7
Andrés Dockendor, Dorotea Lòpez When do business groups embrace outside lobbying in trade policy? The case of the CPTPP in Chile
When do business groups embrace outside
lobbying in trade policy? The case of the
CPTPP in Chile1.
¿Cuándo adoptan los grupos empresariales el lobby
externo en la política comercial? El caso del CPTPP
en Chile.
Quando é que os grupos empresariais adotam o lobbying
externo na política comercial? O caso do CPTPP no Chile.
Andrés Dockendorff 2
Dorotea Lòpez3
DOI: 10.5752/P.2317-773X.2023v11n2p7-23
Recebido em: 14 de Março de 2024
Aprovado em: 27 de Junho de 2024
ABSTRACT
Literature shows that business interest groups have fewer incentives to embrace
outside lobbying in trade policy. This article proposes an alternative explanation.
As we discuss, special economic interests are more likely to adopt a specic
subtype of outside lobbying (press, media appearances and op-eds) when poli-
cymakers are not responsible for them, and their long-term interests associated
with a model of open trade are potentially threatened. We test our argument
with the case of Chile and the long debate around the Comprehensive and Pro-
gressive Agreement for Trans-Pacic Partnership (CPTPP) ratication process.
Our results support the hypothesis: businesses have a greater probability of
media appearances, publishing op-eds, and the like, in comparison to other lob-
bies, such as labor and single-issue groups against the treaty. However, the eect
is conditional to salience: the subtype of outside lobbying from business groups
is more likely to be observed as the distance to the social outbursts of October
2019 increases.
Keywords: outside lobbying- business groups – trade policy - CPTPP
RESUMO
A literatura mostra que os grupos de interesses empresariais têm menos incenti-
vos para adotar o lobbying externo em matéria de política comercial. Este artigo
propõe uma explicação alternativa. Como discutimos, os interesses económicos
especiais são mais propensos a adotar um subtipo especíco de lobbying externo
(imprensa, aparições nos meios de comunicação social e artigos de opinião)
quando os decisores políticos não são responsáveis por eles e os seus interesses
1. This work has been possible thanks
to the Fondecyt N° 11190948 and ANID-
-Millenium Science Initiatives Programs
[grant number NCS2021_063] and [iclac
Millennium Nucleus of China’s Impacts
in Latin Americagrant number NCS 053].
2. Professor, International Studies
Institute, University of Chile, adocken@
uhile.cl, PhD in Political Science,
University of Essex, Master of Political
Science, University of Chile.
3. Professor, International Studies
Institute, University of Chile, dolopez@
uchile.cl, PhD in Social Science, Uni-
versity of Chile, Master of Philosophy
in Economics, Cambridge University,
United Kingdom.
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estudos internacionais • Belo Horizonte, ISSN 2317-773X, v. 11, n. 2, (jun. 2023), p. 7-23
de longo prazo associados a um modelo de comércio aberto estão potencial-
mente ameaçados. Testámos o nosso argumento com o caso do Chile e o longo
debate em torno do processo de raticação do Acordo Global e Progressivo
para a Parceria Transpacíca (CPTPP). Os nossos resultados corroboram a
hipótese: as empresas têm uma maior probabilidade de aparecer nos meios de
comunicação social, publicar artigos de opinião e ans, em comparação com
outros grupos de pressão, como os grupos laborais e os grupos de ação única
contra o tratado. No entanto, o efeito está condicionado à saliência: o subtipo
de lobbying externo de grupos empresariais é mais provável de ser observado à
medida que aumenta a distância para as explosões sociais de outubro de 2019.
Palavras-chave: lobbying externo - grupos empresariais - política comercial - CPTPP
RESUMEN
La literatura muestra que los grupos de interés empresariales tienen menos
incentivos para adoptar medidas de presión externas en política comercial. Este
artículo propone una explicación alternativa. Como discutimos, es más probable
que los intereses económicos especiales adopten un subtipo especíco de lobby
externo (prensa, apariciones en los medios y artículos de opinión) cuando los
políticos no son responsables de ellos, y sus intereses a largo plazo asociados a
un modelo de comercio abierto se ven potencialmente amenazados. Ponemos
a prueba nuestro argumento con el caso de Chile y el largo debate en torno al
proceso de raticación del Acuerdo Integral y Progresista de Asociación Trans-
pacíco (CPTPP). Nuestros resultados apoyan la hipótesis: las empresas tienen
una mayor probabilidad de aparecer en los medios de comunicación, publicar
artículos de opinión y similares, en comparación con otros grupos de presión,
como los sindicatos y los grupos monotemáticos contrarios al tratado. Sin
embargo, el efecto está condicionado a la saliencia: es más probable observar el
subtipo de lobby externo de los grupos empresariales a medida que aumenta la
distancia a los estallidos sociales de octubre de 2019.
