47 • Conjuntura Internacional • Belo Horizonte,
ISSN 1809-6182, v.17 n.2, p.47 - 61, dez. 2020
Artigo
Coronavirus, Global Risk and The New
International Crisis Management Model
Coronavírus, Risco Global e O Novo Modelo Internacional de Gestão de Crises
Coronavirus, Riesgo Global y El Nuevo Modelo Internacional de Gestión de Crisis
Jorge M. Lasmar 1
Leonardo Coelho Assunção Santa Rita2
DOI: 10.5752/P.1809-6182.2020v17n3p47
Received in June 26, 2020
Accepted in November 16, 2020
Abstract
Te main target of this article is to discuss, in the light of the new crisis management
models, the immediate responses that state authorities have given to the COVID-19 crisis,
in order to better understand the way in which global leaders are facing the novel interna-
tional crises.
Keywords: Coronavirus. Crisis Managent. Risk.
Resumo
O objetivo do artigo é discutir, à luz dos novos modelos de gestão de crise, as respostas
imediatas que as autoridades estatais deram para a crise da COVID-19, a fim de entender
melhor a maneira com que as lideranças globais estão enfrentando as novas crises interna-
cionais.
Palavras Chave: Coronavirus. Gestão de Crise. Risco.
Resumen
El objetivo del artículo es discutir, a la luz de los nuevos modelos de gestión de crisis, las
respuestas inmediatas que las autoridades estatales han dado a la crisis COVID-19, a fin
de comprender mejor la forma en que los líderes mundiales se enfrentan a las nuevas crisis
internacionales.
Palabras Clave: Coronavirus. Manejo de Crisis. Riesgo.
1 Jorge M. Lasmar is a Profesor of International Relations at PUC Minas, Belo Horizonte, Brazil. He holds a PhD in International
Relations from the London School of Ecomomics and Political Science, LSE.
2 Leonardo Coelho Assunção Santa Rita is a master’s student in the Postgraduate Program in International Relations at PUC Minas,
Belo Horizonte, Brazil. He holds a Bachelor’s degree in International Relations from the Pontifícia Universidade Católica de
Minas Gerais, PUC Minas.
48 • Conjuntura Internacional • Belo Horizonte, ISSN 1809-6182, v.17 n.3, p.47 - 61, dez. 2020
Coronavirus, Global Risk and
Coronavirus Pandemic (I), to then briefly des-
The New International Crisis
cribe the international responses (II) in order
Management Model
to better comprehend what is the new inter-
national crisis model and how it can help re-
Te first cases of the new Coronavirus
-shape how we think about crisis managements
(SARS-COV-2) contamination in humans ar-
(III) to finally conclude with the lessons lear-
guably appeared on the outskirts of the Wuhan
ned from the current crisis.
region, China, in late 2019. Even though the
virus has a lower mortality rate when compared
I. Key Features of the Coronavirus
to other pathogens such as Ebola - which has an
Crises: Context and Global Structure
impressive fatality rate of 50% (WHO, 2020a)
- it does spread quickly. In fact, it is exactly
One of the defining characteristics of the
such a spread rate that led a regional epidemic
new Coronavirus crisis is that it clearly follows
transform into a full-scale global Pandemic
globalisation. Tis is because there is a direct re-
(WHO, 2020b). Te pandemic, in its turn,
lationship between the contagion pathways and
brought about global-scale disruptions that go
the intensity of transnational flows. If we follow
well beyond the issue of individual health: it
both the maps and timeline of the virus conta-
impacted the very structure of societies. It af-
gion worldwide, there is a remarkable parallel
fected global business and commerce (OECD,
between its ability to spread following from the
2020), increased the mortality rates, affected
first regions affected by the pandemic straight
the distribution of wealth, changed the priority
to the most heavily globalised locations (i.e. re-
and dynamics of the infrastructure matrix and
gions with denser global interactions flows) and
even altered the behaviour of individuals and
then following to increasingly less globalised
societies (GOOGLE, 2020).
locations. After China and its neighbours, the
In fact, both the global-scale crisis as well
Coronavirus spread more rapidly and more in-
as the responses adopted to counter it were lar-
tensely throughout Western Europe and North
gely perceived as unprecedented. However, this
America. By April 2020 these regions already
is not the case. For at least a few years various
led the international ranking in both num-
‘global political risks estimates’ have been poin-
ber of cases and number of deaths (HEALTH
ting out the high risk of a global-scale pande-
MAP, 2020). Amongst other factors, what these
mic disruption (WORLD ECONOMIC FO-
regions have in common is that they also led
RUM, 2019). Along the same lines, for almost
the globalization index. Tis is an index which
a decade, there has also been a debate on the
considers everything from economic to cultu-
need to develop a new model of internatio-
ral and informational issues. Tus, we can infer
nal crisis management capable of dealing with
that a positive correlation exists between the in-
“novel” global-level disruption crises (OECD,
tensity of transnational flows and the spread of
2013). Tus, to understand what the new mo-
the virus (GYGLI et al, 2019).
