Tran Xuan Hiep, Le Hoang Kiet, Phan Thi Hai Yen A políca de olhar para o leste da Índia: o papel fundamental do Vietnã em meio à inuência regional crescente da China

A política de olhar para o leste da Índia:

o papel fundamental do Vietnã em meio à

inﬂuência regional crescente da China

India’s look east policy: Vietnam’s pivotal role amidst

China’s rising regional inﬂuence

Política de mirada al este de la India: el poderoso papel de

Vietnam en medio de la creciente inﬂuencia regional de

China

Tran Xuan Hiep1

Le Hoang Kiet2

Phan Thi Hai Yen3

Enviado: Novembro de 2024

Aceito em: 30 de Abril de 2025

RESUMO

Índia e Vietnã estabeleceram uma Parceria Estratégica Abrangente em 2016.

Ambos os países são pilares importantes nas políticas e estratégias regionais

e globais um do outro. Em particular, o Vietnã desempenha um papel muito

signicativo na Política de Ação para o Leste da Índia desde seu anúncio pelo

Primeiro Ministro Narendra Modi em 2014. Este artigo utiliza principalmente

métodos de análise qualitativa por meio de fontes de dados secundárias para es-

clarecer a posição e o papel do Vietnã na Política de Ação para o Leste da Índia

diante dos desaos da China. Os resultados mostram que a Índia está aprimo-

rando a cooperação em defesa, segurança e econômico-comercial com o Vietnã

para consolidar a parceria estratégica e limitar a inuência da China no país. A

análise destaca a importância estratégica do Vietnã para abordar os interesses

econômicos e de segurança da Índia na região do Mar da China Meridional, ao

mesmo tempo em que contrabalança a crescente assertividade da China. O estu-

do conclui que o Vietnã desempenha um papel crucial na Política de Ação para

o Leste da Índia, ajudando a Índia a aprimorar sua presença marítima, integra-

ção econômica e cooperação em segurança na região Indo-Pacíco.

Palavras-chave: Índia. Vietnã. China. Política do Leste Asiático. Sudeste Asiático.

ABSTRACT

India and Vietnam established a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership in 2016.

Both countries are important pillars in each other’s regional and global policies

and strategies. In particular, Vietnam plays a very signicant role in India’s Act

East Policy since its announcement by Prime Minister Narendra Modi in 2014.

This paper mainly utilizes qualitative analysis methods through secondary

data sources to clarify Vietnam’s position and role in India’s Act East Policy in

1. The University of Da Nang, University

of Science and Education, Vietnam.

https://orcid.org/0000-0002-5236-993X

2. Yersin University, Vietnam. https://

orcid.org/0009-0002-9968-1952

3. Van Hien University, Vietnam. https://

orcid.org/0009-0000-0004-2778

estudos internacionais • Belo Horizonte, ISSN 2317-773X, v. 12, n. 3, (dez. 2024), p. 51-73

the face of challenges from China. The results show that India is enhancing

defense-security and economic-trade cooperation with Vietnam to consolidate

the strategic partnership and limit China’s inuence in the country. The analysis

highlights Vietnam’s strategic importance in addressing India’s security and eco-

nomic interests in the South China Sea region, while counterbalancing China’s

growing assertiveness. The study concludes that Vietnam plays a crucial role in

India’s Act East Policy, helping India enhance its maritime presence, economic

integration, and security cooperation in the Indo-Pacic region.

Keywords: India. Vietnam. China. Act East Policy. Southeast Asia.

RESUMEN

India y Vietnam establecieron una Asociación Estratégica Integral en 2016.

Ambos países son pilares importantes en las políticas y estrategias regionales y

globales de cada uno. En particular, Vietnam desempeña un papel muy signi-

cativo en la Política de Actuar hacia el Este de la India desde su anuncio por el

Primer Ministro Narendra Modi en 2014. Este documento utiliza principalmen-

te métodos de análisis cualitativos a través de fuentes de datos secundarios para

aclarar la posición y el papel de Vietnam en la Política de Actuar hacia el Este de

la India frente a los desafíos de China. Los resultados muestran que India está

mejorando la cooperación en materia de defensa, seguridad y economía-comer-

cio con Vietnam para consolidar la asociación estratégica y limitar la inuencia

de China en el país. El análisis destaca la importancia estratégica de Vietnam

para abordar los intereses económicos y de seguridad de la India en la región del

Mar de China Meridional, al tiempo que contrarresta la creciente asertividad de

China. El estudio concluye que Vietnam desempeña un papel crucial en la Políti-

ca de Actuar hacia el Este de la India, ayudando a la India a mejorar su presencia

marítima, la integración económica y la cooperación en materia de seguridad en

la región del Indo-Pacíco.

Palavras-chave: India. Vietnam. China. Política de Actuar hacia el Este. Sudeste

Asiático.

1 INTRODUCTION

The Indo-Pacic region is undergoing profound and complex trans-

formations due to the intensifying strategic competition among major

powers. Within this context, the rivalry between India and China has

emerged as one of the most signicant dynamics—second only to the

U.S.-China competition in terms of scale and inuence (Kiet & Tuyen,

2023). This competition is particularly pronounced in Southeast Asia, a

region comprising some of the most dynamic emerging economies of the

21st century (Saha, 2022). As two rising powers with global ambitions,

India and China are actively reshaping the political and security architec-

ture of the region.

According to the International Monetary Fund (IMF, 2024), both

India and China rank among the fastest-growing economies in the

world, with India’s GDP reaching USD 3.75 trillion and China’s GDP

reaching USD 17.52 trillion. These economic projections indicate sus-

tained growth for both nations throughout the 21st century. However,

bilateral relations between India and China remain fraught with his-

torical tensions, particularly unresolved border disputes and security

concerns regarding water resources linked to the Tibetan Plateau (Kiet,

Tran Xuan Hiep, Le Hoang Kiet, Phan Thi Hai Yen A políca de olhar para o leste da Índia: o papel fundamental do Vietnã em meio à inuência regional crescente da China

2023). A core cause of their divergent strategic perspectives is the pro-

longed border dispute. The 1962 Sino-Indian War and subsequent skir-

mishes have left deep scars and mutual distrust. Areas such as Aksai

Chin and Arunachal Pradesh continue to be ashpoints in the bilate-

ral relationship (Walker, 2025). These strategic dierences often stem

from how each country perceives its historical and cultural position in

the region. For instance, China views Tibet as an inseparable part of

its territory, while India maintains historical and cultural ties to the re-

gion. India and China also dier signicantly in their relationships with

neighboring countries. India is often regarded as a democratic power in

South Asia, whereas China exerts stronger economic inuence across

many regions. These enduring tensions, coupled with geographic proxi-

mity and competing great power ambitions, have led the two countries

into a persistent cycle of strategic rivalry.

Against this backdrop, India–Vietnam relations have become in-

creasingly signicant, particularly within the framework of India’s Act

East Policy (AEP). This article seeks to examine Vietnam’s strategic role in

supporting India’s eorts to respond to the China challenge in Southeast

Asia. The India–China strategic rivalry is not limited to Southeast Asia

but is also deeply embedded in bilateral history and regional dynamics in

South Asia. This study is grounded in the theoretical traditions of neorea-

lism and complex interdependence, providing a dual lens to understand

the evolution of India’s regional strategy and its implications for India–

Vietnam relations.

From a neorealist perspective, states are primarily concerned with

survival and relative power in an anarchic international system (Waltz,

1979). In this context, India’s transition from the Look East Policy (LEP)

to the Act East Policy (AEP) can be interpreted as a strategic response to

the growing inuence of China in the Indo-Pacic region, particularly in

Southeast Asia. Neorealism explains India’s increasing alignment with

Vietnam as part of a broader balancing strategy aimed at countering

China’s assertiveness and preserving a favorable balance of power in the

region.

Simultaneously, the framework of complex interdependence

(Keohane & Nye, 1977) oers a complementary approach that acknow-

ledges the growing importance of economic, institutional, and strategic

linkages between states. The deepening of India–Vietnam cooperation

in trade, defense, and multilateral engagement through ASEAN-led me-

chanisms reects a shift towards more diversied and institutionalized

forms of interaction. In this view, India’s strategic interests are not only

shaped by hard power calculations but also by the need to embed itself in

regional economic and diplomatic networks to enhance its inuence and

resilience.

By integrating these two perspectives, this study seeks to capture

the dynamic interplay between traditional power politics and the increa-

singly interconnected nature of contemporary international relations in

the Indo-Pacic. This theoretical framework enables a more nuanced un-

derstanding of India’s evolving regional posture and the strategic role of

Vietnam within it.

estudos internacionais • Belo Horizonte, ISSN 2317-773X, v. 12, n. 3, (dez. 2024), p. 51-73

India’s contemporary strategy toward Southeast Asia is articu-

lated through the Act East Policy (AEP), introduced by Prime Minister

Narendra Modi in 2014. The AEP marks a shift from the earlier Look East

Policy (LEP), reecting a more proactive and multidimensional approa-

ch to regional engagement. Within this strategic framework, Vietnam

plays a pivotal role, particularly in enhancing India’s economic and se-

curity cooperation with ASEAN. Complementary policies such as the

Indo-Pacic Strategy and the Indo-Pacic Oceans Initiative should also

be considered (Cuong & Linh, 2023).

This study examines the strategic evolution from India’s Look East

Policy (LEP) to the Act East Policy (AEP) and how this policy shift has

shaped India’s defense, security, and economic cooperation with Vietnam.

