estudos internacionais • Belo Horizonte, ISSN 2317-773X, v. 12, n. 3, (dez. 2024), p. 7-29

China’s leadership in BRICS+: driving

change in the Global South

El liderazgo de China en los BRICS+: impulsando el cambio

en el Sur Global

A liderança da China no BRICS+: impulsionar a mudança

no Sul Global

Waldimeiry Correa da Silva1

Daniel Romera Mejías2

Enviado em: 26 de setembro de 2024

Aceito em: 19 de março de 2025

ABSTRACT

This article examines China’s consolidation of leadership within BRICS+,

highlighting its historical evolution and key strategies that have enabled it to

assume a leading role. The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) is analyzed as a crucial

example of China’s projection of economic and political power, signicantly

strengthening its inuence in the Global South. Through a literature review, the

article explores the internal dynamics of BRICS+ and how the Asian country

has eectively aligned its interests with those of other member states, promo-

ting economic cooperation and sustainable development through institutions

such as the New Development Bank (NDB). The analysis of Chinese leadership

not only addresses criticisms of potential economic neocolonialism but also

emphasizes its role in seeking a new world order that is more favorable for

emerging economies. By advancing multilateralism and greater equity in global

governance, China’s leadership within BRICS+ represents both a signicant

challenge and an opportunity for the existing international system.

KEYWORDS: China; BRICS+; Leadership; Belt and Road Initiative; Global

South

RESUMEN

Este artículo examina la consolidación del liderazgo de China dentro de los

BRICS+, destacando su evolución histórica y las estrategias clave que le han

permitido asumir un papel de liderazgo. La Iniciativa de la Franja y la Ruta (BRI,

por sus siglas en inglés) es analizada como un ejemplo crucial de la proyección

de poder económico y político de China, fortaleciendo signicativamente su

inuencia en el Sur Global. A través de una revisión de la literatura, el artículo

explora la dinámica interna de los BRICS+ y cómo el país asiático ha armoniza-

do con ecacia sus intereses con los de otros estados miembros, promoviendo la

cooperación económica y el desarrollo sostenible a través de instituciones como

el Nuevo Banco de Desarrollo (NDB). El análisis del liderazgo chino no solo

1. Distinguished researcher/Associate

professor at the Department of Inter-

national Public Law and International

Relations of the University of Seville.

ORCID: 0000-0002-1863-8454. This

study is part of the research results in

the framework of the project, in which

the two researchers are part of: Conso-

lidación Investigadora (Ref.CNS2023-

144884) funded by Agencia Estatal de

Investigación (AEI).

2. Contract researcher at the Depart-

ment of International Public Law and

International Relations of the University

of Seville. ORCID: 0009-0008-8284-

4851.

Waldimeiry Correa da Silva, Daniel Romera Mejías China’s leadership in BRICS+: driving change in the Global South

aborda las críticas a un posible neocolonialismo económico, sino que tambi-

én enfatiza su papel en la búsqueda de un nuevo orden mundial que sea más

favorable para las economías emergentes. Al promover el multilateralismo y

una mayor equidad en la gobernanza global, el liderazgo de China dentro de los

BRICS+ representa tanto un desafío signicativo como una oportunidad para el

sistema internacional actual.

PALABRAS CLAVE: China; BRICS+; Liderazgo; Iniciativa de la Franja y la

Ruta; Sur Global

RESUMO

Este artigo examina a consolidação da liderança da China no seio dos BRICS+,

destacando a sua evolução histórica e as principais estratégias que lhe permi-

tiram assumir um papel de liderança. A Iniciativa do Cinturão e Rota (BRI) é

analisada como um exemplo crucial da projeção do poder económico e político

da China, reforçando signicativamente a sua inuência no Sul Global. Através

de uma revisão da literatura, o artigo explora as dinâmicas internas do BRICS+

e a forma como o país asiático tem alinhado ecazmente os seus interesses

com os dos restantes Estados membros, promovendo a cooperação económica

e o desenvolvimento sustentável através de instituições como o Novo Banco

de Desenvolvimento (NDB). A análise da liderança chinesa não só aborda as

críticas de um potencial neocolonialismo económico, como também enfatiza o

seu papel na procura de uma nova ordem mundial mais favorável às economias

emergentes. Ao promover o multilateralismo e uma maior equidade na gover-

nação global, a liderança da China nos BRICS+ representa um desao signica-

tivo e uma oportunidade para o atual sistema internacional.

PALAVRAS CHAVE: China; BRICS+; Liderança; Iniciativa do Cinturão e Rota;

Sul Global

1 INTRODUCTION

China’s leadership in the BRICS+3 has been the subject of nu-

merous academic studies and political analyses. Previous research has

highlighted China’s ability to use its economic and diplomatic inuence

to consolidate its position within the group and promote a cooperation

and development agenda (Breslin, 2013). However, criticism has also been

raised about the implications of this leadership, suggesting that it may re-

present a new form of economic colonialism (Antiwi-Boateng, 2017). This

paper aims to contribute to this discussion by providing a detailed and

up-to-date analysis of the evolution of Chinese leadership in the BRICS+

and its impact on the Global South.

The creation of the BRICS+ has represented a signicant shift in

the global order, providing a platform for cooperation among emerging

economies seeking to counter the hegemony of developed economies

(Cooper, 2017). Since its inception, China has played a crucial role in the

formation and consolidation of this group, leveraging its economic gro-

wth and political inuence to establish itself as a leader within the bloc.

Various studies have explored how China has used its economic power

and investment capacity to strengthen its position, highlighting the role

of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) as a key tool in its expansion strategy

(Lipscy, 2017).

3. The BRICS+ is an expansion of the

original BRICS group, which includes

Brazil, Russia, India, China and South

Africa. This expansion involves the

inclusion of other countries and organi-

zations in the region where the BRICS

summit is held, as well as the potential

addition of new members. The BRICS+

format is seen as a way to enhance the

international inﬂuence of the BRICS and

create new global governance platforms

(LISSOVOLIK, 2024). This expansion

reﬂects the rise of emerging powers

and the transformation of the global

economic framework (MERINO, 2024).

However, there is a need for increased

interaction and cooperation among the

BRICS economies (BAUMANN, 2009).

estudos internacionais • Belo Horizonte, ISSN 2317-773X, v. 12, n. 3, (dez. 2024), p. 30-50

The Belt and Road Initiative4 has been widely analyzed in academic

literature as an example of China’s power projection (Baik, 2019). This

initiative not only seeks to improve connectivity and trade between Asia,

Europe and Africa, but also strengthens China’s inuence in the Global

South (Gulseven, 2022). Through this initiative, China has been able to

consolidate strategic alliances and expand its economic and political in-

uence, promoting infrastructure projects that benet emerging econo-

mies and strengthen its position on the global stage (ECONOMY, 2018).