del of international crisis management can tea-
In fact, this is not something new. Khan-
ch us about present and future global crises, we
na (2020), for example, compares the spread
will first outline a few important aspects of the
of the new Coronavirus from China to the
49 • Conjuntura Internacional • Belo Horizonte, ISSN 1809-6182, v.17 n.3, p.47 - 61, dez. 2020
rest of the world with the spread of the Black
traditional state sources (such as political-mi-
Death in the 14th century. Te Black plague
litary threats) but can also have transnational
also followed the main pathway of transnatio-
and diffuse origins (KEOHANE, NYE, 2012).
nal flows existing at that time: the silk road.
Nevertheless, this does not mean that the old
Te disease passed through Persia (now Iran)
state-generated risks are extinct or obsolete.
and reached Italy. However, the most interes-
What the pandemic does demonstrate is that
ting point about this analogy is not the simi-
the states face an environment of increased
larity in the route of the virus. After all, in the
complexity. Te traditional international risks
case of COVID-19, the spread in Europe and
co-exist with a host of non-traditional, trans-
North America occurred almost simultaneou-
national and diffuse threats that are growingly
sly. What comes to attention is the speed with
disruptive, more frequent and bringing up in-
which it spread (KHANA, 2020). In the 14th
creasingly demanding challenges for the states.
century, the Black Death took years to travel
Another striking key feature of the CO-
the Silk Road and affect Europe as a whole.
VID-19 crisis is its disruptive power. Such po-
In 2020, however, it took only a few months
wer is reflected in the rapid cascade effect of
for the new Coronavirus to affect most of the
the pandemic in other structural and social
world. Again, in both situations the intensity
areas. Its impact ranges from global economic,
of transnational flows and globalization deter-
logistic, and infrastructure disruptions to pro-
mined the pace of the international crisis.
found social, demographic, institutional and
Tis also seem to confirm Keohane’s and
behavioural changes. Te spread of the virus
Nye’s statement that as the degree of interde-
and the measures taken to contain it caused
pendence amongst countries grows, so do the
logistical difficulties to companies ranging
risks arising from the increase in their mutual
from car factories to producers of digital games
level of sensitivity and vulnerability (KEOHA-
(STUART, 2020; DEBORD, 2020). Global
NE, NYE, 2012).3 In other words, there is a
economies have also been hit hard by the cri-
tendency that the greater the density and inten-
sis. Since the start of the Pandemic, stock mar-
sity of flows, the higher the level of sensitivity
kets have experienced historic declines, while
and vulnerability will be. It is exactly this corre-
in the United States - the largest economy in
lation between the greater density of sensitivity,
the world - and elsewhere, millions of workers
risks and the pandemic effects of COVID-19
have signed up to receive unemployment in-
that will be discussed here. Te increased den-
surance benefits (GLOBAL... 2020; RUSHE;
sity of interactions and flows also potentially
HOLPUCH, 2020). In fact, we can safely state
increases risks. In fact, as the theory also points
that the disruption brought about by the coro-
out, the risks and threats not only come from
navirus crisis was strong enough to expose the
many vulnerabilities of globalisation.
3 According to Keohane and Nye (2012) “sensitivity refers
One final important element that charac-
to the costly effects of cross-border flows on societies and
governments, within an unchanged framework of basic pol-
terizes the crisis of the new Coronavirus is the
icies”, while “vulnerability is another step further in cost.
informational environment in which it is em-
It refers to the costs of adjusting to the change indexed by
bedded. Never - not even during the H1N1
sensitivity, by changing one’s own policies” (KEOHANE,
NYE, 2012, p. 232-233).
Pandemic in 2009 - has a crisis of this scope
50 • Conjuntura Internacional • Belo Horizonte, ISSN 1809-6182, v.17 n.3, p.47 - 61, dez. 2020
occurred in an environment in which informa-
allow us to gauge how novel global crises will
tion (and disinformation) flows so quickly and
impact us in the future. Having this in mind,
in such a decentralised manner. Tis has a dou-
and learning from the current state’s responses,
ble effect. On the one hand, it allows relevant
can be an important tool to evaluate how to
information about the pandemic to quickly
prepare for and manage new crises.
reach a significant number of people. On the
other hand, it also allows disinformation to be
II. States’ Responses
disseminated at an even faster pace than the vi-
rus itself. Tis is a huge problem. A series of
Te COVID-19 pandemic crisis quickly
different actors employed disinformation du-
became systemic. So did its disruptive effects.