The central research question guiding this inquiry is: “how does the tran-

sition from India’s Look East Policy (LEP) to the Act East Policy (AEP)

reect the country’s evolving strategic interests in Southeast Asia, and

in what ways has this shift inuenced India–Vietnam cooperation in de-

fense, security, and trade in response to regional dynamics, particularly

China’s assertiveness?”

By integrating historical analysis with contemporary develop-

ments, this study explores Vietnam’s role as a strategic partner and an

enabling factor in advancing India’s long-term objectives in Southeast

Asia and the broader Indo-Pacic region.

2 OVERVIEW OF THE HISTORY AND CIRCUMSTANCES BEHIND INDIA’S LEP

By the late 1990s, China had openly expanded its sphere of inuen-

ce into South Asia and the Indian Ocean region, signicantly impacting

India’s traditional security and strategic position in these areas. During

this period, India undertook “comprehensive economic reforms aimed

at global integration, liberalization, and the development of multilateral

and global trade relations in 1991” (Nghi & Nghia, 2013). Simultaneously,

former Prime Minister Narasimha Rao introduced the LEP as a key

component of India’s foreign policy and strategic vision in the new era

of the New Delhi government. This policy had four main objectives: (1)

Strengthening market connectivity and expanding economic and trade

cooperation with countries in Southeast Asia; (2) “Building an economic

corridor extending from South Asia to the Pacic Ocean, driving development

in India’s remote and impoverished northeastern region and the Indian eco-

nomy as a whole” (Hai, 2017, p. 35); (3) Increasing inuence over Southeast

Asian countries, while promoting a peaceful and stable regional order; (4)

“Indirectly counterbalancing China’s policies and strategies being implemented

in Southeast Asia, especially in Myanmar” (Paode, 2013). India’s LEP can be

divided into two phases:

2.1 Phase 1 (1991–2003): Foundational Engagement

This initial phase emphasized political and economic engagement

with ASEAN. India prioritized diplomacy, multilateral cooperation, and

institutional integration. In 1995, it became a full dialogue partner of

Tran Xuan Hiep, Le Hoang Kiet, Phan Thi Hai Yen A políca de olhar para o leste da Índia: o papel fundamental do Vietnã em meio à inuência regional crescente da China

ASEAN and joined the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) in 1996, marking

its entry into regional security dialogues. India also began asserting its

maritime presence by forging naval partnerships with key coastal states,

including Singapore, Malaysia, Indonesia, Thailand, and Vietnam (Binh,

2013). In 2003, India signed a Joint Defense Treaty with Singapore, dee-

pening military-to-military ties, particularly in naval operations aimed at

securing vital maritime chokepoints like the Strait of Malacca.

2.2 Phase 2 (2003–2014): Expansion and Consolidation

This phase witnessed the expansion of India’s engagement into

East Asia, including Japan, South Korea, China, and Oceania, such as

Australia and New Zealand (Liem & Thao, 2021). Unlike the initial pha-

se, which focused on political and maritime initiatives, the second pha-

se placed a stronger emphasis on economic integration. Key milestones

in this phase include: (1) The India-ASEAN Framework Agreement on

Comprehensive Economic Cooperation in 2003, laying the foundation

for the liberalization of trade in goods, services, and investment; (2) the

ASEAN-India Trade in Goods Agreement (AITIG) in 2009, aimed at eli-

minating tari and non-tari barriers; (3) the ASEAN-India Investment

and Services Agreement in 2014, further deepening regional nancial

cooperation and service sectors (Mai & Hang, 2021).

India also participated in negotiations for the Regional

Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) in 2011, although it wi-

thdrew from the agreement in 2019. This shift impacted India’s position

and role in Southeast Asia. Nonetheless, India was prepared to reduce ta-

ri barriers with ASEAN countries. In response, Southeast Asian nations

encouraged India to play a larger balancing role in the regional security

architecture. The convergence of interests between India and ASEAN,

particularly concerning security and freedom of navigation, paved the

way for deeper political and defense cooperation (Lan, 2018).

Recognizing the changing dynamics in the Indo-Pacic region, on

November 12, 2014, at the ASEAN-India Summit, Prime Minister Modi

ocially announced the shift from the Look East Policy (LEP) to the

Act East Policy (AEP), marking a reorientation of India’s foreign policy

towards Southeast Asia. Modi declared, “An era of industrialization, eco-

nomic growth, and trade is beginning in India. India’s Look East Policy is

now the Act East Policy” (Muni & Mishra, 2019). The Act East Policy inhe-

rited and expanded upon the goals of the LEP, with a focus on: (1) strate-

gic partnerships with key countries in the region (particularly Vietnam);

(2) maritime presence in disputed areas such as the South China Sea; (3)

regional integration through ASEAN mechanisms; (4) direct balancing

against China’s increasing assertiveness in Southeast Asia (Sang, 2022).

Prime Minister Modi’s diplomatic eorts, which included high-le-

vel visits to 8 of the 10 ASEAN countries (except Cambodia and Brunei,

where visits were made by the Deputy Prime Minister or Foreign

Minister), and the elevation of relations to Comprehensive Strategic

Partnerships (CSP) with Vietnam, Singapore, and Malaysia, demonstra-

ted India’s strong commitment to the region. The emphasis on maritime

estudos internacionais • Belo Horizonte, ISSN 2317-773X, v. 12, n. 3, (dez. 2024), p. 51-73

cooperation and support for UNCLOS norms highlighted India’s position

as a maritime power based on international law, in contrast to China’s

coercive actions (Trong, 2017).

In 2014, India ocially acknowledged the importance of maintai-

ning maritime security and freedom of navigation, respecting the so-

vereignty of nations in the South China Sea in the joint statement bet-

ween former U.S. President Barack Obama and Prime Minister Narendra

Modi. When China deployed the Haiyang Shiyou 981 drilling rig into

Vietnam’s sovereign waters in May 2014, Prime Minister Modi expres-

sed support for Vietnam, stating: “For peace and stability in the South China

Sea, all nations must adhere to international principles and laws, including the

United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) of 1982 and the

Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (DOC) of 2002”

(Liem & Thao, 2021).

The AEP has been successfully demonstrated through the

Comprehensive Dialogue Partnership between India and ASEAN. This

relationship has evolved from a sectoral dialogue partner in 1992, to a

full partner in 1995, and further upgraded to a Comprehensive Strategic

Partnership in 2022 (Statements, 2022). Not only has this partnership dri-

ven bilateral trade, with total trade reaching over 110 billion USD in 2022

(VNTR, 2024), but India has also actively engaged in ASEAN-led mecha-

nisms such as the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), the East Asia Summit

(EAS), and the Expanded ASEAN Defense Ministers’ Meeting (ADMM+)

(Nanda, 2022). These eorts aim to ensure peace, security, and stability in

the region, while also witnessing India’s strong rise on the international

political stage.

Through the Comprehensive Asia Development Plan (CADP),

India has developed Asia connectivity—by road, rail, sea, and air—appro-

ved by the relevant governments in 2015, such as the India-Myanmar-

Thailand Economic Corridor (IMT). India has built “strategic trust” as

a rising peaceful power, capable of making signicant contributions to

a peaceful and prosperous world (Thăng, 2023). The exible, “consen-

sus-based” cooperation model helps mitigate conicting interests, create

harmony, and contribute to building strategic trust with ASEAN. This

development philosophy of India is partly inspired by the tradition of

harmony in Hinduism, which has helped the country shape an image as

a respectful and cooperative partner in the development process, parti-

cularly in Southeast Asia. As a result, the AEP has been highly regarded

by ASEAN and the international community for its role in promoting

multilateralism and creating a security, peace, and freedom of navigation

environment in Southeast Asia.

3 VIETNAM’S POSITION AND ROLE IN INDIA’S AEP AMID THE

CHALLENGES FROM CHINA

Vietnam and India are bound by deep-rooted historical, friendly,

and traditional ties stemming from both nations’ struggles for indepen-

dence from colonial rule in the 20th century. The timeless and transcen-

dent nature of this relationship reects a close spiritual and ideological

Tran Xuan Hiep, Le Hoang Kiet, Phan Thi Hai Yen A políca de olhar para o leste da Índia: o papel fundamental do Vietnã em meio à inuência regional crescente da China

anity forged through shared challenges in the past (Uyanaev, 2022).

This commonality provides a solid foundation for the two countries to

continually consolidate and advance comprehensive cooperation across

various domains. The relationship between the two peoples was founded

by the great leaders of the global independence movements, President

Ho Chi Minh and Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru, and has been nur-

tured by subsequent generations of leadership and the nations populaces

(Cuong & Linh, 2023). Moreover, Vietnam and India share numerous cul-

tural, artistic, and religious similarities, as well as convergent perspec-

tives on traditional and non-traditional security issues unfolding regio-

nally and globally. The mutually benecial foreign policy interests and

long-standing friendship “have enabled Vietnam and India to cooperate in

constructing and developing an enduring, transparent relationship between the

two Asian nations” (Liem & Thao, 2021, p. 24).

Under Prime Minister Narendra Modi, Vietnam is a country with

a very important geo-strategic position for India’s AEP in the Southeast

Asian region, especially in the East Sea area. According to estimates by

the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD)

(2020): “About 80% of global trade by volume and 70% by value is transported by

sea. Of this, around 60% of maritime trade passes through Asia and the East Sea

plays an important role, accounting for an estimated one-third of global freight

movement”.