Moreover, the creation of institutions such as the New Development

Bank5 (NDB) and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank6 (AIIB)

has been central to China’s strategy to consolidate its leadership in the

BRICS+. These nancial institutions not only provide an alternati-

ve to traditional Western institutions such as the World Bank and the

International Monetary Fund7 (IMF), but also promote economic coo-

peration and sustainable development among BRICS+ members and

other countries in the Global South (Morton, 2016). The literature has

highlighted how these institutions have enabled the Asian country to po-

sition itself as an advocate of multilateralism and a promoter of a new,

more equitable world order.

However, not all is positive in the analysis of China’s leadership.

Many critics argue that China’s strategy represents a new form of eco-

nomic colonialism (Antiwi-Boateng, 2017). Through its investments and

infrastructure projects, China has been accused of creating economic and

political dependence in recipient countries, which has led to debates over

the true intentions of its leadership in the BRICS+. These critics point

out that, while China promotes greater representation of emerging eco-

nomies, its strategy may be more focused on expanding its own inuen-

ce and control at the expense of other countries’ sovereignty (Hurley;

Morris; Portelance, 2019).

This article is part of this academic discussion, providing a com-

prehensive analysis of China’s leadership in the BRICS+ and its impact on

the Global South. In order to address the objectives of this paper, a me-

thodology based on literature review and documentary analysis will be

employed. Primary and secondary sources will be examined, including

academic articles, reports from international institutions, ocial spee-

ches and case studies. The literature review will identify and synthesize

the main academic contributions on the topic, while the documentary

analysis will provide a broader historical and political context.

The methodological approach will focus on the identication

and analysis of patterns and trends in the participation of the People’s

Republic of China in the BRICS+, as well as on the assessment of its im-

pact on the Global South. Special attention will be paid to the projects

and strategies implemented by the Asian country in the framework of

the Belt and Road Initiative, as well as to the creation and functioning of

the aforementioned nancial institutions. The documentary analysis will

include the review of speeches and ocial statements by Chinese leaders

and other BRICS+ members, as well as reports by international organi-

zations and think tanks.

In order to provide a balanced and well-grounded view of the power

4. The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI),

also known as the New Silk Road, is an

ambitious infrastructure and develo-

pment project launched by China in

2013, aiming to revitalize the old trade

routes connecting Asia, Europe and

Africa. promoting regional integration

and globalization (GULUZIAN, 2017).

Although it presents great economic and

trade opportunities, it faces signiﬁcant

challenges in terms of local sustainabi-

lity and structural barriers. In addition,

the initiative is a key strategic tool for

China, designed to increase its global

inﬂuence and promote a multipolar

world order (LEVERETT; BINGBING,

2017).

5. The New Development Bank (NDB)

is a ﬁnancial institution created by the

BRICS countries to address the lack of

infrastructure ﬁnancing and give deve-

loping countries a greater role in the

global ﬁnancial system (LATINO, 2017).

Although it follows a similar model

to that of other development banks, it

seeks to differentiate itself through coo-

peration with other ﬁnancial institutions

and a focus on sustainable ﬁnancing.

Despite the challenges, the NDB has

the potential to become an important

tool to encourage investments in large

development projects and strengthen

economic and trade ties among member

countries (WANG, 2019).

6. The Asian Infrastructure Investment

Bank (AIIB) is a multilateral ﬁnancial

institution created to address infras-

tructure needs in Asia and promote

sustainable economic development. Its

creation reﬂects both China’s frustration

with the existing international ﬁnancial

architecture and its ambition to play a

more prominent role in global economic

governance (MORRIS, 2020). AIIB has

introduced innovations in its governance

structure and adopted practices from

existing development banks to ensure

its legitimacy. The international accep-

tance of the AIIB and its ability to form

cooperative partnerships underscore its

signiﬁcant impact on geopolitics and

global governance (WILSON, 2019).

7. The International Monetary Fund was

established to encourage global mone-

tary cooperation and maintain foreign

exchange stability, aiming to support

international trade, high employment

rates, real income growth and the deve-

lopment of productive resources among

all its member countries. However its

credibility and effectiveness are at

stake due to its governance structure,

ideological bias and insufﬁcient reform

efforts (TORRES, 2007).

Waldimeiry Correa da Silva, Daniel Romera Mejías China’s leadership in BRICS+: driving change in the Global South

dynamics in the BRICS+ and the implications of China’s leadership for

the future of the global order, this article is structured in ve main sec-

tions. The rst section presents the consolidation of China’s leadership

in the BRICS+, analyzing the historical evolution of its participation and

the key milestones that accompany it. The second section explores the

dierent types of leadership exercised by China, in light of Correa’s classi-

cation (Correa da Silva, 2022). It continues with an analysis of the impact

of the Belt and Road Initiative on Chinese leadership in the framework of

BRICS+ and the Global South.

Fourth, it assesses the impact of China’s leadership in the Global

South and examines the criticisms it has received, analyzing its promo-

tion of the redenition of international norms and its promotion of a mul-

tipolar world order that challenges Western hegemony. Finally, the fth

and last section presents the article’s conclusions, synthesizing the main

ndings and reecting on the future of the People’s Republic of China’s

leadership in the BRICS+ and its role in shaping a new world order more

favorable to the interests of the Global South.

2 THE CONSOLIDATION OF CHINA’S LEADERSHIP OF THE BRICS+

Beijing’s leadership within BRICS+ cannot be fully understood wi-

thout rst analyzing its relationship with the Global South. The concept of

the “Global South”8 has been the subject of extensive debate, and its appli-

cation to China raises both theoretical and practical questions (Barany,

2024; Murphy, 2022). Traditionally, the term has been used to refer to

middle- and low-income countries with historical trajectories marked by

colonialism, economic dependency, and structural inequality within the

international system (Levander; Mignolo, 2011). However, China’s gro-

wing inuence has challenged its classication within this framework.

