29
Fernanda Albuquerque, Alexandre César Cunha Leite, Crisna Carvalho Pacheco SINO-RUSSIAN ENERGY COOPERATION IN THE POST-COLD WAR (2000-2021)
SINO-RUSSIAN ENERGY COOPERATION IN
THE POST-COLD WAR (2000-2021)1
COOPERAÇÃO ENERGÉTICA SINO-RUSSA NO PÓS
GUERRA FRIA (2000-2021)
COOPERACIÓN ENERGÉTICA SINO-RUSA EN LA POS
GUERRA FRÍA (2000-2021)
Fernanda Albuquerque 2
Alexandre César Cunha Leite 3
Cristina Carvalho Pacheco 4
DOI: 10.5752/P.2317-773X.2023v11n2p29-49
Recebido em: 18 de novembro de 2022
Aprovado em: 21 de março de 2024
ABSTRACT
This article aims to analyze Sino-Russian energy cooperation. Energy coopera-
tion is the cornerstone in the relations between Russia and China. The Rus-
sian interest in this cooperation is to assure demand for the country’s energy
exports, to acquire investment capital, and to benet from Chinese labour. On
the Chinese side, the aim has been to obtain access to Russian natural resources
and to invest surplus capital. Despite the overlap in supply and demand, as well
as the geographical proximity, the Russian energy market is directed towards
Europe, while Chinese energy demand primarily is covered by the Middle East
and Central Asia. The need for energy diversication has changed this situation
and spurred Sino-Russian cooperation. The article is structured in three parts:
it rst presents Sino-Russian energy trade, secondly, it treats the agreements
signed between both countries, and nally, it analyses energy cooperation. We
concluded that this cooperation tends to endure due to the energy-related ties
formed as part of the long-term agreements and construction of infrastructure.
Also, that this cooperation is of a strategic nature for both countries, as it oers
an alternative to other energy relations and provides the necessary room of
maneuver to defend central political and security-related interests.
Keywords: Energy cooperation; Russia; China.
RESUMO
A cooperação energética é o principal elo no relacionamento entre Rússia e Chi-
na. O interesse russo nessa cooperação é, sobretudo, assegurar demanda para
suas exportações energéticas, adquirir capital para investimento e aproveitar a
mão de obra chinesa. E o interesse chinês é ter acesso aos recursos naturais rus-
sos e investir seu capital excedente. Apesar da coincidência de oferta e demanda
e da proximidade geográca, o mercado energético russo é voltado majorita-
1. This article is derived from Fernanda
Albuquerque’s dissertation – with
funding from Coordenação de Aperfei-
çoamento de Pessoal de Ensino Superior
(CAPES) – presented to the Postgradua-
te Program in International Relations at
the State University of Paraíba (UEPB) to
obtain the Master’s degree. The trans-
lation of this article from Portuguese to
English was done by Niels Soenderga-
ard, contact: nielssonder888@gmail.com
2. Internationalist, Master in Interna-
tional Relations and PhD student in
International Relations at San Tiago
Dantas Postgraduate Program (UNESP,
UNICAMP, PUC-SP). Professor at
Centro Universitário Tabosa de Almeida
(Asces-Unita). Contact: fernandaalbu-
querque0@hotmail.com
3. Economist, Master in Political
Economy, and PhD in Social Sciences.
Permanent faculty member at the
State University of Paraíba, coordinator
of the Study and Research Group on
Asia-Pacific (GEPAP/UEPB/CNPq) and
the SACIAR LAB – Political Economy of
Hunger Laboratory (SACIAR LAB/UEPB/
CNPq). Founder of the SACIAR Solidarity
Kitchen. Contact: alexccleite@gmail.com
4. Political Scientist, Master in Political
Science and PhD in Social Sciences.
Permanent faculty member at the State
University of Paraiba, Dean of the Gra-
duate Program in International Relations
at the same institution. CAPES Fulbright
Scholar at American University (2013).
Researcher at the NISUS (National Insti-
tute for the Study of the United States).
Contact: criscpacheco@gmail.com
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estudos internacionais • Belo Horizonte, ISSN 2317-773X, v. 11, n. 3, (out. 2023), p. 29-49
riamente para Europa e o fornecimento energético chinês obtido sobretudo do
Oriente Médio e da Ásia Central. É a necessidade de diversicação energética
que inicia a mudança desse cenário e impulsiona a cooperação sino-russa. O
objetivo do artigo consiste em analisar a cooperação energética sino-russa. Para
tanto, o artigo está estruturado em três partes: primeiro, apresenta o comércio
energético sino-russo, em seguida aborda os acordos rmados entre os dois
países; e por m, analisa a cooperação energética. Conclui-se que essa coope-
ração tende a ser duradoura em razão dos vínculos energéticos criados com os
acordos de fornecimento a longo prazo e a construção de infraestruturas. Ade-
mais, constata-se que a cooperação é estratégica para ambos países, pois oferece
alternativa às demais relações energéticas proporcionando a liberdade de ação
necessária para defender seus interesses em questões político-securitárias.
Palavras-chave: Cooperação energética; Rússia; China.
RESUMEN
La cooperación energética es el eslabón principal en la relación entre Rusia y
China. El interés de Rusia en esta cooperación es, sobre todo, asegurar la de-
manda de sus exportaciones energéticas, adquirir capital para invertir y apro-
vechar la mano de obra china. Y el interés chino es tener acceso a los recursos
naturales rusos e invertir su excedente de capital. A pesar de la coincidencia
de oferta y demanda y la proximidad geográca, el mercado energético ruso
se concentra principalmente en Europa y la oferta energética china se obtiene
principalmente de Oriente Medio y Asia Central. Es la necesidad de diversica-
ción energética lo que inicia el cambio en este escenario e impulsa la coopera-
ción chino-rusa. El objetivo del artículo es analizar la cooperación energética
chino-rusa. Para ello, el artículo se estructura en tres partes: primero, presenta
el comercio energético chino-ruso, luego aborda los acuerdos rmados entre los
dos países; y nalmente, analiza la cooperación energética. Se concluye que esta
cooperación tiende a ser duradera debido a los lazos energéticos creados con
acuerdos de suministro a largo plazo y la construcción de infraestructuras. Ade-
más, parece que la cooperación es estratégica para ambos países, ya que ofrece
una alternativa a otras relaciones energéticas, brindándoles la libertad de acción
necesaria para defender sus intereses en temas político-de seguridad.
