Carlos Hernán Gonzalez Parias, Juan Camilo Mesa Bedoya, Maria Camila Alzate

The Role of Internaonal Actors in the Negoaon Process Between the Colombian Government and the Farc-Ep: a Necessary and Controlled Parcipaon

The Role of International Actors in

the Negotiation Process Between the

Colombian Government and the Farc-Ep: a

Necessary and Controlled Participation

Rol de Actores Internacionales en el Proceso de

Negociación de Entre el Gobierno Colombiano y las Farc-

Ep: Una Participación Necesaria y Controlada

O Papel dos Actores Internacionais no Processo de

Negociação Entre o Governo Colombiano e a Farc-Ep: Uma

Participação Necessária e Controlada

Carlos Hernán Gonzalez Parias1

Juan Camilo Mesa Bedoya2

Maria Camila Alzate3

DOI: 10.5752/P.2317-773X.2022v10.n2.p59

Recebido em: 10 de maio de 2021

Aprovado em: 11 de abril de 2022

A

One of the major objectives of the Juan Manuel Santos´ (2010-2018) adminis-

tration was the consolidation and completion of the negotiation process for an

agreement with the FARC-EP to end the armed conict between these parts. To

achieve this, it was necessary to mobilize and align the state apparatus, including

foreign policy. The objective of this article is to determine the role played by the

international community in the negotiation process between the Colombian

government and the FARC-EP guerrilla group in the Cuban capital. The above,

concealed by a qualitative method based on the press’ documentary review

and ocial speeches. This article demonstrates that Colombian foreign policy

established as objectives, on the one hand, to internationalize the process to

obtain legitimacy and support in a possible post-conict phase, but also to limit,

between negotiations, the participation of the dierent international actors.

Keywords: Colombian Foreign Policy, Havana´s Negotiation Process, Neoclassi-

cal Realism, Internationalization.

R

Uno de los grandes objetivos de la administración de Juan Manuel Santos

(2010-2018) fue la consolidación y nalización del proceso de negociación de

un acuerdo con las FARC-EP que pusieran n al conicto armado entre estas

1.Doutor, Tecnológico de Antioquia.

E-mail: carlosheg@gmail.com.

2. Doutor, Institución Universitaria Esu-

mer. E-mail: mesabedoya@gmail.com.

3. Graduanda, Institución Universitaria

Esumer. E-mail: mcamilalzater@gmail.

com.

estudos internacionais • Belo Horizonte, ISSN 2317-773X, v. 10, n. 2, (jun. 2022), p. 59-77

partes. Para su logro, fue necesario la movilización y alineación del aparato

estatal, incluyendo a la política exterior. El objetivo del presente artículo consiste

en determinar el rol jugado por la comunidad internacional en el proceso de

negociación entre el gobierno colombiano y el grupo guerrillero Farc-Ep, en la

capital cubana. Lo anterior, bajo un método de corte cualitativo, basado en la

revisión documental de prensa y de discursos ociales. El articulo evidencia que

la política exterior colombiana estableció como objetivos, por una parte, inter-

nacionalizar el proceso con la pretensión de lograr legitimidad y respaldo en una

eventual etapa de posconicto, pero también limitar, durante las negociaciones,

la participación de los diferentes actores internacionales.

Palabras Clave: Política Exterior Colombiana, Proceso de Negociación de la

Habana, Realismo neoclásico, Internacionalización.

R

Um dos principais objetivos da administração de Juan Manuel Santos (2010-

2018) era a consolidação e conclusão do processo de negociação de um acordo

com as FARC-EP que pusesse m ao conito armado entre estas partes. Para

o conseguir, foi necessário mobilizar e alinhar o aparelho de Estado, incluindo

a política externa. O objetivo deste artigo é determinar o papel desempenhado

pela comunidade internacional no processo de negociação entre o governo

colombiano e o grupo guerrilheiro das FARC-EP na capital cubana. O acima

exposto, sob um método qualitativo, baseado numa revisão documental da im-

prensa e em discursos ociais. O artigo mostra que a política externa colombia-

na estabeleceu como objetivos, por um lado, internacionalizar o processo com o

objetivo de conseguir legitimidade e apoio numa eventual fase pós-conito, mas

também limitar, durante as negociações, a participação dos diferentes atores

internacionais.

Palavras-chave: Política Externa Colombiana, Processo de Negociação de Hava-

na, Realismo Neoclássico, Internacionalização.