ring the outbreak to achieve different objecti-
At first glance, to say that a pandemic and its
ves. Fraudsters, pranksters, companies, states
disruptive effects became systemic might seem
and political and social groups disseminated
tautological, but that is most certainly not the
disinformation using varying methods and de-
case. To observe that the pandemic became
grees of sophistication Tis wide spectrum of
systemic is to assert that not only its dynami-
disinformation brought about both short-term
cs is determined by the autopoietic interaction
and long-term risks and has actually proven to
between agent and structure (i.e., the fact that
be potentially fatal (WATTS, 2020). In fact,
they are mutually constitutive), but also that
the disinformation pandemic became so rele-
its effects have produced a trophic cascade ef-
vant that digital platforms such as YouTube,
fect. In fact, the scale and seriousness of the
Facebook and Twitter have adopted - though
matter led the Germany Chancellor, Angela
they are still struggling - measures to inhibit
Merkel, to declare that the current pandemic
and discourage the spread of false information
is the greatest challenge for her country since
that even included creating official channels of
World War II (MERKEL... 2020). It is still
communication about the crisis (LING, 2020).
relatively early for us to fully understand the
Tus, to peruse the state’s responses to the
real dimension of the crisis and compare it to a
new Coronavirus crisis can be an important
war is certainly debatable. However, when Ger-
tool to both evaluate the current state of our
many compares the pandemic to World War II
crisis management capabilities as well as to un-
it does provide us with an idea of the scale of
derstand the challenges that lay ahead. Tis is
the public policies’ responses that world leaders
so not only because the pandemic is a transna-
adopted. Likewise, the disruptive power of the
tional crisis. We have faced other transnational
pandemic is so high that former US Secretary
crises before. Te COVID-19 crisis is embed-
of State Henry Kissinger said that the CO-
ded within a new informational environment
VID-19 crisis will definitely change the global
that was constructed globally after the spread
order (KISSINGER, 2020).
of digital media. Additionally, the trophic cas-
No one questions the scale of the state
cade effects triggered by the global pandemic is
responses to contain the virus or the impacts
another factor that make this crisis so unique
those measures may have upon our daily lives.
and challenging for crisis managers. Finally,
However, there is yet another hidden and more
its unprecedented size, dimension and speed
important underdiscussed impact: the pande-
51 • Conjuntura Internacional • Belo Horizonte, ISSN 1809-6182, v.17 n.3, p.47 - 61, dez. 2020
mic brought about a broader crisis of meaning.
nister Viktor Órban the power to govern by de-
Whether one looks careful, several state and
cree, that is, the ability to approve measures wi-
non-state responses seem to go in the opposite
thout the need to submit them to parliament.
direction of what would be expected from the
Te justification of the Prime Minister and the
current crisis. We are witnessing the denial of
parliamentarians who approved the decision
science, the discrediting of international orga-
is that the urgency imposed by pandemic re-
nizations, an increase in authoritarianism and
quires that decisions be taken without much
a weakening of democracy, an informational
deliberation (DEMPSEY, 2020). Tis is a clear
and rhetorical war, an over-centralization and
example of one out-of-many securitisation
disorganization of the decision-making pro-
narratives within the pandemic, the question
cess, a return of hard borders and the poor
being whether the audience will accept it and
coordination amongst states as well as between
for long. Te real danger is that of ‘normalisa-
states and non-state actors. Tere are so many
tion of the extraordinary’ (MOECKLI, 2008,
examples of these practices that is even difficult
p. 229), i.e. the general tendency for emergen-
to list here. But take the denial of science, for
cy regimes to become entrenched and engen-
example. Countries such Nicaragua, Belarus
der definitive normative changes.
and Turkmenistan reject the very existence of
Another important reframing during the
Pandemic. Tese countries - together with a
COVID-19 crisis is that of territoriality and
few others that do not deny the existence of
borders. States responses to the pandemic un-
the pandemic - reject the response protocols
doubtedly led to a (re)strengthening of physical
recommendations by the World Health Orga-
borders. Not only there was a deliberated clo-
nisation and continue their everyday life as if
sing of physical borders between countries to
nothing had changed in a clear example of dis-
stop the spread of Coronavirus, but also several
credit for international organisations (CORO-
states turned away from solidarism, i.e., from
NAVIRUS… 2020a; PRESIDENT... 2020;
cooperating in joint ventures in pursuit of com-
RSF, 2020).
mon values (BUZAN, 2004, p. 62). Tis shift
Tus, one of the important questions rai-
towards more pluralist relations can be clearly
sed during the Pandemic is how it will affect
seen in those countries that engaged in a price
democracies and whether some of them will
war to secure medical supplies already destined
withstand a systemic crisis of this magnitude.
to other countries (US... 2020). Tis shift can
Te crisis is creating both a material and social
also be seen in the informational and narrative
pressure to reframe how we confer meaning
disputes over the Coronavirus engaged by the
upon many international practices and values.