Palabras clave: Cooperación energética; Rusia; China.
INITIAL CONSIDERATIONS
In December 2019, the pipeline Power of Siberia, was inaugurated,
a result of the “silent agreement” (BBC, 2019) between China and Russia.
The agreement, which was reached in May 2014, encompassed a contract
worth some US$ 400 billion according to which Gazprom committed to
supplying China with 38 billion of m of gas annually, during a period of 30
years, through an oriental route: the Power of Siberia pipeline (Gazprom;
Pallardy, 2020). At the inauguration of Power of Siberia, Xi Jinping (in
power since 2013) declared: “The Eastern route of the Russian-Chinese
gas pipeline is a landmark project of bilateral energy cooperation. It is an
example of deep integration and mutually advantageous cooperation of
our countries” (Tass, 2019).
According to Salin (2011, p. 72) the essence of the bilateral relations
between Russia and China can be resumed by the following sentence
“Russian natural resources in exchange for access to Chinese nancial re-
sources, including conditional loans”. Salin argues that the objective of the
31
Fernanda Albuquerque, Alexandre César Cunha Leite, Crisna Carvalho Pacheco SINO-RUSSIAN ENERGY COOPERATION IN THE POST-COLD WAR (2000-2021)
Chinese policy of partnership with Russia is to gain access to Russian natu-
ral and energy resources, and also to establish long-term economic ties to
guarantee the continued growth of the Chinese economy; on the Russian
side, the objective is to ensure exports of natural resources and to obtain
Chinese capital and labour (because of the Russian demographic decline).
This article’s goal is to analyze the Sino-Russian energy cooperation
in the period from 2000 to 2021. For this purpose, answers are sought for
the following two questions: how do China and Russia cooperate within
the eld of energy? Which role does this cooperation play within both
countries? Two hypotheses were established in relation to these questions:
hypothesis 1 sustains that China concedes loans and nancing for Russia
in exchange for long-term energy supplies; hypothesis 2 arms that this
corporation is strategic for both countries, as it diversies energy demand
and supply (guaranteeing energy security and economic development)
and consequently, provides a wider room of manoeuvre regarding politi-
cal and security-related matters – such as the Ukraine crisis (2014)5 and the
South China Sea Conicts6 .Since its initial economic opening in the 1970s,
Chinese energy demand has increased markedly. The elevation of indus-
trial, civil, and military consumptionhas repositioned China as the world’s
largest energy importer (Yilmaz; Daksueva, 2017, p. 2). According to BP
(2022, p. 8), China is the largest global primary energy consumer7 (26,5%).
Russia, on the other hand, is the largest global exporter of oil (12,3%)
and natural gas through pipelines8 (28,6%) and occupies the place as the
second-largest global producer of oil (with 12,2%, the same amount as
Saudi Arabia, behind only the United States (18,5%)) and natural gas (with
17,4%) and the sixth-largest global producer of coal (with 5,5%) (BP, 2022,
p. 15, 27, 29, 37, 38)). The background for this position of energy domi-
nance vary from an abundance of natural reserves9 , a highly developed
energy sector during the Cold War, to the investments made by Moscow
within this sector in recent decades (Hill, 2004, p. 47).
Despite signicant investments within the sector, Russia still needs
to modernize its energy infrastructure (Putin, 1999, p. 51), as it suers
from: 1) a high degree of depreciation of capital goods within the Fuel and
Energy Complex (FEC) (nearly 60% within the gas industry and electrical
energy and 80% within the oil renement industry) apart from a mini-
mum replacement of these goods – between 2005-2015, the replacement
rate was approximately 2%, – with an exception for oil extraction, which
was 4%; 2) technological backwardness in relation to the average level
of technology within energy industries (Kuznetsova, N.; Kuznetsova,
E., 2015, p. 164-165); 3) aging infrastructure; and 4) the need for increa-
sed energy eciency (Bushev 2014 apud Kuznetsova, N.; Kuznetsova, E.,
2015, p. 166). Moreover, oil and gas represent half (58,7%) of goods exports
(World Bank Group, 2018, p. V), which along with service exports repre-
sent more than ¼ (30,7% in 2018) of Russian GDP (World Bank, no data).
It is hereby evident that Russia needs investment in order to deve-
lop and modernize its energy infrastructure. Conversely, China requires
energy resources to maintain its economic growth rates, while it posses-
ses capital to construct the necessary infrastructure for its energy supply
(Bolt, 2014, p. 50-52).
5. The crisis was marked by a series
of protests, supposedly incited by the
United States and the European Union,
against former Ukrainian President,
Victor Yanukovych, not to sign a trade
agreement with the European Union.
The onset of the crisis resulted in the
destitution of Yanukovych from the pre-
sidency and the annexation of Crimea
by Russia.
6. The divergences in this region regard
a dispute about maritime resources
spread over four island groups (amongst
which are the islands of Spratly and
Paracel) and the delimitation of territo-
rial waters claimed by China, Taiwan,
Vietnam, the Philippines, Indonesia, Ma-
laysia, and Brunei. The situation is made
worse by the participation of external
actors, such as the US, Japan, India,
and Australia who are attracted by the
strategic importance of these waters
(Yilmaz; Daksueva, 2017, p. 20).
7. This estimate includes petroleum,
natural gas, coal, nuclear energy,
hydroelectricity and renewables (BP,
2022, p. 9).
8. The largest global exporter of
Liquified Natural Gas (LNG) is Australia,
which represents 20,9% of global
exports (BP, 2022, p. 36).
9. Russia retains the largest natural
gas reserves in the world (19,8%), the
second largest coal reserves (15,2%)
and the sixth-largest oil reserves (6,1%)
(BP, 2019, p. 14, 30, 42).
