Sovereign debt crisis: approaches around contemporary discussion of restructuring mechanisms
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.5752/P.2317-773X.2019v7n1p7-24Keywords:
Sovereign debt crisis, Restructuring mechanisms, New international financial architectureAbstract
As a consequence of the political-structural changes brought about by globalization, sovereign debt crises became more frequent, affecting a greater number of actors and turning increasingly difficult to manage. Numerous were the proposals that were made in recent decades to address this problem. Despite the plurality of projects and perspectives, the deliberations on the subject were restricted to the confrontation of two perspectives: on the one hand, the "statutory" proposal designed and fostered originally by the International Monetary Fund (IMF); on the other hand, the "contractual" one. The reluctance of the United States and key actors of the international financial system to the statutory proposalled to virtual closure of the debate in favor of the contractualist approach. However, the succession of sovereign debt crises experienced since then and the setbacks of Argentina in the claims filed by the holdouts resurfaced the debate, prompting institutional reformulations.This article aims to analyze the state of the contemporary debate on the mechanisms of sovereign debt restructuring. In so doing, the article revisits the contributions of the liberal institutionalism regarding the disputes on the levels of delegation subjacentin any process of legalization in the international scenario.It is understood that the approach to these discussions is capital considering the exponential growth of the level of States´ indebtedness -of the so-called "emerging" ones, in particular-during recent years.
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