United States, Russia and China. Te United
Democracy is one such value. Te common
States accuses China and Russia of both di-
idea that there is a need for a strong state res-
sinformation campaigns on social media and
ponse to the pandemic has caused an upsurge
in blaming Washington as responsible for the
in authoritarianism in some countries and the
Pandemic. Meanwhile, China accuses the USA
weakening of democracies in others, such as
of racism (AS... 2020; TRUMP… 2020). Tis
Hungary. On March 30, 2020, the Hungarian
war of narratives also reveals the very low level
parliament approved a bill granting Prime Mi-
of coordination present among the great po-
52 • Conjuntura Internacional • Belo Horizonte, ISSN 1809-6182, v.17 n.3, p.47 - 61, dez. 2020
wers to manage a global crisis and also reflects
the first step to prepare to a large-scale disrup-
an upsurge of rivalries between them. Tis is
tive crisis is to do a risk assessment (OECD,
relevant because the common norms and goals
2013). ISO defines risk assessment as “...that
of international society are created diffusely by
part of risk management which provides a
the direct clash/negotiation of individual in-
structured process that identifies how objec-
terests and by any ‘performance and sanction’
tives may be affected and analyses the risk in
social control systems that exist in interstate
terms of consequences and their probabilities
society. Key actors exercise influence over wea-
before deciding on whether further treatment
ker actors in interstate society mainly through
is required” (ISO, p. 6, 2009). Tus, risk asses-
processes of leadership, authority and coer-
sment is related to the general approach adop-
cion. Hence, changes in the behaviour of key
ted by a government or organization to identi-
actors have a greater potential to lead to shifts
fy possible threats and risks.
in shared norms and values in interstate society
Traditional risk assessment approaches are
(LASMAR, 2012).
built using “sectoral analysis based on historical
Finally, another relevant aspect of the sta-
events” (OECD, 2013). Tis means that the
tes’ responses is the notoriously poor coordi-
entire crisis preparation and identification fra-
nation between state and non-state actors. An
mework must first be divided into specific sec-
example is the lack of effective engagement to
tors
(industrial, economic, sanitary, military,
create industrial convergence and the produc-
etc.) and be based on other historical events of
tion of items needed to fight the new Corona-
the same type (OECD, 2013). In other words,
virus. States and large industries, for example,
to predict, identify and prepare for the CO-
are finding increasingly difficult to coordinate
VID-19 crisis, states should have built prepa-
their efforts or are doing so via emergency sta-
redness structures dedicated exclusively to deal
te laws that eventually force the convergence
with a pandemic crisis based on the experience
(MULDER, 2020).
of past events such as the Influenza AH1N1
Pandemic. In fact, places such as Taiwan, Sin-
III. The Old and the (not so) new
gapore and Hong Kong did so and were he-
crisis management model
ralded for keeping their cases count low at the
beginning of the pandemic (KUGUYO et al,
Dealing with a systemic crisis requires
2020).
a complex risk management structure. Tis
However, the COVID-19 pandemic is
structure includes tools for risk identification
not a traditional crisis. Te systemic cascading
and crisis preparedness, response teams and
effect of the pandemic - which can be observed
policies for crises management as well as me-
on the immediate social and economic conse-
chanisms to evaluate the crisis afterwards (fee-
quences of the crisis - makes it inappropriate
dback and lessons learned). Tus, traditionally
to adopt a sectorial and approach. Likewise, the
crisis management begins way before the crisis.
new structural environment in which the crisis
Identifying threats and adequately preparing
is embedded, makes it difficult to adopt mea-
for them is essential to mitigate the potential
sures based on past events. Crises of this nature
consequences of a future crisis. In this sense,
require a different risk assessment approach to
53 • Conjuntura Internacional • Belo Horizonte, ISSN 1809-6182, v.17 n.3, p.47 - 61, dez. 2020
be able to deal more effectively with both un-
cies must focus on coordinating their actions
certainty and complexity (OECD, 2013). In
rather than preparing for specific threats. Lea-
these cases, it is necessary to develop a national
dership, innovation capacity and systems that
risk assessment designed with a broader view
allow cooperation are essential to prepare for
of risk. In other words, it is necessary to un-
new crises (OECD, 2013).
