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estudos internacionais

REVISTA DE RELAÇÕES INTERNACIONAIS

Poncia Universidade

Católica de Minas Gerais

Programa de Pós-Graduação

em Relações Internacionais

Belo Horizonte

ISSN: 2317-773X

v. 11 n. 3

outubro 2023

estudos internacionais

REVISTA DE RELAÇÕES INTERNACIONAIS

Conselho Executivo

Prof. Javier Alberto Vadell

Prof. Leonardo César Ramos

Equipe Editorial

Amanda de Lacerda Robadel

Ana Luiza Braga Eliziário

Caio Ribeiro de Oliveira

Fábio Ferreira Andrade

Leonardo Coelho Assunção Santa Rita

Luiz Felipe Dias Pereira

Victor de Matos Nascimento

Conselho Editorial

Adam David Morton (University of Sidney)

Andrés Malamud (Instituto de Ciências Sociais– Universidade de Lisboa)

Antonio Carlos Lessa (Universidade de Brasília UNB)

Atílio Borón (Universidade de Buenos Aires - Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Cientícas y Técnicas)

Carlos Milani (Universidade do Estado do Rio de Janeiro)

Carlos S. Arturi (Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul)

Gladys Lechini (Universidade Nacional de Rosário - Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Cientícas y Técnicas)

Henrique Altemani (Universidade Estadual da Paraíba)

Jens Bartelson (Lund University)

João Pontes Nogueira (Pontifícia Universidade Católica do Rio de Janeiro)

José Flávio Sombra Saraiva (Universidade de Brasília)

José Luis León-Manríquez (Universidade Autónoma Metropolitana Xochimilco)

Letícia Pinheiro (Universidade do Estado do Rio de Janeiro)

Luis Fernando Ayerbe (Universidade Estadual Paulista)

Marco Aurélio Chaves Cepik (Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul)

Marcos Costa Lima (Universidade Federal de Pernambuco)

Maria Regina Soares de Lima (Universidade do Estado do Rio de Janeiro)

Matt Ferchen (Tsinghua University)

Miriam Gomes Saraiva (Universidade do Estado do Rio de Janeiro)

Monica Hirst (Universidad Di Tella–Universidad de Quilmes)

Paulo Luiz Moreaux Lavigne Esteves (Pontifícia Universidade Católica do Rio de Janeiro)

Paulo Fagundes Vizentini (Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul)

Rafael Villa (Universidade de São Paulo)

R. Evan Ellis (Center for Strategic and International Studies)

Renato Boschi (Universidade do Estado do Rio de Janeiro)

Sean Burges (Australian National University)

Shiguenoli Myamoto (Universidade Estadual de Campinas – San Tiago Dantas)

Tullo Vigevani (Universidade Estadual Paulista)

Apoio

Departamento de Relações Internacionais da Pontifícia Universidade Católica de Minas Gerais (PUC-Minas)

Chefe do Departamento: Chyara Salles Pereira

Special Issue – Contemporary Russia in International

Relations – Introduction ...................................................................................7

Dossiê – Rússia Contemporânea nas Relações Internacionais – Introdução

Dossier – Rusia Contemporánea en las Relaciones Internacionales – Introducción

Daniela Vieira Secches, Fabiano P. Mielniczuk

Recalibrating Moscow’s Strategies in Asia: Russia and

Southeast Asia in a Multipolar World ...........................................................11

Reajustando as Estratégias de Moscou na Ásia: Rússia e Sudeste Asiático num Mundo

Multipolar

Reajustando las Estrategias de Moscú en Asia: Rusia y el Sudeste Asiático en un Mundo

Multipolar

Rafael Contreras-Luna, Natthanan Kunnamas

SINO-RUSSIAN ENERGY COOPERATION IN THE POST-COLD

WAR (2000-2021) ...............................................................................................29

COOPERAÇÃO ENERGÉTICA SINO-RUSSA NO PÓS GUERRA FRIA (2000-2021)

COOPERACIÓN ENERGÉTICA SINO-RUSA EN LA POS GUERRA FRÍA (2000-2021)

Fernanda Albuquerque, Alexandre César Cunha Leite, Cristina Carvalho Pacheco

A economia política internacional da questão agroalimentar

na Rússia..............................................................................................................50

The international political economy of the agrifood question in Russia

La economía política internacional de la cuestión agroalimentaria en Rusia

Fabiano Escher

Prostitutes, Mercenaries and Feminism: The Public and the

Private in International Relations ...................................................................72

Prostitutas, Mercenários e Feminismo: O Público e o Privado nas Relações Internacionais

Prostitutas, mercenarios y feminismo: lo público y lo privado en las relaciones Internacionales

Wagner Santos, Cristiano Mendes

Socio-political developments in Greece and Spain in the

wake of the grassroots anti-austerity campaign: towards

national parliaments and local spaces .........................................................89

Desenvolvimentos sociopolíticos na Grécia e Espanha na esteira da campanha popular

antiausteridade: em direção aos parlamentos nacionais e espaços locais

Acontecimientos sociopolíticos en Grecia y España tras el movimiento popular contra la

austeridad: hacia parlamentos nacionales y espacios locales

Gabriel M. Vieira

El MERCOSUR ante la desaceleración del comercio

intrarregional y las dinámicas de desintegración entre 2012 y

2022: análisis y perspectivas actuales en clave autonomista ..................108

MERCOSUR facing the slowdown of intra-regional trade and the dynamics of disintegration

between 2012 and 2022: analysis and current perspectives in an autonomist perspective

O MERCOSUL diante da desaceleração do comércio intra-regional e da dinâmica de

desintegração entre 2012 e 2022: análise e perspectivas atuais em uma perspectiva

autonomista

Nastasia Barceló Severgnini, Amanda Barrenengoa2

Ideologia e Instituições Internacionais: uma nova

abordagem (Erik Voeten, 2021)........................................................................126

Ideology and International Institutions: a new approach (Erik Voeten, 2021)

Ideología e instituciones internacionales: un nuevo enfoque (Erik Voeten, 2021)

Laura Pimentel Barbosa

Daniela Vieira Secches, Fabiano P. Mielniczuk Special Issue – Contemporary Russia in Internaonal Relaons – Introducon

Special Issue – Contemporary Russia in

International Relations – Introduction

Dossiê – Rússia Contemporânea nas Relações

Internacionais – Introdução

Dossier – Rusia Contemporánea en las Relaciones

Internacionales – Introducción

Daniela Vieira Secches1

Fabiano P. Mielniczuk2

Recebido em: 12 de julho de 2024

Aprovado em: 05 de agosto de 2024

DOI: 10.5752/P.2317-773X.2023v11n2p7-10

The Russian launching of the Special Military Operation (SMO) in

Ukraine in February 2022 brought Russia back to the agenda of interna-

tional politics. Due to the unprecedented nature of what was instantly

called a “full scale invasion” or a “war of aggression” by NATO allies, the

irrelevance conferred to Russia in the last decades gave place to a promi-

nent role in world aairs. Like it or not, it seems that Russia’s continental

size, abundant wealth in natural resources, military prowess and long

history as a diplomatic broker are once again making the headlines of

mainstream media and lling the pages of specialized journals world-wi-

de. This is the context of this special issue of Estudos Internacionais.

After the end of the USSR, President Boris Yeltsin and his minis-

ter of foreign aairs, Andrei Kozyrev, strove to assure the international

society that Russia had a western lineage. All in all, Russia adopted hu-

man rights discourse, defended the advantages of multilateralism, and

reassured members of the “global community” that free markets were

needed to guarantee political freedom. The leaders even armed that

the communist period was a gap in the Soviet countries’ history of learn-

ing with the West.

Nonetheless, in spite of these eorts, Russia’s conciliatory discourse

was not recognized by the West. The Western State’s lack of political will

to solve Russia’s economic problems and continuing worries about the

country’s military revival ensured that the self-image Russia was trying

to sell about herself was not convincing. The consequent lack of sup-

port for Russia’s leaders resulted in social animosity against the West.

Neocommunists and ultranationalists, both political groups with clear

1. Professor at the Graduate Program

in International Relations of Pontiﬁcal

Catholic University of Minas Gerais

(PUC Minas), Belo Horizonte – Brazil.

PhD in International Relations (PUC Mi-

nas). MA in Political Sciences (Masaryk

University, Czechia). BA in International

Relations (PUC Minas). BA in Law (Fede-

ral University of Minas Gerais).

2. Professor at the Graduate Program

in International Strategic Studies of the

Federal University of Rio Grande do Sul

(UFRGS), Porto Alegre, Brazil. Doctor in

International Relations by the Institute

of International Relations (Pontiﬁcal

Catholic University of Rio de Janeiro).

He is a research member at NEBRICS/

UFRGS.

estudos internacionais • Belo Horizonte, ISSN 2317-773X, v. 11, n. 3, (out. 2023), p. 7-10

anti-western platforms, gained popular appeal. This fact forced Yeltsin

to shift Russia’s foreign policy. To maintain the support of Russia’s con-

stituents, the country’s foreign policy in the near abroad became more

assertive. This tendency was then reinforced by Yevgeny Primakov in the

mid 1990’s, and has persisted in Russian foreign policy since then, even

despite the short honeymoon between presidents Putin and Bush after

September 11th. Russia’s confrontation with Georgia, in 2008, and the lat-

er annexation of Crimea in 2014 appears to only conrm this tendency.

The “emulation-confrontation” dichotomous relationship with the

West needs to be qualied. Domestically, Russia passes through a process

of consolidating an alternative statehood project in the new millennium.

Its signicant economic growth in the early 2000s, driven by oil and gas

dividends, and the arrival of Vladimir Putin to power served as the start-

ing point for a series of reforms. The growth of the Russian economy

enabled relevant social policies at the beginning of Putin’s government,

leveraging his popular support. In the scope of security and defense, the

country focused its eorts on modernizing its military arsenal, with spe-

cial attention to oensive nuclear capabilities considering the deconstruc-

tion of the international nuclear deterrence architecture initiated by the

United States of America (USA) in the late 1990s. The security agenda

also served as a space for national reconciliation in resolving the situa-

tion in Chechnya and for promoting the concentration of powers in the

central government in the face of the terrorist threat, especially after the

Beslan attacks in 2004.

At the international level, the 21st century witnesses an interna-

tional order under various pressures. Experiencing crises related to pol-

itics, security, economics, health and environment, contemporary inter-

national politics challenges the eld of International Relations when it de-

bates polarity, continuity and change. While US hegemony is undergoing

undeniable deterioration, China’s economic projection still does not seem

to be a sucient element for Beijing to take its place as the sole pole in the

international system, nor does China show interest in proposing its own

version of an order in total opposition to the liberal project articulated by

the West in the 20th century.

The current international scenario complexity can be exemplied

in the escalation of the Ukrainian crisis in 2022. Politically, the centrali-

ty of the Eastern Ukrainian territory for Russian international insertion

through access to a year-round navigable sea materializes traditional dy-

namics of dispute for power-generating capabilities. Moreover, the North

Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) expansion into Eastern Europe

and the deconstruction of the nuclear deterrence architecture are ele-

ments strongly present in the Russian narrative about the escalation in

2022 and reect pressures on the distribution of power in the internation-

al order. The strategic partnership between Russia and China in recent

years also illustrates pressures for potential changes in the international

order and is a central element in relativizing the Kremlin’s isolation. The

trajectory of this friendship qualied by Vladimir Putin and by Xi Jinping

as “limitless” also reects deeper revisionist tendencies in the face of the

deterioration of US hegemony.

Daniela Vieira Secches, Fabiano P. Mielniczuk Special Issue – Contemporary Russia in Internaonal Relaons – Introducon

Furthermore, the worsening of the Ukrainian crisis demonstrated

eects of international economic integration that had not been felt until

then, at least of this magnitude and character. Sanctions on Russia and

their impact on the availability and price of a range of products shook

markets around the world, especially in the early months of the conict.

In the medium and long term, it is observed that the Russian-Ukrainian

conict contributes to accelerating deglobalization movements already

underway in the context of the economic-nancial crisis of 2008 and the

2020 Covid-19 pandemics. Added to this, the demand for a more robust

international cooperation on climate change may also be impacted by

the cleavages fostered in the context of the escalation of tensions and the

imposition of international sanctions.

Therefore, it is worth noting that today’s International Relations

scholars face a world full of paradoxes. On the one hand, we have never

lived in a world in which information about international politics was

so available and easily accessible. On the other, the plurality of sources

and the manipulation of information place specialists in a dicult posi-

tion to study phenomena whose nature is marked by the diverse politi-

cal-ideological interests that constitute them. Hence, the special edition

Contemporary Russia in International Relations aims to promote a qualied

debate on the place occupied by Russia internationally. We do not wish

to start here by defending the possibility of neutral scientic production.

However, diversifying academic production on such a complex topic can

bring to the fore relevant contributions produced from dierent perspec-

tives. In this sense, mobilizing scholars from the Global South to present

their views on contemporary Russia may advance alternative perspec-

tives on the current crisis.

This special edition invited authors to incorporate two dimensions

in their contributions: (1) Russian interests in light of the Kremlin’s con-

temporary foreign policy; and (2) the context of escalating tensions in

the Ukrainian crisis, in 2022. The three articles that were approved for

publication share a common concern with empirical analysis and the

treatment of data based on primary sources. They also support their

arguments through literature reviews that consider not only the argu-

ments of Western specialists, but also those of scholars belonging to other

geographic spaces like the Global South. Regarding the theoretical and

methodological foundation of the texts presented here, pluralism marks

the constitution of pragmatic research designs, suitable for dealing with

the complex and multifaceted phenomenon that this edition intends to

problematize.

The relations between Russia and Asia are the central theme of

the contribution Sino-Russian Energy Cooperation in the Post-Cold War (2000-

2021), written by Brazilian researchers Fernanda Albuquerque, Alexandre

César Cunha Leite and Cristina Carvalho Pacheco. In their piece, they

focus on the Sino-Russian relations from the energy production dimen-

sion. Energy is taken as the cornerstone of relations between Moscow

and Beijing, which are deepening in a context in which both Russia and

China need greater diversication of their trading partners in this eld.

After analyzing the possibilities and challenges that these partners face in

estudos internacionais • Belo Horizonte, ISSN 2317-773X, v. 11, n. 3, (out. 2023), p. 7-10

this sector, they suggest that these ties will last based on the reaching of

long-term agreements and the construction of a support infrastructure

for joint exploration and import of energetic resources.

Rafael Contreras-Luna and Natthanan Kunnamas address cen-

tral elements for understanding Russia’s international insertion in the

contemporary international order in the article Recalibrating Moscow’s

Strategies in Asia: Russia and Southeast Asia in a Multipolar World. The au-

thors investigate the Asian turn of Russian foreign policy with a focus

on its rapprochement not only with China, but, especially, with other

Southeast Asian powers. In doing so, the article is premised on the multi-

polar reality of the contemporary international order and problematizes

the Russian position as a great power based on its increasingly strategic

appropriation of the Asian world. According to the authors, the Kremlin

still lacks a more comprehensive and well-established strategy in relation

to the powers of Southeast Asia so that it can implement its reorientation

towards the continent as a stage for its global projection.

The third article, entitled The international political economy of the

agrifood question in Russia, reects on the agenda of agricultural produc-

tion. Food production presents itself as an important constitutive capa-

bility for state power at the international level, as can be seen from the

impact that the escalation of tensions in 2022 generated on the grain and

fertilizer markets, for example. Fabiano Escher, researcher aliated with

the Graduate Program in Social Sciences in Development, Agriculture

and Society (CPDA), at the Federal Rural University of Rio de Janeiro

(UFRRJ), analyzes topics such as agribusiness, family farming, food se-

curity and geopolitics from statistical data and qualied bibliographical

review on Russian agri-food production.

The special edition Contemporary Russia in International Relations

fullls, then, its objective of expanding the perspective on Russian in-

ternational insertion in the scholarship of International Relations, in-

volving researchers from the Global South in problematizing the topic.

Furthermore, by focusing on relations with Asia, this edition of Revista

Estudos Internacionais discusses an extremely relevant sphere within

the scope of Russia’s foreign policy, which is relatively little explored by

mainstream literature that tends to mostly oppose the Kremlin’s actions

from a western centric perspective.

Rafael Contreras-Luna, Nahanan Kunnamas Recalibrang Moscow’s Strategies in Asia: Russia and Southeast Asia in a Mulpolar World

Recalibrating Moscow’s Strategies in Asia:

Russia and Southeast Asia in a Multipolar

World1

Reajustando as Estratégias de Moscou na Ásia: Rússia e

Sudeste Asiático num Mundo Multipolar

Reajustando las Estrategias de Moscú en Asia: Rusia y el

Sudeste Asiático en un Mundo Multipolar

Rafael Contreras-Luna2

Natthanan Kunnamas3

DOI: 10.5752/P.2317-773X.2023v11n3p11-28

Recebido em: 07 de dezembro de 2022

Aprovado em: 02 de fevereiro de 2024

ABSTRACT

Russia’s partnership with China acted as a strategic cushion for the country’s

leadership to launch the military operation in Ukraine. At the same time, warm

relations with long-term allies in Asia reinforced Russia’s decision to make such

a dangerous move and take the risks of being cut-o nancially from the West.

In this sense, relations not only with China but with other Asian middle and

small powers is crucial for Russia’s development in the upcoming years. Southe-

ast Asia appears to be one of the most important prospective partners. Rus-

sia-Southeast Asia relations show that despite evident achievements in various

spheres, Russia’s plans in the region remain unsubstantiated in terms of policies

and lack a comprehensive strategy. Ultimately, Russia has rst to determine to

what extent it is serious on its “reorientation” to Asia and what it expects from

it, and whether it is ready to recalibrate substantially its relationship with Sou-

theast Asia.

Keywords: Russia; Asia; ASEAN; Southeast Asia; China; perceptions; multipo-

larity.

RESUMO

A parceria da Rússia com a China serviu como um colchão estratégico para a

liderança do país lançar a operação militar na Ucrânia. Ao mesmo tempo, as

relações cordiais com aliados de longo prazo na Ásia reforçaram a decisão da

Rússia de tomar uma medida tão perigosa e assumir os riscos de ser cortada

nanceiramente pelo Ocidente. Nesse sentido, as relações não apenas com a

China, mas com outros poderes médios e pequenos da Ásia são cruciais para o

desenvolvimento da Rússia nos próximos anos. O Sudeste Asiático parece ser

um dos parceiros prospectivos mais importantes. As relações entre Rússia e Su-

1. * The authors disclosed receipt of

the following ﬁnancial support for the

research, authorship, and publication

of this article: this work was supported

by funding provided by Chulalongkorn

University.

2. Rafael Contreras-Luna is an Associate

Professor at the School of Advanced

Studies (SAS), Tyumen University, Rus-

sia. He received in 2017 his PhD from

Durham University, United Kingdom.

He has worked and collaborated with

several universities in European Russia

and Siberia (Samara, Saint Petersburg,

Krasnoyarsk, Yakutsk). In 2022, Rafael

worked as visiting professor at Chu-

lalongkorn University in Bangkok. His

research concerns politics in the Asia-

-Paciﬁc region, Russia’s foreign policy

in Asia, Russia’s “pivot to the East”, the

Arctic, and geopolitics of outer space.

3. Natthanan Kunnamas is Jean Monnet

Chair, Jean Monnet Module coordinator,

and Associate Professor in Political

Science at Chulalongkorn University,

where she also leads the Centre for

European Studies. In 2019, she was

decorated the Knight of the Order of

Academic Palm from the Ministry of

National Education, France. Her recent

research interests are external relations

of the EU in Asia, focusing on the Indo-

-paciﬁc region as well as comparative

regionalisms among EU, ASEAN and

Ecowas. She is an author of ‘European

Studies in Thailand’, in Na Thalang et

al. (Routledge, 2018).

estudos internacionais • Belo Horizonte, ISSN 2317-773X, v. 11, n. 3, (out. 2023), p. 11-28

deste Asiático mostram que, apesar das conquistas evidentes em várias esferas,

os planos da Rússia na região permanecem não fundamentados em termos de

políticas e carecem de uma estratégia abrangente. Em última análise, a Rússia

precisa determinar em que medida está comprometida com sua “reorientação”

para a Ásia e o que espera dela, e se está pronta para recalibrar substancialmente

seu relacionamento com o Sudeste Asiático.

Palavras-chave: Rússia; Ásia; ASEAN; Sudeste Asiático; China; percepções;

multipolaridade.

RESUMEN

La asociación estratégica de Rusia con China fungió como amortiguador en la

decisión del liderazgo ruso de lanzar una operación militar en contra de Ucra-

nia. Asimismo, los lazos estrechos de Rusia con aliados históricos en Asia con-

tribuyeron en la determinación del gobierno ruso para realizar un movimiento

tan peligroso y tomar el riego de ser aislado por Occidente. En este sentido, para

Rusia en el futuro próximo son cruciales sus lazos no sólo con China sino con

otras potencias asiáticas. De esta forma, el sudeste de Asia se perla como una

de las regiones más importantes para Rusia en el mediano plazo. Las relacio-

nes entre Rusia y los países del sudeste de Asia muestran que, a pesar de éxitos

notables en diversos ámbitos, los planes de Rusia en la región carecen de cierta

congruencia y no son parte de una estrategia integral. En denitiva, Rusia tiene

que determinar hasta qué punto está dispuesta a llevar a cabo su “reorientación”

a Asia y lo que espera de ella, así como si se encuentra presto a recalibrar de

manera sustancial sus relaciones con el sudeste de Asia.

Palabras clave: Rusia; Asia; ASEAN; sudeste de Asia; China; percepciones;

multipolaridad.

The armed conict in Ukraine and the geopolitical confrontation

between Russia and the West has proved to have a global component

and may be the beginning of a signicant recalibration of the interna-

tional order. In this context, Russia’s policies in East Asia seem to gain

more relevance as Russia’s confrontation with the West over Ukraine

evolves. At the same time, Russia aims to enhance its status in Asia and

the world by seeking business and strategic opportunities to compensate

to a certain extent Russia’s loss following the sanctions imposed by the

West. In this sense, diverse partnerships are being developed between

Russian and Southeast Asian countries; this research will analyse the key

components of those partnerships along with their potential benets and

impeding factors. Evidence for this paper was drawn from governmen-

tal documents, academic articles, news resources, think tank’s publica-

tions, and occasionally personal interviews with academics and ocials

in Bangkok, Hanoi, and Moscow. This article is organized as follows.

Firstly (1), it argues that Russia’s self-perception of being a great power

in a multipolar world plays a central and dening role in Russia’s foreign

policy. The following section (2) is devoted to Russia’s “turn” to Asia. It

succinctly describes the historical background of the alleged shift and the

function of the China-component in the equation Thirdly (3), this paper

examines historical and current trends in Russia-Southeast Asia relations

to understand their shifts and continuities. In the following section (4),

this research analyses current relevant issues of the Russian-Southeast

Asia partnership as well as obstacles and catalysts to development in the

Rafael Contreras-Luna, Nahanan Kunnamas Recalibrang Moscow’s Strategies in Asia: Russia and Southeast Asia in a Mulpolar World

context of the military conict in Ukraine. This paper concludes (5) by

reecting upon the relevance of the topic and connects it with a broad

historical context.

RUSSIA’S STANCE IN INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

Russia’s self-image as a great power plays a central and dening

role in Russia’s foreign policy and critically shapes Russia’s understan-

ding of its relations with the world. For the Russian leadership and most

of its citizens, greatpowerness or “velikoderzhavnost” is inherent to the

existence and survival of the Russian state. Russia’s great power iden-

tity has been scrutinized by a large number of authors and publications

over the last decade (Clunan, 2014; Leichtova, 2014; Smith, 2016). Andrei

Tsygankov (2020) argues that Russian greatpowerness consists of three

main elements: “(1) a sphere of cultural and value inuence in Eurasia

and Europe, (2) political and economic self-sufciency, and (3) military

capabilities sufcient to defeat any other power”. For Russian elites, it is

crucial to maintain the internal unity of a geographically vast and com-

plex country; a socially diverse state bordering non-Western and Western

states and powerful neighbours.

Accordingly, the Russian elite has developed the concept of multi-

polarity: an international system in which a handful of large states (great

powers, poles) were the guardians of the global order based on a balance

of power among them. The Russian government has declared numerous

times that multipolarity is the basis of the Russian approach to internatio-

nal politics. Former Russian Foreign Minister Yevgeny Primakov was the

main advocate of multipolarity during the Yeltsin era (Rangsimaporn,

2009), but at that time in the 1990s, the arguments seemed unconvincing

as Russia was a weak state. The aim of achieving the status of a great

power was more clearly dened under Putin’s government, and he began

to pursue this end more pragmatically. Putin’s purpose was not to restore

the Soviet as a superpower, but to make Russia a “normal great power”

(Tsygankov, 2005).

Russia’s conception of a multipolar world constitutes a prime com-

ponent in the country’s foreign policy decision-making. As Margot Light

observes: “The sanctication of Russia’s great power status and the de-

clared preference for a multipolar world order based on sovereignty and

non-interference in states’ internal aairs has been a constant” (Cadier;

Light, 2015:23). In this sense, at a summit in Saint Petersburg last year,

President Putin reiterated this idea: “A multipolar system of international

relations is now being formed. It is an irreversible process; it is happening

before our eyes and is objective in nature” (Tass 2022). As a global power

in a multipolar world, Russia has pursued a multi-vector foreign policy in

the last fteen years and the Asian vector has gain considerable strength.

Russia’s ‘pivot’ to Asia initiated as a long-term rebalancing project under

Putin’s administration, aimed mostly to maintain its global power iden-

tity by preserving Russia’s freedom of manoeuvrability and independen-

ce in world aairs, and to be recognised as an Euro-Asian power.

estudos internacionais • Belo Horizonte, ISSN 2317-773X, v. 11, n. 3, (out. 2023), p. 11-28

RUSSIA’S PIVOT TO ASIA

In 1986, Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev made a landmark visit to

the Russian Far East and delivered an important speech in Vladivostok,

signalling that the USSR would engage in international politics as an Asia-

Pacic power as much as a European (Thakur; Thayer, 1987). This Soviet

version of Ostpolitik launched by Gorbachev was followed by President

Putin in the 2010s. In December 2012, in his annual address to the Federal

Assembly, President Putin established the development of Siberia and the

Far East as a national priority for the whole twenty rst century. As a re-

sult, the Russian Government commenced to elaborate a long-term project

to develop and improve living conditions in Asiatic Russia and advance its

integration into Northeast Asia. Subsequently, Russia’s “pivot” to Asia has

been a highly discussed topic within Russian elites and leading scholars.

In this regard, the Russian think tank Valdai International Discussion Club

presented a series of analytical reports entitled Toward the Great Ocean to

impulse debate between the Russian elites and leading scholars.

President Putin used the 2012 APEC summit in Vladivostok as

a means to turn assertively to East Asia and to push for development

projects in the region. Afterwards, Asiatic Russia attracted important fe-

deral-level attention and investment. According to Vladivostok scholar

Sergei Sevastianov, one of the main achievements of this “pivot” to Asia

has been the implementation of a new institutional framework aimed to

improve the investments climate in the RFE (Personal Communication,

2022). This certainly gave impetus to the development of the region.

Most analyses on Russia’s shift to Asia recognise recent eorts towards

the development of Asiatic Russia and the improvement of socioecono-

mic indicators; there is a general agreement in Russia that in recent years

“the government is paying more attention to its eastern part” and “has

done a lot” (Bashkatova, 2022).

Indeed, the Russian government has devoted much eort and re-

sources to impulse regional development; the problem seems to be that

these are isolated eorts reecting a narrow viewpoint – to certain ex-

tent overly technocratic – and full of provisional variables, there is a

lack of a comprehensive plan whatsoever and strategies have been gui-

ded primarily by scal needs based on national security considerations

(Kireev, 2017). Russian scholar Igor Makarov considers that Putin him-

self was committed to the development of the region and the creation

of the Ministry for the Development of the Far East under his presiden-

cy corroborates this fact. Nonetheless, Russia had many other national

priorities, namely the Sochi Winter Olympics, the FIFA World Cup in

2018 (which did not include cities from Asiatic Russia), and the integra-

tion of Crimea into the Russian Federation. As Makarov underlines, there

were too many other projects for the Asian century project to succeed

(Personal Communication, 28 September 2022). In this context, success

would mean to halt the outow of population from the Russian Far East

that continues to this day.

In terms of foreign policy, the much-touted “pivot” to Asia has been

subject of discussions for the Russian elites and Russia specialists alike.

Rafael Contreras-Luna, Nahanan Kunnamas Recalibrang Moscow’s Strategies in Asia: Russia and Southeast Asia in a Mulpolar World

Nevertheless, for many Russian experts in Asia it remains a vague con-

cept that lacks true depth and they cast doubt on the feasibility of such a

project. As per Andrei Dmitrichenko, Minister Counsellor of the Russian

Embassy in Thailand, it is a futile discussion as Russia cannot simply

“turn” to Asia as rhetoric suggests. The Russian diplomat draws a paral-

lel between the alleged “pivot” to Asia and a transatlantic liner: the lar-

gest state on Earth cannot “turn” as easily and smoothly to Asia, Russia

as an ocean liner can only turn slowly, one degree at a time (Personal

Communication, 30 May 2022).

Russia’s policies in East Asia seem to gain more relevance once more

as Russia’s confrontation with the West over Ukraine evolves. Following

the military operation in Ukraine, Russia had to drastically reassess its

relations with the West. which apparently has accelerated the country’s

turning to Asia. Nonetheless, the crisis in Ukraine has simultaneously

pushed Russia into a sort of insulation, and into China’s growing depen-

dence. Both scenarios have their own opportunities and risks.

Russia-China relations have developed into arguably the best rela-

tions between great powers. The Sino-Russian comprehensive strategic

partnership is one of the most important elements of the world order and

the achievements made by the two countries in the last two decades are

impressive. Both countries have many common strategies and interests,

from global to regional and there is a growing systematic coordination.

Suce to say that in the last ten years, Russian President Vladimir Putin

and Chinese President Xi Jinping have met more than forty times.

The relationship with China acted as a strategic cushion for Russia

to launch the military operation in Ukraine (Tchakarova, 2022). Seemly,

Russia would have never launched such a large-scale military operation if

it were not to rely to a certain degree on China’s economic and political

support. China has maintained a “friendly neutrality” because the coun-

try “needs the stability of external sources, resource security, stability at

the borders and the presence of a ‘strategic buer’ in competition with

the United States.” (Safronova, 2022). Still, China’s economic involvement

in several Russian projects came to a halt and the country has restrai-

ned from an all-out economic support to Russia as Chinese companies

do not want to risk being sanctioned. After initial disengagement, China

has gradually deepened economic cooperation with Russia in the second

part of 2022 and compared to the same period in 2021, trade volume has

increased 50 percent. Still, actual gures may be higher as there are no

ocial data of bilateral trade volume (Tromov, 2022). According to Igor

Makarov, Chinese business has tried to hedge the menace of sanctions

from the West by diversifying its partnerships with Russian compa-

nies and creating parallel infrastructure to deal specically with Russia

through rms not exposed to foreign markets.

Irrespective of the outcomes of the armed conict in Ukraine, China

will not let this spoil relations with Russia (Wishnick, 2022). Apparently,

even some segments of Chinese public support Russia. According to opi-

nion research carried out in China in 2022, Russia turned out to be the

most positively perceived country: 70 percent of the respondents claimed

to have positive views of Russia. Similarly, 80 percent of the respondents

estudos internacionais • Belo Horizonte, ISSN 2317-773X, v. 11, n. 3, (out. 2023), p. 11-28

said that their image of Russia has improved in the last three years

(Turcsanyi; Dubravcikova; Kironska, 2022).

For Russia, the partnership with China is essential not only at the

global level but also at the regional level. The high prole of the bilateral

ties legitimises to a certain extent Russia’s claims to Asian power. China

remains central to Russia’s Asia policy and the Russian leadership seems

to agree on the need to keep China as a key partner. Nevertheless, Russia

necessitates dierent partners in East Asia as excessive dependency on

China would probably jeopardise Russia’s sovereignty. Russia’s diversi-

cation attempts toward Japan and South Korea ultimately did not suc-

ceed; therefore, Russia requires to develop relations with other states and

Southeast Asian states appear to be one be the most prospective partners.

RUSSIA-SOUTHEAST ASIA RELATIONS

Relations between the Russian Empire/Soviet Union/Russian

Federation and Southeast Asian states have followed distinct and at

times contrasting paths. Still, there are some long-term points of con-

uence throughout dierent periods; one of the recurrent lines of con-

vergence has seemingly been the struggle from both sides to be recong-

nised as equal partners in Europe. Indeed, at dierent periods of time,

counterbalance to the perceived Euro-centric world has served as com-

mon ground for mutual interactions. It should be noted that this was

not exclusive to the Soviet period when the USSR portrayed itself as a

non-Western power.

Arguably, the rst landmark event in mutual interactions occurred

when future Russian emperor Nikolai Romanov visited Asia. After inau-

gurating the construction of the Trans-Siberian railway in Vladivostok in

1891, the Tsarevich embarked in a historic trip to Japan, India, and Siam.

In Bangkok, the future Russian Emperor received a sumptuous welcome

by King Chulalongkorn the Great, marking the beginning of mutual in-

teractions between both countries. Six years later, as part of its landmark

visit to Europe, King Chulalongkorn visited the Russian Empire and was

hosted by Nicholas II. According to records, they met “as two old friends”,

spending plenty of time only the two of them; during the seven days

visit, the King of Siam was taken as part of the family by the Romanov

(Phiramontri, 2017).

In political terms, for Siam it was the most consequential visit of the

entire trip. Amidst threats from colonial powers such as France and Britain,

the Russian Emperor asserted that “the independence of Siam will never

be curtailed” (Phiramontri, 2017). It has to be emphasised that the Siamese

King was treated by the Russian Emperor as equal (Mezhdunarodnye

Otnosheniya, 1997). This was immortalised in a famous photograph of

the two supreme leaders taken in the outskirts of Saint Petersburg. The

picture, which was published in dierent newspapers across Europe, in-

tended to send a political message to European powers. In this sense, the

visit of King Chulalongkorn the Great to Saint Petersburg 1897, “sitting

side by side with Emperor Nicholas II, boosted Thai position as an equal

partner in Europe” (Phubunlap, 2022). In the end, “amicable relations

Rafael Contreras-Luna, Nahanan Kunnamas Recalibrang Moscow’s Strategies in Asia: Russia and Southeast Asia in a Mulpolar World

between Emperor Nicholas II and King Chulalongkorn helped Siam to

avoid colonial dependence and maintain balance between the great po-

wers of the time” (Koldunova; Rangsimaporn, 2012).

By the end of the 1960s, the Soviet Union had managed to esta-

blish stable relations with all actors in the region. Nonetheless, the Soviet

Union had signicantly less ocial contact with maritime Southeast Asia.

The USSR exerted inuence in determined countries, especially Vietnam

and Laos after adopting communist rule in 1975 (Huan; Thambipillai,

2019), whereas relations with Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand, and the

Philippines were characterised by “discontinuous political involvement”

and “nominal economic interests” (Kapoor, 2020). In the case of Indonesia,

bilateral relations gained momentum after Sukarno-Khrushev visits and

stable relations remained even under Suharto anti-communist regime.

Relations between the USSR and the ve ASEAN members at the

time strained after the Soviet Union and Vietnam concluded in 1978 the

Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation, and the subsequent invasion of

Cambodia. At that time, ASEAN states tilted towards the United States.

Soviet support for the Vietnamese occupation of Kampuchea remained

for a decade the main impending issue for developing relations between

the USSR and ASEAN (Thakur; Thayer, 1987).

Following the demise of the Soviet Union, Russia practically va-

nished from East Asia. Still, Russia became ASEAN Dialogue partner in

1996. As noted by Viktor Sumsky, former Director of the ASEAN Centre

of MGIMO University, this was a crucial moment as Southeast Asia signa-

led it wanted Russia to be there notwithstanding its weakness (personal

communication, 28 September 2022). Henceforth, Russia has participa-

ted in most ASEAN-led forums and joined ASEAN regional structures.

At the same time, Russia has developed cooperation with countries with

whom it had limited relations in earlier decades. In 2018, ASEAN-Russia

relations nally were elevated to a strategic partnership.

Distant neighbours or strategic partners?

Southeast Asia’s main goal developed into avoiding being a sphere of

ideological and political struggle and limit the inuence of major powers.

ASEAN countries have managed to develop “a regulatory framework for

managing interstate relations, regional cooperation has made the crucial

dierence between forces of conict and harmony that lie at the core of

the international relations of Southeast Asia” (Bainus; Manurung, 2021).

ASEAN Centrality and ASEAN norms so called ‘ASEAN Way’ (consulta-

tion and consensus, non-intervention) are well founded in broader East

Asia regionalisms (Acharya, 2017). Analyses frequently emphasise the

hedging strategy pursued by regional powers in Southeast Asia aimed

to manage regional order: a range of policies encouraging middle posi-

tions and avoid taking sides to prevent the dominance of foreign powers

(Busbarat, 2016).

ASEAN and Russia have forged diverse linkages in the last thirty

years through dierent institutional arrangements. These multilate-

ral avenues have provided Russia the possibility to enhance ties with

estudos internacionais • Belo Horizonte, ISSN 2317-773X, v. 11, n. 3, (out. 2023), p. 11-28

dierent Southeast Asian states (Huan; Thambipillai, 2019). Certainly,

Russia’s interests in the region have grown and Russia’s diplomacy is

more visible in the region. Similarly, the strategic value of Russia for

Southeast Asia can hardly be denied. According to Viktor Sumsky, du-

ring the last decade Russia has signaled its interest to take incremental

steps to engage with the region, and Southeast Asia has made clear that

it wants Russia to be there. In this sense, “the welcoming of increased

Russian interest is a well-thought out move as [ASEAN countries] they

focus on hedging to deal with the challenges posed by a changing regio-

nal order” (Kapoor, 2020).

Russia’s neutral stance has enhanced its position in the region.

Arguably, Russia has managed to establish itself in the region as a respon-

sible power. Russia’s foreign policy in Southeast Asia, in contrast to that

in the West, is much more pragmatic and conciliatory. For Dmitrichenko

in Bangkok, unlike the United States, Russia avoids picking sides and has

good working relations with all ASEAN states, as a result, Russia is seen

as a balancing power in the region.

As in other cases in Asia, economic cooperation between Russia and

its partners lags behind from political collaboration. Russia is ASEAN’s

11th largest trade partner (Kapoor, 2020). Eorts to further develop eco-

nomic ties have had limited success and Russia’s economic presence in

Southeast Asia continues to be weak. In contrast to other powers’ eco-

nomic involvement in the region, Russia’s involvement is minimal: be-

fore the pandemics Russia constituted barely one percent of ASEAN’s

total trade. It should be noted that Russia is the largest arms exporter to

Southeast Asia, from 2000 to 2021 the value of the country’s arms exports

to the region was US$10.87 billion. US exports by comparison, accounted

$8.4 billion for the same period (Storey, 2022).

Certainly, there is a dissonance between the economic and political

vectors of the Russia-ASEAN strategic partnership. This is, “economic

obstacles against growing strategic congruence in their perceptions of in-

ternational processes” (Kanaev; Korolev, 2019). Most analysts agree that

weak economic linkages between Russia and ASEAN countries comprise

the major impediment to the qualitative improvement of ties.

Inadequate high-level representation at regional summits also

has negatively impacted mutual dynamics. President Putin has shown

certain unwillingness to forge personal connections with other ASEAN

leaders (Mahaseth; Wong, 2022). This in contrast to personal interac-

tion with other leaders in the region such as Xi Jinping, Shinzo Abe,

and Narendra Modi. Russia is not represented at the highest levels in

regional forums. Indeed, interactions between Russia and ASEAN coun-

tries often take place |on the sidelines of world summits. Putin’s visit to

Singapore for the 2018 East Asia Summit constituted his rst attendance

to the ASEAN-agship Forum.

In recent years, Russia has focused ties with Vietnam, Indonesia

and Myanmar while also forging ties Malaysia, Thailand and the

Philippines. It should be highlighted that Russia has succeeded in for-

ging closer ties with Indonesia, which apparently has become one of

its most important partners in the region. Russia and Indonesia have

Rafael Contreras-Luna, Nahanan Kunnamas Recalibrang Moscow’s Strategies in Asia: Russia and Southeast Asia in a Mulpolar World

managed to establish broad contacts in dierent spheres since the be-

ginning of the administration of President Widodo, favouring multi-

lateralism over global power competition. For Indonesia, “Russia is an

important partner in maintaining stability and security in the region”

(Bainus; Manurung, 2021).

Relations with Vietnam comprise one of the main pillars of Russia’s

policies in Southeast Asia. After relations were close to zero in the 1990s,

after Putin’s rst visit to Vietnam in 2001 bilateral ties improved subs-

tantially and the partnership is based on totally dierent principles; it is

a strategic partnership conceived for a long-term perspective determined

by a wide range of common interests. Thus, Vietnam remains the clo-

sest and more stable partner for Russia (Lokshin, 2021). This strategic

partnership reects in many aspects “the multifacetedness of bilateral

relations and the high level of trust” (Vershinina, 2022).

Russia’s political relations with Southeast Asia remain Vietnam-

centred to a certain degree. Aside from forums and news about high-

-prole summits, for most Russians Vietnam remains ASEAN´s centre

of attention whereas Thailand and Indonesia’s province Bali constitute

the pole of attraction to Russian tourists. In this sense, Russia should at-

tempt to make a “breakthrough in Asian aairs” and activate its Asian

vector that should consist not only of conferences, seminars and sum-

mits but recipes to solve political issues in the region” (Tromchuk,

2022). In this sense, for Russia it seems imperative to participate in the

decision-making processes in the region and not only at declarative

level, otherwise, Southeast Asia may ultimately overlook Russia.

