UM LIBERALISMO FORTEMENTE INDIVIDUALISTA
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.5752/P.2177-6342.2023v14n28p688-712Keywords:
Liberalismo, Individualismo, Filosofia PolíticaAbstract
Este artigo oferece uma fundamentação para um lugar-comum mais assumido do que explicitamente defendido segundo o qual o liberalismo é uma abordagem fortemente individualista. Minha estratégia é defender que compromissos centrais do liberalismo são bem capturados pelo que chamo de “individualismo global”, uma espécie de enquadramento ou modelo que une duas ideias: a de que indivíduos exaurem o mundo normativo e a de que tudo que há no mundo social são indivíduos. Sugiro também que há uma harmonia interna entre os constituintes do enquadramento. No fim, se o liberalismo é capturado por um enquadramento no qual toda a normatividade é exaurida por indivíduos e só há indivíduos, o liberalismo é tão individualista quanto se pode ser.
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