The East Sea region is particularly important for the supply chains

of countries with geographic locations adjacent to the sea in the Northeast

Asian region such as China, Taiwan, Japan, and South Korea. These cou-

ntries all rely on maritime transportation through the Strait of Malacca,

connecting to the East Sea and expanding to the Pacic Ocean and the

Indian Ocean. For India, “maritime transportation in the East Sea through

the Strait of Malacca accounts for 55% of India’s total 92-95% of global merchan-

dise trade” (Liem & Thao, 2021, p. 45). In particular, the rise of the Indian

economy has created an energy shortage for national development needs.

As a result, 85% of New Delhi’s oil imports are transported by sea, and

cooperation in oil exploration with countries in the East Sea is one of the

important energy sources for India’s energy security, especially coopera-

tion in oil exploration with Vietnam (Chakraborty, 2022). Therefore, the

East Sea plays an extremely important role in India’s security policy and

national interests in the 21st century. Realizing China’s “hegemonic” ac-

tions regarding Vietnam’s sovereignty over islands in the East Sea region,

on July 19, 2010, at the ASEAN Regional Forum held in Hanoi, New Delhi

for the rst time publicly expressed its position in support of the East Sea

issues: “The East Sea is an important maritime route, India supports freedom of

navigation in the East Sea” (Nghi & Nghia, 2013).

On July 12, 2016, immediately after the Permanent Court of

Arbitration (PCA) is ruling on the East Sea case, India called on China

to comply with the principles and international laws based on the 1982

United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), the 2002

Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the East Sea (DOC), calling

for an end to activities that could complicate or escalate the dispute, af-

fecting regional peace (Liem & Thao, 2021, p. 75). This arms India’s

estudos internacionais • Belo Horizonte, ISSN 2317-773X, v. 12, n. 3, (dez. 2024), p. 51-73

position of participating in maintaining a peaceful environment and

freedom of navigation in the East Sea region, while increasing India’s

inuence and presence to limit China’s expanding power in this region.

On July 16, 2020, as the two powers of the US and China were arguing

over Beijing’s claims in the East Sea, Indian Foreign Ministry spokesman

Anurag Srivastava stated:

“The East Sea is a part of the global commons. India has an abiding interest in

peace and stability in the region. We rmly stand for the freedom of navigation

and overight and unimpeded lawful commerce in these international wate-

rways, in accordance with international law, notably UNCLOS” (Ministry of

Information and Broadcasting, 2020).

The statement was made after Australia - a major power in the

Indo-Pacic - strongly voiced its support for the internationalization

and freedom of navigation in the East Sea. At the 17th ASEAN-India

Summit held virtually on November 13, 2020, Prime Minister Narendra

Modi continued to call for “all parties (China) to fully implement the DOC,

expedite the nalization of an eective and substantive COC consistent with

international law and the 1982 UNCLOS” (Anh, 2020). On June 16, 2022,

at the ASEAN-India Special Foreign Ministers’ Meeting, Indian Foreign

Minister Subramanyam Jaishankar reiterated India’s support for ASEAN’s

eorts to promote dialogue and condence-building, and the full and

eective implementation of a substantive, eective, and eective COC

in accordance with international law and UNCLOS 1982 (Government

Newspaper, 2022). At the 18th Session of the Vietnam-India Joint

Committee on Economic, Commercial, Scientic and Technological

Cooperation on October 16, 2023, Indian Foreign Minister Subramanyam

Jaishankar armed his support for ASEAN’s central role and ASEAN’s

fundamental principles in addressing regional issues, including the East

Sea issue (Vietnam News Agency, 2023). Therefore, in order to promote

strategic interests in the East Sea region and economic and trade interests

in Southeast Asia, Vietnam plays an extremely important role in India’s

AEP under Prime Minister Narendra Modi.

4 STRENGHENING INDIA-VIETNAM DEFENSE TIES TO COUNTER

CHINA’S ASSERTIVENESS IN THE SOUTH CHINA SEA

In the Indo-Pacic region, Vietnam is the country most severely

aected by China’s strategy of expanding its power by asserting the “ni-

ne-dash line” claim in the East Sea. The Beijing government has imposed

unorthodox “historical evidence” regarding maritime sovereignty over

countries in the East Sea in an attempt to control global “trade intersec-

tions”, demonstrate its “hegemonic” power, and pose a serious threat to

the security and sovereignty of countries in the region. This has strongly

inuenced the globalization and internationalization trend of vital ma-

ritime routes on the oceans. Therefore, the power imbalance between

China and Vietnam has created a power imbalance between the two

countries in the region. With its overwhelming strength, the Beijing go-

vernment has made unorthodox claims regarding Vietnam’s sovereignty

over islands in the East Sea. China’s “hegemonic” actions have increased

Tran Xuan Hiep, Le Hoang Kiet, Phan Thi Hai Yen A políca de olhar para o leste da Índia: o papel fundamental do Vietnã em meio à inuência regional crescente da China

instability, tensions, and confrontation between countries with conic-

ting interests with China. Particularly, the incident on May 1, 2014, when

China deployed the Haiyang Shiyou 981 oil rig in the East Sea area, es-

calated tensions in Vietnam-China relations in this region. According

to the recent report of the U.S Department of Defense (2023) Report on

Military and Security Developments Involving China, it noted China’s

recent aggressive actions:

“The People’s Republic of China (PRC) continues to challenge foreign military

activities in its exclusive economic zone (EEZ) in a manner that is inconsistent

with the rules of customary international law as reected in the UNCLOS. At

the same time, the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) conducts activities in

the EEZs of other countries, including the United States, Australia, Philippines,

Vietnam, and Malaysia” (U.S. Department of Defense, 2023).

Therefore, although Vietnam has always sought to maintain a frien-

dly neighborly relationship with China, it has also strengthened bilateral

relations with other countries around the world, especially with major po-

wers that have strategic interests in this region such as India, US, Japan,

South Korea, and Australia (Thayer, 2016). At the same time, Vietnam has

strengthened multilateral cooperation and global integration, supporting

the role of the United Nations as a supranational government to protect

interests, maintain peace, and create an equal legal environment to main-

tain regional and international security and stability. This is to ensure that

all countries are treated fairly and adhere to international rules, ensuring

freedom of navigation in the East Sea. The rise of China, accompanied by

its assertive and aggressive policies in the region, has compelled neighbo-

ring countries to respond to emerging threats to their security. China’s ex-

pansive and often illegitimate maritime claims in the South China Sea have

contributed to a volatile and uncertain security environment in Southeast

Asia. Notably, in September 2012, the Indian naval vessel INS Airavat was

challenged by the PLA Navy while transiting through Vietnamese wa-

ters, further reinforcing India’s strategic imperative to deepen maritime

cooperation and interoperability with Vietnam. In 2014, Vietnam exten-

ded India’s lease of two oil blocks in the South China Sea—an action that

clearly drew disapproval from China. In 2016, despite the ruling of the

Permanent Court of Arbitration, China maintained its hardline approach

in the South China Sea. India, sharing a similar position with Vietnam, has

consistently supported freedom of navigation, adherence to international

law—particularly the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea

(UNCLOS)—and has continued its oil and gas exploration activities wi-

thin Vietnam’s Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), even expanding to new

blocks despite Chinese objections (Anand, 2017).

Furthermore, the South China Sea serves as a principal maritime

conduit to the Pacic Ocean. China’s territorial claims over this body of

water would directly impact India, particularly if Beijing begins to enfor-

ce its sovereignty assertions. Historically and culturally, the South China

Sea—and Southeast Asia more broadly—constitute an integral part of

India’s civilizational footprint. Any hegemonic control by China over the

South China Sea would eectively constrain India’s ability to pursue its

“Act East” Policy with strategic autonomy. Consequently, India’s objective

must be to ensure that the South China Sea remains a global commons.

estudos internacionais • Belo Horizonte, ISSN 2317-773X, v. 12, n. 3, (dez. 2024), p. 51-73

Additionally, both Vietnam and India are heavily dependent on

maritime routes to sustain their economic vitality. Their geographical

positioning confers upon them the responsibility of safeguarding interna-

tional sea lines of communication in the Indian and Pacic Oceans, inclu-

ding the South China Sea. India’s Maritime Military Strategy of 2015—as

well as its earlier version in 2007—explicitly identies the South China

Sea as a region of strategic interest. As such, New Delhi is a stakeholder

in the evolving security dynamics of the South China Sea.

As a result, the East Sea has become “an inseparable part of India’s

security necklace” (Anh & Van, 2017). This has provided an impetus for

New Delhi’s strong intervention in the region to prevent a scenario whe-

re the entire East Sea falls under China’s control, directly threatening

India’s vital interests along the maritime routes passing through the East

Sea. According to Huynh Tam Sang’s (2022) study on the drivers behind

India’s intervention in the East Sea: “The main factors driving India’s presen-

ce in the East Sea are the rise of China in the disputed waters, India’s pragmatic

interests in those waters, and the increasing strategic weight of the Indo-Pacic

region”.