Palabras clave: lobby externo - grupos empresariales - política comercial – CPTPP
INTRODUCTION
In October 2019, protestors took the streets in Santiago and other
Chilean cities voicing demands about social security, health access and
education, among other issues. Surprisingly, among the posters and can-
vases of the people protesting, as well as grati in the streets, you could
nd explicit references against the Comprehensive and Progressive Trans
Pacic Partnership Agreement CPTPP4 (known before as TPP before the
United States left negotiations). Moreover, a new radical left coalition
took oce in March 2022, with a dierent discourse towards preferential
trade agreements than in previous years. For the rst time since 1990, it
gave the impression that decision makers wanted to profoundly change
the country’s trade policy implemented by center left and right govern-
ments between 1990 and 2021. This view represented a drastic departure
from the previous elite consensus around an open trade policy.
The article argues that this particular political environment, and
the politicization of the trade policy, induced business lobbies to embrace
a more aggressive strategy to advocate in favor of the CPTPP. They were
encouraged by the fear that Chilean politics could be redirected towards
a less trade openness-oriented model, perhaps more similar to the import
4. The Comprehensive and Progressive
Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership
(CPTPP) is a plurilateral economic inte-
gration agreement in the Asia-Pacific
region. It covers various aspects of trade
policy, such as market access in goods,
trade facilitation, government procu-
rement, intellectual property, services,
e-commerce, investment, environment,
labor issues, among others. Currently,
the CPTPP is in force for the 11 original
signatory countries, namely: Australia,
Brunei Darussalam, Canada, Chile,
Malaysia, Mexico, Japan, New Zealand,
Peru, Singapore and Vietnam, and its
objectives include promoting economic
integration, establishing predictable
legal frameworks for trade, facilitating
regional trade, promoting sustainable
growth, among others. (Subrei, 2023)
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Andrés Dockendor, Dorotea Lòpez When do business groups embrace outside lobbying in trade policy? The case of the CPTPP in Chile
substitution model of the 60s. This outcome is somehow puzzling.
Indeed, most of the literature assumes that outside lobbying – actions
that are thought to be oriented to the mobilization of public opinion —
is not a mechanism chosen by business lobbies (i.e., Binderkrantz, 2005;
Dür and Mateo, 2013; Kollman, 1998, Dür and Mateo 2024). Moreover,
the literature examining the link between interests’ groups and trade,
focuses overwhelmingly on the actions of activists and groups against
trade policy (Dür and Mateo, 2014; Gheyle and De Ville, 2019). An alter-
native explanation is made in this article, as outlined above: where there
is a misalignment of preferences between business lobbies and policyma-
kers on trade policy, groups have incentives to embrace a more aggressive
specic type of outside lobbying: press releases, op-eds, interviews, and
the like. Moreover, following previous works (Dür and Mateo, 2023; De
Bruycker and Beyers, 2018), our model specication assumes that outside
lobbying by business groups would be conditional to salience.
The argument is tested in the case of Chile. The country experien-
ced a long period of a stable trade policy based on a general consensus
that the signing of preferential trade agreements (PTAs) were supposedly
benecial (Aninat, Navia et al., 2006; Fermandois and Henríquez, 2005).
Moreover, business participated actively (Bull, 2008). In recent years
however, political elites started to become polarized around the issue.
Indeed, after the signing of the CPTPP in 2018, the National Congress
spent almost ve years ratifying the agreement. This was quite unusual
in comparison to the time spent in Congressional approval of other PTAs
on average. Moreover, single issue groups against the CPTPP emerged
during the debate process towards the signing of the agreement. They
conducted the rst protests around the trade policy in Chile.
Original data was collected on inside and outside lobbying actions
between 2018 and 2022 in Chile. The observational data allows testing
of the following hypothesis: business lobbies are more likely to embrace
outside lobbying and the eect is more pronounced when moving away
from the social crisis when the CPTPP was more salient. We consider the
social outbursts of October 2019 as a point in time where the debate about
the CPTPP was more prominent. Salience is the proxy of politicization.
As the model species, businesses have incentives to avoid going public
when the public is paying too much attention to the issue at stake. The
results conrm that businesses in Chile embrace outside lobbying more
often in comparison to labor groups, and more importantly, in compari-
son to single-issue lobbies against the agreement. This pattern, however,
is sensitive to salience (politicization).
The empirical test has implications for understanding the lobbying
dynamics in the case of trade policy. This paper’s contribution is two-
fold. Firstly, for understanding the representation of interests in contexts
of politicization of trade, such as the CPTPP in Chile. Secondly, adding
to the incipient literature on lobbying in Latin America regarding trade
policy issues. The latter is because there are only a few empirical studies
available in the region about lobbying dynamics, and most of them focus
on direct lobbying (face to face contacts) with legislators or at commit-
tee hearings (i.e., Vallejo Vera, 2021). A potential exception is the case
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estudos internacionais • Belo Horizonte, ISSN 2317-773X, v. 11, n. 2, (jun. 2023), p. 7-23
study of Benzecry (2023) on labor lobbying the Brazilian constitutional
assembly. To the best of our knowledge, this is one of the rst articles exa-
mining lobbying campaigns by business groups in trade policy in Latin
America. The role of interests’ groups in trade policy has been studied
mainly in Western European democracies. This work contributes to this
line of research.
The next section presents our theoretical framework, presenting
the concepts encompassing the notion of outside lobbying and the foun-
dations of our theoretical model. Then, the main insights of the Chilean
case are outlined, followed by the research design, data and results.
Finally, the main implications of the analysis are presented.
