was possible to apply in Colombia the strategic approach

undertaken in El Salvador in the late 1980s. This approach avoided direct inter-

vention and favoured escalating assistance in the form of equipment, training

and intelligence technology, to defeat guerrilla groups and create conditions for a

negotiated solution.

As Mesa and Yepes (2020) indicate, the Pastrana government be-

gins one of the stages of further internationalisation of the Colombian

armed conict, since, through foreign policy strategies, the famous “Plan

Colombia” (Colombia Plan) was signed. Although, at the outset, this plan

was explicitly anti-narcotic in nature and not directly alluded to the sub-

versive ght, after 11th September 2001, in the context of the World War

against terrorism, the inclusion of counter-terrorism in the structure of

the plan was facilitated.

With strategies like this, war has ceased to be internal, it has become externa-

lized, opening the way to interventions in the country´s internal aairs and its

external relations. Its preponderance has been accentuated inversely proportional

to the weakness or strength of the Colombian state on its triple front against

drug trackers, insurgency and counterinsurgency. Under the impact of the uni-

versalization of terrorism and drug tracking, and in that direction although it

cannot be said that the Colombian war is international, it is a war of internatio-

nal interest, with international eects and consequences (MEDINA, 2009, p. 36).

estudos internacionais • Belo Horizonte, ISSN 2317-773X, v. 10, n. 2, (jun. 2022), p. 59-77

As noted in the rst part of this section, the international context

has always inuenced the dynamics of the Colombian armed conict

both in the 1940s and at the dawn of the 21st century. Another event that

directly inuenced the characteristics of the Colombian confrontation

was the 11th September 2001 terrorist attacks in the United States.

For Yepes (2018) this event added an important tinge to the concep-

tualization of the Colombian armed conict in the post-Pastrana adminis-

tration since during the Álvaro Uribe Vélez (2002-2010) governments, the-

re was an alignment of domestic and external policy concerning direct mi-

litary confrontation and the new international agenda to ght terrorism.

“In this context, the counter-insurgency ght takes the ags of the

battle against international terrorism, thus eliminating the political recog-

nition that previous governments had made to guerrilla groups and giving

them a connotation of terrorists” (MESA; YEPES, 2020). In fact, the three

major Colombian armed groups (FARC-EP, ELN and AUC) were identied

by the U.S. Department of State as terrorist organizations and the involve-

ment of FARC and paramilitaries, in the drug business (TICKNER, 2007).

In this scenario, the dynamics of the conict continued to be internationalising

and, in some cases, regionally isolating the country. Two episodes were key to

this isolation: the initiative to install U.S. military bases in the country and Co-

lombia´s intervention to bomb a guerrilla camp in which FARC-EP number two

would be dropped; Raúl Reyes, in Ecuadorian territory (MESA; YEPES, 2020).

Amid this diplomatic crisis, Juan Manuel Santos (2010-2018) as-

sumes his role as president, who “in contravention of the thesis of the

terrorist threat, accepts the existence of the internal armed conict in

Colombia, recognising the political foundation of the rebellion in which

guerrilla groups have their action” (YEPES, 2018, p. 11) which paved the

way for a possible negotiated settlement. In addition to this, Santos opted

in the rst three months of his government to lower the tension of batte-

red diplomatic relations with neighbours such as Ecuador and Venezuela.

The Santos government´s peace process with the FARC-EP is

perhaps one of the most successful of recent years. As will be seen in the

subsequent paragraphs, the accompaniment of the international commu-

nity was predominant, with mediation and guarantee by Cuba, Venezue-

la, Chile and Norway, the United Nations and the United States.

The Havana Negotiation process with the FARC-EP and the Colombian

Foreign Policy

Commencement of the negotiation process and strategy; between the

perception and the learning of the past.

The strategy proposed by the Santos government, to advance the

negotiation process with the FARC-EP, transitions between the percep-

tion of the head of state and the strategic culture shaped over decades of

the negotiation process, which has left successes and misunderstandings,

creating a state memory regarding methods and strategies to face future

negotiations with guerrilla groups (GONZÁLEZ, 2021, pág. 111)

Carlos Hernán Gonzalez Parias, Juan Camilo Mesa Bedoya, Maria Camila Alzate

The Role of Internaonal Actors in the Negoaon Process Between the Colombian Government and the Farc-Ep: a Necessary and Controlled Parcipaon

However, before proceeding with the argument of the previous sta-

tement, it must be specied the existence of material conditions conducive

to undertaking a further attempt at the negotiating process. In the decade

before the beginning of the Havana process, a change in the correlation

of forces, state vs guerrilla groups, was evident in favour of the rst actor.