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estudos internacionais • Belo Horizonte, ISSN 2317-773X, v. 11, n. 3, (out. 2023), p. 29-49
Traditionally, in Russia, this sector has been mainly aimed at
Europe, while the Chinese energy supplies have primarily been obtained
from the Middle East (oil) and Central Asia (gas). According to Yilmaz
and Daksueva (2017, p. 8-9), the aspiration to change this situation and
the consequent evolution of the Sino-Russia energy relations takes place
as a response to two dierent types of challenges: 1) geopolitical – more
precisely the Conicts in the South Chinese Sea and the Ukrainian Crisis
(2014) – which resulted in the annexation of Crimea by Russia and in the
subsequent sanctions; and 2) geoeconomic, as both aim to deepen their
energy relations, given that Russian exports are mainly directed towards
the European market (See Graph 1 and 4), and as the Chinese oil imports
mainly originate from West Africa and the Middle East (nearly 60% – See
Graph 2).
Russia becomes relevant for China as an energy exporter (Salin,
2011, p. 60; Gabuev, 2015, p. 2), due to the Chinese concern related to the
country’s oil imports from West Africa and the Middle East, which are
transported by sea routes and pass through the Malacca Strait, a point
which could become blocked in the case of an escalation of conict in the
South China Sea. Moreover, the political instability in the Middle East
is another factor of Chinese preoccupation concerning its energy supply
(Yilmaz; Daksueva, 2017, p. 7-25). In Salin’s analysis (2011, p. 61), Russia is
the only supplier which can guarantee a stable ow in the case of military
conict between Beijing and Washington or if the situation in the South
China Sea simply becomes too unstable.
Russia, on the other hand, has become increasingly focused on
its Turn to the East, since the 2000s, due to the Asian economic growth
(Lukin, 2019, p. 1-2). In its ocial foreign policy documents Moscow ar-
ms that the Western ability to dominate the global economy and politics
is decreasing, while global power and development potential is shifting
towards the Asia-Pacic (Mid, 2013, 2016). Trenin (2015, p. 33-34) views
this shift in the politico-economic pole towards the Asia-Pacic as the
main motivation for the Russian reorientation towards the East.
Two events have contributed to accelerate the Russian reorien-
tation towards the East: the global nancial crisis, which took place in
2008, and the Ukrainian crisis six years later. The nancial crisis aected
the Russian economy, which was in need of rebalancing, but the country
could not seek assistance from the West, which itself was in the course of
reviving its economy (Trenin, 2015, p. 33). The eect of the nancial crisis
of 2008 which was felt most by the Russians was, according to Sussex
(2014, p. 215), the lack of liquidity and the increasingly expensive credit
which its energy companies faced. This was the case with Gazprom. As a
consequence of this, China conceded loans to Russia for the construction
of energy infrastructure in 2009 (energy for loans) (Sussex, 2014, p. 215).
The second episode regards the political and economic crisis faced by
Ukraine towards the end of 2013 and early 2014 that resulted in Russian
annexation of Crimea and Western sanctions imposed on Russia.
According to Kaczmarski (2015, p. 12-13), the nancial crisis of 2008
led to 1) the end of the “Russian economic renaissance of the 2000s” – as
the Russian economy was incapable of resuming the pace of growth that
33
Fernanda Albuquerque, Alexandre César Cunha Leite, Crisna Carvalho Pacheco SINO-RUSSIAN ENERGY COOPERATION IN THE POST-COLD WAR (2000-2021)
had marked the period before the crisis and eventually stagnated; 2) the
recession of the European and American economies which resorted to
austerity policies; and 3) the acceleration of the Chinese ascension (that
had its beginning from the 1990s) – which despite having suered from
an increase in unemployment and a reduction of economic growth still
was much more modestly impacted than the Western powers.
By redirecting its trade and investment strategies towards Asia,
Russia concentrated on China (Lukin, 2019, p. 1-2). The focus on China
can be explained by the fact that this is the second-largest global eco-
nomy, which held signicant capital stocks (Bolt, 2014, p. 50-52) and fur-
thermore also was one of the main energy consumers and importers.
The combination of these factors made China the ideal partner for Russia
which needed to guarantee its energy demand and nancial resources to
develop its economy (Salin, 2011, p. 72).
In sum, the two states deepened their energy cooperation as a stra-
tegy for export and import diversication which has proved to be com-
patible and complementary and as a response to geopolitical challenges
(Yilmaz; Daksueva, 2017, p. 7-9). With this in mind, seeking to analyze
the Sino-Russian energy cooperation between 2000 and 2021, this article
is structured in three parts: the rst presents the Sino-Russian energy
trade, the second engages with the agreements signed between the two
countries, and the third analyses energy cooperation.
SINO-RUSSIAN ENERGY TRADE
In 1996, Beijing and Moscow established the Russian-Chinese
Energy Cooperation Committee which strengthened the bilateral coope-
ration. However, in this period, as Xu and Reisinger (2018, p. 3) highlight,
the Chinese demand for Russian energy resources was still suppressed.
The relation between Beijing and Moscow became closer when the two
countries in 2001 signed the Treaty of Good Neighborliness and Friendly
Cooperation (Yilmaz; Daksueva, 2017, p. 2). However, it was only from
2008, when another mechanism was established, the Russia-China Energy
Dialogue (RCED), that the Sino-Russian energy cooperation entered a
trajectory of rapid development. According to Xu and Reisinger (2018, p.
3-12), this occurred because practically all bilateral cooperation initiati-
ves within the energy sector from 2008 were discussed and eectuated
within the RCED. For example, it was from this year that Russia ceased
selling gas to China at the same price at which it sold to the European
market. The RCED permitted a more pragmatic price determination and
cooperation was intensied (Xu; Reisinger, 2018, p. 12).
