LA QUESTION DES SOUMISSION DES POUVOIRS D’ÉTAT DANS LE PROJET DE LOI D’APPEL D’OFFRE BRESILIEN:

un debat sur la limitation de concurrence

Abstract

This article demonstrates how public administration has changed over time. In this term, the actual model of constitutional state imposes an instrumentality on the public administration so as not to allow any constitutional directive to be distorted. As consequence, a recent discussion over the new project of public acquisition in Brazil has been raised, especially regarding an eventual limit for competitiveness as a result of the demand imposes over public suppliers for governance. The discussion is whether this obligation shall not be considered as promoting competitiveness, especially, considering the principle of neutrality foreseen in the constitutional forecast and its consequences over the public administration. To confirm this argument, this study demonstrates several models of public administration and the bases over which the actual public administration is sustained. The hypothesis raised through the dogmatic and discuss study methodology is that any demand for governance shall only be chargeable without those that are already offered by the public administration, or rather, might not be demandable beyond the assignment of the public contract. After the exposition of the main studies, the results are presented as well as the confirmation of the hypothesis raised.