Change driven, to a large extent, by the modernization of Colom-

bian military forces, initiated even during the failed Caguán negotiations,

the consolidation of the Plan Colombia, the beginning of patriot plans and

consolidation, and by the strategy of direct confrontation during the admi-

nistration of Alvaro Uribe (2002-2010). At the end of the rst decade of the

21st century, The FARC-EP were in an unfavourable military and tactical

position concerning the state military forces (GONZÁLEZ, 2021, pág. 111)

The FARC, by 2010 end up retreating in peripherical departments, mostly

frontier ones such as Norte de Santander, Arauca, Chocó, Nariño and Putumayo, or

others related to them such as Cauca or Caquetá. Its municipal scope has fallen to

160 municipalities – half of which, in 2002, and its volume of armed actions is

724, almost half that of 1,278 in 2002. In addition, its strength has been reduced

by almost 50%, from nearly 17,000 ghters to just over 8,000 guerrillas (RÍOS,

2015, p. 70).

Graph 1: Evolution of the Number of FARC-EP and ELN members (1964-2014)

Source: (Echandia, 2015)

Despite the above, a denitive military defeat of the FARC-EP was

not foreseen in the near time horizon. Military setbacks and the loss

of members in their ranks generate a tactical retreat from this guerril-

la group; they distance themselves from the main urban centres of the

country and its surrounding areas, retreating to the jungle periphery

and border areas. During this retreat, the FARC-EP retake the essence

estudos internacionais • Belo Horizonte, ISSN 2317-773X, v. 10, n. 2, (jun. 2022), p. 59-77

of guerrilla warfare, a strategy they practised during the rst decades

of existence. The conict would therefore enter a new, long-term stage

(GONZÁLEZ, 2021, pág. 112)

Figure 1: FARC-EP´s Territorial presence. 1998 and 2010

Source: (ECHANDIA, 2015)

Under this scenario, two options were presented to the political eli-

te: to continue the strategy of confrontation employed in the last decade,

or to take advantage of the change in the correlation of forces in favour of

the state, in search of a negotiated solution.

In 2010, Juan Manuel Santos assumes the head of state, which, al-

though elected under the political ags of this predecessor, Alvaro Uribe

Vélez, a particular perception regarding the reality and future of the ar-

med conict with the FARC-EP, led to the design of a negotiating strategy

with them.

Today we can talk about peace because my government´s vision is integral:

we do NOT ght to ght; we ght for peace […] Today we can talk about

peace thanks to the success of our military and police forces, and thanks to the

growing presence of the state throughout the national territory […] (SANTOS,

2012).

The next step was to dene the methods and strategies for con-

ducting the negotiations. In the public opinion and the country´s politi-

cal elites, the idea that the clearing zone was one of the reasons that led

the Caguán5 process to failure, was established. It was an area in which,

during the dialogues, the FARC-EP strengthened militarily, transferred

5. The so-called clearing zone covered

an area of 42.000 km2.

Carlos Hernán Gonzalez Parias, Juan Camilo Mesa Bedoya, Maria Camila Alzate

The Role of Internaonal Actors in the Negoaon Process Between the Colombian Government and the Farc-Ep: a Necessary and Controlled Parcipaon

abducted from other parts of the country, consolidated their drug traf-

cking activity, and exercised territorial and social power more freely,

to become a para-state organization with the ability to carry out exclu-

sive state functions: public administration, construction of public infras-

tructure, regulations of commercial activities, settle disputes among area

inhabitants, among others (GONZÁLEZ, 2021, pág. 113). Therefore, from

hope and optimism at the beginning of these dialogues, over time, it be-

came evident, the FARC-EP´s scant will to reach a denitive agreement,

the guerrilla group had a rm “determination to take advantage of the

respective truces and to project their territorial expansion, which they

otherwise considered irreversible” (CENTRO NACIONAL DE MEMORIA

HISTÓRICA, 2014, p. 13)

In addition to the above, the media (REVISTA SEMANA, 1999), re-

ferred to the cleared zone as an independent republic, alluding to the

areas of high inuence of the guerrilla group that received this name

in the 1960s, such as: Tequendama, Urabá, Vichada, Territorio Vásquez, El

Duda, Ariari, Guayabero, Pato, Riochiquito, Maruetalia, among others (PE-

NAGOS, 2013, p. 150).

Therefore, initiating a new negotiation process that would grant

a zone free from the presence of state control, would entail high politi-

cal costs and an increase in national mistrust of the new process. Then,

instead of establishing a de-escalation zone, the decision was made to

conduct dialogues outside the Colombian territory, which was a method

of linking the international community. Thus, a direct way of linking fo-

reign policy with the domestic policy of resolving the armed conict was

achieved (GONZÁLEZ, 2021, pág. 112).

Another learning of the Caguán process was in terms of the size of

the agenda and the number of points to be addressed in the negotiations.

As an example, the Caguán agenda was composed of twelve points and

forty-seven subpoints. “In four years, both sides did not move beyond the

rst issue and no agreement was reached” (CHERNICK, 2015, p. 145), the-

se points contained complex aspects, such as the revision of the economic

and political structure of the state and the exploitation of natural resour-

ces, the reformulation of external debt, and international treaties, among

others. Thus, the Havana agenda avoided these structural aspects of the

state, seeking greater pragmatism and realism, by dening ve points of

discussion. “The rst two items on the agenda such as the FARC-EP´s his-

torical claims: (1) the agricultural issue and (2) the political participation.