From a postcolonial perspective, the Global South encompasses

nations that have historically been marginalized within the Western-

led world order and seek alternatives to the economic and political rules

imposed by the neoliberal capitalist system (Levander; Mignolo, 2011;

Mignolo, 2011). In the case of China, the country continues to identify it-

self as part of the Global South for both historical and discursive reasons,

grounding this claim in its experience of Western colonial intervention

during the “Century of Humiliation” (Char, 2024). Additionally, despite

being the world’s second-largest economy in nominal GDP terms, China

has a relatively low GDP per capita compared to economies of the Global

North, with many regions still facing challenges related to uneven deve-

lopment (Freeman, 2024). The creation of nancial institutions such as

the AIIB and the NDB also reects its ambition to reshape the Western-

dominated global nancial architecture.

However, despite its self-identication with the Global South, some

scholars argue that China has surpassed this status due to its immense

economic and military power, high degree of industrialization, and lea-

dership in advanced technologies, placing it in direct competition with

traditional global powers (Taylor; Cheng, 2022). Furthermore, critics con-

tend that its infrastructure investments and loan strategies in the Global

8. The term has evolved from a purely

geographical notion into a political and

economic category. Modern conceptu-

alization acknowledges that divisions

are not exclusively spatial but rather

reﬂect structural inequalities in terms of

market access, ﬁnancing, technological

development, and political power within

global institutions (MIGNOLO, 2011). In

any case, this conception is not homo-

geneous: some Global South countries

are emerging economies with signiﬁcant

geopolitical inﬂuence, while others lack

the structural power to shape global

affairs.

estudos internacionais • Belo Horizonte, ISSN 2317-773X, v. 12, n. 3, (dez. 2024), p. 30-50

South reect neocolonial tendencies, creating new forms of dependency

(Chellaney, 2017). While internal inequalities persist, China’s rapid deve-

lopment and signicant poverty reduction eorts set it apart from other

developing economies. This debate reects a broader reality regarding

the evolution of the international system. Although China has beneted

from the rhetoric of South-South solidarity, its economic and geopolitical

strength places it in an intermediary category between traditional glo-

bal powers and developing nations. In many ways, China can be seen

as a “hybrid actor”: on the one hand, it actively promotes the recon-

guration of the global order in favor of emerging economies, while on

the other, it has developed economic and political capabilities that distin-

guish it signicantly from other members of the Global South (Eisenman;

Heginbotham, 2019; Sutter, 2023).

This dual positioning has been key to its rise within BRICS+, whe-

re it has carefully balanced its identity as an emerging economy with its

growing inuence as a global power. China’s rise as a leader within the

BRICS+ has been a gradual and strategic process that has unfolded over

two decades, from the creation of the BRIC Forum in 2006 to its assump-

tion of the presidency of the group for the second time in 2021. Along the

way, China has implemented a series of carefully planned actions that

have allowed it to consolidate its leadership position and become a key

player on the global stage. Three distinct periods can be identied:

2.1 Origins and rst steps (2006-2010): laying the groundwork for South-

-South cooperation

The BRIC Forum, created in 2006, emerged as a response to the

lack of representation of emerging economies in Western-dominated in-

ternational institutions. Initially composed of Brazil, Russia, India and

China, the group sought to promote cooperation among these nations

and strengthen their positions on the global stage (Cooper, 2016). The

term “BRIC” was coined by economist Jim O’Neill in 2001, in a Goldman

Sachs report that highlighted the growing economic weight of Brazil,

Russia, India and China in the world economy. Although the group had

no formal structure at the time, China’s inclusion in this category was

signicant, as the country accounted for a large share of global economic

growth (Cheng, 2015).

The Asian country was experiencing rapid economic growth and

was becoming a world power in terms of production, trade and nancial

reserves. This economic rise sparked the interest of other emerging eco-

nomies that shared similar characteristics in terms of population size,

natural resources and growth potential (Abdenur, 2014). In this context,

emerging economies sought a greater voice and participation in global

decision-making. The BRIC Forum became an important platform for

dialogue and cooperation among the four emerging economies, laying

the groundwork for greater collaboration in various areas such as trade,

investment and technology.

Waldimeiry Correa da Silva, Daniel Romera Mejías China’s leadership in BRICS+: driving change in the Global South

2.2 Consolidating China’s leadership (2011-2021): a strategic approach to

consolidating inuence

Starting in 2011, China began to implement concrete actions

to consolidate its leadership within BRICS+. The establishment of the

BRICS NDB in the same year marked a crucial milestone, followed by the

creation of the AIIB in 2016 (Iqbal; Rahman; Rahman, 2020). The BRICS

Development Bank was born as an alternative to international nancial

institutions, such as the World Bank and the IMF, criticized for their lack

of representativeness and their pro-developed country policies.

China created the NDB with the aim of responding to the needs

of emerging economies, promoting South-South cooperation and chal-

lenging Western dominance in the international nancial system (Iqbal;

Rahman; Rahman, 2020). The NDB became an important source of -

nancing for development projects in countries of the Global South, rein-

forcing China’s economic inuence within BRICS+ by establishing itself

as the institution’s main investor.

China sought to complement the NDB with a multilateral nancial

institution focused on Asia, the region of greatest strategic interest to the

country. The AIIB was created with the aim of nancing infrastructure

projects in Asia, promoting regional development, strengthening China’s

economic inuence in the region and challenging the dominance of the

US-led Asian Development Bank9 (ADB). The AIIB has become an im-

portant source of nancing for infrastructure projects in Asia, competing

directly with the ADB and increasing China’s economic inuence in the

region (Mahmood et al., 2022).

In 2021, China assumed the BRICS+ presidency for the second time,

reecting its growing leadership within the group. Under the Chinese

presidency, the group is committed to promoting South-South coopera-

tion, upholding multilateralism, strengthening BRICS+ as a platform for

dialogue and collaboration among emerging economies and contributing

to building a fairer and more equitable international order (Cooper, 2017).

The historical evolution of China’s participation in the BRICS+ has been

marked by a clear and consistent strategy: consolidating its leadership po-

sition through economic power, political inuence and the ability to oer

solutions to the problems of the Global South. The BRI, the NBD and the

AIIB are tangible examples of this strategy, which has enabled China to

position itself as a global leader in the current landscape.

