11
Rafael Contreras-Luna, Nahanan Kunnamas Recalibrang Moscow’s Strategies in Asia: Russia and Southeast Asia in a Mulpolar World
Recalibrating Moscow’s Strategies in Asia:
Russia and Southeast Asia in a Multipolar
World1
Reajustando as Estratégias de Moscou na Ásia: Rússia e
Sudeste Asiático num Mundo Multipolar
Reajustando las Estrategias de Moscú en Asia: Rusia y el
Sudeste Asiático en un Mundo Multipolar
Rafael Contreras-Luna2
Natthanan Kunnamas3
DOI: 10.5752/P.2317-773X.2023v11n3p11-28
Recebido em: 07 de dezembro de 2022
Aprovado em: 02 de fevereiro de 2024
ABSTRACT
Russia’s partnership with China acted as a strategic cushion for the country’s
leadership to launch the military operation in Ukraine. At the same time, warm
relations with long-term allies in Asia reinforced Russia’s decision to make such
a dangerous move and take the risks of being cut-o nancially from the West.
In this sense, relations not only with China but with other Asian middle and
small powers is crucial for Russia’s development in the upcoming years. Southe-
ast Asia appears to be one of the most important prospective partners. Rus-
sia-Southeast Asia relations show that despite evident achievements in various
spheres, Russia’s plans in the region remain unsubstantiated in terms of policies
and lack a comprehensive strategy. Ultimately, Russia has rst to determine to
what extent it is serious on its “reorientation” to Asia and what it expects from
it, and whether it is ready to recalibrate substantially its relationship with Sou-
theast Asia.
Keywords: Russia; Asia; ASEAN; Southeast Asia; China; perceptions; multipo-
larity.
RESUMO
A parceria da Rússia com a China serviu como um colchão estratégico para a
liderança do país lançar a operação militar na Ucrânia. Ao mesmo tempo, as
relações cordiais com aliados de longo prazo na Ásia reforçaram a decisão da
Rússia de tomar uma medida tão perigosa e assumir os riscos de ser cortada
nanceiramente pelo Ocidente. Nesse sentido, as relações não apenas com a
China, mas com outros poderes médios e pequenos da Ásia são cruciais para o
desenvolvimento da Rússia nos próximos anos. O Sudeste Asiático parece ser
um dos parceiros prospectivos mais importantes. As relações entre Rússia e Su-
1. * The authors disclosed receipt of
the following financial support for the
research, authorship, and publication
of this article: this work was supported
by funding provided by Chulalongkorn
University.
2. Rafael Contreras-Luna is an Associate
Professor at the School of Advanced
Studies (SAS), Tyumen University, Rus-
sia. He received in 2017 his PhD from
Durham University, United Kingdom.
He has worked and collaborated with
several universities in European Russia
and Siberia (Samara, Saint Petersburg,
Krasnoyarsk, Yakutsk). In 2022, Rafael
worked as visiting professor at Chu-
lalongkorn University in Bangkok. His
research concerns politics in the Asia-
-Pacific region, Russia’s foreign policy
in Asia, Russia’s “pivot to the East”, the
Arctic, and geopolitics of outer space.
3. Natthanan Kunnamas is Jean Monnet
Chair, Jean Monnet Module coordinator,
and Associate Professor in Political
Science at Chulalongkorn University,
where she also leads the Centre for
European Studies. In 2019, she was
decorated the Knight of the Order of
Academic Palm from the Ministry of
National Education, France. Her recent
research interests are external relations
of the EU in Asia, focusing on the Indo-
-pacific region as well as comparative
regionalisms among EU, ASEAN and
Ecowas. She is an author of ‘European
Studies in Thailand’, in Na Thalang et
al. (Routledge, 2018).
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estudos internacionais • Belo Horizonte, ISSN 2317-773X, v. 11, n. 3, (out. 2023), p. 11-28
deste Asiático mostram que, apesar das conquistas evidentes em várias esferas,
os planos da Rússia na região permanecem não fundamentados em termos de
políticas e carecem de uma estratégia abrangente. Em última análise, a Rússia
precisa determinar em que medida está comprometida com sua “reorientação”
para a Ásia e o que espera dela, e se está pronta para recalibrar substancialmente
seu relacionamento com o Sudeste Asiático.
Palavras-chave: Rússia; Ásia; ASEAN; Sudeste Asiático; China; percepções;
multipolaridade.
RESUMEN
La asociación estratégica de Rusia con China fungió como amortiguador en la
decisión del liderazgo ruso de lanzar una operación militar en contra de Ucra-
nia. Asimismo, los lazos estrechos de Rusia con aliados históricos en Asia con-
tribuyeron en la determinación del gobierno ruso para realizar un movimiento
tan peligroso y tomar el riego de ser aislado por Occidente. En este sentido, para
Rusia en el futuro próximo son cruciales sus lazos no sólo con China sino con
otras potencias asiáticas. De esta forma, el sudeste de Asia se perla como una
de las regiones más importantes para Rusia en el mediano plazo. Las relacio-
nes entre Rusia y los países del sudeste de Asia muestran que, a pesar de éxitos
notables en diversos ámbitos, los planes de Rusia en la región carecen de cierta
congruencia y no son parte de una estrategia integral. En denitiva, Rusia tiene
que determinar hasta qué punto está dispuesta a llevar a cabo su “reorientación”
a Asia y lo que espera de ella, así como si se encuentra presto a recalibrar de
manera sustancial sus relaciones con el sudeste de Asia.
Palabras clave: Rusia; Asia; ASEAN; sudeste de Asia; China; percepciones;
multipolaridad.