Two other points as societal claims: (3) “solution to the problem of illicit

drugs” and (4) victims; and the end of the conict (5), addressed how the

nal agreement is implemented (REVISTA SEMANA, 2012).

However, in November 2011, months before the inception of the ex-

ploratory phase, the guerrilla group, in a letter addressed President Juan

Manuel Santos, expressed the interest in resuming the Caguán agenda:

“To question privatizations, deregulations, absolute freedom of trade and

investment, environmental predation, market democracy, and military

doctrine” (EL ESPECTADOR, 2012). To which, he closes any possibility of

resuming that agenda, responding with a resounding: “¡Forget about a

new Caguán!”

estudos internacionais • Belo Horizonte, ISSN 2317-773X, v. 10, n. 2, (jun. 2022), p. 59-77

When necessary, we must be prepared to ght, and it was up to me – as Minister

of Defense and as President – to ght illegal groups in my country. I did it

eectively and forcefully when the ways of peace were closed […] However, it is

absurd to think that the end of conicts is the extermination of the counterparty

[…] The nal victory for weapons–when there are non-violent alternatives – is

nothing more than the defeat of the human spirit […] To defeat by the weapons,

to annihilate the enemy, to bring war until its last consequences, is to give up

seeing, on the contrary, another human being, someone with whom one can

speak (SANTOS, 2016).

Necessary but controlled internationalization

The end of the Colombian armed conict, whether through the

search for a negotiated solution or by military action, has permeated and

inuence Colombia´s foreign policy over the last few decades. Until the

late 1990s “the issue of armed conict neither in its implications nor its

resolution, was part of the country´s international agenda. The country´s

strategic culture in this area was characterized by treating it as a domes-

tic policy issue against which any external intervention was an unhelpful

or desirable interference” (ROJAS, 2006, p. 86).

Precisely, before the process undertaken by Juan Manuel Santos,

three negotiation processes had begun to end the conict with the FAR-

C-EP: the rst, from 1984 to 1987 in Uribe Meta in the Belisario Betancur´s

government, then, between 1991 and 1992 in Caracas and Tlaxcala Me-

xico during the César Gaviria´s administration, and the third, between

1999 and 2002 in the municipality of San Vicente del Caguán in the depart-

ment of Caquetá during the Andres Pastrana´s government. In the rst

two processes, the participation of international actors was null and in

the dialogues of the Cagúan, marginal (BEJARANO, 2017).

In the Andrés Pastrana Arango´s administration, in the framework

of the so-called diplomacy for peace, much of the country´s international

agenda focuses on the internationalization of the Colombian conict in

pursuit of a negotiated solution. In fact, it can be dened as an intermes-

tic foreign policy, being closely related to the country´s domestic policy

(GONZÁLEZ, 2021, pág. 111).

On the one hand, diplomatic action focused on the Plan Colombia´

approval which was initially anti-narcotics with an indirect link to the

ght against subversive groups, but after 11th September 2001, it was lin-

ked to the ght against terrorism. Initially, it was intended to link a large

part of the international community, especially the European countries,

to the Plan Colombia, however, despite dierent meetings and presidential

tours for this purpose, this initiative failed to gain the support of the old

continent, being considered a militaristic initiative which could lead to a

further escalation of the conict and violation of Human Rights, despite

being presented by the Colombian government “as the strategy that will

enable the peace process to be consolidated through plans of economic

recovery, strengthening democracy and the substitution of illicit crops,

among others” (EL TIEMPO, 1999).

Even, the intention was to establish a donor table to channel fun-

ding to the Plan Colombia, the meeting would be held at the Spanish ca-

Carlos Hernán Gonzalez Parias, Juan Camilo Mesa Bedoya, Maria Camila Alzate

The Role of Internaonal Actors in the Negoaon Process Between the Colombian Government and the Farc-Ep: a Necessary and Controlled Parcipaon

pital in July 2000, but due to the lack of consensus of the European coun-

tries and the objections to the Plan Colombia, the meeting in Madrid was

focused no longer on obtaining nancial resources for Plan Colombia, but

on forming a group to support the negotiation process that initiated.

The diplomatic action of foreign policy “led to a signicant support

for government action for peace from governments and some non-gover-

nmental actors who form opinions worldwide” (GARCÍA, 2002, p. 191). In

this sense, the tour of European countries stands out: Sweden, Norway,

France, Spain, Italy and the Vatican, composed of a commission from the

FARC-EP and the Colombian government (GONZÁLEZ, 2021, pág. 112).

The presence of international actors at the Caguán dialogue table

consisted of two types of participations “The rst is facilitation, which

was in charge of Italy, Spain, Sweden and Norway; and the second, ac-

companiment, exercised by the same facilitating countries, accompanied

by Costa Rica, Venezuela and Mexico” (MORENO, 2009, p. 151).