In contrast to other major powers, Russia has a historical disad-

vantage in the region. Russia does not form part of regional integration

processes and ASEAN countries are not in rush for cooperation. Russia

is arriving to a region that has already its own dynamic and is unable to

determine the agenda. ASEAN countries engage with Russia because

of what it is at global level but it is perceived as a distant partner. As for

many in the region, “Russia is a European power focused primarily on

its relations with the West, drawing strength from its high-prole ties

with China” (Dave, 2016). Russia’s relations with Southeast Asia are in-

sucient in substance and eort (Tsvetov, 2016), and at times “minima-

list, ad-hoc and reactive” (Huan; Thambipillai, 2019).

ASEAN states have decided not taking sides and to hedge the

growing antagonism between the US and China in Asia-Pacific – see-

king opportunities but working to place controls and limits on its de-

velopment. Ergo, Southeast Asia welcomes Russia’s great power inte-

rests in the region as part of its hedging strategy and attempt to bring

other great powers to the region to increase interdependence and re-

duce the possibility of conflict. This opens up different opportunities

for Russia.

The armed conict in Ukraine has certainly added a sense of urgen-

cy to Russia’s plans in Southeast Asia. But to what extent can the hybrid

war between Russia and the West in Ukraine aairs alter current trends

in Russia-Southeast Asia relations?

estudos internacionais • Belo Horizonte, ISSN 2317-773X, v. 11, n. 3, (out. 2023), p. 11-28

PROSPECTS FOR INTERACTIONS AFTER THE CONFLICT IN UKRAINE

The Russian military operation in Ukraine has been seen with am-

bivalence in Southeast Asia; ASEAN countries have continued to focus on

regional issues related to integration and development whilst being vocal

against excluding Russia from international structures. Responses and

attitudes from the ten ASEAN members towards the armed conict have

signicantly varied, ranging from the strong condemnation of Singapore

and the subsequent imposition of sanctions to Myanmar’s outright endor-

sement. For most ASEAN countries, it is clear that even while condem-

ning the violation of other countries’ sovereignty, ocially they have not

placed Russia or Ukraine in an aggressor-victim axis.

Singapore was the only ASEAN member to condemn Russia by

name and impose sanctions. According to Russian scholars, despite sanc-

tions are far from being symbolic, the impact will be minimal as since

2014 economic cooperation considerably decreased. Other countries have

only condemned violation of Ukraine’s sovereignty and called to end hos-

tilities. Thailand has maintained cordial relations with Russia and has

tried to avoid taking sides remaining neutral during the conict. Laos

and Vietnam have sought to preserve their time-hallowed relations with

Russia and have refrained of any criticism and constantly exercise res-

traint. Myanmar is the only ASEAN member to vocally support Russia.

Indeed, Russia has been one of the rst countries to recognise the military

government in Naypyidaw. Multilaterally, ASEAN has expressed deep

concern over hostilities in Ukraine and calling all parties to exercise ma-

ximum restraint (ASEAN, 2022). In this sense, ASEAN simply followed

its approach which maximises diplomatic options and manoeuvrability,

and distanced itself equally from Russia, Ukraine, and Western countries.

Economic ties between Russia and ASEAN countries will certainly

resent the “draconian sanctions” in place by the West and this will leave

little space for furthering cooperation (Korolev, 2022). Nevertheless, as

Viktor Sumsky suggest, most ASEAN countries will not refrain to buy

cheaper hydrocarbons nor to engage in trade with Russia if it happens to

be benecial. Much will depend on Russia’s ability to adapt to partners

and its necessities considering new conditions. Indonesia and Vietnam

seem to be the most prospective partners, but the list should not be re-

duced to them. For instance, Malaysia could partially compensate for the

current losses in the eld of high-tech products.

In bilateral terms, practically all Southeast Asian countries have

maintained stable and cordial diplomatic ties with Russia and have not

ceded to the pressure of Western countries to isolate Russia. It should be

noted the important role that Indonesia has played in this matter. In late

June 2022, President Widodo embarked on a landmark visit to Europe,

including visits to Kiev and Moscow and sustaining meetings with

his counterparts Zelensky and Putin. As noted by a Russian specialist,

“Indonesia, for the rst time in modern history, entered the European

and global arena beyond the historical borders of its sphere of inuence,

reclaiming its role as a global intermediary” (Kuklin, 2022). Indeed, the

country archipelago became the rst Southeast Asian state attempting

Rafael Contreras-Luna, Nahanan Kunnamas Recalibrang Moscow’s Strategies in Asia: Russia and Southeast Asia in a Mulpolar World

to impact global events through multilateralism. Indonesia attempted to

speak to the wider world and specially the West representing Southeast

Asian countries and demonstrating the state of “realpolitik” in the region

(Chongkittavorn, 2022).

The visit of President Widodo attempted to prove the country’s

ability to chair the G20 and not further destabilise the world economy but

“recover together”. Indeed, the armed conict in Ukraine coincided with

the “ASEAN year” as Indonesia and Thailand took over the chairmanship

of key global and regional organisations, the G20 and APEC respectively.

As Russian scholar Ekaterina Koldunova points out, despite big pres-

sure from the United States and the European Union, Southeast Asian

countries rejected calls to exclude Russia from ASEAN-centred format.

According to her, for ASEAN multilateral institutions the organisation of

the summits comprised an endurance test (Personal Communication 30

September 2022). President Putin decided not to attend any of the sum-

mits. For Russian scholars Timofey Bordachev and Vasily Kashin, whilst it

was desirable in political terms Putin attending the summit in Indonesia,

the “fate” of Russia-Southeast Asia ties and the G20 would be decided

not in Bali but in Ukraine (Bordachev, 2022). In the end and despite all

complexities, the three summits were successfully hosted by Cambodia,

Indonesia, and Thailand with the participation of the Russian Federation.

According to Viktor Sumsky, many in Southeast Asia would lose if

Russia, who is seen as at the forefront in the struggle for a multipolar world,

completely failed in Ukraine and weakened. Notwithstanding Western

sanctions and political pressure, ASEAN countries have signalled their

interest in Russia to become involved in regional aairs. Nevertheless,

the current model of interactions between Russia and Southeast Asian

countries seems to be exhausted and has been unable to evolve into an

actual strategic partnership. Arguably, there are three features that may

turn vital in this endeavour: (a) the development/engagement of Asiatic

Russia; (b) being a viable option for hedging between the US and China;

(a) Asiatic Russia. Arguably, one of the intrinsic reasons for Russia

to be perceived as a distant partner in Southeast Asia is that Siberia, and

particularly the RFE, is still viewed by these countries as a Russian terri-

tory in Asia, but not as Russia per se. The mere existence of Asiatic Russia

is not sucient basis for Russia to be recognised as an Asian power. Ergo,

Asiatic Russia may play a crucial role in Russia’s shift towards closer rela-

tions with Asian countries.

In this sense, physical connectivity comprises one of the main

obstacles hindering further economic cooperation, particularly due to

“the poor level of transport infrastructure in the Russian Far East and

its insucient integration into the logistic network of the Asia-Pacic

region” (Kanaev; Korolev, 2019). The situation was tested a few months

after Russia’s military campaign in Ukraine: as European companies re-

fused to work with Russian cargo, Saint Petersburg and other Russia’s

ports in the Baltic were largely “blocked”. Consequently, it was expected

that ows could be redirected to Asiatic Russia through Vladivostok and

Vostochny ports.

estudos internacionais • Belo Horizonte, ISSN 2317-773X, v. 11, n. 3, (out. 2023), p. 11-28

Indeed, there is an increasing demand for transport corridors to

the Russian Far East. The main question, however, is how border and

port infrastructure in the region can handle the recent workload in-

crease that could lead to an even greater growth of export-import o-

ws (EastRussia(a), 2022). News emerged about ports in Primorskiy Krai

overloaded by cargo and long waiting lines for freight to be transported

through the Trans-Siberian Railway (Primamedia, 2022). The situation in

Russian far eastern ports became critical by Summer 2022 and ports such

as Vladivostok and Vostochny started working to the limit. According

to specialists, cargo ships arriving to the RFE had to wait in average ten

days to be unloaded as they were working at full capacity due to lack of

infrastructure and personnel.

As a matter of fact, the new economic reality opens up new chan-

ces for RFE to become a larger hub of Russia with countries of East Asia.

Nevertheless, the turn of the majority of logistics chains to the Far East

has led to a signicant shortage of transportation capacity in the region

(Bashkatova, 2022). Thus, it is essential for Russia to enlarge and mo-

dernise current transportation infrastructure in the RFE, particularly

the Trans-Siberian Railway and the Baikal-Amur Mainline (BAM) and

to clear up bottlenecks at customs checkpoints. As per Russian ocials:

“Western markets have closed for Russia, only the eastern ports remain.

Therefore, building infrastructure for Russia’s turn to the East is an im-

portant task for the country. It is extremely costly, but in the near fu-

ture it should become a priority for the country” (EastRussia(b), 2022).

According to Deputy Prime Minister for the Development of the Far East

Yuri Trutnev, the shortage of work power of the Trans-Siberian Railway

and BAM comprises about 40 percent of the current demand. In 2022, the

demand for transportation would be around 258 million tons, currently

both railways can transport about 150-160 million tons. Thus, the volume

of non-transported cargo could reach 100 million tons (Bashkatova, 2022).

It is imperative for Russia to pay utmost attention to improve

Asiatic Russia-Southeast Asia connectivity and develop air and maritime

communications linking the region with the Russian Far East and ease de-

pendency on Japanese and South Korean transport companies (Lukshin,

2021). The absence of direct ights embodies Russia-ASEAN weak con-

nectivity. It should be noted that in October 2022 Russia launched a direct

ight to Laos from Vladivostok, linking the RFE the capital Vientiane. At

the same time, the FESCO transport group launched a regular sea line

FESCO VIETNAM DIRECT LINE (FVDL) on the route Vladivostok –

Haiphong (Vietnam) – Ho Chi Minh City (Vietnam) – Ningbo (China)

– Vladivostok. This should constitute one big rst step in the region’s

integration process. (EastRussia(b), 2022).

(b) Viable option for hedging. As Russia and China declare a “partner-

ship with no limits”, an important question rapidly arises: to what extent

Russia’s relations with Southeast Asian countries can be limited/aected

by close relations with China?

Southeast Asia’s quest for multipolarity is not unambiguous; it con-

sists of many vectors and despite the clear presence of certain anti-West

sentiments, it would be fallacious to argue that they comprise the main

Rafael Contreras-Luna, Nahanan Kunnamas Recalibrang Moscow’s Strategies in Asia: Russia and Southeast Asia in a Mulpolar World

element. Arguably, the current hedging strategy of the region is more

China-related. According to the latest survey The State of Southeast Asia

2022 (Seah, 2022), China is notoriously seen by Southeast Asian elites as

the most inuential economic and political power in the region, 59 and

41 percent respectively. Incidentally, 64 percent of the respondents clai-

med to be “worried about China’s growing regional economic inuen-

ce”. Concern is particularly pronounced within the respondents from

Vietnam (86 percent). Conversely, Indonesia and Cambodia appear to

be the least concerned over China’s economic inuence. By the same to-

ken, 49 percent of the regional elites in Southeast Asia “distrust” China

whereas 54 percent “trust” the United States. Finally, when asked, “if

ASEAN was forced to align itself with one of the two strategic rivals, whi-

ch should it choose?” 61 percent of the respondents replied they would

choose the US whereas 39 named China. Vietnamese elites decisively

choose the United States (77 percent) whereas regional elites in Thailand,

Malaysia and Indonesia are somewhat equally divided. Finally, 73 percent

of the respondents fear that ASEAN is becoming an arena of major power

competition and its member states may become major power proxies. For

Vietnam and Cambodia, this concern ranks at the top at 90.4 and 84.3%

respectively.

Certainly, there is a consistent trend in the region’s anxiety over

China’s growing inuence. Nevertheless, for the regional elites Russia

does not appear to be one of the most viable third parties to hedge against

the US-China strategic rivalry (Skosyrev, 2022). In this matter, the EU and

Japan seem to be the elites’ rst choices and not Russia; for ASEAN cou-

ntries, Russia’s pivot to Asia signies primarily Russia siding with China.

Ergo, if there is no eort from the Russian side to build simultaneously

ties with other regional powers, this could negatively impact Russia’s po-

sition as a neutral and strategic player in the region. Russia should avoid

being perceived as a pure declarative power and most importantly an

independent actor in relation to China. In this sense, one of the most

prospective partners is the Socialist Republic of Vietnam.

It has to be emphasised that such a partnership with Vietnam

should be not conceived as an alternative to Russia’s partnership with

China but together as diversication of ties in the East so to prevent re-

lations with China “to become those of vassal and suzerain” (Lokshin,

2021). Vietnam remains the closest and more stable partner for Russia.

At the same time, Vietnam position as a middle power becomes more

precarious as it attempts to hedge the growing Russia-China and the

US antagonism. As Ekaterina Koldunova underlines, among all ASEAN

countries Vietnam faces the biggest foreign policy dilemma. On the

one hand, Vietnam endures tremendous pressure for the US and its al-

lies to curtail ties with Russia. On the other hand, as the antagonism

between the United States and China continue to grow, Vietnamese

bamboo diplomacy seems to be gradually losing manoeuvrability. “As

a result, [Vietnam] it is walking a tightrope between the superpowers.

But as their rivalry gets more intense, Vietnam’s tightrope will get thin-

ner. There will likely be a time when the tightrope becomes too thin to

walk” (Vuving, 2022).

estudos internacionais • Belo Horizonte, ISSN 2317-773X, v. 11, n. 3, (out. 2023), p. 11-28

Vietnamese scholars verily believe that Russia’s military operation

in Ukraine could set a bad precedent if similar incidents were to occur in

Southeast Asia, particularly in the context of the growing antagonism bet-

ween China and the United States. Vietnam remains “friendly neutral” to

Russia’s actions in Ukraine and whilst Vietnamese political elites sympa-

thise with the victims in Ukraine, they certainly blame NATO for provo-

king this conict. Still, many in Vietnam fear China could at some point

take similar actions in the South China Sea (Personal Communication,

Hanoi, April 2023).

Russia could become a power balance in the region by supporting

regional order amidst the growing antagonism between China and the

United States. Ergo, Russia should reconceptualise Russia-China-Vietnam

relations and in general Russia-China-Southeast Asia relations. A rein-

vigorated partnership with Vietnam and a strategic partnership with

Indonesia would help Russia to cement its image as a reliable partner and

as an eective power balance.

nicantly improve ties with Southeast Asia is the Eurocentric world-

view of the Russian elites. In the aftermath of the merger of Crimea

with Russia in 2014, Russian China-specialist Vladimir Portyakov dis-

puted the idea of Russia’s reorienting itself to Asia. According to him,

most of the Russian elites were mostly pro-Western, including Dmitri

Medvedev and all vice-prime ministers. In the words of Portyakov: they

were “classical liberals”, whose heart and soul aware not in Asia but in

Europe” (Personal Communication, 20 April 2016). Indeed, among the

Russian intellectual elite, the majority belongs to those people who are

still European oriented. Specially the liberal part of the society, which is

the core of the economic group of the Russian government and Russia

experts, and they are still very inuential, and prior to the military con-

ict in Ukraine they still asserted that Russia should collaborate primary

with Europe. To what extent have hostilities in Ukraine and the hybrid

war between Russia and the West altered this?

Dmitri Trenin, long-time director of the Carnegie Moscow

Endowment for Peace, argues that “long gone are the days when

Moscow could straddle the divide between the West and the non-West”

(2022). Consistently, Trenin calls for the preferment of non-Western em-

bassy posting over the Western ones. According to the Russian scholar:

“Above all, [Russia] it needs to give priority to relations with non-Wes-

tern countries over de facto frozen ties with the West. Being an ambas-

sador to Indonesia should be more prestigious than an ambassadorship

in Rome” (Trenin, 2022).

In the same manner, Fyodor Lukyanov, editor-in-chief of Russia

in Global Aairs and Research Director of the Valdai Discussion Club,

argues that “Russia faces a totally unprecedented existential challen-

ge”. Consequently, Russia must attract the non-Western world not on

an ideological basis but in more practical matters and benets from

interactions. For this endeavour, Lukyanov considers that “one pre-

requisite is necessary. Understand that all this is not a way to beat the

West, but the only guarantee of Russia’s adaptation to the changed

Rafael Contreras-Luna, Nahanan Kunnamas Recalibrang Moscow’s Strategies in Asia: Russia and Southeast Asia in a Mulpolar World

circumstances for its survival. What we are used to will not be any

longer” (Lukyanov, 2022).

Before the war, there had been much ambiguity over Russia’s turn

to Asia. For the last decade, the East has been “mostly a function of the

interaction between Russia and the West” (Narozhna, 2021). In other

words, relations with Asia were not an end in itself, but a geopolitical

bargaining tool. Plausibly, Russian elites mostly saw the conict with

the West as an interval before a new future rapprochement. Russia has

now severed consciously ties with the West, however. It seems imperati-

ve for the Russian elites to follow a strategic and congruent approach to

Southeast Asia. Arguably, success on this endeavour will hinge more on

will than on capabilities.

Strategic shifts of unprecedented proportions are unfolding in glo-

bal aairs. Russia’s military intervention in Ukraine has transformed

the political and economic landscape for the country. Most of Russian

analysts/civil servants interviewed for this work appear to be certain that

Western countries attempt to torpedo multilateral structures created in

the last two decades and exclude Russia from global decision-making

processes. In this sense, there is an ostensible complementarity between

Russia’s and Southeast Asia’s interests and possibilities. ASEAN countries

appear to be as one of the best natural partners of Russia as it promotes

multilateralism and multipolarity that Russia favours.

At the G20 Summit in Bali, the Russian delegation headed by Foreign

Minister Lavrov was welcomed at the airport with a banner depicting an

“updated” map of Russia, including the four provinces Russia had incor-

porated in late September (Rentv, 2022). Southeast Asian countries have

made a few polite nods in the direction of Russia, but they are not in rush

for cooperation. Several ASEAN countries have slyly and subtly expres-

sed Russia they understand the reasons behind its military operation, and

they have signaled their readiness to explore new economic opportunities.

Ultimately, Russia has rst to determine to what extent it is serious on its

“reorientation” to Asia and what it expects from it, and whether it is ready

to recalibrate substantially its relationship with Southeast Asia.

CONCLUSIONS

Russia’s self-perception of being a great power in a multipolar

world plays a central and dening role in Russia’s foreign policy. As noted

by Tsygankov (2020), greatpowerness is associated “not only with inde-

pendent foreign policy and national security, but also with the opportu-

nities and inuence that only a few states in the world have”. It is to be

seen whether Russia can inuence regional dynamics in Southeast Asia.

Prior to the armed conict in Ukraine, relations with East Asia were not

an end in itself for Russia but means to counter the West. There was

no comprehensive vision in Russia for its relations with Asia in general

and Southeast Asia in particular. Additionally, Russia’s Asian strategy

was Sino-centric. New patterns of cooperation comprise the condition

of possibility for Russia to substantially move closer to Southeast Asia.

Inasmuch as no reconceptualisation of the Russia-Southeast relations is

estudos internacionais • Belo Horizonte, ISSN 2317-773X, v. 11, n. 3, (out. 2023), p. 11-28

articulated by Moscow and framed on current realities, it seems implau-

sible to change prior trends.

Russia-Southeast Asia relations show that despite evident achieve-

ments in various spheres, Russia still lacks political and economic strength

in the region to carry a proactive agenda. Arguably, one of the main reasons

is due to the low level of interactions between Asiatic Russia and Southeast

Asia. It is paradoxical that Russia conceives of itself as a Euro-Pacic power

but most channels of interactions between Russia and Southeast Asia does

not occur in Asia-Pacic but via Moscow. As to enhance economic and po-

litical ties with ASEAN countries, Russia should strive to build relations as

a federation, avoiding relations to be triangulated. It is crucial to have the

active involvement of Asiatic Russia and particularly the RFE.

Certainly, Russia’s partnership with China acted as a strategic

cushion for the country’s leadership to launch the military operation in

Ukraine. At the same time, warm relations with long-term allies in Asia

such as India and Vietnam reinforced Russia’s decision to make such a

dangerous move and take the risks of being cut-o nancially from the

West. In this sense, relations not only with China but with other Asian

middle and small powers is crucial for Russia’s development in the upco-

ming years. Undoubtedly, Southeast Asia appears to be one of the most

prospective regions for cooperation. Additionally, Russia-Southeast Asia

ties could reinforce their mutual aspirations to forge a multipolar world

and hedge the growing antagonism between the United States and China,

which plausibly will exacerbate in the foreseeable future.

One of the challenges Russia faces in engaging Asia, is that Russia

is in Asia but not of Asia. Russia should avoid being perceived as a pure

declarative power and most importantly an independent actor in relation

to China. Therefore, Russia should strive to follow a middle course in

Southeast Asia: hedge the antagonism seeking opportunities but limiting

the trend towards US-China bipolarity. This also points Russia towards

new understanding with other states in the region that are hedging, one

a well-known partner – Vietnam – but also those that are less recognised,

such as Indonesia, Malaysia, and Thailand.

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Fernanda Albuquerque, Alexandre César Cunha Leite, Crisna Carvalho Pacheco SINO-RUSSIAN ENERGY COOPERATION IN THE POST-COLD WAR (2000-2021)

SINO-RUSSIAN ENERGY COOPERATION IN

THE POST-COLD WAR (2000-2021)1

COOPERAÇÃO ENERGÉTICA SINO-RUSSA NO PÓS

GUERRA FRIA (2000-2021)

COOPERACIÓN ENERGÉTICA SINO-RUSA EN LA POS

GUERRA FRÍA (2000-2021)

Fernanda Albuquerque 2

Alexandre César Cunha Leite 3

Cristina Carvalho Pacheco 4

DOI: 10.5752/P.2317-773X.2023v11n2p29-49

Recebido em: 18 de novembro de 2022

Aprovado em: 21 de março de 2024

ABSTRACT

This article aims to analyze Sino-Russian energy cooperation. Energy coopera-

tion is the cornerstone in the relations between Russia and China. The Rus-

sian interest in this cooperation is to assure demand for the country’s energy

exports, to acquire investment capital, and to benet from Chinese labour. On

the Chinese side, the aim has been to obtain access to Russian natural resources

and to invest surplus capital. Despite the overlap in supply and demand, as well

as the geographical proximity, the Russian energy market is directed towards

Europe, while Chinese energy demand primarily is covered by the Middle East

and Central Asia. The need for energy diversication has changed this situation

and spurred Sino-Russian cooperation. The article is structured in three parts:

it rst presents Sino-Russian energy trade, secondly, it treats the agreements

signed between both countries, and nally, it analyses energy cooperation. We

concluded that this cooperation tends to endure due to the energy-related ties

formed as part of the long-term agreements and construction of infrastructure.

Also, that this cooperation is of a strategic nature for both countries, as it oers

an alternative to other energy relations and provides the necessary room of

maneuver to defend central political and security-related interests.

Keywords: Energy cooperation; Russia; China.

RESUMO

A cooperação energética é o principal elo no relacionamento entre Rússia e Chi-

na. O interesse russo nessa cooperação é, sobretudo, assegurar demanda para

suas exportações energéticas, adquirir capital para investimento e aproveitar a

mão de obra chinesa. E o interesse chinês é ter acesso aos recursos naturais rus-

sos e investir seu capital excedente. Apesar da coincidência de oferta e demanda

e da proximidade geográca, o mercado energético russo é voltado majorita-

1. This article is derived from Fernanda

Albuquerque’s dissertation – with

funding from Coordenação de Aperfei-

çoamento de Pessoal de Ensino Superior

(CAPES) – presented to the Postgradua-

te Program in International Relations at

the State University of Paraíba (UEPB) to

obtain the Master’s degree. The trans-

lation of this article from Portuguese to

English was done by Niels Soenderga-

ard, contact: nielssonder888@gmail.com

2. Internationalist, Master in Interna-

tional Relations and PhD student in

International Relations at San Tiago

Dantas Postgraduate Program (UNESP,

UNICAMP, PUC-SP). Professor at

Centro Universitário Tabosa de Almeida

(Asces-Unita). Contact: fernandaalbu-

querque0@hotmail.com

3. Economist, Master in Political

Economy, and PhD in Social Sciences.

Permanent faculty member at the

State University of Paraíba, coordinator

of the Study and Research Group on

Asia-Paciﬁc (GEPAP/UEPB/CNPq) and

the SACIAR LAB – Political Economy of

Hunger Laboratory (SACIAR LAB/UEPB/

CNPq). Founder of the SACIAR Solidarity

Kitchen. Contact: alexccleite@gmail.com

4. Political Scientist, Master in Political

Science and PhD in Social Sciences.

Permanent faculty member at the State

University of Paraiba, Dean of the Gra-

duate Program in International Relations

at the same institution. CAPES Fulbright

Scholar at American University (2013).

Researcher at the NISUS (National Insti-

tute for the Study of the United States).

Contact: criscpacheco@gmail.com

estudos internacionais • Belo Horizonte, ISSN 2317-773X, v. 11, n. 3, (out. 2023), p. 29-49

riamente para Europa e o fornecimento energético chinês obtido sobretudo do

Oriente Médio e da Ásia Central. É a necessidade de diversicação energética

que inicia a mudança desse cenário e impulsiona a cooperação sino-russa. O

objetivo do artigo consiste em analisar a cooperação energética sino-russa. Para

tanto, o artigo está estruturado em três partes: primeiro, apresenta o comércio

energético sino-russo, em seguida aborda os acordos rmados entre os dois

países; e por m, analisa a cooperação energética. Conclui-se que essa coope-

ração tende a ser duradoura em razão dos vínculos energéticos criados com os

acordos de fornecimento a longo prazo e a construção de infraestruturas. Ade-

mais, constata-se que a cooperação é estratégica para ambos países, pois oferece

alternativa às demais relações energéticas proporcionando a liberdade de ação

necessária para defender seus interesses em questões político-securitárias.

Palavras-chave: Cooperação energética; Rússia; China.

RESUMEN

La cooperación energética es el eslabón principal en la relación entre Rusia y

China. El interés de Rusia en esta cooperación es, sobre todo, asegurar la de-

manda de sus exportaciones energéticas, adquirir capital para invertir y apro-

vechar la mano de obra china. Y el interés chino es tener acceso a los recursos

naturales rusos e invertir su excedente de capital. A pesar de la coincidencia

de oferta y demanda y la proximidad geográca, el mercado energético ruso

se concentra principalmente en Europa y la oferta energética china se obtiene

principalmente de Oriente Medio y Asia Central. Es la necesidad de diversica-

ción energética lo que inicia el cambio en este escenario e impulsa la coopera-

ción chino-rusa. El objetivo del artículo es analizar la cooperación energética

chino-rusa. Para ello, el artículo se estructura en tres partes: primero, presenta

el comercio energético chino-ruso, luego aborda los acuerdos rmados entre los

dos países; y nalmente, analiza la cooperación energética. Se concluye que esta

cooperación tiende a ser duradera debido a los lazos energéticos creados con

acuerdos de suministro a largo plazo y la construcción de infraestructuras. Ade-

más, parece que la cooperación es estratégica para ambos países, ya que ofrece

una alternativa a otras relaciones energéticas, brindándoles la libertad de acción

necesaria para defender sus intereses en temas político-de seguridad.

Palabras clave: Cooperación energética; Rusia; China.

INITIAL CONSIDERATIONS

In December 2019, the pipeline Power of Siberia, was inaugurated,

a result of the “silent agreement” (BBC, 2019) between China and Russia.

The agreement, which was reached in May 2014, encompassed a contract

worth some US$ 400 billion according to which Gazprom committed to

supplying China with 38 billion of m of gas annually, during a period of 30

years, through an oriental route: the Power of Siberia pipeline (Gazprom;

Pallardy, 2020). At the inauguration of Power of Siberia, Xi Jinping (in

power since 2013) declared: “The Eastern route of the Russian-Chinese

gas pipeline is a landmark project of bilateral energy cooperation. It is an

example of deep integration and mutually advantageous cooperation of

our countries” (Tass, 2019).

According to Salin (2011, p. 72) the essence of the bilateral relations

between Russia and China can be resumed by the following sentence

“Russian natural resources in exchange for access to Chinese nancial re-

sources, including conditional loans”. Salin argues that the objective of the

Fernanda Albuquerque, Alexandre César Cunha Leite, Crisna Carvalho Pacheco SINO-RUSSIAN ENERGY COOPERATION IN THE POST-COLD WAR (2000-2021)

Chinese policy of partnership with Russia is to gain access to Russian natu-

ral and energy resources, and also to establish long-term economic ties to

guarantee the continued growth of the Chinese economy; on the Russian

side, the objective is to ensure exports of natural resources and to obtain

Chinese capital and labour (because of the Russian demographic decline).

This article’s goal is to analyze the Sino-Russian energy cooperation

in the period from 2000 to 2021. For this purpose, answers are sought for

the following two questions: how do China and Russia cooperate within

the eld of energy? Which role does this cooperation play within both

countries? Two hypotheses were established in relation to these questions:

hypothesis 1 sustains that China concedes loans and nancing for Russia

in exchange for long-term energy supplies; hypothesis 2 arms that this

corporation is strategic for both countries, as it diversies energy demand

and supply (guaranteeing energy security and economic development)

and consequently, provides a wider room of manoeuvre regarding politi-

cal and security-related matters – such as the Ukraine crisis (2014)5 and the

South China Sea Conicts6 .Since its initial economic opening in the 1970s,

Chinese energy demand has increased markedly. The elevation of indus-

trial, civil, and military consumptionhas repositioned China as the world’s

largest energy importer (Yilmaz; Daksueva, 2017, p. 2). According to BP

(2022, p. 8), China is the largest global primary energy consumer7 (26,5%).

Russia, on the other hand, is the largest global exporter of oil (12,3%)

and natural gas through pipelines8 (28,6%) and occupies the place as the

second-largest global producer of oil (with 12,2%, the same amount as

Saudi Arabia, behind only the United States (18,5%)) and natural gas (with

17,4%) and the sixth-largest global producer of coal (with 5,5%) (BP, 2022,

p. 15, 27, 29, 37, 38)). The background for this position of energy domi-

nance vary from an abundance of natural reserves9 , a highly developed

energy sector during the Cold War, to the investments made by Moscow

within this sector in recent decades (Hill, 2004, p. 47).

Despite signicant investments within the sector, Russia still needs

to modernize its energy infrastructure (Putin, 1999, p. 51), as it suers

from: 1) a high degree of depreciation of capital goods within the Fuel and

Energy Complex (FEC) (nearly 60% within the gas industry and electrical

energy and 80% within the oil renement industry) apart from a mini-

mum replacement of these goods – between 2005-2015, the replacement

rate was approximately 2%, – with an exception for oil extraction, which

was 4%; 2) technological backwardness in relation to the average level

of technology within energy industries (Kuznetsova, N.; Kuznetsova,

E., 2015, p. 164-165); 3) aging infrastructure; and 4) the need for increa-

sed energy eciency (Bushev 2014 apud Kuznetsova, N.; Kuznetsova, E.,

2015, p. 166). Moreover, oil and gas represent half (58,7%) of goods exports

(World Bank Group, 2018, p. V), which along with service exports repre-

sent more than ¼ (30,7% in 2018) of Russian GDP (World Bank, no data).

It is hereby evident that Russia needs investment in order to deve-

lop and modernize its energy infrastructure. Conversely, China requires

energy resources to maintain its economic growth rates, while it posses-

ses capital to construct the necessary infrastructure for its energy supply

(Bolt, 2014, p. 50-52).

5. The crisis was marked by a series

of protests, supposedly incited by the

United States and the European Union,

against former Ukrainian President,

Victor Yanukovych, not to sign a trade

agreement with the European Union.

The onset of the crisis resulted in the

destitution of Yanukovych from the pre-

sidency and the annexation of Crimea

by Russia.

6. The divergences in this region regard

a dispute about maritime resources

spread over four island groups (amongst

which are the islands of Spratly and

Paracel) and the delimitation of territo-

rial waters claimed by China, Taiwan,

Vietnam, the Philippines, Indonesia, Ma-

laysia, and Brunei. The situation is made

worse by the participation of external

actors, such as the US, Japan, India,

and Australia who are attracted by the

strategic importance of these waters

(Yilmaz; Daksueva, 2017, p. 20).

7. This estimate includes petroleum,

natural gas, coal, nuclear energy,

hydroelectricity and renewables (BP,

2022, p. 9).

8. The largest global exporter of

Liquiﬁed Natural Gas (LNG) is Australia,

which represents 20,9% of global

exports (BP, 2022, p. 36).

9. Russia retains the largest natural

gas reserves in the world (19,8%), the

second largest coal reserves (15,2%)

and the sixth-largest oil reserves (6,1%)

(BP, 2019, p. 14, 30, 42).

estudos internacionais • Belo Horizonte, ISSN 2317-773X, v. 11, n. 3, (out. 2023), p. 29-49

Traditionally, in Russia, this sector has been mainly aimed at

Europe, while the Chinese energy supplies have primarily been obtained

from the Middle East (oil) and Central Asia (gas). According to Yilmaz

and Daksueva (2017, p. 8-9), the aspiration to change this situation and

the consequent evolution of the Sino-Russia energy relations takes place

as a response to two dierent types of challenges: 1) geopolitical – more

precisely the Conicts in the South Chinese Sea and the Ukrainian Crisis

(2014) – which resulted in the annexation of Crimea by Russia and in the

subsequent sanctions; and 2) geoeconomic, as both aim to deepen their

energy relations, given that Russian exports are mainly directed towards

the European market (See Graph 1 and 4), and as the Chinese oil imports

mainly originate from West Africa and the Middle East (nearly 60% – See

Graph 2).

Russia becomes relevant for China as an energy exporter (Salin,

2011, p. 60; Gabuev, 2015, p. 2), due to the Chinese concern related to the

country’s oil imports from West Africa and the Middle East, which are

transported by sea routes and pass through the Malacca Strait, a point

which could become blocked in the case of an escalation of conict in the

South China Sea. Moreover, the political instability in the Middle East

is another factor of Chinese preoccupation concerning its energy supply

(Yilmaz; Daksueva, 2017, p. 7-25). In Salin’s analysis (2011, p. 61), Russia is

the only supplier which can guarantee a stable ow in the case of military

conict between Beijing and Washington or if the situation in the South

China Sea simply becomes too unstable.

Russia, on the other hand, has become increasingly focused on

its Turn to the East, since the 2000s, due to the Asian economic growth

(Lukin, 2019, p. 1-2). In its ocial foreign policy documents Moscow ar-

ms that the Western ability to dominate the global economy and politics

is decreasing, while global power and development potential is shifting

towards the Asia-Pacic (Mid, 2013, 2016). Trenin (2015, p. 33-34) views

this shift in the politico-economic pole towards the Asia-Pacic as the

main motivation for the Russian reorientation towards the East.

Two events have contributed to accelerate the Russian reorien-

tation towards the East: the global nancial crisis, which took place in

2008, and the Ukrainian crisis six years later. The nancial crisis aected

the Russian economy, which was in need of rebalancing, but the country

could not seek assistance from the West, which itself was in the course of

reviving its economy (Trenin, 2015, p. 33). The eect of the nancial crisis

of 2008 which was felt most by the Russians was, according to Sussex

(2014, p. 215), the lack of liquidity and the increasingly expensive credit

which its energy companies faced. This was the case with Gazprom. As a

consequence of this, China conceded loans to Russia for the construction

of energy infrastructure in 2009 (energy for loans) (Sussex, 2014, p. 215).

The second episode regards the political and economic crisis faced by

Ukraine towards the end of 2013 and early 2014 that resulted in Russian

annexation of Crimea and Western sanctions imposed on Russia.

According to Kaczmarski (2015, p. 12-13), the nancial crisis of 2008

led to 1) the end of the “Russian economic renaissance of the 2000s” – as

the Russian economy was incapable of resuming the pace of growth that

Fernanda Albuquerque, Alexandre César Cunha Leite, Crisna Carvalho Pacheco SINO-RUSSIAN ENERGY COOPERATION IN THE POST-COLD WAR (2000-2021)

had marked the period before the crisis and eventually stagnated; 2) the

recession of the European and American economies which resorted to

austerity policies; and 3) the acceleration of the Chinese ascension (that

had its beginning from the 1990s) – which despite having suered from

an increase in unemployment and a reduction of economic growth still

was much more modestly impacted than the Western powers.

By redirecting its trade and investment strategies towards Asia,

Russia concentrated on China (Lukin, 2019, p. 1-2). The focus on China

can be explained by the fact that this is the second-largest global eco-

nomy, which held signicant capital stocks (Bolt, 2014, p. 50-52) and fur-

thermore also was one of the main energy consumers and importers.

The combination of these factors made China the ideal partner for Russia

which needed to guarantee its energy demand and nancial resources to

develop its economy (Salin, 2011, p. 72).

In sum, the two states deepened their energy cooperation as a stra-

tegy for export and import diversication which has proved to be com-

patible and complementary and as a response to geopolitical challenges

(Yilmaz; Daksueva, 2017, p. 7-9). With this in mind, seeking to analyze

the Sino-Russian energy cooperation between 2000 and 2021, this article

is structured in three parts: the rst presents the Sino-Russian energy

trade, the second engages with the agreements signed between the two

countries, and the third analyses energy cooperation.

SINO-RUSSIAN ENERGY TRADE

In 1996, Beijing and Moscow established the Russian-Chinese

Energy Cooperation Committee which strengthened the bilateral coope-

ration. However, in this period, as Xu and Reisinger (2018, p. 3) highlight,

the Chinese demand for Russian energy resources was still suppressed.

The relation between Beijing and Moscow became closer when the two

countries in 2001 signed the Treaty of Good Neighborliness and Friendly

Cooperation (Yilmaz; Daksueva, 2017, p. 2). However, it was only from

2008, when another mechanism was established, the Russia-China Energy

Dialogue (RCED), that the Sino-Russian energy cooperation entered a

trajectory of rapid development. According to Xu and Reisinger (2018, p.

3-12), this occurred because practically all bilateral cooperation initiati-

ves within the energy sector from 2008 were discussed and eectuated

within the RCED. For example, it was from this year that Russia ceased

selling gas to China at the same price at which it sold to the European

market. The RCED permitted a more pragmatic price determination and

cooperation was intensied (Xu; Reisinger, 2018, p. 12).

Guided by the deterioration of relations with the West and by eco-

nomic interests, after the Ukraine Crisis (2014), which resulted in the

annexation of Crimea by Russia and the imposition of North-American

and European sanctions on the country, Moscow became increasingly

oriented towards Beijing. Due to the increase in energy consumption,

China became the natural destination for Russia to oset the losses it had

incurred because of the sanctions and the decreasing oil prices (Yilmaz;

Daksueva, 2017, p. 9). The Chinese nancial power also paved the way for

estudos internacionais • Belo Horizonte, ISSN 2317-773X, v. 11, n. 3, (out. 2023), p. 29-49

large energy agreements which involved extensive investments in logisti-

cs, construction, and maintenance works (Yilmaz; Daksueva, 2017, p. 9).

Currently, China is the main destination for Russian oil exports (ac-

counting for 30% of foreign demand) and coal exports (24%) – see Graph 1.

Graph 1- Destination of Russian oil and coal exports in 2021

Author’s elaboration based on data from BP (2022, p. 27, 40).

While Russia is the second crude oil (15%) and coal (22%) supplier

to China – see Graph 2. The main crude oil supplier to China is Saudi

Arabia (17%), which since 2001 had been at the top of the list (DOWNS,

2018) in most of the years. Regarding coal, Indonesia (49%) is the main

supplier of commodities to China – see Graph 2.

Graph 2 – Origin of the Chinese crude oil and coal imports in 2021

Author’s elaboration based on data from BP (2022, p. 27,40).

Fernanda Albuquerque, Alexandre César Cunha Leite, Crisna Carvalho Pacheco SINO-RUSSIAN ENERGY COOPERATION IN THE POST-COLD WAR (2000-2021)

The oil trade between Russia and China grew under favorable geo-

graphical and economic conditions. In geographical terms, Russia posses-

ses large oil and natural gas elds in Eastern Siberia, a border region to

the industrialized Northeastern China. In economic terms, the Russian

economy is blessed with resources that complement the Chinese indus-

trial base (Yilmaz; Daksueva, 2017, p. 3-4).

The energy trade has created such a strong link between the

Russian and Chinese economies that the decline in the Chinese GDP gro-

wth – which can be observed since 2014 (Spellman; Leite, 2020) – worries

Kremlin because a decrease in Chinese growth (which also would af-

fect the country’s energy consumption) could seriously compromise the

Russian economy (Xu; Reisinger, 2018, p. 15).

Russia supplies oil to China through two pipelines: the Eastern

Siberia-Pacic Ocean (ESPO), the Eastern supply route (the Taishet-

Skovorodino route (ESPO 1, concluded in 2009) Skovorodino-Kozmino (ESPO

2, concluded in 2012) Skovorodino-Daqing (China Spur, concluded in 2010));

and the Omsk-Pavlodar-Atasu Pipeline, in operation since 1980, which su-

pplies China through a Western route which leaves Omsk in Russia and

passes through Kazakhstan until reaching China (EIA 2017, 13-14).

In relation to Liqueed Natural Gas (LNG), China (16%) is the se-

cond destination of Russian exports, while in Russian natural gas exports

by pipeline, China stand at a much lower position, responsible for only

4% of the foreign demand – see Graph 3.

Graph 3 – Destination of Russian natural gas exports in 2021

Own elaboration based on data from BP (2022, p. 36-37).

The Chinese imports of natural gas can be divided into two categories:

imports via pipeline, coming mainly from Central Asia (See Graph 4); and

imports via ship, in this case of LNG coming mainly from Australia (40%,

see Graph 4). China imports more LNG (109,5 bcm) than natural gas via

pipeline (53,2 bcm) (BP, 2022, p. 35-37). Despite the low presence of Russian

natural gas within the Chinese economy, which only represents 6% of the

country’s LNG imports – see Graph 4, – the agreements signed in recent

years – the theme of the next section – point to a change in this situation.

estudos internacionais • Belo Horizonte, ISSN 2317-773X, v. 11, n. 3, (out. 2023), p. 29-49

Graph 4 – Origin of Chinese Natural Gas imports in 2021

Own elaboration based on data from BP (2022, p. 36-37).