FRAMEWORK: when do business groups embrace outside lobbying in
trade policy?
Trade policy is usually analyzed from an economic perspective,
focusing on protectionism and openness of markets to global or regio-
nal trade, and primarily in goods. More recently, scholars have moved
towards examining the formation of trade policy and the inuence of
lobbies and interests groups (Hoeckman, Mattoo and English, 2002). In
a global scenario increasingly linked by commerce, the dichotomy bet-
ween protectionism and those advocating open markets has become
more complicated than only taris. The growing complexity of trade po-
licy, the relevance in the development countries agendas and the incorpo-
ration of new topics in PTAs has attracted new lobbies and groups to par-
ticipate more actively in trade debates (Eliasson and García-Durán Huet
2016; Bull, 2008). From an ideational perspective, for instance, Dingwerth
and Weinhardt (2019) show how new concepts such as genderization, en-
vironment and democracy are now part of the trade debates. This is the
case, as we argue in this article, of the CPTPP.
Some interest groups have been more visible than others in trade
policies. This is the case, for instance, of groups protecting agriculture,
especially in the European negotiations, or environmental protectionist
groups against the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA)
or the WTO Ministerial Meeting held in Seattle in 1999, among others
(Grossman and Helpman 2002). The complexity of international trade ne-
gotiations requires participation with a high degree of technical knowled-
ge on the subject (Bull, 2008). However, under democratic and pluralist
conditions, the number of interest groups that participate in trade policy
debates will increase and often generate alliances with governments that
can be useful at the international level (Lee 2010).
Despite the extensive literature, political science does not establish
a single denition of interest groups (Baumgartner & Leech 1998). Some
authors have managed to identify two categories. On the one hand, those
groups whose purpose is closely related to the defense of an economic
position that pursue their own benet, such as business associations. On
the other hand, public interest groups that promote issues of concern to
large groups such as human rights or the environment (Jerez, 1997). In re-
ference to the rst category, several studies have analyzed how business
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Andrés Dockendor, Dorotea Lòpez When do business groups embrace outside lobbying in trade policy? The case of the CPTPP in Chile
groups are able to advance their interests in international economic ne-
gotiations, or in cases such as agricultural protection or geographical in-
dications in the European Union (Baccini, Dür, Elsig, and Milewicz, 2011;
Bombardini and Trebbi, 2012; Dür and Lechner, 2015; Elsig and Dupont,
2012). On the other hand, the economic policy approach that studies the
process of trade policy formation assumes that politicians and govern-
ments are rational agents, maximizing welfare based on their own and
their voters’ welfare. Grossman and Helpman (2002) use this approach in
which they build a model that predicts the tari structure resulting from
the inuence of interest groups in a free trade agreement negotiation.
Lobbies and interest groups’ aim is inuencing policy content and
decisions. This premise holds whether we examine patterns of lobbying
in trade policy or in other policy areas and issues. In pursuing inuen-
ce, groups and lobbies may adopt dierent tactics or strategies, which
is the focus of this research. The literature organizes these dierent
strategies adopted by them: direct (also known as insider) and outside
or indirect (media and grassroots) (Dür and Mateo, 2013; Nicolle Victor,
2007; Binderkrantz, 2005; Binderkrantz, 2008; Weiler and Brändli 2015).
Operationally, inside lobbying corresponds to direct actions or approa-
ches to representatives or policymakers in meetings, legislative hea-
rings, and other face to face contacts. This type of lobby is very com-
mon. However, sometimes it is also polemic, since contacts between lo-
bbies and representatives are usually subject to suspicion and criticism.
Outside lobbying, meanwhile, encompasses all actions oriented to the
mobilization of public opinion (Beyers, 2004). Specically, outside lob-
bying comprehends approaching journalists, social media adverts, press
releases, grassroots meetings, demonstrations, public campaigns, among
others (De Bruycker and Beyers, 2019; Mahoney, 2007). In this article, the
focus will be on outside lobbying actions mainly associated with the press
and media outlets. In the case of lobbying on trade policy, this is conside-
red as a subtype of outside lobbying which has been less covered in the
comparative literature and case studies.
The literature also discusses the main determinants of how to
lobby, or the particular venues that interest groups focus on when see-
king to inuence policy or regulations. The choices about the type of
lobbying strategies to be employed, are endogenously linked to characte-
ristics of the interests’ groups (Binderkrantz 2008, Dür and Mateo, 2013).
Indeed, a predominant stream in the literature identies that business
lobbies are in a privileged position because of their resources and budget.
