The democratic deficit of regulation in the shared management mechanisms of the Brazilian National Water Resources Policy

Abstract

The main purpose of this paper is to investigate the role of river basin committees as participation mechanisms proposed by the Brazilian National Water Resources Policy, bearing in mind the democratic deficit of regulatory agencies. The research uses the example of study cases in situations of administrative conflict of interests from a vertical order, with the analytical theoretic framework proposed by Marçal Justen Filho regarding the democratic deficit of regulation. The research findings demonstrate that the external democratic deficit in water regulation is supplied by the actions of the National Water Resources Management System (SINGREH) entities, particularly by the actions of the National Water Agency and the Watershed Committees. As for the internal democratic deficit, the case study shows that, in certain situations, there may be a mismatch between the interests of the SINGREH members, which leads to a fragmentation of the river basin due to overlapping interests, when it is notorious the prevalence of democratic legitimation by the procedure.