A NÃO REDUÇÃO DA EPISTEMOLOGIA AS CIÊNCIAS COGNITIVAS E A QUESTÃO DO DISJUNTIVISMO

Abstract

In this pappers I address the issue of reducing epistemology to the cognitive sciences, exploring the debate between Burge and McDowell about epistemological disjunctivism. In this way, I begin by pointing out the indistinguishable thesis that states that there is a common denominator between a true perceptual experience and a misleading perceptual experience. I will show that this thesis motivates a skeptical argument. Then I present McDowell's disjunctivist position, which states that although they have a common denominator, veridical and non-veridical experiences differ in cognitive value. I show Burge's criticisms of McDowell's disjunctivism, and his thesis that the perceptual experience must be addressed by the cognitive sciences. After that, I show McDowell's response to Burge that the epistemic character of experience differs from the descriptive character of the cognitive sciences. Finally, I say why epistemology cannot be reduced to epistemology.