Introduction

Colombia´s foreign policy during the two Juan Manuel Santos (2010-

2018) administrations, experienced a turning point regarding the way the

previous administration was conducted. This change is expressed in as-

pects such as the restoration of battered relations with neighbouring cou-

ntries (Ecuador and Venezuela), reincorporation into regional dynamics,

active participation in multilateral spaces, the use of South-South coope-

ration as a foreign policy instrument (GONZÁLEZ; MESA; MONTOYA,

2018), among others. However, perhaps the main bet of both government

periods was the consolidation of the negotiation process with the FARC-

-EP. While the search for resolution of the armed conict is largely at the

root of domestic policy, because of the dierent levels of internationali-

zation achieved by the Colombian conict, much of the country´s foreign

policy was directed towards this main objective. One of the aims of the

country´s foreign policy, before and during the formal commencement of

negotiations, was to involve the international community, seeking to le-

gitimize the process, to obtain political support and to procure commit-

ments in international cooperation for the post-conict phase. Therefore,

the objective of this article is to characterize the international commu-

Carlos Hernán Gonzalez Parias, Juan Camilo Mesa Bedoya, Maria Camila Alzate

The Role of Internaonal Actors in the Negoaon Process Between the Colombian Government and the Farc-Ep: a Necessary and Controlled Parcipaon

nity´s participation in the negotiation process. It is based on the assump-

tion that such participation was limited and controlled by the Colombian

government. That is, the country´s foreign policy, understood as a stra-

tegic and intentional construction, incorporated as one of its objectives,

limited participation of the international community in the process. This

article is structured in four parts. The rst is responsible for presenting

and justifying the selection of the theoretical reference, which consists

of an adaptation of the neoclassical realism developments. The second

section is responsible for presenting a brief contextualization of the Co-

lombian armed conict and the manners in which it has internationali-

zed and inuenced the State´s foreign policy. The following analyses the

dierent roles, limits and scopes of international participation during the

negotiation process in Havana. Finally, a series of reections and conclu-

sions are given.

Theoretical and conceptual references

This article is developed based on the neoclassical realism theory

(NCR). The neoclassical realistic research program has a renewed inte-

rest in reconciling the relationship between internal, external, and idea-

tional factors (GONZÁLEZ; MUÑOZ, 2020, p. 26), which are assumed as

diatomic by various theories of International Aair.

Based on this argument, the theory postulates four dimensions, the

rst being the independent variable, which corresponds to the stimuli

perceived from the international system. Then, there are the so-called

intervening variables, which consist of variables of the level of units: per-

ceptions of leaders making foreign policy decisions, the strategic culture

of the state, institutional design around foreign policy and the State-So-

ciety relationship. Concerning the introduction of the variables involved,

(FERNANDES, 2015) states that it results in the possibility of relativizing

the assumption of rationality of agents, considering contexts of distor-

tion and incomplete information, as well as perceptions nuanced by ins-

titutional and historical features (FERNANDES, 2015, p. 206). The third

group of variables, at the intermediate level, is the foreign policy process:

the realisation of the perception process, decision-making and the sub-

sequent policy implementation; that is, that these factors work to “chan-

nel, mediate and (re) direct” foreign policy (SCHWELLER, 2004). Finally,

there is the dependent variable, which corresponds to the foreign policy

response made by the State.

estudos internacionais • Belo Horizonte, ISSN 2317-773X, v. 10, n. 2, (jun. 2022), p. 59-77

Figure 1: Neoclassical Realism Model

Source: (RIPSMAN; TALIAFERRO; LOBELL, 2016, p. 34)

Another aspect highlighted by the NCR is that it places importance

on foreign policy executives (FPE). In high proportion, a state´s foreign

policy is inuenced and formulated by a small group of high-level leaders

and ocials. Neoclassical realists consider that foreign policy is not a fai-

thful and accurate reection of the state´s power capabilities, since, at the

moment of the design and decision-making process, involving elites and

leaders, there are distortions mediated by the perceptions of those deci-

sion-makers and limitations regarding the use of such resources. But the-

se distortions do not necessarily imply inhibition of the implementation

of foreign policy and objectives, more than that, they can also facilitate

and expedite this process.

For this analysis, emphasis is placed on the variables involved in

perceptions of decision-making leaders in foreign policy and the state´s

strategic culture.