The low level of the Chinese imports of natural gas from Russia is

understandable when considering that China only began to import na-

tural gas from 2007 (EIA, 2015, p. 16), and, even so, still produces 55% of

its consumption (BP, 2022, p. 29-31). Moreover, when China began im-

porting natural gas, the small amounts did not attract Gazprom’s inte-

rest, which directed Chinese buyers towards Central Asia, and especially

Turkmenistan (Gabuev, 2015, p. 3).

In Gabuev’s perspective (2015, p. 3), the Chinese orientation towards

natural gas from Turkmenistan (which accounts for 59% of Chinese natu-

ral gas imports – see Graph 4) can be explained by Moscow’s preoccupa-

tion with its position on the European market and Gazprom’s lack of in-

terest in the Chinese market (which derives from the depressed demand,

low prices, and Chinese state regulation). In cooperation with Central

Asia, China hereby constructed the Central Asia-China pipeline (bet-

ween 2007 and 2009), which has its point of departure in Turkmenistan

and passes through Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan before arriving in the

Chinese Xinjiang region (Estadão, 2009). Apart from alleviating the im-

mediate Chinese demand for Russian natural gas, it also became an im-

portant bargaining chip for China during the energy negotiations with

Moscow in 2010 and in the agreement of 2014 with Gazprom. Later, the

Chinese energy imports from Turkmenistan awoke Gazprom’s interest

in the Chinese market (Xu; Reisinger, 2018, p. 8-10).

China and Russia have conicting energy interests in Central Asia

– a region that holds large natural gas reserves as well as a strategic po-

sition between the two countries and the Middle East. With economic

gains in mind, Russia controls the energy infrastructure – because it ob-

tains energy cheaply and resells to Europe – and views the region as part

of its sphere of inuence, meaning that it does not permit the intrusion

of other states. China, on the other hand, is interested in investing, in

intensifying economic relations, and in increasing energy imports from

Central Asia through energy contracts and infrastructure development,

which converges with the Russian objectives in the region10 (Bolt, 2014, p.

10. On the other hand, the two countries

share political and security interests in

Central Asia. Both seek to diminish the

North American inﬂuence and to main-

tain regional stability. For this purpose,

they seek to eradicate the “three evils”

– “terrorism, separatism, and religious

extremism”, and to limit military North

American military bases in Central Asia

and avoid the eruption of new Colored

Revolutions (ZIEGLER, 2010, p. 233-237).

One instrument of cooperation between

the two countries in Central Asia is the

Shanghai Cooperation Organization

(SCO), a bloc of Asian regional integra-

tion led by China and Russia.

Fernanda Albuquerque, Alexandre César Cunha Leite, Crisna Carvalho Pacheco SINO-RUSSIAN ENERGY COOPERATION IN THE POST-COLD WAR (2000-2021)

60-61). Bolt (2014, p. 60) highlights that beyond China and Russia, many

countries – such as the United States, India, Pakistan, Iran, and Turkey –

also seek inuence in Central Asia.

The Russian gas supply to China is shipped through two chan-

nels. The LNG from the Yamal peninsula is transported by cargo ships

through the Northern Sea Route (equivalent to the “Summer Route” on

Map 1) or by the Western Route via the Suez Canal (equivalent to the

“Winter Route” on Map 1) – varying according to the time of the year

(Reuters, 2018; Lng World News, 2018).

Map 1 – Supply Routes of the Yamal LNG Project

Source: Bianco (2018)

And the natural gas is shipped by the pipeline Power of Siberia (see

Map 2), with supply beginning in December 2019 (GAZPROM).

estudos internacionais • Belo Horizonte, ISSN 2317-773X, v. 11, n. 3, (out. 2023), p. 29-49

Map 2 – The Power of Siberia pipeline

Source: Gazprom

The main destinations of Russian energy exports are China and

Europe (EIA, 2017, p. 11, 21, 28). Although Europe as a whole holds an

important position as a consumer of Russian energy resources (see Graph

1 and Graph 3), examining the countries individually, China becomes

distinguished and surpasses the European countries as the largest desti-

nation of Russian oil and coal exports (as it holds the rst place in terms

of oil (30%) and coal exports (24% – see Graph 1), and only becomes less

relevant regarding natural gas by pipeline (4% – see Graph 3).

The next section presents the agreements signed between China

and Russia since 2000, highlighting the continuity and maybe even an

increase in the energy trade between China and Russia.

ENERGY AGREEMENTS BETWEEN RUSSIA AND CHINA

The Sino-Russian energy cooperation already encompasses trade

in energy resources, investments within the energy sector, equity parti-

cipation, infrastructure development, technological exchanges, nuclear

energy projects and even explorations in the Arctic (Yilmaz; Daksueva,

2017, p. 2-10).

Energy cooperation is a vital instrument for the obtainment of

Russian objectives, including strategic interactions with China (Yilmaz;

Daksueva, 2017). The Russian interest in energy cooperation with China

is, above all, to guarantee demand for its natural resources, to acquire in-

vestment capital within the energy sector, and to benet from Chinese la-

bour (Salin, 2011, p. 73). The Chinese interest in energy cooperation with

Russia consists in: 1) guaranteeing energy security through diversication

Fernanda Albuquerque, Alexandre César Cunha Leite, Crisna Carvalho Pacheco SINO-RUSSIAN ENERGY COOPERATION IN THE POST-COLD WAR (2000-2021)

of its sources of energy supply (Yilmaz; Daksueva, 2017; Salin, 2011, p. 60);

2) invest its surplus capital; and 3) intensify its trade interactions (Bolt,

2014, p. 50-57).

In Xu and Reisinger’s analysis (2018, p. 2), the literature points to

various factors which spur Sino-Russian energy trade, such as 1) the over-

lap in supply and demand – the Chinese energy needs and abundancy of

Russian energy reserves; 2) the deterioration of Russian relations with the

West – this has incentivized Moscow to go beyond pragmatic and short-

-term energy agreements with China and to move towards strategic coo-

peration; 3) the Russian aspiration to use energy cooperation with China

to promote its economic status in Northeast Asia and the Asia Pacic; and

nally 4) Moscow’s interest in promoting economic development in the

Far East and in Eastern Siberia.

Throughout the 21st Century, various energy agreements were sig-

ned between the two countries. According to Meidan (2016, p. 11), in 2005

China conceded the rst oil-backed loan to Russia, in line with which the

China National Petroleum Corporation – CNPC lend US$ 6 billion to

Rosneft as a payment in advance for the supply of 48,8 million tons of oil

until 2010 (Trevisan, p. 2005).

In 2009, the Russian companies Rosneft and Transneft obtained a

loan of US$ 25 billion with the China Development Bank (CDB). As part

of this transaction, it was agreed that Transneft would receive US$ 10

billion (the necessary amount in order to conclude the construction of

the ESPO pipeline without delay), while Rosneft would receive another

US$ 15 billion, and in exchange, the company committed to supplying 15

million tons of oil annually during 20 years (the equivalent of 300 mil-

lion tons in total, as a value of approximately US$ 90 billion) (Paxton;

Soldatkin, 2009). As a result of this agreement, in January 2001, Russia be-

gan shipping oil to China through the ESPO pipeline (BOLT, 2014, p. 54).

In June 2013, Rosneft made an agreement worth US$ 270 billion

with the CNPC, as part of which it committed to supplying 300 thousand

barrels of oil per day to China during 25 years from 2015; a total of 256

million tons of oil (BBC, 2013; Clover, 2013; Exame, 2013). In October the

same year, Rosneft signed a contract of US$ 85 billion with Sinopec, a

Chinese oil rening company, as part of which it committed to supplying

the company with some 100 million tons of crude oil for a ten years pe-

riod (Rosneft, 2013; RT, 2013; Petronotícias, 2013). In this round of nego-

tiations in October 2013, Novatek (a Russian Natural gas company) com-

mitted to supplying three million tons of LNG annually to CNPC for 15

years (Rosneft, 2013; RT, 2013; Estadão, 2013; Petronotícias, 2013).

In May 2014, Gazprom and the Chinese State-Owned Company,

CNPC, signed a contract at the value of US$ 400 billion, which determi-

ned that Gazprom during 30 years would supply 38 billion m3 of natural

gas annually to China through the Power of Siberia pipeline, which was

inaugurated in December 2019 (Gazprom; Pallardy, 2020). It is important

to highlight that this agreement has been under negotiation for ten years

and the price of gas, which always has been a cause of disagreement bet-

ween Russia and China, – and even blocked negotiations, – was kept se-

cret, including after the signature of the contract (Wan; Hauslohner, 2014).

estudos internacionais • Belo Horizonte, ISSN 2317-773X, v. 11, n. 3, (out. 2023), p. 29-49

In 2015, Gazprom and the CNPC signed a preliminary agreement

according to which Russia would ship some 30 billion m3 of gas annually

to China through the Eastern Route – the pipeline Power of Siberia-2

(Gazprom, 2015; Tass, 2017). Although the project still is on the drawing

board, relevant questions such as the price of gas have still not been sett-

led. Gazprom plans to launch Power of Siberia-2 in 2030 (Pallardy, 2020).

Chinese companies also invest – through equity acquisition – in

the Russian gas and oil exploration. Amongst the agreements, one was

concluded between Rosneft and CNPC to jointly develop the oil and gas

elds in Eastern Siberia, while another regards the contract between

Rosneft and Sinopec to jointly develop of elds of Russkoye and Yurubcheno-

Tokhomskoye (Yilmaz; Daksueva, 2017, p. 5).

In 2016, the Export-Import Bank of China (Exim) and the China

Development Bank (CDB) committed to supplying US$ 12 billion,

throughout a 15 years period, to nance the Yamal LNG Project, led by

Novatek (Bermingham, 2016; Africa Reuters, 2016). Situated on the Yamal

Peninsula (a region rich in natural gas of the Arctic Siberia), the project en-

compasses production, liquication and transport of natural gas (Sputnik,

2018; Sahuquillo, 2018). Sahuquillo (2018) highlights that this is the energy

project with the largest Chinese participation in Russia – approximately

30% divided between CNPC (20%) and the Silk Road Fund (9,9%), the

rest of the stocks are held by Novatek (50,1%) and the French Total (20%)

(Africa Reuters, 2016; Efe, 2017; Sputnik, 2018; Sahuquillo, 2018) – without

Chinese investment, this project would not have been possible.

The main destination of the LNG produced in Yamal are Asia (54%)

and Europe (46%) (Exame, 2017) with the main focus on the East, al-

though the Russian icebreakers can travel all year departing from Sabetta

(see Map 1) heading West and only six months in the direction Eastwards,

given that the ice obstructs and sometimes hinders sailing (Sahuquillo,

2018; Escarda, 2017).

In July 2018, Novatek delivered the rst shipment of LNG to Yamal

to China via the Northern Sea Route – equivalent to the Summer Route

on Map 1 (Arctic Bulk; Reuters, 2018; Novatek, 2018). The deliveries of

LNG from the port in Sabetta to China via the Northern Sea Route are

signicant because they diminish the time and costs of transportation

when compared with the rst LNG shipment from Yamal to China, whi-

ch took place through the Western Route – equivalent to the Winter

Route on Map 1 – in April that year (Reuters, 2018; Lng World News,

2018; Novatek, 2018; Sun, 2018).

Table 1 resumes the energy agreements presented in this study, al-

beit it does not necessarily comprise all the contracts signed between the

two countries. It nonetheless provides an overview of the intense Sino-

Russian energy cooperation.

Fernanda Albuquerque, Alexandre César Cunha Leite, Crisna Carvalho Pacheco SINO-RUSSIAN ENERGY COOPERATION IN THE POST-COLD WAR (2000-2021)

Table 1 – Energy agreements between Russia and China (2000-2021)

X: Information not available.-

Author’s elaboration11

Downs (2018) argues that the trend is that Russia will remain as the

main source of oil for China due to political and infrastructure-related

reasons, and because of the long-term contracts – as presented in Table 1.

The commitments described in Table 1 do not only maintain – for

decades – the Chinese demand for Russian energy resources, as the in-

crease in consumption at the cost of other suppliers would suggest. The

long-term supply contracts sealed the Russian and Chinese energy part-

nerships for at least 29 years. After this period, the trend is that the Sino-

Russian energy trade will extend for many more decades to compensate

for the signicant investment in the construction of energy infrastructu-

re – the ESPO and Power of Siberia – in order to connect their countries.

Moreover, the Chinese imports of Russian energy resources tend to in-

crease due to the growing capacity and ease of transportation with the

construction of the ESPO and Power of Siberia pipelines, and because of

the problems in the South China Sea which could make the country redi-

rect parts of its imports from the Middle East and West Africa to Russia.

It is also important to highlight how these agreements impact

the current situation of low Chinese imports from Russian gas and lead

China, in the near future, to the group of the main Russian gas con-

sumers. The main agreement signed concerning natural gas (between

Gazprom and CNPC at a value of US$ 400 billion) and the energy project

with the largest Chinese participation in Russia is the Yamal LNG Project

(Sahuquillo, 2018) which already has entered operation. Apart from this,

the Chinese natural gas imports tend to increase because of an ongoing

change in the Chinese energy matrix in the direction of resources that

emit fewer gasses with a polluting eect on the atmosphere and which

tend to burn more eciently (Yilmaz And Daksueva, 2017, p. 6).

It can thus be concluded, that the Sino-Russian energy trade is per-

sistent and that the two countries tend to become increasingly important

for each other within the energy sector. The next section analyses the

Sino-Russian energy cooperation and its eects.

11. Based on data from Meidan (2016,

11); Trevisan (2005); Paxton, Soldatkin

(2009); Bbc (2013); Clover (2013);

Exame (2013); Rosneft (2013); Rt (2013);

Estadão (2013); Petronotícias (2013);

Gazprom; Pallardy (2020); Gazprom

(2015); Tass (2017); Bermingham (2016);

Africa Reuters (2016).

estudos internacionais • Belo Horizonte, ISSN 2317-773X, v. 11, n. 3, (out. 2023), p. 29-49

ANALYSIS OF THE SINO-RUSSIAN ENERGY COOPERATION

In the RCED negotiations, Xu and Reisinger (2018, p. 12) conclude

that the Chinese ability to shape the agenda is superior to that of Russia,

given that nearly all the proposals initiated by China have been conclu-

ded and the changes in the themes of the RCED mainly reect Chinese

interests (Russia has been relatively passive in terms of dening the agen-

da from 2008 until 2015). It also became evident that Russia makes use of

price manipulation of energy resources as its principal method to inuen-

ce the bargaining process (Xu; Reisinger, 2018, p. 12).

The Russian inability to dene the agenda could be associated with

the economic disparities between China and Russia. Moscow needs to

strengthen its economic capacity to obtain an advantageous position in

the process of energy bargaining with Beijing (Xu; Reisinger, 2018, p. 16).

There is also a disparity in terms of commercial relevance, in which

China is much more important to Russia than that country is to China;

while China holds the rst place on the ranking of the origin of imports

(with 20%) and destination of Russian exports (with 11%) (OEC), Russia

is only the 11th most important source of imports (with 2,5%) and the 10th

most important destination of Chinese exports (with 1,8%, at a similar le-

vel to the Netherlands and Singapore) (OECa). Moreover, the very struc-

ture of trade relations of the two countries – in which Moscow mainly

exports raw materials (53% crude oil, (OEC)) and imports industrialized

products (10% transmission equipment’s, 5,7% automatic data processing

machines and magnetic readers, amongst others (OECa)) – represents a

disadvantage for the Russian Federation (Kaczmarski, 2015, p. 21).

Independently of the abovementioned circumstances, it is a fact

that the Sino-Russian energy cooperation has proved itself to be essential

and benevolent to both countries, as it spurs energy diversication and

consequently, a higher degree of freedom of action in relation to politi-

cal and security-related crises, such as the Ukraine Crisis (2014) and the

Conicts in the South China Sea.

The Ukraine Crisis (2014) resulted in the annexation of Crimea

by Russia and in subsequent western sanctions on Moscow. The Sino-

Russian energy cooperation has eased the eects of the sanctions (Yilmaz;

Daksueva, 2017, p. 3) in relation to energy demand, capital and technolo-

gy – given that, 1) energy trade has intensied, as Russia has become the

main oil supplier to China from 2016 (Downs, 2018) and China has incor-

porated Russian natural gas within its economy with the US$ 400 billion

agreement between Gazprom and CNPC12 – see Table 1; 2) the Chinese

investments in Russia increased from 2014 – see Figure 1; 3) China and

Russia have engaged in technological exchanges, at least in the construc-

tion of the Power of Siberia pipeline (Yilmaz; Daksueva, 2017, p. 9-10).

The Western sanctions imposed on Moscow limit the access of cer-

tain Russian nancial institutions to Western capital markets, isolating them

from the nancial centers of London and New York. Therefore, the Russian

authorities sought to substitute Western credit, with credit from Chinese

nancial institutions, successfully securing the following investments: 1)

Chinese nancing for the Yamal LNG project (see Table 1); 2) loans for the

12. Established in May 2014, this agree-

ment has been under negotiation for 20

years and was announced shortly after

the US Secretary of the Treasury asked

China to refrain from steps which could

limit the impact of Western sanctions

on China (YILMAZ; DAKSUEVA, 2017,

p. 18-19).

Fernanda Albuquerque, Alexandre César Cunha Leite, Crisna Carvalho Pacheco SINO-RUSSIAN ENERGY COOPERATION IN THE POST-COLD WAR (2000-2021)

Vnesheconombank (VEB) and the VTB, state-owned Russian nancial institu-

tions; and 3) the creation of a joint investment between the China Investment

Corporation and the Russian Direct Investment Fund (Gabuev, 2015, p. 3-5).

Figure 1 illustrates that in 2014 – the year of the Ukraine Crisis and

the subsequent Western sanctions imposed on Moscow – China invested

heavily in Russia, and in the following years, although the level of invest-

ments did diminish, they still remained higher than before the Ukraine

Crisis (with exception only of 2010). Hence, Figure 1 suggests a trend of

Chinese support for Russia and boycott of the sanctions imposed by the

US and the European Union.

Figure 1 – Chinese investment in Russia (2003-2018)

Source: Spivak and Foy (2019)

Xu and Reisinger (2018, p. 4-5) stress how personalism is a strong

characteristic in the Russian political structure, which has been even

more evident in the energy diplomacy towards China, in which Putin

personally impacts negotiations. Vladimir Putin has proved to be positi-

vely minded to opening the energy sector to Chinese companies, to in-

terfere in order to conclude energy agreements, and to participate in mul-

tilateral cooperation led by China, thus, demonstrating a Sino-Russian

unity in relation to international issues. In exchange, Xi Jinping is also

more inclined to provide economic nancing to Russia, especially within

the eld of energy (Xu; Reisinger, 2018, p. 5-13).

Even with the intensication of the Russia-China cooperation after

2014, it is still evident that China does not possess the necessary condi-

tions to completely substitute the West as an energy market, and as a

source of capital and technology (Gabuev, 2015, p. 1-8), however, the Sino-

Russian relations have eased the eects of the sanctions through an in-

crease in the energy imports and Chinese investments in Russia (Yilmaz;

Daksueva, 2017, p. 3).

estudos internacionais • Belo Horizonte, ISSN 2317-773X, v. 11, n. 3, (out. 2023), p. 29-49

The increase of the Chinese investments in Russia and the rise in

imports of Russian energy resources by China provides Moscow with an

alternative to the Western nancial institutions and the European energy

demand, which results in a larger room of maneuver for Russia regarding

questions concerning which the country diverges from the West, such as

the expansion of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), of the

European Union, and the Ukraine Crisis (2014).

The Russian energy supply to China has also played an important

role in relation to political and security-related matters of this Asian coun-

try, especially regarding the Conicts in the South China Sea, as it repre-

sents an alternative to the energy resources of the Middle East and West

Africa, which is transported through maritime routes that pass through the

Malacca Strait, – a place which could become blocked in case that the South

China Sea Conicts deteriorate. Hence, the Russian energy shipments ser-

ve to reassure China with regards to its energy supply and provides a higher

degree of freedom to act more assertively within the region, without wor-

rying about how a US naval blockade could cut o vital energy supplies

(Yilmaz; Daksueva, 2017, p. 8-23). The recent Chinese signals – such as the

development of islands, the implementation of a system of defense on re-

cently constructed islands, and the increasing activity of the Chinese Navy

and Coast Guard in the South China Sea – constitute examples of the increa-

sed Chinese room of maneuver in the region provided by the energy coo-

peration with Russia. Thus, this cooperation bestows energy security for

China, and, consequently, the freedom of action which the country needs

to defend its interests within the region (Yilmaz; Daksueva, 2017, p. 23).

Hence, the Ukrainian Crisis (2014) and the Conicts in the South

China Sea shed light on the importance of the Sino-Russian energy coo-

peration for both countries, not only in economic terms but also with

regards to political and security issues.

FINAL CONSIDERATIONS

Energy cooperation is the main link in the Sino-Russian rela-

tionship. China is one of the largest consumers of energy in the world

and Russia is one of the main global energy exporters and producers.

Because of the aging infrastructure and the inferiority and technological

backwardness of the FEC, Russia needs investments to develop and mo-

dernize its energy infrastructure, while China needs energy resources

to maintain its economic growth, while the country possesses capital to

invest and construct the necessary infrastructure to support its energy

supply. Despite the overlap in supply and demand, as well as the geogra-

phical proximity, the Russian energy market is mainly aimed towards

Europe, while Chinese energy supply primarily is met by the Middle East

(oil) and Central Asia (gas).

The ambitions to change this situation and the subsequent evolu-

tion of the Sino-Russian energy relations has taken place as a response

to two challenges: 1) geopolitical – more precisely the South China Sea

conicts and the Ukraine Crisis (2014) – and 2) geoeconomic – the need to

diversify energy relations.

Fernanda Albuquerque, Alexandre César Cunha Leite, Crisna Carvalho Pacheco SINO-RUSSIAN ENERGY COOPERATION IN THE POST-COLD WAR (2000-2021)

The Crisis of 2008 and the western sanctions imposed as a conse-

quence of the Ukrainian Crisis (2014) highlighted Kremlin’s dependency

on the European energy and nancial markets, accentuating the Russian

need for energy diversication and a new source of capital, both available

within the Chinese market.

Russia, therefore, redirected its trade and investment strategies to-

wards China. China, on the other hand, resorted to increasing imports

of Russian energy resources to guarantee the necessary energy supply to

secure the growth of its economy, given that more than half of Chinese

oil imports originate from the Middle East and West Africa, and are

transported through a space vulnerable to blockades (the Malacca Strait).

Moreover, the political instability in the Middle East also worries the

Chinese leaders as this could threaten Chinese energy security.

Therefore, the two states have undertaken energy cooperation as

an export and import diversication strategy which has proven to be

compatible and complementary. The Russian interest in energy coopera-

tion with China is, above all, to ensure demand for its energy exports, to

acquire investment capital within the energy sector, and to apply Chinese

labour. Another Chinese interest is to gain access to Russian natural re-

sources to guarantee its energy security and invest surplus capital.

The energy cooperation between Russia and China encompasses

trade in energy resources, investment within the energy sector, infras-

tructure development, technological exchange, and even exploration of

the Arctic. More specically, the energy cooperation involves: 1) the esta-

blishment of agreements according to which Chinese companies – such as

CNPC, CDB, and Sinopec – concede loans to Russian energy companies

– such as Rosnoft, Transneft, Novatek, and Gazprom – in exchange for

long-term energy supply; 2) construction of pipelines which connect the

two countries – ESPO and Power of Siberia; and 3) Chinese investment

in energy projects – such as the Yamal LNG Project and the development

of Russian gas and oil exploration elds in Eastern Siberia, by Russkoye

and Yurubcheno-Tokhomskoye.All these agreements reect the intensity of

the Sino-Russian energy cooperation and its tendency of continuity at

the cost of other partners. This is because Beijing and Moscow have tied

energy supplies to their economies’ demand for years (even decades) into

the future with long-term supply contracts, and also sought to maintain

– and even increase – their energy relations when investing in joint ener-

gy projects, such as the construction of the ESPO and Power of Siberia,

given that these pipelines harness the capacity, and facilitate and chea-

pen the transport of commodities and represent a signicant investment,

compensated only with intense trade in the coming decades. Moreover,

the problems in the South China Sea could make Beijing redirect part of

its imports from the Middle East and West Africa to Russia.

These agreements also suggest a change in the current situation of

low Chinese imports of Russian natural gas, and tend to push China to-

wards the group of main consumers of Russian gas, as the largest energy

agreement signed was related exactly to natural gas (between Gazprom

and CNPC at a value of US$ 400 billion) and the energy project with the

largest Chinese participation in Russia is the Yamal LNG Project. Apart

estudos internacionais • Belo Horizonte, ISSN 2317-773X, v. 11, n. 3, (out. 2023), p. 29-49

from this, the Chinese imports of Russian natural gas tend to increase

due to the construction of the Power of Siberia pipeline, and to the on-

going change in the Chinese energy matrix towards resources that emit

less polluting gases in the atmosphere and that burn more eciently.

By increasing imports of Russian energy resources and investments

in Russia, China reduces the eects of the Western sanctions imposed on

that country and provides Moscow with an alternative to the Western

nancial institutions and to the European energy market, which gives a

higher degree of freedom to Russia in relation to issues around which the

country diverges from the West. On the other hand, the Russian energy

supply reduces the Chinese dependency on hydrocarbon resources from

the Middle East and West Africa (the transport of which is susceptible

to Western blockades) representing an alternative for China, which as-

sists the country with regards to its energy supply and provides a higher

degree of freedom to act more assertively in the Conicts in the South

China Sea without worrying about having its energy suppliers cut o

by a naval blockade. Thus, this cooperation provides energy security for

China, and, consequently, the room of manoeuvre which the country

needs in order to defend its interests in the region.

We can thereby conclude that the Sino-Russian energy cooperation

is essential for both countries, given that beyond contributing to both

economies – guaranteeing energy security for China and capital and

energy demand for Russia – it also provides a larger margin of manoeu-

vre regarding their political and security questions.

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estudos internacionais • Belo Horizonte, ISSN 2317-773X, v. 11, n. 3, (out. 2023), p. 50-71

A economia política internacional da

questão agroalimentar na Rússia

The international political economy of the agrifood

question in Russia

La economía política internacional de la cuestión

agroalimentaria en Rusia

Fabiano Escher1

DOI: 10.5752/P.2317-773X.2023v11n3p50-71

Recebido em: 21 de outubro de 2023

Aprovado em: 22 de março de 2024

R

O artigo analisa as transformações, tendências e contradições do sistema

agroalimentar russo e suas implicações globais de longo alcance. A análise

emprega o arcabouço teórico-metodológico da economia política internacional

da agricultura e da alimentação. O argumento é que as recentes dinâmicas eco-

nômicas, sociais e políticas na Rússia respondem, em larga medida, aos desaos

desencadeados pelo deslocamento da “questão agrária” clássica para a “questão

agroalimentar” contemporânea. A questão agroalimentar abrange três grandes

problemáticas: acumulação de capital, reprodução social e poder político. A pes-

quisa recorre a uma abrangente revisão da literatura especializada e qualicada,

bem como a documentos e dados estatísticos ociais relevantes, tanto de fontes

russas como internacionais. A análise da questão agroalimentar mostra-se bas-

tante fértil para examinar a recente trajetória de desenvolvimento e projeção de

poder da Rússia e a sua inserção no regime alimentar internacional contempo-

râneo, chamando atenção para a abertura de uma formidável, mas ainda pouco

explorada, agenda de pesquisas em economia política internacional.

Palavras-chave: Rússia. Agronegócio. Agricultura Familiar. Segurança Alimen-

tar. Geopolítica.

A

The article analyses the transformations, trends, and contradictions of the

Russian agrifood system and its far-reaching global implications. The analysis

employs the theoretical-methodological framework of international political

economy of agriculture and food. The argument is that recent economic, social,

and political dynamics in Russia largely respond to the challenges triggered

by the shift from the classic ‘agrarian question’ to the contemporary ‘agrifood

question’. The agrifood question encompasses three major problematics: capital

accumulation, social reproduction, and political power. The research draws on a

comprehensive review of specialized and qualied literature, as well as relevant

1. Professor do Departamento de De-

senvolvimento, Agricultura e Sociedade

(DDAS) e do Programa de Pós-Gradua-

ção de Ciências Sociais em Desenvolvi-

mento, Agricultura e Sociedade (CPDA),

Universidade Federal Rural do Rio de

Janeiro (UFRRJ). Doutor em Desenvol-

vimento Rural pelo Programa de Pós-

-Graduação em Desenvolvimento Rural

(PGDR), Universidade Federal do Rio

Grande do Sul (UFRGS), com doutorado

sanduíche no College of Humanities and

Development Studies (COHD), China

Agricultural University (CAU). Mestre

em Desenvolvimento Rural pelo PGDR/

UFRGS. Graduado em Ciências Econô-

micas pela Universidade Estadual do

Oeste do Paraná (UNIOESTE). Pós-Dou-

torado no CPDA/UFRRJ, em parceria

com o Instituto Nacional de Ciência e

Tecnologia em Políticas Públicas, Estra-

tégia e Desenvolvimento (INCT PPED),

Universidade Federal do Rio de Janeiro

(UFRJ) (2017-2018). Pós-Doutorado no

COHD/CAU, Beijing, China (2019), pelo

Programa Pós-Doutorado no Exterior da

CAPES. Pós-Doutorado no CPDA/UFRRJ,

pelo Programa Pós-Doutorado Nota 10

da FAPERJ (2020). É membro do Grupo

de Estudos sobre Mudanças Sociais,

Agronegócio e Políticas Públicas

(GEMAP/UFRRJ), do Grupo de Estudos e

Pesquisas em Agricultura, Alimentação

e Desenvolvimento (GEPAD/UFRGS), do

Grupo de Pesquisas Mercados, Redes

e Valores (MRV/UFRRJ) e do Grupo de

Pesquisas BRICS Initiative for Critical

Agrarian Studies (BICAS/Interinstitucio-

nal). Possui experiência e interesse nas

áreas de Economia Política Internacional

e Comparada, Sociologia Econômica,

Economia Institucional, Desenvolvimen-

to Socioeconômico, Desenvolvimento

Rural, Agricultura Familiar, Sistema

Agroalimentar, China contemporânea

e BRICS.

Fabiano Escher A economia políca internacional da questão agroalimentar na Rússia

ocial documents and statistical data, both from Russian and international

sources. The analysis of the agrifood question proves to be quite fertile to ex-

amine the recent trajectory of development and power projection of Russia and

its insertion in the contemporary international food regime, calling attention to

the opening of a formidable, but still little explored, research agenda in interna-

tional political economy.

Keywords: Russia. Agribusiness. Family Farming. Food Security. Geopolitics.

R

El artículo analiza las transformaciones, tendencias y contradicciones del

sistema agroalimentario ruso y sus implicaciones globales de longo alcance. El

análisis emplea el marco teórico-metodológico de la economía política inter-

nacional de la agricultura y la alimentación. El argumento es que las dinámicas

económicas, sociales y políticas recientes en Rusia responden, en larga medida,

a los desafíos desencadenados por el paso de la “cuestión agraria” clásica a la

“cuestión agroalimentaria” contemporánea. La cuestión agroalimentaria abarca

tres grandes problemáticas: acumulación de capital, reproducción social y poder

político. La investigación se basa en una amplia revisión de literatura especiali-

zada y calicada, así como en documentos y datos estadísticos ociales rele-

vantes, tanto de fuentes rusas como internacionales. El análisis de la cuestión

agroalimentaria resulta bastante fértil para examinar la reciente trayectoria de

desarrollo y proyección de poder de Rusia y su inserción en el régimen alimen-

tario internacional contemporáneo, llamando la atención sobre la apertura de

una formidable, pero aún poco explorada, agenda de investigación en economía

política internacional.

Palabras clave: Rusia. Agronegocio. Agricultura Familiar. Seguridad Alimenta-

ria. Geopolítica.

Introdução

A invasão da Ucrânia pela Rússia exacerba a ruína da ordem mun-

dial neoliberal deagrada pela crise nanceira global de 2008, aprofunda-

da pela guerra comercial e tecnológica entre EUA e China, acelerada pela

pandemia de Covid-19 e agora escancarada pela guerra Israelense contra

os Palestinos. São múltiplas as incertezas e preocupações que surgem em

todo o mundo com as consequências da guerra na Ucrânia e das duras

sanções econômicas impostas à Rússia (Cheng, 2022). A Organização das

Nações Unidas para Alimentação e Agricultura (FAO) chama especial

atenção para os riscos e impactos do conito sobre os mercados agrícolas

e a segurança alimentar global.

Em 2021, a Federação Russa ou a Ucrânia (ou ambas) caram entre os três princi-

pais exportadores globais de trigo, milho, colza e sementes e óleo de girassol,

enquanto a Federação Russa também se destacou como maior exportador mun-

dial de fertilizantes nitrogenados, segundo maior fornecedor de fertilizantes po-

tássicos e terceiro maior exportador de fertilizantes fosfatados. Essa concentração

pode expor tais mercados a uma maior vulnerabilidade a choques e volatilidade.

[Vários países] que se enquadram nos grupos de países menos desenvolvidos

(PMD) e países de baixa renda com décit alimentar (PBRDA), dependem de

suprimentos alimentares ucranianos e russos para atender às suas necessidades

de consumo. Muitos desses países, já antes do conito, vinham enfrentando

os efeitos negativos dos altos preços internacionais de alimentos e fertilizantes

(FAO, 2022, p.1).

estudos internacionais • Belo Horizonte, ISSN 2317-773X, v. 11, n. 3, (out. 2023), p. 50-71

Na imprensa brasileira, analistas alertam para as repercussões do

contencioso sobre o aumento dos custos de produção agrícola decorren-

tes do choque na oferta e nos preços dos fertilizantes, dos índices de pre-

ços dos alimentos ao consumidor, particularmente dos derivados de tri-

go, e dos indicadores de insegurança alimentar no Brasil, que se agravam

desde 2018, muito antes da pandemia, depois do país ter saído do Mapa

da Fome da FAO, em 2014 (DBO, 2022; ESTADÃO, 2022; BBC, 2022; IFZ,

2022). Salta aos olhos, entretanto, a carência de conhecimento e produção

acadêmica especializada no Brasil sobre questões ligadas à agricultura,

alimentação e ruralidade na Rússia contemporânea.

São poucas e apreciáveis as exceções. Requião e Gonçalves (2021)

apresentam um panorama da evolução do mercado agrícola russo ao lon-

go das últimas décadas no intuito de avaliar desaos e oportunidades e

oferecer sugestões para a melhor inserção das exportações do agronegó-

cio brasileiro nesse mercado. Niederle et al (2018) fazem uma análise com-

parada das monoculturas da soja e do trigo nas estratégias de inserção

internacional das economias brasileira e russa, destacando os padrões de

intervenção estatal subjacentes, de caráter mais liberalizante e subordi-

nado no Brasil e mais protecionista e autônomo na Rússia. Lima e Dias

(2018) argumentam que ao centrar-se na diminuição das importações de

alimentos e na produção de excedentes agrícolas exportáveis, o Kremlin

visa reduzir a vulnerabilidade econômica do país em um contexto geo-

político hostil, a m de projetar poder e inserir-se internacionalmente de

maneira mais soberana.

Esses trabalhos oferecem contribuições pertinentes, mas não se

propõem a analisar o conjunto das recentes transformações, tendências

e contradições do sistema agroalimentar russo e suas implicações globais

de longo alcance. O objetivo do artigo é justamente fazer isso a partir

do arcabouço teórico-metodológico da economia política internacional.

Como as dinâmicas observadas no sistema agroalimentar e nas relações

sociais rurais russas afetam a sua trajetória de desenvolvimento e a sua

projeção internacional de poder? Argumento que as recentes dinâmicas

econômicas, sociais e políticas na Rússia respondem, em larga medida,

aos desaos desencadeados pelo deslocamento da “questão agrária” clás-

sica para a “questão agroalimentar” contemporânea. Esses desaos dizem

respeito à articulação de um novo regime de acumulação de capital na

agricultura e no sistema agroalimentar, aos novos padrões de reprodução

social dos meios de vida das classes urbanas e rurais e ao caráter do esta-

do e sua política nacional de segurança alimentar em meio a crescentes

tensões geopolíticas.

Metodologicamente, a pesquisa recorre a uma abrangente revisão

da literatura especializada e qualicada, bem como a documentos e dados

estatísticos ociais relevantes de fontes russas e internacionais. A próxi-

ma seção situa historicamente a Rússia na evolução dos regimes alimen-

tares internacionais. As três seções seguintes tratam das problemáticas da

questão agroalimentar contemporânea na Rússia: acumulação de capital,

reprodução social e poder político. A seção nal sumariza conclusões e

aponta direções de pesquisa.

Fabiano Escher A economia políca internacional da questão agroalimentar na Rússia

A inserção russa nos regimes alimentares internacionais: teoria e história

Byres (1986) oferece uma síntese do intrincado debate sobre a

questão agrária no pensamento marxista clássico. Marx superou as

teorias da renda da terra de Smith e Ricardo e interpretou a transição

para o capitalismo na Inglaterra a partir da assim chamada acumulação

primitiva. Mas foram somente seus continuadores na Alemanha e na

Rússia que vieram a tratar das especicidades teóricas da questão agrária.

Em Engels, a questão assume um sentido primordialmente “político”, so-

bre as contradições entre campesinato e latifundiários e sua articulação

com o conito fundamental entre proletariado e burguesia nos proces-

sos de construção do estado moderno e nas lutas pelo socialismo. Para

Kautsky e Lenin, a questão era essencialmente “sociológica”, sobre as for-

mas de desenvolvimento do capitalismo na agricultura a partir do predo-

mínio da propriedade privada da terra, do trabalho assalariado e da gran-

de indústria e as suas implicações para a diferenciação social rural. Para

Bukharin e Preobrazhensky, a questão era prioritariamente “econômica”,

sobre a extração, apropriação e transferência de excedentes agrícolas (tra-

balho, alimentos, matérias primas, recursos nanceiros) para sustentar a

acumulação de capital, a transformação estrutural e a industrialização

em condições de desenvolvimento tardio (Byres, 1986).

Friedmann e McMichael (1989), todavia, inauguraram uma nova

economia política internacional da questão agroalimentar ao proporem

uma abordagem teórica e histórica sobre o lugar da agricultura e da ali-

mentação na evolução da economia mundial e do sistema de estados, ten-

do como núcleo analítico o conceito de “regime alimentar”.

A denição de regimes alimentares inclui constelações de relações de classe,

especialização geográca e poder interestatal, articulando ‘relações internacio-

nais de produção e consumo alimentar’ a ‘períodos de acumulação de capital’

(Friedmann, 2009, p.335).

[O conceito possibilita] identicar os fundamentos agroalimentares de períodos

históricos, ciclos ou mesmo tendências seculares do capitalismo (McMichael,

2009, p.148).

Apesar de algumas controvérsias, possui amplo respaldo a periodi-

zação que concebe três regimes alimentares na história do capitalismo,

onde a Russia sempre teve lugar de destaque (Escher, 2021). O primeiro

regime (1870-1914/30) foi erigido sob a hegemonia do Império Britânico,

o padrão ouro, a ideologia do livre comércio e a subordinação das perife-

rias coloniais ou dependentes como fornecedoras de alimentos e matérias

primas para a indústria dos centros imperialistas. Graças à obschina e ao

mir garantindo o acesso à terra aos camponeses, a emancipação dos ser-

vos em 1861 pouco favoreceu a formação de uma reserva de mão de obra

para a indústria nascente russa. E dada a vasta disponibilidade de uma

força de trabalho barata no rural, a nobreza latifundiária tampouco de-

monstrou interesse em introduzir inovações e aumentar a produtividade

da agricultura (Gerschenkron, 2015). Mas isso não impediu que as ex-

portações de grãos entre 1860 e 1905 quintuplicasse, alcançando metade

das exportações totais do país, com a agricultura camponesa espremida

respondendo por 3/4 de toda a produção (Shanin, 1986). Entre 1850 e 1914,

estudos internacionais • Belo Horizonte, ISSN 2317-773X, v. 11, n. 3, (out. 2023), p. 50-71

quando estoura a Primeira Guerra Mundial, 80% do trigo comercializado

internacionalmente provinha de Rússia, EUA e Canadá, sendo a Rússia

responsável por cerca de metade do total, servindo de esteio do regime

alimentar (Krausmann; Langthaler, 2019).

O segundo regime (1945-1973/85) foi construído sob a hegemonia

dos EUA, o sistema monetário de Bretton Woods, a ideologia anticomu-

nista da Guerra Fria e a subordinação das periferias através da difusão

dos programas de “ajuda alimentar” e dos pacotes tecnológicos da “re-

volução verde”. O rompimento da aliança operário-camponesa com o

m da Nova Política Econômica (NEP) e a coletivização forçada da agri-

cultura resultaram na formação de grandes fazendas estatais (sovkhozy)

e coletivas (kohlkhozy) mecanizadas, de onde eram extraídos os recursos

para a industrialização soviética (Niederle et al, 2018). A URSS partici-

pou de Bretton Woods, mas não aderiu ao Acordo Geral sobre Comércio

e Tarifas (GATT), senão criou o Conselho de Assistência Econômica

Mútua (COMECON) para promover o comércio intrabloco, protegendo

seus consumidores e produtores das turbulências do mercado mundial.

Durante as décadas de 1960 e 1970, a URSS se viu várias vezes obrigada a

recorrer à importações de grãos, levantando críticas nos EUA, seu princi-

pal fornecedor. E nos anos 1980 tornou-se um cliente regular do Ocidente,

importando também carne, frutas, legumes, óleo vegetal e açúcar além

de grãos, mas sem cumprir um papel muito relevante no regime alimen-

tar (Wegren; Nilssen, 2022).

O terceiro regime (1995-hoje) foi erguido sob a atualizada hege-

monia dos EUA, o sistema monetário do dólar exível, a ideologia neo-

liberal e o predomínio das corporações transnacionais do agronegócio.