Therefore, China’s “hegemonic”4 actions have led to the vigilance

of Indian leaders, prompting New Delhi to intervene in this region to

protect its interests and curb Beijing’s “hegemonic” ambitions in the coas-

tal areas of Southeast Asia. As a result, India has strengthened defense

and security cooperation with Vietnam and engaged in East Sea issues

with three main objectives: (1) Ensuring peace, stability in the region and

keeping vital maritime routes open and free; (2) Building and maintai-

ning a close relationship with Vietnam to curb the scope of China’s ex-

panding power in the East Sea and Southeast Asia regions, counterbalan-

cing China’s strategies to encircle and contain India in South Asia and the

Indian Ocean; (3) Increasing India’s presence in the East Sea region with

the desire to demonstrate its rising power status with a peaceful tenden-

cy, in contrast to China’s assertiveness.

Prior to establishing the CSP (9/2016), defense and security coopera-

tion between Vietnam and India had achieved notable successes through

statements, memoranda of understanding, and leadership visits between

the two countries in the past. Before upgrading to the CSP, in 1980, India

opened a Defense Attaché Oce in Vietnam. In return, Vietnam opened

a Defense Attaché Oce in India in 1985. During the visit of Defense

Minister George Fernandes to Vietnam in 2000, the two sides signed a

Defense Cooperation Agreement, creating a more comprehensive me-

chanism for regular discussions between the two countries Defense

Ministers, joint naval exercises between the two navies and coast guard

forces, as well as India assisting in training pilots for Vietnam (Ha, 2019,

p. 215). The year 2003 marked a new development in defense and security

cooperation when the two sides signed the “Joint Declaration on the

Comprehensive Cooperative Framework between the Socialist Republic

of Vietnam and the Republic of India”, in which defense and security coo-

peration was seen as a key pillar in the relationship between the two cou-

ntries (Mai & Hang, 2021). The July 2007 Strategic Partnership Agreement

further solidied this relationship by providing a framework to enhance

4. The term ‘hegemonic ambitions’

is widely used in studies and analy-

tical writings on China’s policies and

strategies to describe its aspirations to

expand dominant inﬂuence and exert

regional control. Example, Articles on

Peace Diplomacy (2025), OFCS (2024),

DW (2019), and IGI Global (2023) all use

this phrase to describe China’s actions

and policies in the Indo-Paciﬁc region.

Tran Xuan Hiep, Le Hoang Kiet, Phan Thi Hai Yen A políca de olhar para o leste da Índia: o papel fundamental do Vietnã em meio à inuência regional crescente da China

cooperation in the defense sector. The agreement commits both coun-

tries to strengthen their ties across political, security, defense, cultural,

scientic, and technological domains. Civil nuclear cooperation, regional

security enhancement, counterterrorism collaboration—including ad-

dressing transnational crime and drug tracking challenges—are inte-

gral components of this strategic partnership. According to Ha (2019, p.

217), during the period spanning from 2005 up to 2007, Vietnam sent over

100 military ocers to participate in training programs at Indian defense

institutions and educational facilities. In June 2005, the Indian Navy faci-

litated the transportation of 150 tons of military equipment intended for

Vietnam’s Petya submarine chasers and Osa-II missile boats.

In 2013, representatives from the two Defense Ministries signed the

“Agreement on Mutual Protection of Classied Information Exchange

and Memorandum of Understanding on Training of Vietnamese Navy

and Air Force Ocers”, with both leaders agreeing on the “determination

to jointly maintain peace, stability, freedom of navigation in the East Sea,

not using or threatening to use force, and resolving disputes through pea-

ceful negotiations based on international law, including UNCLOS” (Ha,

2019, p.230). During Prime Minister Nguyăn Tăn Dăng’s visit to India in

October 2014, Prime Minister Narendra Modi remarked: “Our defense

cooperation with Vietnam is among our most important partnerships.

India remains committed to the modernization of Vietnam’s defense and

security forces. This commitment includes expanding our already subs-

tantial training programs, conducting joint exercises, and cooperating

on defense equipment”. In May 2015, the Defense Ministers of the two

countries signed the “Joint Vision Statement on Vietnam-India Defense

Relations for the Period of 2015-2020”, and also signed a “Memorandum

of Understanding between Vietnam and India on cooperation and coordi-

nation in preventing and combating transnational crimes and terrorism”.

The aforementioned statement was built on the previous defense and se-

curity cooperation mechanisms and procedures between the two coun-

tries, reecting the development trend in expanding the comprehensive

strategic relationship between India and Vietnam, facilitating enhanced

defense and security cooperation across the three main services: army,

navy, and air force; at the same time, the two sides have strengthened coo-

peration in important areas such as military training, capacity building,

and support for defense industry development. In addition, the two sides

have signed a “Cooperation Program on United Nations Peacekeeping

Operations” and a “Technical Agreement on Sharing of Non-Military

Maritime Information” (Lan, 2018).

Defense and security cooperation between India and Vietnam was

elevated to a new level during Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s State visit

from September 2-3, 2016 to upgrade relations to a CSP with Vietnam.

Here, Prime Minister Narendra Modi approved a $500 million Defense

Line of Credit (LoC) for Vietnam (Neelakanta, 2016), aimed at strengthe-

ning bilateral defense and security ties, in line with the common interests

of the two countries in maintaining a secure, peaceful and prosperous

environment in the region, kicking o the rst important area of coope-

ration under the CSP between New Delhi and Hanoi. Immediately upon

estudos internacionais • Belo Horizonte, ISSN 2317-773X, v. 12, n. 3, (dez. 2024), p. 51-73

returning to India after his visit to Southeast Asian countries, according

to reports, Prime Minister Narendra Modi instructed Brahmos Aerospace

to expedite the delivery of Brahmos missiles to the Vietnamese Air

Force (Lan, 2018). By 2017, Vietnam and India had negotiated India’s sale

of Akash surface-to-air missiles to Vietnam, while signing the “Action

Program for the 2017-2020 Period”, which emphasized that the two sides

need to maintain defense and security cooperation, continue to expand

training programs, technical support, preferential credit provision, and

strengthen cooperation in responding to current traditional and non-tra-

ditional security challenges for the interests of the two countries as well

as contributing to building a peaceful, stable, cooperative and develop-

ment environment in the region and globally (Trong, 2017).

In January 2018, on the sidelines of the ASEAN-India

Commemorative Summit marking 25 years of ASEAN-India Dialogue

Relations and the 69th Republic Day of India, Prime Ministers Nguyen

Xuan Phuc and Narendra Modi held talks to promote bilateral coope-

ration, in which both sides proposed “strengthening defense and security

cooperation, urging relevant ministries and sectors to make eorts to overcome

obstacles in the bilateral cooperation process” (Dung, 2018). Also in January

2018, the two countries held their rst joint exercise under the framework

of the United Nations Bilateral Peacekeeping Field Training Exercise

in Jabalpur, India. In August 2018, Senior Lieutenant General Nguyen

Chi Vinh and the Indian Defense Secretary discussed the purchase of

the Akash missile system and Dhruv helicopters for the Vietnamese Air

Force, helping enhance the military strength of the Vietnamese Air Force

and creating a deterrent capability against regional adversaries (Linh,

2018).

From June 8-10, 2022, Indian Defense Minister Rajnath Singh visi-

ted Vietnam to hand over 12 high-speed guard boats under a $100 mil-

lion credit line to the Vietnamese Navy, and also signed the Joint Vision

Statement on India-Vietnam Defense Partnership towards 2030 and a

Memorandum of Understanding on Mutual Logistics Support, aiming to

expand the scope and scale of bilateral defense and security cooperation

(Saha, 2022). This event marked an important breakthrough in India-

Vietnam defense cooperation, helping to deepen and substantiate the

two sides’ cooperative relationship. On June 17, 2023, during the ocial

visit of Vietnamese Defense Minister Phan Van Giang to India, the Indian

Defense Ministry gifted the missile escort ship INS Kirpan to Vietnam,

stating: “This is a testimony to India’s commitment to support friendly nations

to enhance their position and maritime defense capabilities based on the Security

and Growth for All in the Region (SAGAR) initiative” (Thu, 2023).

On July 24, 2023, Indian Navy Admiral Hari Kumar visited and

worked with Vietnam’s Ministry of National Defense; at this event, the

two sides discussed naval training cooperation and armed that defense

and security cooperation plays an important role, serving as a bridge for

the two countries to support and draw closer to each other (Khanh &

Tuan, 2023). On December 11, 2023, the Vietnamese Ministry of National

Defense, in coordination with the Indian Ministry of Defense, organi-

zed the 2023 Vietnam-India Bilateral United Nations Peacekeeping Field

Tran Xuan Hiep, Le Hoang Kiet, Phan Thi Hai Yen A políca de olhar para o leste da Índia: o papel fundamental do Vietnã em meio à inuência regional crescente da China

Training Exercise, which contributed to enhancing solidarity and pro-

moting substantive Vietnam-India defense and security cooperation

(Thanh, 2023). This shows that defense and security cooperation bet-

ween the two countries in the 2016-2023 period has achieved positive re-

sults and helped both countries strengthen their defense capabilities in

the face of new era challenges. Both sides have agreed to continue streng-

thening defense and security cooperation in the spirit of the “Joint Vision

Statement on Vietnam-India Defense Partnership Towards 2030”. These

events demonstrate that Vietnam occupies a very important position in

India’s AEP under Prime Minister Narendra Modi, through which India-

Vietnam relations will become an important link in increasing inuence

and curbing China’s “hegemonic” ambitions in Southeast Asia.