2.3 New challenges and issues (2022-today): membership enlargement and

the Chinese slowdown

While China’s chairmanship in 2021 marked an important miles-

tone in its leadership of the bloc, the evolution of the group and China’s

inuence does not stop there. From 2022 onwards, there are some ele-

ments that could characterize a third phase in China’s participation in

BRICS+. August 2023 sees the addition of new members, including Saudi

Arabia, Egypt, Indonesia, the United Arab Emirates and others, opening

up the possibility of BRICS+ becoming a more heterogeneous platform

9. The Asian Development Bank is a

key institution in promoting econo-

mic and social development in Asia

and the Paciﬁc. Since its founding in

1966, it has grown in membership and

capital, playing a crucial role in regional

cooperation and economic development

(NAKAO, 2017). The United States

has had considerable inﬂuence on the

formation and structure of the ADB,

using the bank to expand its economic

and political inﬂuence in the region

(DUTT, 2001).

estudos internacionais • Belo Horizonte, ISSN 2317-773X, v. 12, n. 3, (dez. 2024), p. 30-50

with more diverse interests and priorities. This could dilute China’s rela-

tive inuence within the group (Cochrane; Zaidan, 2024).

This period saw the consolidation of China’s agenda, exemplied

by the promotion of the Global Security Initiative proposed by the cou-

ntry as an alternative to the international order led by the United States.

This initiative is based on six fundamental principles, including a vision

of common, cooperative, comprehensive and sustainable security, res-

pect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all countries and the

peaceful resolution of disputes through dialogue and dispute (Cochrane;

Zaidan, 2024). Similarly, it emphasizes the importance of environmental

sustainability and climate change while advancing digital cooperation

and the development of information and communication technologies

(Al-Aiban, 2024)

In addition to the aforementioned, other challenges that the Asian

power would have to face in this new stage of the bloc include the eect

that geopolitical tensions and rivalries between the great powers could

have on the cohesion and functioning of the group. Similarly, China’s

economic slowdown and rising domestic debt could limit its capacity to

nance projects and initiatives within the group, putting pressure on its

leadership, while criticism of the lack of transparency and accountability

in some of the projects launched could increase.

Despite skepticism about the eectiveness of BRICS+, Western po-

wers are stepping up their engagement eorts, recognizing the group’s

growing importance. However, underlying strategic divergences persist

among member states, reecting a nuanced interplay of geopolitical am-

bitions and development imperatives. Amidst these complexities, howe-

ver, common ground is found in addressing pressing global challenges,

especially in reforming nancial architectures (Darnal et al., 2023).

3 THE DIFFERENT TYPES OF CHINESE LEADERSHIP IN THE BRICS+

The rise of the People’s Republic of China as a global power has

had a signicant impact on the geopolitical landscape, including its role

within the group that this article reviews. In order to understand the

power’s leadership in this context, it is useful to analyze it through the

dierent models of international leadership set out by professor Correa

(Correa da Silva, 2022): hierarchical, functional, relational, discursive and

critical.

First, the hierarchical or structural model is based on the idea that

international leadership is determined by a state’s position of power in the

international system. States with greater economic, military or political

power have a greater ability to inuence other states and set the interna-

tional agenda (Helms apud Correa, 2022). This approach is commonly as-

sociated with realist international relations theory and hegemonic theory.

From this hierarchical or structural perspective, China’s leadership

in the BRICS+ is based on its growing economic and military power.

China is the largest economy in the group and possesses signicant mili-

tary muscle, which gives it a considerable position of inuence. In turn,

it has used its economic power to drive infrastructure and development

Waldimeiry Correa da Silva, Daniel Romera Mejías China’s leadership in BRICS+: driving change in the Global South

projects in other BRICS+ countries, increasing their economic interde-

pendence and strengthening its leadership position. However, this hie-

rarchical approach has also generated some criticism, as some BRICS+

members might perceive China’s inuence as excessive or overbearing,

even more so when it has some open confrontations over territorial dis-

putes, as might be the case with India, with the recent border skirmishes

that erupted between the two countries in May 2020.

Functional leadership, also referred to as behavioral leadership,

focuses on the actions and roles that leaders play in international pro-

blem solving. Eective leaders are thus those who can identify problems,

propose solutions, mobilize resources and build consensus among states

(Keohane 2010, apud Correa, 2022). This approach is associated with ins-

titutional liberalism and global governance theory.

Following this model, China has demonstrated eective functional

leadership in the BRICS+ by proposing initiatives and solutions to com-

mon problems faced by member countries. A notable example is the crea-

tion of the NDB, a multilateral nancial institution driven by China to

support infrastructure and development projects in emerging countries,

as we have noted above. China has also played an active role in promo-

ting South-South cooperation and defending the interests of developing

countries in international fora.

Third, we nd relational leadership. This model emphasizes the

importance of relationships and networks among international actors for

leadership, which is not exercised exclusively by a state with power but

arises from interaction and cooperation among multiple actors (Uhl-Bien

2011, apud Correa, 2022). Thus, this approach highlights the divergence

between leadership and hegemony, arguing that the former is also capab-

le of directing the achievement of goals without relying exclusively on

traditional power to achieve the goals of dierent actors (Clark 2011, apud

Correa, 2022). Relational leadership is associated with constructivism and

actor-network theory.

The People’s Republic of China has cultivated close relations with

the other BRICS+ countries through bilateral and multilateral dialogue

and cooperation mechanisms. The BRICS+ Leaders’ Forum has become

an important platform for the exchange of ideas and policy coordination

among the members of the group. China has also established bilateral

cooperation agreements with each of the countries that make up the bloc,

covering diverse areas such as trade, investment, technology and culture.

Fourth, we nd the discursive leadership model. This highlights

the role of language and communication in the exercise of international

leadership. It states that eective leaders are those who can use language

to persuade, inspire and legitimize their worldview (Nabers, 2008, apud

Correa, 2022). This model understands that “leadership is conditioned

by structures and process, given that the environment in which leader-

ship unfolds is both material and ideational” (Correa da Silva, 2022). This

approach is often associated with constructivism and discourse theory.

Following the discursive model, China has used discourse to ar-

ticulate a worldview that resonates with the BRICS+ countries, empha-

sizing the importance of multilateralism, South-South cooperation and

estudos internacionais • Belo Horizonte, ISSN 2317-773X, v. 12, n. 3, (dez. 2024), p. 30-50

sustainable development. The concept of the Belt and Road Initiative

(commonly referred to in academia as the New Silk Road) is presented as

a global vision that promotes connectivity, trade and development bet-

ween Asia, Europe and Africa, resonating with the BRICS+ countries.

China has also used its inuence in the media to promote its narra-

tive and position itself as a responsible global leader. There are multiple

examples to support this claim: China has an extensive and well-funded

state media network, such as CCTV and Xinhua, which broadcast glo-

bally in multiple languages and disseminate the Chinese government’s

ocial narrative (Lu; Xu, 2020). Similarly, China has invested signicantly

in foreign media, acquiring shares and entering into strategic alliances10 .

