THE OUROBOROS BETWEEN LAW AND MORALS IN LON L. FULLER'S LEGAL THEORY

Abstract

This article examines Lon L. Fuller's theory on the connection between morality and law, focusing on his contribution to the understanding of legal legitimacy. Fuller proposes an approach in which the validity of legal norms is based on specific internal principles and, based on a critical analysis of legal positivism and traditional jusnaturalism, argues that the internal morality of Law does not depend on external value judgments, but rather on procedural criteria that guarantee the integrity and effectiveness of the legal system. However, the adaptive limitations of this approach are discussed, through hypothetical-deductive reasoning, given the contemporary complexities of legal practices, especially in relation to the practicable application of laws and the need for flexibility in the face of new interpretative contexts. The research is bibliographic and adopts a theoretical-dogmatic approach, using materials such as articles and academic books. It is concluded that, although Fuller's theory offers a solid theoretical basis, further developments are needed to reconcile its internal morality with the practical demands of a diverse and dynamic legal world.