John Rawls' Political Conception of Justice and the Idea of Public Reason

Abstract

The aim of this article is to focus on John Rawls’s idea of public reason as the main innovation in his political conception of justice as fairness. With this idea, the philosopher opens possibilities for his political conception of justice as fairness to ensure “reconciliation” among different comprehensive, yet mutually incompatible, reasonable doctrines. Rawls defines public reason as the way a political society formulates its plans and makes decisions according to a specific order of priority. Public reason is also the capacity that a political society has to act in this way. Thus, public reason is seen as both an intellectual and moral faculty rooted in the capacities of its citizens. We seek to develop this article by first presenting John Rawls’s view on public reason and the innovations that this concept introduces in the context of a political conception of justice. Next, we aim to identify the object and content of Rawls’s public reason, as well as its differences from non-public reason. Finally, we address how Rawls dealt with the difficulties and criticisms directed at the idea of public reason.