Finally, we nd the critical leadership model. This challenges the

idea that international leadership is always positive or benecial. It points

out that leadership can be used to promote hegemonic interests and

maintain unjust power structures. In this way, “leadership is associated

with the international organic elite, whose function is to forge consen-

sus through coordination, organization and monitoring of shared goals”

(Correa da Silva, 2022). This approach is associated with critical studies

and post-colonial theory.

Some critics of Beijing’s leadership in BRICS+ argue that it is based

on hegemonic interests and promotes a model of globalization that essen-

tially benets China (Antwi-Boateng, 2017). They point out that China

has used its economic power to pressure other countries in the bloc to

adopt its policies and priorities, while criticizing the lack of transparen-

cy and accountability in the institutions led by the People’s Republic of

China, such as the NDB.

The ve models of international leadership presented here oer dif-

ferent perspectives on the nature and exercise of leadership in the global

arena. It is important to understand these dierent approaches in order to

critically analyze the leadership roles assumed by states and other actors

in the international arena. Thus, in the case at hand, China’s leadership

in the BRICS+ is complex and multifaceted. Chinese leadership can be

analyzed from dierent perspectives, each of which oers a partial un-

derstanding of the phenomenon.

4 THE MAIN STRATEGIES OF BEIJING TO CONSOLIDATE ITS POWER

IN THE BRICS+

4.1 The Belt and Road Initiative as a pillar of China’s leadership in

BRICS+

China has consolidated its leadership within BRICS+ not only due

to its economic power but also through strategies that strengthen its in-

uence in the Global South. The Belt and Road Initiative has been a key

component of this strategy, allowing China to project its development

model in BRICS+ member countries (Nascimento; Maynetto, 2019). Since

its launch in 2013, the BRI has facilitated investments in infrastructure,

trade, and economic integration, reinforcing these countries’ interdepen-

dence with China and expanding its diplomatic reach. This initiative has

10. Studies show how the most impor-

tant Chinese companies have a strategic

intention when taking acquisition

decisions in Europe and other parts of

the world. The ﬁnal strategic objective

is to obtain sustainable competitive

advantages by transforming into a

global player, once a national player

(RUI; YIP, 2008).

Waldimeiry Correa da Silva, Daniel Romera Mejías China’s leadership in BRICS+: driving change in the Global South

not only fostered growth in recipient countries but has also positioned

China as the main driver of a multipolar economic order (Petry, 2023).

Through the BRI, China has linked its leadership within BRICS+ to

the expansion of its trade and nancial networks. Institutions such as the

NDB and the AIIB have provided alternative nancing to member coun-

tries, reducing their dependence on Western organizations such as the IMF

(Mahmood et al., 2022). However, this leadership is not without challenges:

while countries like Russia and South Africa have supported the BRI, others,

such as India and Brazil11 , have expressed reservations about the risks of

economic dependence and the lack of transparency in projects funded by

China. Their governments also fear that the BRI could reinforce China’s

hegemony at the expense of a more balanced leadership within the group.

The People’s Republic has repeatedly presented the Belt and Road

Initiative as an opportunity for the countries of the bloc to cooperate

on infrastructure and development projects that benet all members of

the group (Bandeira; Tsiropoulos, 2020). China has used its leadership

position to promote its project within BRICS+ and secure the partici-

pation of other member countries. This has allowed the Asian country

to strengthen its economic and political ties with the countries in the

group, increasing its inuence in the Global South and on the global stage

(Hillman, 2020).

The New Silk Road has signicantly boosted the construction of

infrastructure in the bloc’s member countries, including roads, railways

and ports. In the rst case, the Chinese project has nanced the cons-

truction of thousands of kilometers of new roads in countries such as

India, Brazil and Russia, improving regional connectivity and facilitating

the transport of goods and people (De Soyres; Mulabdic; Ruta, 2020). A

notable example is the so-called Middle Corridor (ocially known as the

Trans-Caspian International Transport Route or TITR), which connects

China to Europe via Central Asia and Russia (Hussain, 2021).

Similarly, the initiative has enabled the construction of new high-

-speed rail lines in countries such as Brazil and South Africa, reducing

travel times and increasing the eciency of rail transport (Liu; Dunford,

2016). The Musina-Makhado Special Economic Zone in South Africa and

Zimbabwe is a good example of China’s important role in the country.

Funded by the China Development Bank and built by the China Railway

Construction Corporation, a railway facilitates the transport of goods

between the two countries (Bond, 2021).

For its part, the Belt and Road Initiative has facilitated trade bet-

ween China and BRICS+ members through reduced transportation costs,

increased connectivity or the promotion of trade agreements, which has

allowed bilateral trade to grow (Deepak, 2018). The construction of in-

frastructure has not infrequently been conditional on the promotion of

trade agreements, reducing taris and facilitating the ow of goods and

services. The New Silk Road has facilitated and improved the connecti-

vity of the People’s Republic with the countries of the bloc, opening new

trade routes and facilitating access to new markets (ECONOMY, 2018).

An example of this is the momentum seen in bilateral trade bet-

ween China and India, which has reduced taris for trade in goods and

11. India has been particularly critical,

arguing that the Chinese project ignores

sovereignty concerns and represents a

model of geopolitical expansion disgui-

sed as economic cooperation (AHAMED;

RAHMAN, 2020). Brazil, mainly during

the government of Jair Bolsonaro, said

that the country should avoid excessive

dependence on foreign investments that

do not favor the development of its own

infrastructure (BARRUCHO, 2023).

estudos internacionais • Belo Horizonte, ISSN 2317-773X, v. 12, n. 3, (dez. 2024), p. 30-50

services between the two countries. Bilateral trade has grown considera-

bly in this time, from $10 billion in 2001 to $132 billion in 202312 (Haidar,

2024). Similarly, bilateral trade between South Africa and the People’s

Republic has settled down in recent years, with taris eliminated on a

wide range of products traded between the two powers (Bond, 2021). In

this case, trade between the two powers has grown from $6.2 billion in

2001 to $75 billion in 2021.

The People’s Republic has simultaneously made signicant invest-

ments in key sectors of the BRICS+ economies under the New Silk Road,

including energy projects in countries such as Brazil, Russia and South

Africa to secure the energy supply of their growing economies, the cons-

truction of telecommunications networks or the creation of industrial

zones to promote technology transfer and job creation (Zhang; Zhang;

Xiao, 2022). In manufacturing, the creation of the Sino-Brazilian indus-

trial zone in Manaus, which is home to more than 60 Chinese companies,

stands out (Brito, 2017).