Guided by the deterioration of relations with the West and by eco-
nomic interests, after the Ukraine Crisis (2014), which resulted in the
annexation of Crimea by Russia and the imposition of North-American
and European sanctions on the country, Moscow became increasingly
oriented towards Beijing. Due to the increase in energy consumption,
China became the natural destination for Russia to oset the losses it had
incurred because of the sanctions and the decreasing oil prices (Yilmaz;
Daksueva, 2017, p. 9). The Chinese nancial power also paved the way for
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estudos internacionais • Belo Horizonte, ISSN 2317-773X, v. 11, n. 3, (out. 2023), p. 29-49
large energy agreements which involved extensive investments in logisti-
cs, construction, and maintenance works (Yilmaz; Daksueva, 2017, p. 9).
Currently, China is the main destination for Russian oil exports (ac-
counting for 30% of foreign demand) and coal exports (24%) – see Graph 1.
Graph 1- Destination of Russian oil and coal exports in 2021
Author’s elaboration based on data from BP (2022, p. 27, 40).
While Russia is the second crude oil (15%) and coal (22%) supplier
to China – see Graph 2. The main crude oil supplier to China is Saudi
Arabia (17%), which since 2001 had been at the top of the list (DOWNS,
2018) in most of the years. Regarding coal, Indonesia (49%) is the main
supplier of commodities to China – see Graph 2.
Graph 2 – Origin of the Chinese crude oil and coal imports in 2021
Author’s elaboration based on data from BP (2022, p. 27,40).
35
Fernanda Albuquerque, Alexandre César Cunha Leite, Crisna Carvalho Pacheco SINO-RUSSIAN ENERGY COOPERATION IN THE POST-COLD WAR (2000-2021)
The oil trade between Russia and China grew under favorable geo-
graphical and economic conditions. In geographical terms, Russia posses-
ses large oil and natural gas elds in Eastern Siberia, a border region to
the industrialized Northeastern China. In economic terms, the Russian
economy is blessed with resources that complement the Chinese indus-
trial base (Yilmaz; Daksueva, 2017, p. 3-4).
The energy trade has created such a strong link between the
Russian and Chinese economies that the decline in the Chinese GDP gro-
wth – which can be observed since 2014 (Spellman; Leite, 2020) – worries
Kremlin because a decrease in Chinese growth (which also would af-
fect the country’s energy consumption) could seriously compromise the
Russian economy (Xu; Reisinger, 2018, p. 15).
Russia supplies oil to China through two pipelines: the Eastern
Siberia-Pacic Ocean (ESPO), the Eastern supply route (the Taishet-
Skovorodino route (ESPO 1, concluded in 2009) Skovorodino-Kozmino (ESPO
2, concluded in 2012) Skovorodino-Daqing (China Spur, concluded in 2010));
and the Omsk-Pavlodar-Atasu Pipeline, in operation since 1980, which su-
pplies China through a Western route which leaves Omsk in Russia and
passes through Kazakhstan until reaching China (EIA 2017, 13-14).
In relation to Liqueed Natural Gas (LNG), China (16%) is the se-
cond destination of Russian exports, while in Russian natural gas exports
by pipeline, China stand at a much lower position, responsible for only
4% of the foreign demand – see Graph 3.
Graph 3 – Destination of Russian natural gas exports in 2021
Own elaboration based on data from BP (2022, p. 36-37).
The Chinese imports of natural gas can be divided into two categories:
imports via pipeline, coming mainly from Central Asia (See Graph 4); and
imports via ship, in this case of LNG coming mainly from Australia (40%,
see Graph 4). China imports more LNG (109,5 bcm) than natural gas via
pipeline (53,2 bcm) (BP, 2022, p. 35-37). Despite the low presence of Russian
natural gas within the Chinese economy, which only represents 6% of the
country’s LNG imports – see Graph 4, – the agreements signed in recent
years – the theme of the next section – point to a change in this situation.
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estudos internacionais • Belo Horizonte, ISSN 2317-773X, v. 11, n. 3, (out. 2023), p. 29-49
Graph 4 – Origin of Chinese Natural Gas imports in 2021
Own elaboration based on data from BP (2022, p. 36-37).
The low level of the Chinese imports of natural gas from Russia is
understandable when considering that China only began to import na-
tural gas from 2007 (EIA, 2015, p. 16), and, even so, still produces 55% of
its consumption (BP, 2022, p. 29-31). Moreover, when China began im-
porting natural gas, the small amounts did not attract Gazprom’s inte-
rest, which directed Chinese buyers towards Central Asia, and especially
Turkmenistan (Gabuev, 2015, p. 3).
In Gabuev’s perspective (2015, p. 3), the Chinese orientation towards
natural gas from Turkmenistan (which accounts for 59% of Chinese natu-
ral gas imports – see Graph 4) can be explained by Moscow’s preoccupa-
tion with its position on the European market and Gazprom’s lack of in-
terest in the Chinese market (which derives from the depressed demand,
low prices, and Chinese state regulation). In cooperation with Central
Asia, China hereby constructed the Central Asia-China pipeline (bet-
ween 2007 and 2009), which has its point of departure in Turkmenistan
and passes through Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan before arriving in the
Chinese Xinjiang region (Estadão, 2009). Apart from alleviating the im-
mediate Chinese demand for Russian natural gas, it also became an im-
portant bargaining chip for China during the energy negotiations with
Moscow in 2010 and in the agreement of 2014 with Gazprom. Later, the
Chinese energy imports from Turkmenistan awoke Gazprom’s interest
in the Chinese market (Xu; Reisinger, 2018, p. 8-10).
China and Russia have conicting energy interests in Central Asia
– a region that holds large natural gas reserves as well as a strategic po-
sition between the two countries and the Middle East. With economic
gains in mind, Russia controls the energy infrastructure – because it ob-
tains energy cheaply and resells to Europe – and views the region as part
of its sphere of inuence, meaning that it does not permit the intrusion
of other states. China, on the other hand, is interested in investing, in
intensifying economic relations, and in increasing energy imports from
Central Asia through energy contracts and infrastructure development,
which converges with the Russian objectives in the region10 (Bolt, 2014, p.
10. On the other hand, the two countries
share political and security interests in
Central Asia. Both seek to diminish the
North American influence and to main-
tain regional stability. For this purpose,
they seek to eradicate the “three evils”
– “terrorism, separatism, and religious
extremism”, and to limit military North
American military bases in Central Asia
and avoid the eruption of new Colored
Revolutions (ZIEGLER, 2010, p. 233-237).