Table 1: The roles of participants in the negotiation process

Characteristics Accompaniment Facilitation Arbitration

Is an external observer.

Clariﬁes the parties on points of

which doubts arise during the

development of the process.

Seeks to create an environment

of clarity and transparency of the

actors involved.

Proposes techniques to solve the

conﬂict.

Is present at all stages of the

negotiation process. Usually has a

support team.

Are essential and of leading cha-

racter in the negotiation.

Must know the issue, be impartial,

creative and empathetic.

Carries the thread of conﬂict.

The intervention of third parties,

based on a discrepancy between

them.

Is not mandatory.

Is conﬁdential.

Help the parties involved to make

their decisions. Therefore, should

not impose their own on any of the

parties involved.

Is not directly involved in the

conﬂict.

Source: Own elaboration based on (FISAS, 2012)

In the age of Alvaro Uribe, under the so-called democratic security

policy, foreign policy experienced a process of “securitization”, in which

the armed conict was articulated to the discourse and dynamics of the

international war against terrorism, allowing the United States to be di-

rectly linked to the ght against subversive groups. This linkage allows a

change in the character of the Plan Colombia: from an anti-narcotics plan

to an anti-terrorist plan (GONZÁLEZ; MESA; YEPES, 2018, p. 92). This

articulation can be understood as a result of the perception of foreign po-

licy executives who interpreted this change in the international system,

as an opportunity to link the country´s anti-subversive and anti-narcotics

struggle, with international dynamics.

For the present, it is called conict externalization, as those conse-

quences caused by the dynamics of the conict, capable of generating ef-

fects and repercussions outside the country´s borders; “contagion” eect.

This situation generates greater resonance in the international media

and greater attention both from governments of aected states, as well

as from dierent international agencies and non-governmental organi-

zations. On its side, the internationalization of the conict is due to an

estudos internacionais • Belo Horizonte, ISSN 2317-773X, v. 10, n. 2, (jun. 2022), p. 59-77

autonomous, strategic and intentional decision of the belligerent actors

of the internal conict. When such a decision comes from the state, it is

positioned as a foreign policy strategy in the face of an internal situation.

On the part of the non-state armed actor, internationalization is expres-

sed through the so-called parallel diplomacy.

The internationalization of the conict is aimed at the search of

three main objectives: ocial discourse and diplomatic resources are di-

rected towards the search for support and legitimacy of the negotiation

process or during the confrontation. When seeking to delegitimate or

isolate the opposing group internationally. Finally, when international ac-

tors, with a particular role, are explicitly and consciously included at any

phase of the conict; hostility or negotiation (CUJABANTE, 2016, p. 211)

and (BORDA, 2012, p. 11).

The above conceptual dierentiation is done to avoid confusion

and to facilitate the proposed analysis which revolves around the inter-

nationalization of the conict, perhaps the most rigorous analysis of

the internationalization of the Colombian conict. Sandra Borda (2012),

presents a division into two types: military and political. The rst of

these, respond to “[…] the actors more likely to be invited by the state

and insurgent organizations to participate in their conict to obtain

military and logistical support […] to continue the war and to impro-

ve their military position against their adversaries”. Political interna-

tionalization occurs by involving “[…] non-committed neighbouring

countries, European countries, international organizations and inter-

national non-governmental organizations […] invited when parties are

interested in obtaining political recognition and support, which usually

happens, but not exclusively, during peace negotiations” (2012, p. 21-

22). These two strategies are not mutually exclusive; they can be used

simultaneously, such as the Santos administration´s decision to start ne-

gotiations amid the ghting.

Prior to the formal opening of negotiations in Havana, the FARC-

-EP sought to actively involve international organizations and third cou-

ntries. Moreover, regional authorities such as the Andean Community of

Nations (CAN for its acronyms in Spanish), and the Community of Latin

American and Caribbean States (CELAC for its acronyms in Spanish),

through press releases expressed to the Colombian government, the in-

tention to actively participate in the negotiation process, in the face of

this intentions, president Santos took the opportunity to reiterate that the

search for peace is a matter for Colombia: “For now the best way to help is

to do nothing, I said in my possession that peace is an internal Colombian

matter and we, Colombians will solve it” (EL TIEMPO, 2011a). Later, in

2013, within the framework of the 68th session of the United Nations Ge-

neral Assembly, the Head of State again expresses an interest in limiting

the participation of international actors in the negotiation process:

What we are asking to the UN and the international community is to respect the

right of Colombia –and every nation– to seek peace […] We ask that we continue

to be accompanied in this eort by respecting our decisions, our way of doing

things, and trusting that our actions have never been alien to the sensitivities of

the international community (CANCILLERÍA DE COLOMBIA, 2013).