About the former, leaders make such decisions based to a large ex-

tent on their perceptions and calculations of the relative power and inten-

tions of other states. The leader´s images are presented as cognitive lters

that intervene the time leaders process information from the international

environment: what they pay attention to, when and how to prepare to res-

pond to possible threats and opportunities (TALIAFERRO, 2006, p. 485)

and (RIPSMAN; TALIAFERRO; LOBELL, 2016, p. 34). Strategic culture is

due to all interrelated beliefs, norms and assumptions; it is assumed as a sta-

te memory, which intervenes as guidance to leaders and decision-makers

about possible paths, methods and strategies to be employed in response

to a foreign policy situation. It provides information to decision-makers,

about what is appropriate or inappropriate, based on the country´s tradi-

tion of external behaviour. This is a political calculation, sometimes the le-

vel of threat or opportunity can lead to action against the strategic culture.

For this analysis and following the theoretical references, the foreign

policy shall be understood as a state strategy with projection towards other

states, actors and conditions at the international level where the priorities,

objectives, means and instruments necessary to achieve them are mani-

Carlos Hernán Gonzalez Parias, Juan Camilo Mesa Bedoya, Maria Camila Alzate

The Role of Internaonal Actors in the Negoaon Process Between the Colombian Government and the Farc-Ep: a Necessary and Controlled Parcipaon

festly, intentionally and consented to. It is formulated by people in ocial

or authority positions. The formulation process involves both actors (inte-

rest groups, elites, organised civil society, the media, subnational govern-

ments, non-governmental organizations, among others) as well as factors

(the image of decision-makers, ideational, cultural, state institutionality,

state-to-society relationship, among others) (GONZÁLEZ, 2021, p. 22)

A short brief on Colombian internal armed conﬂict.

The researchers´ group of the National Centre for Historical Me-

mory of Colombia (2014), divide the Colombian armed conict into four

stages. The rst between 1958 and 1982, a stage characterized by the tran-

sition from partisan to subversive violence, in this period the creation of

guerrilla groups were energized. The second, between 1982 and 1996, a

stage essentially marked by international inuenced, the decline of the

Cold War along with the positioning of drug tracking on the global

agenda, as well as an almost exponential expansion of the guerrilla groups

that marked the state´s institutionality. The third, between 1996 and 2005,

a stage inuenced by an issue that redrawn the international stage in mi-

litary terms, and the ght against terrorism, fuelled by the escalate of ar-

med conict due to the simultaneous expansion of guerrillas and parami-

litary groups. The fourth, between 2005 and the present, a stage marked

by a state´s military oensive in terms of counterinsurgent ghting and

peace process that developed Juan Manuel Santos’s government with the

FARC-EP, a process supported by the international community.

It should be emphasized that there is no consensus at the beginning

of Colombia´s internal armed conict. Dierent authors have postulated

that the conict in Colombia dates to the beginning of the republican

stage at the beginning of the nineteenth century, others start the stage of

the violence, initiated after the assassination of the liberal warlord Jorge

Eliécer Gaitán. There is also a legal precedent that frames the beginning

of the internal armed conict in 1985, this precedent is law 1448 of 2011

which entered into force during the Juan Manuel Santos government, a

law that, among others, recognises the existence of the conict and its

political and social causes (YEPES, 2018) cited by (MESA; YEPES, 2020).

There is also no consensus on the dates of foundation of Colombian

guerrillas, however, there is a coincidence that the creation of these takes

place in the 1960s, in which the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia

(FARC for its acronyms in Spanish), The National Liberation Army (ELN

for its acronyms in Spanish) and the People´s Liberation Army (EPL for

its acronyms in Spanish) are simultaneously born (MESA; YEPES, 2020).

It can be said that there is a common ideological denominator in

the creation of the Colombian guerrilla organizations, composed of the

peasant heritage of land struggles and discontent with the restrictions

on political participation of the Frente Nacional4 (the National Front), the

inuence of the Chinese and Cuban revolutions and even the May revolu-

tion of ´68 in France and the mobilization against the Vietnam War in the

United States, as well as the lack of guarantees for political participation

(MESA; YEPES, 2020). In fact, this latter aspect was the trigger for the

4. In the history of Colombia it is known

as “

El Frente Nacional

(The National

Front)”, a period between 1958 and

1974 during which, thanks to a great

agreement, the main Colombian political

parties, Liberals and Conservatives

divided power, excluding from it all the

other political movements that existed

at that historical time in Colombia

(MESA, 2009, p. 159).

estudos internacionais • Belo Horizonte, ISSN 2317-773X, v. 10, n. 2, (jun. 2022), p. 59-77

creation of the April 19th Movement (M-19), created in 1970 because of

voter fraud in that year´s presidential elections.