The armed conict in Ukraine and the geopolitical confrontation
between Russia and the West has proved to have a global component
and may be the beginning of a signicant recalibration of the interna-
tional order. In this context, Russia’s policies in East Asia seem to gain
more relevance as Russia’s confrontation with the West over Ukraine
evolves. At the same time, Russia aims to enhance its status in Asia and
the world by seeking business and strategic opportunities to compensate
to a certain extent Russia’s loss following the sanctions imposed by the
West. In this sense, diverse partnerships are being developed between
Russian and Southeast Asian countries; this research will analyse the key
components of those partnerships along with their potential benets and
impeding factors. Evidence for this paper was drawn from governmen-
tal documents, academic articles, news resources, think tank’s publica-
tions, and occasionally personal interviews with academics and ocials
in Bangkok, Hanoi, and Moscow. This article is organized as follows.
Firstly (1), it argues that Russia’s self-perception of being a great power
in a multipolar world plays a central and dening role in Russia’s foreign
policy. The following section (2) is devoted to Russia’s “turn” to Asia. It
succinctly describes the historical background of the alleged shift and the
function of the China-component in the equation Thirdly (3), this paper
examines historical and current trends in Russia-Southeast Asia relations
to understand their shifts and continuities. In the following section (4),
this research analyses current relevant issues of the Russian-Southeast
Asia partnership as well as obstacles and catalysts to development in the
13
Rafael Contreras-Luna, Nahanan Kunnamas Recalibrang Moscow’s Strategies in Asia: Russia and Southeast Asia in a Mulpolar World
context of the military conict in Ukraine. This paper concludes (5) by
reecting upon the relevance of the topic and connects it with a broad
historical context.
RUSSIA’S STANCE IN INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS
Russia’s self-image as a great power plays a central and dening
role in Russia’s foreign policy and critically shapes Russia’s understan-
ding of its relations with the world. For the Russian leadership and most
of its citizens, greatpowerness or “velikoderzhavnost” is inherent to the
existence and survival of the Russian state. Russia’s great power iden-
tity has been scrutinized by a large number of authors and publications
over the last decade (Clunan, 2014; Leichtova, 2014; Smith, 2016). Andrei
Tsygankov (2020) argues that Russian greatpowerness consists of three
main elements: “(1) a sphere of cultural and value inuence in Eurasia
and Europe, (2) political and economic self-sufciency, and (3) military
capabilities sufcient to defeat any other power”. For Russian elites, it is
crucial to maintain the internal unity of a geographically vast and com-
plex country; a socially diverse state bordering non-Western and Western
states and powerful neighbours.
Accordingly, the Russian elite has developed the concept of multi-
polarity: an international system in which a handful of large states (great
powers, poles) were the guardians of the global order based on a balance
of power among them. The Russian government has declared numerous
times that multipolarity is the basis of the Russian approach to internatio-
nal politics. Former Russian Foreign Minister Yevgeny Primakov was the
main advocate of multipolarity during the Yeltsin era (Rangsimaporn,
2009), but at that time in the 1990s, the arguments seemed unconvincing
as Russia was a weak state. The aim of achieving the status of a great
power was more clearly dened under Putin’s government, and he began
to pursue this end more pragmatically. Putin’s purpose was not to restore
the Soviet as a superpower, but to make Russia a “normal great power”
(Tsygankov, 2005).
Russia’s conception of a multipolar world constitutes a prime com-
ponent in the country’s foreign policy decision-making. As Margot Light
observes: “The sanctication of Russia’s great power status and the de-
clared preference for a multipolar world order based on sovereignty and
non-interference in states’ internal aairs has been a constant” (Cadier;
Light, 2015:23). In this sense, at a summit in Saint Petersburg last year,
President Putin reiterated this idea: “A multipolar system of international
relations is now being formed. It is an irreversible process; it is happening
before our eyes and is objective in nature” (Tass 2022). As a global power
in a multipolar world, Russia has pursued a multi-vector foreign policy in
the last fteen years and the Asian vector has gain considerable strength.
Russia’s ‘pivot’ to Asia initiated as a long-term rebalancing project under
Putin’s administration, aimed mostly to maintain its global power iden-
tity by preserving Russia’s freedom of manoeuvrability and independen-
ce in world aairs, and to be recognised as an Euro-Asian power.
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estudos internacionais • Belo Horizonte, ISSN 2317-773X, v. 11, n. 3, (out. 2023), p. 11-28
RUSSIA’S PIVOT TO ASIA
In 1986, Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev made a landmark visit to
the Russian Far East and delivered an important speech in Vladivostok,
signalling that the USSR would engage in international politics as an Asia-
Pacic power as much as a European (Thakur; Thayer, 1987). This Soviet
version of Ostpolitik launched by Gorbachev was followed by President
Putin in the 2010s. In December 2012, in his annual address to the Federal
Assembly, President Putin established the development of Siberia and the
Far East as a national priority for the whole twenty rst century. As a re-
sult, the Russian Government commenced to elaborate a long-term project
to develop and improve living conditions in Asiatic Russia and advance its
integration into Northeast Asia. Subsequently, Russia’s “pivot” to Asia has
been a highly discussed topic within Russian elites and leading scholars.
In this regard, the Russian think tank Valdai International Discussion Club
presented a series of analytical reports entitled Toward the Great Ocean to
impulse debate between the Russian elites and leading scholars.
President Putin used the 2012 APEC summit in Vladivostok as
a means to turn assertively to East Asia and to push for development
projects in the region. Afterwards, Asiatic Russia attracted important fe-
deral-level attention and investment. According to Vladivostok scholar
Sergei Sevastianov, one of the main achievements of this “pivot” to Asia
has been the implementation of a new institutional framework aimed to
improve the investments climate in the RFE (Personal Communication,
2022). This certainly gave impetus to the development of the region.
Most analyses on Russia’s shift to Asia recognise recent eorts towards
the development of Asiatic Russia and the improvement of socioecono-
mic indicators; there is a general agreement in Russia that in recent years
“the government is paying more attention to its eastern part” and “has
done a lot” (Bashkatova, 2022).