Carlos Hernán Gonzalez Parias, Juan Camilo Mesa Bedoya, Maria Camila Alzate

The Role of Internaonal Actors in the Negoaon Process Between the Colombian Government and the Farc-Ep: a Necessary and Controlled Parcipaon

In addition to these FARC-EP initiatives, involving international

actors, after releasing the French journalist Roméo Langlois, the guerril-

la group sent with him a letter to the then-president François Hollande,

urging the Gallic country to get involved in the search for peace in Co-

lombia. However, the French president´s response closed the possibility

to that proposal, categorically noting that: “We want there to be a politi-

cal resolution and that is all [...] We do not have to interfere with Colom-

bia´s political life” (EL TIEMPO, 2012a).

Also, several non-governmental organizations, both national and

international, and recognized personalities: Piedad Córdoba and the Co-

lombian organization for peace, to name a few, made proposals to bring

the government and the FARC-EP closer, in search of a formal start of

negotiations. Given this, the government was emphatic in pointing out,

“I do not think it is appropriate for anyone to seek parallel channels to

dialogue with the guerrillas, and I disallow any attempt to […] When we

consider that the moment exists and the opportunity is there, we will

open that opportunity in the way we believe to achieve that goal” (EL

TIEMPO, 2011b). This is in contrast to the Caguán negotiation process,

where, as Borda and Gómez (2015, p. 166) state, the premise against presi-

dent Pastrana´s international actors in the negotiation process was “the

more, the better” (the more actors, the more pressure over the FARC to

remain on the negotiating table).

The attention and participation of the international community in

the negotiation process in Havana can be understood, on the one hand,

as a response to the externalization of the eects of the conict, in border

areas, and on the other, precisely to a decision of the country´s foreign poli-

cy decision, of political and diplomatic internationalization of the conict,

through the explicit inclusion of international actors over specic roles.

Thus, during the beginning of the process the discourse of the

country´s foreign policy was turned, to a large extent to legitimizing the

process before the international community: “Peace in Colombia is pea-

ce in the region” (El TIEMPO, 2013a), “The support of the international

community helps the process to move in the right direction; legitimizes

the process” (EL TIEMPO, 2013a), words spoken by the Colombian Am-

bassador to Washington, Luis Carlos Villegas, before the U.S government

and Juan Manuel Santos, respectively.

Colombian foreign policy sought to direct the participation of the

dierent international actors towards the post-conict process. “When

the post-conict arrives, we will have immense challenges to reintegrate

the demobilized, to ensure the presence of the state in the areas aected

by the conict, and to guarantee citizen security. ¡What important would

be then the contribution and competition of the international commu-

nity, which we now call for! (CANCILLERÍA DE COLOMBIA, 2014)

The beginning of the negotiation process had such an internatio-

nal resonance, that together with Hugo Chávez´ death, the resignation

of Pope Benedict XVI, and the succession of whoever was the rst Latin

American Pope, Francis, was considered one of the most relevant histori-

cal events in the region in 2013, according to the annual survey conduc-

ted by the Grupo de Diarios América (GDA) (EL TIEMPO, 2013b).

estudos internacionais • Belo Horizonte, ISSN 2317-773X, v. 10, n. 2, (jun. 2022), p. 59-77

Table 2: International support for the negotiation process.

Estates International Organiza-

tions

Non-Governmental Orga-

nizations

Other Actors

Ecuador, in the words of the then

President Rafael Correa: “the best

news for Latin America would be the

end of the armed conﬂict in Colombia”

(EL TIEMPO, 2013c)

The United States, from the outset,

expressed its support for the process

but clariﬁed that it would continue

to persecute FARC-EP members with

debts to the justice of that country.

France, repeatedly, the chancellery

of the Gallic country celebrated the

different progress of the process by

reiterating its support.

Uruguay. In 2013 President José

Mujica offers Uruguay to Juan Manuel

Santos as an alternate venue for

negotiations.

Countries such as Brazil, Bolivia,

Venezuela and Ecuador expressed their

congratulations on every progress in

the process

Brazil, in the ﬁrst days of October

2012. Gilma Rousseff´s government

releases a document entitled: “Brazil

and South America support the rapid

end of the armed conﬂict in Colombia”,

in which they express the support for

the process that would begin in a few

days, considering that it is an event of

high relevance not only for Colombia

but for all South America: qualifying

the decision to initiate dialogues as

a mature and patriotic decision (EL

TIEMPO, 2012b)

European Union. During the

negotiation process, it kept

a distance, considering that

this process was a matter

for the state of Colombia

and the guerrilla organi-

zation. However, since

2013, without specifying

the amount, its pledge to

ﬁnance the post-conﬂict

scenario.

Organization of American

States (OAS)

Inter-American Develop-

ment Bank (IDB).

World Bank (WB)

Unasur. At the summit of

Heads of State held in

Lima in November 2012,

they expressed their entire

support.

United Nations Organi-

zation. Both the General

Assembly and the Security

Council.