Between 1970 and 1980, dierent subversive organizations emer-

ged whom gradually signed peace processes. These include the Worker´s

Revolutionary Party (PRT for its acronyms in Spanish) and the Quintín

Lame Movement, the latter in the claim of indigenous territories.

In addition to the guerrilla groups, the phenomenon of paramilita-

rism emerged in the 1990s (GRUPO DE MEMORIA HISTÓRICA, 2014).

In the beginning, they were considered “Cooperatives of surveillance and

private security”, they led to the creation of the so-called United Self-De-

fense Forces of Colombia (AUC for its acronyms in Spanish), considering

themselves as “a Political-Military movement of an anti-subversive nature

in the exercise of the right to a legitimate self-defence” (EL TIEMPO, 1997).

Given the previous context, it can be said that from the middle of

the twentieth century to the present day the armed conict has been part

of Colombian political history, therefore domestic and foreign policy has

suered from conditioning. As Carolina Yepes (2018, p. 9) states “domes-

tic policy on the end of the armed conict in Colombia, has largely con-

ditioned and directed the formulation, design and implementation of the

foreign policy of the dierent Colombian governments”

One of the rst recognitions of the armed conict as a political pro-

blem was carried out by President Belisario Betancur (1982-1986). Prior to

this date, this issue was considered more of a problem of public order and

internal treatment in government policy, but from that point onwards

there was a kind of political recognition to the uprising in arms (GRUPO

DE MEMORIA HISTÓRICA, 2013). Belisario Betancur was the rst pre-

sident to devise an international strategy to support his eorts to achieve

peace at a local level, i.e., the design of a foreign policy strategy. Although

this strategy cannot be dened in the strict sense as an internationalisa-

tion strategy, it was an important eort to validate the peace process and

make it more coherent (BORDA, 2012).

The government that succeeded Betancur, that of Virgilio Barco

(1986-1990) accelerate a peace process with the M-19. To this end, it pre-

vented the armed conict from permeating the country´s foreign policy

agenda, as the main interest in this policy focused on obtaining resources

for strengthening the economy. However, at the end of this government,

as García (1992, p. 187) mentions, there was an interest in negotiating with

the FARC-EP, who proposed as mediators, former US President Jimmy

Carter and Venezuelan President Carlos Andrés Pérez “which meant a

new interest in linking the conict to the international context” (MESA;

YEPES, 2020) and, therefore, a new foreign policy strategy, designed and

implemented from an internal condition.

Between 1990 and 1994 during the Cesar Gaviria government, it

was characterized in foreign policy by the restoration of bilateral relations

with Cuba in the context of the process that was ahead with the M-19, so

that it is again observed, the domestic nuances in the State´s foreign policy.

Even amid the sharp escalation of violence during the last two decades of the

twentieth century and the deployment of an extensive repertoire of peace

initiatives, as occurred during the administrations of […] Belisario Betancur

Carlos Hernán Gonzalez Parias, Juan Camilo Mesa Bedoya, Maria Camila Alzate

The Role of Internaonal Actors in the Negoaon Process Between the Colombian Government and the Farc-Ep: a Necessary and Controlled Parcipaon

(1982-1986), Virgilio Barco (1986-1990) and César Gaviria (1990-1994) adminis-

trations, there was no considerable external participation. Nor was there any

strategy to link the peace processes in place to multilateral actors such as the UN

or the OAS, although there were some calls in this regard from dierent sectors

(FAWCETT, 2012, p. 117).

On the other hand, in Ernesto Samper´s government (1994-1998)

several developments in international relations and foreign policy took

place and had a direct connection to the armed conict. This is the case

with the submission to the Congress of the Republic of Additional Pro-

tocol II to the Geneva conventions, which involves regulations relating

to the protection of victims of non-international armed conicts, this is a

clear example of how internal and external stimuli coexist in the formu-

lation of the Colombian State´s foreign policy strategies.

Attempts at peace with the FARC-EP and the ELN were constant in

the Samper government, while as Tokatlian (2000) argues, the president´s

attempts to seek greater support abroad for his initiatives were constant,

through dierent actions in the pursuance of his government´s foreign policy.

Although the foreign policy was often conditioned in these periods,

previous dynamics of cases of internationalisation of the armed conict

were isolated and unsystematic. Nevertheless, as Borda (2012) highlights,

subsequent governments (Pastrana and Uribe) had clear foreign policy

strategies concerning the armed conict.