Mas a adesão da China à Organização Mundial do Comércio (OMC) e

ao Acordo sobre Agricultura (AoA), em 2001, ao lado do maior protago-

nismo dos BRICS, tem contribuído para aumentar o poder de barganha

dos países periféricos e semiperiféricos frente às imposições dos países

centrais, intensicando os impasses da OMC. As reformas pró-mercado

implementadas nos anos 1990 por Boris Yeltsin incluíram a privatização

da terra e dos ativos dos kolkhozy e sovkhozy. A “terapia de choque” de-

sorganizou a agricultura, fez a produção desabar e desmontou o sistema

de bem-estar existente, deixando as famílias em condições vulneráveis

(Niederle et al, 2018). A dependência de importações massivas de alimen-

tos para compensar a queda da produção doméstica acompanhou a libe-

ralização comercial após 1992, que reduziu barreiras tarifárias em anteci-

pação a adesão à OMC, em 2012. A crise nanceira russa e a subsequente

desvalorização do rublo em 1998 tornaram a situação insustentável, aler-

tando sobre as ameaças à segurança alimentar nacional e a necessidade

de o governo assumir um papel mais ativo na regulação e proteção do

mercado doméstico. Esse doloroso processo de integração ao regime ali-

mentar pavimentou o caminho para a mudança de rumo iniciada por

Putin (Wegren; Nilssen, 2022).

A discussão precedente deixa claro que a questão agrária clássica

sofreu deslocamentos históricos e teóricos e adquiriu novos signica-

dos. Mesmo assim, seguindo os três sentidos da questão no pensamento

marxista clássico, sugere-se que a questão agroalimentar contemporânea

Fabiano Escher A economia políca internacional da questão agroalimentar na Rússia

também comporta três grandes “problemáticas”. A primeira é a “acumu-

lação de capital”, que trata do lugar da agricultura e do sistema agroali-

mentar na dinâmica econômica, especialmente as ligações intersetoriais

das empresas de agronegócio e seu desempenho nos mercados interno e

externo. A segunda é a “reprodução social”, que trata dos níveis de transi-

ção nutricional e suas implicações nas dietas dos consumidores urbanos,

bem como da mercantilização da agricultura e seus efeitos nos meios de

vida rurais. A terceira é o “poder político”, que trata das contradições,

conitos, alianças e compromissos entre as classes rurais e as demais clas-

ses sociais na denição do caráter do estado e das políticas públicas para

agricultura e segurança alimentar, entre outras (e.g., econômica, social e

externa). É claro que essa distinção entre as três problemáticas é somente

analítica, uma vez que, na prática, elas encontram-se profundamente co-

nectadas e entrelaçadas na realidade concreta russa.

Acumulação de capital: expansão das agroholdings e abertura de mercados

Através da liberalização nanceira e da privatização de ativos esta-

tais, as reformas de mercado da década de 1990 ensejaram a restauração

do capitalismo na Rússia, com a ascensão do capital nanceiro na forma

de grandes conglomerados industriais controlados por grandes bancos na

extração mineral, na construção civil e na mídia. Mas desde a subida de

Putin ao poder, em 2000, passou-se a articular um novo regime de acu-

mulação ancorado em um projeto nacionalista de reorganização do esta-

do russo que combina a expansão da indústria de petróleo e gás, voltada

à exportação, do complexo industrial-militar, das nanças e do mercado

interno (Medeiros, 2011).

A agricultura e o sistema agroalimentar, entretanto, não foram ar-

ticulados de imediato ao novo regime de acumulação. A partir de 1992, os

antigos kolkhozy e sovkhozy foram assumindo novas formas jurídicas (socie-

dades anônimas, sociedades limitadas, etc.) e seus ex-membros e funcioná-

rios receberam certicados em papel, tornando-se uma espécie de “acio-

nistas”. Apenas uma minoria converteu seus certicados em parcelas reais

de terra, registrando-as como propriedades camponesas. Em comparação

com as privatizações em outros setores, a privatização da propriedade

agrária mostrou-se menos excitante. Gigantes da energia como Gazprom

e Lukoil chegaram adquirir terras agrícolas de devedores inadimplentes,

mas acabaram por revendê-las. Em 2002, entrou em vigor a Lei Federal

de Transações de Terras Agrícolas especicando os procedimentos para

a venda ou transferência de terras para o capital das empresas agrícolas

reestruturadas em troca de compensações monetárias. Mas foi somente

durante o segundo mandato de Putin (2004-2008), com o forte crescimento

econômico, o boom dos preços das commodities e o aquecimento da deman-

da interna e externa, que a terra veio a ser percebida como um ativo valori-

zado, atraindo capitais vindos de outros países e setores para o agronegócio

russo (Visser; Mamonova; Spoor, 2012).2 Teve início então um processo

de formação de megafazendas, em geral consolidadas sob a propriedade e

o controle de “agroholdings” pertencentes à oligarcas conhecidos – razão

pela qual ganharam o apelido de “oligarkhozy” (Nikulin, 2011).

2. A maior parte dos investimentos na

agricultura russa era capital “repatria-

do” de seus oligarcas, mas também

incluía fundos soberanos do Bahrein,

Emirados Árabes Unidos e Arábia

Saudita, Líbia, Coreia do Sul e China,

bem como uma variedade fundos de

pensão, fundos de hedge e fundos de

private equity dos EUA, Canadá, Israel,

Dinamarca, Alemanha, Luxemburgo,

Suécia e Suíça, etc. (Wengle, 2021).

estudos internacionais • Belo Horizonte, ISSN 2317-773X, v. 11, n. 3, (out. 2023), p. 50-71

O Censo Agropecuário Russo 2016 classica 19,592 das 36 mil “or-

ganizações agropecuárias” registradas como “grandes empresas agro-

pecuárias” (ROSSTAT, 2018). Agroholdings são grupos econômicos que

congregam várias dessas entidades legalmente independentes, controla-

dos por uma empresa matriz ou por uma pessoa física com participa-

ção majoritária, que podem incluir produtores agrícolas, processadores,

prestadores de serviços e outros operadores vinculados com atividades

agrícolas. São basicamente grandes corporações agroindustriais horizon-

tal e verticalmente integradas, não muito distintas das existentes no agro-

negócio brasileiro. Em 2016, foram identicadas 1,063 agroholdings que

controlam 3,204 empresas, detém 24,3 milhões de hectares e empregam

502 mil pessoas. Desse total, 85 são estatais e 978 privadas. As estatais

controlam 20,3% das empresas, detém 14,4% das terras e comandam 14%

dos empregos, enquanto as privadas controlam 79,7% das empresas, de-

tém 85,6% das terras e empregam 86% dos trabalhadores. Considerando

o total das agroholdings privadas, apenas 6,3% delas são de propriedade

estrangeira, mas controlam 9,9% das empresas, detém 21,6% das terras

e comandam 22,2% dos empregos. Investidores internacionais entram

no mercado de terras por meio da criação de subsidiárias russas, pois a

aquisição direta de terras por estrangeiros não é ocialmente permitida.

Entretanto, uma empresa estrangeira pode ser registrada em oshores por

cidadãos russos ou ter sócios russos, enquanto empresas de processamen-

to e distribuição podem ser simplesmente liais de multinacionais. Em

2016, as agroholdings geraram aproximadamente metade dos lucros e das

vendas totais das grandes empresas agropecuárias – que somaram RUB$

2,6 trilhões. As 100 maiores agroholdings, cujas receitas superam RUB$

2 bilhões por ano cada, abocanharam sozinhas 37% de todo esse valor

(Uzun; Shagaida; Lerman, 2021).

A concentração de poder econômico das agroholdings é evidente

no fato de que, em 2016, os cinco maiores proprietários controlavam 3,7

milhões de hectares de terras agrícolas na Rússia: Miratorg com 1 milhão

de ha; Prodimeks/Agrokul’tura com 865 mil ha; Agrocompleks com 653

mil ha; Rusagro com 643 mil ha; e EkoNiva com 599 mil ha. Prodimeks,

de propriedade majoritária de Igor Khudormov, é a maior produtora de

açúcar e beterraba, fornecendo para Coca-Cola e Pepsi, além produzir

trigo, cevada, girassol, milho e soja. Rusagro, controlada por Vadim

Moskovich, é a maior fabricante de margarina, a segunda maior fabri-

cante de maionese e óleos vegetais, a terceira de açúcar e um dos maio-

res produtores de soja e milho. Miratorg, controlada pelos irmãos Viktor

e Aleksandr Linnik, é a maior produtora de carne suína e a segunda

maior produtora de aves. Cherkizovo, de propriedade majoritária de Igor

Babaev e sua esposa Lidia Mikhailova, é a segunda maior produtora de

carne suína e a terceira maior produtora de aves. Ambas plantam terras e

fabricam ração para suas operações pecuárias verticalmente integradas e

são as maiores processadoras e distribuidoras de carne para o consumidor

nal. EkoNiva, fundada pelo empresário de origem alemã Stefan Dürr,

é a maior produtora de leite. Com as próprias vacas, fábricas de ração e

plantas de processamento, abastece a Danone e outros grandes laticínios

e vende leite uído e produtos lácteos sob marca própria. Agrokompleks,

Fabiano Escher A economia políca internacional da questão agroalimentar na Rússia

de propriedade da família do ex-ministro da agricultura e ex-governador

de Krasnodar, Aleksandr Tkachev, é outra gigante na indústria de carnes

e laticínios. Os capitalistas donos dessas agroholdings pertencem à classe

dos “super ricos” na Rússia (Wengle, 2021).

Durante a década de 1990, a maioria dos segmentos agrícolas era

organizada em torno de complexos agroindustriais altamente integrados

(combinats) que normalmente incluíam vários ex-kolkhozy e sovkhozy su-

pervisionados por uma grande processadora, a qual utilizava máquinas e

tecnologias herdadas da era soviética. Essa situação vem mudando, com

apoio à importação de tecnologias mais ecientes a partir dos anos 2000 e

à recuperação da indústria nacional de bens de capital para a agricultura

desde 2010 (Grouiez, 2018; Wengle, 2021). O Ministério da Agricultura es-

tima que 10% das 12 mil maiores fazendas da Rússia utilizam tecnologia

avançada do tipo “agricultura digital”, incluindo internet das coisas, ro-

bótica, drones, sensores a laser e colheitadeiras sem piloto (Wegren, 2018).

As tecnologias associadas à “agricultura de precisão”, com equipamentos

de informática embarcados em tratores e maquinários, são geralmente

importadas. Mas algumas rmas russas de tecnologia agrícola estão ga-

nhando mercado, como a Rostsel’mash, a maior fabricante de colheita-

deiras do país. Ademais, as agroholdings estão começando a desenvolver

centros nacionais de reprodução genética. A instituição mais importante

na reprodução de suínos na Rússia hoje é o Centro de Seleção Genética

de Znamensk, que recebeu investimentos dos gigantes da carne Miratorg

e Cherkizovo (Wengle, 2021).

A Rússia tem por volta de 128 milhões de hectares de terras agríco-

las realmente utilizados e 94 milhões de hectares não utilizados (em sua

maioria terras de baixa qualidade em áreas inóspitas). Estima-se que 19,3

milhões de hectares de terras abandonadas possam ser recuperados para

o uso produtivo. A população rural russa diminuiu ligeiramente de 38,9

milhões em 1990 para 37,6 milhões em 2018, permanecendo estável em

torno de 26% de um total de 144 milhões de habitantes. Mas a parcela de

trabalhadores agrícolas no emprego total caiu de 14,2% para 5,9% entre

1990 e 2018. Já a produção agropecuária russa cresceu 55% entre 1999

e 2017, após uma queda de 43% entre 1990 e 1999. E a participação do

PIB agropecuário no PIB total aumentou de 3,5% em 2012 para 4,4% em

2017. Entre 1990 e 2017, a produção de trigo, beterraba e hortaliças quase

dobrou, enquanto a produção de girassol triplicou e a de milho sextupli-

cou. A produção de suínos recuperou o nível de 1990 em 2017 e a de aves

cresceu 2,5 vezes no mesmo período. Apenas a produção de carne bovina

e de leite estagnou em cerca de 50% do nível de 1990 (Uzun; Shagaida;

Lerman, 2019).

Se em 2000 as grandes fazendas agropecuárias respondiam por ape-

nas 45% do valor de produção apesar de ocuparem mais de 75% das áreas

de terra, em 2016 elas respondem por 52,8% do valor de produção con-

trolando 68% das áreas de terra. As agroholdings, que expandiram suas

áreas de terra em quase 8 milhões de hectares entre 2006 e 2016, estão na

dianteira desse processo. Elas hoje concentram mais de 30% das terras

controladas pelo total das grandes empresas agropecuárias e 11% do total

das terras agrícolas do país. Embora pouco relevantes na produção de

estudos internacionais • Belo Horizonte, ISSN 2317-773X, v. 11, n. 3, (out. 2023), p. 50-71

vegetais, carne bovina e leite, a sua dominância é absoluta nos ramos mais

lucrativos, concentrados e intensivos em capital, que além de atenderem

o mercado interno têm forte peso nas exportações. As agroholdings sozi-

nhas concentram a produção de 77% da carne suína, 73% das aves, 69%

da beterraba e, junto com as grandes empresas agropecuárias, 70% dos

grãos e 64% das oleaginosas na Rússia (Uzun; Shagaida; Lerman, 2019).

Atualmente as 20 maiores rmas concentram 60% de toda a indústria de

carne suína e 49% da ração animal, enquanto as 25 maiores concentram

43% do abate e distribuição de carne bovina no país (Wegren, 2018).

Essas mudanças estão reposicionando a Rússia no regime alimen-

tar internacional. Entre 2000 e 2020, as importações totais russas cres-

ceram de USD$ 34 para USD$ 240 bilhões e as suas exportações totais

de USD$ 103 para USD$ 336 bilhões, enquanto a proporção de produtos

agroalimentares nas importações totais caiu de 21,5% para 12,2% e nas ex-

portações totais subiu de 1,5% para 9% nesse período. De um importador

alimentar líquido histórico, com décit recorde de USD$ 27 bilhões em

2013, pela primeira vez em mais de meio século a Rússia tornou-se um

exportador alimentar líquido em 2020, com um superávit de USD$ 1,3

bilhão. O ano de 2014 é o ponto de virada, quando a Rússia contrapõe um

“embargo alimentar” em reação às sanções impostas pelas nações ociden-

tais depois da anexação da Criméia (Wegren; Nilssen, 2022).

As agroholdings cumprem um papel chave nesse reposicionamen-

to. Previsões pessimistas sobre a expansão da capacidade de produção e

exportação agrícola da Rússia revelaram-se equivocadas (Visser; Spoor;

Mamonova, 2014). Entre 2000 e 2020, a área colhida de trigo aumentou

de 21 para 28 milhões de hectares e a produção de 35 para 85 milhões de

toneladas. Em 2015, a Rússia ultrapassou o Canadá e os EUA, tornando-

-se o maior exportador de trigo do mundo. Com 19% do mercado mun-

dial em 2020, essa posição deve manter-se na próxima década (USDA,

2022). Apesar dos preocupantes impactos negativos da guerra na Ucrânia

em 2022, os principais mercados para o trigo russo – Turquia, Egito,

Bangladesh, Arabia Saudita, Irã e outros países da Ásia, Oriente Médio e

Norte da África – não aderiram às sanções ocidentais, à exceção de alguns

países da Europa, que não obstante seguem recebendo carregamentos

(USDA, 2022a). Embora traders globais de commodities, como a Cargill,

operem sob estritas regulações no mercado russo, players domésticos

dominam o ramo, principalmente agroholdings estatais (Lander, 2018),

sendo que as 15 maiores rmas no ramo exportam 75% dos grãos russos

(Wegren, 2018).

Mesmo na soja, onde a Rússia ocupa posição de menor destaque, a

produção e a exportação têm crescido, respectivamente, a taxas de 14% e

169% entre 2012 e 2020 (USDA, 2022). A China já anunciou uma “aliança

da soja” com a Rússia, para que dos menos de 1% atuais o parceiro ve-

nha a responder por 10% das suas importações totais na próxima década

(Wesz; Escher; Fares, 2023). A trader agrícola Sodrujestvo, propriedade de

Alexandr Lutsenko, parece ser estratégica nessa empreitada. Registrada

em Luxemburgo, a empresa é a maior esmagadora de soja e outras oleagi-

nosas da Rússia, tem operações de originação, processamento e logística

no Paraguai, Brasil, Turquia e Bielorrússia e distribui seus produtos por

Fabiano Escher A economia políca internacional da questão agroalimentar na Rússia

todo Norte, Centro e Leste da Europa, Estados Bálticos e CEI (Escher;

Wilkinson; Pereira, 2018).

A Rússia também fornece quantidades não negligenciáveis de carne

bovina e lácteos para China, Vietnã, Ucrânia, Cazaquistão e Bielorrússia,

alimentos processados para a CEI, peixes e frutos do mar para Coréia do

Sul, China e Holanda, aves para o Oriente Médio, África, Ásia e Europa

(Dzhancharoval; Ilyasov; Romadikova, 2022). Ainda, agroholdings líde-

res como Miratorg, Cherkizovo, Prioskolye, GAP Resurs, Belgranskorm,

Agrocompleks e Damate, entre outras, apesar da acirrada concorrência

global, em particular com as rmas brasileiras, estão ansiosas para ex-

pandir suas exportações de carnes de aves e suínos para o gigantesco e

promissor mercado chinês (Dzhancharoval; Bolaev; Murtazova, 2021).

Todas essas realizações e expectativas estão rmemente ancoradas no

arcabouço institucional da política nacional de segurança alimentar do

estado russo.

Reprodução social: transição nutricional e agricultura familiar heterogênea

As reformas da década de 1990 resultaram na queda da produção

e no aumento das importações de alimentos, na redução dos níveis de

consumo da população e na maior atenção à relevância da agricultura fa-

miliar. Desde os anos 2000, a mercantilização da agricultura e a expansão

das agroholdings, bem como ascensão do grande varejo e a difusão das

refeições fora de casa, têm transformado tanto as dietas dos consumido-

res urbanos, que experimentam um processo de transição nutricional,

como os meios de vida dos produtores rurais, que sofrem um processo de

marginalização (Wegren; Nikulin; Trotsuk, 2021).

As possibilidades de consumo alimentar são estruturalmente con-

dicionadas pelos níveis e as desigualdades de renda da população do lado

da demanda e pelas estratégias dos grandes oligopólios na indústria e na

distribuição de alimentos do lado da oferta, o que é normalmente regu-

lado por certas formas de intervenção estatal. A diferenciação das dietas

e tipos de alimento consumidos por distintos segmentos de classe é es-

pecíca de cada país, mas a carne é um item central em qualquer lugar.

Denomina-se “transição nutricional” o conjunto de mudanças nos hábi-

tos alimentares, decorrente do aumento da renda e da urbanização, em

direção a maiores níveis de consumo de proteína animal e produtos ul-

traprocessados em detrimento do consumo de grãos e vegetais in natura

ou minimamente processados, tendo como efeito colateral a maior inci-

dência de obesidade e sobrepeso, doenças crônicas relacionadas e riscos

ambientais (OTERO et al, 2018).

Tal processo encontra-se bastante avançado e possui certas espe-

cicidades na Rússia. No período pós-guerra, a fome deixou de ser um

problema crônico na URSS. Em 1988, a ingestão calórica diária na Rússia

era similar a dos EUA. Mas um alto percentual do orçamento doméstico

era gasto em alimentos, a disponibilidade de muitos itens era irregular e

as longas filas tornaram-se mais frequentes com a introdução dos cupons

de racionamento de comida no inverno de 1990-1991. Entre 1990 e 1999,

a renda per capita caiu de USD$ 3,492 para USD$ 1,330, o número de

estudos internacionais • Belo Horizonte, ISSN 2317-773X, v. 11, n. 3, (out. 2023), p. 50-71

pessoas ocupadas caiu de 74,9 para 64,7 milhões e a ingestão calórica diá-

ria média per capita caiu 9%. Em 1991, mais de 40 milhões de pessoas

viviam abaixo da linha da pobreza nacional e na década seguinte o con-

sumo de carnes e lácteos caiu mais de 40%, o de cereais, vegetais e frutas

diminuiu 5% e o de batatas aumentou 11% à medida que os consumido-

res se adaptaram comprando alimentos mais baratos. Essas são médias

nacionais, mas para a população urbana a situação era mais grave, já que

não podia contar com a produção para o autoconsumo como a população

rural (Wegren; Nikulin; Trotsuk, 2021).

A situação mudou depois que Putin se tornou presidente. A econo-

mia russa cresceu a uma taxa média de 7% ao ano entre 2000 e 2008 e a

uma taxa de apenas 1% entre 2009 e 2019. De USD$ 1,771 em 2000, a renda

per capita atingiu USD$ 15,974 em 2013 e caiu para USD$ 11,536 em 2019

(World Bank, 2022). Esse desempenho possibilitou que entre 2000 e 2019

o número de desempregados diminuísse de quase 7,7 para 3,4 milhões e

de pessoas na pobreza pela linha nacional caísse de 42 para 17 milhões

(ROSSTAT, 2020). O poder de compra da renda familiar disponível para

uma cesta básica de 23 produtos quase quadruplicou entre 1999 e 2010,

mas voltou a cair na medida em que os preços dos alimentos sofreram

uma elevação de 41% entre 2013 e 2018 (Uzun; Shagaida; Lerman, 2019).

Os gastos com alimentação em relação à renda familiar total despendi-

da em consumo – o chamado “coeciente de Engel” – são elevados na

Rússia em comparação com outros países desenvolvidos ou mesmo mui-

tos emergentes. O coeciente de Engel cresceu de 44% em 1992 para 52%

em 1999, caiu para o mínimo histórico de 26% em 2013 e voltou a subir

para 28% em 2019. Em 2019, enquanto o coeciente de Engel foi de 43%

para o quintil de renda inferior, 40% para o segundo quintil mais baixo

e 35% para o terceiro, foi de 19% para o quintil de renda superior e 31%

para o segundo quintil mais alto (ROSSTAT, 2020).

A ingestão calórica diária per capita da população russa cresceu de

2,394 calorias em 2000 para 2,626 em 2013 e 2,644 em 2019. Como previs-

to pela tese da transição nutricional, na composição das dietas reduziu-se

em 1,5% o consumo de carboidratos e aumentou em 11% o consumo de

proteínas e em 10% o de gorduras, com pouca variação entre domicílios

urbanos e rurais (ROSSTAT, 2020). Como resultado, a prevalência de des-

nutrição no total da população russa passou de 6% em 1996-1998 para

menos de 2,5% desde 2004-2006. Contudo, em 2019-2021 ainda se veri-

ca a prevalência de 5,5% de insegurança alimentar moderada no país,

que afeta as famílias de menor renda. Na atual conjuntura, portanto, a

disponibilidade e o acesso aos alimentos já não constituem mais um pe-

rigo. Hoje a principal preocupação de segurança alimentar para a Rússia

é a sobrenutrição e a obesidade, que acomete mais de 23% da população

(FAO, 2022). Pesquisadores russos encontraram dados ainda mais preocu-

pantes a esse respeito: uma prevalência de obesidade de 30,8% entre mu-

lheres e 26,9% entre homens, intimamente associada ao abuso de álcool

e a incidência de diabetes, distúrbios metabólicos e hipertensão arterial

(Balanova et al, 2018).

Na URSS, grandes lojas estatais gerais e especializadas, coope-

rativas de consumo, feiras organizadas por agricultores membros dos

Fabiano Escher A economia políca internacional da questão agroalimentar na Rússia

kolkhozy, cafeterias públicas e cozinhas comunitárias eram a base do sis-

tema de distribuição de alimentos. Não era um paraíso do consumidor,

mas a estabilidade social era garantida pelo controle direto do estado so-

bre o armazenamento e distribuição no atacado e a oferta de produtos e

denição de preços no varejo. Hoje, o estado permite que rmas priva-

das, publicidade e marcas nacionais e estrangeiras moldem a cultura ali-

mentar e os hábitos de consumo na Rússia. A média de gastos dos consu-

midores urbanos com refeições fora de casa subiu de 2,5% do orçamento

familiar em 2002 para 3,7% em 2013, caiu para 3,5% em 2016 e voltou para

3,7% em 2018. Os principais segmentos do varejo de alimentos são lide-

rados pelas rmas russas Magnit, X5 Retail Group, Lenta, Diksi, Azbuka

Vkusa e O’Key, a francesa Auchan e a alemã Metro. Em 2018, as quatro

maiores lojas de desconto controlavam 86% do mercado, as três maiores

redes de supermercados tinham 59% das vendas e os três maiores hiper-

mercados capturaram 30% das receitas. Algumas agroholdings também

têm diversicado seus negócios. A gigante Miratorg, por exemplo, tinha

45 supermercados, dois hipermercados, 11 hamburguerias e 14 açougues

em 2018. Por m, duas agências federais supervisionam diferentes aspec-

tos da segurança dos alimentos: o mandato da Rospotrebnadzor é pro-

teger os consumidores da falsicação de alimentos processados; e o da

Rossel’khoznadzor é prover serviços veterinários e padrões tossanitá-

rios para produtos agrícolas in natura (Wegren; Nikulin; Trotsuk, 2021).

Embora mais intensas entre a população urbana, essas mudanças

também afetaram as relações de produção e os meios de vida rurais. A

reforma agrária da década de 1990 não resultou em direitos fundiários

bem denidos e segurança na posse da terra. A maioria dos ex-membros

das fazendas coletivas considerava os procedimentos cadastrais compli-

cados e burocráticos e os altos custos de registro das suas parcelas como

as principais diculdades para o estabelecimento de pequenas proprie-

dades familiares. Além disso, um dos principais legados dos mais de 60

anos de coletivização foi a erosão da identidade camponesa e a crença na

superioridade das fazendas de grande escala. A maioria dos moradores

rurais russos raramente se autodenomina “camponês” e sim “trabalha-

dor” (Mamonova, 2016). Em vez de formar unidades camponesas, a sua

expectativa no pós-coletivização era que as autoridades públicas atraís-

sem “bons investidores” capazes de recapitalizar as grandes operações

e manter os postos de trabalho e outros benefícios para a comunidade

(Groiez, 2018; Vorbrugg, 2019).

O espaço rural russo é povoado por um vasto conjunto de “unidades

rurais familiares”. O Censo Agropecuário Russo 2016 registra 23 milhões

dessas unidades: 174 mil classicadas como “fazendas camponesas”, 17,5

milhões como “fazendas subsidiárias” e 5,9 milhões como “domicílios ru-

rais”. A última categoria agrega terrenos destinados a residência, casas de

veraneio, jardins e hortas, entre outros ns, ao passo que as duas primei-

ras categorias constituem o que se pode chamar de “agricultura familiar”.

Mas cada uma delas é em si mesma heterogênea e possui suas próprias

especicidades. A categoria fazendas camponesas é composta por 136 mil

“empreendimentos familiares” e 38 mil “empreendimentos individuais”,

ocupa 377 mil pessoas (57% membros das famílias, 25% trabalhadores

estudos internacionais • Belo Horizonte, ISSN 2317-773X, v. 11, n. 3, (out. 2023), p. 50-71

permanentes e 18% trabalhadores temporários), detém 28% das áreas de

terra agrícola e responde por 12,5% do valor de produção total (18,2% da

pecuária e 5,1% da agricultura). Já a categoria fazendas subsidiárias ocupa

quase 30 milhões de pessoas (todos membros das famílias), detém 4% das

áreas de terra agrícola e responde por 34,7% do valor de produção total

(38% da pecuária e 32,1% da agricultura). Assim, a agricultura familiar

em seu conjunto realiza 47,2% da produção utilizando somente 32% das

terras (ROSSTAT, 2018). No entanto, enquanto as fazendas familiares de-

dicam o grosso da sua força de trabalho para a produção agropecuária,

operam orientadas para o mercado e obtém a maior parte da sua renda

da venda dos produtos, as fazendas subsidiárias dedicam a sua força de

trabalho apenas parcialmente à produção agropecuária, buscando em ati-

vidades assalariadas a sua principal fonte de renda e produzindo predomi-

nantemente para o autoconsumo, embora também vendam excedentes

de produção no mercado (Pallot; Nefedova, 2007).

Apesar de a coletivização da agricultura ter quebrado o campesina-

to como classe, não se pode imaginar a agricultura soviética sem o papel

dos “lotes privados” na produção de alimentos para o autoconsumo dos

coletivos e o abastecimento das áreas urbanas. No período pós-soviético,

as expectativas dos reformadores neoliberais de que a descoletivização

e privatização da terra resultariam automaticamente no surgimento de

uma agricultura familiar pujante em moldes europeus foram amplamen-

te frustradas. Com o colapso econômico da década de 1990, a produção de

alimentos por pequenos produtores passou de uma atividade subsidiária

à uma estratégia vital para a sobrevivência das famílias rurais e urbanas

diante da grave situação de desemprego, inação e insegurança alimen-

tar, pois compensou em parte o declínio da produção das antigas fazen-

das estatais e coletivas, contribuindo para prevenir a agitação de massas

(Wegren, 2021).

Nos últimos anos, porém, a produção das fazendas subsidiárias,

que de fato representam uma forma social tipicamente camponesa, tem

cado aquém não só das agroholdings, mas também das fazendas cam-

ponesas, que apesar do nome são mais bem descritas como uma forma

de produção comercial. Dados de survey informam que, em 2019, a par-

ticipação das fazendas subsidiárias caiu para 28,6% do valor total de pro-

dução, enquanto as participações das grandes empresas agropecuárias e

das fazendas camponesas subiram para 57,7% e 13,7%, respectivamente

(ROSSTAT, 2020). Em razão das diculdades de acessar crédito, integrar-

-se com processadores e entrar em mercados exigentes e das restrições

legais e burocráticas e falta de apoio do estado, para Wegren (2021) as

fazendas subsidiárias tendem a ser cada vez mais marginalizadas em ter-

mos produtivos.

Outros autores, contudo, ainda que não discordem acerca do favo-

recimento estatal ao agronegócio, enfatizam a notável resiliência e re-

levância da agricultura familiar subsidiária. Alexveev e Safronov (2018)

destacam que apesar da redução do peso relativo das fazendas subsidiá-

rias para o valor de produção agropecuária total, a sua contribuição segue

crescendo em termos absolutos e o seu desempenho é diferenciado den-

tro das e entre as regiões, sobretudo por conta de variações geográcas

Fabiano Escher A economia políca internacional da questão agroalimentar na Rússia

e naturais, características do padrão de assentamento, estrutura etária e

densidade populacional rural, proximidade de grandes centros urbanos e

presença de agroholdings no território. Evteeva, Rovný, Petriák (2019)

salientam que embora as grandes fazendas e agroholdings dominem na

produção de cereais, oleaginosas, beterraba açucareira, suínos, frango e

ovos, as fazendas subsidiárias produzem 77% das batatas, cerca de 70%

dos vegetais e várias frutas, 57% da carne bovina e 42% do leite, 70% da

carne de ovinos e 94% do mel, enquanto as fazendas camponesas produ-

zem 18% dos vegetais e cerca de 30% dos cereais e das oleaginosas, entre

outros. Yanbykha, Saraikina e Lerman (2020) demonstram que a agricul-

tura familiar contribui com elevados 33,5% das receitas agropecuárias

totais e que, apesar da produção das fazendas subsidiárias ser majoritaria-

mente para o autoconsumo, pouco mais de 3 milhões delas contribuem

com 19% da receita total, mais do que as fazendas camponesas, contra-

riando a visão de que sua participação é marginal no aprovisionamento

dos mercados urbanos.

Esses dados parecem contestar a visão de que as fazendas subsidiá-

rias são, até por denição legal, unidades não comerciais voltadas unica-

mente à subsistência. Mamonova (2016) identica uma permanência de

elementos camponeses na agricultura familiar subsidiária, que se mani-

festa em seu duplo caráter. Por um lado, se tal segmento não consegue

acumular recursos de terra e capital para operar um estilo de agricultura

propriamente comercial, consegue resistir à tendência de proletarização

com base numa estratégia assentada na “pluriatividade”, combinando

atividades agropecuárias em seus pequenos lotes com empregos assa-

lariados nas áreas rurais ou em cidades próximas. Por outro lado, se as

fazendas subsidiárias não representam mais o segmento dominante na

produção agropecuária, a sua contribuição para a segurança alimentar

continua essencial, seja por alimentar a si mesma produzindo para o auto-

consumo, seja por ofertar parte signicativa da cesta básica de alimentos

consumidos nas áreas rurais e urbanas.

Em todo o caso, há relativo consenso na literatura que a reprodução

da agricultura familiar subsidiária depende fortemente de suas “relações

simbióticas” com as grandes fazendas. Primeiro, porque é do interesse

das grandes empresas agropecuárias ter as famílias camponesas autôno-

mas funcionando como um “exército rural de reserva”. O que para os

empresários é visto como uma força de trabalho disponível de baixo cus-

to, à qual eles podem recorrer continuamente, para os habitantes rurais é

percebido como uma oferta de empregos perto de casa. Segundo, porque

é comum as famílias e comunidades rurais serem beneciadas com for-

mas de assistência das grandes fazendas, uma obrigação coletivista que

subsiste como herança do chamado “contrato social” soviético. Embora

hoje isso esteja em relativo declínio ou venha sendo repaginado na forma

de programas de responsabilidade social corporativa, é esperado que as

empresas se disponham ou sejam pressionadas a apoiar a manutenção de

infraestruturas e serviços locais, a fornecer serviços de aragem, máqui-

nas e equipamentos, a ceder campos para pastagem e a permitir acesso à

lhotes para criação, fertilizantes, pesticidas, forragem e ração a preços

abaixo do mercado. Subsiste, ainda, uma habitual tolerância a pequenos

estudos internacionais • Belo Horizonte, ISSN 2317-773X, v. 11, n. 3, (out. 2023), p. 50-71

furtos de insumos dos armazéns das fazendas, dando continuidade de

velhas práticas da época socialista baseadas na máxima “tudo é coletivo,

tudo é meu” (Mamonova, 2016; Vorbrugg, 2019; Grouiez, 2018; Visser et

al, 2019; Wegren, 2021).

Poder político: estado e políticas públicas para agricultura e alimentação

Putin emergiu de uma “catástrofe estrutural”, no rescaldo do co-

lapso da URSS, como uma gura “cesarista” que suscitou “o aparecimen-

to de uma espécie de solução arbitral [capaz de] despertar e organizar

a vontade coletiva de um determinado bloco histórico, restaurando e

reorganizando o estado russo” (Lima, 2019, p.78). Através de alianças ur-

didas junto ao aparato militar e ao serviço de segurança pública, Putin

mostrou-se capaz de restaurar a autonomia relativa do estado frente aos

interesses oligárquicos que dominavam a Rússia desde 1991. O notável

desempenho da economia russa a partir das reestatizações no setor ener-

gético, das reestruturações no setor nanceiro e do controle no complexo

industrial-militar, permitiu-lhe recompor um estado forte e centralizado,

equipado para monitorar a acumulação de capital. Contudo, apenas com

as consequências da guerra na Ucrânia no comércio internacional de

grãos e de fertilizantes começou-se a dar atenção ao lugar do agrone-

gócio no projeto hegemônico putinista. E quase nada se discute sobre o

papel da população rural como base social na sustentação da sua legiti-

midade política.

O crescimento das agroholdings é incompreensível sem levar em

conta o apoio econômico e político recebido pelos oligarcas que com-

põem essa fração da burguesia, realçando a relação entre interesses de

classe e prioridades da política pública do estado.

O governo do presidente Vladimir Putin se voltou para essas agroholdings como

aliados privilegiados, recrutando-os para um projeto político conhecido como

Agenda de Segurança Alimentar Russa. Os principais objetivos da agenda eram

a recuperação das fazendas russas, a redução da dependência de importação her-

dada dos governos de Yeltsin e mais carne na dieta dos russos. Desde o início dos

anos 2000, uma série de medidas de apoio público, como créditos subsidiados,

incentivos scais e barreiras comerciais, ajudaram as agroholdings a prosperar.

Elas também foram incentivadas a adquirir vastas áreas de terras agrícolas em

troca de suas contribuições para um projeto político de fortalecer a agricultura e

a produção doméstica de alimentos. Mesmo sendo empresas privadas, o governo

Putin mobilizou as agroholdings e rmas de agrotecnologia como instrumentos

indispensáveis para concretizar sua agenda política. As agroholdings prospe-

raram e se tornaram atores econômicos globalmente competitivos porque

produzem com mais eciência e lucratividade do que as fazendas coletivas [da

antiga URSS], mas também porque podem contar com proteção e apoio político

(Wengle, 2021, p.59-60).

As atuais diretrizes da política agrícola na Rússia foram estabelecidas

no Projeto Nacional Prioritário para o Desenvolvimento da Agricultura

2006-2007 e posteriormente ampliadas nos Programas Estatais de Apoio

ao Desenvolvimento da Agricultura 2008-2012, 2013-2020 e 2021-2025. O

valor disponibilizado ronda os 1,3% do orçamento do estado e 0,5% do

PIB. A distribuição dos recursos claramente favorece as grandes empresas

agropecuárias, que abocanham cerca de 85% do total, enquanto as fazen-

das camponesas obtêm 13% e as fazendas subsidiárias apenas 2%. Além

Fabiano Escher A economia políca internacional da questão agroalimentar na Rússia

disso, no período 2013-2020, apenas 2% dos grandes beneciários recebe-

ram 50% dos subsídios, sendo que 1% levou mais de 40% do total, com

as maiores agroholdings no topo da lista; ao passo que na extremidade

inferior, 40% dos menores beneciários receberam apenas 1% de todos os

subsídios distribuídos (Uzun; Shagaida; Lerman, 2019).

Entretanto, diferente da “bancada ruralista” no Brasil ou do “agri-

cultural lobby” nos EUA, “no contexto russo, os atores econômicos ge-

ralmente são muito mais dependentes das boas graças dos funcionários

públicos e, apesar de alguns donos de grandes agroholdings serem clara-

mente bem conectados por meio de redes informais, eles não são mem-

bros de longa data das elites do poder” (Wengle, 2021, p.71). O entrelaça-

mento de interesses entre governo e agroholdings decorre principalmen-

te desses oligarcas terem se tornado aliados chave quando Putin almejava

que o país se afastasse da integração incondicional ao mercado mundial

e obtivesse maior independência nacional em relação às principais com-

modities alimentares. A transformação da agricultura e das dietas russas,

facilitada pela articulação das agroholdings ao regime de acumulação,

é saudada como uma conquista política do governo, como demonstra o

alinhamento da retórica de várias rmas – Cherkizovo, Miratorg, United

Grain, EkoNiva, etc. – com a agenda de segurança alimentar nacional

(Wengle, 2021).

Em 2008, a Rússia era o segundo maior importador mundial de ali-

mentos, atrás apenas da China. Nesse contexto, a escalada nos preços dos

alimentos que seguiu a crise nanceira global – apontada entre os fato-

res que motivaram a “primavera árabe” e outros distúrbios sociais pelo

mundo – fez disparar o alarme. Em 2010 foi promulgada a Doutrina de

Segurança Alimentar da Federação Russa, com o objetivo de reduzir a

dependência estrangeira por meio da “substituição de importações” e da

“autossuciência” na produção de alimentos. Cotas tarifárias por país ou

região tornaram-se a regra, mesmo após a Rússia ter aderido à OMC em

2012. Mas a virada foi em 2014, quando o decreto do “embargo alimen-

tar” levou à proibição de importação de muitos produtos como retalia-

ção às sanções impostas pelos EUA, União Europeia, Austrália, Canadá e

Noruega após a crise ucraniana e a anexação da Crimeia, incluindo pos-

teriormente o Reino Unido em reação ao Brexit (Wegren; Nilssen, 2022).

A Doutrina de Segurança Alimentar, de 2010, e a Estratégia de

Segurança Nacional da Federação Russa, de 2015, devem ser analisadas em

conjunto. A mensagem crucial nelas contida é que a segurança alimentar

é um componente estruturante da segurança nacional (Lima; Dias, 2018).

A Doutrina determinou limiares para a produção nacional do consumo

de certos grupos alimentares: grãos, 95%; açúcar, 80%; óleo vegetal, 80%;

carnes e derivados, 85%; leite e laticínios, 90%; pescado, 80%; batatas, 95%;

sal, 85%. Uma vez que as medidas “protecionistas” começaram a gerar re-

sultados em termos de aumento da produção doméstica, na nova versão

da Doutrina, promulgada em 2020, alguns percentuais de autossuciên-

cia alimentar foram ampliados – açúcar, 90%; óleo vegetal, 90%; pescado,

85% – e outros adicionados – legumes e cabaças, 85%; frutas e bagas, 60%;

sementes das principais culturas, 75% (Solodova; Sigidov; Ilyasov, 2021). E

uma vez provado o êxito na substituição de importações e no aumento da

estudos internacionais • Belo Horizonte, ISSN 2317-773X, v. 11, n. 3, (out. 2023), p. 50-71

produção doméstica de alimentos, ao protecionismo presente na política

de segurança alimentar nacional logo agregou-se um componente estra-

tégico “neomercantilista” de promoção das exportações agroalimentares

russas. Consequentemente, em 2018 foi aprovado o Programa Nacional

de Exportação de Produtos do Complexo Agroindustrial, com dotação

orçamentária de RUB$ 400 bilhões. O programa previa que o valor das

exportações alimentares russas atingisse USD$ 45 bilhões até 2024. Mas

os efeitos recessivos da pandemia levaram o Ministério da Agricultura

postergar tal meta para 2030 (Wegren; Nilssen, 2021).

A análise revela que a Rússia hoje reúne as condições para utilizar a

produção e o comércio agroalimentar como instrumento de poder nacio-

nal e arma geopolítica. Os líderes russos estão plenamente conscientes de

que o “poder agroalimentar” é uma variável chave para as grandes potên-

cias (Lima; Dias, 2018). Eles sabem muito bem que os EUA, sobre-tudo du-

rante a Guerra Fria, sempre zeram uso político dos uxos de alimentos.