One instrument of cooperation between
the two countries in Central Asia is the
Shanghai Cooperation Organization
(SCO), a bloc of Asian regional integra-
tion led by China and Russia.
37
Fernanda Albuquerque, Alexandre César Cunha Leite, Crisna Carvalho Pacheco SINO-RUSSIAN ENERGY COOPERATION IN THE POST-COLD WAR (2000-2021)
60-61). Bolt (2014, p. 60) highlights that beyond China and Russia, many
countries – such as the United States, India, Pakistan, Iran, and Turkey –
also seek inuence in Central Asia.
The Russian gas supply to China is shipped through two chan-
nels. The LNG from the Yamal peninsula is transported by cargo ships
through the Northern Sea Route (equivalent to the “Summer Route” on
Map 1) or by the Western Route via the Suez Canal (equivalent to the
“Winter Route” on Map 1) – varying according to the time of the year
(Reuters, 2018; Lng World News, 2018).
Map 1 – Supply Routes of the Yamal LNG Project
Source: Bianco (2018)
And the natural gas is shipped by the pipeline Power of Siberia (see
Map 2), with supply beginning in December 2019 (GAZPROM).
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estudos internacionais • Belo Horizonte, ISSN 2317-773X, v. 11, n. 3, (out. 2023), p. 29-49
Map 2 – The Power of Siberia pipeline
Source: Gazprom
The main destinations of Russian energy exports are China and
Europe (EIA, 2017, p. 11, 21, 28). Although Europe as a whole holds an
important position as a consumer of Russian energy resources (see Graph
1 and Graph 3), examining the countries individually, China becomes
distinguished and surpasses the European countries as the largest desti-
nation of Russian oil and coal exports (as it holds the rst place in terms
of oil (30%) and coal exports (24% – see Graph 1), and only becomes less
relevant regarding natural gas by pipeline (4% – see Graph 3).
The next section presents the agreements signed between China
and Russia since 2000, highlighting the continuity and maybe even an
increase in the energy trade between China and Russia.
ENERGY AGREEMENTS BETWEEN RUSSIA AND CHINA
The Sino-Russian energy cooperation already encompasses trade
in energy resources, investments within the energy sector, equity parti-
cipation, infrastructure development, technological exchanges, nuclear
energy projects and even explorations in the Arctic (Yilmaz; Daksueva,
2017, p. 2-10).
Energy cooperation is a vital instrument for the obtainment of
Russian objectives, including strategic interactions with China (Yilmaz;
Daksueva, 2017). The Russian interest in energy cooperation with China
is, above all, to guarantee demand for its natural resources, to acquire in-
vestment capital within the energy sector, and to benet from Chinese la-
bour (Salin, 2011, p. 73). The Chinese interest in energy cooperation with
Russia consists in: 1) guaranteeing energy security through diversication
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Fernanda Albuquerque, Alexandre César Cunha Leite, Crisna Carvalho Pacheco SINO-RUSSIAN ENERGY COOPERATION IN THE POST-COLD WAR (2000-2021)
of its sources of energy supply (Yilmaz; Daksueva, 2017; Salin, 2011, p. 60);
2) invest its surplus capital; and 3) intensify its trade interactions (Bolt,
2014, p. 50-57).
In Xu and Reisinger’s analysis (2018, p. 2), the literature points to
various factors which spur Sino-Russian energy trade, such as 1) the over-
lap in supply and demand – the Chinese energy needs and abundancy of
Russian energy reserves; 2) the deterioration of Russian relations with the
West – this has incentivized Moscow to go beyond pragmatic and short-
-term energy agreements with China and to move towards strategic coo-
peration; 3) the Russian aspiration to use energy cooperation with China
to promote its economic status in Northeast Asia and the Asia Pacic; and
nally 4) Moscow’s interest in promoting economic development in the
Far East and in Eastern Siberia.
Throughout the 21st Century, various energy agreements were sig-
ned between the two countries. According to Meidan (2016, p. 11), in 2005
China conceded the rst oil-backed loan to Russia, in line with which the
China National Petroleum Corporation – CNPC lend US$ 6 billion to
Rosneft as a payment in advance for the supply of 48,8 million tons of oil
until 2010 (Trevisan, p. 2005).
In 2009, the Russian companies Rosneft and Transneft obtained a
loan of US$ 25 billion with the China Development Bank (CDB). As part
of this transaction, it was agreed that Transneft would receive US$ 10
billion (the necessary amount in order to conclude the construction of
the ESPO pipeline without delay), while Rosneft would receive another
US$ 15 billion, and in exchange, the company committed to supplying 15
million tons of oil annually during 20 years (the equivalent of 300 mil-
lion tons in total, as a value of approximately US$ 90 billion) (Paxton;
Soldatkin, 2009). As a result of this agreement, in January 2001, Russia be-
gan shipping oil to China through the ESPO pipeline (BOLT, 2014, p. 54).
In June 2013, Rosneft made an agreement worth US$ 270 billion
with the CNPC, as part of which it committed to supplying 300 thousand
barrels of oil per day to China during 25 years from 2015; a total of 256
million tons of oil (BBC, 2013; Clover, 2013; Exame, 2013). In October the
same year, Rosneft signed a contract of US$ 85 billion with Sinopec, a
Chinese oil rening company, as part of which it committed to supplying
the company with some 100 million tons of crude oil for a ten years pe-
riod (Rosneft, 2013; RT, 2013; Petronotícias, 2013). In this round of nego-
tiations in October 2013, Novatek (a Russian Natural gas company) com-
mitted to supplying three million tons of LNG annually to CNPC for 15
years (Rosneft, 2013; RT, 2013; Estadão, 2013; Petronotícias, 2013).