Global Action of Parlia-

mentarians (PGA for its

acronyms in Spanish) in

December 2013 as part of

a forum held in Bogota. In

addition to their support,

they offered to send a

delegation, as a visit to the

negotiating table.

The Elders, a group of

global leaders such as Koﬁ

Annan, Nelson Mandela,

Desmond Tutu, Martti

Ahtisaari; Jimmy Carter and

Fernando Henrique Cardoso

(Brazil) (EL TIEMPO, 2013d)

International Committee

of the Red Cross. On the

visit of its Chairman, Peter

Maurer, he expressed the

committee´s for the process

and the willingness to

continue to be even in a

post-conﬂict context.

Former President of the

Spanish government, Felipe

González.

Oscar Arias, former Pre-

sident of Costa Rica and

Nobel Peace Prize: “The

world got bored with the

war in Colombia”

XXIII Ibero-American Sum-

mit in October 2013.

Representative of the

Vatican State, Pope Francis.

In a private audience with

Juan Manuel Santos, in

May 2013, expressed his

support for the processes

and blessed it.

Congressmen from the

United States. Through a

letter signed by near 14

Democratic congressmen

and a Republican, express

support for the process and

asked Secretary of State,

John Kerry to design a

policy that would respond

to needs emerging from it

(EL TIEMPO, 2013e).

José Luis Rodríguez Zapa-

tero, former head of the

Spanish government.

Source: (GONZÁLEZ, 2021, págs. 126-127)

One of the reasons for the Colombian government´s control over

the internationalization of the negotiation process is due to a pulse of for-

ce between the two sides of the conict: on the side of the government,

“so that the guerrillas could not tactically and strategically use the nego-

tiating scenario to strengthen themselves in the military” (BEJARANO,

2017, p. 199).

Distrust between the parties involved in an armed conict is

perhaps the most complex barrier that must be overcome in the search

for a negotiated solution. “The United Nations (UN) in coordinating the

Monitoring and Verication Mechanism for the Bilateral and Denitive

Ceasere and Hostilities Agreement, and as a verication body for the

abandonment of weapons by the guerrillas” (BEJARANO, 2017, p. 183).

Carlos Hernán Gonzalez Parias, Juan Camilo Mesa Bedoya, Maria Camila Alzate

The Role of Internaonal Actors in the Negoaon Process Between the Colombian Government and the Farc-Ep: a Necessary and Controlled Parcipaon

The verication mission was established by the Security Council

by resolution 2261 of 2016, which is established for 12 months and indica-

tes the functions and purpose of the mission. Then, by resolution 2366 of

2017 the Security Council, at the request of the Government of Colombia

and the FARC-EP, extends the mandate of the Verication Mission for an

initial period of 12 months under the leadership of a Special Representa-

tive of the Secretary-General of the United Nations, who was entrusted

inter alia, with reporting every 90 days on mission activities.

Conclusions

The internationalization of the negotiation process between the

Colombian State and the FARC-EP was a purported and objective issue

on the part of the government which through internationalization it

sought to add political support, legitimacy to the process and cooperation

in its dierent forms, in the face of post-conict. However, the involve-

ment of dierent actors in international society took place in a calculated,

streamlined and measured manner. That is, internationalization of the

process, but with clear restraints. In this regard, as demonstrated in the

article, some states were involved, with clear roles and above all with

little capability for autonomous decision-making on issues inherent to ne-

gotiation. On the other hand, to international actors who sought a more

active role, the government, in a sort of strategic evaluation and relevan-

ce, discarded these participations. Other actors such as France, remained

expectant, but without pretending active participation as considering the

process to be exclusive to the sovereignty and self-determination of the

Colombian State.

The decision to control the dierent international actors´ participa-

tion was due to an objective of the Colombian foreign policy which can

be read in the light of the theoretical developments of neoclassical rea-

lism under the intervening variable of leaders’ perceptions and the states’

strategic culture. As mentioned in the article, traditionally, the search

for termination of the conict through a negotiated solution was seen

by the country´s political tradition as an issue of domestic policy to be

resolved by Colombia, therefore, this way of perceiving the solution to

the conict, means an element of that state memory, which permeated

the Havana process.

On its part, strategic culture, depending on the circumstances, af-

fects how foreign policy executives perceive particular situations; is that

tradition of state behavior that often enlightens and guides state leaders.

In this particular case, President Juan Manuel Santos told the media, that

achieving peace with the guerrilla group was a country´s internal matter.

However, despite the controlled and sometimes limited role of Havana´s

negotiation process, the international actors´ participation helped to ge-

nerate security, which led to a break-up of the paradigms of distrust that

delayed and hindered the implementation of the process in previous ver-

sions.

estudos internacionais • Belo Horizonte, ISSN 2317-773X, v. 10, n. 2, (jun. 2022), p. 59-77

BIBLIOGRAPHY

BEJARANO, P. (2017). La vericación internacional: condición decisiva en la solución negociada

del conicto armado colombiano. Opera, 183-208.