derstand that there are multiple threats, a great
Once the main risks have been identified
number of unknowns and that any threat can
and adequately planned to address them, it is
trigger cascade effects in other areas. Tis broa-
necessary to have trigger mechanisms that ac-
der view of risk assessment cannot be restricted
tivate the response to the crisis. Te traditional
to just one sector as it needs to hold a systemic
policy is the development of early warning sys-
view. Central governments must also coordina-
tems that detect the occurrence of a threat and
te with other stakeholders such as private com-
quickly initiate the response protocols. Tese
panies and NGOs in identifying and anticipa-
systems are able to identify threats through
ting threats. Terefore, cooperation between
intense monitoring and information sharing,
the central government and the various sectors
such as natural disaster monitoring systems, for
of civil society is essential for the development
example. New crises however, due to their dif-
of a national risk assessment (OECD, 2013).
fuse nature and the speed with which they ari-
Once the risk has been identified, the
se, are often not detected by traditional means
next step is to develop an action plan. Tis is
of early warning. Tese novel situations call for
especially important when the risk identified
the development of strategic foresight capabili-
has either a high probability of occurrence or
ties in order to perceive and identify the weak
a significant consequence. Te planning of tra-
signs present at the beginning of a crisis that
ditional crisis emergencies is generally based on
often goes unnoticed. To develop such capabi-
scenarios. In this technique, each agency and/
lities, it is necessary to set up a multidiscipli-
or government sector, develop a series of res-
nary intelligence network (OECD, 2013). Tis
ponse protocols that must be adopted if a cer-
is clearly the case with the COVID-19 pande-
tain situation arises. Scenario-based planning
mic. States and organisations long ago already
depends directly on a fixed chain of command
identified the high risk of pandemic-like crises.
and predetermined procedures designed to
In the same lines, a significant number of go-
deliver the right response at the right time
vernment agencies, scientists and even CEOs
(OECD, 2013). However, new crises, such as
of large companies already recognised the des-
the new Coronavirus, no longer allow planning
tructive potential that a highly contagious vi-
based on fixed scenarios and protocols. Te un-
rus could cause and how unprepared we were
certainty of contemporary crises and the fact
(DAVIES, 2020). In fact, a study published in
that they are unprecedented, require approa-
the journal Nature in 2015, a group of resear-
ches that are more flexible and capable of adap-
chers warned precisely about the possibility of
ting better to the threat as it evolves. Planning
a new virus of the type “Coronavirus” escaping
for current crises requires building a response
from bats and contaminating humans (ME-
network whose focus is on capacity building
NACHERY, et al, 2015). Yet - although we do
rather than scenario planning. Multiple agen-
recognise the technical difficulties of early war-
54 • Conjuntura Internacional • Belo Horizonte, ISSN 1809-6182, v.17 n.3, p.47 - 61, dez. 2020
ning in biological threats - despite all the risk
trates the clear - more-than-ever - entanglement
assessments and the various methods that cou-
between politics and crisis management.
ntries and organisations had at their disposal
Tis entanglement aggravates yet another
to identify threats, there was no early warning.
problem of the initial response to new crises.
Tis brings us back to an already mentio-
Traditionally, at the beginning of the crisis,
ned interesting aspect of new crises. In addition
those involved in its management construct
to studies in the field of medicine and virology,
what is termed the ‘operational picture’. In
some researchers in the field of social sciences
traditional crises, the operational picture is de-
have already identified the destructive potential
signed through an accurate monitoring of the
of a global Pandemic. In his article on existential
development of the crisis. In other words, the
security submitted in September 2019, Nathan
authorities identify the dimension of the pro-
Sears (2020) pointed out that pandemics are
blem, estimate its reach and impact, predict
one of the main “catastrophic” threats to hu-
how it can evolve and plan the authorities’ res-
manity (SEARS, 2020). In the risk assessment
ponsibilities in the response process (OECD,
document published by the American agency
2013). Nonetheless, because new crises are
FEMA (Federal Emergency Management Agen-
unprecedented or have discreet effects, they
cy) in 2019, the possibility of a global pandemic
may not present a clear operational picture.
was identified as one of the main threats that the
Teir threats and effects are diffuse, fast and
organization was preparing for (FEMA, 2019).
unprecedented. Te authorities, thus, need
More recently, a report published by ABC News
engage in a sense-making process to first un-
revealed that the National Center for Medical
derstand what is actually happening and how
Intelligence (NCMI) had already been repor-
big the problem is (OECD, 2015). Te need
ting the possibility of a pandemic from China
for sense-making is clear in the COVID-19 cri-
since November 2019. However, the Pentagon
sis. Many authorities dealt with the pandemic
denied the claim and stated that the intelligen-
in a state of complete dearth of information.
ce service began reporting the situation only in
As the crisis evolved, questions became more
January 2020 (MARGOLIN; MEEK, 2020).
