A consciência (re)sentida

Abstract

This article proposes a reflection on the problem of consciousness in the light of phenomenology. The phenomenological approach starts from the idea that the subjective experience occurs when sensations from the interpretation of external information, coming from sense organs and processed by the brain, generate internal feelings, linked to affective states. Thus, they are understood as mental experiences of bodily states and can be influenced by memories, personal experiences, and beliefs, a fact that requires some redundancy. Questioning whether immanent consciousness contradicts the principle of parsimony and why this would occur, the article evaluates how the lucidity would be maintained and how sensory and perceptual alterations interfere in the psychopathology of consciousness construct. If consciousness needs to re-feel to be aware of itself and the other, the resentment, as the basis of psychopathology, would appear as a repetition of feelings arising from dysfunctional mental operations or the imbalance of internal and affective processes, with its redundancy preventing the oblivion and, consequently, the normal flow of life.