Indeed, the Russian government has devoted much eort and re-
sources to impulse regional development; the problem seems to be that
these are isolated eorts reecting a narrow viewpoint – to certain ex-
tent overly technocratic – and full of provisional variables, there is a
lack of a comprehensive plan whatsoever and strategies have been gui-
ded primarily by scal needs based on national security considerations
(Kireev, 2017). Russian scholar Igor Makarov considers that Putin him-
self was committed to the development of the region and the creation
of the Ministry for the Development of the Far East under his presiden-
cy corroborates this fact. Nonetheless, Russia had many other national
priorities, namely the Sochi Winter Olympics, the FIFA World Cup in
2018 (which did not include cities from Asiatic Russia), and the integra-
tion of Crimea into the Russian Federation. As Makarov underlines, there
were too many other projects for the Asian century project to succeed
(Personal Communication, 28 September 2022). In this context, success
would mean to halt the outow of population from the Russian Far East
that continues to this day.
In terms of foreign policy, the much-touted “pivot” to Asia has been
subject of discussions for the Russian elites and Russia specialists alike.
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Rafael Contreras-Luna, Nahanan Kunnamas Recalibrang Moscow’s Strategies in Asia: Russia and Southeast Asia in a Mulpolar World
Nevertheless, for many Russian experts in Asia it remains a vague con-
cept that lacks true depth and they cast doubt on the feasibility of such a
project. As per Andrei Dmitrichenko, Minister Counsellor of the Russian
Embassy in Thailand, it is a futile discussion as Russia cannot simply
“turn” to Asia as rhetoric suggests. The Russian diplomat draws a paral-
lel between the alleged “pivot” to Asia and a transatlantic liner: the lar-
gest state on Earth cannot “turn” as easily and smoothly to Asia, Russia
as an ocean liner can only turn slowly, one degree at a time (Personal
Communication, 30 May 2022).
Russia’s policies in East Asia seem to gain more relevance once more
as Russia’s confrontation with the West over Ukraine evolves. Following
the military operation in Ukraine, Russia had to drastically reassess its
relations with the West. which apparently has accelerated the country’s
turning to Asia. Nonetheless, the crisis in Ukraine has simultaneously
pushed Russia into a sort of insulation, and into China’s growing depen-
dence. Both scenarios have their own opportunities and risks.
Russia-China relations have developed into arguably the best rela-
tions between great powers. The Sino-Russian comprehensive strategic
partnership is one of the most important elements of the world order and
the achievements made by the two countries in the last two decades are
impressive. Both countries have many common strategies and interests,
from global to regional and there is a growing systematic coordination.
Suce to say that in the last ten years, Russian President Vladimir Putin
and Chinese President Xi Jinping have met more than forty times.
The relationship with China acted as a strategic cushion for Russia
to launch the military operation in Ukraine (Tchakarova, 2022). Seemly,
Russia would have never launched such a large-scale military operation if
it were not to rely to a certain degree on China’s economic and political
support. China has maintained a “friendly neutrality” because the coun-
try “needs the stability of external sources, resource security, stability at
the borders and the presence of a ‘strategic buer’ in competition with
the United States.” (Safronova, 2022). Still, China’s economic involvement
in several Russian projects came to a halt and the country has restrai-
ned from an all-out economic support to Russia as Chinese companies
do not want to risk being sanctioned. After initial disengagement, China
has gradually deepened economic cooperation with Russia in the second
part of 2022 and compared to the same period in 2021, trade volume has
increased 50 percent. Still, actual gures may be higher as there are no
ocial data of bilateral trade volume (Tromov, 2022). According to Igor
Makarov, Chinese business has tried to hedge the menace of sanctions
from the West by diversifying its partnerships with Russian compa-
nies and creating parallel infrastructure to deal specically with Russia
through rms not exposed to foreign markets.
Irrespective of the outcomes of the armed conict in Ukraine, China
will not let this spoil relations with Russia (Wishnick, 2022). Apparently,
even some segments of Chinese public support Russia. According to opi-
nion research carried out in China in 2022, Russia turned out to be the
most positively perceived country: 70 percent of the respondents claimed
to have positive views of Russia. Similarly, 80 percent of the respondents
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said that their image of Russia has improved in the last three years
(Turcsanyi; Dubravcikova; Kironska, 2022).
For Russia, the partnership with China is essential not only at the
global level but also at the regional level. The high prole of the bilateral
ties legitimises to a certain extent Russia’s claims to Asian power. China
remains central to Russia’s Asia policy and the Russian leadership seems
to agree on the need to keep China as a key partner. Nevertheless, Russia
necessitates dierent partners in East Asia as excessive dependency on
China would probably jeopardise Russia’s sovereignty. Russia’s diversi-
cation attempts toward Japan and South Korea ultimately did not suc-
ceed; therefore, Russia requires to develop relations with other states and
Southeast Asian states appear to be one be the most prospective partners.
RUSSIA-SOUTHEAST ASIA RELATIONS
Relations between the Russian Empire/Soviet Union/Russian
Federation and Southeast Asian states have followed distinct and at
times contrasting paths. Still, there are some long-term points of con-
uence throughout dierent periods; one of the recurrent lines of con-
vergence has seemingly been the struggle from both sides to be recong-
nised as equal partners in Europe. Indeed, at dierent periods of time,
counterbalance to the perceived Euro-centric world has served as com-
mon ground for mutual interactions. It should be noted that this was
not exclusive to the Soviet period when the USSR portrayed itself as a
non-Western power.
Arguably, the rst landmark event in mutual interactions occurred
when future Russian emperor Nikolai Romanov visited Asia. After inau-
gurating the construction of the Trans-Siberian railway in Vladivostok in
1891, the Tsarevich embarked in a historic trip to Japan, India, and Siam.
In Bangkok, the future Russian Emperor received a sumptuous welcome
by King Chulalongkorn the Great, marking the beginning of mutual in-
teractions between both countries. Six years later, as part of its landmark
visit to Europe, King Chulalongkorn visited the Russian Empire and was
hosted by Nicholas II. According to records, they met “as two old friends”,
spending plenty of time only the two of them; during the seven days
visit, the King of Siam was taken as part of the family by the Romanov
(Phiramontri, 2017).