The fourth India-Vietnam Maritime Security Dialogue took place

in Hanoi in August 2024, focusing on enhancing cooperation in areas

such as marine scientic research, ocean economy, humanitarian assis-

tance and disaster relief (HADR), as well as strengthening coordination

between the two countries’ navies and coast guards (Aairs, 2024). Both

sides exchanged views on measures to protect critical sea lines of commu-

nication, particularly in the East Sea, which faces numerous challenges

related to freedom of navigation and adherence to international law.

Earlier, in 2023, India transferred the missile corvette INS Kirpan to

Vietnam—a symbolic step in enhancing Vietnam’s defense capabilities

(Singh, 2024). With access to advanced technologies such as radar, missile

systems, and maritime equipment produced by India, Vietnam can acqui-

re high-quality defense products at competitive prices, while bolstering

its self-defense capacity amid a complex geopolitical environment. For

India, this initiative forms part of its domestic defense industry develo-

pment strategy, aligned with the “Make in India” policy. This initiative

not only helps India reduce its dependence on defense imports but also

arms its role as a reliable partner in exporting military equipment to

strategic partners like Vietnam.

Additionally, visits by Indian warships such as INS Delhi and INS

Satpura to Da Nang have contributed to consolidating bilateral defen-

se relations and enhancing naval coordination between the two forces

(Singh, 2024). Within the ASEAN framework, both countries have par-

ticipated in maritime exercises aimed at improving interoperability and

responding to maritime security threats in the region.

Cooperation between India and Vietnam in regional forums such

as ASEAN and the East Asia Summit (EAS) continues to be promoted

through various concrete initiatives, especially in upholding a rules-based

regional order and restraining unilateral actions by China. This is also a

space where members of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (QUAD)

play an active role, facilitating Vietnam’s engagement in regional security

cooperation (Pant, 2022).

At the 20th ASEAN-India Summit and the 18th East Asia Summit

in September 2023, the Indian Prime Minister rearmed India’s com-

mitment to a free, open, and rules-based Indo-Pacic region. India and

Vietnam jointly support these principles and call for enhanced mariti-

me cooperation to ensure regional security and stability. Prime Minister

estudos internacionais • Belo Horizonte, ISSN 2317-773X, v. 12, n. 3, (dez. 2024), p. 51-73

Modi also emphasized ASEAN’s central role in the regional architectu-

re, promoting interaction between India’s Indo-Pacic Oceans Initiative

(IPOI) and ASEAN’s Outlook on the Indo-Pacic (AOIP). This clearly re-

ects India’s stance on elevating ASEAN’s centrality within the QUAD

vision.

India’s role in the QUAD is evident in several dimensions. First,

India has strengthened strategic cooperation with QUAD member sta-

tes to counterbalance China’s growing inuence in the region. Events

such as the Doklam stando (2017) and the Ladakh border conict (2020)

have propelled India to take a more active role in multilateral security

structures. Second, India participates in joint naval exercises, notably the

Malabar exercises, to enhance coordination and readiness to protect cri-

tical sea lanes. Third, India advances non-military initiatives within the

QUAD framework, including cybersecurity, climate change, and huma-

nitarian assistance—areas with potential for cooperation with Vietnam.

From Vietnam’s perspective, support for a rules-based regional or-

der, the protection of freedom of navigation, and peaceful dispute resolu-

tion in the East Sea under the United Nations Convention on the Law of

the Sea (UNCLOS) demonstrate strategic alignment with QUAD’s core

objectives. In this context, the QUAD provides a potential platform for

India and Vietnam to deepen cooperation—not only in security but also

in economic and sustainable development—contributing to regional sta-

bility and strategic balance.

5 INDIA HAS STRENGTHENED ECONOMIC COOPERATION WITH

VIETNAM WITH THE AIM OF BUILDING AN ECONOMIC CORRIDOR

EXTENDING FROM SOUTH ASIA TO THE EAST SEA AND EXPANDING

TO THE COUNTRIES IN THE PACIFIC REGION

In the context of globalization and deep integration among econo-

mies in the region and the world, enhancing economic cooperation bet-

ween India and Vietnam has become an important trend in the foreign

policies of both countries, especially since the AITIG was signed in 2009.

July 24, 1991 is considered an important milestone in India’s economic

history, when the New Delhi government comprehensively reformed the

economy towards openness, liberalization and international integration

after a long period of pursuing an inward-looking, self-sucient econo-

mic model that India applied before the end of the Cold War era (Singh,

2019). Therefore, to strengthen cooperation with countries in the region,

especially with ASEAN, Indian Prime Minister Narasimha Rao (1991-

1996) introduced the LEP in 1991 with the aim of enhancing economic

relations between countries in the region, and comprehensively develo-

ping and deeply integrating with ASEAN economies.

Vietnam played the role of an intermediary linking India with the

East Sea and extending towards the major economies of Northeast Asia,

the island countries of Southeast Asia, and Oceania (Paode, 2013). This

created an economic leverage for the development of the remote and im-

poverished Northeast region in particular, and the Indian economy in ge-

neral. Therefore, strengthening cooperation between India and Vietnam

Tran Xuan Hiep, Le Hoang Kiet, Phan Thi Hai Yen A políca de olhar para o leste da Índia: o papel fundamental do Vietnã em meio à inuência regional crescente da China

is not simply a measure to promote strategic and political development,

but also has economic development signicance, especially when both

countries are undergoing comprehensive economic reforms, pursuing a

peaceful, stable and prosperous regional order that aligns with the com-

mon interests of the two countries. During Prime Minister Narasimha

Rao’s visit to Vietnam on September 7, 1994, he emphasized that: “India

supports Vietnam’s reform eorts and considers Vietnam a particularly impor-

tant partner. Therefore, India wishes to strengthen cooperation with Vietnam in

all elds” (Paode, 2013).

Thus, the economic corridor originating from South Asia to the

East Sea and expanding to the Pacic region has positioned India and

Vietnam at the two ends of the link between the two regions, creating

favorable conditions for the two countries to cooperate in many areas,

especially in the economic eld. Vietnam and India have enjoyed a close

political relationship since the two countries gained independence and

ocially established diplomatic relations on January 7, 1972.

However, despite the close political ties, economic cooperation

was not a priority in the bilateral relationship between the two coun-

tries until 1991. This stemmed from two main reasons: (1) Both coun-

tries pursued inward-looking, self-sucient economic models; (2) Both

countries fell into political instability, with Vietnam embroiled in war

circumstances, while India had to deal with ethnic crises. Therefore, af-

ter Prime Minister Narasimha Rao reformed the economy towards open-

ness, integration, and liberalization, and introduced the LEP in 1991, this

marked the rst milestone in the economic cooperation between India

and Vietnam. In 1992, India and Vietnam established extensive econo-

mic relations in areas such as oil and gas exploration, agriculture, and

manufacturing (Son, 2022). To promote bilateral trade and investment,

the India-Vietnam Business Council was established in 1993. By 1997, the

two countries elevated their trade partnership through the signing of

the Bilateral Investment Promotion and Protection Agreement (BIPPA).

Entering the 21st century, Vietnam-India relations witnessed signicant

progress in both breadth and depth. In particular, bilateral trade relations

were strongly boosted as the two countries opened up and liberalized

their economies.

The comprehensive partnership between Vietnam and India has

undergone a remarkable development process over the past two deca-

des. In 2003, the two countries issued a Joint Declaration establishing the

Comprehensive Partnership, followed by the establishment of a Strategic

Partnership in 2007. The signing of the AITIG in 2009 facilitated trade ex-

changes between the two countries through tari preferences (Uyanaev,

2022). Additionally, the Maritime Transport Agreement (AST) signed in

July 2014 laid the legal foundation for maritime and shipping coopera-

tion between the two sides (Lan, 2018). In 2016, bilateral relations were

upgraded to a CSP. Since then, economic cooperation between Vietnam

and India has witnessed strong and comprehensive development. Most

recently, in December 2022, the two countries signed a Memorandum of

Understanding on Cooperation in the Energy and Mineral Resources sec-

tors, creating a legal basis to promote cooperation in these crucial areas

estudos internacionais • Belo Horizonte, ISSN 2317-773X, v. 12, n. 3, (dez. 2024), p. 51-73

(Vietnam Government Newspaper, 2023). Furthermore, Vietnam and

India also cooperate based on other important agreements such as the

Mekong-Ganga Cooperation Initiative (MGC). The development of the

partnership between the two countries is partly due to Vietnam oering

an attractive business environment for Indian companies, with political

stability, economic reforms, a large consumer base, and strategic access

to ASEAN and Pacic markets.

Table 1: Import-export turnover between Vietnam and India in the period 1991 - 2023

Unit: million USD

1991 2001 2007 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023

Export 24 228 1357 2687 3759 6543 6672 5235 6280 7961 8500

Import 5.5 45 180 2745 3940 4147 4528 4435 6963 7086 5860

Balance of trade 18.5 183 1177 -58 1812 2396 2144 800 -683 875 2640

Total exports and imports 29.5 273 1537 5432 7698 10690 11200 9670 132430 15048 14360

Source: Compiled by the author from the General Department of Customs (Vietnam)

Through the data from Table 1, it shows that the bilateral trade tur-

nover between the two countries is increasing, reaching $29.5 million in

1991; $273 million in 2001, an increase of nearly 9.3 times; $1,537 million in

2007; $7,698 million in 2017, an increase of 5 times compared to 2007 and

an increase of 261 times compared to 1991; nearly $15,048 million in 2023

and an increase of about 510 times compared to 1991. This gure slightly

decreased in 2023 to $14,360 million due to the impact of a sharp decline

in domestic demand due to the global economic recession. Vietnam’s tra-

de balance was in surplus during this period, increasing from $58 million

in 2016 to $2,640 million in 2023. This shows that Vietnam’s trade surplus

with India is increasing. In general, the scale of Vietnam-India trade has

grown rapidly after the two countries established a CSP in 2016. This

economic engagement is not merely transactional—it plays a strategic

role in shaping Vietnam’s broader foreign policy orientation. As Vietnam

diversies its trade partners to reduce economic dependence on China,

India emerges as a reliable and complementary partner. This diversica-

tion aligns with Vietnam’s desire to maintain strategic autonomy in the

face of China’s assertiveness in the East Sea. In this context, economic

cooperation with India functions as a form of “soft balancing,” whereby

deeper economic ties provide a foundation for broader strategic collabo-

ration without provoking overt military confrontation.