Hence, they spend them on implementing direct strategies to approach
policymakers. Evidence from the United States raties that lobbyists and
interest groups with more resources embrace direct lobbying activities
more often (Nicolle Victor, 2007: 840). Evidence from a sample of lob-
byists and groups in Chile also show that cause groups are more likely
to embrace indirect tactics (Dockendor et al., 2024). Corporate leaders
only occasionally use outside lobbying tactics (Kollman, 1998:5). Another
reason may also explain why business lobbies focus on direct lobbying
tactics. Indeed, as Culpepper (2011) argues, business and corporate groups
achieve their goals more often under conditions that he refers to as “quiet
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estudos internacionais • Belo Horizonte, ISSN 2317-773X, v. 11, n. 2, (jun. 2023), p. 7-23
politics’, while failing to attain their preferences when the issue is of high
political salience. In contrast, less privileged lobbies engage in outside lo-
bbying activities more frequently (Binderkrantz, 2005: 697). For instan-
ce, citizens’ organizations (with less resources) would be more prone to
participate in public campaigns, demonstrations (Dür and Mateo, 2013:
661; Schlozman and Tierney, 1986: 431) or public campaigns, as data from
Scandinavian politics shows (Binderkrantz, 2008). As it stands, in the case
of business groups it seems to apply the idea that outside lobbying “is not
always an optimal strategy or even feasible” (Mahoney, 2007: 109). An
alternative explanation, however, emerges when analyzing business lo-
bbying repertoires in trade policy. Our approach encompasses the litera-
ture on outside lobbying and trade policy. The baseline model maintains
that, under certain specic conditions, economic lobbies may have incen-
tives to embrace a particular subtype of outside lobbying (approaching
journalists, issue advertising, op-eds, and interviews) more aggressively.
In the next paragraphs our model will be specied.
OUTSIDE LOBBYING IN TRADE POLICY: the argument
The literature has addressed lobbying dynamics over trade policy,
focusing on rms and companies both from a theoretical and an empi-
rical perspective (i.e., Bombardini and Trebbi, 2012; Hanegraa, Poletti
and Van Ommeren, 2023). In respect of outside lobbying, the topic exa-
mined here, scholars have been focused mainly on the role of anti-trade
interests’ groups in sustaining opposition to trade through grassroots
mobilizations and campaigns (Dür and Mateo, 2014; De Bièvre and
Poletti, 2020; Eliasson and Garcia-Duran Huet, 2018; Kay and Evans 2018;
Gheyle and De Ville, 2019; Young 2019). Protests in Europe, Seattle and
other major cities in Western democracies against specic trade agree-
ments or the WTO are well known. Hence, the literature has addressed
the issue of how dierent actors and lobbies react to the politicization of
trade (Dür, Hamilton et al., 2024; De Vries, et al., 2021). Antoine (et al.,
2024) provides evidence that a more diverse mobilization of the business
sector during debates on trade combined to less salience may induce de-
cisions in favor of trade liberalization. This is due to legitimacy gains
associated with the diversity.
In what follows, we discuss the conditions under which business
lobbies do public campaigns in advocating their preferred policies regar-
ding trade.
An explanation would highlight that grassroots and protests are
more prominent forms of lobbying, and anti-trade and labor groups more
likely to drive such actions. Indeed, outside lobbying’s main goal is as-
sumed to be the socialization of conict by targeting a wider audience.
As Kollman (1998: xiii) noted, outside lobbying’s goal is to signal to po-
licymakers, public support to the lobby’s preferred policy. If one follows
that approach, conict expansion would imply realistic chances of increa-
sing public support in order to attain inuence. As such, it is more rea-
listic to assume that lobbies without access to policymakers would focus
more on campaigning for promoting their preferred trade policy. As will
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Andrés Dockendor, Dorotea Lòpez When do business groups embrace outside lobbying in trade policy? The case of the CPTPP in Chile
be discussed below, there is an alternative story. The opposite may be
expected from economic lobbies. Stevens and De Bruyecker (2020) show,
with evidence from a survey to lobbyists in the context of the European
Union, lobbies enjoying resource advantages attain their goals at a higher
rate, but this is conditional to the low salience of the issues under debate.
Deriving from the lobbying literature and the insights of the case
examined here, the article focuses specically on press and media ac-
tions, as a specic subtype of outside lobbying in trade policy. The un-
derstanding is that such actions constitute a second-best strategy for
business groups. When they fail to persuade policymakers directly, bu-
siness lobbies have incentives to adopt a more aggressive public prole in
advocating their preferences. As noted by Wolton (2019), special groups
defending the status quo would embrace outside lobbying after they fai-
led to persuade policymakers to rule according to the group preference.