frequent and answers became scarcer and more
Tus, if intelligence agencies and researchers
imprecise. Even “simple” questions - such as:
were already aware of the risk of a global pan-
whether We should use protective masks (RO-
demic, what brought the COVID-19 crisis to
BERTS, 2020); What is the most appropriate
the level it reached? Here comes an interesting
method of social isolation? (KATZ, 2020), or;
aspect of the current scenario. Te problem was
which drugs should be used against the virus
not that of an intelligence failure, but rather
(GOODMAN; GILES, 2020)? - became pro-
that of a political botch. Te failure laid not on
blematic. Tis reaffirms the importance of both
the misidentification or wrong risk assessment.
engaging in fact-based sense-making as well as
Instead, the failure was located on the initial res-
employing a multidisciplinary networked res-
ponse phase. Political rivalries, ideological extre-
ponse combining civil society and governmen-
mism and lack of leadership negatively impacted
tal specialists to provide decision makers with
the initial response phase and were among the
the necessary tools to properly understand the
main drivers of the crisis. Hence, this demons-
crisis (OECD, 2018).
55 • Conjuntura Internacional • Belo Horizonte, ISSN 1809-6182, v.17 n.3, p.47 - 61, dez. 2020
It is important to note that there is some
networked response. Managing a large respon-
debate regarding a certain inability of scientists
se network requires sharing the responsibility
to communicate with the public. Te use of eli-
with several stakeholders ranging from the cen-
tist language combined with the almost exclusi-
tral government, passing through sub-natio-
ve use of the English in publications can create
nal units and international organisations and
barriers between scientists, the population and
reaching the private sector. Tis responsibility
the decision makers (LARIVIÈRE; SHU; SU-
network, although diverse, must be in constant
GIMOTO, 2020). Tis is an important factor.
communication and maintain a high level of
A key point for science is that the results of aca-
coordination of its actions (OECD, 2013).
demic research should be published and made
However, several of the international res-
available for scrutiny. Te results should reach
ponses to the COVID-19 crisis went exactly on
not only peer scientists but also the civil society
the opposite direction: they were centralised,
as a whole. Tus, the communication of scien-
inward-centric, and refused to cooperate with
tific research’s results should aim at adopting
different stakeholders such as other states, in-
the most simple and direct language as possible
ternational organisations and the civil society.
to effectively broadcast its finds to a broader au-
Managing a large-scale response network has
dience without losing its scientific rigour. Ho-
proven to be a major challenge for the autho-
wever, the fact that this is not always the case,
rities during the COVID-19 crisis. Examples
is not an excuse. Unscientific practices and lack
of poor coordination amongst central gover-
of coordination with specialists can seriously
nments, subnational entities, non-state actors
hamper the ability of sense-making. One stri-
and international organisations abound. Even
king example of how this can be so is the Turk-
within the context of the European Union,
menistan president, Gurbanguly Berdymukha-
many countries have given unilateral responses
medov, who came to condemn the use of the
to the crisis (JUST... 2020). In fact, this lack
word ‘Coronavirus’ and recommended the use
of coordination directly impacted the crisis in
of the smoke of medicinal herbs to supposedly
Italy, one of the most affected countries. Accor-
kill the virus (ABDURASULOV, 2020).
ding to Italian Prime Minister Giuseppe Con-
Te same can be said about crisis mana-
te, the EU project may fail if it is unable to res-
gement guidelines and protocols. In crisis ma-
pond adequately to the crisis (LOWEN, 2020).
nagement it is equally important to coordinate
It is also possible to identify a lack of
the response process and establish how it will be
coordination between the public and private
managed. To respond adequately to a crisis, go-
sectors. For example, in early March 2020 the
vernments usually construct certain operating
United States’ main companies such as Google,
standards
(standard operating procedures or
Amazon and Apple were already implementing
SOP) in advance. Tese pre-set standards have
home office working while the government
typically a hierarchical order in which units at
was questioning social isolation (ORACLE...
a lower level directly depend on guidelines and
2020). Another example of poor coordination
instructions for units at a higher level. None-
between government and the private sector
theless, the transnational, complex, diffuse and
was the attempt to make use of a wartime law
disruptive nature of modern crises requires a
to force industries to manufacture equipment
56 • Conjuntura Internacional • Belo Horizonte, ISSN 1809-6182, v.17 n.3, p.47 - 61, dez. 2020
to fight the pandemic (SIRIPURAPU, 2020).
