When do business groups embrace outside lobbying in trade policy? The case of the CPTPP in Chile.
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.5752/P.2317-773X.2023v11n2p7-23Keywords:
Outside lobbying, Business groups, Trade policy, CPTPPAbstract
Literature shows that business interest groups have fewer incentives to embrace outside lobbying in trade policy. This article proposes an alternative explanation. As we discuss, special economic interests are more likely to adopt a specific subtype of outside lobbying (press, media appearances and op-eds) when policymakers are not responsible to them, and their long-term interests associated with a model of open trade are potentially threatened. We test our argument with the case of Chile and the long debate around the CPTPP ratification process. Our results support the hypothesis: businesses have a greater probability of media appearances, publishing op-eds and the like in comparison to other lobbies, such as labor and single-issue groups against the treaty. However, the effect is conditional to salience: the subtype of outside lobbying from business groups is more likely to be observed as the distance to the social outbursts of October 2019 increases.
Downloads
References
ANINAT, C, LONDREGAN, J, NAVIA, P; VIAL, J. Political institutions, policymaking processes, and policy outcomes in Chile. Washington, DC: Inter-American Development Bank, 2006
BAEZA FREER, J., LÓPEZ VARAS, M. El Congreso Nacional de Chile y el proceso de ratificación del Tratado de Libre Comercio con los Estados Unidos de América. Estudios Internacionales 47(182), P. 37-55, 2015.
BENZECRY, G. Power to the People?: Lobbying for Labor Rights in Brazil's National Constituent Assembly. The Independent Review 27(4), p. 571-593, 2023.
BEYERS, J. Voice and access: Political practices of European interest associations. European Union Politics, 5(2), p. 211-240, 2004.
BINDERKRANTZ, A. Interest group strategies: Navigating between privileged access and strategies of pressure. Political Studies 53(4), p. 694-715, 2005.
BINDERKRANTZ, A. Different groups, different strategies: How interest groups pursue their political ambitions. Scandinavian Political Studies 31(2), p. 173-200, 2008.
BOEHMKE, FREDERICK J. Going outside is easier than getting in: the effect of direct democracy on interest group lobbying strategies. Annual Meeting of the Western Political Science Association. Las Vegas, NV. 2001.
BOMBARDINI, M. AND TREBBI, F. (2012) Competition and Political Organization: Together or Alone in Lobbying for Trade Policy? Journal of International Economics 87(1), p. 18–26, 2012.
BULL, B. Policy networks and business participation in free trade negotiations in Chile. Journal of Latin American Studies 40(2), P. 195-224, 2008.
DE BRUYCKER, ISKANDER, BEYERS, J. Lobbying strategies and success: Inside and outside lobbying in European Union legislative politics. European Political Science Review 11(1), p. 57-74, 2019.
DE WILDE, P. No polity for old politics? A framework for analyzing the politicization of European integration. Journal of European Integration 33(5), p. 559-575, 2011.
DÜR, A; MATEO, G. Lobbying in the face of politicisation: interest group strategies in trade policy. Journal of European Public Policy, P. 1-27, 2023.
DÜR, A; MATEO, G. Public opinion and interest group influence: how citizen groups derailed the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement. Journal of European Public Policy 21(8), P. 1199-1217, 2014.
DÜR, A; MATEO, G. Gaining access or going public? Interest group strategies in five European countries. European Journal of Political Research 52(5), p. 660-686, 2013.
ELIASSON, L.H; GARCIA-DURAN HUET, P. TTIP negotiations: Interest groups, anti-TTIP civil society campaigns and public opinion. Journal of Transatlantic Studies 16(2), p. 101-116, 2016.
FERMANDOIS, J; HENRÍQUEZ, M.J ¿Contradicción o díada? Política exterior de Chile ante el Mercosur. Estudios Internacionales, p. 55-77.
GHEYLE, N; DE VILLE, F. Outside lobbying and the politicization of the transatlantic trade and investment partnership. Lobbying in the European Union: Strategies, dynamics and trends, P. 339-354, 2019.
HANEGRAAFF, M; POLETTI, A; VAN OMMEREN, E. Firms and Trade Policy Lobbying in the European Union. JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies, 2023.
HOEKMAN, BERNARD M., AADITYA MATTOO, AND PHILIP ENGLISH, eds. Development, trade, and the WTO: a handbook. Vol. 1. World Bank Publications, 2002.
KASTNER, L. Business lobbying under salience–financial industry mobilization against the European financial transaction tax. Journal of European Public Policy 25(11), p. 1648-1666, 2018.
KOLLMAN, K. Outside lobbying: Public opinion and interest group strategies. Princeton University Press, 1998.
NICOLL VICTOR, J. Strategic lobbying: Demonstrating how legislative context affects interest groups' lobbying tactics. American Politics Research 35(6), p. 826-845, 2007.
MAHONEY, C; DESCHOWER, D. The role of interest groups in fostering citizen engagement: The determinants of outside lobbying. Politics Beyond the State: Actors and Policies in Complex Institutional Settings, P. 109-138, 2007.
MAHONEY, C. Lobbying success in the United States and the European Union. Journal of Public Policy 27(1), p. 35-56, 2007.
TRESCH, A; FISCHER, M. In search of political influence: Outside lobbying behaviour and media coverage of social movements, interest groups and political parties in six Western European countries. International Political Science Review 36(4), p. 355-372, 2015.
TRAPP, N. L; LAURSEN, B. Inside out: interest groups’‘outside’media work as a means to manage ‘inside’lobbying efforts and relationships with politicians. Interest Groups & Advocacy 6, p. 143-160, 2017.
VALLEJO VERA, S. "By invitation only: on why do politicians bring interest groups into committees." The Journal of Legislative Studies 29(1), p. 1-38, 2023.
WALKER, E. Grassroots mobilization and outside lobbying." New Directions in Interest Group Politics. Routledge, p. 44-59, 2013.
Published
How to Cite
Issue
Section
License
Authors who publish with this journal agree to the following terms:
a.Authors retain copyright and grant the journal right of first publication with the work simultaneously licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution License that allows others to share the work with an acknowledgement of the work's authorship and initial publication in this journal
b.Authors are able to enter into separate, additional contractual arrangements for the non-exclusive distribution of the journal's published version of the work (e.g., post it to an institutional repository or publish it in a book), with an acknowledgement of its initial publication in this journal.
c.Authors are permitted and encouraged to post their work online (e.g., in institutional repositories or on their website) prior to and during the submission process, as it can lead to productive exchanges, as well as earlier and greater citation of published work (See The Effect of Open Access).