All of the above-mentioned projects, funded under China’s Belt and

Road Initiative, have boosted South-South cooperation in various areas.

The BRI has facilitated platforms for the exchange of experiences and

best practices in various elds, such as science, technology, sustainable

development and governance (Visvizi; Lytras; Jin, 2020). Similarly, China

has implemented scholarship and training programs for professionals

from the BRICS+ countries, with the aim of strengthening their skills

and knowledge in areas relevant to the New Silk Road (Zhang; Zhang;

Xiao, 2022). Collaboration in research and development projects has been

a key element of China’s South-South cooperation (Vadell; Brutto; Leite,

2020).

Finally, the BRI has led to the creation of new cooperation mecha-

nisms between China and the countries of the bloc, such as the AIIB and

the NDB. These multilateral nancial institutions provide nancial su-

pport and technical assistance for infrastructure and development pro-

jects in the region, fostering collaboration and joint investment and will

be discussed later (Wang, 2019). The People’s Republic of China’s Belt

and Road Initiative has brought with it a multitude of possibilities for

the BRICS+ countries, promoting not only infrastructure development,

but also trade, investment and South-South cooperation (Cooper, 2017).

However, the Chinese project is not without its challenges and criticisms,

which must be taken into consideration to ensure its long-term sustaina-

bility and benets.

One of the main challenges of the initiative is the increase in debt

in some of the bloc’s countries, especially those with less developed eco-

nomies, what has been called as “debt-trap diplomacy” (Chellaney, 2017).

Chinese loans to nance infrastructure projects have signicantly in-

creased the external debt of these countries, which could generate pro-

blems of nancial sustainability in the future and grant Beijing leverage

over their economy and political decisions (Bagwandeen, 2022). A case in

point is the aforementioned rail project, “China is a major foreign nance

provider for African railway systems, focusing on the needs of recipient

countries but also commercial interests play a role in this allocation to

12. However, the high trade deﬁcits,

the unequal structure of exports and

imports, closed markets, high tariff

and non-tariff barriers and India’s trade

dependence on China hamper effective

trade development (GALISTCHEVA;

RESHCHIKOVA, 2022).

Waldimeiry Correa da Silva, Daniel Romera Mejías China’s leadership in BRICS+: driving change in the Global South

complement World Bank funding and ll the nancing gap in the sector”

(Marson; Maggi; Scacchi, 2021).

This critique has been particularly relevant in Africa and Asia, whe-

re several countries have accumulated signicant debt to nance large-s-

cale infrastructure projects under China’s Belt and Road Initiative. The

case of Sri Lanka’s Hambantota Port is often cited as the most prominent

example of debt-trap diplomacy. In 2017, Sri Lanka, unable to meet its

debt obligations, granted China a 99-year lease on the strategically lo-

cated port (Abi-Habib, 2018). This fueled concerns that China was using

infrastructure investment as a tool for geopolitical expansion, securing

key assets in developing nations under the guise of economic cooperation

(Hewamanne, 2023).

The lack of transparency in project selection, loan terms and the

use of funds has led to doubts and criticism of the initiative. At the

same time, concerns are growing over the environmental impact of

projects funded under the New Silk Road. Deforestation, destruction

of natural habitats and water pollution are some of the problems that

critics regularly point to (Tracy et al., 2017). For example, the construc-

tion of the Belo Monte hydroelectric project in the Brazilian Amazon

rainforest, which is estimated to have led to the deforestation of 40,000

hectares of rainforest, the destruction of natural habitats and the displa-

cement of indigenous communities (Fearnside, 2006). Critics argue that

China’s extensive investment in natural resource extraction, particu-

larly in Africa and Latin America, mirrors historical patterns of econo-

mic exploitation where raw materials are extracted from developing na-

tions while high-value manufacturing remains concentrated in China

(Antwi-Boateng, 2017).

Finally, numerous Chinese aid projects have failed due to the lack

of communication between the Asian country and the direct recipients

of the investments, with the former being unaware of the latter’s true

needs (Diakite, 2023). For the Chinese project to have a more eective

and transformative impact on the Global South, it is necessary to involve

the beneciaries directly in the design and implementation of the pro-

jects, “going beyond rhetoric to integrate practices and create interven-

tion models that focus on the needs of the direct beneciaries” (Diakite

2023: 100).

The Belt and Road Initiative has been a central component of

China’s leadership within BRICS+ and has had a signicant impact on

the relations and development of the group’s member countries. The

initiative has enabled the People’s Republic to strengthen its economic

and political ties with the countries of the bloc, increasing its inuence

and leadership within the bloc, as well as on the global stage, facili-

tating cooperation and development in the countries of the bloc (Liu;

Dunford, 2016). Through infrastructure investments and trade promo-

tion, China has increased its inuence in the Global South. However,

to maintain its leadership and ensure long-term benets, China must

address the challenges and criticisms associated with the project by pro-

moting greater transparency, nancial sustainability and environmen-

tal responsibility.

estudos internacionais • Belo Horizonte, ISSN 2317-773X, v. 12, n. 3, (dez. 2024), p. 30-50

4.2 China’s global initiatives: A new model for development and security?

Chinese leadership has become particularly evident over the past

decade, as China has adopted a stance as a “norm entrepreneur”, seeking

to redene the rules of the global system through its own proposals and

institutional structures (Kewalramani, 2024). In this context, three initia-

tives promoted by Xi Jinping —the Global Development Initiative (GDI),

the Global Security Initiative (GSI), and the Global Civilization Initiative

(GCI)— have served as pillars for consolidating Chinese leadership within

BRICS+ and the Global South. These initiatives not only seek to expand

China’s inuence but also oer an alternative to Western-dominated nor-

ms and institutions, promoting an order more aligned with the interests

of developing countries.

The GDI, introduced in 2021, has been China’s vehicle for positio-

ning itself as a key player in global development, oering nancing and

technical cooperation in areas such as infrastructure, poverty reduction,

and digital development. This initiative has helped strengthen economic

interdependence among BRICS+ members, promoting a growth model

based on South-South cooperation. However, it has also raised concerns

in countries such as Brazil and India, where there are fears that Chinese

nancing could translate into economic dependence, limiting the auto-

nomy of recipient nations (Cochrane; Zaidan, 2024).