must also transmit values to the audience and
Te lack of a cohesive cooperation between
manage anxieties. Te leadership, thus, have a
some important countries and the WHO is also
key role in this process as it must convey sin-
striking. Perhaps, the most notable example is
cerity, stability and competence in order to
the U.S. decision to cut the WHO’s funding
manage civil society’s ever-changing expecta-
on the grounds that the organisation is flawed
tions. Tis is a process called meaning-making
and lenient with China (CORONAVIRUS…
(OECD, 2015). In order to establish a succes-
2020b). Despite the fact that one can certainly
sful communication during crisis, leaders must
question WHO’s conduct during the crisis, re-
make extensive use of new communication
ducing its funding during a global pandemic is
strategies, tools and vehicles. Tis is not only
not the best way to establish a response network
because social media has a broader reach but
amongst international stakeholders. Managing
also because it is precisely in this environment
an international network depends heavily on
that the greatest amount of misinformation
cooperation between the major actors. Unfor-
is spread (OECD, 2015). Another related as-
tunately, examples such as the altercations bet-
pect enhanced by social media is the need for
ween United States and China were a common
leaders to be accountable. Leaders have to res-
feature of this crisis (FEIGENBAUM, 2020).
pond adequately to the civil society’s demands
Tese examples also point to another
and expectations related to the crisis (OECD,
key factor in crisis management: leadership.
2015). Te new communication tools allow the
Implementing an integrated and coordinated
population to promote a more intense and de-
response network requires trust and resilien-
tailed scrutiny of each measure adopted by the
ce. Leadership is essential in this process as it
authorities. Tat is why leaders must be pre-
is key to mobilise the different stakeholders
pared to answer all questions however sensitive
and communicate with civil society (OECD,
they may be. Leaders need to transmit to the
2013). To manage the population’s trust and
audience the fundamental confidence and sere-
expectations, leaders must constantly commu-
nity needed in times of crisis (OECD, 2015).
nicate with the public during the crisis. In tra-
In the COVID-19 crisis, international
ditional communication approaches, leaders
leaders made extensive use of the new media to
usually update the status of the crisis, provide
establish dialogue with civil society. In fact, the
technical information and inform about the
use of social media has been the main means of
measures being adopted (OECD, 2013). Al-
communication used by some government of-
though this communication with civil society
ficials for some time. However, during the crisis
is still very important, such an approach is not
of the new Coronavirus, social networks have
enough to deal with crises set within the new
not been a platform for building meaning-ma-
information environment (OECD, 2013). In
king. Te US Defence Department accused the
view of the characteristic uncertainties of the
Russian government of using tweets and blogs
new crises, adjusting expectations and building
to falsely accuse the United States of being
trust is essential for good leadership. To be
the creators and responsible for the new Co-
able to achieve this, the communication must
ronavirus (BROAD, 2020; RANKIN, 2020).
not only inform about the state of affairs but
Te European Union also made similar accu-
57 • Conjuntura Internacional • Belo Horizonte, ISSN 1809-6182, v.17 n.3, p.47 - 61, dez. 2020
sations. Te Russian government denied accu-
example beyond authoritarian regimes is that
sing, instead, the USA of engaging in a fake
of Hungary. Te country stands out as a young
news campaign (CORONAVIRUS... 2020c).
democracy, but it was shaken when the prime
Tis “blame-game” between great powers is
minister, Viktor Orbán, approved a bill gran-
very harmful and hardly an adequate commu-
ting power to govern without submitting de-
nication strategy in times of crisis
(OECD,
cisions to the parliament with no set deadline.
2015). Instead of using the internet to reassure
Te measure was based on the argument that
and provide answers to the population, states
the urgency of the crisis requires faster politi-
engaged in a politically motivated “semantic
cal action (HOCKENOS, 2020). Actions such
war”
(TRUMP...
2020; ROSENBERGER,
as this contribute negatively impact the trust-
2020). Likewise, there are no apparent attempt
-building between the government, its popula-
to coordinate a joint international effort to ma-
tion and the international community.
nage the crisis of the new Coronavirus.
Consequently, the scale of COVID-19 cri-
Tis leadership role was expected, in lar-
sis, combined with the environment in which
ge part, from the United States. However,
the crisis is embedded, has exposed states’ deep
the American government displayed a lack of
inability to properly respond to novel interna-
coordination even with its closest allies. Both
tional crisis. As it was described above, models
Germany and France accused Washington of
and knowledge on how to manage novel cri-
committing “modern piracy” by diverting shi-
ses are already known and have been long well
pments of protective masks that were heading
diffused by relevant organisations such as the
towards these countries (CORONAVIRUS...
OECD. However, the pandemic demonstrate
2020d; OKELLA,
2020). Te European
that most state authorities still think within the
Union also failed to display leadership even
old crisis model. Te rise of authoritarianism,
within Europe as it was unable to coordina-
the politicisation of science, the over-centrali-
te actions amongst its own members. In fact,
sation and over-specialisation of the crisis ma-
the European Commission President Ursula
nagement process as well as the misuse of mass
Von Der Leyen even apologised for not being
communication tools by the state during the
able to assist Italy properly (HERSZENHOR,
new Coronavirus pandemic demonstrate that
WHEATON, 2020; HENTLEY, 2020). Like-
we still have a long way to go to effectively deal
wise, at the beginning of the pandemic, there
with the upcoming future global crises.
was a high expectation that China would take
up the role as the main international leader du-
Conclusion: Lessons Learned
ring the crisis filling up the Western leadership
void. Nevertheless, China also failed to do so.