This may be a particularly attractive tactic when decision makers are
not sensitive to lobbies’ demands. Recall that, ultimately, in the original
formulation of Schattschneider (1957): socialization of conict, equiva-
lent here to outside lobbying, is a strategy more frequently used by those
actors (agents) who see themselves as harmed by a particular political
result. Now, think about the position of business lobbies defending the
continuity of the open trade policy. This, against the position of political
reformers who endorsed a platform of radical change, as in the case stu-
died here, Chile. Hence, a drastic policy change, meaning in this case the
adoption of some form of protectionism and perhaps state-led strategies,
meant a serious setback for business. This is not trivial, from an empiri-
cal point of view. Indeed, the Wolton (2019) model proposes that outside
lobbying is more likely in cases of overreaching policy reforms –the case
of potentially comprehensive policy shifts in the trade policy as studied
here. Dierently, business lobbies may engage in outside lobbying in
“dicult issues as a last resort” (Mahoney, 2007:53). This reconciles with
qualitative evidence gathered by the authors. In fact, one interviewee
who organized the Side Room (a place established by the government for
civil society consultation during negotiations) claimed that “the private
sector got involved with the CPTPP only in the nal phases because
the opposition to the agreement shifted towards an opposition to the
Chilean trade policy”.5
In the case of trade policy, it is not realistic to suppose that busi-
ness would gamble for a social mobilization in favor of the free trade
agreement or a drastic increase in the salience of the trade policy among
the public priorities. On the contrary, if anything is expected, it would
be mobilization of activists and other lobbies against trade, as several
examples demonstrate (Gheyle and De Ville, 2019). Instead, in trade
policy debates, it is more accurate to conceive outside lobbying, in the
press and media variant, as a strategy played by business lobbies to tar-
get insiders who are more sensitive to news stories (Trapp and Laursen,
2017). A signaling game where business actors ought to induce elites and
policymakers towards their preferences by pressuring them from the
media environment, for example by spending resources in issue adverti-
sing, op-eds, interviews and the like. This is the specic form of outside
5. Senior Advisor, CPTPP Side Room.
Interview conducted on the 12th of July,
2023. Some interviews were conducted
with senior political advisors and autho-
rities who conducted the negotiations
of the CPTPP in representation of Chile
(N=3).
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lobbying examined here, as outlined above. Model specication is an ex-
tension of Dür & Mateo (2014), who emphasize the interdependence bet-
ween public opinion and interest groups in the policymaking process, as
the negotiations about ACTA show. However, this article approach focu-
ses more on campaigns conducted by lobbies using the press and media
outlets to pressure policymakers, instead of inducing a mobilization of
the public opinion.
Model specication is conditional to the salience of trade policy,
which is one of the components of politicization (i.e., De Bièvre 2018).6
Dür and Mateo (2024) showed that when politicization is mounting and
trade policy debates are more salient, business groups prefer to go into hi-
ding and focus more on inside lobbying tactics. Meanwhile, De Bruycker
and Beyers (2018) have documented that, under certain circumstances,
lobbies may decide to go public and do outside lobbying, but this is con-
ditional on whether the issue at stake is popular among the public or not.
Likewise, qualitative evidence from the EU showed how the nancial
lobbies may embrace a mix of strategies to “get back on its feet” after the
nancial crisis, including both quiet and “noisy politics” (Kastner, 2018).
In particular, the author argues that when the contextual eects of the
nancial crisis started to vanish, industries started to recover their pre-
vious position by going out and forming coalitions, arguing in a more
appealing way and circulating evidence to support their position against
the nancial transaction tax. Hence, after some time elapsed since the
crisis unfolded, economic lobbies adopted a more aggressive outside lob-
bying strategy. Therefore, in the sequence we put forward, when business
groups are induced by policymakers’ lack of responsiveness to embrace
outside lobbying on trade policy, they ponder the level of politicization,
in particular salience.
Deriving from insights of the literature on both outside lobbying
and trade policy, we argue that when business interests are threatened
long term, they adopt a more confrontational stance and embrace outside
lobbying more aggressively as a last resort. All else being equal, business
would embrace outside lobbying when there is a misalignment between
lobbies and policymakers preferences regarding trade policy. This would
be the optimal strategy when the trade debate is less salient.
Hypothesis: business lobbies are more likely to embrace outside lob-
bying (median, press, op-eds) and the eect is more pronounced when the trade
issue is less salient.
CASE SELECTION AND DATA
This is a case study of the ratication of the CPTPP in Chile. The
stylized facts show that the ratication process creates incentives for busi-
ness lobbies to embrace outside lobbying actions more often. Politicization
of trade in Chile was something new. The Chilean trade policy was cha-
racterized by a general consensus that having an open economy to the
world and signing PTAs were supposedly benecial (Aninat, Navia et al.,
2006; Van Klaveren 2011; Fermandois and Henríquez, 2005). Since 1990,
the center-left governments have conducted an economic policy that
6. For a conceptual debate and operatio-
nalization, See De Wilde (2011).
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Andrés Dockendor, Dorotea Lòpez When do business groups embrace outside lobbying in trade policy? The case of the CPTPP in Chile
fostered Free Trade Agreements (FTA) with countries all around the glo-
be. Previous ratication processes, such as the Chile-U.S. FTA were cha-
racterized by low intensity politics. Debates during ratications of those
agreements were associated mainly to the interests of farmers and similar
groups. In some cases, legislators representing districts with industries or
farmers that may be harmed by specic FTAs, may voice their opposition
to specic provisions (López and Baeza, 2015). However, the opposition
to FTAs was not associated with profound ideological dierences or a
questioning about the trade policy.
In 2018, President Piñera, from the center-right coalition Chile
Vamos, entered Palacio de la Moneda, the Chilean presidential palace, for
a second presidential term, with signicant distance to his contenders. In
the Program was a clear continuity to the trade policy orientation since
1990. In particular, the manifesto included a favorable position towards
the strategy of signing FTAs, including the CPTPP. Recall that the negotia-
tion started back in 2016. The candidate who came second was Alejandro
Guillier, who represented the parties of the former Concertación por la
Democracia, a center-left coalition that won the election against Pinochet
in 1990. In the campaign program it was pointed out that Latin America
and its insertion would be a priority but that they would also improve the
possibilities of looking to diversify its export basket with scale initiatives
in our relations with Asia Pacic. This was clearly a continuity. Finally,
the surprise was that the candidate of the current President Boric’s party,
Frente Amplio, Beatriz Sanchez, was the third most voted candidate in
2017. In her programme, she questioned the insertion model as part of
the neoliberal system and proposed a new model, in which continuity in
trade policy was not evident.
