The Possibility of not Exercising the Right to be Judged by the Jury Court

Considerations based on the Constitutional Model of Procedure

Abstract

The recent tensions over the trial before the Jury Court, a type of council formed by seven members of the public, with the power to judge intentional crimes against life, occupy the legal and media scene. Analyses of famous cases and the contours of a decision made by a lay person, without technical training, support the need to reformulate the Jury Court, in order to bring legitimacy and validity to the decisions made by the Sentencing Council. The purpose of this study is to promote the analysis of the possibility that the accused does not exercise his right to be judged by the Jury. Therefore, it is necessary to revisit the very nature of the institution of the Jury, if constituted as a mere definition of competence or a fundamental right that can be renounced. Through a hypothetical-deductive method, supported by exploratory research, the origins of the Jury Court, its procedure and the constitutional principles of a procedural nature inherent to the accusatory system were understood. The methodology used was bibliographic research, through readings and critical analysis of the current legislation, doctrine and jurisprudence. Based on the understanding of specific cases, whose decision ended up undermining the continuation of the fundamental rights of the accused submitted to the decision coming from the Sentencing Council, it was revealed that the jurisdiction of the Jury Court is a fundamental procedural right and not a mere rule of competence. Therefore, there is a dissonance about the allocation of the Jury and in interpretation according to the Republic's Constitution of 1988, the defendant should be allowed to stand trial before the Sentencing Council.