State responses to the crisis were by no
Finally, the new Coronavirus crisis revea-
means homogeneous. Tey were diverse en-
led that accountability is a more sensitive issue
compassing a wild range of views on science,
than expected. Several states did not react well
the role of international organisations, the ci-
to the intense scrutiny that the new informa-
vil society and about what measures should be
tional environment allowed and end up inten-
adopted. However, as mentioned above, one
sifying authoritarian measures. An interesting
common underlining aspect of most responses
58 • Conjuntura Internacional • Belo Horizonte, ISSN 1809-6182, v.17 n.3, p.47 - 61, dez. 2020
we have seen so far is that they reinforce old
between different stakeholders. It is no longer
crisis management practices that do not seem
possible to face today’s crises by centralizing res-
to be the best response to the current crisis. Te
ponses as the characteristics of the events and
COVID-19 crises require a crisis management
the environment in which they take place requi-
approach that takes into account the need of
re joint, multilevel and multisectoral actions. It
sense-making and meaning-building, the mul-
is essential that all different stakeholders coor-
tiplicity of actors and channels of communi-
dinate their preparedness and responses in or-
cation involved, the networked nature of its
der to effectively build a more resilient society.
disruptive effects as well as the diffuse and
Te design of a network that shares common
unprecedented scale and nature of the crises.
values, principles and approaches amongst its
Tus, we should take this opportunity to un-
members successfully creating collective action
derstand that the COVID-19 crisis displays
becomes increasingly important. In this sense,
signs that this is not a once-upon-a-time cri-
it is also important that these shared principles
sis. It is imperative that we re-think the current
and values are aligned with the scientific and
crisis management models in order to better
technical specialised knowledge. As described
prepare and respond to increasingly diffuse,
above, sense-making and meaning-making are
disruptive, sudden and unprecedented threats
a crucial element in the management of unique
with a more adaptable and efficient system of
crisis. Scientific and technical knowledge are
crisis management.
fundamental to obtain situational awareness in
In this process, it is important to learn
diffuse and unprecedented crisis.
from our mistakes. Tey can provide impor-
Te COVID-19 Pandemic also raises
tant lessons for the future. Te first, and pro-
question about the importance of effective
bably most important lesson is that contempo-
leadership in times of crisis. Te inability of
rary crises call for new approaches. As much as
several international leaders to communicate
similar events have occurred in the past - such
effectively combined with the constant “bla-
as past pandemics - current global crises require
me-game” - especially among the great powers
a different strategy. Tis new approach is ne-
- seriously hindered a joint international res-
cessary because the structural environment in
ponse. Of course, world leaders such as Ger-
which the crises are embedded is fundamentally
man Chancellor Angela Merkel and New Ze-
different from the past. It presents a series of
land’s Prime Minister Jacinda Arden played a
new possibilities and limitations that were not
good role as communicators during the crisis.
available before. As an example, even though
(RISING, MOULSON, 2020). However, as
social media has been available for a while, it
a whole, the pandemic clearly highlights the
did not have the same reach and impact it has
necessity for world leaders to improve their
today. Tis can clearly be seen when comparing
communication with the larger audience whi-
the role of social media during the 2009 H1N1
le, at the same time, also demonstrating that
and the 2020 New Coronavirus pandemics.
civil society also have a key role in improving
Another important lesson that can be lear-
the choices of the leaders in future crisis.
ned from the COVID-19 crisis is the impor-
Several other measures to prevent the oc-
tance of cooperation and information sharing
currence of new global pandemics on such a
59 • Conjuntura Internacional • Belo Horizonte, ISSN 1809-6182, v.17 n.3, p.47 - 61, dez. 2020
large scale have also been suggested. It is beyond
mation-health-coronavirus.html. Accessed: 15 May 2020.
the scope of this chapter to describe and dis-
BUZAN, Barry. From International to World Society?: En-
cuss all of them. However, the calls for the re-
glish School Teory and the Social Structure of Globalisa-
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out. Australia made one of the most prominent
CORONAVIRUS: Why are football teams in Belarus still
proposals for WHO reform. According to Aus-
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needs to be equipped with tools that guarantee
CORONAVIRUS: Russia denies spreading US conspiracy on
more autonomy to the international organi-
sation. In this manner, it could investigate in
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advance a potential health crisis or even propo-
2020.
CORONAVIRUS: US accused of ‘piracy’ over mask ‘confisca-
se containment strategies in lieu of state mem-
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creation of an independent auditing body that
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