At the system level, the positions of Chilean parties on trade po-
licy are observable in parliamentary surveys. The Parliamentary Elites
Survey Project (PELA) data shows that Chilean parliamentarians are
more favorable to economic integration with the U.S and the EU in com-
parison to other legislators in Latin America, and the contrary occurs in
the case of the Alianza Bolivariana para los Pueblos de Nuestra América
(ALBA) (Bohigues and Rivas, 2019). Moreover, those attitudes seem to
be explained by ideological and programmatic factors, with right wing
legislators more supportive of commercial integration with the U.E and
the E.U and left wing closer to the ALBA.
Specically, the positions of Chilean parties regarding the CPTPP
are observable in the votes during the treaty ratication. As recent resear-
ch shows (see López et al., 2024), new leftists parties, part of the coalition
Frente Amplio, and the Communist Party legislators were among those
more critical to the ratication of the CPTPP, joined by legislators from
the center left. The gridlock in the ratication process is explained in part
due to the erce opposition of those lefties parties, in the opposition to
Piñera`s government at that time.
Low intensity politics changed during the debate of the CPTPP. Not
only unprecedented demonstrations took place and grati during the
2019 social outburst showed popular opposition to the trade from radical
groups, but also an ascending political force, Frente Amplio, would make
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the opposition towards the CPTPP a agship in the questioning of the
commercial policy of the country.7 The salience of the CPTPP reached
a peak around October 2019. To support this claim, we corroborate this
by checking the search terms frequency of Google, which is easily repli-
cable. Meanwhile, anti-trade lobbies involve shifting the discourse away
from the traditional dichotomy of free trade versus protectionism and
redirecting the debate toward ideological and cultural dimensions such
as legitimacy and sovereignty. The defensive position of business lobbies,
who supported the ratication, was aggravated when the new leftist coa-
lition took oce with anti-trade policy stances.
Mobilization and demonstrations against the CPTPP began in
2016 (GLOBAL TIMES 2016). Those protests produced concern among
policymakers and trade experts, as our interviews corroborate. Those
demonstrations were also cause for concern internationally (Sputnik
Mundo, 2016). Hence, the Chilean government at the time invested in
a huge campaign to change back the criticism which was prominent
among the protestors and single-issue groups leading the protests, such
as “Chile Better Without TPP11”. This is indicative of how, for the rst
time, policymakers had to consider the new role of lobbies and civil so-
ciety. After the subscription of the agreement in 2018, in Viña del Mar,
Chile, protests, demonstrations and public campaigns in social networks
mobilized students and unions. Criticism and demonstrations endured
even after the United States withdrew from the agreement under the pre-
sidency of Donald Trump and some of the disciplines that were critici-
zed were taken out. Another element of the policy environment was the
demand for transparency about the negotiations and the contents of the
agreement, that never happened before with any other PTA, while they
were negotiated with the same approach.
The CPTPP received strong criticism regarding the negotiations
and contents of the agreement. Hence, public ocials and policymakers
deployed a media strategy which ought to demonstrate why the CPTPP
was good for the country. Social organizations specialized on trade decla-
red to be “in the dark ‘’ about the negotiation, questioning the legitimacy
of the treaty. This is why the DIRECON (now the undersecretary for
economic international relations, Subrei) adopted the strategy of having
a “Cuarto Adjunto”.
The research design contemplates an exhaustive review of the lea-
ding media outlets of Chile between January 2018 and December 2022.
Five newspapers and media outlets are included in the data entry: El
Mercurio; La Tercera; La Segunda; El Mostrador and El Financiero. The
data also comprises public information recorded by the Law 20,730, that
regulates lobbying and representation of interests with authorities and
representatives. The unit of analysis is lobbying action. Then, the data
was hand-coded with each action, meeting or news to characterize the
type of the lobbying action involved, inside or outside lobbying, the type
of group behind each action, the distance, in days, to the social outburst,
which was the point of greater salience of the CPTPP, among others.
As the data collected showed, dierent types of interest groups
participate in both direct lobbying actions and, our focus here, outside
7. On the other hand, specialized social
organizations said they were “in the
dark” regarding the negotiation of the
treaty and its legitimacy (El Mostrador,
2016), leading to the Direcon’s adoption
of the so-called “Cuarto Adjunto”
(side room of negotiations, that was
implemented during Nafta negotiations
for the private sector) The CPTPP vote
in the Chamber of Deputies and the
Senate revealed a division that was not
present before.