In the realm of security, the GSI, announced in 2022, aims to esta-

blish an alternative security framework that rejects the mentality of mili-

tary blocs and interference in the internal aairs of states. Unlike the GDI,

which operates through mechanisms like the “Group of Friends,” the GSI

lacks a formal coordination structure, with China instead emphasizing

that over ninety countries and organizations have expressed “apprecia-

tion and support” for the initiative (Kewalramani, 2024). This absence of

an institutionalized mechanism appears to be both a deliberate eort to

avoid the optics of bloc politics and a reection of developing countries’

hesitations toward fully committing to Beijing’s vision (Yip, 2024).

Finally, the GCI, introduced in 2023, reinforces China’s narrative

of a multipolar world where civilizations should coexist without external

impositions of values or political models. China argues that cultural di-

versity should be a pillar of the international order, challenging the uni-

versality of Western democratic values and promoting a more relativistic

approach to human rights and governance. This initiative has been well

received by countries such as Russia and South Africa, while Brazil has

shown some ambivalence, suggesting that the GCI could be used as a soft

power tool to legitimize China’s political model within the Global South

(Kewalramani, 2024).

5 REDEFINING THE WORLD ORDER UNDER CHINESE LEADERSHIP IN

THE GLOBAL SOUTH

China’s rise as a global power has led to a signicant reconguration

of international norms and the balance of power in the system. Within the

BRICS+ framework, China has played a key role in promoting a multipolar

Waldimeiry Correa da Silva, Daniel Romera Mejías China’s leadership in BRICS+: driving change in the Global South

world order and challenging Western hegemony. China’s leadership in re-

dening international norms has been evident on several fronts.

China has played an active and signicant role in reshaping inter-

national nancial institutions, advocating reforms that better reect the

economic weight of emerging economies, particularly the BRICS coun-

tries. This eort has been an integral part of China’s strategy to balance

power in global economic governance and promote a more multipolar

world order (Morozkina, 2015). The IMF has been one of the main insti-

tutions in which the power has sought to implement reforms (Mahmood

et al., 2022).

The People’s Republic has strongly advocated for a realignment of

quotas and voting rights in the IMF to more fairly reect the economic

importance of the BRICS+ countries and other emerging economies.

These eorts have led to some changes, such as the 2010 quota reform,

which slightly increased the representation of emerging economies

(Cooper, 2017). In addition to the quota adjustment, China has pushed for

reforms in IMF governance to give emerging economies a stronger voice

in decision-making, including greater representation of these countries at

the highest levels of management (Dixon, 2015).

Recognizing the limitations and resistance to reform in existing

institutions, China has led the way in creating new international nancial

institutions to serve as alternatives to those dominated by the West. At

this point it is relevant to highlight the NDB, established in 2014 by the

BRICS countries (prior to their expansion) with the aim of creating a -

nancial institution that would oer fairer and more equitable alternatives

to those dominated by the West (Wang, 2019).

Thus, the countries of the bloc played an essential role in shaping

and launching the NDB, contributing seed capital and participating in the

governance of the institution (Cooper, 2017). However, China’s leader-

ship has been particularly prominent, reecting its economic capacity, its

strategic interest in fostering South-South cooperation and its ability to

inuence the agenda of the rest of the countries in the group (Abdenur,

2014). China’s leadership is not only manifested in its nancial contribu-

tion to the NDB, which is crucial for the bank’s start-up and operation,

but also in terms of governance and leadership.

In these terms, the People’s Republic has secured an inuential po-

sition within the NDB, which established its headquarters in Shanghai.

Furthermore, China has promoted governance principles that emphasize

equity, inclusiveness and consensus- based decision-making, seeking to

dierentiate itself from the more hierarchical practices of Western ins-

titutions (Morozkina, 2015). Moreover, China’s strategic vision for the

NDB aligns with its Belt and Road Initiative, seeking synergies between

bank-funded projects and the BRI’s global connectivity and development

goals (Bandiera; Tsiropoulos, 2020). Unlike traditional nancial institu-

tions such as the IMF or the World Bank, the NDB focuses on nancing

infrastructure and sustainable development projects with more exible

lending conditions, without limiting the economic sovereignty of reci-

pient countries (Morozkina, 2015). While it is not exempt from certain

conditions and criteria for project approval, these tend to be less intrusive

estudos internacionais • Belo Horizonte, ISSN 2317-773X, v. 12, n. 3, (dez. 2024), p. 30-50

and less geared towards structural reforms that could limit such sovereig-

nty (Dixon, 2015).

While the NDB is still a relatively young institution, it has gai-

ned popularity among countries in the Global South, having approved

more than 200 loans totaling more than $80 billion across a wide range

of sectors (Dixon, 2015). Similarly, the bank has expanded its membership

beyond the BRICS countries to include Egypt, Uruguay and Bangladesh.

China has been the strongest advocate for expanding the NDB. However,

this push has met resistance, particularly from India and Brazil, which

fear that expansion could increase China’s inuence within the bank

and shift its governance structure in Beijing’s favor. India has been espe-

cially wary, opposing attempts to link NDB nancing with China’s BRI

and resisting Beijing’s eorts to integrate the bank into the Multilateral

Cooperation Center for Development Finance (MCDF)13 . Despite these

concerns, China successfully secured a majority vote to align the NDB

with the MCDF, highlighting both Beijing’s strategic maneuvering and

the internal fractures within BRICS+ (Zhu, 2024). Additionally, Russia,

initially reluctant about expansion, has come to see it as a way to main-

tain nancial stability amid Western sanctions, underscoring the geopo-

litical stakes of the NDB’s evolution.

Beyond geopolitical rivalries, China views NDB expansion as a way

to counterbalance Western nancial inuence while ensuring the bank’s

long-term viability. The NDB operates under an equal contribution-e-

qual voice model, limiting China’s unilateral control, but by incorpora-

ting new members, Beijing aims to dilute internal opposition from cou-

ntries like India while broadening the bank’s funding base (Zhu, 2024).

However, this raises concerns about governance eciency, as a more

diverse membership could complicate decision-making and reduce the

institution’s responsiveness to nancial crises. Ultimately, the NDB’s ex-

pansion reects the broader tension within BRICS+: China’s ambition to

lead a new global nancial order versus the need to maintain a balanced,

consensus-driven institution (Zhu, 2024). This expansion takes part of a

wider process of empowerment of the emerging economies in the inter-

national arena that can be analyzed from several perspectives:

First, there is a redistribution of economic and nancial power with

the creation of new institutions, such as the NDB and the AIIB, as alter-

natives to traditional institutions such as the IMF and the World Bank.