In May 2014, Gazprom and the Chinese State-Owned Company,
CNPC, signed a contract at the value of US$ 400 billion, which determi-
ned that Gazprom during 30 years would supply 38 billion m3 of natural
gas annually to China through the Power of Siberia pipeline, which was
inaugurated in December 2019 (Gazprom; Pallardy, 2020). It is important
to highlight that this agreement has been under negotiation for ten years
and the price of gas, which always has been a cause of disagreement bet-
ween Russia and China, – and even blocked negotiations, – was kept se-
cret, including after the signature of the contract (Wan; Hauslohner, 2014).
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estudos internacionais • Belo Horizonte, ISSN 2317-773X, v. 11, n. 3, (out. 2023), p. 29-49
In 2015, Gazprom and the CNPC signed a preliminary agreement
according to which Russia would ship some 30 billion m3 of gas annually
to China through the Eastern Route – the pipeline Power of Siberia-2
(Gazprom, 2015; Tass, 2017). Although the project still is on the drawing
board, relevant questions such as the price of gas have still not been sett-
led. Gazprom plans to launch Power of Siberia-2 in 2030 (Pallardy, 2020).
Chinese companies also invest – through equity acquisition – in
the Russian gas and oil exploration. Amongst the agreements, one was
concluded between Rosneft and CNPC to jointly develop the oil and gas
elds in Eastern Siberia, while another regards the contract between
Rosneft and Sinopec to jointly develop of elds of Russkoye and Yurubcheno-
Tokhomskoye (Yilmaz; Daksueva, 2017, p. 5).
In 2016, the Export-Import Bank of China (Exim) and the China
Development Bank (CDB) committed to supplying US$ 12 billion,
throughout a 15 years period, to nance the Yamal LNG Project, led by
Novatek (Bermingham, 2016; Africa Reuters, 2016). Situated on the Yamal
Peninsula (a region rich in natural gas of the Arctic Siberia), the project en-
compasses production, liquication and transport of natural gas (Sputnik,
2018; Sahuquillo, 2018). Sahuquillo (2018) highlights that this is the energy
project with the largest Chinese participation in Russia – approximately
30% divided between CNPC (20%) and the Silk Road Fund (9,9%), the
rest of the stocks are held by Novatek (50,1%) and the French Total (20%)
(Africa Reuters, 2016; Efe, 2017; Sputnik, 2018; Sahuquillo, 2018) – without
Chinese investment, this project would not have been possible.
The main destination of the LNG produced in Yamal are Asia (54%)
and Europe (46%) (Exame, 2017) with the main focus on the East, al-
though the Russian icebreakers can travel all year departing from Sabetta
(see Map 1) heading West and only six months in the direction Eastwards,
given that the ice obstructs and sometimes hinders sailing (Sahuquillo,
2018; Escarda, 2017).
In July 2018, Novatek delivered the rst shipment of LNG to Yamal
to China via the Northern Sea Route – equivalent to the Summer Route
on Map 1 (Arctic Bulk; Reuters, 2018; Novatek, 2018). The deliveries of
LNG from the port in Sabetta to China via the Northern Sea Route are
signicant because they diminish the time and costs of transportation
when compared with the rst LNG shipment from Yamal to China, whi-
ch took place through the Western Route – equivalent to the Winter
Route on Map 1 – in April that year (Reuters, 2018; Lng World News,
2018; Novatek, 2018; Sun, 2018).
Table 1 resumes the energy agreements presented in this study, al-
beit it does not necessarily comprise all the contracts signed between the
two countries. It nonetheless provides an overview of the intense Sino-
Russian energy cooperation.
41
Fernanda Albuquerque, Alexandre César Cunha Leite, Crisna Carvalho Pacheco SINO-RUSSIAN ENERGY COOPERATION IN THE POST-COLD WAR (2000-2021)
Table 1 – Energy agreements between Russia and China (2000-2021)
X: Information not available.-
Author’s elaboration11
Downs (2018) argues that the trend is that Russia will remain as the
main source of oil for China due to political and infrastructure-related
reasons, and because of the long-term contracts – as presented in Table 1.
The commitments described in Table 1 do not only maintain – for
decades – the Chinese demand for Russian energy resources, as the in-
crease in consumption at the cost of other suppliers would suggest. The
long-term supply contracts sealed the Russian and Chinese energy part-
nerships for at least 29 years. After this period, the trend is that the Sino-
Russian energy trade will extend for many more decades to compensate
for the signicant investment in the construction of energy infrastructu-
re – the ESPO and Power of Siberia – in order to connect their countries.
Moreover, the Chinese imports of Russian energy resources tend to in-
crease due to the growing capacity and ease of transportation with the
construction of the ESPO and Power of Siberia pipelines, and because of
the problems in the South China Sea which could make the country redi-
rect parts of its imports from the Middle East and West Africa to Russia.
It is also important to highlight how these agreements impact
the current situation of low Chinese imports from Russian gas and lead
China, in the near future, to the group of the main Russian gas con-
sumers. The main agreement signed concerning natural gas (between
Gazprom and CNPC at a value of US$ 400 billion) and the energy project
with the largest Chinese participation in Russia is the Yamal LNG Project
(Sahuquillo, 2018) which already has entered operation. Apart from this,
the Chinese natural gas imports tend to increase because of an ongoing
change in the Chinese energy matrix in the direction of resources that
emit fewer gasses with a polluting eect on the atmosphere and which
tend to burn more eciently (Yilmaz And Daksueva, 2017, p. 6).
It can thus be concluded, that the Sino-Russian energy trade is per-
sistent and that the two countries tend to become increasingly important
for each other within the energy sector. The next section analyses the
Sino-Russian energy cooperation and its eects.
11. Based on data from Meidan (2016,
11); Trevisan (2005); Paxton, Soldatkin
(2009); Bbc (2013); Clover (2013);
Exame (2013); Rosneft (2013); Rt (2013);
Estadão (2013); Petronotícias (2013);
Gazprom; Pallardy (2020); Gazprom
(2015); Tass (2017); Bermingham (2016);
Africa Reuters (2016).