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Andrés Dockendor, Dorotea Lòpez When do business groups embrace outside lobbying in trade policy? The case of the CPTPP in Chile
lobbying activities. Descriptive statistics reveal interesting features of the
lobbying dynamic around the CPTPP. Around 42% of the total lobbying
activity was inside lobbying to policymakers, including meetings with
government representatives and legislators. Almost 58% of the lobbying
was coded as outside lobbying, encompassing op-eds, interviews, semi-
nars and public campaigns, against and in favor. Only the 6.6% of the lob-
bying activity of labor groups were coded as direct lobbying. This corres-
ponds to presentations at committee hearings and meetings with authori-
ties and representatives recorded following the mandate of the Lobbying
Law 20730 passed in 2014. It is worth mentioning that labor groups, as the
inferential analysis will corroborate, were all against the ratication of
the CPTPP. Meanwhile, single issue groups against the CPTPP, such as
“Chile Better Without TPP11’’ also concentrate their lobbying activities
on inside actions (79%), where outside activities represent only 21% of
the total lobbying. In the case of both labor and single-issue lobbies, most
of their activities included in the sample are presentations at committee
hearings at the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate, during the long
process of ratication.
Descriptive statistics of business lobbies support the hypothesis
suggesting that business lobbies in the CPTPP in Chile embrace outside
lobbying more often. As data shows, almost 80% of the lobbying activity
of business groups was coded as outside lobbying. This is the opposite
gure in comparison to the single-issue groups mentioned above. Those
actions were mainly interviews with national media outlets such as El
Mercurio, La Tercera, El Financiero and El Mostrador and op eds in the
same newspapers and online media outlets. Even though they partici-
pate in legislative hearings, in comparison to other groups against the
CPTPP they focus more on on-going public campaigning in favor of the
ratication.
RESULTS AND ANALYSIS
This section presents the main results of the analysis. The depen-
dent variable is a dummy that takes the value of 1 when the meeting
corresponds to the category Outside Lobbying (zero otherwise). The main
independent variable captures whether we are in the presence of a busi-
ness lobby or not. Given our model specication, it includes a continuous
variable that captures the distance in days (logarithm) to the social crisis
of October 2019. Also, the model is controlled for the variable Labor Group,
which is a dichotomous variable indicating if the group in each lobbying
action was coded labor or not. The same logic underlies the control va-
riable Single Issue Group, which basically encompasses groups against the
CPTPP.
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estudos internacionais • Belo Horizonte, ISSN 2317-773X, v. 11, n. 2, (jun. 2023), p. 7-23
Table 1 - Outside Lobbying in the TPP11 Ratification Process
(Logit Model)
VARIABLES Outside Lobbying
Business Group 1.337***
(0.431)
Days to Social Outburst 0.003***
(0.0008)
Labor Group -3.677***
(1.240)
Single Issue Group -1.303
(0.849)
Piñera Government 0.753
(1.169)
Constant -1.155
(1.151)
Observations 177
R-squared 0.37
Standard errors in parentheses. * p < .10 ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
Source: elaborated by the authors.
Table 1 summarizes the main results. Given the binary character
of the dependent variable, a logit model was run. The coecient of our
independent variable Business Group is positive, and it is statistically signi-
cant at the 0.01 level. This supports, at the correlational level, the eect
that the hypothesis anticipated. Meanwhile, the variable Days to Social
Outburst yields an upward estimate. This corroborates that as we move
away from the social crisis with topics such as the CPTPP mobilizing
dierent lobbies and social groups, Outside Lobbying, which we know now
that was impulse primarily by business lobbies, increases.
Figure 1 - Marginal Effects of Outside Lobbying by Group and Time to Social Outburst
Source: elaborated by the authors.
19
Andrés Dockendor, Dorotea Lòpez When do business groups embrace outside lobbying in trade policy? The case of the CPTPP in Chile
Table 1 also shows that the variable Labor Groups has a negative
coecient, and it is statistically signicant at the 0.01 level. Thus, in the
case of unions and the alike, it could be observed to have the opposite
eect in comparison to business lobbies. The control variables for Single-
Issue and Piñera Government are not statistically signicant at any level.
Predicted probabilities show the monotonic increase in the probability of
observing outside lobbying as the temporal distance to the social outburst
increases but not in both extremes of the variable capturing time before
and after October 2019. The probability increases after the occurrence of
the social outburst. Distinguishing between Business Groups and the rest
allows us to disentangle the dierent behaviors of business in comparison
to the reference group (non-business lobbies). Overall, the results showed
that the probability of embracing outside lobbying actions is on average
20% higher for business groups. However, at both ends of the distribution
condence intervals overlap, meaning that there has to be caution in the
interpretation of the results. As noted above, Figure 1 also shows that out-
side lobbying increases monotonically only after the social outburst and
not before and after. It is expected to be a u-shaped curve, with increasing
levels of outside lobbying from economic groups on the left of the distri-
bution and again higher values as we move towards the right extreme. A
plausible explanation for the linear outcome that it could observe, would
emphasize that as we move toward the right, the perception of gridlock
in Congress in the ratication of the CPTPP was higher. Also, the right of
the distribution coincides with the government of a new leftist coalition
embracing anti trade views, elected in December 2021.
Mean dierences would ease the interpretation of the results.