In political terms, for Siam it was the most consequential visit of the
entire trip. Amidst threats from colonial powers such as France and Britain,
the Russian Emperor asserted that “the independence of Siam will never
be curtailed” (Phiramontri, 2017). It has to be emphasised that the Siamese
King was treated by the Russian Emperor as equal (Mezhdunarodnye
Otnosheniya, 1997). This was immortalised in a famous photograph of
the two supreme leaders taken in the outskirts of Saint Petersburg. The
picture, which was published in dierent newspapers across Europe, in-
tended to send a political message to European powers. In this sense, the
visit of King Chulalongkorn the Great to Saint Petersburg 1897, “sitting
side by side with Emperor Nicholas II, boosted Thai position as an equal
partner in Europe” (Phubunlap, 2022). In the end, “amicable relations
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Rafael Contreras-Luna, Nahanan Kunnamas Recalibrang Moscow’s Strategies in Asia: Russia and Southeast Asia in a Mulpolar World
between Emperor Nicholas II and King Chulalongkorn helped Siam to
avoid colonial dependence and maintain balance between the great po-
wers of the time” (Koldunova; Rangsimaporn, 2012).
By the end of the 1960s, the Soviet Union had managed to esta-
blish stable relations with all actors in the region. Nonetheless, the Soviet
Union had signicantly less ocial contact with maritime Southeast Asia.
The USSR exerted inuence in determined countries, especially Vietnam
and Laos after adopting communist rule in 1975 (Huan; Thambipillai,
2019), whereas relations with Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand, and the
Philippines were characterised by “discontinuous political involvement”
and “nominal economic interests” (Kapoor, 2020). In the case of Indonesia,
bilateral relations gained momentum after Sukarno-Khrushev visits and
stable relations remained even under Suharto anti-communist regime.
Relations between the USSR and the ve ASEAN members at the
time strained after the Soviet Union and Vietnam concluded in 1978 the
Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation, and the subsequent invasion of
Cambodia. At that time, ASEAN states tilted towards the United States.
Soviet support for the Vietnamese occupation of Kampuchea remained
for a decade the main impending issue for developing relations between
the USSR and ASEAN (Thakur; Thayer, 1987).
Following the demise of the Soviet Union, Russia practically va-
nished from East Asia. Still, Russia became ASEAN Dialogue partner in
1996. As noted by Viktor Sumsky, former Director of the ASEAN Centre
of MGIMO University, this was a crucial moment as Southeast Asia signa-
led it wanted Russia to be there notwithstanding its weakness (personal
communication, 28 September 2022). Henceforth, Russia has participa-
ted in most ASEAN-led forums and joined ASEAN regional structures.
At the same time, Russia has developed cooperation with countries with
whom it had limited relations in earlier decades. In 2018, ASEAN-Russia
relations nally were elevated to a strategic partnership.
Distant neighbours or strategic partners?
Southeast Asia’s main goal developed into avoiding being a sphere of
ideological and political struggle and limit the inuence of major powers.
ASEAN countries have managed to develop “a regulatory framework for
managing interstate relations, regional cooperation has made the crucial
dierence between forces of conict and harmony that lie at the core of
the international relations of Southeast Asia” (Bainus; Manurung, 2021).
ASEAN Centrality and ASEAN norms so called ‘ASEAN Way’ (consulta-
tion and consensus, non-intervention) are well founded in broader East
Asia regionalisms (Acharya, 2017). Analyses frequently emphasise the
hedging strategy pursued by regional powers in Southeast Asia aimed
to manage regional order: a range of policies encouraging middle posi-
tions and avoid taking sides to prevent the dominance of foreign powers
(Busbarat, 2016).
ASEAN and Russia have forged diverse linkages in the last thirty
years through dierent institutional arrangements. These multilate-
ral avenues have provided Russia the possibility to enhance ties with
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dierent Southeast Asian states (Huan; Thambipillai, 2019). Certainly,
Russia’s interests in the region have grown and Russia’s diplomacy is
more visible in the region. Similarly, the strategic value of Russia for
Southeast Asia can hardly be denied. According to Viktor Sumsky, du-
ring the last decade Russia has signaled its interest to take incremental
steps to engage with the region, and Southeast Asia has made clear that
it wants Russia to be there. In this sense, “the welcoming of increased
Russian interest is a well-thought out move as [ASEAN countries] they
focus on hedging to deal with the challenges posed by a changing regio-
nal order” (Kapoor, 2020).
Russia’s neutral stance has enhanced its position in the region.
Arguably, Russia has managed to establish itself in the region as a respon-
sible power. Russia’s foreign policy in Southeast Asia, in contrast to that
in the West, is much more pragmatic and conciliatory. For Dmitrichenko
in Bangkok, unlike the United States, Russia avoids picking sides and has
good working relations with all ASEAN states, as a result, Russia is seen
as a balancing power in the region.
As in other cases in Asia, economic cooperation between Russia and
its partners lags behind from political collaboration. Russia is ASEAN’s
11th largest trade partner (Kapoor, 2020). Eorts to further develop eco-
nomic ties have had limited success and Russia’s economic presence in
Southeast Asia continues to be weak. In contrast to other powers’ eco-
nomic involvement in the region, Russia’s involvement is minimal: be-
fore the pandemics Russia constituted barely one percent of ASEAN’s
total trade. It should be noted that Russia is the largest arms exporter to
Southeast Asia, from 2000 to 2021 the value of the country’s arms exports
to the region was US$10.87 billion. US exports by comparison, accounted
$8.4 billion for the same period (Storey, 2022).
Certainly, there is a dissonance between the economic and political
vectors of the Russia-ASEAN strategic partnership. This is, “economic
obstacles against growing strategic congruence in their perceptions of in-
ternational processes” (Kanaev; Korolev, 2019). Most analysts agree that
weak economic linkages between Russia and ASEAN countries comprise
the major impediment to the qualitative improvement of ties.