BORDA, S. (2012). La internacionalización de la paz y de la guerra en Colombia durante los gobiernos

de Andrés Pastrana y Álvaro Uribe. Bogotá: Universidad de los Andes, Facultad de Ciencias Socia-

les, Departamento de Ciencia Política, Ediciones Uniandes.

BORDA, S., & Gómez, S. (2015). The internationalization of Colombia´s Current Peace Process.

From Isolation to Containment. En B. Bagley, & J. Rosen, Colombia´s political economy at the outset

of the twenty-rst century (p. 163-262). New York: Lexington Books.

CANCILLERÍA DE COLOMBIA. (24 de septiembre de 2013). Palabras del presidente de la Re-

pública de Colombia, Juan Manuel Santos, ante la asamblea general de la organización de las

Naciones Unidas en el 68 periodo de sesiones ordinaria.

CANCILLERÍA DE COLOMBIA. (2014). Discurso del presidente Juan Manuel Santos ante la

Asamblea General de las naciones Unidas en el periodo 69° periodo de sesiones.

CENTRO NACIONAL DE MEMORIA HISTORÍCA. (2014). Guerrilla y Población Civil. Trayecto-

ria de las Farc 1949-2013. Bogotá: CNMH.

CHERNICK, M. (2015). Santos, the FARC, and the Evolution of Peace Negotiations in Colombia.

En B. Bagley, & J. Rosen, Colombia’s Political Economy at the Outset of the Twenty-First Century. From

Uribe to Santos and Beyond (p. 141-162). New York: Lexington Books.

CUJABANTE, X. (2016). La comunidad internacional y su participación en los procesos de paz

en Colombia. Equidad y Desarrollo, 207-222.

ECHANDIA, C. (2015). Cincuenta años de cambios en el conicto armado colombiano (1964-

2014). Polis, 2-14.

EL ESPECTADOR. (10 de enero de 2012). “Que se olviden de un nuevo Caguán”: Juan Manuel

Santos. El Espectador. Obtenido de https://www.elespectador.com/noticias/politica/se-olviden-

-de-un-nuevo-caguan-juan-manuel-santos-articulo-320196

EL TIEMPO. (1997). Paramilitares se habrían unido. Archivo digital El Tiempo. Recuperado el 24

de 7 de 2018, de http://www.eltiempo.com/archivo/documento/MAM-513963

EL TIEMPO. (26 de octubre de 1999). Unión Europea analiza plan Colombia. El Tiempo.

EL TIEMPO. (3 de diciembre de 2011a). La paz es asunto interno y vamos a resolverlo los colom-

bianos: Santos. El Tiempo.

EL TIEMPO. (23 de mayo de 2011b). Santos rechazó mediación internacional para diálogo con

las Farc. El Tiempo.

EL TIEMPO. (1 de junio de 2012). Francia no interferirá en la política colombiana’: Hollande. El Tiempo.

EL TIEMPO. (4 de octubre de 2012b). Espaldarazo de Brasil a proceso con las Farc. El Tiempo.

Obtenido de https://www.eltiempo.com/archivo/documento/CMS-12283324

EL TIEMPO. (21 de diciembre de 2013a). Diálogos de paz, entre los hechos del año en la región,

según sondeo. El Tiempo.

EL TIEMPO. (12 de diciembre de 2013b). La Unión Europea nanciará un escenario de poscon-

icto en Colombia. El Tiempo.

EL TIEMPO. (25 de noviembre de 2013c). ‘Somos más hermanos que nunca’, le dijo Santos a

Correa. El Tiempo.

EL TIEMPO. (16 de noviembre de 2013d). Colombia se presenta ante Estados Unidos como una

potencia regional. El Tiempo.

EL TIEMPO. (29 de marzo de 2013e). Congresistas de EE. UU. rman respaldo al proceso en La

Habana. El Tiempo.

FAWCETT, L. (2012). Participación internacional en conictos armados: los esfuerzos de las

Naciones Unidas por lograr la paz de Colombia. En S. Borda, & F. Cepeda, Proceso de paz en Co-

lombia. Participación de actores internacionales (p. 89-148). Bogotá: ECOE ediciones.

FERNANDES, G. (2015). Política externa do governo Geisel (1974 – 1979): análise realista neo-

clássica. estudos internacionais, 203-224.

FISAS, V. (2012). Roles de un proceso de paz. Semana.

GARCÍA, A. (2002). La política exterior del último cuatrienio: paz y conicto en el centro de la

agenda. Políticas Públicas, 191-217.

Carlos Hernán Gonzalez Parias, Juan Camilo Mesa Bedoya, Maria Camila Alzate

The Role of Internaonal Actors in the Negoaon Process Between the Colombian Government and the Farc-Ep: a Necessary and Controlled Parcipaon

GARCÍA, M. (1992). De la Uribe a Tlaxcala. Procesos de Paz. Bogotá: Cinep.