In terms of merchandise trade, India is Vietnam’s 8th largest tra-

ding partner, while Vietnam is India’s 23rd largest trading partner in the

world and 4th largest in the ASEAN region (Vietnamese Government

Newspaper, 2023). Some of Vietnam’s main export items to India inclu-

de phones, computers, auto parts, coee, pepper...; imports from India

include coal, vegetable oils, iron and steel, machinery, dyes.. (Vietnam

Ministry of Industry and Trade, 2023). This indicates that the two eco-

nomies possess distinct strengths and comparative advantages, thereby

facilitating eective trade cooperation and complementing rather than

Tran Xuan Hiep, Le Hoang Kiet, Phan Thi Hai Yen A políca de olhar para o leste da Índia: o papel fundamental do Vietnã em meio à inuência regional crescente da China

directly competing with each other. Furthermore, according to the

theory of trade complementarity, when two countries exhibit comple-

mentary export-import structures, the potential for bilateral trade gro-

wth is higher. The complementarity in product composition between

Vietnam and India not only enhances bilateral trade volume but also

lays the foundation for deeper economic cooperation, promotes the de-

velopment of regional and global value chains, and elevates both cou-

ntries’ positions within multilateral free trade agreements such as the

ASEAN-India Free Trade Area (AIFTA). For these reasons, the current

trade structure between the two nations is regarded as highly comple-

mentary and holds signicant potential for further development. The fact

that Vietnam and India are important trading partners for each other re-

ects their complementary and mutually supportive economic relations.

Specically, “Vietnam’s GDP per capita of $4,110 is higher than India’s $2,500.

Meanwhile, Vietnam’s debt-to-GDP ratio (%) is signicantly lower than India’s

at 46.7% compared to 73.95%, showing a lower degree of dependence on foreign

countries” (Uyanaev, 2022). Additionally, the ination rate in Vietnam is

lower than in India at 3.21% compared to 4.25%, which can partly ensure

price stability of raw materials and other costs - an important factor in

times of instability (Van, 2022).

Moreover, Vietnam has a slightly lower corporate tax rate of 20%

compared to India’s 25.17%, helping businesses pay lower taxes (Uyanaev,

2022). Indeed, Vietnam has demonstrated exibility in the face of the

Covid-19 pandemic by quickly introducing attractive corporate tax rates

for large corporations wishing to relocate to Vietnam. For example, “for

eligible large-scale manufacturing projects, the preferential corporate income tax

rates of 10% and 20% will be applied for 15 or 10 years respectively” (Thuy,

2023, p. 196). Foreign businesses also hope that Vietnam will avoid cur-

rency risk with low exchange rate volatility. In contrast, the Indian Rupee

is considered a “freely oating currency” with a market-determined ex-

change rate. In addition, in terms of market size, India may easily surpass

Vietnam. However, economists also look at the export similarity index,

which measures the overlap between countries export baskets and thus

their export competitiveness. According to this index, Vietnam has an

export basket most similar to China’s, indicating that it can benet more

from replacing China’s export basket. As a result, although India’s eco-

nomic structure is signicantly larger, leading to other benets such as

cheap labor and a large market, Vietnam enjoys notable advantages that

help promote stability for investors, despite global volatility.... Thus, the

two countries do not compete but complement each other in the global

value chain. This is a healthy model of economic cooperation, mutually

benecial for the common prosperity of the two countries. The fact that

Vietnam ranks 4th in exports to India in ASEAN also shows that Vietnam

has certain competitive advantages. Therefore, trade relations between

Vietnam and India can be further strengthened in line with their CSP

role in the future.

In terms of investment, as of 2023, India currently has over 400 va-

lid investment projects in Vietnam with a total registered capital of about

$1 billion, ranking 26th out of 141 countries and territories investing

estudos internacionais • Belo Horizonte, ISSN 2317-773X, v. 12, n. 3, (dez. 2024), p. 51-73

in Vietnam, with Indian investment focusing on oil and gas, mining,

energy, textiles, agricultural processing,... (Vietnam People’s Police

Newspaper, 2023). Notable Indian corporations and companies inves-

ting in Vietnam include ONGC Videsh (OVL), Venkateswara Hatcheries,

Ruchi Industries, United Phosphorus,... Among them, OVL and Essar

Oil have provided and are providing oil and gas exploration services in

Vietnam along with Petrovietnam (Liem & Thao, 2021, p. 319). In return,

Vietnam also has about 6-9 investment projects in India with a total capi-

tal of about $28 million (Anh, 2022). Vietnamese businesses mainly invest

in India in agriculture, agricultural processing and supporting industries.

The two countries also focus on infrastructure connectivity and trade

facilitation. The launch of direct ights between Vietnam and India in

2022 demonstrates strong political will to promote economic, cultural

and people-to-people exchanges between the two countries. In addition,

both sides have made and are making eorts to build seaports in strate-

gically important regions to increase maritime connectivity capabilities

such as Van Phong Port (Vietnam), Chabahar Port (India)...

Economic cooperation between India and Vietnam in 2023 has

made signicant progress compared to its inception in 1991. The rapid

growth of both economies, coupled with shared interests in bilateral and

multilateral cooperation, has created a favorable foundation for increasin-

gly deep economic and political relations. In this context, India envisions

its partnership with Vietnam as forming a dynamic and prosperous eco-

nomic corridor connecting South Asia with the East Sea and extending

to markets across the Pacic region. India’s decision to withdraw from

the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) in 2019 did

not diminish trade relations; rather, it prompted India to focus more on

bilateral agreements, including cooperation with Vietnam.

In the energy sector, India has made substantial investments in

Vietnamese energy projects while supporting infrastructure develop-

ment aligned with Vietnam’s development goals without creating econo-

mic dependence. Moreover, both India and Vietnam share the strategic

objective of reducing reliance on China within supply chains. According

to Bích (2021), “Vietnam is striving to diversify its trade partners regio-

nally and globally to reduce its increasingly serious dependence on the

Chinese economy.” This opens new opportunities for closer cooperation

between the two countries in strategic areas such as energy and trade.

Additionally, India maintains its commitment to ASEAN through initia-

tives like the ASEAN-India Free Trade Agreement (AIFTA), which has

reinforced economic ties with Vietnam and supported Vietnam’s regional

integration and sustainable development process.

However, India–Vietnam relations face challenges, most notably

the growing competition from China. China’s Belt and Road Initiative

(BRI)—a large-scale infrastructure project connecting China with cou-

ntries across Asia, Europe, and Africa—has expanded its inuence in

Vietnam, raising Indian concerns about Vietnam’s increasing economic

dependence on China, potentially undermining Vietnam’s sovereignty.

Nevertheless, Vietnam has approached the BRI selectively and cautiou-

sly, aiming to leverage economic development opportunities without

Tran Xuan Hiep, Le Hoang Kiet, Phan Thi Hai Yen A políca de olhar para o leste da Índia: o papel fundamental do Vietnã em meio à inuência regional crescente da China

compromising national sovereignty. Simultaneously, this engagement

facilitates New Delhi’s inuence through the Act East Policy (AEP) and

multilateral initiatives such as the Mekong-Hoang Ha Cooperation and

the Indo-Pacic Economic Framework (IPEF). These frameworks oer

alternatives to the BRI, emphasizing sustainable development and res-

pect for national sovereignty. By promoting transparent and responsible

development initiatives, India not only strengthens its partnership with

Vietnam but also helps shape a more balanced and sustainable regional

order to counter China’s expanding inuence in Southeast Asia.

Vietnam currently faces serious challenges due to China’s increa-

singly assertive actions in the East Sea. In this context, Hanoi has proac-

tively established and reinforced strategic partnerships with major po-

wers sharing common interests in the region, including India, the United

States, Japan, South Korea, and Australia. The consensus among these

countries to restrain China’s hegemonic ambitions forms a crucial ba-

sis for building a stable and prosperous regional security environment.

On this foundation, the strategic partnership between India and Vietnam

continues to be consolidated and developed, reecting strategic align-

ment amid China’s rising power and the accompanying security challen-

ges in the East Sea region.

In the context of intensifying strategic competition between India

and China, Vietnam has emerged as a key partner in India’s AEP. The

India–Vietnam cooperation extends beyond defense and security to en-

compass economic, cultural, and political domains. This relationship is

built on a foundation of historical ties, friendship, and mutual trust, dri-

ven by shared interests in maintaining peace, stability, and freedom of

navigation in the Indo-Pacic region.