Inadequate high-level representation at regional summits also
has negatively impacted mutual dynamics. President Putin has shown
certain unwillingness to forge personal connections with other ASEAN
leaders (Mahaseth; Wong, 2022). This in contrast to personal interac-
tion with other leaders in the region such as Xi Jinping, Shinzo Abe,
and Narendra Modi. Russia is not represented at the highest levels in
regional forums. Indeed, interactions between Russia and ASEAN coun-
tries often take place |on the sidelines of world summits. Putin’s visit to
Singapore for the 2018 East Asia Summit constituted his rst attendance
to the ASEAN-agship Forum.
In recent years, Russia has focused ties with Vietnam, Indonesia
and Myanmar while also forging ties Malaysia, Thailand and the
Philippines. It should be highlighted that Russia has succeeded in for-
ging closer ties with Indonesia, which apparently has become one of
its most important partners in the region. Russia and Indonesia have
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Rafael Contreras-Luna, Nahanan Kunnamas Recalibrang Moscow’s Strategies in Asia: Russia and Southeast Asia in a Mulpolar World
managed to establish broad contacts in dierent spheres since the be-
ginning of the administration of President Widodo, favouring multi-
lateralism over global power competition. For Indonesia, “Russia is an
important partner in maintaining stability and security in the region”
(Bainus; Manurung, 2021).
Relations with Vietnam comprise one of the main pillars of Russia’s
policies in Southeast Asia. After relations were close to zero in the 1990s,
after Putin’s rst visit to Vietnam in 2001 bilateral ties improved subs-
tantially and the partnership is based on totally dierent principles; it is
a strategic partnership conceived for a long-term perspective determined
by a wide range of common interests. Thus, Vietnam remains the clo-
sest and more stable partner for Russia (Lokshin, 2021). This strategic
partnership reects in many aspects “the multifacetedness of bilateral
relations and the high level of trust” (Vershinina, 2022).
Russia’s political relations with Southeast Asia remain Vietnam-
centred to a certain degree. Aside from forums and news about high-
-prole summits, for most Russians Vietnam remains ASEAN´s centre
of attention whereas Thailand and Indonesia’s province Bali constitute
the pole of attraction to Russian tourists. In this sense, Russia should at-
tempt to make a “breakthrough in Asian aairs” and activate its Asian
vector that should consist not only of conferences, seminars and sum-
mits but recipes to solve political issues in the region” (Tromchuk,
2022). In this sense, for Russia it seems imperative to participate in the
decision-making processes in the region and not only at declarative
level, otherwise, Southeast Asia may ultimately overlook Russia.
In contrast to other major powers, Russia has a historical disad-
vantage in the region. Russia does not form part of regional integration
processes and ASEAN countries are not in rush for cooperation. Russia
is arriving to a region that has already its own dynamic and is unable to
determine the agenda. ASEAN countries engage with Russia because
of what it is at global level but it is perceived as a distant partner. As for
many in the region, “Russia is a European power focused primarily on
its relations with the West, drawing strength from its high-prole ties
with China” (Dave, 2016). Russia’s relations with Southeast Asia are in-
sucient in substance and eort (Tsvetov, 2016), and at times “minima-
list, ad-hoc and reactive” (Huan; Thambipillai, 2019).
ASEAN states have decided not taking sides and to hedge the
growing antagonism between the US and China in Asia-Pacific – see-
king opportunities but working to place controls and limits on its de-
velopment. Ergo, Southeast Asia welcomes Russia’s great power inte-
rests in the region as part of its hedging strategy and attempt to bring
other great powers to the region to increase interdependence and re-
duce the possibility of conflict. This opens up different opportunities
for Russia.
The armed conict in Ukraine has certainly added a sense of urgen-
cy to Russia’s plans in Southeast Asia. But to what extent can the hybrid
war between Russia and the West in Ukraine aairs alter current trends
in Russia-Southeast Asia relations?
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PROSPECTS FOR INTERACTIONS AFTER THE CONFLICT IN UKRAINE
The Russian military operation in Ukraine has been seen with am-
bivalence in Southeast Asia; ASEAN countries have continued to focus on
regional issues related to integration and development whilst being vocal
against excluding Russia from international structures. Responses and
attitudes from the ten ASEAN members towards the armed conict have
signicantly varied, ranging from the strong condemnation of Singapore
and the subsequent imposition of sanctions to Myanmar’s outright endor-
sement. For most ASEAN countries, it is clear that even while condem-
ning the violation of other countries’ sovereignty, ocially they have not
placed Russia or Ukraine in an aggressor-victim axis.
Singapore was the only ASEAN member to condemn Russia by
name and impose sanctions. According to Russian scholars, despite sanc-
tions are far from being symbolic, the impact will be minimal as since
2014 economic cooperation considerably decreased. Other countries have
only condemned violation of Ukraine’s sovereignty and called to end hos-
tilities. Thailand has maintained cordial relations with Russia and has
tried to avoid taking sides remaining neutral during the conict. Laos
and Vietnam have sought to preserve their time-hallowed relations with
Russia and have refrained of any criticism and constantly exercise res-
traint. Myanmar is the only ASEAN member to vocally support Russia.
Indeed, Russia has been one of the rst countries to recognise the military
government in Naypyidaw. Multilaterally, ASEAN has expressed deep
concern over hostilities in Ukraine and calling all parties to exercise ma-
ximum restraint (ASEAN, 2022). In this sense, ASEAN simply followed
its approach which maximises diplomatic options and manoeuvrability,
and distanced itself equally from Russia, Ukraine, and Western countries.
Economic ties between Russia and ASEAN countries will certainly
resent the “draconian sanctions” in place by the West and this will leave
little space for furthering cooperation (Korolev, 2022). Nevertheless, as
Viktor Sumsky suggest, most ASEAN countries will not refrain to buy
cheaper hydrocarbons nor to engage in trade with Russia if it happens to
be benecial. Much will depend on Russia’s ability to adapt to partners
and its necessities considering new conditions. Indonesia and Vietnam
seem to be the most prospective partners, but the list should not be re-
duced to them. For instance, Malaysia could partially compensate for the
current losses in the eld of high-tech products.