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ANALYSIS OF THE SINO-RUSSIAN ENERGY COOPERATION
In the RCED negotiations, Xu and Reisinger (2018, p. 12) conclude
that the Chinese ability to shape the agenda is superior to that of Russia,
given that nearly all the proposals initiated by China have been conclu-
ded and the changes in the themes of the RCED mainly reect Chinese
interests (Russia has been relatively passive in terms of dening the agen-
da from 2008 until 2015). It also became evident that Russia makes use of
price manipulation of energy resources as its principal method to inuen-
ce the bargaining process (Xu; Reisinger, 2018, p. 12).
The Russian inability to dene the agenda could be associated with
the economic disparities between China and Russia. Moscow needs to
strengthen its economic capacity to obtain an advantageous position in
the process of energy bargaining with Beijing (Xu; Reisinger, 2018, p. 16).
There is also a disparity in terms of commercial relevance, in which
China is much more important to Russia than that country is to China;
while China holds the rst place on the ranking of the origin of imports
(with 20%) and destination of Russian exports (with 11%) (OEC), Russia
is only the 11th most important source of imports (with 2,5%) and the 10th
most important destination of Chinese exports (with 1,8%, at a similar le-
vel to the Netherlands and Singapore) (OECa). Moreover, the very struc-
ture of trade relations of the two countries – in which Moscow mainly
exports raw materials (53% crude oil, (OEC)) and imports industrialized
products (10% transmission equipment’s, 5,7% automatic data processing
machines and magnetic readers, amongst others (OECa)) – represents a
disadvantage for the Russian Federation (Kaczmarski, 2015, p. 21).
Independently of the abovementioned circumstances, it is a fact
that the Sino-Russian energy cooperation has proved itself to be essential
and benevolent to both countries, as it spurs energy diversication and
consequently, a higher degree of freedom of action in relation to politi-
cal and security-related crises, such as the Ukraine Crisis (2014) and the
Conicts in the South China Sea.
The Ukraine Crisis (2014) resulted in the annexation of Crimea
by Russia and in subsequent western sanctions on Moscow. The Sino-
Russian energy cooperation has eased the eects of the sanctions (Yilmaz;
Daksueva, 2017, p. 3) in relation to energy demand, capital and technolo-
gy – given that, 1) energy trade has intensied, as Russia has become the
main oil supplier to China from 2016 (Downs, 2018) and China has incor-
porated Russian natural gas within its economy with the US$ 400 billion
agreement between Gazprom and CNPC12 – see Table 1; 2) the Chinese
investments in Russia increased from 2014 – see Figure 1; 3) China and
Russia have engaged in technological exchanges, at least in the construc-
tion of the Power of Siberia pipeline (Yilmaz; Daksueva, 2017, p. 9-10).
The Western sanctions imposed on Moscow limit the access of cer-
tain Russian nancial institutions to Western capital markets, isolating them
from the nancial centers of London and New York. Therefore, the Russian
authorities sought to substitute Western credit, with credit from Chinese
nancial institutions, successfully securing the following investments: 1)
Chinese nancing for the Yamal LNG project (see Table 1); 2) loans for the
12. Established in May 2014, this agree-
ment has been under negotiation for 20
years and was announced shortly after
the US Secretary of the Treasury asked
China to refrain from steps which could
limit the impact of Western sanctions
on China (YILMAZ; DAKSUEVA, 2017,
p. 18-19).
43
Fernanda Albuquerque, Alexandre César Cunha Leite, Crisna Carvalho Pacheco SINO-RUSSIAN ENERGY COOPERATION IN THE POST-COLD WAR (2000-2021)
Vnesheconombank (VEB) and the VTB, state-owned Russian nancial institu-
tions; and 3) the creation of a joint investment between the China Investment
Corporation and the Russian Direct Investment Fund (Gabuev, 2015, p. 3-5).
Figure 1 illustrates that in 2014 – the year of the Ukraine Crisis and
the subsequent Western sanctions imposed on Moscow – China invested
heavily in Russia, and in the following years, although the level of invest-
ments did diminish, they still remained higher than before the Ukraine
Crisis (with exception only of 2010). Hence, Figure 1 suggests a trend of
Chinese support for Russia and boycott of the sanctions imposed by the
US and the European Union.
Figure 1 – Chinese investment in Russia (2003-2018)
Source: Spivak and Foy (2019)
Xu and Reisinger (2018, p. 4-5) stress how personalism is a strong
characteristic in the Russian political structure, which has been even
more evident in the energy diplomacy towards China, in which Putin
personally impacts negotiations. Vladimir Putin has proved to be positi-
vely minded to opening the energy sector to Chinese companies, to in-
terfere in order to conclude energy agreements, and to participate in mul-
tilateral cooperation led by China, thus, demonstrating a Sino-Russian
unity in relation to international issues. In exchange, Xi Jinping is also
more inclined to provide economic nancing to Russia, especially within
the eld of energy (Xu; Reisinger, 2018, p. 5-13).
Even with the intensication of the Russia-China cooperation after
2014, it is still evident that China does not possess the necessary condi-
tions to completely substitute the West as an energy market, and as a
source of capital and technology (Gabuev, 2015, p. 1-8), however, the Sino-
Russian relations have eased the eects of the sanctions through an in-
crease in the energy imports and Chinese investments in Russia (Yilmaz;
Daksueva, 2017, p. 3).
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The increase of the Chinese investments in Russia and the rise in
imports of Russian energy resources by China provides Moscow with an
alternative to the Western nancial institutions and the European energy
demand, which results in a larger room of maneuver for Russia regarding
questions concerning which the country diverges from the West, such as
the expansion of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), of the
European Union, and the Ukraine Crisis (2014).
The Russian energy supply to China has also played an important
role in relation to political and security-related matters of this Asian coun-
try, especially regarding the Conicts in the South China Sea, as it repre-
sents an alternative to the energy resources of the Middle East and West
Africa, which is transported through maritime routes that pass through the
Malacca Strait, – a place which could become blocked in case that the South
China Sea Conicts deteriorate. Hence, the Russian energy shipments ser-
ve to reassure China with regards to its energy supply and provides a higher
degree of freedom to act more assertively within the region, without wor-
rying about how a US naval blockade could cut o vital energy supplies
(Yilmaz; Daksueva, 2017, p. 8-23). The recent Chinese signals – such as the
development of islands, the implementation of a system of defense on re-
cently constructed islands, and the increasing activity of the Chinese Navy
and Coast Guard in the South China Sea – constitute examples of the increa-
sed Chinese room of maneuver in the region provided by the energy coo-
peration with Russia. Thus, this cooperation bestows energy security for
China, and, consequently, the freedom of action which the country needs
to defend its interests within the region (Yilmaz; Daksueva, 2017, p. 23).