Secondly, infrastructure projects are essential for sustainable economic

growth. However, high costs and lack of access to favorable nancing

have hindered progress in many regions (Wang, 2019). In this regard, the

NDB and AIIB has provided loans with more exible and favorable terms,

accelerating infrastructure development in countries in the Global South

and improving regional and global connectivity (Cooper, 2017).

The empowerment of emerging economies is also manifested in

the promotion of South-South cooperation. In contrast to North-South

cooperation, which is often characterized by asymmetric power rela-

tions and dependence, South-South cooperation can also be seen in the

promotion of South-South cooperation (Abdenur, 2014). South-South

cooperation seeks to adopt an approach based on equality and mutual

13. The MCDF is considered a BRI-rela-

ted multilateral ﬁnancing platform, so

India opposed efforts to link NDB ﬁnan-

cing with BRI-related projects, seeing

this as an attempt by Beijing to use the

bank as an extension of its geoeconomic

strategy.

Waldimeiry Correa da Silva, Daniel Romera Mejías China’s leadership in BRICS+: driving change in the Global South

benet, providing platforms for developing countries to work together.

This cooperation in turn strengthens solidarity among developing coun-

tries, enabling them to address common challenges and seize collective

opportunities.

However, China’s growing inuence in the Global South has not

been without controversy. In addition of the debt-trap diplomacy and

neocolonial economic practices accusations aforementioned, another per-

sistent criticism of China’s leadership in the Global South is its perceived

role in reinforcing authoritarian governance. Scholars argue that China’s

economic model, which combines state capitalism with strict political

control, serves as an attractive alternative for authoritarian and hybrid

regimes seeking to consolidate power while maintaining economic gro-

wth (Lagerkvist, 2021). This so-called “Beijing Consensus” contrasts with

the Western model of democracy promotion and market liberalization,

emphasizing state-led development, non-interference in domestic aairs,

and political stability over democratic governance. However, defenders

of China’s engagement argue that its policies reect a commitment to

sovereignty and non-intervention rather than an ideological push for au-

thoritarianism (Carmody; Taylor; Zajontz, 2022).

China’s leadership in reshaping the global order, particularly wi-

thin the Global South, can be further understood through the framework

of moral realism, as developed by Xuetong (2024). This theory challen-

ges purely systemic explanations of international change by emphasi-

zing the decisive role of leadership and its perceived moral legitimacy.

Unlike Western-dominated institutions that often impose conditionali-

ties, China presents itself as a leader committed to equity and inclusi-

veness, particularly through institutions like the NDB. However, moral

realism also highlights that leadership is not just about material power

but about gaining acceptance from other actors. While China has succes-

sfully positioned itself as an alternative leader in global governance, its

expanding inuence has sparked resistance, particularly within BRICS+,

where India and Brazil have expressed concerns over China’s growing

role. This tension underscores a fundamental challenge in redening the

world order: achieving legitimacy and strategic credibility in a multipolar

system (Xuetong, 2024).

6 CONCLUSIONS

China has consolidated its leadership in the BRICS+ through a

gradual and strategic process that spans from the creation of the BRIC

Forum in 2006 to its chairmanship in 2021. This leadership has been built

on planned actions that have strengthened its position on the global sta-

ge. Central to this consolidation has been the implementation of the Belt

and Road Initiative, which has promoted connectivity and development

in the Global South.

In the realm of BRICS+ internal dynamics, China has played a cru-

cial role in harmonizing interests within the group. Using the Belt and

Road Initiative, it has been able to consolidate its inuence, facilitating

collaboration on infrastructure and development projects that benet

estudos internacionais • Belo Horizonte, ISSN 2317-773X, v. 12, n. 3, (dez. 2024), p. 30-50

member countries. In addition, the creation of institutions such as the

NDB and the AIIB has been instrumental in supporting these projects

and strengthening China’s position in the group.

Beijing’s leadership in BRICS+ is multifaceted, encompassing va-

rious models of international leadership. Hierarchically, China’s econo-

mic and military power provides signicant inuence, though this do-

minance can be contentious. Functionally, China has driven key initia-

tives like the NDB, promoting South-South cooperation. Relationally,

China has fostered strong bilateral and multilateral ties within BRICS+.

Discursively, China eectively uses language and media to promote its

vision of multilateralism. Critically, some argue China’s leadership serves

its hegemonic interests, raising concerns about transparency and accoun-

tability. Each model oers a unique perspective, collectively providing a

comprehensive understanding of China’s complex role in BRICS+.

The impact of Chinese leadership in the Global South has been

signicant, promoting the redenition of international norms and foste-

ring a multipolar world order that challenges Western hegemony. This

approach has found resonance with many countries in the Global South

seeking greater representation and voice in global aairs. However,

China’s strategy has not been without its critics. Some argue that Chinese

investments and infrastructure projects create economic and political de-

pendence, which could be seen as a new form of economic colonialism.

These critics highlight the need for transparency and accountability in

Chinese-led initiatives.

Looking ahead, China’s leadership in the BRICS+ presents both

challenges and opportunities. The expansion of its economic and poli-

tical inuence may lead to a greater balance of power, but it also raises

questions about the long-term intentions and eects of its strategy. China

promotes a model of globalization that seeks to be inclusive and bene-

cial to emerging economies, although the sustainability of this model

will depend on its ability to balance its own interests with those of the

other countries in the group.

The long-term vision of China’s leadership in BRICS+ focuses on

strengthening multilateralism and South-South cooperation. China aspi-

res to a world order where emerging economies play a more prominent

role and can inuence global decisions more equitably. The emphasis on

sustainable development and global connectivity suggests that China will

continue to promote projects that not only benet its BRICS+ partners,

but also contribute to global economic and social development.

Ultimately, the People’s Republic of China’s leadership of BRICS+

and its promotion of the Belt and Road Initiative reect its vision of a

more equitable and multipolar world order. By challenging Western he-

gemony and advocating for greater representation of emerging econo-

mies in international institutions, China seeks to reshape the global sys-

tem to be more favorable to the interests of the Global South. The New

Silk Road is a manifestation of this strategy, using China’s economic and

diplomatic power to promote a new world order.

Waldimeiry Correa da Silva, Daniel Romera Mejías China’s leadership in BRICS+: driving change in the Global South

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