Zhang (2020, p.63) lembra que, em 1974, o então secretário de agricultura

Earl Butz, inspirado no uso do petróleo como instrumento de política ex-

terna pela Organização dos Países Exportadores de Petróleo (OPEP), “se

referia ao uso dos alimentos como arma para avançar os objetivos estra-

tégicos dos Estados Unidos: conquistar amigos, punir inimigos e conter a

propagação do comunismo.” Ironicamente, hoje são os EUA que acusam a

Rússia de usar a segurança alimentar como arma num contexto de “guer-

ra híbrida” frente as crescentes vulnerabilidades advindas das mudanças

climáticas (Summers; Goodman, 2020). O mais irônico, no entanto, é que

tal projeção não é sem cabimento, já que o vice-presidente do Conselho

de Segurança da Federação Russa, Dmitry Medvedev, lhe dá toda razão.

Os produtos alimentícios russos são sucientes para atender plenamente às

nossas necessidades domésticas. A prioridade no abastecimento de alimentos

é o nosso mercado interno e o controle de preços. Ao mesmo tempo, o estado

vai dar continuidade à assistência em larga escala e sistemática aos agricultores.

Fornecemos alimentos e colheitas apenas para nossos amigos. Felizmente temos

muitos deles, e eles não estão na Europa e nem na América do Norte. Vamos

vender tanto por rublos quanto por sua moeda nacional em proporções com-

binadas. Não forneceremos nossos alimentos e produtos agrícolas aos nossos

inimigos e não compraremos nada deles. Lembro que na minha infância a URSS

comprava grãos do Canadá. Era estranho, o maior país comprando trigo por

dólares. Hoje, o quadro é completamente diferente: a Rússia é o maior produtor

de grãos, junto com Índia e China. E nos últimos anos, o maior exportador de

trigo. Acontece que a segurança alimentar de muitos países depende de nossos

suprimentos. Acontece que nossa comida é nossa arma silenciosa. Silenciosa,

mas formidável. Supera a exportação de armas reais. Totalizou mais de US$ 37

bilhões no ano passado [2021] (TASS, 2022).

Além das preocupações com as frações burguesas e a segurança

nacional, a política agroalimentar também se propõe assegurar o con-

sentimento das classes populares. A garantia da segurança alimentar e da

transição nutricional rumo a dietas mais ricas em proteína animal é um

forte argumento para galvanizar o apoio da massa da população urbana,

ainda que a inação nos preços dos alimentos seja um fator perturbador.

Mas se e em que medida a massa da população rural, consubstanciada

na agricultura familiar subsidiária, sente-se contemplada e concede a sua

aprovação ao projeto hegemônico, ou tenta se engajar em projetos políti-

cos alternativos, é algo mais difícil de entender.

Fabiano Escher A economia políca internacional da questão agroalimentar na Rússia

A literatura especializada levanta dois problemaschave para ana-

lisar o lugar do meio rural na atual situação política russa. A primeiro se

refere ao apoio da população rural ao governo de Putin, caracterizado

como um exemplo de “populismo autoritário”. Liderança autoritária e ca-

rismática, estado forte e disciplinador, apelos tradicionalistas inuencia-

dos pela Igreja Ortodoxa, retórica nacionalista exaltando o passado cza-

rista e stalinista para justicar a política do estado em relação à oposição

interna e inimigos externos e identicação direta entre o povo e o presi-

dente contra as elites gananciosas e corruptas seriam traços denidores

do regime putinista. Os apoiadores de Putin são comumente retratados

de maneira homogênea, como uma maioria silenciosa, passiva, conserva-

dora e manipulável, que age irracionalmente contra seus próprios interes-

ses materiais (Granberg; Sätre, 2016). O segundo problema se refere à au-

sência de movimentos sociais rurais autônomos capazes de propor uma

política agrária articulada a um projeto de desenvolvimento mais amplo

pautado na ideia de “soberania alimentar”. O legado socialista e as restri-

ções impostas às organizações da sociedade civil pelo regime inibiriam

a organização de um movimento de base, associado à Via Campesina,

que se oponha à agricultura industrial, ao agronegócio e aos seus im-

pactos socioambientais negativos. O estado tampouco encamparia qual-

quer programa de soberania alimentar. Como corolário, a ascensão das

agroholdings e a marginalização das fazendas subsidiárias atestariam que

a soberania alimentar não tem futuro na Rússia (Wegren, 2021).

Embora ambos os problemas levantados encontrem lastro na rea-

lidade russa contemporânea, eles não contam toda a história. É possível

traçar um diagnóstico mais complexo e nuançado. Na prática, a conso-

lidação de um poder estatal autoritário não é vista pela maioria da po-

pulação rural como contraditória à democracia. Os russos tendem a ver

as eleições como um ato simbólico de expressar lealdade e aprovação ao

governo e associam democracia com um estado forte que cuida do povo,

estabilidade econômica, lei e ordem doméstica, soberania nacional e pro-

teção contra ameaças externas. A imagem de Putin como um “verdadei-

ro muzhik” (um homem do povo) é muito difundida, mas a maioria não

partilha ilusões ingênuas sobre ele. É que a memória amarga do “perío-

do de transição” faz a política econômica atual ser percebida de forma

mais positiva. Além disso, o apoio popular à Putin revela o fracasso da

democracia representativa burguesa frente a corrente crise orgânica do

capitalismo neoliberal, à semelhança de outros países que também teste-

munharam a ascensão de líderes populistas autoritários, como os EUA e

o Brasil (Mamonova, 2019).

O baixo estímulo para a ação coletiva, por sua vez, deve-se ao le-

gado socialista de intervenção estatal permanente em assuntos rurais

e à dependência da agricultura subsidiária as relações simbióticas com

as grandes fazendas. A maioria dos movimentos e organizações so-

ciais rurais existentes na Rússia operam em moldes corporativistas sob

o patrocínio do estado. A única exceção foi a Krestyanskiy Front (Frente

Camponesa), que defendia os moradores rurais da grilagem e apropriação

ilegal de terras, mas que devido às crescentes restrições do estado e à falta

de mobilização social, foi dissolvida em 2013. Mas apesar das fazendas

estudos internacionais • Belo Horizonte, ISSN 2317-773X, v. 11, n. 3, (out. 2023), p. 50-71

subsidiárias serem estigmatizadas como atrasadas e inecientes, em opo-

sição às agroholdings, vistas como modernas e ecientes, elas fornecem

uma parcela substancial dos alimentos básicos. Elas tendem a produzir

com tecnologias tradicionais mais sustentáveis (trabalho manual dedica-

do, rotação de culturas, esterco e compostagem, baixo uso de energia

fóssil, tração animal), adotadas por causa da incapacidade de comprar in-

sumos caros e do desejo de cultivar alimentos saudáveis e de garantir a

fertilidade a longo prazo do solo. Além disso, comercializam seus pro-

dutos majoritariamente em mercados localizados, com uma cadeia ali-

mentar curta e pouca distância do campo ao prato. Mas essa “soberania

alimentar silenciosa” não é uma força social de contestação e resistência

aberta ou um projeto político que disputa o futuro da sociedade. Tais

práticas coexistem com o agronegócio corporativo. Enquanto o direito de

produzir os próprios alimentos não estiver ameaçado, a agricultura fami-

liar parece não ter muito incentivo para se mobilizar. Pode-se presumir

que exista uma convergência tácita entre a manutenção desse contrato

social implícito com as classes populares no campo e a implementação de

uma política de segurança alimentar explicitamente protecionista e neo-

mercantilista para as classes dominantes. Se isso for verdade, ao invés de

esperar um movimento social russo por soberania alimentar próximo ao

proposto pela Via Campesina, o mais previsível é o seguimento de uma

espécie de “Via Kremlina” capturada pelo estado (Mamonova, 2016).

Conclusões

Este artigo analisou a economia política internacional da questão

agroalimentar na Rússia e suas implicações globais de longo alcance. O

surgimento e rápida expansão das agroholdings e seu notável desempe-

nho no mercados doméstico e nas exportações demonstram a articula-

ção do sistema agroalimentar russo a um novo regime de acumulação

de capital. O avanço do processo de transição nutricional e a formação

de uma agricultura familiar mercantilizada e heterogênea atestam a pro-

funda transformação nos padrões de reprodução social dos meios de vida

da população urbana e rural. O recrutamento de um novo segmento da

burguesia oligárquica e o consentimento das classes populares rurais ao

projeto hegemônico de Putin revelam o caráter complexo e nuançado do

seu poder político.

A análise da questão agroalimentar russa empreendida neste ar-

tigo chama atenção para a abertura de uma formidável, mas ainda pou-

co explorada, agenda de pesquisas em economia política internacional.

Três linhas de análise podem se mostrar bastante férteis nessa direção.

Primeiro, as problemáticas da acumulação de capital, da reprodução so-

cial e do poder político são fundamentais para compreender os rumos da

trajetória de desenvolvimento econômico e projeção internacional de po-

der da Rússia no futuro próximo. Segundo, a evolução da política agroali-

mentar praticada pelo estado russo, de uma reação essencialmente prote-

cionista para uma estratégia cada vez mais neomercantilista, indica que

o regime alimentar contemporâneo se está movendo para além do con-

senso neoliberal. Terceiro, esses movimentos estão em conuência com

Fabiano Escher A economia políca internacional da questão agroalimentar na Rússia

o papel do estado e dos capitais chineses na conguração de um sistema

agroalimentar global mais policêntrico e multipolar, facilitando novos

uxos de comércio, investimentos, tecnologias e nanças impulsionados

pela China por todo o sul global. É difícil imaginar a construção de um

novo projeto nacional de desenvolvimento e inserção externa mais justo,

soberano e sustentável para o Brasil sem a adequada compreensão dessas

grandes transformações da nossa época.

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Prostitutes, Mercenaries and Feminism:

The Public and the Private in International

Relations

Prostitutas, Mercenários e Feminismo: O Público e o

Privado nas Relações Internacionais

Prostitutas, mercenarios y feminismo: lo público y lo

privado en las relaciones Internacionales

Wagner Santos1

Cristiano Mendes2

DOI: 10.5752/P.2317-773X.2023v11n3p72-88

Recebido em: 15 de fevereiro de 2022

Aprovado em: 1º de abril de 2024

A

Feminist approaches have become increasingly present in International Rela-

tions studies. Using these theoretical perspectives, the present article analyzes

the basis on which rests the prejudice toward prostitutes and employees of

Military and Private Security Companies (MPSCs). The premise is that social

constructions ideally locate the role of women in the private sphere, while

public spaces are reserved for regular military soldiers. Our argument is that

both the prostitute, when positioning herself in the public environment, and the

MPSC employee, when in the private sphere, destabilize the expected idealities

for their categories, generating distrust, repulsion, and uncertainty.

Key-words: Prostitutes, Mercenaries, Feminism, Public and private, Private

Military and Security Companies.

R

Abordagens feministas têm se tornado cada vez mais presentes nos estudos de Rela-

ções Internacionais. Utilizando essas perspectivas teóricas, o presente artigo analisa

as bases sobre as quais se sustenta o preconceito em relação às prostitutas e funcio-

nários de Empresas Militares Privadas (MPSCs). A premissa é que as construções

sociais localizam idealmente o papel das mulheres na esfera privada, enquanto os

espaços públicos são reservados aos soldados militares regulares. Nosso argumento

é que tanto a prostituta, ao se posicionar no ambiente público, quanto os funcioná-

rios de Empresas Militares Privadas, na esfera privada, desestabilizam as idealidades

esperadas para suas categorias, gerando desconança, repulsa e incerteza.

Palavras-chave: Prostitutas, Mercenários, Feminismo, Público e Privado, Em-

presas Militares Privadas.

1. Doctor in political science, Federal

University of Pernambuco

2. Doctor in International Relations,

Pontiﬁcal Catholic University of Minas

Gerais

Wagner Santos, Crisano Mendes Prostutes, Mercenaries and Feminism: The Public and the Private in Internaonal Relaons

R

Los enfoques feministas se han vuelto cada vez más presentes en los estudios de

Relaciones Internacionales. Desde estas perspectivas teóricas, este artículo anali-

za las bases sobre las que se sustentan los prejuicios en relación con las prosti-

tutas y los empleados de las Empresas Militares Privadas (MPSC). La premisa

es que las construcciones sociales ubican idealmente el papel de las mujeres en

la esfera privada, mientras que los espacios públicos están reservados para los

militares regulares. Nuestro argumento es que tanto la prostituta, al posicionar-

se en el ámbito público, como los empleados de Empresas Militares Privadas,

en el ámbito privado, desestabilizan los ideales esperados para sus categorías,

generando desconanza, repulsión e incertidumbre.

Palabras clave: Prostitutas, Mercenarios, Feminismo, Público y Privado, Empre-

sas Militares Privadas.

Introduction

The public/private dichotomy has been used to categorize human

beings and normalize their actions as social agents (Barry, 1996; Chapkis,

1997; Gorman-Murray, 2008). The construction and cultural dissemina-

tion of this dichotomy point to ideal spaces of occupation of gender that

reproduce relations of domination between the masculine and the femi-

nine. The emergence of feminist approaches in International Relations

(IR) since the 1980s has sought to introduce the study of these dicho-

tomies into more traditional academic debates. According to feminist

theory, binary oppositions such as public and private spaces are mobilized

to accommodate pre-dened social roles, with each gender occupying an

expected location. Any undue occupation of spaces by certain identities

would be seen as abnormal or pathological.

Traditional male-privileging views assign women to the private

sphere, the ideal place for their assumed natural qualities and virtues,

such as motherhood, love, trust, and integrity. On the other hand, men,

likewise idealized for their bravery, boldness, and strength, would nd

in the public sphere the necessary tools so that their own natural virtues

could be fully expressed (Siltanen; Stanworth, 1984).

Drawing on the analytical contributions of feminist scholars, the

present work analyzes two categories that contradict this logic of the pu-

blic/private: the prostitute and the mercenary. Without ignoring the fact

that there are also male sex workers, as well as female mercenaries or

employees of Military and Private Security Companies (MPSCs), this stu-

dy focuses on the socially constructed idealities around these professions.

Despite the fact that there are men who prostitute themselves and wo-

men who work for MPSCs, the narratives that describe these functions

refer us to the role of the feminine and the masculine respectively.3

Our argument is that, in contradicting the acceptable logic of their

social roles, both the prostitute, occupying the public environment, and

the mercenary, when situated in the private sphere, destabilize the expec-

ted idealities of their genders, generating distrust, repulsion, and uncer-

tainty. The analysis is developed with reference to a literature composed

of theoretical views in the areas of Sociology and International Relations.

3. We may even note that part of the

prejudice that is held about men prosti-

tuting themselves or women ﬁghting as

mercenaries or soldiers comes precisely

from the social expectation that delimits

their professional idealities into the two

genders.

estudos internacionais • Belo Horizonte, ISSN 2317-773X, v. 11, n. 3, (out. 2023), p. 72-88

In particular, we try to show how the problem of gender manifests for

the two categories analyzed. Through a literature review on this topic,

and applying a deductive methodology, we’ll discuss the reasons for these

specic cases.

The denition of the public/private dichotomy is not a consensus

in the literature. In a more traditional sense, the realm of the public is

linked to the idea of social practice and politics. According to Hannah

Arendt (2016), the very condition of being human requires the company

of other people who give meaning to the actions of our species. Thus,

according to her, a person who lives in complete isolation from other

people, would not dier from other animals for not being able to obtain

awareness of their condition or give meaning to their acts as something

that occurs beyond the merely biological processes of survival (labor).

The condition of being human requires the activity of creating

articialism over the natural world (work), and, on a social level, prac-

ticing interaction in the plurality of a society (action). In this way, the

private realm would be linked to the mere eort of survival and to the

more restricted human interactions originally linked to family. The

creation of the public space occurs in the transposition both of the fa-

mily nucleus and of the condition of mere provider of biological life. The

public (usually guaranteed by the establishment of the State, but histo-

rically also having its condition created by the role of religion) would be

the exercise of plurality in social and political spheres with the aim of

generating consensus, not by the exercise of violence, but by discourse

and persuasion (Arendt, 2016).

In this article we work with the dichotomy of public and private

using the state sphere as a reference. The regular soldier, by nature an

agent of the state sphere, would always be in the public domain. Not so

much for defending the interests of society (which could also be done by

private agents), but because they are subject to control, inspection, and

regulation by governments. Similarly, the activity of prostitution would

also be in this public sphere because it is subject to regulation and control

by the State.

The mercenary and the gure of the domestic woman would be

in the private sphere. Both would not be subject to state inspection and

regulation, since their relationships (the mercenary with their contractor

and the wife with her husband) ideally don’t belong to State interference.

When referring to combatants considered mercenaries, we are not

including employees of larger and more transparent Private Military and

Security Companies, which are subject to state laws and become suscep-

tible to government regulations. In these cases, social prejudice is mini-

mal or almost nonexistent because the State can control and limit the sco-

pe of their actions. Social prejudice towards the gure of the mercenary,

when referring to MPSCs, comes precisely from companies that escape

this regulation, leaving their employees free to act without any interfe-

rence from the States.

The same occurs with the phenomenon of prostitution. Those wo-

men who prostitute themselves as the only means of survival are not the

main targets of social prejudice. These are considered more as victims of

Wagner Santos, Crisano Mendes Prostutes, Mercenaries and Feminism: The Public and the Private in Internaonal Relaons

society than susceptible to social opprobrium. By prostituting themselves

only for their own sustenance, such women are merely ensuring their

biological subsistence (labor). However, those who choose this profession

freely, even having other opportunities to ensure their own sustenance,

are the main victims of collective prejudice. It is precisely these last wo-

men who, instead of limiting themselves to the private sphere of the fa-

mily nucleus, submit to the regulation of their activities by public bodies,

and, therefore, move out of the private sphere and come to be situated in

the public sphere.

The debate on mercenaries and prostitutes, with their respective

prejudices linked to these two gures, can contribute to a better unders-

tanding of two contemporary debates in this area of knowledge. One of

them refers to the use of Private Military Companies. Beyond discussions

about eectiveness, pros and cons, and the legitimacy of these organiza-

tions, there is an ongoing debate about whether the employees of these

companies can or cannot be considered modern-day mercenaries.

This discussion becomes relevant not just from a legal standpoint

(since mercenary activity is prohibited by the Geneva Convention) but

also because the prejudice surrounding the gure of the mercenary leads

to any study advocating the closeness between employees of MPSCs and

mercenaryism resulting in the tacit delegitimization of the use of these

companies. Thus, understanding the origins of the international commu-

nity’s aversion to the gure of the mercenary means situating the debate

beyond its merely legal aspects, showing all the complexity of this type

of discussion.

A second debate in vogue in International Relations lies in the femi-

nist view of this eld of knowledge. Among the various points addressed

by feminist authors in IR, we nd the denunciation of the sexist view of

society that restricts women’s roles to spaces ideally considered as private.

In this way, women who act in the international environment are often

prevented from playing roles as soldiers; from occupying decision-ma-

king positions and even from acting in prominent positions in interna-

tional politics. Therefore, understanding how these idealities restrict and

judge the places reserved for women also means having a clearer view of

how prejudices can arise from the transpositions of these barriers created

by the sexist view. The case of prostitutes, although it can also be applied

to the domestic environment (as in the case of mercenaries), helps us bet-

ter understand the dynamics and the basis of these aversions created by

the breaking of these idealized locations by societies.

We begin the article exposing the emergence of feminist theories

in International Relations and its main approaches: liberal, critical, cons-

tructivist, poststructuralist, and postcolonial. Above all, we emphasize

the omnipresence of the gender problem in its critiques and analyses, as

well as the denunciation of the power relations and domination that this

variable carries. Proceeding with the theme of prostitution, the second

part analyzes feminist approaches to prostitution, highlighting the se-

xological, constructivist, and Marxist interpretations of the theme. We

introduce into our analysis a discussion about the binary dichotomies

between the prostitute and her conceptual opposite, namely the wife/

estudos internacionais • Belo Horizonte, ISSN 2317-773X, v. 11, n. 3, (out. 2023), p. 72-88

mother, showing how the characteristics attributed to each category di-

verge substantially from each other.

After that, we advance with the analysis of the gure of the merce-

nary and his conceptual opposite, the soldier in the regular armed forces.

In this part, we highlight how the private version of the soldier—the mer-

cenary or employee of an MPSC—destabilizes the idealities expected for

his category. Just as the ideal space of occupation of women would be the

private sphere, in the case of the soldier defending the homeland, it would

be the public sphere. While the soldier (public) is associated with love

of the motherland, humanitarian work, nationalism, and ideology, the

mercenary (private) is seen as someone who is at the service of whomever

pays more; the mercenary is seen as serving their personal interests and

can easily abandon their charge in case of a more attractive oer.

In the third and fourth parts, we discuss how gender identities in

the international environment (in the case of mercenaries) reproduce the

same logic of domination found in the local sphere (the case of prosti-

tutes), reserving for each category a space considered legitimate for the

stabilization of their identities. Because they fail to understand the idea-

tional logic, both in the international environment and in the domestic

sphere, these workers end up being the targets of prejudice because they

do not occupy the places reserved to them.

Feminism and International Relations

Feminist theories emerged in IR between the late 1980s and early

1990s (Sylvester, 2003; Tickner, 2001), associated with the so-called third

debate (Lapid, 1989).4 The rst works in the 1980s aimed to question

women’s role in global politics and how they would be represented

(Elshtain, 1987; Enloe, 2014). More than that, these works challenged

scholars in International Relations to think about how their theories

could be reformulated and their understanding of global politics im-

proved by paying special attention to new analytical experiences.

According to these authors, only with the introduction of gender analy-

sis in international studies would we observe a considerable analytical

impact on some key IR concepts such as sovereignty, state, and security

(Sjoberg; Tickner, 2013b). The introduction of the gender issue as a re-

levant category and analytical tool would construct alternatives to dis-

ciplinary studies dominated by rationalist and reproductive methods of

the logic of masculine (True, 2005; Ackerly; Stern; True, 2006; Steans,

2006). Certain that women would be underrepresented in IR, the main

concern for feminists would be to explain the subordination of the fe-

minine gender, or the unfair asymmetry between the positions held by

women and men in the social, economic, and especially political sphe-

res (Whitworth, 1994).

According to these authors, global politics would not only relegate

female experiences to the margins, but would also ratify relations bet-

ween dichotomies, especially those related to the division between the

public and the private. Women would be ideally reserved for the private

sphere and characterized by irrationality, weakness, emotion, sensitivity,

4. According to the author, the ﬁrst

debate would be between realists and

idealists. The second between neorea-

lists and neoliberals. The third between

the latter and post-positivist theoretical

approaches, among them, feminism.

Wagner Santos, Crisano Mendes Prostutes, Mercenaries and Feminism: The Public and the Private in Internaonal Relaons

and motherhood. Men would be assigned to the public sphere and ideali-

zed as rational, virile, strong, brave, and heroic (Shepherd, 2010).

Feminists questioned the frontiers through which such opposition

had settled in the international arena and sought the means to combat

them. Starting from hermeneutical, discursive and humanistic metho-

dologies, they used philosophical traditions previously ignored by con-

ventional approaches, looking at global politics through “gender lenses”

(Peterson, Runyan, 2010; Sjoberg, Tickner, 2013a).

In the eld of foreign policy, feminists warn that the male sex is not

only dominant, but also the policymaker based on the assumption that if

they are rational and strategically oriented actors, they would be better

able to represent the nation’s line of defense, making better life or death

decisions (True, 2005). In their study of foreign policy and defense, Nancy

E. McGlen and Meredith Reid Sarkees (1993) concluded that women are

rarely insiders in the political game and even more rarely make or parti-

cipate in foreign policy decisions that lead to war, for example.

But despite sharing a deep interest in gender equality or, as they

prefer to assert, in “gender emancipation” in IR, feminism is not a one-no-

te theory. The variety of activism associated with feminism parallels the

innumerable paths that its arguments may take (Jaggar, 1983; Mohanty,

Russo, Torres, 1991; Steans, 1998; Sylvester, 1996; Zalewski, 2000). Liberal

Feminism, for example, draws attention to the subordination suered by

women in global politics and argues about the need to include women

in the areas of the public sphere that have been denied to them (Sjoberg;

Tickner, 2013b). It departs from the assumption that women have the

same capacity for action as men and cannot be excluded from any social

sphere: higher education, government, international institutions, and -

nancial aairs, among others. Liberal feminists investigate, for example,

the inequalities between men and women and the human rights viola-

tions committed disproportionately against women, such as internatio-

nal tracking and rape at war. Their approach uses gender as an expla-

natory variable in the analysis of foreign policy through statistical varia-

tions (Caprioli; Boyer, 2001). They also argue that discrimination deprives

women of having equal rights to achieve their own goals. While men

are judged by their individual merits, women are judged by their femini-

ne qualities or collectively as a group. Such barriers could be eliminated

by removing the obstacles that underpin them, and by providing equal

opportunities to both genders (Whitworth, 2008; Tickner, 2001)5 .

Critical Feminism, by contrast, goes beyond Liberal Feminism and

its use of gender as an analytical variable. This approach focuses less on

women’s participation in the public sphere and more on unequal rela-

tionships between men and women as gender representations in a patriar-

chal society, in which men have historically wished to control women’s

sexuality, reproduction, and other social roles. For critical feminists, men

and women are essentially dierent and similar to each other in several

respects. These authors tend to agree that men are less prone to showing

emotion and more aggressive and competitive, while women are more

caring and more emotional. In these terms, society is organized taking

into account masculine characteristics, privileging patriarchal norms and

5. However, Liberal Feminists tend to

be criticized by other approaches for

using methods considered positivist

in their analyses. See, for example,

McMillan C (1982) Women, Reason and

Nature: Some Philosophical Problems

with Feminism. Princeton: Princeton

University Press; Steans J (2010) ‘Femi-

nist perspectives’ in Steans J et al. An

Introduction to International Relations

Theory: perspectives and themes, 3rd

edition. Essex: Pearson, p. 155-82; and

Mohanty CT, Russo A; Torres L (eds.)

(1991) Third World Women and the Po-

litics of Feminism. Bloomington: Indiana

University Press.

estudos internacionais • Belo Horizonte, ISSN 2317-773X, v. 11, n. 3, (out. 2023), p. 72-88

rules, inuencing not only our institutions, but also the way we see the

world (Fraser; Nicholson, 1990).

The same impetus for achieving change in the way we unders-

tand international politics is also shared by Constructivist Feminism.

Constructivist feminists focus on how ideas about gender form and are

shaped by global politics. In her book The Global Construction of Gender,

Elisabeth Prügl (1999) analyzes how women have been treated in inter-

national negotiations and in international law. Even when they represent

a greater number of workers than men, women still suer lower wages

and poorer working conditions. In the specic case of domestic wor-

kers, the author explains that the justication is given because domestic

work is not considered “real work,” since the private sphere associated

with the family diers from the public sphere in which work, in fact,

would occur, lacking higher wages and individual rights. Such a dicho-

tomy would not be limited to the local environment, but also the inter-

national (West; Austrin, 2005). Although in similar positions and with

responsibilities as great as those of men in international organizations,

the salary between them would diverge under the claim that women are

less productive than men who hold the same positions. Prügl and other

Constructivist feminists study the processes by which ideas about gen-

der inuence global politics, as well as the ways in which global politics

shape ideas about gender.

In an even more relativistic and discursive spectrum, Post-

structuralist Feminism constitutes one of the most important contribu-

tions to International Relations. Post-structuralist feminists assert that

the meanings attributed to the things around us are coded through lan-

guage (Sjoberg; Tickner, 2013b), and that linguistically constructed di-

chotomies such as strong/weak, rational/emotional, and public/private

serve to empower the masculine over the feminine. As regards interna-

tional relations, the civilized/barbaric, order/anarchy, and developed/

underdeveloped dichotomies play an important role in how we divide

the world linguistically, always considering a positive side and a negative

one. In this way, post-structuralist feminists want to deconstruct hierar-

chies, especially those related to gender that lead women to be portrayed

as inferior and men as superior. To disrupt the hierarchies that privilege

one (man) to the detriment of the other (woman), it would be crucial to

verify how we value and ratify the superiority/inferiority relationship

between genders.

Some prominent works by poststructuralist feminists, the main

theoretical argument of this article, serve as the basis for the decons-

truction of social roles, especially those related to the valuation of gen-

der dichotomies. Hooper (2001), among others6 , are examples of posts-

tructuralist researchers who have contributed to feminist thought.

Shepherd’s work, in particular, looks at how the concept of gender

factors into the UN Security Council resolutions and how it is imple-

mented in peace processes. In arguing that women are more peaceful

than men, the former would be expected to be more involved in con-

ict negotiation processes, assuming that they would be more adept at

dealing with the stabilization of violence and the resumption of peace.

6. See also Shepherd L (2008) Gender,

Violence, and Security: Discourse as

Practice. London: Zed Books; Sylvester

C (1994) Feminist Theory and Interna-

tional Relations in a Postmodern Era.

Cambridge: Cambridge University Press;

Sylvester C (2003) Feminist International

Relations: An Unﬁnished Journey. Cam-

bridge: Cambridge University Press.

Wagner Santos, Crisano Mendes Prostutes, Mercenaries and Feminism: The Public and the Private in Internaonal Relaons

However, this process does not always work, revealing its precarious-

ness and simplicity, as well as the very inability of the United Nations to

include women in their peacemaking processes. Something that could

represent gender emancipation instead reinforces the continuity of di-

chotomies and stereotypes around women.

Post-colonial Feminism is also based on binary dichotomies crea-

ted from gender relations (Spivak, 2010; Lorde, 2007). Its concern, howe-

ver, is with the relationship of subordination established under the aegis

of imperialism. In claiming that history has been told by colonizers who

tend to be white and Western, post-colonialist theorists embark on a dif-

cult task: rewriting history including those whose perspectives have

been excluded, as well as incorporating interpretations from the margins.

Post-colonial feminists criticize Western feminists for treating women as

a homogenous category, failing to recognize their dierences in culture,

social class, race, and geographic location. Such disregard would deprive

women of their own stories by assuming that they all have similar needs

for emancipation when in fact their realities are quite dierent.

Prostitutes and mercenaries

Feminist approaches in International Relations introduced gender

as an essential variable to analyze the dynamics of actors’ interactions

in the international environment. However, despite this eort, their

analyses still seem to have little practical impact on international policies

(Hutchings, 1999). Feminist analysts argue that this vacuum exists becau-

se politics, at its various levels, is still considered a mostly male environ-

ment (Enloe, 2014). Nevertheless, because it is the only approach that uses

gender as an analytical starting point (Sylvester, 1996), some themes nd

in feminism a legitimate spokesperson for their positions. Prostitution is

one such theme.

Commonly considered an intrinsic condition of women under a

patriarchal society (Barry, 1984; Gorman-Murray, 2008; Pateman, 1998;

Scoular, 2004) and often cited as the absolute embodiment of male pa-

triarchal privilege (see Kesler, 2002, p. 219-35) prostitution has been

approached from dierent perspectives. Sexological approaches, for

example, start from the premise that male behavior, when using women

in prostitution, is a simple result of their biological imperative, for whi-

ch such behavior would be natural. Constructivist approaches, on the

contrary, consider male behavior in relation to prostitution as historical

and socially constructed through male domination in detriment of fe-

male subordination, with responsibility and guilt over the existence of

prostitutes (Jereys, 1997; Rezeanu, 2015). Marxist feminists allege that

prostitution is the only activity in a capitalist society in which women

are, not infrequently, better paid than men (Overall, 1992)7 .

As previously observed, the private sphere has historically been

considered feminine, while the public sphere has remained exclusive to

the masculine gender (Bourdieu, 2002; Bryson, 2007; Löfren, 2003) with

each environment having expected and acceptable behavior. In the case

of women, the good wife, aectionate, reproductive, and sensitive, would

7. For a critique of the Marxist analysis

raised by Overall, see Laurie Shrage’s

(1993) Moral Dilemmas of Feminism.

New York: Routledge.

estudos internacionais • Belo Horizonte, ISSN 2317-773X, v. 11, n. 3, (out. 2023), p. 72-88

nd in the domestic environment the ideal place where her natural vir-

tues would blossom. Prostitution, by contrast, contradicts this logic. If

the private sphere is the proper place for a woman, the prostitute, in per-

vading the public environment, violates the natural order of things.

At the state level, prostitution in the past was considered by au-

thorities as a problem of law and order; an abnormal phenomenon that

would be associated with other anomalous behaviors such as drun-

kenness and trickery, causing embarrassment and public annoyance in

neighborhoods, threatening security and violating peace. Authorities ge-

nerally took steps to control or to curb prostitution, limiting it to certain

areas, and registering women who provided sex services in taverns, pubs,

and brothels. From the morality point of view, prostitution was a sin or

an addiction. Prostitutes would be “fallen women,” lacking redemption

and salvation (Outshoorn, 2004).

From the 1970s, with the strengthening of feminist movements, a

great eort has been made to change the stigma created around the pros-

titute. Claiming that the arguments surrounding the practice said little

or nothing about the actual situation of women, feminists problemati-

zed this practice, presenting the idea of “erotic work” (see Chapkis, 1997

and Nagle, 1997) in an attempt to eliminate the stereotypes surrounding

prostitution and to bring the discussion to a commercial and professional

level (Augustín, 2005; O’connell Davidson, 2002). The use of new terms

such as “sex work” or “sex worker” represented not only an important se-

mantic change but also the strengthening of the practice in terms of work

and human rights8 (see Delacoste; Alexander, 1998 and Pheterson, 1989).

In relation to the study of prostitution, at least two great perspecti-

ves are present in the literature. The rst argues that women who work

as prostitutes are exploited by the sex industry (mostly men). In addition,

prostitution and the sex industry together would serve to sustain and

reinforce this practice while strengthening the distorted image created

around the prostitute. The second argues that in a free society, prostitu-

tion is chosen by many women as a way of working, although they do not

enjoy the same rights aorded to other professional workers (O’connell

Davidson, 1998). These women should be free to work without fear of ex-

ploitation or violence (O’neill, 2001). More than that, sexual/erotic work

arguably serves as a “liberating ground for women” (see Chapkis, 1997)

regarding the discipline of their social role, traditionally relegated to the

private sphere. These authors also argue that violations of the practice

are linked to the legal and social construction of prostitutes as sexual

deviants rather than as workers (O’connell Davidson, 2002). Such a view

becomes even clearer in light of criticisms of binary dichotomies around

sex: normal/abnormal, pleasurable/dangerous, healthy/ill. In this way,

prostitutes, besides being stigmatized, are seen as dangerous due to the

fact they became accessible to anyone, what is considered inappropriate

for the feminine gender.

But we are far from reaching a consensus regarding the idea of

considering prostitution a job, especially as regards its ability to liberate

women from a strictly patriarchal society. Jill Jesson (1993), in reviewing

several papers on the subject, argues that feminism and prostitution are

8. In this article, we used the term

“prostitutes” as it is the one most

closely associated with the prejudice

under analysis. Although we agree that

the term “sex workers” is more appro-

priate, this choice would not reﬂect the

prejudice present not only in reality but

also in the designation of this type of

professionals.

Wagner Santos, Crisano Mendes Prostutes, Mercenaries and Feminism: The Public and the Private in Internaonal Relaons

not easily reconcilable. If, on the one hand, some feminists claim that

prostitution is a free choice that empowers women in a society that has

little to oer them, many others understand that, regardless of how the

practice is seen, it will always represent a masculine exploitation of the

feminine. For more radical feminists, for example, prostitution makes a

woman a “sex slave” because of the sexual violence that is always present

in the relationship between genders. In addition, legalizing the practice

means authorizing and granting men the right to women, legally ar-

ming a phenomenon to be combated (Barry, 1996; Jereys, 1997). In other

words, exploitation and submission would continue, only under a die-

rent guise.

Regardless of which argument best represents prostitution, the

fact is that by introducing the idea of gender into the discussion, feminist

analysis challenges the sexual and social inequalities which, in their view,

serve to replicate ideology, patriarchy, and hierarchical gender relations

(Barry, 1996).

In turn, studies on Military and Private Security Companies

(MPSCs) have noted the growth of this market after the end of the Cold

War9 . Several factors are considered responsible for this exponential gro-

wth: the large labor force, militarily well-trained and idle, available for

hire by these companies; the presence of cutting-edge weapons on the

black market—mainly from the former Soviet republics—and oered at

relatively low prices to the private sector; the increase in the number of

regional conicts, generating a greater demand for private security servi-

ces; and the advent of the neoliberal wave with its assumption that priva-

tization is the best way to increase the eciency of services provided in

society (Singer, 2003).

The myriad of services oered by MPSCs has since ranged from

contributing troops for direct combat to reinforce the regular military

and personnel in conict zones to providing military apparel, training

soldiers from various countries, and/or working on data processing and

logistics. Unlike the former mercenaries, who concentrated their eorts

on direct support of regular troops during battles, the current MPSCs

also provide aid to humanitarian organizations by supporting popula-

tions in regions hit by natural disasters and supporting UN peace opera-

tions (Avant, 2005; Ostensen, 2009).

Private security companies provide military and security services to states,

international organizations, INGOs, global corporations, and wealthy individu-

als. Every multi-lateral operation conducted by the UN since 1990 included the

presence of PSCs (AVANT, 2005, p. 7).

With the Cold War leading to the growth of MPSCs, there emer-

ged, as might be expected, criticisms surrounding hiring these compa-

nies. Among the main arguments used in opposition to this phenomenon

are: the high costs and the lack of transparency in the contracts between

states and MPSCs; the de-characterization of the nature of states due to

their loss of legitimate monopoly over the use of violence; the constant

reports of incidents between MPSC employees and the local populations

in the regions where they operate; the lack of a clear legal framework for

accountability on mistakes made by the MPSCs on the battleeld; and

9. It is a fact that PMSCs (Private

Military and Security Companies)

can be hired by various international

actors, including states themselves.

However, even when they are serving

governments and, therefore, in pursuit

of public objectives, the prejudice

surrounding the term ‘mercenaries’ still

prevails. Evidence of this is the nume-

rous criticisms made by authors who

work on this topic regarding this type

of hiring when done by state agents

(AVANT, 2005; SINGER, 2003).

estudos internacionais • Belo Horizonte, ISSN 2317-773X, v. 11, n. 3, (out. 2023), p. 72-88

the need for greater control of the activities of these rms by the con-

tracting actors (Thomson, 1996). Several experts still criticize MPSCs for

the notion that their employees’ activities approach mercenary activities

condemned by the international community (see Percy, 2007).

In spite of the criticism, however, the growth of the MPSC mar-

ket seems to be an irreversible phenomenon. The degree of dependence

that states have developed in relation to these agents, as well as the need

for continuity of services provided to international organizations—espe-

cially in humanitarian missions—has made the search for better regula-

tion and transparency of this market the only feasible option to combat

the misconduct of MPSCs. As international eorts move towards further

limitation of their functions and activities, there is also a collective com-

mitment by the companies themselves to increase the legitimacy and

condence of the international community in the services provided by

the MPSCs (Chesterman; Lehardt, 2009).

For centuries the hiring of mercenaries to ght in conict regions

has fueled the imaginary and the discussion about the legitimacy of this

phenomenon. Accused of going to war only for material gains, merce-

naries have always been seen as second-rate soldiers. Authors studying

politics and war have always characterized mercenaries as materialistic

people who cannot be trusted, either because of the danger of their chan-

ging sides if the enemy oers a greater value than the one already paid,

or their easily eeing from conict when the violence gets out of hand

(Chestermn; Lehardt, 2009).

As noted previously, one of the main criticisms of the activities of

Military and Private Security Companies is precisely the proximity of the

services oered by these companies to the centuries-old mercenary acti-

vities. Authors who try to show the similarities between MPSCs and mer-

cenaries often do so to delegitimize these companies as legitimate actors

in the international scene. The more the gure of the MPSC employee is

narratively approximated to the role of the former mercenaries, the less

legitimacy these companies have to continue oering their services (see

Lanning, 2005).

[...] The private military market was delegitimated by the end of the 1800s for

both material and normative reasons. The practice of hiring foreign soldiers

was universally condemned and legislated against, culminating in the Geneva

Conventions that withdrew from mercenaries the legal protections that soldiers

enjoyed in warfare. Essentially, the mercenary trade was criminalized (SINGER,

2003, p. 42).

The inverse of this logic can also be seen. The narratives cons-

tructed mainly by the owners of these companies, which emphasize the

humanitarian work of the MPSCs and idealize them as maintainers of

the international order and as stabilizers of conict zones, try to bring

the identity of these actors closer to the narrative ideality of regular sol-

diers. Dissembling the material motivation of these ocials, defenders

of MPSCs try to build a counter-narrative that distances the role of their

employees from the traditional caricature of the mercenary and brings

them closer to the UN’s blue helmets with their broad legitimacy already

won internationally (Lanning, 2005).

Wagner Santos, Crisano Mendes Prostutes, Mercenaries and Feminism: The Public and the Private in Internaonal Relaons

The narratives about MPSCs are not exempt from the relations of

power and gender present in every international phenomenon. Discourses

on the role of these companies, as well as the imaginary created from

their representations, are embedded in subjectivities that idealize the ro-

les of the masculine and the feminine, placing them in supposed discur-

sive arenas with apparent status of naturalness. Through the processes of

contraposition, reication, and erasure of identity instabilities, narratives

about MPSCs are constructed by contrasting the nature of their activities

with other similar phenomena present in the international environment,

such as mercenaries and regular armed forces (Singer, 2003).

As with all social phenomena, all constructed identities are ideally

linked to the public domain or the private sphere. In this way, the narra-

tives about regular soldiers, precisely because they emphasize their na-

tionalistic aspects and ideological motivations, end up relating them to

the public scope. Adherence to the military must be justied by supposed

ethical and collective standards and not by personal and nancial inte-

rests. In this way, the arena of the public ends up becoming the place par

excellence of these characters (Singer, 2003).

As for the mercenaries, we can verify the opposite logic. Stories

about soldiers of fortune identify them as selsh characters that join in

as supporters of regular troops only to take advantage of the money paid

by their contractors.10 In this way, the private sphere becomes the natu-

ral domain of this type of agent because the construction of its image

ends up presupposing the total absence of national or ideological values

(Singer, 2003; Thomson, 1996).