One of the most active governments in international dynamics, given

the peace process that went ahead with the FARC-EP, was that of Andrés

Pastrana (1998-2002). This negotiation, known as the Caguán peace process,

turned the interest of the international community to the country. A clear de-

monstration of this was the US interest in supporting a dialogued solution to

the conict with this guerrilla group. In fact, as Rojas (2007, p. 49 - 50) indicates:

At the beginning of the negotiation process with the FARC, the United States

was inclined to support this alternative, albeit with some discrepancy. The State

Department thought it was possible to apply in Colombia the strategic approach

undertaken in El Salvador in the late 1980s. This approach avoided direct inter-

vention and favoured escalating assistance in the form of equipment, training

and intelligence technology, to defeat guerrilla groups and create conditions for a

negotiated solution.

As Mesa and Yepes (2020) indicate, the Pastrana government be-

gins one of the stages of further internationalisation of the Colombian

armed conict, since, through foreign policy strategies, the famous “Plan

Colombia” (Colombia Plan) was signed. Although, at the outset, this plan

was explicitly anti-narcotic in nature and not directly alluded to the sub-

versive ght, after 11th September 2001, in the context of the World War

against terrorism, the inclusion of counter-terrorism in the structure of

the plan was facilitated.

With strategies like this, war has ceased to be internal, it has become externa-

lized, opening the way to interventions in the country´s internal aairs and its

external relations. Its preponderance has been accentuated inversely proportional

to the weakness or strength of the Colombian state on its triple front against

drug trackers, insurgency and counterinsurgency. Under the impact of the uni-

versalization of terrorism and drug tracking, and in that direction although it

cannot be said that the Colombian war is international, it is a war of internatio-

nal interest, with international eects and consequences (MEDINA, 2009, p. 36).

estudos internacionais • Belo Horizonte, ISSN 2317-773X, v. 10, n. 2, (jun. 2022), p. 59-77

As noted in the rst part of this section, the international context

has always inuenced the dynamics of the Colombian armed conict

both in the 1940s and at the dawn of the 21st century. Another event that

directly inuenced the characteristics of the Colombian confrontation

was the 11th September 2001 terrorist attacks in the United States.

For Yepes (2018) this event added an important tinge to the concep-

tualization of the Colombian armed conict in the post-Pastrana adminis-

tration since during the Álvaro Uribe Vélez (2002-2010) governments, the-

re was an alignment of domestic and external policy concerning direct mi-

litary confrontation and the new international agenda to ght terrorism.

“In this context, the counter-insurgency ght takes the ags of the

battle against international terrorism, thus eliminating the political recog-

nition that previous governments had made to guerrilla groups and giving

them a connotation of terrorists” (MESA; YEPES, 2020). In fact, the three

major Colombian armed groups (FARC-EP, ELN and AUC) were identied

by the U.S. Department of State as terrorist organizations and the involve-

ment of FARC and paramilitaries, in the drug business (TICKNER, 2007).

In this scenario, the dynamics of the conict continued to be internationalising

and, in some cases, regionally isolating the country. Two episodes were key to

this isolation: the initiative to install U.S. military bases in the country and Co-

lombia´s intervention to bomb a guerrilla camp in which FARC-EP number two

would be dropped; Raúl Reyes, in Ecuadorian territory (MESA; YEPES, 2020).

Amid this diplomatic crisis, Juan Manuel Santos (2010-2018) as-

sumes his role as president, who “in contravention of the thesis of the

terrorist threat, accepts the existence of the internal armed conict in

Colombia, recognising the political foundation of the rebellion in which

guerrilla groups have their action” (YEPES, 2018, p. 11) which paved the

way for a possible negotiated settlement. In addition to this, Santos opted

in the rst three months of his government to lower the tension of batte-

red diplomatic relations with neighbours such as Ecuador and Venezuela.

The Santos government´s peace process with the FARC-EP is

perhaps one of the most successful of recent years. As will be seen in the

subsequent paragraphs, the accompaniment of the international commu-

nity was predominant, with mediation and guarantee by Cuba, Venezue-

la, Chile and Norway, the United Nations and the United States.

The Havana Negotiation process with the FARC-EP and the Colombian

Foreign Policy

Commencement of the negotiation process and strategy; between the

perception and the learning of the past.

The strategy proposed by the Santos government, to advance the

negotiation process with the FARC-EP, transitions between the percep-

tion of the head of state and the strategic culture shaped over decades of

the negotiation process, which has left successes and misunderstandings,

creating a state memory regarding methods and strategies to face future

negotiations with guerrilla groups (GONZÁLEZ, 2021, pág. 111)