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anti-western platforms, gained popular appeal. This fact forced Yeltsin
to shift Russia’s foreign policy. To maintain the support of Russia’s con-
stituents, the country’s foreign policy in the near abroad became more
assertive. This tendency was then reinforced by Yevgeny Primakov in the
mid 1990’s, and has persisted in Russian foreign policy since then, even
despite the short honeymoon between presidents Putin and Bush after
September 11th. Russia’s confrontation with Georgia, in 2008, and the lat-
er annexation of Crimea in 2014 appears to only conrm this tendency.
The “emulation-confrontation” dichotomous relationship with the
West needs to be qualied. Domestically, Russia passes through a process
of consolidating an alternative statehood project in the new millennium.
Its signicant economic growth in the early 2000s, driven by oil and gas
dividends, and the arrival of Vladimir Putin to power served as the start-
ing point for a series of reforms. The growth of the Russian economy
enabled relevant social policies at the beginning of Putin’s government,
leveraging his popular support. In the scope of security and defense, the
country focused its eorts on modernizing its military arsenal, with spe-
cial attention to oensive nuclear capabilities considering the deconstruc-
tion of the international nuclear deterrence architecture initiated by the
United States of America (USA) in the late 1990s. The security agenda
also served as a space for national reconciliation in resolving the situa-
tion in Chechnya and for promoting the concentration of powers in the
central government in the face of the terrorist threat, especially after the
Beslan attacks in 2004.
At the international level, the 21st century witnesses an interna-
tional order under various pressures. Experiencing crises related to pol-
itics, security, economics, health and environment, contemporary inter-
national politics challenges the eld of International Relations when it de-
bates polarity, continuity and change. While US hegemony is undergoing
undeniable deterioration, China’s economic projection still does not seem
to be a sucient element for Beijing to take its place as the sole pole in the
international system, nor does China show interest in proposing its own
version of an order in total opposition to the liberal project articulated by
the West in the 20th century.
The current international scenario complexity can be exemplied
in the escalation of the Ukrainian crisis in 2022. Politically, the centrali-
ty of the Eastern Ukrainian territory for Russian international insertion
through access to a year-round navigable sea materializes traditional dy-
namics of dispute for power-generating capabilities. Moreover, the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) expansion into Eastern Europe
and the deconstruction of the nuclear deterrence architecture are ele-
ments strongly present in the Russian narrative about the escalation in
2022 and reect pressures on the distribution of power in the internation-
al order. The strategic partnership between Russia and China in recent
years also illustrates pressures for potential changes in the international
order and is a central element in relativizing the Kremlin’s isolation. The
trajectory of this friendship qualied by Vladimir Putin and by Xi Jinping
as “limitless” also reects deeper revisionist tendencies in the face of the
deterioration of US hegemony.