But other ramications can still be found in these accounts of re-

gular soldiers and mercenaries. Both identities are linked to the role of

masculinity, defenders of the homeland or feminized victims (Eichler,

2015). However, although the narratives refer both the soldier and the

mercenary to the role of the masculine, the former is always portrayed as

a civilized masculinity, while the latter is related to barbaric masculinity,

one that imposes order from virility and unorganized eciency. MPSC

employees would thus be posited somewhere between these two iden-

tity ideals. When represented as conict stabilizers, they would approach

the public sphere of the regular soldier. However, when narratives about

MPSCs depict their military capabilities and eciency by force, their

identity would tend to approach the opposite eld, the private sphere and

close range of the mercenary.

Prostitutes, Mercenaries, and Feminism: The Public and the Private

Several academic studies have already been and continue to be done

regarding MPSCs. Several authors in the eld of International Relations

study and are dedicated to the classication, criticism, and defense of, or

at least reection on, the future of this security market.

Although studies on feminism and International Relations have left

their status of marginality in recent years, research on the relationship

between gender and MPSCs is still relatively scarce. Among the eorts

to think about the relationship between these two themes, there are

10. Machiavelli’s The Prince already

drew attention to the danger of relying

on mercenaries. According to the author,

mercenaries would not be trusted to

ﬁght for money and would be on your

side only in times of peace. See Niccolo

Machiavelli’s The Prince (Chicago: The

University of Chicago Press, 2011).

estudos internacionais • Belo Horizonte, ISSN 2317-773X, v. 11, n. 3, (out. 2023), p. 72-88

productions that call attention to the reproduction of the relations of

exploitation caused by neoliberalism within these companies. Research

shows how hiring MPSCs replicates the dominant male logic in the regu-

lar military. Other authors demonstrate that MPSCs are a depository of

the male chauvinist imaginary that relates the role of their (male) emplo-

yees to the protection of their always feminized victims.

Though dierent in content, critical accounts of the contractor business, parti-

cularly in the media, take part in this gendered framing of the new state-market

relationship and rely on the ideal of soldier masculinity associated with state

forces. The stereotype of the hyper masculine, aggressive, greedy, and unpatrio-

tic contractor is contrasted with the image of the disciplined restrained, patriotic,

and self-sacricing state soldier (Stachowitsch, 2015, p. 32).

We believe, however, that other relationships between MPSCs and

gender issues can be unraveled. Especially those that refer to the criticis-

ms suered by these companies and the imaginary that delimits mascu-

line and feminine roles within the armed forces. The choice of this study

to focus on the designation of mercenaries is justied by the contempora-

neity of the debate on the modern conguration of these agents through

MPSCs (Private Military and Security Companies). Moreover, for com-

parison, the gure of the mercenary is the one that best aligns with the

role of prostitutes by traversing a path inverse to them in a process of

displacement from their idealized locations.

As seen in this article, the eld of International Relations is mar-

ked by the presence of gender positions that ideally delimit the scope of

the masculine in counterpoint to the space supposedly belonging to the

feminine. The construction of gender identities in the international envi-

ronment, in the case of mercenaries, reproduces the same logic of domi-

nation found in the local sphere for the prostitute, reserving for each cate-

gory a space considered legitimate for the stabilization of their identities.

What we can perceive is that the debate about the legitimacy of

MPSCs is based on subjective standards of judgment that go beyond

the nature of the services provided by these companies. When questio-

ning the lawfulness of the MPSCs, we are tacitly wondering how much

their activities can be considered as belonging to the public sphere or

not. Any private connotation of their services can generate destabi-

lization in the construction of their identities due to their supposed

proximity to the role of the mercenary. Considering the employees of

PMSCs (Private Military and Security Companies) as mercenaries not

only places these companies in a legal limbo – due to the prohibition

of mercenary activities by International Law – but also disqualies the

work of these agents by linking their activities to merely private inte-

rests. This portrayal of PMSC employees as mercenaries distorts the

idealized nature of war as a phenomenon of public character with col-

lective goals to be achieved.

The same occurs, only in reverse, in relation to the construction

of the feminine role. As the ideality of the woman is situated in the

private sphere (mother, wife, daughter, etc.), any activity of a public

nature by these will be considered as undue. The legitimacy of female

activities depends on the private nature of their intentions. The public

Wagner Santos, Crisano Mendes Prostutes, Mercenaries and Feminism: The Public and the Private in Internaonal Relaons

oering of the woman’s body generates gender identity destabilization

because it places women in an inappropriate environment according to

social conventions.

In this way, mercenaries and prostitutes have something in com-

mon. Both have diculty securing their legitimacy because they are su-

pposedly in undue spaces (public or private) according to gendered social

constructions. The former would be private soldiers, deprived of the su-

pposed public nature of the profession. The latter would be public women,

thus counteracting the ideally deprived character of the feminine role.

Conclusion

Feminist studies in International Relations have brought to the fo-

refront issues of gender, public and private spaces, and relations of domi-

nation. Approaching post-positivist theoretical currents, the authors of

these approaches have always tried to identify and denounce the cons-

tructions of assumptions that would delegate to the feminine marginali-

zed places in the international environment when compared to the cons-

tructions of masculine gender present in this space.

First, the present article has demonstrated how the feminine gen-

der gure is socially located as the occupant par excellence of private spa-

ces. In this way, the ideal woman (wife, mother) should occupy activities

that always place her in the domestic/private sphere as opposed to in the

public world. Any woman who dares to occupy a culturally reserved area

(in this case a public space) would be viewed negatively by society as she

is in an undue place relative to her social condition. Prostitutes would

thus be targets of prejudice and marginalization precisely because they

transpose these conventions.

Then, we try to demonstrate that similar phenomena also occur

with employees of Military and Private Security Companies. While they

are still in the process of growing and consolidating in the international

arena, these companies would be building their own identities between

the role of soldiers in the regular armed forces (public/legitimate) and that

of mercenaries (private/illegitimate). The more these companies approa-

ch the identity of the mercenary, the less legitimacy they gain from the

fact that they occupy the private space and therefore, are inadequate to

those who serve and defend the homeland motivated by pure love of cou-

ntry. The opposite is also true. By approaching regular soldiers (or blue

helmets), the MPSCs would emphasize their role of stabilizing conicts

and humanitarian work, which would place them in the public arena,

thereby increasing their legitimacy vis-à-vis other international actors.

Prejudice, present both in relation to prostitutes and mercenaries,

would have a common, but inverse, subjective basis. In the case of pros-

titutes, they would be marginalized due to the fact that they are women

who take place in the public sphere, considered inappropriate according

to the idealization of women. The mercenaries, on the other hand, would

suer prejudice by positing themselves in the private sphere, also consi-

dered improper for a soldier in defense of the motherland.

In this way, what can be seen in the discussions on prostitution

and mercenarism would not be as objective questions, as the traditional

debates have tried to lead us to believe. Behind the discussions about the

estudos internacionais • Belo Horizonte, ISSN 2317-773X, v. 11, n. 3, (out. 2023), p. 72-88

legitimacy of prostitutes and mercenaries would be the construction of

gender identity with its respective places of action. By occupying the pu-

blic space, prostitutes, like mercenaries in the private sphere, subvert a

gender ideality by not submitting to the socially constructed spaces con-

sidered most appropriate.

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Gabriel M. Vieira Socio-polical developments in Greece and Spain in the wake of the grassroots

an-austerity campaign: towards naonal parliaments and local spaces

Socio-political developments in Greece

and Spain in the wake of the grassroots

anti-austerity campaign: towards national

parliaments and local spaces

Desenvolvimentos sociopolíticos na Grécia e Espanha na

esteira da campanha popular antiausteridade: em direção

aos parlamentos nacionais e espaços locais

Acontecimientos sociopolíticos en Grecia y España

tras el movimiento popular contra la austeridad: hacia

parlamentos nacionales y espacios locales

Gabriel M. Vieira1

Recebido: 25 de Abril de 2024

Aprovado: 24 de Maio de 2024

DOI: 10.5752/P.2317-773X.2023v11n3p89-107

ABSTRACT

This article investigates the socio-political developments in Greece and Spain

following the grassroots anti-austerity campaign from 2011 on, which unfolded

towards national parliaments and local spaces. It does so by analysing the insti-

tutionalisation of the populist radical Left as compared with the local-oriented

agency of social movements in these two countries. It argues that these alterna-

tive approaches to social change and emancipation illustrate contending para-

digms of contemporary political thought reecting upon collective movements,

political action, and social transformation: the vertical politics of hegemony and

the horizontal politics of the multitude. It rstly introduces these contending

theoretical paradigms and then analyses the political trajectory of Podemos and

SYRIZA from the squares to national parliaments vis-à-vis the radical agency

of social movements transforming and generating socio-spatial entanglements

at the local level. Lastly, the article puts forward theoretical possibilities for an

alternative conceptualisation of grassroots radical agency and democratic politi-

cs in present times, seeking to reconcile the absolute democratic politics of the

multitude with the broad counter-hegemonic revolutionary project.

Keywords: anti-austerity movement. populist radical Left. social movements.

multitude. hegemony.

RESUMO

Este artigo investiga os desenvolvimentos sociopolíticos na Grécia e Espanha

seguindo a campanha popular antiausteridade a partir de 2011, que se desdo-

1. Mgr. Gabriel M. Vieira is a docto-

ral candidate at the Department of

International Relations and European

Studies, and a research assistant at the

Ibero-American Centre, at Metropo-

litan University Prague (Metropolitní

Univerzita Praha), Czech Republic. He

holds a master’s degree in International

Relations at Charles University (Univer-

zita Karlova). He is interested in social

movements, radical democratic politics,

grassroots agency vis-à-vis issues of the

world order, and critical approaches to

social transformation and emancipation.

He has lectured courses on related topi-

cs for IR bachelor programmes. Contact:

gabrielmoreiravieira@gmail.com

estudos internacionais • Belo Horizonte, ISSN 2317-773X, v. 11, n. 3, (out. 2023), p. 89-107

braram em direção aos parlamentos nacionais e espaços locais. Analisa-se a

institucionalização da Esquerda radical populista em contrapartida à agência dos

movimentos sociais voltada para arenas locais nestes dois países. Argumenta-se

que estas abordagens alternativas para mudança social e emancipação ilustram

paradigmas conitantes do pensamento político contemporâneo reetindo

sobre movimentos sociais, ação política e transformação social: as políticas

verticais de hegemonia e as políticas horizontais da multidão. Primeiro, intro-

duz-se estes paradigmas teóricos conitantes e, então, analisa-se a trajetória

política do Podemos e SYRIZA das praças aos parlamentos em contrapartida à

agência radical de movimentos sociais que transforma e cria emaranhamentos

socioespaciais no nível local. Por fim, este artigo avança possibilidades teóricas

para uma conceitualização alternativa de agência popular radical e políticas de-

mocráticas nos dias de hoje, buscando reconciliar as práticas políticas absoluta-

mente democráticas da multidão com o mais amplo projeto contra-hegemônico.

Palavras-chave: movimento antiausteridade. Esquerda radical populista. movi-

mentos sociais. multidão. hegemonia.

RESUMEN

Este artículo investiga los acontecimientos sociopolíticos en Grecia y España

tras el movimiento popular contra la austeridad a partir de 2011, que se han

extendido hacia los parlamentos nacionales y los espacios locales. Lo hace ana-

lizando la institucionalización de la izquierda radical populista en comparación

con la acción local los movimientos sociales en estos dos países. Argumenta que

estos enfoques alternativos al cambio social y emancipación ilustran paradigmas

contradictorios del pensamiento político contemporáneo sobre los movimientos

colectivos, acción política y transformación social: la política vertical de la he-

gemonía y la política horizontal de la multitud. En primer lugar, presenta estos

paradigmas teóricos contradictorios y luego analiza la trayectoria política de

Podemos y SYRIZA desde las plazas hasta los parlamentos nacionales frente a la

acción radical de los movimientos sociales que transforman y generan ámbitos

socioespaciales a nivel local. Por último, el artículo plantea posibilidades teóricas

para una conceptualización alternativa de la acción radical de base y la política

democrática en los tiempos actuales, buscando reconciliar la política democrá-

tica absoluta de la multitud con el amplio proyecto revolucionario contrahege-

mónico.

Palabras clave: antiausteridad. izquierda radical populista. movimientos socia-

les. multitud. hegemonía.

1 INTRODUCTION: FROM THE SQUARES TO NATIONAL PARLIAMENTS

AND LOCAL SPACES

The decline of the protest cycle in the grassroots campaign against

austerity that broke out across the European periphery in the early 2010s

(della Porta, 2017) was followed by two apparently complementary mo-

ves aspiring to social transformation, as the popular encampments in

public squares were demobilised. The populist radical Left committed

to elevating the new common sense and radical democratic politics cul-

tivated in the encampments into the political arena, and so movement-

-parties2 closely associated with the anti-austerity protests achieved sig-

nicant electoral results across Southern Europe over the past decade

(Katsambekis; Kioupkiolis, 2019). At the same time, social movements

turned towards local communities and neighbourhoods to translate the

2. The concept of movement-parties

employed here follows the relational,

dynamic, and constructed approach

proposed by della Porta et al. (2017).

Gabriel M. Vieira Socio-polical developments in Greece and Spain in the wake of the grassroots

an-austerity campaign: towards naonal parliaments and local spaces

new subjectivities and democratic praxis from the movement of the squa-

res into a local-grounded approach, developing a wide array of solidarity

initiatives for collective resilience and radical democratic spaces for foste-

ring people’s control over the commons (Hadjimichalis, 2018; Nez, 2016).

Albeit striving for social transformation and emancipation, these

two endeavours have followed divergent paths. The political trajectory of

the populist radical Left towards national parliaments in Southern Europe

pursues the hierarchical and representative dynamics of institutionalised

state politics (Kioupkiolis, 2019a), whereas the collective agency of so-

cial movements unfolds horizontally within local arenas, autonomously

from the state and market (Prentoulis; Thomassen, 2019). Arguably, the-

se two projects illustrate contending paradigms of contemporary politi-

cal thought reecting upon collective agency, political action, and social

change: the vertical politics of Antonio Gramsci’s hegemony (1971) and

the absolute democratic politics of Antonio Negri and Michael Hardt’s

multitude (2004; 2009).

In what follows, this article investigates these two alternative

projects: the institutionalisation of the populist radical Left vis-à-vis

the local-oriented agency of social movements. It does so by analysing

the socio-political developments unfolding over the vertical and hori-

zontal dimensions in Spain and Greece in the years of austerity, which

oer particularly constructive case studies for a critical analysis of the

shortcomings and potentials of each approach. The interest in the Greek

and Spanish cases is explained not only because of the magnitude of the

Indignados and Aganaktismenoi movements – the most developed occu-

pations in Europe (Gerbaudo, 2017) – but precisely because therein the

vertical and horizontal dimensions of human agency and political action

intersect in pursuit of social change. As these cases are the most illus-

trative of the reverberations of grassroots radical agency for social and

political transformation, this strategic case selection allows to observe

the theory at play (Rua, 2020). This theoretical prominence, therefo-

re, will expand on building from a detailed analysis of complementary

case studies, opposing the political trajectory of Podemos, in Spain, and

SYRIZA, in Greece, to a selection of social solidarity initiatives and radi-

cal democratic spaces that emerged in these two countries constituting,

altogether, the grassroots response to the multiple crises of the neoliberal

hegemonic order. The very selection of the cases for analysis here coin-

cides with these aggravating and intertwining crises of the hegemonic

order, as this article will engage with dierent expressions of grassroots

radical agency entangling multiple dimensions of human life in common

(economic-productive relations, housing and co-habitation, daily needs

and everyday-life management, and socio-spatial relations). This analysis

will then lay the groundwork for putting forward theoretical possibilities

for an alternative conceptualisation of grassroots agency and radical de-

mocratic praxis, seeking to reconcile the democratic politics of the multi-

tude with the broad counter-hegemonic revolutionary project.

The rst section introduces the theoretical debate opposing the ho-

rizontal politics of Hardt and Negri’s multitude and Gramsci’s vertical

politics of hegemony, discussing the alternative ontologies, conceptual

estudos internacionais • Belo Horizonte, ISSN 2317-773X, v. 11, n. 3, (out. 2023), p. 89-107

apparatuses and shortcomings of each theoretical paradigm. The second

section discusses the trajectory of Podemos and SYRIZA from the squa-

res to national politics, analysing their electoral eorts in the wake of the

anti-austerity campaign, and their political achievements and unfullled

promises since they entered national parliaments. The third section in-

vestigates a selection of social solidarity initiatives and radical democra-

tic spaces that ourished across these countries in parallel, resorting to

ocial data available on their websites and social networks, along with

other secondary data sources, such as the established literature and news-

paper articles. The complementarity of these cases and their reach over

multiple dimensions of human life account for the emphasis on dierent

manifestations of grassroots radical agency in Greece and Spain. The

fourth section builds from the analysis developed in the previous sections

to elaborate on the theoretical possibilities for bridging the horizontal

model for being and acting of the multitude and the vertical politics of

hegemony, accommodating key categories of each paradigm into an al-

ternative conceptualisation of grassroots agency and radical democratic

politics at present. The concluding section oers some nal remarks on

the limits and potential of the vertical and horizontal approaches to social

and political transformation and reects on the need to think anew to

conceive concrete possibilities of social change and emancipation.

2 VERTICAL AND HORIZONTAL PARADIGMS OF COLLECTIVE AGENCY,

POLITICAL ACTION AND SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION: HEGEMONY

AND THE MULTITUDE

The Great Recession in the aftermath of the 2008 global nancial

crisis, along with the austerity policies imposed by the European Union

(EU), produced an overwhelming toll on social livelihood across the

European periphery, not to mention the democratic crisis that ensued it,

eroding society’s general trust on political institutions both at the nation-

al and European levels (della Porta, 2017). Nonetheless, grassroots social

forces have responded to these successive crises through autonomous and

radical collective action, and so the popular anti-austerity campaign that

emerged afterwards brought renewed attention to the debate that has an-

imated contemporary political thought for the past decades (Kioupkiolis;

Katsambekis, 2014), expounding alternative approaches to social move-

ments, political action, and emancipation. Intellectual attempts reecting

on grassroots agency and its theoretical and practical reverberations to

social transformation, inspired rstly by the Global Justice Movement,

have lately theorised about the new subjectivities and radical democratic

politics of the movement of the squares. And the variegated interpreta-

tions have revolved around two (apparently) contending paradigms: the

absolute horizontal politics of the multitude and the vertical politics of

hegemony (Kioupkiolis; Katsambekis, 2014).

The vertical paradigm draws upon Gramsci’s theory of hegemony,

presupposing the elevation of a political agent that brings together and

guides subordinate social forces in the struggle against the hegemonic

order to enact political and social transformation. A counter-hegemonic

Gabriel M. Vieira Socio-polical developments in Greece and Spain in the wake of the grassroots

an-austerity campaign: towards naonal parliaments and local spaces

revolutionary project must target institutional power and the occupation

of the political realm, understood in terms of the Gramscian extended

state (i.e., the entanglement of the political and civil societies), which is

the terrain wherein antagonistic political subjects contend for hegemo-

ny (Gramsci, 1971). The need for taking political power to elevate social

struggles into the building of a new social order necessarily entails the

construction of a counter-hegemonic historic bloc, in which multiple sub-

jects cohere under the centralised leadership of a political body capable

of challenging the dominant forces of a given hegemonic formation (Cox,

1993; Gill, 1993). Consequently, collective mobilisation and action of the

grassroots have a decisive role at the liminal stage of the revolutionary

project: the development of constituent subaltern politics.

Gramsci assigned the development of “alternative, bottom-up

and autonomous forms of life” (Fonseca, 2016, p. 7) to the working class

and subaltern groups to give form to an embryonic workers’ democra-

cy. Within these loci of proletarian life, gestated through the association

and organisation of the working class (precisely what Gramsci meant by

constituent subaltern politics) an emancipatory consciousness is nurtured

and the revolutionary praxis instigated among the subalterns (Fonseca,

2016; Gramsci, 1919a). Gramsci (1919a) insisted on the proletarian power

and the institutions of the proletarian social life that bore the potentiality

of the socialist state, arguing that a genuine workers’ democracy could

only emerge from the self-organised association and action of workers

and peasants. Furthermore, in these autonomous and spontaneous ar-

rangements of working-class social life (e.g., the occupied factories, so-

cialist clubs, peasant communities in 1920s Italy), a counter-hegemonic

common sense eventually embeds within everyday life.

The constituent subaltern politics of the working class allow for

the formation of a national popular front, fostering the politicisation of

the masses at large and overcoming ideological divisions, cohering a di-

verse social majority around the counter-hegemonic project. The “amal-

gamation of politicised masses (…) into a national popular movement”

(Briziarelli, 2018, p. 98) provides sustained mobilisation for the revolution-

ary party (the Modern Prince of Gramsci’s Prison Notebooks, 1971), which

embodies the national popular collective will and, endowed with intel-

lectual and moral leadership, wages a war of position against hegemony.

Gramsci’s notion of war of position foresees the “constant rear-

rangement of relations of forces” between hegemonic and counter-hege-

monic social classes, through the “expansion of the struggle on multiple

fronts such as political, economic, cultural, and social” (Briziarelli, 2018,

p. 97-8). And just as several dimensions and social confrontations intersect

each other in pursuit of hegemony, the war of position unfolds through

the patient and laborious eort of putting together the moral and intellec-

tual resources and institutions for building up a counter-hegemonic or-

der – unlike in a war of movement, when the revolutionary party seizes

power through a direct assault against the establishment (Gramsci, 1971;

Cox, 1993). The task of the revolution is twofold therefore: it requires

the implementation of progressive politics for transforming the estab-

lished political structures and creating alternative institutions within the

estudos internacionais • Belo Horizonte, ISSN 2317-773X, v. 11, n. 3, (out. 2023), p. 89-107

hegemonic order; and it relies upon the permeation of a shared conscious-

ness throughout the social fabric, binding together oppressed groups un-

der capitalism into a common subjectivity (Cox, 1993; Briziarelli, 2018).

Notwithstanding the logical inuence of the vertical approach

among contemporary Marxist circles reecting on emancipatory strug-

gles against capital, the politics of hegemony also resonates among

post-Marxist thinkers, inspired by E. Laclau’s (2005) populist-discursive

interpretation of Gramsci’s works. Understanding hegemony as rhetori-

cally constructed, post-Marxist scholars reinterpret key categories of this

conceptualisation to propose a transversalist vision for aggregating dif-

ferent social subjects into a common construct through empty signiers

that establish “a potential chain of equivalence between dierent social

groups, circumstances, identities, and interests” (Agustín; Briziarelli,

2018, p. 15). This populist-discursive approach insists on the transversali-

ty of the aggregative discourse for creating an inclusive popular front, by-

passing classic concepts of Marxism (e.g., class struggle, the Left x Right

dichotomy) and dovetailing with the encounter of multiple subjectivities

during the anti-austerity campaign (Kioupkiolis; 2019b). Aggregated un-

der empty signiers, this social majority challenges the politico-econom-

ic establishment, contending for hegemony once elevated into the polit-

ical arena alongside the revolutionary party. Accordingly, political con-

centration and cohesion, hierarchy and leadership, and antagonism are

key categories of the vertical paradigm, irrespective of whether taking a

cue from Gramsci’s theory of hegemony or Laclau’s populist-discursive

approach to it (Kioupkiolis; Katsambekis, 2014).

On the other hand, the horizontal paradigm rejects these catego-

ries, centring upon the process of becoming of autonomous subjectiv-

ities into a new constituent social subject and the absolute democratic

politics it brings into play in a post-hegemonic order. As Hardt and Negri

(2004; 2009) theorise, this emerging constituent subject – the multitude

– is loosely and horizontally articulated in a rhizomatic network and

thence engages in the collaborative production of social reality. The plu-

rality and freedom of the multiple singularities collaborating through

this network are nevertheless preserved in this process of collective sub-

jectivation. And from its irreducible plurality stems the constituent po-

tential of the multitude for producing new expansive forms of life: “the

full expression of autonomy and dierence of each here coincides with

the powerful articulation of all” (Hardt; Negri, 2004, p. 87). This auton-

omous and horizontal articulation of multiple social subjectivities and

their cooperative and inventive agency are constituent of the production

of social reality, rather than means for taking political power and chal-

lenging the hegemonic order, as Gramsci envisaged. These categories of

absolute democratic politics are actually an end in themselves, i.e., the

very ontology of the alternative social realities that the multitude en-

acts (Hardt; Negri, 2009). Following this horizontal conceptualisation,

radical democratic politics, spontaneous human agency, and horizontal

modes for collaborating and acting are, in eect, the sine qua non of an

emerging post-hegemonic order (Hardt; Negri, 2012). Therefore, the

multitude can only rise as the constituent collective social subject of our

Gabriel M. Vieira Socio-polical developments in Greece and Spain in the wake of the grassroots

an-austerity campaign: towards naonal parliaments and local spaces

times as long as it organically incorporates these fundamental principles

in its subjectivation process.

Moreover, it is upon these foundations that the multitude acts: hor-

izontally collaborating within a rhizomatic networked model of associ-

ation and therein producing social realities (Hardt; Negri, 2009). These

horizontal modes of association not only allow for the multitude to come

into being but also oer the organisational apparatus for this new col-

lective social subject to act in the production of the common in the con-

text of biopolitical reality (Hardt; Negri, 2009). Precisely because of the

biopolitical context of producing the common nowadays – “all spheres

of life,” both the natural world and the constitutive elements of human

society (Hardt; Negri, 2009, p. 171) – the multitude is “formed through

articulations on the plane of immanence without hegemony” (Hardt;

Negri, 2009, p. 169). As such, it discards hierarchical and representative

politics, for the multitude is itself “capable of making decisions and of

taking action without being directed by a hegemonic force” (Kioupkiolis;

Katsambekis, 2014, p. 9).

The main objections to Gramsci’s hegemonic politics, according to

the horizontal paradigm, refer to two complementary notions: the emer-

gence of a hierarchical power over disparate social subjects and the need

for coherence and cohesion around the programmatic unity under this

emerging political body. As Hardt and Negri (2009) have pointed out, this

vertical conception of political constitution through unied and hierar-

chical organisation, for providing the oppressed social forces with disci-

pline and education – as Gramsci (1971) attributed this role to the Modern

Prince – can only disrupt the constituent potential of the subordinated so-

cial subjects coming together in a post-hegemonic order. Accordingly, the

emergence of a counter-hegemonic party will eventually arouse vertical

and centralising tendencies, reproducing capitalist relations of power and

subordination. Moreover, coherence and cohesion essentially contradict

the radical heterogeneity of the social eld, hence undermining the au-

tonomy and the creative potential of the multiple social subjectivities

interacting and cooperating in the production of social reality (Hardt;

Negri, 2004; 2009). Bearing the alternative ontologies and conceptual

apparatuses of the vertical and horizontal paradigms in mind, the next

sections analyse the socio-political developments in Greece and Spain to-

wards national parliaments with the populist radical Left and local com-

munities and neighbourhoods with social movements, respectively.

3 THE RISE AND FALL OF THE POPULIST RADICAL LEFT IN GREECE

AND SPAIN

The rise of Podemos and SYRIZA illustrates the breakthrough of

the populist radical Left in Europe since the early 2010s (Katsambekis;

Kioupkiolis, 2019). Notwithstanding, their fall is instructive about the

perils of yet another attempt to contain grassroots agency into the ver-

tical institutions of liberal democracy (Kioupkiolis, 2019b). The electo-

ral success of movement-parties closely associated with the grassroots

campaign against austerity indicated the emergence of a new political

estudos internacionais • Belo Horizonte, ISSN 2317-773X, v. 11, n. 3, (out. 2023), p. 89-107

cycle founded upon radical democratic politics and a new common sense

(Agustín; Briziarelli, 2018). Tellingly, the victory of SYRIZA in the 2015

Greek national elections and the expressive popularity of Podemos since

its foundation (eventually securing a place in the coalitional government

in Spain as of 2020) can be credited to a bold strategy instrumentalising

the Gramscian notion of war of position into their political agenda.

The rst pillar of these movement-parties’ electoral project is the

incorporation of the radical democratic practices developed within the

encampments, which became laboratories of grassroots politics (della

Porta, 2013). Therein protesters experimented with deliberative and par-

ticipatory decision-making within assemblies and working groups, and

enacted open, horizontal, and egalitarian processes for the collective ma-

nagement of the daily life within the occupations (Kioupkiolis, 2019b).

These democratic mechanisms were transposed into the political dy-

namics of Podemos and SYRIZA. The former established an innovative

multi-layered apparatus of direct practices for engaging its constituency

through local circles, fully open primaries, and the collective construc-

tion of its program (Rendueles; Sola, 2018), insisting on the ‘technopoliti-

cal’ dimension of grassroots democracy through online platforms, such

as Plaza Podemos, Agora Voting, and social networks (Kioupkiolis, 2019a).

In its turn, SYRIZA insisted upon the Greek people’s sovereignty, exten-

ding direct democracy through the popular referendum on a new bailout

agreement with the country’s lenders (Katsambekis, 2019).

Arguably, these movement-parties endeavoured to transpose the

radical democratic praxis from the anti-austerity movement into national

politics. Their goal was to incubate oppositional institutions for building

a new political order within the shell of the old post-democratic order that

had long been rooted in Spanish and Greek politics (Kioupkiolis, 2019a).

Meanwhile, on the strategic plane, is the instrumentalisation of the

Laclauian populist-discursive approach to hegemony for creating an in-

clusive popular front (Briziarelli, 2018). Podemos and SYRIZA articula-

ted the multifaceted identities coming together during the anti-austerity

campaign into equivalential chains, using empty signiers (e.g., ‘the peo-

ple,’ ‘the masses,’ ‘democracy’) for cohering the grassroots around their

electoral projects (Kioupkiolis, 2019a). This aggregated social majority

overcame ideological and identity idiosyncrasies for opposing the politi-

co-economic establishment: domestic elites (politicians, banks, corpora-

tions, the media) and international actors (the ‘troika’, i.e., the European

Commission, the European Central Bank, and the International Monetary

Fund).

This populist-discursive frame was exhaustively explored during

their electoral campaigns. Podemos boldly explored the popularity of po-

litical talk shows in Spain at that time for devising a “counter-hegemonic

television project” (Rendueles; Sola, 2018, p. 34), successfully resonating

its aggregative rhetoric with society at large and pervading the everyday

language of Spanish politics (Franzé, 2018). Likewise, the coalitional natu-

re of SYRIZA oriented the party’s electoral strategy. A “mass connective

party” (Katsambekis, 2019, p. 27), SYRIZA emphasised the development

of cross-class alliances with social movements, bringing together diverse

Gabriel M. Vieira Socio-polical developments in Greece and Spain in the wake of the grassroots

an-austerity campaign: towards naonal parliaments and local spaces

struggles (environmental, labour, migrants, and so on) countrywide into

the broad anti-neoliberal camp.

The employment of this populist-discursive strategy proved decisi-

ve in laying the foundation for the ‘national popular project’ of the popu-

list radical Left in Greece and Spain (Briziarelli, 2018), raising a new social

majority behind these movement-parties as elections drew closer. Most

importantly, it allowed for the new common sense that emerged from the

occupations to eventually expand beyond the encampments, pervading

the social fabric of Greek and Spanish civil societies and preguring “po-

pular power as a real political alternative” (Agustín; Briziarelli, 2018, p. 5).

Notwithstanding the overreliance on the politics of hegemony

as the orienting theoretical-strategic framework for their emancipatory

political projects, it is rather contradictory that these movement-parties

have failed to acknowledge the risks of ending up entrapped in a pas-

sive revolution. Gramsci (1971) understood it as the dialectical relation

between revolution and restoration, or progressive objectives hindered

by regressive methods. A passive revolution, thus, produces a stalemate

opposing the revolutionary and dominant forces, as the former’s progres-

sive potential is not yet sturdy enough to dislodge the conservative fou-

ndations of the hegemonic order (Cox; 1993). In that sense, Gramsci saw

the dominant forces introducing limited changes that rather than arou-

sing from popular forces are instead interventions ‘from above,’ incorpo-

rating revolutionary subaltern groups into the politics of hegemony (Cox,

1993). Comprehensive and systemic change is consequently forestalled,

as the counter-hegemonic forces are channelled into the existing political

structures of the hegemonic order.

Against the backdrop of an organic crisis of representative demo-

cracy at the national and European realms – a critical juncture wherein

political institutions lost legitimacy alongside the capability of produ-

cing consent (Briziarelli, 2018) – the political trajectory of Podemos and

SYRIZA was hindered both within national parliaments and at the supra-

national level. As they became entangled in national politics, they gra-

dually abandoned the grassroots, becoming more vertical and centralised

and adapting their agenda to the institutional logic of parliaments, favou-

ring hierarchical and representative relations (Kioupkiolis, 2019a). These

movement-parties also found themselves powerless against the top-down

EU intervention on austerity policies (della Porta, 2017) as well as the

structural constraints of international economic governance with bailout

programmes (Katsambekis, 2019).

One of the central elements of Podemos’ innovative organisational

model, the popular circles were soon emptied by a top-down logic that

appropriated the party’s leadership (Kioupkiolis, 2019a), just like the digi-

tal platforms soon lost inuence and autonomy (Prentoulis; Thomassen,

2019). As these participatory practices eroded, “Podemos’ democratic

centralism” (Mazzolini; Borriello, 2018, p. 242) manifested in the em-

powerment of the then secretary-general Pablo Iglesias and his nucleus,

who systematically strengthened control over the party at the expense of

greater plurality, horizontal participation of the rank and le, and disso-

nant voices from within.

estudos internacionais • Belo Horizonte, ISSN 2317-773X, v. 11, n. 3, (out. 2023), p. 89-107

Unsurprisingly, the party has undergone internal splits and recor-

ded a steady decline in election performance recently. Even more con-

cerning, Podemos has been relegated as a marginal member of the coa-

litional government led by the Spanish Socialist Workers’ Party, PSOE.

Critics have pointed out that rather than advancing progressive policies as

those championed by the anti-austerity movement, Podemos has instead

taken on a more traditional Left position (Errejón, 2021). Thus, the party

contradictorily legitimises the ruling of PSOE, the centre-Left party that

for decades concurred with a neoliberal agenda, which threw the cou-

ntry into the double (economic and democratic) crisis that brought the

Indignados to the streets in 2011.

SYRIZA’s adventure in Greek national politics is also disappointing,

as the party found itself powerless against structural constraints of inter-

national economic governance, while developing a vertical and centralist

orientation. It became “a much more homogeneous party” (Mudde, 2017,

p. 31) dominated by the then Prime Minister Alexis Tsipras, what became

evident in his unexpected – and unilateral – decision to accept yet ano-

ther bailout agreement with the country’s lenders a week after the Greek

people have voted against it. Ignoring the Greeks’ manifest will (61% of

the voters rejected the new agreement), SYRIZA bent to the ‘troika,’ fai-

ling to uphold its promise to restore popular sovereignty over this matter

(Katsambekis, 2019). The capitulation to the third memorandum and the

ensuing internal rebellion against Tsipras eroded SYRIZA’s governmen-

tability and, all in all, the party navigated the years in government with

old-fashioned politics of ery rhetoric and pragmatic – and rather contro-

versial – policies, or by ‘talking left and walking right’ (Sheehan, 2017).

Even though Tsipras had managed to secure another win at the

snap election that followed the acceptance on the third bailout program-

me and the subsequent party defections, SYRIZA has recorded poorly

in European, local, and general elections since then, not securing a se-

cond mandate in the 2019 national elections, hence paving the way for the

reinstallation of the conservative New Democracy, ND, in government

(Mylonas, 2020). Critically, just as SYRIZA’s contradictions discredited

the radical Left, the party witnesses the resurgence of far-Right ultra-

nationalist forces across the country, which have systematically targe-

ted with xenophobia, racism, and violence, the very same people which

the Aganaktismenoi stood for – refugees, migrants, and ethnic minorities

(Smith, 2021).

This analysis of the journey of Podemos and SYRIZA from the

squares to national parliaments (and therein towards a passive revolution)

– as well as the position they currently hold, whether in power or oppo-

sition – makes a case against the preponderance of the vertical approach

to hegemony as the orienting framework for political action and social

transformation. The very few social demands attained during their years

in government should arguably be understood as marginal concessions

from the establishment that, nevertheless, serve to the reproduction of

hegemonic structures of neoliberal capitalism. Furthermore, at the time

of writing, rather than advancing progressive politics enabling a real

democratic praxis – as those gestated within the popular occupations

Gabriel M. Vieira Socio-polical developments in Greece and Spain in the wake of the grassroots

an-austerity campaign: towards naonal parliaments and local spaces

against austerity – both movement-parties are much more on the defen-

sive, currently engaged in containing the advances of the far-right, whi-

ch appropriates the political agenda and shapes the public conversation

(Errejón, 2021). Alternatively, this article now turns towards local-level

autonomous and horizontal social reproduction, as did the social move-

ments engaged in the anti-austerity campaign after the encampments’

demobilisation.

4 LOCAL-LEVEL COLLECTIVE AGENCY OF SOCIAL MOVEMENTS IN THE

YEARS OF AUSTERITY

Local-level capacity building has traditionally been a strong fea-

ture of social movements’ repertoire of action (Voss; Williams, 2012).

Understanding the protest cycle as a specic time frame within the broa-

der ght for social change, in periods of less visible mobilisation – but of

latent activity nevertheless – social movements invest in “strengthening

[…] autonomous spaces for collective decision-making and social trans-

formation” (Flesher Fominaya, 2015, p. 149). This local-oriented approach

is by no means an exclusive feature of the (Greek and Spanish) anti-auste-

rity movement since it has manifested in dierent historical and geogra-

phical contexts of grassroots collective agency. Notwithstanding, within

this framework, the radical agency of social movements reaches an im-

pressive scale both in terms of extension and diversity, constituting the

grassroots response to the multiple crises of neoliberal capitalism.

As the Indignados and Aganaktismenoi movements turned towards

local communities, the protesters were not leaving but expanding, as

they would meet back in the neighbourhoods (Nez; 2016). In the years

of austerity, a rich constellation of loci of grassroots radical agency surfa-

ced in Greek and Spanish civil societies autonomously from the state and

market (Kousis et al., 2018) and, grounded in the foundational principles

of the occupations – equality, freedom, plurality, and social justice – it

represents an important legacy of the movement of the squares (Flesher

Fominaya, 2017).

Very much important in Spain are the several existing neighbou-

rhood associations that, since Franco’s dictatorship, became symbolic spa-

ces of collective mobilisation (Flesher Fominaya, 2015). As the Indignados

main encampments were dispersed, neighbourhood associations conti-

nued decentralising general assemblies, implementing grassroots agency

within local communities and suburbs. Despite some loose coordination

among these local assemblies, they enjoy a relatively high degree of au-

tonomy and exibility for formulating concrete propositions concerning

each neighbourhood (Prentoulis; Thomassen, 2013). Notwithstanding,

given the recurrence of critical issues across dierent areas, the social poli-

cies implemented by collective movements transpose and interact beyond

geographical limits, especially in regard to labour, immigration, and hou-

sing issues (Nez, 2016). Most recently, responding to the COVID-19 health

crisis, neighbourhood associations in urban centres that were hit harder

by the pandemic (as the Community of Madrid) joined the ght against

the precarization of public healthcare services, securing the continuing

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operation of public health centres and the jobs of many temporary health

workers (Asamblea Popular de Carabanchel, 2021).

Constructive relations were soon developed between these

neighbourhood associations and other autonomous citizens’ organisa-

tions, enabling direct grassroots action to address pressing individual and

communitarian daily life issues. For instance, the grassroots association

Plataforma de Afectados por la Hipoteca (Platform of Those Aected

by Mortgages), PAH, that since 2009 has fought home foreclosure and

eviction, campaigned for housing rights, and actively participated in the

Indignados (Mir Garcia, 2019) has expanded its reach of action across the

country while engaging with many neighbourhood assemblies, forming

a network of more than 200 territorial nodes (Plataforma de Afectados

por la Hipoteca, n.d.). PAH has impacted everyday life in Spain, stopping

thousands of evictions and rehousing hundreds of families in occupied

buildings (Mir Garcia, 2019). It has also reshaped the debate over public

housing policies towards a grassroots campaign for the right to housing

in Spain, promoting a “social and shared governance” (Quintanar, 2021,

p. 83) around the issue.

Several self-organised social centres also operate across Spain, in-

tervening in the everyday social organisation of neighbourhoods. These

social centres navigate dierent spatial dimensions, legal statuses, tem-

poralities, and funding mechanisms (Saltzman, 2019). The squatted so-

cial centre Can Batlló, in Barcelona, is a remarkable socio-spatial experi-

ment, for instance. An abandoned factory converted into a multifunctio-

nal socio-cultural facility, Can Batlló has since 2011 been collectively and

horizontally self-managed by the local community, becoming a genuine

expression of the self-conceived transformation of the neighbourhood’s

socio-spatial fabric through grassroots agency (Can Batlló, n.d.). It pro-

vides the community where the squatted centre is located with several

projects that thrive on associationism and cooperation, e.g., solidary eco-

nomy activities, a publishing house, a communitarian children’s school,

a library about libertarian thought, a housing cooperative, a restau-

rant, and multiple workshops (Can Batlló, n.d.). Consequently, the Can

Batlló became not only a transformative communitarian socio-cultural

space but also an inspiration for local urban networks in several squat-

ting actions and other bottom-up projects across the city (De Balanzó;

Rodríguez-Planas, 2018).

In Greece likewise, solidarity networks traditionally associated with

grassroots activism entangled with the trajectory of the Aganaktismenoi,

notably from 2012 onwards, coinciding with the weakening of protests

(Malamidis, 2020). Greek solidarity providers have built resilience among

most vulnerable individuals, alleviating the toll of austerity on society,

and also engaged with social economy experiments, self-organised spa-

ces, and environment-related initiatives.3

The collective self-management of occupied factories represents an

important democratic experiment in terms of the emancipatory struggle

for combating the economic crisis and expanding social control over

production and the workspace (Kioupkiolis; Katsambekis, 2014). Under

the slogan ‘Occupy, Resist, Produce’, the workers of the Vio.Me/Bio.Me

3. Under the scope of the ‘Living with

Hard Times’ (LIVEWHAT) research

project, KOUSIS, et al. (2018) mapped

a comprehensive database of solidarity

initiatives promoting alternative forms

of resilience across Greece since the

early 2010s.