Hence, the Ukrainian Crisis (2014) and the Conicts in the South
China Sea shed light on the importance of the Sino-Russian energy coo-
peration for both countries, not only in economic terms but also with
regards to political and security issues.
FINAL CONSIDERATIONS
Energy cooperation is the main link in the Sino-Russian rela-
tionship. China is one of the largest consumers of energy in the world
and Russia is one of the main global energy exporters and producers.
Because of the aging infrastructure and the inferiority and technological
backwardness of the FEC, Russia needs investments to develop and mo-
dernize its energy infrastructure, while China needs energy resources
to maintain its economic growth, while the country possesses capital to
invest and construct the necessary infrastructure to support its energy
supply. Despite the overlap in supply and demand, as well as the geogra-
phical proximity, the Russian energy market is mainly aimed towards
Europe, while Chinese energy supply primarily is met by the Middle East
(oil) and Central Asia (gas).
The ambitions to change this situation and the subsequent evolu-
tion of the Sino-Russian energy relations has taken place as a response
to two challenges: 1) geopolitical – more precisely the South China Sea
conicts and the Ukraine Crisis (2014) – and 2) geoeconomic – the need to
diversify energy relations.
45
Fernanda Albuquerque, Alexandre César Cunha Leite, Crisna Carvalho Pacheco SINO-RUSSIAN ENERGY COOPERATION IN THE POST-COLD WAR (2000-2021)
The Crisis of 2008 and the western sanctions imposed as a conse-
quence of the Ukrainian Crisis (2014) highlighted Kremlin’s dependency
on the European energy and nancial markets, accentuating the Russian
need for energy diversication and a new source of capital, both available
within the Chinese market.
Russia, therefore, redirected its trade and investment strategies to-
wards China. China, on the other hand, resorted to increasing imports
of Russian energy resources to guarantee the necessary energy supply to
secure the growth of its economy, given that more than half of Chinese
oil imports originate from the Middle East and West Africa, and are
transported through a space vulnerable to blockades (the Malacca Strait).
Moreover, the political instability in the Middle East also worries the
Chinese leaders as this could threaten Chinese energy security.
Therefore, the two states have undertaken energy cooperation as
an export and import diversication strategy which has proven to be
compatible and complementary. The Russian interest in energy coopera-
tion with China is, above all, to ensure demand for its energy exports, to
acquire investment capital within the energy sector, and to apply Chinese
labour. Another Chinese interest is to gain access to Russian natural re-
sources to guarantee its energy security and invest surplus capital.
The energy cooperation between Russia and China encompasses
trade in energy resources, investment within the energy sector, infras-
tructure development, technological exchange, and even exploration of
the Arctic. More specically, the energy cooperation involves: 1) the esta-
blishment of agreements according to which Chinese companies – such as
CNPC, CDB, and Sinopec – concede loans to Russian energy companies
– such as Rosnoft, Transneft, Novatek, and Gazprom – in exchange for
long-term energy supply; 2) construction of pipelines which connect the
two countries – ESPO and Power of Siberia; and 3) Chinese investment
in energy projects – such as the Yamal LNG Project and the development
of Russian gas and oil exploration elds in Eastern Siberia, by Russkoye
and Yurubcheno-Tokhomskoye.All these agreements reect the intensity of
the Sino-Russian energy cooperation and its tendency of continuity at
the cost of other partners. This is because Beijing and Moscow have tied
energy supplies to their economies’ demand for years (even decades) into
the future with long-term supply contracts, and also sought to maintain
– and even increase – their energy relations when investing in joint ener-
gy projects, such as the construction of the ESPO and Power of Siberia,
given that these pipelines harness the capacity, and facilitate and chea-
pen the transport of commodities and represent a signicant investment,
compensated only with intense trade in the coming decades. Moreover,
the problems in the South China Sea could make Beijing redirect part of
its imports from the Middle East and West Africa to Russia.
These agreements also suggest a change in the current situation of
low Chinese imports of Russian natural gas, and tend to push China to-
wards the group of main consumers of Russian gas, as the largest energy
agreement signed was related exactly to natural gas (between Gazprom
and CNPC at a value of US$ 400 billion) and the energy project with the
largest Chinese participation in Russia is the Yamal LNG Project. Apart
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estudos internacionais • Belo Horizonte, ISSN 2317-773X, v. 11, n. 3, (out. 2023), p. 29-49
from this, the Chinese imports of Russian natural gas tend to increase
due to the construction of the Power of Siberia pipeline, and to the on-
going change in the Chinese energy matrix towards resources that emit
less polluting gases in the atmosphere and that burn more eciently.
By increasing imports of Russian energy resources and investments
in Russia, China reduces the eects of the Western sanctions imposed on
that country and provides Moscow with an alternative to the Western
nancial institutions and to the European energy market, which gives a
higher degree of freedom to Russia in relation to issues around which the
country diverges from the West. On the other hand, the Russian energy
supply reduces the Chinese dependency on hydrocarbon resources from
the Middle East and West Africa (the transport of which is susceptible
to Western blockades) representing an alternative for China, which as-
sists the country with regards to its energy supply and provides a higher
degree of freedom to act more assertively in the Conicts in the South
China Sea without worrying about having its energy suppliers cut o
by a naval blockade. Thus, this cooperation provides energy security for
China, and, consequently, the room of manoeuvre which the country
needs in order to defend its interests in the region.
We can thereby conclude that the Sino-Russian energy cooperation
is essential for both countries, given that beyond contributing to both
economies – guaranteeing energy security for China and capital and
energy demand for Russia – it also provides a larger margin of manoeu-
vre regarding their political and security questions.
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