In bilateral terms, practically all Southeast Asian countries have
maintained stable and cordial diplomatic ties with Russia and have not
ceded to the pressure of Western countries to isolate Russia. It should be
noted the important role that Indonesia has played in this matter. In late
June 2022, President Widodo embarked on a landmark visit to Europe,
including visits to Kiev and Moscow and sustaining meetings with
his counterparts Zelensky and Putin. As noted by a Russian specialist,
“Indonesia, for the rst time in modern history, entered the European
and global arena beyond the historical borders of its sphere of inuence,
reclaiming its role as a global intermediary” (Kuklin, 2022). Indeed, the
country archipelago became the rst Southeast Asian state attempting
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Rafael Contreras-Luna, Nahanan Kunnamas Recalibrang Moscow’s Strategies in Asia: Russia and Southeast Asia in a Mulpolar World
to impact global events through multilateralism. Indonesia attempted to
speak to the wider world and specially the West representing Southeast
Asian countries and demonstrating the state of “realpolitik” in the region
(Chongkittavorn, 2022).
The visit of President Widodo attempted to prove the country’s
ability to chair the G20 and not further destabilise the world economy but
“recover together”. Indeed, the armed conict in Ukraine coincided with
the “ASEAN year” as Indonesia and Thailand took over the chairmanship
of key global and regional organisations, the G20 and APEC respectively.
As Russian scholar Ekaterina Koldunova points out, despite big pres-
sure from the United States and the European Union, Southeast Asian
countries rejected calls to exclude Russia from ASEAN-centred format.
According to her, for ASEAN multilateral institutions the organisation of
the summits comprised an endurance test (Personal Communication 30
September 2022). President Putin decided not to attend any of the sum-
mits. For Russian scholars Timofey Bordachev and Vasily Kashin, whilst it
was desirable in political terms Putin attending the summit in Indonesia,
the “fate” of Russia-Southeast Asia ties and the G20 would be decided
not in Bali but in Ukraine (Bordachev, 2022). In the end and despite all
complexities, the three summits were successfully hosted by Cambodia,
Indonesia, and Thailand with the participation of the Russian Federation.
According to Viktor Sumsky, many in Southeast Asia would lose if
Russia, who is seen as at the forefront in the struggle for a multipolar world,
completely failed in Ukraine and weakened. Notwithstanding Western
sanctions and political pressure, ASEAN countries have signalled their
interest in Russia to become involved in regional aairs. Nevertheless,
the current model of interactions between Russia and Southeast Asian
countries seems to be exhausted and has been unable to evolve into an
actual strategic partnership. Arguably, there are three features that may
turn vital in this endeavour: (a) the development/engagement of Asiatic
Russia; (b) being a viable option for hedging between the US and China;
(c) a shift in the attitudes of the Russian elites towards Asia.
(a) Asiatic Russia. Arguably, one of the intrinsic reasons for Russia
to be perceived as a distant partner in Southeast Asia is that Siberia, and
particularly the RFE, is still viewed by these countries as a Russian terri-
tory in Asia, but not as Russia per se. The mere existence of Asiatic Russia
is not sucient basis for Russia to be recognised as an Asian power. Ergo,
Asiatic Russia may play a crucial role in Russia’s shift towards closer rela-
tions with Asian countries.
In this sense, physical connectivity comprises one of the main
obstacles hindering further economic cooperation, particularly due to
“the poor level of transport infrastructure in the Russian Far East and
its insucient integration into the logistic network of the Asia-Pacic
region” (Kanaev; Korolev, 2019). The situation was tested a few months
after Russia’s military campaign in Ukraine: as European companies re-
fused to work with Russian cargo, Saint Petersburg and other Russia’s
ports in the Baltic were largely “blocked”. Consequently, it was expected
that ows could be redirected to Asiatic Russia through Vladivostok and
Vostochny ports.
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Indeed, there is an increasing demand for transport corridors to
the Russian Far East. The main question, however, is how border and
port infrastructure in the region can handle the recent workload in-
crease that could lead to an even greater growth of export-import o-
ws (EastRussia(a), 2022). News emerged about ports in Primorskiy Krai
overloaded by cargo and long waiting lines for freight to be transported
through the Trans-Siberian Railway (Primamedia, 2022). The situation in
Russian far eastern ports became critical by Summer 2022 and ports such
as Vladivostok and Vostochny started working to the limit. According
to specialists, cargo ships arriving to the RFE had to wait in average ten
days to be unloaded as they were working at full capacity due to lack of
infrastructure and personnel.
As a matter of fact, the new economic reality opens up new chan-
ces for RFE to become a larger hub of Russia with countries of East Asia.
Nevertheless, the turn of the majority of logistics chains to the Far East
has led to a signicant shortage of transportation capacity in the region
(Bashkatova, 2022). Thus, it is essential for Russia to enlarge and mo-
dernise current transportation infrastructure in the RFE, particularly
the Trans-Siberian Railway and the Baikal-Amur Mainline (BAM) and
to clear up bottlenecks at customs checkpoints. As per Russian ocials:
“Western markets have closed for Russia, only the eastern ports remain.
Therefore, building infrastructure for Russia’s turn to the East is an im-
portant task for the country. It is extremely costly, but in the near fu-
ture it should become a priority for the country” (EastRussia(b), 2022).
According to Deputy Prime Minister for the Development of the Far East
Yuri Trutnev, the shortage of work power of the Trans-Siberian Railway
and BAM comprises about 40 percent of the current demand. In 2022, the
demand for transportation would be around 258 million tons, currently
both railways can transport about 150-160 million tons. Thus, the volume
of non-transported cargo could reach 100 million tons (Bashkatova, 2022).