6 CONCLUSION

This article explores the evolving dynamics of India’s AEP, focu-

sing on Vietnam’s strategic role within this framework. While China’s in-

creasing assertiveness in the East Sea undeniably shapes India’s regional

calculations, ndings indicate that India’s engagement with Vietnam is

driven by a range of motivations extending well beyond mere geopoliti-

cal balancing.

Firstly, economic cooperation has become a cornerstone of stra-

tegic engagement, with rising bilateral trade and investment fostering

interdependence and regional stability. Vietnam’s position as a maritime

gateway and rapidly growing economy aligns with India’s objectives of

market diversication and connectivity to the Pacic.

Secondly, historical and cultural linkages between the two coun-

tries provide normative direction and soft power to the partnership—con-

sistent with India’s broader narrative of civilizational ties with Southeast

Asia.

Thirdly, deepening defense and security cooperation reects con-

vergent interests in maritime domains, freedom of navigation, and re-

gional stability—without necessarily provoking overt confrontation with

China.

estudos internacionais • Belo Horizonte, ISSN 2317-773X, v. 12, n. 3, (dez. 2024), p. 51-73

Thus, Vietnam emerges as a vital and multifaceted partner in

India’s Indo-Pacic vision, not only as a counterbalance to China but also

as a promoter of a stable multipolar regional order. The India–Vietnam

partnership exemplies how economic pragmatism, cultural diplomacy,

and strategic cooperation can converge in pursuit of shared development

and security goals. India’s AEP, with Vietnam as a key pillar, demonstra-

tes India’s strategic recalibration to address China’s rise and safeguard its

national interests. This cooperation benets both countries and contribu-

tes to regional stability and prosperity.

However, India–Vietnam relations also face signicant challenges,

including competition from China and diering perspectives on certain

regional issues. To overcome these challenges, both countries need to

continue enhancing dialogue, building trust, and exploring new areas

of cooperation. Therefore, further research is warranted to examine

Vietnam’s expanding role within India’s broader Indo-Pacic architectu-

re, including initiatives such as the Quad and the India-ASEAN Maritime

Dialogue. Moreover, analyzing how India balances strategic competition

with China while engaging Vietnam may provide valuable insights into

emerging norms of asymmetric cooperation in regional geopolitics.

The re-election of Prime Minister Narendra Modi for a third term

(Modi 3.0) marks a continuation and likely expansion of the Act East

Policy—an essential pillar of India’s foreign policy. Amid rapidly shifting

geopolitical dynamics, India–Vietnam relations are expected to deepen

both strategically and across multiple sectors. Under this new term, India

is likely to expand military training programs, defense equipment su-

pport, and defense technology sharing with Vietnam. Shared concerns

over maritime security and freedom of navigation in the East Sea will con-

tinue to underpin bilateral and multilateral naval exercises. Furthermore,

Vietnam is emerging as a key regional partner. Priority areas for bila-

teral economic cooperation include renewable energy, information te-

chnology, electronics manufacturing, and logistics. Consequently, India

may strengthen its commitment to advancing sustainable supply chains

and market diversication. The Modi 3.0 administration is also expec-

ted to enhance coordination with Vietnam through regional mechanis-

ms such as ASEAN, the India-ASEAN Forum, the Mekong-Hoang Ha

Cooperation, and regional initiatives like the Free and Open Indo-Pacic

(FOIP). These eorts will not only help balance China’s inuence but also

reinforce Vietnam’s central role in India’s Southeast Asia strategy.

In conclusion, as India seeks to counterbalance China’s inuen-

ce and protect its strategic interests in the Indo-Pacic, Vietnam has

emerged as a crucial partner. The consolidation of the Comprehensive

Strategic Partnership (CSP), underpinned by shared maritime concerns

and economic interests, will shape the regional balance of power and con-

tribute to a free, open, and inclusive Indo-Pacic order.

REFERENCES

AFFAIRS, M. O. 4th India-Vietnam Maritime Security Dialogue. 16 Aug. 2024. Available at: https://

mea.gov.in/. Access in: 15 Mar. 2024.

Tran Xuan Hiep, Le Hoang Kiet, Phan Thi Hai Yen A políca de olhar para o leste da Índia: o papel fundamental do Vietnã em meio à inuência regional crescente da China

ANAND, B. V. Achievements: India-Vietnam Defence and Security Cooperation. 12 May 2017. Availa-

ble at: https://www.vindia.org/article/2017/may/12/achievements-india-vietnam-defence-an-

d-security-cooperation. Access in: 15 Mar. 2024.

ANH, C. The potential for Vietnam-India investment cooperation is still very large. 2022. Available

at: https://diendandoanhnghiep.vn/du-dia-hop-tac-dau-tu-viet-nam-an-do-con-rat-lon-229149.

html. Access in: 15 Dec. 2023.

ANH, K. India supports ASEAN’s principled stance on the East Sea. 2020. Available at: https://vne-

conomy.vn/techconnect/an-do-ung-ho-lap-truong-cua-asean-ve-bien-dong.htm. Access in: 18

Nov. 2023.

ANH, K.; VAN, T. India and the East Sea: Dual Interests and the AEP. 2017. Available at: h t t p s : //

vietnamnet.vn/an-do-voi-bien-dong-loi-ich-kep-va-chinh-sach-hanh-dong-phia-dong-420539.

html. Access in: 3 Dec. 2023.

BICH, T. T. Vietnam needs to do more to reduce trade dependence on China. 2021. Available at: ht-

tps://www.thinkchina.sg/vietnam-needs-do-more-reduce-trade-dependence-china. Access in:

13 Mar. 2024.

BINH, N. X. India and India-Vietnam Relations. Hanoi: The World Publishing House, 2013.

CAIRNEY, P. The politics of policy analysis: theoretical insights on real world problems. Journal

of European Public Policy, v. 30, n. 9, p. 1820–1838, 2023. DOI: 10.1080/13501763.2023.2221282.

CHAKRABORTY, D. India Wants Russia to Discount Its Oil to Below $70 a Barrel. 2022. Available

at: https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2022-05-04/india-wants-russia-to-discount-its-

-oil-to-less-than-70-a-barrel. Access in: 15 Feb. 2024.

CHAUDHURY, D. R. Vietnam: Key-partner in Delhi’s Indo-Pacic vision & key pillar of AEP. 2020.

Available at: https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/politics-and-nation/vietnam-key-

-partner-in-delhis-indo-pacic-vision-key-pillar-of-act-east-policy/articleshow/79850863.cms.

Access in: 13 Mar. 2024.

CUONG, V. T.; LINH, K. M. Vietnam - India Strategic Engagements: From the East Sea to the Indian

Ocean in the Context of Indo-Pacic Era. 2023. Available at: https://indiafoundation.in/articles-an-

d-commentaries/vietnam-india-strategic-engagements-from-the-east-sea-to-the-indian-ocean-

-in-the-context-of-indo-pacic-era/. Access in: 18 Mar. 2024.

DU NG, V. Prime Minister Nguyen Xuan Phuc holds talks with Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi.

2018. Available at: https://vov.vn/chinh-tri/thu-tuong-nguyen-xuan-phuc-hoi-dam-voi-thu-

-tuong-an-do-narendra-modi-723023.vov. Access in: 15 Feb. 2024.

HA, D. T. Vietnam - India Relations From the Beginning of the 21st Century to Present. Hanoi: Culture

and Arts Publishing House, 2019.

HAI, N. H. India and India-Vietnam Relations. 2017. Master’s Thesis – Graduate Academy of Social

Sciences, Vietnam.

IMF. Country Data. 2024. Available at: https://www.imf.org/en/Countries/IND. Access in: 11

Dec. 2023.

JAYARATNA, N. Systems analysis: The need for a better understanding. International Journal of

Information Management, v. 10, n. 3, p. 228–234, 1990. DOI: 10.1016/0268-4012(90)90022-K.

KHANH, D.; TUAN, D. Indian Navy Chief visits Vietnam Navy. 2023. Available at: h t t p s : //

baohaiquanvietnam.vn/tin-tuc/tu-lenh-hai-quan-an-do-tham-hai-quan-viet-nam. Access in: 19

Nov. 2023.

KIET, L. H. Some factors inuencing the geopolitical competition between India and China in

the Indian Ocean region in the 21st century. Journal of China Studies, v. 6, n. 262, p. 69–87, 2023.

KIET, L. H.; TUYEN, N. V. Vietnam’s geopolitical position with the United States in preventing

China’s hegemonic ambitions. Danang Journal of Science and Technology, v. 21, n. 8, p. 63–69, 2023.

Available at: https://jst-ud.vn/jst-ud/article/view/8630/5950.

LAN, N. V. Vietnam - India Relations: From Strategic Partnership to CSP. 2018. Available at: h t t p s ://

www.tapchicongsan.org.vn/web/guest/quoc-phong-an-ninh-oi-ngoai1/-/2018/53393/quan-he-

-viet-nam---an-do--tu-doi-tac-chien-luoc-den-doi-tac-chien-luoc-toan-dien.aspx. Access in: 16

Feb. 2024.

LIEM, V. D.; THAO, N. X. China-India Competition in Southeast Asia. Hanoi: Truth National Po-

litics Publishing House, 2021.

estudos internacionais • Belo Horizonte, ISSN 2317-773X, v. 12, n. 3, (dez. 2024), p. 51-73

LINH, T. Senior Lieutenant General Nguyen Chi Vinh receives Indian Defense Attaché in Vietnam.

