POR UMA ÉTICA DA LINGUAGEM: SOBRE O SUPOSTO CARÁTER SOLIPSISTA E MONOLÓGICO DA RAZÃO PRÁTICA

Abstract

The present paper aims to introduce a set of reflections that deal with the problem of lie and the duty of truth as elements that structure Kant's practical philosophy. To this end, it deals with the primacy of language as a fundamental issue of critical philosophy. It then discusses some of the main moments where this problem presents itself. Thus, in addition to a reconstruction of the general theses that constitute the transcendental part of the moral-practical doctrine, it seeks to indicate to what extent practical-synthetic a priori judgments find in the human nature their factual domain of application. Such effort will be an indirect response to the criticisms directed by Karl-Otto Apel and Jürgen Habermas against an alleged solipsistic and monological character of practical reason in order to maintain that, after all, Kant would not be only the most natural ally of these two thinkers, but that his conception of practical reason would be essentially dialogical.