Indeed, while the average distance to the social outburst in our full sam-
ple was 286 days, in the case of Business Lobbies the mean was 389. The
dierence is particularly pronounced with Single Issue groups, where the
mean distance to the social outburst in their case was only 45 days. The
dierence, in days, with Labor Groups is less pronounced. This result
suggests that Labor organizations were more present during the dierent
phases of the debate. Single-issue groups opposing the CPTPP, probably
with less resources and personnel, concentrate their participation at a
time when politicization is more intense.8
Preliminary results indicate rejection of the null hypothesis that
group type and indirect lobbying actions are uncorrelated at all standard
signicance levels. Overall, the results corroborate, at the correlational
level, that business lobbies in Chile focus more strongly on outside lob-
bying strategies in comparison to other lobbies, such as labor and single-
-issue groups, in the case of the debate surrounding the CPTPP ratica-
tion. Moreover, the eect seems to be sensitive to the salience of the trade
debate. Mean dierences also corroborate that business lobbies prefer to
go out when we move away from the days of the social outburst when po-
liticization was higher. Hence, business would embrace outside lobbying,
but this is conditional to salience and politicization.
8. The literature showed that less
resourceful groups have more limited
lobbying repertoires. In comparison to
business, for example, they usually lack
personal and resources (Victor 2007;
Binderkrantz 2008).
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estudos internacionais • Belo Horizonte, ISSN 2317-773X, v. 11, n. 2, (jun. 2023), p. 7-23
DISCUSSION
Trade policy is an increasingly contested area. In this case study it
examined the politicization of the trade policy in a political system, Chile,
where debates around trade since the democratic restoration in 1990
were mostly technical and with a high degree of consensus. Moreover,
there was an agreement implemented among the main political parties
of the policy to foster an economic model based on open and free trade.
This translated into the subscription of several PTAs with both major
economic powers and other polities of similar size with Chile. In this sce-
nario, business lobbies have few incentives for embracing an aggressive
strategy for lobbying in favor of an open trade policy. This scenario was
completely transformed with the debate around the CPTPP. Increasing
polarization and the emergence of single-issue lobbies and a new political
coalition against the deal, and more generally, with a critical assessment
of the trade policy implemented since 1990, induced business actors to
adopt a more aggressive tone in public debates.
The hypothesis for when businesses decide to campaign actively for
their preferred trade policy has received scarce attention. The empirical
test outlined in this article does not challenge the prediction that business
lobbies, all else equal, would prefer inside lobbying or a direct approach
to policymakers. Instead, the conditions are established for when a spe-
cic form of outside lobbying, interviews, press releases and issue adver-
tising, would be a suitable sub-optimal strategy for business lobbies in
trade policy. For those who assume that outside lobbying in trade policy
is generally driven by anti-trade activists and labor, the results would be
somewhat puzzling. The model tests an alternative explanation: busines-
ses have incentives to focus more on campaigning and doing issue ad-
vertising when policymakers seem to be biased against their preference.
This type of lobbying by business or economic groups is conditional to
the salience of topics. The data ts the hypothesis.
The dynamic described in this research, may be indicative of a
form of lobbying which can be extended to other actors besides business,
such as labor or cause groups. For instance, a recent case study of labor
lobbying to the Brazilian constitutional assembly, showed that those ac-
tivists adopted strategies to pressure uncommitted legislators by discre-
diting them in front of the workers and the public. This type of lobbying
was labeled as a “legislative disincentive” (Benzecry, 2023). The indirect
lobbying deployed in the case of the CPTPP in Chile was relatively close.
Some implications arise. Firstly, the analysis provides a characteri-
zation of lobbies strategies in pursuing inuence. Previous research has
shown that businesses avoid public campaigns and prefer to approach po-
licymakers directly. This article sets the conditions for observing a die-
rent pattern: confronted by hostile policymakers, business will embrace
outside lobbying in the variants of press releases, interviews, op-eds and
other media advertising. Secondly, we contribute to the study of a case
of politicized trade policy: the CPTPP. Chile was somehow a least likely
case for observing a policy change that may take trade policy away from
the business preferred option. Against those odds, Chile experimented
21
Andrés Dockendor, Dorotea Lòpez When do business groups embrace outside lobbying in trade policy? The case of the CPTPP in Chile
with both the politicization of trade policy by activists and new leftist
parties which ultimately create the conditions for business groups clin-
ching outside lobbying.
CONCLUSION
International cooperation is increasingly more contested and part
of public debates in democracies worldwide. Mobilization against FTA is
more visible. Perhaps, this is due to the fact that protests and rallies are
more likely to capture the attention of the public. However, economic
lobbies also go out campaigning to protect their interests under certain
circumstances. In a time where open trade policy is contested by gover-
nments that incentivize protectionism, and when multilateral instances
are subject of increasing criticism, understanding the eect of public
campaigns against and pro FTAs is important.
From the perspective of the functioning of democratic institutions,
promoting public and transparent debates about trade policy in this new
more demanding civil society seems to be important. The politicization
of international cooperation or, in particular in this case, trade policies,
may aect the ability of governments to foster exchanges with other eco-
nomies, which ultimately may lead to inclusive economic growth and
social mobility.
The politicization of trade policy in Chile, and the aggressive stra-
tegy of business groups regarding the CPTPP, suggests the perils of po-
larization in Latin America, a region where economic integration is at
best, limited. Further research may incorporate similar debates in other
Latin American settings. The role of interests’ groups in trade policy has
been studied mainly in Western European democracies. More studies on
Latin American settings may enhance our understanding of this impor-
tant topic.
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