It is imperative for Russia to pay utmost attention to improve
Asiatic Russia-Southeast Asia connectivity and develop air and maritime
communications linking the region with the Russian Far East and ease de-
pendency on Japanese and South Korean transport companies (Lukshin,
2021). The absence of direct ights embodies Russia-ASEAN weak con-
nectivity. It should be noted that in October 2022 Russia launched a direct
ight to Laos from Vladivostok, linking the RFE the capital Vientiane. At
the same time, the FESCO transport group launched a regular sea line
FESCO VIETNAM DIRECT LINE (FVDL) on the route Vladivostok –
Haiphong (Vietnam) – Ho Chi Minh City (Vietnam) – Ningbo (China)
– Vladivostok. This should constitute one big rst step in the region’s
integration process. (EastRussia(b), 2022).
(b) Viable option for hedging. As Russia and China declare a “partner-
ship with no limits”, an important question rapidly arises: to what extent
Russia’s relations with Southeast Asian countries can be limited/aected
by close relations with China?
Southeast Asia’s quest for multipolarity is not unambiguous; it con-
sists of many vectors and despite the clear presence of certain anti-West
sentiments, it would be fallacious to argue that they comprise the main
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Rafael Contreras-Luna, Nahanan Kunnamas Recalibrang Moscow’s Strategies in Asia: Russia and Southeast Asia in a Mulpolar World
element. Arguably, the current hedging strategy of the region is more
China-related. According to the latest survey The State of Southeast Asia
2022 (Seah, 2022), China is notoriously seen by Southeast Asian elites as
the most inuential economic and political power in the region, 59 and
41 percent respectively. Incidentally, 64 percent of the respondents clai-
med to be “worried about China’s growing regional economic inuen-
ce”. Concern is particularly pronounced within the respondents from
Vietnam (86 percent). Conversely, Indonesia and Cambodia appear to
be the least concerned over China’s economic inuence. By the same to-
ken, 49 percent of the regional elites in Southeast Asia “distrust” China
whereas 54 percent “trust” the United States. Finally, when asked, “if
ASEAN was forced to align itself with one of the two strategic rivals, whi-
ch should it choose?” 61 percent of the respondents replied they would
choose the US whereas 39 named China. Vietnamese elites decisively
choose the United States (77 percent) whereas regional elites in Thailand,
Malaysia and Indonesia are somewhat equally divided. Finally, 73 percent
of the respondents fear that ASEAN is becoming an arena of major power
competition and its member states may become major power proxies. For
Vietnam and Cambodia, this concern ranks at the top at 90.4 and 84.3%
respectively.
Certainly, there is a consistent trend in the region’s anxiety over
China’s growing inuence. Nevertheless, for the regional elites Russia
does not appear to be one of the most viable third parties to hedge against
the US-China strategic rivalry (Skosyrev, 2022). In this matter, the EU and
Japan seem to be the elites’ rst choices and not Russia; for ASEAN cou-
ntries, Russia’s pivot to Asia signies primarily Russia siding with China.
Ergo, if there is no eort from the Russian side to build simultaneously
ties with other regional powers, this could negatively impact Russia’s po-
sition as a neutral and strategic player in the region. Russia should avoid
being perceived as a pure declarative power and most importantly an
independent actor in relation to China. In this sense, one of the most
prospective partners is the Socialist Republic of Vietnam.
It has to be emphasised that such a partnership with Vietnam
should be not conceived as an alternative to Russia’s partnership with
China but together as diversication of ties in the East so to prevent re-
lations with China “to become those of vassal and suzerain” (Lokshin,
2021). Vietnam remains the closest and more stable partner for Russia.
At the same time, Vietnam position as a middle power becomes more
precarious as it attempts to hedge the growing Russia-China and the
US antagonism. As Ekaterina Koldunova underlines, among all ASEAN
countries Vietnam faces the biggest foreign policy dilemma. On the
one hand, Vietnam endures tremendous pressure for the US and its al-
lies to curtail ties with Russia. On the other hand, as the antagonism
between the United States and China continue to grow, Vietnamese
bamboo diplomacy seems to be gradually losing manoeuvrability. “As
a result, [Vietnam] it is walking a tightrope between the superpowers.
But as their rivalry gets more intense, Vietnam’s tightrope will get thin-
ner. There will likely be a time when the tightrope becomes too thin to
walk” (Vuving, 2022).
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Vietnamese scholars verily believe that Russia’s military operation
in Ukraine could set a bad precedent if similar incidents were to occur in
Southeast Asia, particularly in the context of the growing antagonism bet-
ween China and the United States. Vietnam remains “friendly neutral” to
Russia’s actions in Ukraine and whilst Vietnamese political elites sympa-
thise with the victims in Ukraine, they certainly blame NATO for provo-
king this conict. Still, many in Vietnam fear China could at some point
take similar actions in the South China Sea (Personal Communication,
Hanoi, April 2023).
Russia could become a power balance in the region by supporting
regional order amidst the growing antagonism between China and the
United States. Ergo, Russia should reconceptualise Russia-China-Vietnam
relations and in general Russia-China-Southeast Asia relations. A rein-
vigorated partnership with Vietnam and a strategic partnership with
Indonesia would help Russia to cement its image as a reliable partner and
as an eective power balance.
(c) Attitudes of Russian elites. One of the main impediments to sig-
nicantly improve ties with Southeast Asia is the Eurocentric world-
view of the Russian elites. In the aftermath of the merger of Crimea
with Russia in 2014, Russian China-specialist Vladimir Portyakov dis-
puted the idea of Russia’s reorienting itself to Asia. According to him,
most of the Russian elites were mostly pro-Western, including Dmitri
Medvedev and all vice-prime ministers. In the words of Portyakov: they
were “classical liberals”, whose heart and soul aware not in Asia but in
Europe” (Personal Communication, 20 April 2016). Indeed, among the
Russian intellectual elite, the majority belongs to those people who are
still European oriented. Specially the liberal part of the society, which is
the core of the economic group of the Russian government and Russia
experts, and they are still very inuential, and prior to the military con-
ict in Ukraine they still asserted that Russia should collaborate primary
with Europe. To what extent have hostilities in Ukraine and the hybrid
war between Russia and the West altered this?
