Why RTAs mitigate non-tariff protectionism

An analysis of non-tariff measures, RTAs, and WTO Ministerial Conferences.

  • Lucas Baggi Universidade de Brasília / Doutorando
Palavras-chave: Negociações de larga escala, negociações de pequena escala, medidas não tarifárias, cláusulas OMC-plus, cláusulas OMC-extra

Resumo

Este artigo tem como objetivo avaliar a eficácia das negociações de grande e pequena escala para mitigar medidas não tarifárias (MNTs). A hipótese levantada é que quanto maior for o número de cláusulas WTO-plus e WTO-extra em Acordos Comerciais Regionais (ACRs), menor será o crescimento do estoque de MNTs reportado à OMC e maior o número de MNTs retiradas por membros da OMC. Para testá-la, testes de regressão linear são empregados com dados de ACRs e protecionismo. Trata-se de uma análise sem precedentes de todas as MNTs notificadas à OMC nos últimos 27 anos, tendo por principais conclusões que: há uma correlação negativa moderada / fraca entre o crescimento dos estoques de MNTs, e cláusulas dos tipos WTO-extra e WTO-plus, bem como uma correlação positiva moderada / fraca entre essas cláusulas e as MNTs retiradas pelos membros da OMC. Essas descobertas fortalecem as teorias que afirmam que ACRs são criadores de comércio.

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Publicado
15-11-2023
Como Citar
Baggi, L. (2023). Why RTAs mitigate non-tariff protectionism. Conjuntura Internacional, 19(1), 2-22. https://doi.org/10.5752/P.1809-6182.2022v19n1p2-22