101

Gabriel M. Vieira Socio-polical developments in Greece and Spain in the wake of the grassroots

an-austerity campaign: towards naonal parliaments and local spaces

cooperative, in Thessaloniki, progressed “from a hierarchical company

to a horizontal node of resistance” (Malamidis, 2018, p. 25). In 2013, wor-

kers occupied and took control of the productive and managerial proces-

ses of the factory (that originally produced chemical products and was

about to shut down) and, instrumentalising many of the Aganaktismenoi-

inspired principles, such as horizontalism, participatory and collective

decision-making, and assembly-based practices, managed to resume the

operation of the factory, shifting the production to environmental-frien-

dly cleaning products (Malamidis, 2018). The cooperative distributes its

products exclusively through grassroots channels, participating in local

networks of sales and distribution (Vio.Me/Bio.Me, n.d.). As Vio.Me/Bio.

Me actively takes part in the markets-without-middlemen movement, it

extends the reach of its products and the values of self-management, es-

tablishing a direct and social relationship with its consumers (Malamidis,

2018). Moreover, by insisting upon the right to work, dignity at the wor-

kplace, and self-determination of the workforce, the cooperative employs

a holistic approach to production, its consumers, and the workers them-

selves (Vio.Me/Bio.Me, n.d.), enacting the self-actualisation of the wor-

kers’ emancipatory power.

The 2015 refugees crisis also catalysed social solidarity throughout

the country, as the maxim ‘nobody is alone in the crisis’ (an anti-auste-

rity slogan that soon became part of the new common sense in Greece)

reached thousands of refugees arriving in Greek shores (Hadjimichalis,

2018). Greek civil society mobilised resources and networks to extend

social support structures for addressing refugees’ urgent needs, and of-

fered a constructive response to the governmental migration policy of

camps and detention centres that remained in force during SYRIZA’s

4-year mandate (Agustín; Jørgensen, 2019). In a wave of squatting vacant

buildings for housing refugees across the country, the City Plaza Hotel,

in Athens, ran as an autonomous self-organised space for co-habitation

from 2016 till 2019, becoming an alternative socio-spatial entanglement

produced by grassroots radical agency. Besides inaugurating a space for

communal living and addressing the immediate needs of more than

2,500 refugees, the solidarity movement engaged in the occupation and

daily management of the building insisted on the autonomy and empo-

werment of refugees’ own agency, constituting collective action toge-

ther with them (Antonopoulou, 2022). The co-habitants of the City Plaza

developed new alternatives and imaginaries through the shared coexis-

tence and the self-organising processes of everyday life within the squat

(Agustín; Jørgensen, 2019). Albeit closed in 2019, the City Plaza proved

the potential of grassroots radical agency towards transformation and

emancipation, enacting autonomy and horizontality for producing al-

ternative modes of organising society at the local level and outside the

institutional realm of the state.

By conceiving the social movements engaged in these socio-spatial

entanglements at local arenas as collaborating nodes in a rhizomatic net-

work of horizontal, associational, and autonomous loci of grassroots ra-

dical agency, one realises the process of becoming of a constituent collec-

tive social subject (Saltzman, 2019), as Hardt and Negri theorised. Taking

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the form of the multitude, this emerging collective social subject raises

autonomously, out of the very associative power of the grassroots, and is

capable of producing alternative social realities and imaginaries (Agustín;

Jørgensen, 2019), which are gestated within these socio-spatial entangle-

ments in communities and neighbourhoods. In these local spaces, multi-

ple autonomous subjectivities (social movements, citizens organisations,

activists, vulnerable individuals and groups) come together horizontally

and, bound by the constituent principles of absolute democratic politics –

solidarity, equality, freedom, openness, and collective self-determination

(Hardt; Negri, 2012) – therein engage in the production of the common.

And just as this emerging collective social subject embodies and expands

grassroots radical agency through this network, it transforms every as-

pect of life within these local entanglements: social relations, spatial ar-

rangements, political acting, and productive activities.

A detailed analysis of the scope and reach of these selected social

solidarity networks and radical democratic spaces (alongside other socio-

-spatial entanglements interacting in this network of grassroots radical

agency), as well as the impact they have produced on human life (both

at the collective and individual levels), indicate, therefore, the potential

of the multitude’s horizontal politics for social transformation. Although

leadership, homogeneity, and hierarchy don’t stand in these local socio-

-spatial entanglements, key features and dynamics of the vertical politi-

cs of hegemony might still be accommodated nonetheless, leading to a

fruitful and more accurate conceptualisation of grassroots radical agen-

cy in pursuit of social transformation. The next section advances these

theoretical possibilities.

5 THEORETICAL POSSIBILITIES FOR ENGAGING THE MULTITUDE IN

COUNTER-HEGEMONIC POLITICS

While embodying the ontological realisation and conceptual appa-

ratus of the horizontal paradigm, social movements have provided a

twofold contribution to neighbourhoods and communities in Greece and

Spain in the years of austerity: they shape the terrain of struggle, enacting

collective resistance, and implement a revolutionary praxis, democrati-

sing local arenas and empowering civil society. In fact, by doing so, this

emerging collective social subject embeds and actively takes part in the

politics of hegemony. In this regard, this section proposes some theore-

tical reections for an alternative conceptualisation of grassroots radical

agency, indicating a productive common ground for bridging the hori-

zontal and vertical paradigms.

Within these local socio-spatial entanglements transformed

and generated by social movements, the constituent subaltern politics

that Gramsci attributed to the working class are, in eect, produced.

Preguring the multiple “centres of proletarian life” (Gramsci, 1919a,

p. 80) of his time, in these autonomous and horizontal arrangements of

grassroots social life, a counter-hegemonic common sense develops and

pervades everyday life. On that account, both the communist conscious-

ness and mass constructive action that Gramsci (1919a) insisted upon are

103

Gabriel M. Vieira Socio-polical developments in Greece and Spain in the wake of the grassroots

an-austerity campaign: towards naonal parliaments and local spaces

put at the service of emancipation and bottom-up social transformation,

which is “generated by the associative experience” (Gramsci, 1919b, p.

87) of the multiple subjectivities oppressed under neoliberal capitalism.

By producing constituent subaltern politics at the local level through the

collective power of the grassroots, this constellation of egalitarian and

emancipated socio-spatial entanglements actually embodies a dawning

system of socialist living, corresponding to what Gramsci envisaged as

an embryonic proletarian democracy, hence building up the cornerstone

of the counter-hegemonic revolutionary project.

Moreover, as social movements enact new forms of politics within

the everyday life of communities and neighbourhoods, they actively po-

liticise the multiple social subjects coming together within these local

universes (Garcés, 2019). A national popular front eventually emerges, ex-

panding beyond each socio-spatial entanglement as these multiple nodes

converge and intertwine into a dynamic network of grassroots radical

agency. Social movements also develop alternative institutions and prac-

tices within these local arenas, on the margins of the state and market,

wherein the grassroots engage in the production and management of the

common through this self-determining model of collective association

and organisation (Voss; Williams, 2012). Furthermore, as an emancipa-

tory consciousness ourishes therein and the revolutionary praxis guides

the oppressed social subjects converging into these local arenas, social

movements actively perform a counter-hegemonic role. This emerging

collective social subject, in eect, wages a Gramscian war of position,

which thence takes place outside (and often in opposition to) the insti-

tutionalised politics of the state. Tellingly, it takes place in everyday life,

itself the prime eld of emancipatory struggle (Hadjimichalis, 2018).

Social transformation is, therefore, sparked by the very belief in an

alternative social formation that emancipates one from the hegemonic

structures underpinning the existing order, which alienate and restrict

human life. The multitude raises as a constituent collective social subject

that is organically committed to emancipation by opposing and challen-

ging the hegemony of neoliberal capitalism over human life and hence is

capable of producing new social realities. This antagonistic relation to the

hegemonic order, albeit naively discarded by Hardt and Negri (2009) due

to the immanent nature of the multitude’s subjectivation, is actually pa-

ramount for this new collective social subject to act politically against the

neoliberal capitalist order. In this conceptualisation, the multitude, emer-

ging from these local socio-spatial entanglements is bound by this com-

mitment against neoliberal capitalism, precisely so it can resist and chal-

lenge its hegemony. As discussed above, the alternative realities enacted

by social movements transform the very social, political, and economic

structures oppressing the multiplicity of social subjects entangled within

these local arenas, oering a glimpse of egalitarian and emancipated for-

ms of life.

Arguably, Greek and Spanish civil societies became a vibrant thea-

tre wherein counter-hegemonic struggles intertwine with new forms of

politics from below and are diused through the daily life within local

communities and neighbourhoods (Kanellopoulos, et al., 2021). These

104

estudos internacionais • Belo Horizonte, ISSN 2317-773X, v. 11, n. 3, (out. 2023), p. 89-107

egalitarian and emancipated socio-spatial entanglements, therefore, indi-

cate the potential of alternative social formations wherein the failures of

neoliberal capitalism are tackled in collective, self-determining, and soli-

dary means, even though the harsh impacts of the years of austerity and

struggle in these countries – and these are not to be forgotten – will long

burden upon collective livelihood in these societies. Most importantly, as

the horizontal and vertical dimensions of grassroots agency and radical

democratic politics intersect within these local domains, the new cons-

tituent social subject of our times eventually emerges to produce social

transformation bottom-upwards.

6 CONCLUSION

This article has indicated the shortcomings of the vertical paradigm

as the orienting strategic framework for political action, as the analysis

of the political trajectory of Podemos and SYRIZA from the squares to

national politics (and therein into a passive revolution) produced in the se-

cond section corroborates it. Alternatively, the third section has analysed

a selection of strategic case studies embodying multiple expressions of

local-oriented grassroots radical agency in Greece and Spain, to illustrate

the potentials of the multitude’s horizontal politics for producing social

change at the local level. Most importantly, these analyses laid the grou-

ndwork for putting forward theoretical possibilities for reconciling key

categories of the horizontal and vertical paradigms, exploring productive

common grounds towards an alternative understanding of the subjecti-

vation process of the emerging collective social subject of our times and

the radical democratic practices it brings into play. Grounding these theo-

retical reections on concrete cases of generative collective action that

ourished across Greece and Spain in the years of austerity, the fourth

section attempted to bridge Gramsci’s counter-hegemonic politics and

the networked model for being and acting of Hardt and Negri’s multitu-

de. By situating local-level horizontal and autonomous grassroots radical

agency within the broad revolutionary project, it expects to unravel the

practical possibilities for the multitude to reconstruct socio-spatial arran-

gements from below, eventually succeeding in producing alternative or-

ders to neoliberal capitalism.

In view of the aggravating crises of the hegemonic order, which

recently unfolded over health, migration, and international security is-

sues, to think anew and seek new conceptual approaches to grassroots

agency and democratic politics is all the more essential. Moreover, one

must transcend the theoretical plane and imbue these alternative unders-

tandings into concrete possibilities of social change and emancipation. By

opposing traditional conceptions of political action inherent to the verti-

cal dynamics of state politics and horizontal and autonomous grassroots

radical agency, this article hopes to make a move in this direction.

105

Gabriel M. Vieira Socio-polical developments in Greece and Spain in the wake of the grassroots

an-austerity campaign: towards naonal parliaments and local spaces

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El MERCOSUR ante la desaceleración del

comercio intrarregional y las dinámicas

de desintegración entre 2012 y 2022:

análisis y perspectivas actuales en clave

autonomista

MERCOSUR facing the slowdown of intra-regional trade

and the dynamics of disintegration between 2012 and

2022: analysis and current perspectives in an autonomist

perspective

O MERCOSUL diante da desaceleração do comércio intra-

regional e da dinâmica de desintegração entre 2012 e

2022: análise e perspectivas atuais em uma perspectiva

autonomista

Recebido: 18 de dezembro de 2023

Aceito:22 de maio de 2024

Nastasia Barceló Severgnini1

Amanda Barrenengoa2

DOI: 10.5752/P.2317-773X.2023v11n3p108-125

R

En el presente artículo nos proponemos analizar el binomio integración regio-

nal y comercio intrarregional en América del Sur en perspectiva autonomista.

Se aborda la evolución del comercio -en la última década- del MERCOSUR en

su conjunto con el resto de los países sudamericanos y con China en el período

2012-2022. El desarrollo del artículo da cuenta del proceso de la desintegración

y del aumento de la dependencia y la primarización de las economías de los

países mercosureños. Aspectos que, si bien se acentuaron en los últimos años,

han caracterizado las estructuras económicas de los países del continente y han

condicionado el tipo de inserción y su rol en el comercio internacional. Se busca

analizar cómo el aumento del comercio intrarregional es una vía para fortalecer

los procesos de integración en clave de autonomía. Para su consecución, consi-

deramos que en el actual contexto -marcado por los efectos de la pandemia y la

crisis generalizada que ésta provocó, junto con la guerra entre Rusia y Ucrania-

es relevante reexionar acerca del rol de Brasil en la integración regional. La

pregunta problematizadora que guía este análisis es acerca de la posición que

la región sudamericana y el bloque del MERCOSUR van a jugar en el presente

contexto geopolítico.

1. Dra. en Ciencias por la Universidad

de San Pablo, Magíster en Relaciones

Internacionales (San Tiago Dantas,

UNESP), Licenciada em Relaciones

Internacionales (UNILA). Docente

Asistente de Ciencia Política en la

Universidad de la República (UdelaR).

Investigadora del Sistema Nacional de

Investigadores.

2. Dra. en Ciencias Sociales, Instituto

de Investigaciones en Humanidades y

Ciencias Sociales, Universidad Nacional

de La Plata. Consejo Nacional de Inves-

tigaciones Cientíﬁco Técnicas (IdiHCS-

Conicet), abarrenengoa@fahce.unlp.

edu.ar. Departamento de Sociología de

la Facultad de Humanidades y Ciencias

de la Educación, UNLP. Docente de

grado y posgrado.

109

Nastasia Barceló Severgnini, Amanda Barrenengoa El MERCOSUR ante la desaceleración del comercio intrarregional y

las dinámicas de desintegración entre 2012 y 2022: análisis y perspecvas actuales en clave autonomista

Palabras clave: Integración Regional – MERCOSUR- Brasil- Comercio

R

Neste artigo nos propomos a analisar o binômio integração regional e comércio

intrarregional na região -América do Sul- em perspectiva autonomista. Aborda-

-se a evolução do comércio na última década do Mercosul em seu conjunto com

o resto dos países sul-americanos e com a China. O desenvolvimento do artigo

dá conta do processo de desintegração e aumento da dependência e primariza-

ção das economias dos países “mercosureños”. Aspectos que, embora acentua-

dos nos últimos anos, têm caracterizado as estruturas econômicas dos países do

continente e condicionado o tipo de inserção internacional possível no sistema

internacional. Procura-se analisar como o aumento do comércio intrarregional

é uma forma de fortalecer os processos de integração em termos de autonomia.

Para a sua consecução, consideramos que no atual contexto -marcado pelos efei-

tos da pandemia e pela crise geral que ela provocou, juntamente com a guerra

entre a Rússia e a Ucrânia- é relevante reetir sobre o papel do Brasil na inte-

gração regional. A questão problematizadora que norteia esta análise é sobre a

posição que a região sul-americana e o bloco do MERCOSUL vão ocupar neste

novo esquema geopolítico.

Palavras chave: Integração Regional- MERCOSUL- Brasil- Comércio

A

In this article we propose to analyze the binomial of regional integration and

intra-regional trade in the region -South America- from an autonomist perspec-

tive. We address the evolution of trade of MERCOSUR as a whole with the rest

of the South American countries and with China in the period 2012-2022. The

development of the article shows the process of disintegration and increased

dependence and primarization of the economies of the Mercosur countries.

These aspects, have characterized the economic structures of the countries of

the continent and have conditioned the type of international insertion possible

within the international system. We seek to analyze how the increase in intra-

-regional is a way to strengthen integration processes in terms of autonomy.

To achieve this, we consider that in the current context – marked by the eects

of the pandemic and the generalized crisis it provoked, together with the war

between Russia and Ukraine – it is relevant to reect on the role of Brazil in

regional integration. The problematic question that guides this analysis is about

the position that the South American region and the MERCOSUR bloc will play

in this new geopolitical scheme.

Key words: Regional Integration – MERCOSUR- Brasil- Commerce

Enfoque

La desintegración económica y la fragmentación política que la re-

gión atravesaba de manera previa a la pandemia se agudizaron con su lle-

gada (Barrenengoa, 2020). Como consecuencia, no sólo se han profundi-

zado las desigualdades existentes (Pérez-Saint 2020), sino que, algunos de

los países de la región aumentaron su dependencia económica, y política

en un sistema internacional cada vez más desigual (Barceló, Barrenengoa,

2022). Al mismo tiempo, avanzan procesos de largo alcance como parte

de la transición histórica espacial y crisis mundial (Merino, 2021), a partir

de las cuales se han sucedido una serie de cambios en el propio modelo

de acumulación capitalista, y en el Norte global. Como parte de dichas

110

estudos internacionais • Belo Horizonte, ISSN 2317-773X, v. 11, n. 3, (out. 2023), p. 108-125

transformaciones, los Estados de la región sudamericana han visto limita-

das sus capacidades de maniobra, su autonomía y soberanía.

El propósito de este artículo es aportar a los estudios sobre integra-

ción regional desde una perspectiva autónoma, a partir de problematizar

el comercio regional, y los efectos de la primarización de las economías

en los últimos años. En un contexto donde los distintos caminos para la

integración económico comercial están siendo discutidos, se busca pro-

blematizar la situación actual del intercambio comercial entre países y

reexionar a partir de ello. Asimismo, habiendo transitado la crisis por

la pandemia, consideramos relevante recuperar los procesos previos.

Nos proponemos abordar, en primer lugar, el panorama del comercio in-

trarregional entre los Estados parte del MERCOSUR y con el resto de

América del Sur, con el n de problematizar la situación de dependen-

cia y reprimarización. A partir de ello, se busca plantear la integración

regional como herramienta en articulación con una estrategia de desar-

rollo que busque mayor autonomía para el bloque regional. Es decir, nos

proponemos pensar la dimensión comercial de la integración regional

como instrumento potenciador de la autonomía, a partir de revisar datos

y análisis de la última década y ponerlas en diálogo con distintas teorías

e investigaciones en curso que abordan el proceso de transición histórica

espacial (Merino, 2021).

La apertura y la integración son dos caminos considerados aquí

como opuestos, por sus sentidos políticos. Las políticas de apertura co-

mercial han sido parte de la historia reciente de la región sudamericana,

como parte de las reformas neoliberales del Consenso de Washington

(Kan, 2017), que también moldearon un tipo de integración regional de

carácter abierto. La apertura total de las economías junto con la baja aran-

celaria conguró un tipo de inserción en el mercado mundial desven-

tajoso para los Estados del MERCOSUR. Siguiendo a Mariana Vázquez

(2019), coincidimos con su caracterización, a grandes rasgos, de tres eta-

pas. La primera, entre 1991 y 2002, con un sentido más aperturista a tono

con la época de su surgimiento. En segundo lugar, entre 2003 y 2012,

una etapa más prolíca en términos de integración y diversicación de la

agenda Mercosureña más allá de lo comercial. Y en tercer lugar, la etapa

en la que aquí nos enfocaremos, desde 2012 hasta el presente, caracteriza-

da por los intentos por hacer de la unión aduanera un área de libre comer-

cio, al mismo tiempo que se desaceleraron las tendencias más políticas

dentro del MERCOSUR, a la par del cambio en el mapa político regional

(Barrenengoa, Kan, 2023).

En los últimos años, especialmente desde 2016, la retórica inte-

gracionista pasó a estar marcada por metáforas como “modernización”,

“exibilización” y “distintas velocidades”. Por tanto, ya no se debate si

priorizar las negociaciones externas con otros bloques y países, sino la

manera de llevarlo a cabo: “negociando todo juntos o habilitando la r-

ma individual, por fuera del MERCOSUR. Incluso en Paraguay ya no

cierran la puerta a un acuerdo comercial con China, siempre que se haga

en bloque y que no implique condicionamientos políticos, por ejemplo,

que Asunción asuma la política de “una sola China” y corte vínculos con

Taiwán” (Frenkel, 2022).

111

Nastasia Barceló Severgnini, Amanda Barrenengoa El MERCOSUR ante la desaceleración del comercio intrarregional y

las dinámicas de desintegración entre 2012 y 2022: análisis y perspecvas actuales en clave autonomista

Partimos de una concepción de la integración regional que es mul-

tidimensional, en tanto política pública (Perrota, 2013). Por ello, sugeri-

mos pensar las políticas de integración como herramientas que posibili-

tan reexionar, en el marco de las asimetrías entre Norte y Sur Global,

y en medio de los patrones de comercio predominantes. Con ello nos

referimos tanto al incremento de la presencia china en los Estados merco-

sureños, como a la histórica presencia de EE.UU. como potencia regional,

y desde estas, los conictos y tensiones que se vienen desatando. Tanto

por el acercamiento chino como por el estrechamiento de los vínculos

con la mayoría de los países sudamericanos -excepto Paraguay-, vivimos

tiempos de expansión espacial por parte de China, en paralelo con la reo-

rientación del proceso de acumulación material por fuera de occidente y

su área de inuencia, en lo que algunos autores denominan el heterogé-

neo espacio del Sur global, constituido además por diferentes jerarquías

(Fernández y Moretti, 2020, p. 317).

En ese marco, hacemos referencia a la autonomía regional en

diálogo con los aportes de la teoría de la autonomía. Myriam Colacrai

(2009) propone pensarla como medio para alcanzar una mejor inserción

internacional en un mundo globalizado con una elevada interdependen-

cia, enfatizando la importancia de la integración regional para ellos. La

autora enfatiza en los componentes para que una política exterior sea

autonómica, y alerta sobre los problemas que conlleva el minimizar la

incidencia de los factores domésticos. Otro de los aspectos de la teoría

de la autonomía que se retoma para el análisis es caracterizar al sistema

internacional como estructurado y jerárquico, donde los países del Sur

global tienen una posición subordinada, en contraposición a las visiones

que lo conciben como anárquico (Jagguaribe, 1979; PUIG, 1984). De esta

manera, pensamos en conjunto las políticas domésticas con las agendas

de política exterior, recuperando estudios clásicos y recientes (Míguez,

2020; Simono, 2019; Deciancio, 2016; Colacrai, 2009; Lasagna, 1995; Van

Klaveren, 1992; Rosenau, 1968) que articulan los actores domésticos y las

orientaciones de los países en cuanto a su política económica y exterior.

El presente artículo se divide en tres apartados. En primer lugar,

como diagnóstico inicial, se ofrecerá un panorama del comercio intrarre-

gional entre los Estados parte del Mercado Común del Sur (MERCOSUR)

y con el resto de América del Sur, para visibilizar cómo evolucionó dicho

comercio en la última década. En segundo lugar, se analizan los vínculos

comerciales con uno de los principales socios3 extrarregión de los países

del bloque MERCOSUR en su conjunto: China entre 2012 y 2020. Así se

obtendrá un balance que permita trazar consideraciones iniciales sobre

las relaciones económicas entre los países, en el periodo seleccionado.

Se analiza cómo la desarticulación del comercio intrarregional

coincide con el giro liberal-conservador (Sanahuja y Caetano, 2019) en las

políticas exteriores de los dos grandes socios del bloque MERCOSUR:

Brasil y Argentina, con el triunfo de Mauricio Macri (2015) y la destitu-

ción de Dilma Rousse (2016). Asimismo, la crisis política, con sus mati-

ces y particularidades en cada país, contribuyó al desmantelamiento de

las principales instituciones de la gobernanza regional, como la Unión de

las Naciones Sudamericanas (UNASUR) y la amplia cartera de proyectos

3. Desde 2009, el gigante asiático es el

principal socio comercial de Brasil, al

comprar más del 70% de productos de

exportación agropecuarios, minerales

y petróleo (Taglioni, 2021, p. 77). Así, a

pesar de las rispideces diplomáticas con

China durante el gobierno de Bolsonaro,

continuó la tendencia de aumento en las

ventas al mercado asiático.

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vinculadas a esa organización, en las áreas de Defensa y Seguridad inter-

nacionales, Infraestructura, Salud y cooperación para la preservación del

ambiente. En el caso del MERCOSUR, los intentos por recongurarlo se

pueden observar en los acercamientos a un acuerdo preferencial con la

Alianza del Pacíco y el acuerdo de libre comercio con la Unión Europea

alrededor de 2019. En ambos casos, lo que estaba en juego era su transfor-

mación de una unión aduanera común a un área de libre comercio. Si bien

no fue reformada la cláusula que posibilita que alguno de los Estados del

MERCOSUR rme TLC de manera unilateral, fue por esos años cuando

se buscó que el MERCOSUR fuera objeto de acuerdos económico- comer-

ciales con otros actores por fuera de la región (Barrenengoa, Kan, 2023).

En el tercer apartado, se analiza el rol de Brasil en el proceso de

integración regional, principalmente, en el bloque MERCOSUR, a par-

tir del retorno de la coalición liderada por el Partido de los Trabajadores

(PT), que llevó a Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva por tercera vez a la presidencia.

Para ello, se llevará a cabo un recorrido por las principales tradiciones

de política exterior brasileña hacia la región y las perspectivas que emer-

gen para el MERCOSUR tras el cambio político. Esto permite reexionar

en torno a cómo una agenda conjunta de negociaciones extrarregionales

puede constituirse con anclaje en esta nueva integración.

Se culmina con una sección de consideraciones nales, que recu-

pera las reexiones y discusiones abordadas. A partir de una estrategia

metodológica cualitativa (Marradi, Archenti y Piovani, 2007), basada en

el trabajo con fuentes primarias y secundarias, se han tomado estadísti-

cas provenientes de distintas bases de datos para el análisis del comercio

MERCOSUR, en diálogo con la bibliografía especializada y la revisión de

documentos ociales de organismos como la Comisión Económica para

América Latina (CEPAL).

2. Panorama del comercio intrarregional en América del Sur entre 2012

y 2020

Para comprender el escenario actual, es importante tener en cuenta

factores de larga duración que contribuyen a analizarlo, como la particu-

laridad de Sudamérica y el modo en que los Estados y sus economías se

fueron insertando en un mercado internacional caracterizado por sus es-

tructuras dependientes. Siguiendo las ideas de autores claves de la teoría

de la autonomía como Helio Jaguaribe y Juan Carlos Puig, coincidimos

con Briceño Ruiz y Simono (2015) en torno a pensar un Estado de tipo

regional, en perspectiva estratégica. A diferencia de acotar la integración

al intercambio comercial y el desarrollo económico e industrial -tal como

anunciaban los pronósticos de la CEPAL en los ‘50-, los pensadores auto-

nomistas han contribuido a pensar la integración, el desarrollo y la auto-

nomía política superando la perspectiva económica, aunque sin prescin-

dir de su centralidad. De allí que la multidimensionalidad nos sirve para

pensar en la integración desde un punto de vista amplio. Con relación a

esto, Cecilia Míguez (2021) contribuye a pensar en los rasgos especícos

que asumieron las periferias de esta región, no sólo por su dependencia

en términos económicos sino también políticos.

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Nastasia Barceló Severgnini, Amanda Barrenengoa El MERCOSUR ante la desaceleración del comercio intrarregional y

las dinámicas de desintegración entre 2012 y 2022: análisis y perspecvas actuales en clave autonomista

Partiendo de las transformaciones estructurales del sistema ca-

pitalista y la proliferación de empresas transnacionales, las estructuras

estatales se ven modicadas ante una nueva espacialidad “glocalizado-

ra” (Ordóñez, Fernández y Brandao, 2021: 16). Bajo estas dinámicas, se

genera la fragmentación de los espacios nacionales, y las concepciones

de desarrollo e integración se ven afectadas. De esta manera, se desar-

rolla la economía mundo- capitalista, que liga los centros, semiperiferias

y periferias a la acumulación del capital a escala global, reproduciendo

un patrón de desigualdad, notable en la región sudamericana. Desde la

consideración de la lógica global del capitalismo y su carácter polarizador

y desigual, a continuación, analizamos algunos datos del comercio regio-

nal a nivel del MERCOSUR.

La siguiente síntesis estadística proporciona datos e información

sobre el comercio del MERCOSUR con la región (América del Sur) y es-

pecialmente en los intercambios con China y para el período 2012-2020,

años en que el gigante asiático se consolidó como el primer socio comer-

cial de los países del bloque, con excepción de Paraguay.

Consideramos que un análisis del comercio internacional conlleva,

además de mirar números, entender la economía política que orienta a

los Estados y las estructuras productivas que determinan —en mayor o

menor medida— la división internacional, social y de género, del trabajo.

Por lo tanto, aquí la intención no es solo ver estadísticas, sino interpre-

tar la realidad socioeconómica del MERCOSUR a partir de una lectura

crítica sobre qué denotan, en el marco de los procesos de desintegración

económica y fragmentación política de la última década.

Partimos de la base de que, en los últimos años, el comercio intrar-

regional de América del Sur se encuentra en niveles signicativamente

bajos y la región presenta señales de desaceleración económica desde el

n del boom de los commodities (CNI, 2017). Sumada a la crisis política ma-

nifestada a través del agotamiento del pacto social, que llevó a levanta-

mientos populares en varios países durante 2018 y 2019 (OBIESUR, 2020).

En paralelo a estos procesos, se fueron transformando las dinámicas po-

líticas que habían caracterizado el presente siglo, sobre todo aquellas vin-

culadas con la integración regional (Barrenengoa, Kan, 2023). A partir

de 2015 resurgen, como resultado de las nuevas alianzas de poder en la

región, políticas más anes con los modelos de integración de nales de

los ‘80 e inicios de los ‘90, enfatizando los vínculos económico-comercia-

les por sobre las áreas social, política y cultural (Barrenengoa, Kan, 2023).

Entre 2008 y 2014, durante el denominado boom de los commodities,

se registró el mayor aumento del comercio de América del Sur con el

mundo (Barros et al, 2020). El comercio intrarregional siguió esta ten-

dencia y alcanzó sus mayores ujos entre 2012 y 2014, superando los 

200.000 millones de corriente de comercio (Barros et al, 2020). En este pe-

ríodo prevaleció un alineamiento político de los gobiernos nacionales con

relación a la integración, generando políticas orientadas al fortalecimien-

to de los procesos de integración en sus múltiples dimensiones. Como

consecuencia, se produjo un auge de las instituciones de gobernanza re-

gional, que permitió una mayor concertación política en distintos niveles

-regional, estatal y subnacional- y dimensiones de la realidad -economía y

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comercio, defensa, social, educativo, entre otras. En este sentido, se desta-

ca el relanzamiento del MERCOSUR con el consenso de Buenos Aires en

2003, la creación de la UNASUR en 2008, a partir de la intensicación del

diálogo entre la Comunidad Andina de Naciones (CAN) y el MERCOSUR,

y la creación de la Comunidad de Estados Latinoamericanos y Caribeños

(CELAC) en 2011. Esta organización tuvo como antecedentes meca-

nismos históricos de concertación política, como el Grupo de Río y los

Grupos de Contadora y Apoyo a Contadora de la década de 1980, creados

en un contexto marcado por las transiciones hacia la democracia, princi-

palmente en el Cono Sur (Barrenengoa, Barceló, 2021)

En parte, el mayor entendimiento político y las posibilidades de re-

crear instituciones regionales se debió a la prosperidad económica de ese

ciclo. Ahora bien, dichas instituciones también apostaron por profundizar

el regionalismo económico -manteniendo niveles altos de intercambios

comerciales intrarregionales- y la concertación política. En este sentido,

se destaca la Iniciativa para la Integración de la Infraestructura Regional

Sudamericana (IIRSA, el Banco del Sur4 , el Fondo Latinoamericano de

Reservas (ar) y del Convenio de Créditos y Pagos Recíprocos (ccr) de

la Asociación Latinoamericana de Integración (ALADI), el Consejo

Sudamericano de Defensa de la UNASUR y de toda la estructura ins-

titucional de cooperación en políticas públicas del MERCOSUR, como

el Instituto Social, el Instituto de Derechos Humanos, la Reunión

Especializada de la Agricultura Familiar (reaf), La Reunión Especializada

de la Mujer, entre otras instancias de participación de la sociedad civil en

las instancias regionales de coordinación política. No obstante, estas no

lograron dinámicas que permitieran mayor autonomía para no depender

de las coyunturas internas y los vaivenes ideológicos de los gobiernos na-

cionales (Severo, Magalhaes, 2020).

En esos años también se puede apreciar que los países del

MERCOSUR participaron en al menos 55 % de los intercambios comer-

ciales intrarregionales durante todo el período analizado (2012-2020). Es

decir, el MERCOSUR5 , pese a ser una unión aduanera imperfecta, con

todas las limitaciones inherentes a las políticas domésticas de los países

miembros y a las transformaciones, logró incentivar la profundización de

las relaciones comerciales con el resto de los países del continente. Este

factor es fundamental, considerando que el comercio intrarregional6 es

más diversicado, tiene mayor valor agregado7 que el comercio con el

resto del mundo y, por ende, genera más y mejor empleo de calidad (Barros

et al, 2020). Por su parte, los países del MERCOSUR destinaron, conjun-

tamente, un 13% de sus exportaciones al propio bloque y, de lo que im-

portan, un 16% proviene de socios del bloque. Diere con lo que sucede al

interior de otro bloque, la Alianza del Pacíco, que destina a sí mismo tan

solo un 3% de sus exportaciones (Cepal, 2018). Cómo se señaló antes, los

Estados parte de dicho bloque, han adoptado una estrategia de apertura

indiscriminada mediante la negociación de TLCs.

En términos comparativos, con otras regiones del mundo, el

MERCOSUR cuenta con un arancel externo común (AEC) relativamen-

te elevado (Barros et al, 2020). En consecuencia, el AEC genera cierta

reserva de mercado, en particular para los productos manufacturados

4. La división de los fondos que tenía

que aportar cada Estado fue uno de los

aspectos que mayores controversias

y resistencias generó. Por distintos

motivos de política exterior y doméstica,

al no ser aprobado unánimemente por

todos los parlamentos de los países

miembros, no pudo entrar en vigor

formalmente (Barrenengoa, 2020).

5. Entre 2008 y 2014, el MERCOSUR

logró tener entre sus miembros a prác-

ticamente todos los países del América

del Sur, ya sea como miembros plenos

como en categoría de asociados.

6. Al observar las exportaciones intrar-

regionales por categorías económicas,

se destaca el intercambio de «insumos

industriales», equipamientos y partes de

transporte (industria automotriz), bienes

de consumo y bienes de capital, y gas.

7. La CEPAL señala que el comercio in-

trarregional presenta mayor diversiﬁca-

ción de productos, con un rol preponde-

rante de las manufacturas industriales,

lo que se contrapone con la composición

de las exportaciones extrarregionales,

más concentradas en pocos productos

de origen primario (CEPAL, 2018, p.5)

115

Nastasia Barceló Severgnini, Amanda Barrenengoa El MERCOSUR ante la desaceleración del comercio intrarregional y

las dinámicas de desintegración entre 2012 y 2022: análisis y perspecvas actuales en clave autonomista

(excluyendo al sector automotor y al azucarero, que no son parte del

acuerdo) (CEPAL, 2018). Aún con esa ventaja, la interdependencia comercial

y la integración productiva intrabloque ha ido en retroceso en los últimos

años. La Cepal lo explica por una serie de factores, entre los que destaca la

irrupción de China como gran proveedor de productos manufacturados a

nivel global desde comienzos de los años 2000, la creciente brecha de pro-

ductividad que tienen las actividades del MERCOSUR en relación con sus

pares en economías más desarrolladas y el débil desempeño económico

de Brasil y Argentina (CEPAL, 2018, 2020). Esta combinación de factores

dicultó una mayor integración de las empresas del bloque en las cadenas

internacionales de producción, excepto en el segmento de provisión de

insumos, generalmente materias primas.

Aquí emerge como variable complementaria al análisis del movi-

miento comercial del MERCOSUR, la presencia de China y su sistemá-

tico acercamiento a los distintos países de la región a partir de diversos

instrumentos y herramientas que son parte de una estrategia mayor.

Ahora bien, esto se ha dado en paralelo a una limitación para la región:

no contar con una estrategia común como bloque para comercializar, lo

que termina bilateralizando los vínculos, sumado a las dicultades para

la industrialización de la mayoría de las economías.

3. El MERCOSUR y su principal socio comercial extrabloque: China.

Balances y perspectivas.

Al observar las exportaciones del MERCOSUR con China, es po-

sible constatar que estas se deben a la demanda mundial y a los niveles

de los precios internacionales. Los precios de las commodities aumenta-

ron a partir de 2005, impulsados fundamentalmente por el crecimiento

de China, cuya economía crecía a tasas anuales de un 10%. Luego, en

2008, los precios descendieron como consecuencia de la crisis nanciera

internacional. Retomaron la tendencia hasta 2013, cuando alcanzaron su

máximo para el período considerado.

Como se muestra en los cuadros siguientes8 , a partir de 2014, las

exportaciones totales del MERCOSUR hacia China comenzaron a dis-

minuir de forma acentuada, en coincidencia con la disminución de los

precios y la demanda de commodities, y también con la desaceleración de

la economía China, que acentuó esta tendencia. Sin embargo, en 2017 y

2018, los precios de los productos básicos, con excepción del petróleo, se

mantuvieron relativamente estables, por lo que se produjo una leve recu-

peración para esos años, aunque sin llegar a los niveles de 2013. Entre los

principales productos se encuentran las materias primas, pero también

otros recursos naturales como el litio, cobre, níquel, entre otros.

8. Los cuadros son de elaboración

propia de las autoras a partir de datos

de Comtrade (https://comtrade.un.org/),

Veritrade (https://www.veritradecorp.

com/) y Banco Mundial (https://datos.

bancomundial.org/tema/comercio)

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estudos internacionais • Belo Horizonte, ISSN 2317-773X, v. 11, n. 3, (out. 2023), p. 108-125

Exportaciones desde Mercosur a China

Fuente: Elaboración propia, a partir de datos de COMTRADE. Disponible en: https://

comtrade.un.org/. Veritrade. Disponible en: https://www.veritradecorp.com/. Banco

Mundial. Disponible en: https://datos.bancomundial.org/tema/comercio.

Durante el período 2008-2014, las economías de la región orienta-

ron su estructura productiva a atender la demanda del mercado interna-

cional, especialmente de China. Actualmente, este es el principal socio

comercial de los Estados parte del MERCOSUR. Dicha estrategia llevó

a la reprimarización de la pauta exportadora, por lo tanto, al aumento de

la dependencia en las ventas internacionales, limitadas cada vez a menos

socios comerciales extrarregionales (Obiesur, 2020, Barros et al, 2020).

Como parte de su estrategia, el Estado chino ha ido desarrollando

diferentes instrumentos que no sólo lo han ido posicionando en su rol

actual como líder global, sino que, además, le han permitido acercarse

a la región de AL y el Caribe, consolidando su posición como uno de

los principales socios e inversores de la mayoría de los Estados del con-

tinente americano (con más contundencia a partir de la primera década

de los 2000).

Entre estos, es posible destacar la conformación de un entramado

de potencias emergentes a partir del BRICS (Brasil, Rusia, India, China y

Sudáfrica), y la más reciente idea del BRICS plus. Es decir, su expansión

material (en términos económico-comerciales, nancieros, en infraes-

tructura y tecnología) ha ido acompañada de herramientas diplomáticas

que contribuyen en la búsqueda de una posición geopolítica de relevan-

cia global. Ejemplo de ello es la conformación en 2014 del Foro China-

CELAC, producto del acercamiento entre Xi Jinping y los jefes de Estado

de la CELAC, que reúne a los 33 países latinoamericanos y caribeños.

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Nastasia Barceló Severgnini, Amanda Barrenengoa El MERCOSUR ante la desaceleración del comercio intrarregional y

las dinámicas de desintegración entre 2012 y 2022: análisis y perspecvas actuales en clave autonomista

Asimismo, el “Belt and Road Iniciative” (BRI), o la Iniciativa de

la Franja y la Ruta es uno de los proyectos de mayor envergadura geo-

política de la actualidad, por el volumen de inversiones que plantea en

distintas zonas del mundo, y porque ningún otro organismo de finan-

ciamiento viene planteando un proyecto en esa escala en términos de

infraestructura. Estos instrumentos marcan la relevancia de la región

latinoamericana y caribeña para la expansión geopolítica y geoestra-

tégica del gigante asiático, como parte del Sur global. En esta, los pro-

yectos de infraestructura tienen un rol central. Vinculados también

con los objetivos de ampliar el comercio entre AL y el Caribe y Asia

Pacífico, estas mega obras tienen como característica central la plani-

ficación a largo plazo, las inversiones por parte de bancos chinos y la

articulación con empresas también de origen chino (estatales y mix-

tas). Ahora bien, la creciente presencia de la economía China puede

constituir un factor dinamizador para la región, por ser un país que

consume nuestros productos, -fundamentalmente carne, soja y sub-

productos cárnicos-impulsando las cadenas internacionales de agro-

negocios, pero también se convierte en un elemento desintegrador9.

De acuerdo con la CEPAL, el peso cada vez mayor de las commodi-

ties en la canasta de exportación del MERCOSUR tiende a debilitar el

ritmo de crecimiento exportador de cara al comercio intrarregional.

Esta trayectoria es indisociable de la creciente desintegración produc-

tiva del MERCOSUR (CEPAL, 2021).

Ahora bien, entendemos a la integración como un proceso que res-

ponde, también, a los procesos políticos de los Estados parte que, si bien

están condicionados por las dinámicas del sistema internacional, tienen

poder de agencia para orientar sus respectivas políticas exteriores y trazar

una estrategia conjunta. Es decir, no es el factor chino lo que explica el

proceso de reprimarización y dependencia. En este sentido, los desafíos

para la región son crecientes, en el marco de la nueva posición de China a

nivel global y las posibilidades que la región podría construir en términos

del juego geopolítico más allá de las características -a esta altura estruc-

turales- de nuestras estructuras productivas.