Dmitri Trenin, long-time director of the Carnegie Moscow
Endowment for Peace, argues that “long gone are the days when
Moscow could straddle the divide between the West and the non-West”
(2022). Consistently, Trenin calls for the preferment of non-Western em-
bassy posting over the Western ones. According to the Russian scholar:
“Above all, [Russia] it needs to give priority to relations with non-Wes-
tern countries over de facto frozen ties with the West. Being an ambas-
sador to Indonesia should be more prestigious than an ambassadorship
in Rome” (Trenin, 2022).
In the same manner, Fyodor Lukyanov, editor-in-chief of Russia
in Global Aairs and Research Director of the Valdai Discussion Club,
argues that “Russia faces a totally unprecedented existential challen-
ge”. Consequently, Russia must attract the non-Western world not on
an ideological basis but in more practical matters and benets from
interactions. For this endeavour, Lukyanov considers that “one pre-
requisite is necessary. Understand that all this is not a way to beat the
West, but the only guarantee of Russia’s adaptation to the changed
25
Rafael Contreras-Luna, Nahanan Kunnamas Recalibrang Moscow’s Strategies in Asia: Russia and Southeast Asia in a Mulpolar World
circumstances for its survival. What we are used to will not be any
longer” (Lukyanov, 2022).
Before the war, there had been much ambiguity over Russia’s turn
to Asia. For the last decade, the East has been “mostly a function of the
interaction between Russia and the West” (Narozhna, 2021). In other
words, relations with Asia were not an end in itself, but a geopolitical
bargaining tool. Plausibly, Russian elites mostly saw the conict with
the West as an interval before a new future rapprochement. Russia has
now severed consciously ties with the West, however. It seems imperati-
ve for the Russian elites to follow a strategic and congruent approach to
Southeast Asia. Arguably, success on this endeavour will hinge more on
will than on capabilities.
Strategic shifts of unprecedented proportions are unfolding in glo-
bal aairs. Russia’s military intervention in Ukraine has transformed
the political and economic landscape for the country. Most of Russian
analysts/civil servants interviewed for this work appear to be certain that
Western countries attempt to torpedo multilateral structures created in
the last two decades and exclude Russia from global decision-making
processes. In this sense, there is an ostensible complementarity between
Russia’s and Southeast Asia’s interests and possibilities. ASEAN countries
appear to be as one of the best natural partners of Russia as it promotes
multilateralism and multipolarity that Russia favours.
At the G20 Summit in Bali, the Russian delegation headed by Foreign
Minister Lavrov was welcomed at the airport with a banner depicting an
“updated” map of Russia, including the four provinces Russia had incor-
porated in late September (Rentv, 2022). Southeast Asian countries have
made a few polite nods in the direction of Russia, but they are not in rush
for cooperation. Several ASEAN countries have slyly and subtly expres-
sed Russia they understand the reasons behind its military operation, and
they have signaled their readiness to explore new economic opportunities.
Ultimately, Russia has rst to determine to what extent it is serious on its
“reorientation” to Asia and what it expects from it, and whether it is ready
to recalibrate substantially its relationship with Southeast Asia.
CONCLUSIONS
Russia’s self-perception of being a great power in a multipolar
world plays a central and dening role in Russia’s foreign policy. As noted
by Tsygankov (2020), greatpowerness is associated “not only with inde-
pendent foreign policy and national security, but also with the opportu-
nities and inuence that only a few states in the world have”. It is to be
seen whether Russia can inuence regional dynamics in Southeast Asia.
Prior to the armed conict in Ukraine, relations with East Asia were not
an end in itself for Russia but means to counter the West. There was
no comprehensive vision in Russia for its relations with Asia in general
and Southeast Asia in particular. Additionally, Russia’s Asian strategy
was Sino-centric. New patterns of cooperation comprise the condition
of possibility for Russia to substantially move closer to Southeast Asia.
Inasmuch as no reconceptualisation of the Russia-Southeast relations is
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articulated by Moscow and framed on current realities, it seems implau-
sible to change prior trends.
Russia-Southeast Asia relations show that despite evident achieve-
ments in various spheres, Russia still lacks political and economic strength
in the region to carry a proactive agenda. Arguably, one of the main reasons
is due to the low level of interactions between Asiatic Russia and Southeast
Asia. It is paradoxical that Russia conceives of itself as a Euro-Pacic power
but most channels of interactions between Russia and Southeast Asia does
not occur in Asia-Pacic but via Moscow. As to enhance economic and po-
litical ties with ASEAN countries, Russia should strive to build relations as
a federation, avoiding relations to be triangulated. It is crucial to have the
active involvement of Asiatic Russia and particularly the RFE.
Certainly, Russia’s partnership with China acted as a strategic
cushion for the country’s leadership to launch the military operation in
Ukraine. At the same time, warm relations with long-term allies in Asia
such as India and Vietnam reinforced Russia’s decision to make such a
dangerous move and take the risks of being cut-o nancially from the
West. In this sense, relations not only with China but with other Asian
middle and small powers is crucial for Russia’s development in the upco-
ming years. Undoubtedly, Southeast Asia appears to be one of the most
prospective regions for cooperation. Additionally, Russia-Southeast Asia
ties could reinforce their mutual aspirations to forge a multipolar world
and hedge the growing antagonism between the United States and China,
which plausibly will exacerbate in the foreseeable future.
One of the challenges Russia faces in engaging Asia, is that Russia
is in Asia but not of Asia. Russia should avoid being perceived as a pure
declarative power and most importantly an independent actor in relation
to China. Therefore, Russia should strive to follow a middle course in
Southeast Asia: hedge the antagonism seeking opportunities but limiting
the trend towards US-China bipolarity. This also points Russia towards
new understanding with other states in the region that are hedging, one
a well-known partner – Vietnam – but also those that are less recognised,
such as Indonesia, Malaysia, and Thailand.
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