2018. Available at: https://mod.gov.vn/vn/chi-tiet/sa-ttsk/sa-tt-dnqp/54a1921c-8d14-40-89c-

7-013b2eb5c1bb. Access in: 11 Mar. 2024.

MAHONEY, J.; KIMBALL, E.; KOIVU, K. L. The Logic of Historical Explanation in the Social

Sciences. Comparative Political Studies, v. 42, n. 1, p. 114–146, 2009. DOI: 10.1177/0010414008325433.

MAI, N. T. H.; HANG, D. T. Vietnam - India CSP (2016 - 2020): Achievements and Prospects.

Journal of Party History, v. 8, n. 1, p. 97–102, 2021. Available at: https://sti.vista.gov.vn/tw/Lists/

TaiLieuKHCN/Attachments/324589/CVv243S82021097.pdf.

MUINI, S. D.; MISHRA, R. India’s Eastward Engagement: from antiquity to AEP. New Delhi: Uni-

versity of New Delhi, 2019.

NEELAKANTAN, S. India extends $500 million credit line to Vietnam to help its defence. 2016. Availa-

ble at: https://timesondia.indiatimes.com/india/india-extends-500-million-credit-line-to-viet-

nam-to-help-it-strengthen-its-defence/articleshow/53990763.cms. Access in: 22 Mar. 2024.

NGHI, N. T.; NGHIA, H. H. D. India’s LEP in the early 21st century: position and role in the East

Sea region. Journal of Indian and Asian Studies, v. 32, n. 8, p. 37–53, 2013.

PANT, H. V. India and the Quad: Chinese belligerence and Indian resilience. 20 Mar. 2022. Available

at: https://www.orfonline.org/research/india-and-the-quad. Access in: 15 Feb. 2024.

PAODE, A. India’s LEP. The Journal of International Issues, v. 17, n. 4, p. 86–103, 2013. Available at:

https://www.jstor.org/stable/48505097.

SAHA, P. India-Vietnam defence ties get a major push: Decoding why Rajnath Singh’s Hanoi visit was so

important. 2022. Available at: https://www.orfonline.org/research/india-vietnam-defence-ties-

-get-a-major-push. Access in: 13 Feb. 2024.

SANG, T. M. The Growing Importance of Vietnam to India’s East Sea Policy. 2022. Available at: ht-

tps://www.airuniversity.af.edu/JIPA/Display/Article/2980923/the-growing-importance-of-

-vietnam-to-indias-south-china-sea-policy. Access in: 15 Jan. 2024.

SINGH, H. New Economic Policy of 1991: Objectives, Features and Impacts. 2019. Available at: ht-

tps://www.jagranjosh.com/general-knowledge/new-economic-policy-of-1991-objectives-featu-

res-and-impacts-1448348633-1. Access in: 1 Jan. 2024.

SINGH, M. India, Vietnam deepen defense partnership to confront regional challenges. 6 Apr. 2024.

Available at: https://ipdefenseforum.com/2024/04/india-vietnam-deepen-defense-partnership-

-to-confront-regional-challenges/. Access in: 15 Apr. 2024.

SINGH, S.; DWIVEDI, A.; PRATAP, S. Sustainable Maritime Freight Transportation: Current

Status and Future Directions. Sustainability, v. 15, n. 8, p. 69–96, 2023. DOI: 10.3390/su15086996.

SON, N. T. X. Vietnam-India Relations: 50 Years of Friendship. 2022. Available at: https://www.

tapchicongsan.org.vn/web/guest/quoc-phong-an-ninh-oi-ngoai1/-/2018/825650/quan-he-viet-

nam---an-do--50-nam-gan-ket-tinh-huu-nghi.aspx. Access in: 29 Sept. 2023.

THANH, H. Vietnam-India bilateral peacekeeping exercise. 2023. Available at: https://tuoitre.vn/

dien-tap-song-phuong-viet-nam-an-do-ve-gin-giu-hoa-binh-20231211172544366.htm. Access in:

22 Feb. 2024.

THANG, N. V. Chính sách hành động hướng Đông của Ấn Độ (2014 - 2020). 2023. Doctoral Disserta-

tion – Trường Đại học Khoa học Xã hội & Nhân văn Hà Nội, Khoa Quốc tế học, Hà Nội.

THAYER, C. A. Vietnam’s Strategy of ‘Cooperating and Struggling’ with China over Maritime

Disputes in the East Sea. Journal of Asia Security, v. 3, n. 2, p. 200–220, 2016. Available at: h t t p s ://

www.jstor.org/stable/48601796.

THU, N. Giving INS Kirpan ship to Vietnam, India wants to sell Brahmos and Akash too. 2023. Avai-

lable at: https://sputniknews.vn/20230712/tang-tau-ins-kirpan-cho-viet-nam-an-do-muon-ban-

-ca-brahmos-va-akash-24092497.html. Access in: 13 Jan. 2024.

THUY, D. T. Vietnam-India Infrastructure Connectivity. Hanoi: Social Science Publishing House,

2023.

TRONG, T. V. Vietnam - India Strategic Partnership, from the perspective of defense and security. 2017.

Available at: http://tapchiqptd.vn/vi/quoc-phong-quan-su-nuoc-ngoai/quan-he-doi-tac-chien-

-luoc-viet-nam-an-do-duoi-goc-nhin-quoc-phong-an-ninh/10496.html. Access in: 4 Mar. 2024.

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE. Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Re-

public of China. 2020. Available at: https://media.defense.gov/2020/Sep/01/2002488689/-1/-1/1/

2020-DOD-CHINA-MILITARY-POWER-REPORT-FINAL.PDF. Access in: 10 Mar. 2024.

Tran Xuan Hiep, Le Hoang Kiet, Phan Thi Hai Yen A políca de olhar para o leste da Índia: o papel fundamental do Vietnã em meio à inuência regional crescente da China

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE. Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Re-

public of China. 2023. Available at: https://media.defense.gov/2023/Oct/19/2003323409/-1/-1/1/

2023-military-and-security-developments-involving-the-peoples-republic-of-china.pdf. Access

in: 28 May 2024.

UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT. Review of Maritime

2022. 2022. Available at: https://unctad.org/system/les/ocial-document/rmt2022_en.pdf.

Access in: 13 Jan. 2024.

UYANAEV, S. V. India-Vietnam: fty years on the path of interaction. The Russian Journal of

Vietnamese Studies, v. 6, n. 4, p. 13–22, 2022. DOI: 10.54631/VS.2022.64-117515.

VAN, L. T. T. Global ination in 2022 and its impact on Vietnam. 2022. Available at: h t t p s : //m o f . g o v.

vn/webcenter/portal/vclvcstc/pages_r/l/chi-tiet-tin?dDocName=MOFUCM263689. Access in:

25 Jan. 2024.

VIETNAM GOVERNMENT NEWSPAPER. India supports ASEAN’s principled stance on the East

Sea. 2022. Available at: https://baochinhphu.vn/an-do-ung-ho-lap-truong-nguyen-tac-cua-a-

sean-ve-bien-dong-102220617093141484.htm. Access in: 11 Feb. 2024.

VIETNAM GOVERNMENT NEWSPAPER. Bringing Vietnam-India trade turnover towards the

goal of $20 billion. 2023. Available at: https://baochinhphu.vn/dua-kim-ngach-thuong-mai-viet-

-nam-an-do-huong-toi-muc-tieu-20-ty-usd-102231016212026781.htm. Access in: 14 Sept. 2023.

VIETNAM GOVERNMENT NEWSPAPER. Vietnam and India raised their relationship to a com-

prehensive strategic partnership. 2016. Available at: https://baochinhphu.vn/viet-nam-an-do-nang-

-quan-he-len-doi-tac-chien-luoc-toan-dien-102208539.htm. Access in: 24 Jan. 2024.

VIETNAM MINISTRY OF INDUSTRY AND TRADE. Vietnam-India bilateral trade exceeds

$12 billion in 11 months. 2023. Available at: https://moit.gov.vn/tin-tuc/thi-truong-nuoc-ngoai/

thi-truong-chau-a-chau-phi/thuong-mai-song-phuong-viet-nam-an-do-vuot-12-ty-usd-tron-

g-11-thang.html. Access in: 17 Sept. 2023.

VIETNAM MINISTRY OF INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATIONS. India issues statement

on East Sea amid US-China “head-on” verbal clash. 2020. Available at: https://mic.gov.vn/Pages/

TinTuc/tinchitiet.aspx?tintucid=143429. Access in: 14 Jan. 2024.

VIETNAM NEWS AGENCY. Prime Minister Pham Minh Chinh receives Indian Foreign Minister.

2023. Available at: https://baotintuc.vn/chinh-tri/thu-tuong-pham-minh-chinh-tiep-bo-truong-

-ngoai-giao-an-do-20231016215029913.htm. Access in: 11 Apr. 2024.

VIETNAM PEOPLE’S POLICE NEWSPAPER. India invests in over 400 projects in Vietnam.

2023. Available at: https://cand.com.vn/thi-truong/an-do-dau-tu-hon-400-du-an-vao-viet-nam-

-i714696/. Access in: 6 Mar. 2023.

WALKER, G. The India-China Rivalry and Their Expanding Contest of Power. 30 Jan. 2025. Available

at: https://intpolicydigest.org/the-india-china-rivalry-and-their-expanding-contest-of-power/.

Access in: 15 Feb. 2025.