Si se analizan los cuatro países del MERCOSUR en su conjunto, la

participación de China representa el 30% de las exportaciones totales de

la región, especialmente a partir de 2012, desplazando a Estados Unidos

como destino. De acuerdo con los datos de la Confederación Nacional

de Industrias de Brasil (CNI), es posible visualizar cómo el avance chino

también impactó a Brasil en cuanto al comercio de bienes manufactura-

dos. La disminución de las exportaciones brasileñas a MERCOSUR con-

trasta, entre 2010 y 2019, con un crecimiento del 12,9% observado en las

importaciones totales del subcontinente en ese lapso. En otras palabras,

incluso con el aumento de las importaciones en el subcontinente, Brasil

tuvo una caída en sus ventas. Sobre este punto, es central recordar que,

según los datos de la CNI, en los últimos años los mercados regionales ha-

bían llegado a representar el 71,1% (bienio 2012-2013) de todo el volumen

exportado por las montadoras, el 52,6 % de las exportaciones de goma y

material plástico, y el 42,3 % de las ventas externas de productos químicos

(Con, 2017, p. 3)

9. Desde China, así como desde la UE y

Estados Unidos se han propuesto distin-

tas agendas de asociación bilaterales.

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Es decir, el MERCOSUR es el principal destino para las exporta-

ciones en sectores importantes de la industria brasileña. Este ha sido un

elemento central para la apuesta de Brasil al MERCOSUR, al igual que

Argentina. Sin embargo, en los últimos años, Brasil ha ido perdiendo es-

pacio como socio comercial en los países de la región, fundamentalmente

desde el gobierno de Temer que y luego Bolsonaro -como parte del giro

en la política exterior brasileña desde 2016-. La contracción del comercio

se sintió más en los productos industrializados. En la comparación entre

2010 y 2019, s exportaciones brasileñas de este tipo de productos -produc-

tos químicos y material plástico- para Sudamérica cayeron un 27,6%. Del

lado de las importaciones, hubo una disminución del 25,9%. El decreci-

miento del comercio con los países del subcontinente se intensicó a par-

tir de 2017, lo que demuestra una pérdida de calidad en el comercio de la

integración entre sectores. De acuerdo con el documento “Interesses da

indústria na América do Sul: comércio e investimentos” elaborado por la

CNI, la competencia se da con Estados Unidos, China y Alemania (CNI,

2021, p.3), siendo los propios sectores industriales quienes plantean los

condicionamientos, que se agravaron con el giro político en la región a

partir de 2015.

En dicho marco, la participación de Brasil en las importaciones de

países sudamericanos cayó 3,8% en la última década, del 14,5% en 2012

al 10,7% en 2019 (CNI, 2021). En el período, la participación de China

en las importaciones del subcontinente creció. Por lo tanto, la pérdida

de parte del comercio intrarregional -en especial la presencia de las in-

dustrias brasileñas en los mercados regionales- coincide con el avance de

empresas chinas. Como destaca Frenkel (2022) las principales diculta-

des que ha atravesado el MERCOSUR radican en el desacople reciente

económico-productivo, sobre todo entre sus dos socios mayores: Brasil y

Argentina. Desacople que implica menor peso de los sectores industriales

en detrimento del aumento de los vinculados a la agroexportación, orien-

tados a economías extrarregionales, principalmente China. Asimismo,

los grupos ligados al agronegocio –que generan poco empleo e innova-

ción– se transformaron en la gran apuesta del gobierno de Bolsonaro para

el crecimiento económico y la modernización del capitalismo brasileño,

estableciendo como horizonte los modelos de México y Chile (Frenkel,

Azzi, 2021).

En síntesis, en los últimos 20 años, las economías del MERCOSUR

son más dependientes y se han reprimarizado, en un sistema de relaciones

internacionales profundamente asimétrico entre el Norte y el Sur Global.

En este contexto, agravado por el impacto de la pandemia y la crisis in-

ternacional, apostar a fortalecer el comercio intrarregional constituye en

la mejor opción para paliar los impactos socioeconómicos y las graves

consecuencias que ha tenido en la población. El comercio de productos

con mayor valor agregado genera más y empleo de calidad.

En el escenario actual, la propuesta de “reindustrializar Brasil”

constituye uno de los principales objetivos del nuevo gobierno de Lula da

Silva, siendo la profundización del comercio intrarregional la estrategia

que se busca consolidar. A la par, las negociaciones en bloque con otros

Estados —o conjunto de Estados— y el fortalecimiento del mercado

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Nastasia Barceló Severgnini, Amanda Barrenengoa El MERCOSUR ante la desaceleración del comercio intrarregional y

las dinámicas de desintegración entre 2012 y 2022: análisis y perspecvas actuales en clave autonomista

regional continúan siendo los caminos más viables para apuntar a un de-

sarrollo autónomo. Para ello, los Estados son vehículos centrales para el

diseño de una estrategia que busque aumentar y la diversicación el co-

mercio intrarregional, apoyándose en la consolidación y el relanzamiento

de organizaciones como MERCOSUR y UNASUR, si pensamos en clave

de autonomía y soberanía.

4. El retorno de Lula da Silva al Planalto: el reimpulso a la

industrialización y la búsqueda de autonomía regional

Brasil, además de ser -junto con México- la economía más impor-

tante del continente, impulsó procesos de integración regional desde una

perspectiva multidimensional, como fue el caso de UNASUR y la amplia-

ción de MERCOSUR tras el consenso de Buenos Aires de 2003. Asimismo,

los retrocesos y la paralización en el ámbito de la gobernanza regional

también se deben a las políticas regresivas impulsadas desde los gobiernos

de Temer y Bolsonaro. Es decir, los impulsos y los frenos están vinculados

a la orientación de la PEB, en diferentes momentos históricos. Por ello,

entendemos que el cambio de gobierno en Brasil abre una nueva ventana

de oportunidades para la región. Coincidimos con Vieira Secches, Vadell

y Ramos (2020), quienes desde la economía política internacional lo con-

sideran una potencia emergente y potencia media, a partir de su doble

inserción: internacional y regional, en tanto característica sobresaliente

de lo que se consideraban las “nuevas potencias medias” (Sennes, 1998, p.

400). Además, se muestran indicadores como el tamaño de su economía

y los índices de crecimiento en el período de estudio, junto con la expan-

sión global, para destacar la participación en el BRICS y en el Consejo de

Seguridad de la ONU. Ahora bien, Brasil también comparte con el resto

de los Estados sudamericanos la posición de semiperiferia y las oscilacio-

nes marcadas por los ciclos históricos que han afectado a la región.

En un artículo anterior (Barrenengoa, Barceló 2021) postulába-

mos que, en este escenario de crisis, un camino posible era fomentar

el comercio intrarregional, como estrategia que permitiera retomar la

senda del desarrollo autonómico regional en el largo plazo. También,

que los avances en la integración han dependido en buena medida, de

la articulación política de los gobiernos locales y de las condiciones del

contexto internacional (Barrenengoa, Barceló, 2021). En esa coyun-

tura política especíca, ninguna de esas dos condiciones se cumplía

(Autoras, 2021, p.32). Hoy, el contexto político regional -principalmen-

te por el cambio de gobierno en Brasil a partir del retorno de Lula da

Silva- así como la geopolítica del sistema internacional se han transfor-

mado. Transformaciones que, implican una coyuntura más favorable a

la potenciación del comercio intrarregional y al fortalecimiento de las

instituciones de gobernanza regional en detrimento de propuestas más

aperturistas10 y de “exibilización”. Al mismo tiempo, se trata de opor-

tunidades que se enfrentan a tensiones y disputas en torno a la orien-

tación de las políticas exteriores y como resultado de estas, el modo de

participación del bloque MERCOSUR (o en su defecto, de cada Estado

por separado) en esta nueva transición geopolítica.

10. Propuestas como la de los dos

últimos gobiernos uruguayos sobre la

ﬁrma de un TLC con China por fuera del

MERCOSUR (Barceló, 2023). Ahora bien,

como explica Peña (2022) si eventual-

mente se concretara un acuerdo bilate-

ral entre un país miembro del MERCO-

SUR y un tercer país, especialmente si

fuera con uno relevante en el sistema

comercial global y que no fuera país

miembro de la ALADI, ello podría abrir

una crisis, incluso profunda, que eventu-

almente derivaría en una fragmentación

formal del MERCOSUR o lo conduciría a

una situación de irrelevancia deﬁnitiva.

(citado en Barceló,2023)

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La invasión rusa a Ucrania -desde febrero de 2022-, constituye un

evento histórico que acelera y pone de maniesto las transformaciones

estructurales en el sistema de relaciones internacionales que ya se venían

dando, en conjunción con otros fenómenos recientes destacados en este

artículo, especialmente la pandemia de covid-19. A medida que la guerra

fue adquiriendo mayores proporciones, espaciales y temporales, impactó

en el orden geopolítico y en las estructuras regionales de seguridad, con

una fuerte tendencia a la polarización (Barrenengoa, Barceló, 2022). A

esto se suma el ascenso de China y su disputa global con Estados Unidos

en el campo económico, productivo, tecnológico y geopolítico (Merino,

2021). Estos cambios impactan en la posición del MERCOSUR y en las

posibilidades reales de inserción internacional en el contexto actual.

De manera concomitante, es posible constatar cómo Argentina y

Brasil, parecen converger cada vez más con relación a los BRICS, Brasil

mediante la reaproximación al bloque con el nuevo gobierno y Argentina

tras el pedido de ingreso al mismo11 . Los BRICS fueron constituidos en

2009 con el objetivo de fortalecer el crecimiento económico y promover

la cooperación sur-sur entre las potencias emergentes, que constituyen

un grupo reducido de grandes países en desarrollo que lograron progre-

sivamente diferenciarse dentro del llamado “Sur Global”. Ahora bien,

desde el comienzo de la guerra en Ucrania, estos han adquirido un rol es-

tratégico clave en el equilibrio geopolítico y geoeconómico actual, sobre

todo por el desaante crecimiento chino para las potencias occidentales

y su rol en el conicto. En julio de 2022 se llevó a cabo la cumbre vir-

tual de autoridades de los países que lo componen, participaron los pre-

sidentes de China, Xi Jinping, de Sudáfrica, Cyril Ramaphosa; de Brasil,

Jair Bolsonaro; de Rusia, Vladímir Putin; y el primer ministro de India,

Narendra Modi. En esa ocasión el presidente chino enfatizó en la necesi-

dad de “abandonar la mentalidad de Guerra Fría y la confrontación entre

bloques”, en lo que constituía un claro mensaje a la OTAN, en especial a

Estados Unidos, en respaldo a Rusia ante las sanciones impuestas a media-

dos de marzo de ese año (Barceló, 2022).

Con el retorno de Lula da Silva liderando una coalición de partidos

en Brasil, la aproximación a los BRICS se ha venido profundizando en es-

tos meses. Asimismo, la política exterior que caracterizó a los gobiernos

del Partido de los Trabajadores (PT), signica una reaproximación a los

países del “sur global”, y tiene como estrategia clave para la proyección

mundial de Brasil, fortalecer los procesos de integración sudamericana.

Durante el gobierno de Bolsonaro (2018-2022) se produjo un fuerte

aislamiento de la región, tras la salida de UNASUR, de CELAC y el aban-

dono de las agendas sociales y políticas del MERCOSUR (Barceló, 2023).

Frenkel y Azzi (2020) caracterizaron a esos años como un paréntesis en la

historia de la política exterior de Brasil, que tradicionalmente, incluso du-

rante la dictadura civil-militar (1964-1985) tuvo a la región como el eje prin-

cipal de su orientación internacional. Otro de los indicadores que da cuenta

de dicho “paréntesis” es el abandono de la autonomía como objetivo.

El triunfo de Bolsonaro en 2018 terminó por consolidar el aban-

dono de las políticas integracionistas en ámbitos regionales y multi-

laterales, por un alineamiento automático con los EE. UU. de Trump,

11. En septiembre de 2022 Alberto

Fernández envió una carta a Xi Jinping,

que constituye una de las diecinueve

solicitudes de países que buscan formar

parte de dicho foro, que serán discuti-

das a ﬁnales de mayo de 2023, mientras

se termina de escribir el presente

artículo.

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Nastasia Barceló Severgnini, Amanda Barrenengoa El MERCOSUR ante la desaceleración del comercio intrarregional y

las dinámicas de desintegración entre 2012 y 2022: análisis y perspecvas actuales en clave autonomista

constituyéndose en un giro en la PEB que se venía desarrollando desde

Temer. De esta manera, hubo un freno a la estrategia de regionalismo au-

tónomo, desatando una situación de crisis de las instituciones regionales

como el MERCOSUR, la UNASUR y la CELAC, sin poder reemplazarlas

por la Alianza del Pacíco, aunque con mayor presencia de la OEA en los

conictos regionales. Dicho giro fue parte de una política regional en la

que coincidieron distintos gobiernos como el de Argentina.

En ese marco, a pesar de los cambios estructurales que desde 2016

empezaron a llevarse adelante en Brasil con la crisis institucional y el gol-

pe parlamentario a Dilma Rousse, el gobierno brasileño intenta rápida-

mente recuperar el rol de potencia emergente y volver a liderar el proceso

regional y posicionarse como un actor de relevancia global.

En estos primeros meses del nuevo gobierno -asumido en enero

del 2023- es posible constatar una reorientación de la PEB hacia la región

suramericana. Y aquí tenemos una primera clave; la región para Brasil

es América del Sur y no AL y el Caribe o la subregión. La concepción

suramericana tiene raíces en la historia y se remonta a la política exterior

del Barón de Rio Branco12 así como a las escuelas de pensamiento geopo-

lítico, que desde Itamaraty y desde las Fuerzas Armadas se dedicaron a

reexionar acerca de lo internacional (Soares De Lima, 2013).

Ahora bien, con Lula da Silva América del Sur vuelve a estar en

el centro de las prioridades de la PEB. Durante su discurso de asunción

ante el Congreso Nacional, destacó el énfasis en la integración surame-

ricana desde MERCOSUR, UNASUR y demás instancias de articulación

“soberanas”. A esta fórmula, sobre que el protagonismo brasileño iría de

la mano de la integración suramericana, la repitió en la cumbre de la

CELAC y en los encuentros bilaterales, con Argentina y Uruguay, el re-

ejo del programa de gobierno del PT en las elecciones.

Otra clave para repensar el “retorno de Brasil al mundo” -como ha

dado a llamar el propio Lula- está dada por la autonomía como elemento

que guía los objetivos de esa política exterior. Entendemos que la táctica

adoptada para su consecución -al decir de Cepaluni y Vigevani (2016)- fue

la diversicación13 porque, si bien la integración forma parte del círculo

concéntrico más inmediato, Lula da Silva buscará profundizar sus rela-

ciones con el mundo occidental (Estados Unidos y la Unión Europea);

con los BRICS, y los países del sur global, retomando una tradición de

cooperación -económica, de inversiones y de educación- especialmente

con los países lusófonos -de África, y también de Ásia, como es el caso de

Timor-Leste.

La búsqueda por mayores grados de autonomía, es decir de reducir

los lazos de dependencia con la potencia hegemónica, ha sido un objeti-

vo histórico en la proyección internacional de un Brasil que ha buscado

posicionarse, desde los foros multilaterales, como un líder emergente glo-

bal (Barrenengoa, Barceló, 2021). Al igual que la vocación integracionista,

la autonomía dejó de ser un objetivo durante el gobierno de Bolsonaro,

rompiendo así con décadas de construcción identitaria de la PEB. Por eso,

estamos ante una región que se ha desintegrado y desindustrializado pro-

vocando una considerable disminución del comercio intrarregional. El eje

comercial argentino-brasileño absorbe prácticamente la mitad de dicho

12. Considerado el “patrono de la

diplomacia brasileña”, en su gestión

frente a Itamaraty a inicios del siglo XX,

buscó equilibrio a partir de una alianza

con Estados Unidos y la conformación

de un espacio de paz y de relaciones

privilegiadas con los doce países de

América del Sur.

13. La búsqueda de autonomía en

política exterior ha sido una prioridad

estratégica de los gobiernos de Brasil

desde mediados de la década de 1980,

aunque ha variado en el tiempo (Barce-

ló, Barrenengoa, 2021).

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comercio, y la otra mitad el resto de los países sudamericanos. En este sen-

tido, destacamos lo que fue la alocución de Fernando Haddad, ministro de

Hacienda de Brasil en el Foro Económico Mundial de Davos el 18 enero de

2023. Haddad hizo énfasis en el binomio integración-industrialización para

el desarrollo y el crecimiento de la región, habló de “reservar una parte de

la industria del mundo” para la región. Fue destacada la industria automo-

vilística de “última generación”, los motores híbridos de hidrógeno verde y

la producción de Etanol como ejes centrales para la reindustrialización de

Brasil y el aumento de la cooperación económica en América del Sur.

De manera concomitante Lula da Silva en sus viajes a Uruguay y

Argentina ha dado señales claras acerca de su intención política de reto-

mar el rol del liderazgo brasileño para la integración. Al igual que aquel-

la primera Cumbre de presidentes suramericanos convocada por el en-

tonces presidente Fernando Henrique Cardoso en el año 2000, Lula da

Silva está llevando a cabo una movilización para un “diálogo franco”, en

búsqueda de reactivar la agenda de cooperación sudamericana en áreas

clave como salud, cambio climático, defensa, infraestructura, energía. El

marco en el que hoy Brasil intenta reotar los procesos es una transición

del poder a nivel global, donde avanza la construcción de un mundo mul-

tipolar a partir de distintos indicadores. Uno de ellos es el BRICS Plus,

como hemos comentado antes, en torno a la posibilidad de incorporación

de varios Estados de la región en el BRICS.

En paralelo, se retoma con fuerza una agenda regional, en conso-

nancia con la internacional. Consideramos que esta nos indica las bases

materiales del proceso de integración regional, entre las cuales la plani-

cación conjunta de áreas estratégicas se erige en una variable central.

Ahora bien, estos procesos no están exentos de conictos. El rol que his-

tóricamente Estados Unidos ha tenido en la región viene siendo afectado

por la presencia de China, y el cambio que los distintos Estados sudame-

ricanos han tenido en sus orientaciones de política exterior ante este esce-

nario. Está aún por verse si en el presente escenario global y regional, hay

condiciones para una estrategia conjunta -desde el impulso brasileño de

estos últimos meses- a partir de la cual consolidar las políticas públicas de

integración regional en distintas áreas. La tensión entre el diseño de una

plataforma propia desde un bloque en común, o la subordinación a otros

esquemas -sea Estados Unidos o China- son dos extremos de un problema

común que orienta estas reexiones; cuál es y será, en los próximos años,

el lugar de la región sudamericana en la distribución del mapa del poder

mundial. Y cómo ante dicho panorama, se sostienen los principios de au-

tonomía y soberanía.

Consideraciones ﬁnales

El presente artículo buscó revisar el panorama del comercio intrar-

regional en el período 2012-2020 para problematizar, en el marco de la

transición geopolítica reciente, la situación de fragmentación política y

desintegración regional por la que atraviesa la región mercosureña, re-

sultado de un proceso histórico que no puede explicarse a partir de una

única dimensión.

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las dinámicas de desintegración entre 2012 y 2022: análisis y perspecvas actuales en clave autonomista

En tiempos donde se revitaliza el debate acerca de las relaciones en-

tre Mercosur y otros bloques y/o Estados, se propone una visión a partir

de la integración regional como política pública multidimensional. Es de-

cir, pensamos las relaciones comerciales como parte de una tensión que

atraviesa dos extremos; por un lado, la apertura económica, que ha tenido

un sentido político y geopolítico en nuestra historia, desde los tiempos del

Consenso de Washington hasta los discursos recientes en pos de la “exibi-

lización y apertura”. Por otro lado, la integración regional como llave que

posibilita pensar en un horizonte de mayor autonomía, que se ha trazado

y sostenido históricamente, pero que ha tenido limitaciones. Este sendero

es el que vuelve a proponer el gobierno brasileño en su agenda de política

exterior para con la región, y que aquí recuperamos para pensarlo en su

multidimensionalidad, como apuesta política de participación regional des-

de MERCOSUR como bloque, y no solo en la unilateralidad de cada Estado.

Estos debates son abordados en el marco de considerar el análisis

del comercio del MERCOSUR como parte de un modo de acumulación

que ha polarizado y fragmentado nuestra región. Desde una clave de lec-

tura con base en las teorías autonomistas, observamos a partir del análisis

del comercio de la región entre sí y con China, cómo ha avanzado un pro-

ceso de primarización y desindustrialización, que es previo a la situación

que emerge desde los 2000, donde queda claro el protagonismo chino

en los intercambios comerciales -principalmente en las exportaciones de

MERCOSUR. A la par, los Estados han ido perdiendo cada vez más su

autonomía, soberanía y capacidad de maniobra.

En paralelo, hemos visto cómo los propios sectores industriales de

Brasil y Argentina han sabido aprovechar el comercio intra-MERCOSUR

para instalar sus productos, realidad que se vio modicada en los últi-

mos años junto con el cambio en los gobiernos en ambos países desde

2015-2016. En síntesis, a la par del proceso de desaceleración del comer-

cio intra-MERCOSUR, ha avanzado la fragmentación política regional,

traduciéndose en una mayor desigualdad, que la pandemia ha puesto de

maniesto. Así, el MERCOSUR ha estado expuesto a los vaivenes tanto

de los cambios en el orden político, como geopolítico, oscilando entre la

repetición de las políticas aperturistas y el freno -durante la pandemia- al

proceso de integración regional.

Como corolario, la situación actual pone sobre el tapete un poten-

cial desafío que Brasil está intentando vertebrar: recuperar el ideario in-

tegracionista en un contexto muy diferente a aquel de inicios de siglo, en

pleno boom de los commodities, y con los Estados menos debilitados que

hoy en día. No obstante, el acumulado histórico de los procesos previos

en términos de institucionalidad y gobernanza regional permite pensar

en una plataforma de posibilidades. Los intentos por relanzar la UNASUR

-además de volver a reunir a los presidentes sudamericanos-, fortalecer el

MERCOSUR, y participar de los BRICS son algunas muestras de ello. A

esto se suman las condiciones más generales del escenario geopolítico,

con mayor claridad en torno al declive de Estados Unidos y al liderazgo

chino -no sin consecuencias para nuestra región.

En denitiva, sugerimos pensar el comercio intrarregional

del MERCOSUR como vehículo para fortalecer dicho bloque, y su

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funcionamiento como marco posible de mayor integración, soberanía

y autonomía, en tiempos donde es central mantener posturas comunes

para negociar con China, con Estados Unidos, y poder dialogar desde una

posición común en un contexto geopolítico tan dinámico. Esto signica

aumentar la interdependencia comercial y la integración productiva entre

los miembros del MERCOSUR, evitando que el comercio con China de-

sacelere los vínculos intra región. Para ello es central el trazado de una es-

trategia común referida a recursos y lineamientos estratégicos que China

necesita y que la región tiene, y que puede transformbarrear en manufac-

turas. Y en este marco, poder volver a pensar la integración como política

conjunta de los Estados sudamericanos con sustento material, más allá de

las posiciones ideológicas.

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Ideologia e Instituições Internacionais:

uma nova abordagem (Erik Voeten, 2021)

Ideology and International Institutions: a new approach

(Erik Voeten, 2021)

Ideología e instituciones internacionales: un nuevo

enfoque (Erik Voeten, 2021)

Recebido em:07 de outubro de 2021

Aprovado em: 02 de maio de 2022

Laura Pimentel Barbosa1

DOI: 10.5752/P.2317-773X.2023v11n3p126-130

De modo geral, a literatura em Relações Internacionais ignora o

conceito de ideologia, tratando o tema como de menor relevância no ce-

nário internacional anárquico. No entanto, no decorrer do século XX se

estabeleceu uma ordem internacional que foi capaz de integrar grande

parte dos Estados ao redor de princípios liberais, promovendo a propaga-

ção de regimes de Direitos Humanos, abertura de mercados, e ampliação

dos uxos de capital, pessoas e bens. No entanto, o nal da Guerra Fria

e os novos conitos militarizados, assim como os movimentos naciona-

listas e populistas, têm estimulado a contestação às instituições interna-

cionais sem propostas robustas de como reformá-las, o que estimula o

interesse em entender como essa contestação ideológica afeta a ordem

internacional institucionalizada. Nesse sentido, o mais recente trabalho

de Erik Voeten, “Ideology and International Institutions” (Princeton

University Press, 2021, ainda sem tradução para o Português), oferece

uma contribuição original para analisar a disputa institucional interna-

cional a partir do conceito de ideologia.

Para Voeten, a contestação à ordem liberal tem um elemento ideo-

lógico que não deve ser ignorado. Ou seja, os atores que desaam as or-

ganizações internacionais liberais sustentam mais do que objeções sobre

as consequências materiais, eles têm visões fundamentalmente diferentes

sobre como a sociedade internacional deve ser organizada, e sob quais

princípios (embora nem sempre ofereçam um direcionamento robusto

capaz de formar uma coalizão capaz de avançar uma nova ordem). Nesse

sentido, torna-se importante entender o papel da ideologia na disputa dis-

tributiva internacional. O trabalho de Voeten avança nesse sentido ao de-

senvolver um framework teórico que pode ser usado para analisar como

127

Laura Pimentel Barbosa Ideologia e Instuições Internacionais: uma nova abordagem (Erik Voeten, 2021)

a disputa ideológica afeta a contestação à ordem internacional. O livro

é composto por 10 capítulos, sendo o primeiro a introdução e o último

a conclusão. Nesta resenha, vamos apresentar o trabalho ao público

brasileiro e apontar algumas reexões sobre a abordagem utilizada.

O objetivo do livro é apresentar um framework que nos permita

entender operacionalizar como a contestação ideológica afeta as disputas

distributivas internacionais em diversos temas. Nesse sentido, a aborda-

gem se sustenta no modelo espacial (Downs, 2013 [1957]), muito utiliza-

do na ciência política para entender a disputa política entre partidos no

âmbito doméstico. Para Downs, a ideologia tem um papel importante na

disputa política, principalmente porque ela ajuda a determinar e a comu-

nicar o ponto ideal (o status quo preferível) de cada ator na disputa políti-

ca, por outro lado, a ideologia também ajuda a promover a conança de

comprometimento com uma determinada plataforma política no futuro.

Desse modo, Voeten busca iluminar a disputa ideológica internacional ao

posicionar os Estados em um espaço ideológico unidimensional em que

os atores se movimentam e buscam criar coalizões ao redor de suas ideo-

logias. O primeiro capítulo é uma introdução, dedicado a apresentar o

argumento central do livro, o de que a ideologia está no centro de muitas

disputas distributivas que as organizações e regimes internacionais bus-

cam resolver, e explicar o framework teórico a ser articulado e utilizado.

O segundo e terceiro capítulos se voltam para a questão do concei-

to de ideologia, seu uso na literatura de Relações Internacionais, e como

o autor busca operacionaliza o conceito para análises empíricas. O au-

tor começa com a observação de que o conceito de ideologia é pratica-

mente omitido nos estudos sobre organizações e regimes internacionais,

inclusive pelas abordagens construtivistas, que tendem a se concentrar

em socialização e identidade. O autor examinou os artigos publicados na

prestigiosa revista International Organization entre 1990 e 2016, e obser-

vou que a ampla maioria não utiliza o conceito, ou, quando utiliza, ele

não tem um papel teórico chave. Mesmo onde o conceito aparecia com

destaque, era usado em termos de fonte de autoridade moral, o que não

é exatamente uma denição adequada de ideologia (embora ela possa ter

essa função). Nesse sentido, a contestação ideológica e seus efeitos na or-

dem internacional não são bem compreendidos pela literatura.

Ideologia aqui é denida de modo conciso: um conjunto articulado

de ideias, coeso e estável, que dene como o mundo é, como deve ser,

quais os principais problemas a serem resolvidos, e como. Nesse sentido,

ideologia é extremamente útil para transmitir informações e estabelecer

conança, pois os outros atores conseguem entender quais os principais

comprometimentos de outro em temas importantes, da forma semelhan-

do como opera na relação entre os partidos e eleitores na política domés-

tica. Além disso, ideologia, pelo seu caráter normativo, tem implicações

distributivas, e, portanto, é importante fonte de conito, por isso deve ser

levada em consideração ao se analisar as contestações à ordem internacio-

nal institucionalizada.

O autor então segue para a sua proposta de como operacionalizar

o conceito de ideologia. Para medir as posições ideológicas dos Estados,

o autor pensa a disputa política internacional num espaço ideológico

128

estudos internacionais • Belo Horizonte, ISSN 2317-773X, v. 11, n. 3, (out. 2023), p. 126-130

unidimensional1 em que os atores se posicionam em diferentes pontos

e buscam atrair os outros para o mais próximo possível de seu ponto

ideal. O posicionamento dos Estados é estimado a partir das votações na

Assembleia Geral da ONU desde a sua criação até 2016. Portanto, o autor

não está interessado em denir o conteúdo das ideologias, apenas em po-

sicionar os estados num espaço ideológico.2 O autor escolhe os votos na

AGU porque o caráter não vinculativo das decisões da Assembleia permi-

te com que observemos o posicionamento dos Estados de um modo mais

sincero do ponto de vista ideológico.3

O quarto capítulo retoma as abordagens na literatura focadas na

interdependência, e busca demonstrar a relação entre interdependência

e ideologia na constituição de organizações internacionais. Para o autor,

devemos levar em consideração que a interdependência afeta a determi-

nação dos pontos ideais dos atores no espaço ideológico, uma vez que esse

posicionamento é sempre interrelacional. Quando os Estados têm alta in-

terdependência, essa condição geralmente implica em instituições menos

intrusivas e mais técnicas, por outro lado, a criação de instituições entre

um conjunto de Estados afeta a utilidade (ganhos ou perdas) de outros

Estados, que podem, por sua vez, se afastar dessas instituições por não

se sentirem representados nas mesmas. Nesse sentido, a criação de uma

ordem institucionalizada pode ser considerada como uma nova fonte de

conito, não só material, mas também ideológico.

O quinto capítulo é dedicado justamente a entender como as ins-

tituições podem gerar novos conitos, e como a ideologia adentra nesse

problema. Nesse momento, o autor aponta para um ponto importante, a

relação entre conança nos experts e conito ideológico. De modo geral,

a literatura aborda as instituições internacionais como fontes de informa-

ção (cientíca, técnica e legal), e que seu papel em produzir e transmitir

informação legitima parte de sua autoridade. No entanto, essa perspecti-

va pode estar defasada. Muito da informação que as organizações inter-

nacionais produzem e disseminam não necessariamente estariam fora de

alcance de muitos Estados; por outro lado, é a apresentação e interpreta-

ção da informação o principal papel de muitas organizações internacio-

nais, e, nesse aspecto, a ideologia está presente.

Nesse sentido, as organizações internacionais podem estimular o

conito ideológico entre aqueles que concordam ou não com a interpre-

tação e propostas dessas mesmas organizações. Uma vez que os Estados

que nanciam e emprestam grande parte de experts para compor o cor-

po burocrático de uma instituição tem interesse em mover o status quo

para seu ponto ideal no espaço ideológico, e que a principal forma como

essas instituições funcionam é coordenando, compartilhando, e, princi-

palmente, promovendo uma determinada interpretação da informação,

num cenário heterogêneo, até as organizações mais técnicas se tornam

parte da disputa ideológica.

Nesse ponto, o autor nos apresenta um problema cada vez mais

familiar, a crescente desconança em relação à expertise em meio ao con-

ito ideológico. O autor demonstra que esse processo está em curso em

relação às organizações internacionais da mesma forma que no espaço

doméstico, e como as percepções de imparcialidade são vulneráveis

1. Importante lembrar que houve um

período, em meados da Guerra Fria, que

essa disputa foi multidimensional, em

que as disputas dos países do Norte

e Sul se interrelacionavam com as

disputas Leste-Oeste, mas, de modo

geral, é possível pensar a disputa

ideológica como unidimensional. Essa

forma de estimar os pontos ideais se

assemelha ao modo como analistas de

política doméstica se utilizam dos votos

congressuais para estimar o posicio-

namento dos incumbentes em diversas

votações o que ajuda a observar o

processo de polarização política.

2. A abordagem é semelhante ao índice

NOMINATE conforme foi desenvolvido

por Poole e Rosenthau, (1984).

3. Por exemplo, apesar de a Arábia

Saudita ser rival do Irã e grande aliada

dos Estados Unidos, a similaridade dos

votos da Arábia Saudita com o Irã na

AGU historicamente é muito maior do

que em comparação com os Estados

Unidos, (Voeten, p. 30).

129

Laura Pimentel Barbosa Ideologia e Instuições Internacionais: uma nova abordagem (Erik Voeten, 2021)

a essas disputas. No caso do sistema internacional, a ordem criada no

pós-Segunda Guerra, amplamente liberal, faz com que a forma como a

informação seja interpretada se dê no âmbito dessa ideologia, e, num cená-

rio de disputa ideológica, esse fato dá aos oponentes do liberalismo razões

para acusar de parcialidade os experts e as decisões dessas instituições.

O capítulo sexto é dedicado a entender como a ideologia molda as

decisões dos Estados de participar ou não das instituições internacionais.

O autor demonstra que as mudanças nos posicionamentos ideológicos

dos Estados, medidos desde o nal do século XIX até 2016, estão associa-

dos com os padrões de associação às organizações internacionais. O au-

tor observa que o padrão de associação se tornou mais heterogêneo após

a Guerra Fria, quando passamos a observar mais pontos ideais onde se

formam conjuntos de países em organizações diversas (ou seja, o padrão

de associação próximo ao ponto ideal estadunidense ou soviético não se

observa mais). Esses padrões se mantem mesmo quando controlamos por

fatores como democracia, relações econômicas e proximidade territorial.

Assim, podemos observar o quanto a decisão por se associar a organiza-

ções internacionais, assim como assinar tratados, reete divisões ideoló-

gicas, e não apenas interdependência econômica, proximidade territorial

e semelhança no sistema político (democracia). Obviamente, essa é uma

análise descritiva, mas os resultados nos ajudam a observar como a ideo-

logia pode estar em jogo, operando como um mecanismo que organiza a

institucionalidade internacional.

Os capítulos 7, 8 e 9 são empíricos, nos quais o autor emprega seu

framework para entender o papel da ideologia em três importantes te-

mas: conitos militarizados, disputas econômicas, e a ascensão do po-

pulismo. Em relação aos conitos militarizados, uma vez que o autor

observa como o avanço da institucionalização facilita a cooperação en-

tre atores ideologicamente próximos, mas intensica o vão em relação

às partes excluídas (capítulo 4), ca a questão de se as distâncias entre os

pontos ideais dos Estados organizados em instituições internacionais se

correlacionam com os conitos. O autor observa, a partir de sua análise

de regressão com base na base de dados “Correlates of war”,4 com dados

referentes aos conitos militarizados desde 1880 a 2010, que a formação

de instituições intensica as tensões com países menos alinhados com

os princípios ideológicos que guiam tais instituições, por outro lado, os

conitos se reduzem entre Estados que estão associados às mesmas or-

ganizações (muito embora essa correlação não se sustente entre Estados

contíguos com disputas territoriais). Essa é outra análise descritiva, mas

o fato de a análise ter controlado por interdependência econômica e sis-

tema político fortalece a tese do autor de que um mecanismo ideológico

pode estar em atuação nesses casos.

No que se refere ao regime de investimentos, essa correlação ideo-

lógica é ainda mais evidente. O autor observa que a contestação ideológica

afeta diretamente a forma como se estabeleceu, principalmente por par-

te dos Estados Unidos, o regime de proteção aos investimentos interna-

cionais. Mudanças no posicionamento ideológico dos países no decorrer

do século XX alteraram profundamente seu posicionamento em relação

à proteção ao investimento estrangeiro, o que levou países capitalistas,

4. Disponível em : <https://correlateso-

fwar.org/data-sets/COW-war/dyadic-in-

ter-state-war-dataset-1>. Acesso em 30

de setembro, 2021.

130

estudos internacionais • Belo Horizonte, ISSN 2317-773X, v. 11, n. 3, (out. 2023), p. 126-130

principalmente os Estados Unidos, a recorrerem cada vez mais aos acor-

dos bilaterais para protegerem seus investimentos e investidores. No en-

tanto, quando se refere a países ideologicamente próximos a seu ponto

ideal, os EUA mantiveram acordos com base nos regimes existentes, sem

mais mecanismos de proteção. A questão da conança que a ideologia

promove pode estar em atuação nesse caso.

O capítulo nono é o mais qualitativo do trabalho, onde o autor se

sustenta principalmente nas análises de discurso para entender como o

populismo afeta a ordem internacional liberal. Para isso, o autor se utiliza

especialmente dos discursos de líderes populistas em relação às cortes in-

ternacionais. As cortes internacionais são uma boa representação da pro-

pagação de valores da ordem internacional, e por isso são alvos de líderes

populistas que buscam minar a legitimidade dessas instituições. O autor

empresta a denição de populismo feita por Cas Mudde: “populismo é

uma ideologia na que considera a sociedade como, no limite, separada

em dois grupos homogêneos e antagônicos, o povo puro e a elite cor-

rupta, e que argumenta que a política deve ser expressão da vontade do

povo” (Voeten, 2021, p. 148); nesse capítulo, o autor cita como exemplos

de líderes populistas Victor Orbán, Nicolás Maduro e Jair Bolsonaro.

O populismo, por sua oposição aos direitos das minorias, contes-

tações a princípios democráticos e ênfase nacionalista, é uma resposta

iliberal. No capítulo 5, vimos como a função de interpretar é um papel

fundamental das organizações internacionais, nesse sentido, as cortes são

ainda mais explicitamente interpretativas, tornando-as alvos fáceis aos

populistas. A vantagem da análise do autor é que ele nos oferece uma

forma de operacionalizar a ideia de backlash às organizações internacio-

nais; 1) trata-se de backlash quando há tentativa de reduzir a autoridade da

corte da corte, quando for possível, ou 2) quando um país se retira da ju-

risdição de determinada organização ou corte, como o caso da Venezuela

ao se retirar da Corte Interamericana de Direitos Humanos. O autor se

baseia em 28 casos que se enquadram em uma ou duas dessas formas de

operacionalizar a oposição populista às cortes e analisa os discursos dos

líderes. A partir de sua análise qualitativa o autor indica que os populis-

tas se colocam (e, consequentemente, o hipotético povo puro que dizem

representar), como as reais vítimas das cortes internacionais. Por outro

lado, de uma perspectiva populista, as cortes falham em reetir a voz do

povo pelo seu caráter contra majoritário, nesse sentido, a crítica se esten-

de às cortes domésticas; as duas ideias operam juntas.

No limite, o grande risco da crítica populista às cortes internacio-

nais, e à ordem internacional liberal em sentido amplo, é o fato de não

apresentar uma proposta, seja para reformar ou para criar uma ordem

que a substitua. A consequência é uma contínua deterioração da ordem

institucional internacional, levando a novos problemas de barganha e ne-

gociação, afetando também a proteção aos direitos das minorias, princi-

palmente por meio dos direitos de propriedade violados, além de outras

implicações. A grande contribuição do trabalho ao dar foco aos movimen-

tos populistas é chamar a atenção dos analistas de relações internacionais

para a importância de se observar a política doméstica para entender os

movimentos dos atores no plano internacional contemporâneo.

131

Laura Pimentel Barbosa Ideologia e Instuições Internacionais: uma nova abordagem (Erik Voeten, 2021)

De modo geral, o trabalho de Voetel é inovador ao colocar o concei-

to de ideologia no centro da análise, algo pouco comum na literatura de

Relações Internacionais, e o faz com base numa abordagem consistente e

gerenciável, a partir da análise espacial clássica, muito comum na Ciência

Política, e desenvolvendo uma medida para identicar a polarização, de-

senvolvida a partir dos votos dos Estados na Assembleia Geral da ONU

– uma espécie de índice NOMINATE, utilizado para medir a polarização

política doméstica conforme desenvolvido por Rosenthal e Poole. Nesse

sentido, o autor oferece a analistas interessados em entender como a ideo-

logia afeta as disputas distributivas uma forma original de trabalharem

o conceito. Os estudos empíricos apresentados mostram como podemos

aplicar esse framework, e deram indicações, a partir de correlações in-

teressantes, de como a ideologia pode estar agindo na estruturação dos

conitos nas organizações internacionais.

Por outro lado, o trabalho não adentra numa análise na dos me-

canismos pelos quais a ideologia atua. Ou seja, observamos correlações

entre a polarização ideológica e as disputas observadas nas áreas apre-

sentadas pelo autor, mas é preciso análises mais aprofundadas para en-

tender como a ideologia atua para direcionar os Estados a uma ou outra

direção, isso implica em os analistas darem atenção à política doméstica

e sua interrelação com o cenário internacional, e entender as fontes da

contestação ideológica que estimulam a polarização política. Por exemplo,

a contestação ideológica pode ser estimulada por ideias sobre qual o papel

do Estado na economia, também é possível que o caráter não democrá-

tico das organizações seja outra fonte de disputas ideológicas (essa espe-

cialmente pelos movimentos populistas), ou, ainda, a nível internacional,

a ascensão de novas potências, que não compartilham de valores liberais,

pode estimular um debate ideológico. No limite, ca a reexão sobre o

que pode signicar um cenário internacional onde o multilateralismo se

deteriora e as instituições internacionais perdem relevância, num cenário

em que o posicionamento antiliberal, populista e nacionalista, avança em

diversos países.

REFERÊNCIAS

DOWNS, Anthony. Uma teoria econômica da democracia. São Paulo: Ed. USP, 2013.

POOLE, Keith T., ROSENTHAL, Howard. The Polarization of American Politics. Journal of Politics.

vol. 46, No. 4, 1984.

VOETEN, Erik. Ideology and International Institutions. Princeton: Princeton University Press,

2021.