GONZÁLEZ, C. (2021). Política exterior colombiana, 2010-2018 entre la percepción de los tomadores

de decisiones y la cultura estratégica. Medellín: Universidad Ponticia Bolivariana. Obtenido de

https://repository.upb.edu.co/bitstream/handle/20.500.11912/9047/Politica%20exterior%20

colombiana.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y

GONZÁLEZ, C. H.; MESA, J. C.; MONTOYA, D. (2018). La Cooperación Sur-Sur como herra-

mienta de la política exterior colombiana (2010-2015). Reexión Política, 84-105.

GONZÁLEZ, C. H.; MESA, J. C.; Yepes, C. (2018). La inuencia del narcotráco en la formula-

ción y ejecución de la política exterior colombiana. Escenarios; empresa y territorio (9).

GONZÁLEZ, C. H.; MUÑOZ, O. (2020). Enfoques teoricos para abordar la política exterior. En

C. H. González, Relaciones Internacionales: Política exterior, terrorismo, migración y conicto en el

sistema internacional actual. Medellín: Centro editorial Esumer.

GRUPO DE MEMORIA HISTÓRICA. (2013). ¡Basta Ya! Colombia: Memorias de guerra y digni-

dad. Bogotá: Centro de memoria histórica.

GRUPO DE MEMORIA HISTÓRICA. (2014). ¡Basta ya! Colombia: Memorias de guerra y digni-

dad. Centro Nacional de Memoria Histórica. Bogotá: Imprenta nacional.

MEDINA, C. (2009). Conicto armado y procesos de paz en Colombia. Memoria de casos FARC-EP y

ELN. Bogotá: Universidad Nacional de Colombia.

MESA, J. C.; YEPES, C. (2020). Relaciones Internacionales y Conicto Armado en Colombia: Aná-

lisis desde el modelo polemológico. En Relaciones Internacionales: Política exterior, terrorismo, migra-

ción y conicto en el sistema internacional actual (págs. 139-176). Medellín: Centro Editorial Esumer.

MESA, E. (2009). El Frente Nacional y su naturaleza antidemocrática. Revista FACULTAD DE

DERECHO Y CIENCIAS POLÍTICAS, 39(110), 157-184.

MORENO, C. (2009). Relaciones entre Colombia y Europa 1999-2002: alianzas y conicto en la

cooperación internacional. CS, 147-176.

PENAGOS, J. (2013). El proceso de representaciones sobre las FARC. 1964. Los inicios. Anagra-

mas, 145-162.

REVISTA SEMANA. (2 de agosto de 1999). Más Allá de la Foto. Revista Semana. Obtenido de

https://www.semana.com/nacion/articulo/mas-alla-de-la-foto/38484-3

REVISTA SEMANA. (1 de enero de 2012). Los puntos de la agenda. Revista Semana. Obtenido de

https://www.semana.com/nacion/articulo/los-puntos-agenda/263987-3

RÍOS, J. (2015). Del Caguán a La Habana. Los diálogos de paz con las FARC en Colombia: una

cuestión de correlación de fuerzas. Revista de Estudios en Seguridad Internacional, 63-83.

RIPSMAN, N.; TALIAFERRO, W.; LOBELL, S. (2016). Neoclassical Realist Theory of International

Politics. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

ROJAS, D. (2006). Balance de la política internacional del gobierno Uribe. Análisis Político, 85-105.

ROJAS, D. M. (2007). Estados Unidos y la Guerra en Colombia. En I. d. Internacionales, Nues-

tra guerra sin nombre. Transformaciones del conicto en Colombia (Colección VITRAL ed.). Bogotá:

Grupo Editorial Norma.

SANTOS, J. (4 de septiembre de 2012). Alocución del presidente de la República, Juan Manuel Santos

sobre el ‘Acuerdo General para la Terminación del Conicto.

SANTOS, J. (10 de diciembre de 2016). La Paz en Colombia: de lo imposible a lo posible. Palabras del

presidente de la República de Colombia, Juan Manuel Santos, al aceptar el Premio Nobel de Paz.

SCHWELLER, R. (2004). Unanswered Threats: A Neoclassical Realist Theory of Underbalan-

cing. International Security, 159-201.

TALIAFERRO, J. (2006). State Building for Future Wars: Neoclassical Realism and the Resource

Extractive State. Security Studies, 464-495.

TICKNER, A. (2007). Intervención por invitación. Claves de la política exterior colombiana y sus

debilidades principales. Colombia internacional, 90-111.

TOKATLIAN, J. G. (2000). Colombia at War: The Search for a Peace Diplomacy. International

Journal of Politics, Culture, and Society, 14(2), 333-362.

YEPES, C. (2018). Gobiernos Uribe y Santos. Dos políticas exteriores para la nalización del con-

icto armado, 2006-2016. Caso FARC-EP. Tesis para optar al título de magíster en Derechos Humanos

y Cultura de Paz. Cali: Universidad Javeriana de Cali.